Fighting symptoms or investing in causes?

Recognizing and responding to signals of radicalisation using local networks

Master thesis Public Administration

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Abstract

This research aims to provide insight into the signals indicative of radicalisation that are currently perceived by key actors in the municipality of Hengelo. A literature study with a multi-disciplinary scope was performed in order to come up with a model that incorporates several factors from the literature that are thought to contribute to an individual's radicalisation process. The model can be used to assess whether an individual is at an increased risk of radicalising. In-depth qualitative interviews were subsequently conducted with 11 key actors that deal with radicalisation in their daily work. Actors from four categories were interviewed: government professionals, school staff, frontline professionals and civil society actors. Additionally, the safety advisor to the mayor in Arnhem was interviewed to compare the results of this study. It turned out that there was substantial agreement on the factors that were included in the model, which, after revision, includes ten components: the social environment, personality issues, a violent interpretation of the faith, a need for excitement, identity issues, feelings of alienation, grievances and moral outrage, social polarisation, relative deprivation and discrimination, and perceived illegitimacy of authorities. When this model was applied to the situation in Hengelo, it turned out that most factors were barely present in Hengelo. However, some interviewees mentioned that they frequently pick up signals of social polarisation and feelings of discrimination. It can be concluded that the threat level in Hengelo is relatively low. Furthermore, although all factors in the model were recognized by at least some interviewees, it was striking that not all factors were recognized by all interviewees, i.e. that each actor has a different perception of the factors that contribute to radicalisation. Most actors are fairly positive about their own ability to pick up signals, there are however considerable challenges in both picking up and responding to these signals. An advice was given regarding the development of a network. The current network, that is used to discuss suspected individuals, can be complemented with a network that includes more actors and has somewhat different goals: sharing knowledge and designing interventions that are not limited to individual cases. Also, contacts between actors from all parts of society that deal with radicalisation can be brought together so that information sharing becomes possible.

Key words: early warning system, extremism, jihadism, local governance, radicalisation

Dutch summary

Radicalisering is sinds enkele jaren, met name sinds de opkomst van de Islamitische Staat, een prioriteit in het nationale en internationale veiligheidsbeleid. Het gevaar van radicaliserende burgers die zich aangetrokken voelen tot het internationale gewelddadige Jihadisme is in recente jaren meermaals aangetoond, met als tragisch dieptepunt de aanslag op de redactie van het tijdschrift Charlie Hebdo, in januari 2015 in Parijs. Ook in Nederland staat dit probleem hoog op de agenda. Er wordt voornamelijk gevreesd dat terugkerende Jihadisten uit Syrië op Nederlandse bodem een aanslag willen plegen. Gemeenten staan voor een grote uitdaging. Als het overheidslichaam dat het dichtst bij de burger staat, is de gemeente belast met het monitoren van en reageren op signalen van radicaliserende burgers. De gemeente Hengelo werd in december 2014 geconfronteerd met signalen van een radicaliserende burger. Naar aanleiding hiervan is onderzocht welke signalen van radicalisering in Hengelo worden waargenomen en hoe de gemeente Hengelo hier het best op kan reageren. Daarbij is aandacht besteed aan de factoren die volgens de wetenschappelijke literatuur bijdragen aan radicalisering, de mate waarin deze factoren onderschreven worden door sleutelfiguren en de mate waarin deze factoren in Hengelo waargenomen worden. Verder is een inschatting gemaakt van de capaciteit van sleutelfiguren om signalen waar te nemen, en is een advies gegeven aan de gemeente met betrekking tot het opzetten van een netwerk rond het onderwerp.

Theorie

Ten eerste is een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd naar de factoren die bijdragen aan radicalisering. Hierbij is een multidisciplinaire aanpak gehanteerd, waarbij theorieën uit de klinische psychologie, sociale psychologie, sociologie en politicologie zijn gebruikt. Deze literatuurstudie heeft geresulteerd in een model waarmee bepaald kan worden of een individu een verhoogd risico heeft om te radicaliseren.

Methodologie

Om het model te testen werden kwalitatieve interviews gehouden met 11 sleutelfiguren die zich in hun dagelijks werk bezig houden met radicalisering. De geïnterviewden bestonden uit zowel overheidsmedewerkers als mensen werkzaam in de private sector. De geïnterviewden vertegenwoordigden tien organisaties: de nationale politie, het middelbaar- en beroepsonderwijs, de lokale religieuze gemeenschap, een sportvereniging, verslavingszorg, een organisatie voor jongerenwerk, het Openbaar Ministerie, de gemeente Hengelo en de gemeente Arnhem. Dit laatste interview had als doel om de bevindingen uit dit onderzoek te spiegelen aan een gemeente waar het probleem van radicalisering van grotere omvang is.

Resultaten

Uit de interviews bleek dat er een vrij hoge mate van consensus was over de factoren die in het model waren opgenomen. Hoewel alle factoren in het model werden erkend door meerdere actoren, werden niet alle factoren erkend door alle geïnterviewden. Met andere woorden, de perceptie van de factoren die belangrijk zijn in het radicaliseringsproces verschilt van persoon tot persoon. De interviews hebben geleid tot een aangescherpte versie van het model, dat hieronder is weergegeven. Het model bestaat uit een tiental factoren. Ten eerste de sociale omgeving, die kan bestaan uit familie, ouders, vrienden en partners die het proces van radicalisering kunnen versnellen of remmen. Ook rolmodellen kunnen bijdragen aan het

radicaliseringsproces. Ten tweede kan persoonlijkheidsproblematiek zoals een antisociale persoonlijkheidsstoornis individuen vatbaarder maken voor radicalisering. Ten derde draagt een gewelddadige interpretatie van de Islam bij aan radicalisering, evenals een persoonlijke behoefte aan spanning en opwinding. Andere factoren die bijdragen zijn identiteitsproblemen, zoals conflicterende waarden bij een dubbele nationaliteit, en een gevoel van ontvreemding van de directe omgeving of van de samenleving als geheel. Morele verontwaardiging over bijvoorbeeld buitenlands beleid van Westerse landen kan radicalisering eveneens aanwakkeren, net als sociale polarisatie, het ervaren van deprivatie en discriminatie, en de opvatting dat autoriteiten niet legitiem zijn.

De interviews waren waardevol voor het in kaart brengen van de situatie in Hengelo. Het bleek dat de factoren die in het model zijn opgenomen nauwelijks worden waargenomen in Hengelo. Een uitzondering hierop zijn de factoren sociale polarisatie en relatieve deprivatie/discriminatie. De meeste geïnterviewden waren het erover eens dat deze factoren wel degelijk aanwezig zijn in Hengelo. Er kan geconcludeerd worden dat het dreigingsniveau in Hengelo betrekkelijk laag is. De sleutelfiguren waren positief over hun eigen vermogen om signalen van radicalisering waar te nemen. Er moet echter geconcludeerd worden dat er aanzienlijke uitdagingen zijn in zowel het opvangen als reageren op signalen van radicalisering. Ook moet worden opgemerkt dat het model weliswaar een sterke verklarende waarde heeft, maar dat het maken van voorspellingen op basis van een model moeilijk is.



Advies

Er is een advies uitgebracht ten aanzien van het opstellen van een lokaal netwerk rond radicalisering. Het huidige netwerk, het casusoverleg kan worden aangevuld worden met een netwerk waarin meer actoren, met name ook maatschappelijke partners van de gemeente, plaats nemen. Dit netwerk zou zich niet uitsluitend moeten richten op het bespreken van individuele gevallen, maar zou in bredere zin kennis kunnen delen en interventies gericht op maatschappelijke problematiek kunnen ontwerpen. Daarbij worden de strafrechtelijke aanpak en de aanpak gericht op integratie samengevoegd en worden niet alleen symptomen bestreden, maar wordt ook geïnvesteerd in oorzaken van radicalisering. Hierbij kunnen lessen getrokken worden uit de ervaringen van andere gemeenten zoals Arnhem, Utrecht en Amsterdam. Hoewel de dreiging in Hengelo op dit moment laag is, zorgt het zorgvuldig organiseren van een netwerk ervoor dat adequaat gereageerd kan worden in tijden van crisis.

Preface

Before you lies the result of a process that started in January 2014, when I first had contact with the municipality of Hengelo. At the time, signals of a radicalizing citizen were perceived and I was asked to investigate the problem of radicalisation in a local context. Radicalisation turned out to be a topic that is as challenging as it is interesting. Contrary to what the popular media sometimes suggest, I found out that there is no generic profile of radicalized people, no generic profile of the groups they are involved in and no generic approach for countering radicalisation. This means that researchers, policy makers and policy practitioners need to constantly adapt to changing circumstances, in close interaction with each other. I think I could not have chosen a more timely and interesting topic for my thesis and hope that the results of my research can be of benefit to the municipality.

Several people have made a major contribution to my thesis. First of all, I want to thank Jeroen Cozijnsen from the municipality of Hengelo for his valuable feedback that enabled me to link theory to practice, and for his effort in organizing the interviews. Second, I want to thank Guus Meershoek and René Torenvlied, supervisors from the University of Twente, for their feedback. I interviewed 11 persons for this thesis, without whom this thesis could never have been what it is now. I want to thank them for their open-heartedness and I hope this thesis does justice to their devotion. Last but not least, I am grateful to Janine for her unconditional support and valuable feedback.

Jurriaan van Wakeren
Enschede/Hengelo, October 2015

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1. Introduction

This chapter will serve as an introduction to this thesis. First, some background will be provided on the subject. Then, the research questions will be described followed by a paragraph on the relevance of this study.

1.1 Background and context

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 in New York and Washington marked the start of the global *War on Terror*. Only weeks later, an international coalition led by the United States invaded Afghanistan and started operations in a number of other countries. However, it soon became clear that the war on terror could not be confined to countries in the Middle East or Asia. In 2004 and 2005, with the bombings in Madrid and London, Europe received a violent wake-up call that terrorism was not something that developed in a faraway country, but that its own citizens were able to become terrorists and kill innocent civilians in the name of the global Jihad. The Netherlands too were not spared, as in November 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered by a radicalised Muslim in Amsterdam. These events forced governments to reconsider existing counterterrorism policies. Radicalisation prevention developed as a new policy area and policy making shifted from a focus on external to internal security to deal with a threat that was increasingly cast as emanating from "home-grown" and "self-radicalising" individuals. Concern was directed toward issues of integration of Muslim minorities in particular and policy focussed on both security and integration measures (Bossong, 2014).

In recent years, the global Jihad was able to experience a revival as a result of the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its predecessors, Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and Al-Nusra entered the power vacuums that came into existence after the US-led invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war. After disagreement between the groups broke out, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was formed and on June 29, 2014, the group changed its name to Islamic State (IS) and declared a caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria. The movement thereby came into a unique position in that it was both a terrorist group and a state with a government, be it without international recognition. The fact that it is not hard to reach Syria from Europe and the group's propaganda efforts resulted in an enormous influx from foreign fighters: in 2013, Syria broke the dubious record of hosting the most foreign fighters in a conflict with over 5,000 Jihadists that came from Europe, the United States and the rest of the world (Foreign Policy, 2013). The Dutch government, too, has seen citizens travel to Syria to take up arms in the name of the Islamic State. Although the exact number of Jihadists that left the country is unknown, the estimate as of June 2015 is 200 (AIVD, 2015). Citizens travelling to Syria are seen as an important threat by the Dutch intelligence service as there is a risk that they commit a terrorist attack on Dutch soil when coming back. The reality of this fear was demonstrated by the tragic attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the perpetrators of which were linked to Al Qaida in Yemen (Foreign Policy, 2015).

1.2 Research problem

Municipalities face an important challenge. As the public body that is most close to the citizens, municipalities are tasked with monitoring and responding to signals of radicalisation. In late 2014, the municipality of Hengelo started developing policy on this subject when signals of a radicalising citizen were picked up. This citizen left to join the Islamic State in March 2015. Jihadism and radicalisation are very complex phenomena and knowledge and expertise on these topics are still limited. Furthermore, a vast amount of actors are involved in recognizing

and responding to signals of radicalisation. In order to set up an early warning system that can be used to correctly pick up and respond to signals, the municipality of Hengelo wonders what signals are currently perceived by key actors in the field and to what extent these actors are capable of recognizing these signals. In order to answer this question, an analysis on the literature of radicalisation is needed which can then be used to assess the situation in Hengelo. The combined answer to these questions can then be used to formulate an advice to the municipality that can be of guidance in developing an early warning system.

1.3 Research questions

In order to be able to come up with a solution to the problem described above, the following main research question has been formulated: *What signals indicative of radicalisation are present in Hengelo and how should the municipal government respond to these signals?*

To give some structure to the answering of the main research question, four sub questions were formulated. To be able to understand and analyse the situation in Hengelo, the scientific literature was studied to answer the first sub question:
1) What factors can contribute to radicalisation and how do these translate into concrete signals?

Then, an analysis of the current situation in Hengelo will be made by studying several key actors that are involved in the process of recognizing and responding to radicalisation.
2) What possible signals of radicalisation are perceived by key actors in Hengelo?

Afterwards, the extent to which these key actors are capable of recognizing and correctly responding to these signals will be evaluated.
3) Are these key actors capable of recognizing signals of radicalisation?

Finally, after the other sub questions have been answered, an advice will be formulated that can guide the municipality in developing an early warning system.
4) How can the municipal government in Hengelo use this information to develop an adequate early warning system?

1.4 Relevance

The relevance of this research is twofold. First, from a scientific perspective, an analysis of the current situation in Hengelo can be used to provide valuable empirical feedback to the many theories and models that are currently popular among researchers of radicalisation. Also, given the focus on the perception of key actors in Hengelo, this research can shed some light on the extent to which academic knowledge is used in practice, since there has been no earlier research on how key actors in the field deal with radicalisation. Secondly, by tailoring what is known about radicalisation to the specific circumstances in Hengelo (question 1) and by analysing the current situation in Hengelo (questions 2 and 3) an advice can be given to the municipality that can provide guidance in developing policy (question 4).

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of this study will be discussed. First, several concepts that play an important role in radicalisation will be elaborated. Then, some characteristics of potential terrorists will be described, followed by a review of the literature on factors contributing to radicalisation. The chapter will end with a short conclusion, summing up the most important factors by presenting a model.

Prior to this, the scope of this research should be described. It should be noted that different scientific disciplines all have different approaches to radicalisation, thereby paying attention to different factors (Helmus, 2009). For instance, clinical psychologists will focus on individual processes while social psychologists will emphasize the role that group dynamics play. A sociological perspective will pay attention to e.g. culture while political scientists will focus on the effects of the political environment on radicalisation. Considering the multitude of possible explanatory variables, there is considerable agreement that a multidisciplinary approach is needed when trying to understand radicalisation (e.g. Helmus, 2009; Sageman, 2011; Victoroff, 2005). Therefore, in this thesis, a multidisciplinary scope will be used, using concepts and theories from various disciplines such as clinical psychology, social psychology, sociology and political science.

2.1 Key concepts

Several concepts play an important role in a study concerning radicalisation. Lindekilde (2012) first describes *extremism* as a belief system with totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, lack of tolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery and a division into 'them' and 'us'. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) further mentions a deep-felt desire for fundamental socio-political change. Lindekilde (2012) subsequently describes *radicalisation* as a process of change "in which a person gradually accepts the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised groups". The view of radicalisation as a process is shared by many other researchers (e.g. Kundnani, 2012; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Radicalisation and extremism can take place in various contexts such as animal rights extremism and right-wing extremism. This research, however, will focus on Islamic extremism. In this context, Jihadism is a central theme. In its original meaning it refers to a spiritual inner struggle (the greater Jihad) to live a good and charitable life or an outer physical (but not offensive) struggle against the enemies of the Islam (the lesser Jihad). It is nowadays used to refer to a 'holy war', a battle against the enemies of the Islam, to defend and expand the faith (Aslan, 2011).

Jihadism is a very small yet infamous branch of the Salafi movement, which is a movement within Sunnism, the largest branch of Islam. The Salafi movement has a fundamentalist approach and strives to reconstruct the original Muslim community under the rule of the Sharia, the Islamic law based on the Quran, thereby turning its back to modern and democratic societies. Members seek to emulate the life of the prophet and his earliest followers. However, Salafism is not intrinsically violent. Rather, there are three



Figure 1: Schematic simplification of branches of Islam

factions within the (global) Salafi movement that are also active in the Netherlands: first, the apolitical Salafists, also called the purists, avoid politics altogether as politics in their view is undermining the sovereignty of God. Second, there are politically involved Salafists that view democratic means as a legitimate way to reach their goals. The violent Jihadi Salafists are probably the smallest branch of Salafism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestreiding (NCTb), 2008). Salafi jihadists regard violence as a legitimate, or even the only legitimate way to clear the Islam and the entire world from negative influences and sees participation in the armed fight as a duty of all Muslims (NCTB, 2014b). It should be noted that there is fierce competition between the three groups (Buijs, 2009).

The ideological chemistry between a political interpretation of the Islam, the Salafi doctrine and an anti-western form of Jihadism lead to what is known as internationally oriented Salafist Jihadism (de Poot & Sonnenschein, 2009; Sageman, 2004). According to the Dutch intelligence services, this movement is particularly capable of executing a terrorist attack, and although there is no universally accepted definition for terrorism, a widely accepted definition suggests 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents' (Taylor, 2012). De Poot and Sonneschein (2009) bring Jihadism and terrorism together and use the term Jihadist terrorism, referring to the armed fight against the perceived enemies of the Islam, by the threat of or use of violence. Jihadism is a radical break from other movements such as Islamism, as Islamism does recognize political institutions, while Jihadists reject the Westphalian concept of the nation-state as, according to jihadists, a state does not have sufficient religious legitimacy. The regimes in the Middle East are further seen as inherited structures of a colonial past which are supported by hypocritical and corrupt Western regimes. They see the global Muslim population as a religiously suppressed and humiliated community by tyrannical regimes in both the West and the Middle East. Jihadists want to make their fellow Muslims aware of their vulnerabilities and strive to establish and maintain a caliphate, where they fully submit to Gods laws.



Figure 2: Schematic overview of concepts

It is self-explanatory that all these concepts are strongly interrelated, and one of them cannot be studied without knowledge of the wider context. This study, however, will focus on the first part of the process described above so will use radicalisation as a main concept. As Sageman (2011) notes, the only way to defend against jihadist terrorism is to understand the process of radicalisation and devise strategies to prevent it reaching the point of violence.

2.2 Characteristics of potential terrorists

In order to better understand the home-grown terrorist threat it is useful to examine the characteristics of potential terrorists, before moving on to identifying the factors that contributed to their radicalisation. Bakker (2006) studied the members of 28 jihadist networks in Europe, and his analysis is valuable in gaining better insight into jihadist terrorists. In line with popular belief, members in his sample were predominantly male and were first, second, or third generation migrants. More than half originated from Algeria or Morocco (both 64), followed by Pakistan and Lebanon. Remarkable in the context of the present study is that none

of the terrorists originated from Turkey. Further, among 72 people of whom could be gather socioeconomic data, only three persons are regarded to belong to the upper class, 30 would belong to the middle class and 39 to the lower class. Around two thirds were married or engaged, about a third had children, and about a third was single. A quarter had a criminal record, most of them for the illegal possession of firearms. The average age was 27.3, with a standard deviation of more than seven. Over 50 per cent of the sample had a full time job, with around 25 percent having a part time job and 25 percent being unemployed. Although this number is quite high, the unemployment level is similar to the unemployment level among Muslim communities as a whole in Europe. Further, Bakker notes that about half of his sample was secular during their youth, and explains this by pointing to the secular character of their host countries. Bakker contrasts his European sample with Sageman's (2004) more global sample. In Sageman's sample, most terrorists come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Also, the terrorists in his sample are predominantly middle class. They were fairly educated, with 42% being university graduates. Another important contrast is that in the European case, the term self-recruitment seems more appropriate than recruitment, as most terrorists in Europe joined after a process of radicalisation with very little outside interference. They also seemed to life regular lives. If one looks at the circumstances in which these individuals became involved in jihadi terrorist activities, a picture emerges of networks of friends or relatives that do not seem to have formal ties with global Salafi networks; that radicalise with little outside interference; and that do so in the country in which they live. Two remarks should be made regarding the characteristics mentioned above. Although the described data can be useful in gaining some insight into jihadists in a post-hoc way, the data do not imply causation. Also, the data apply to confirmed jihadists, while this research also focusses on those youngsters that are starting to radicalise but have not yet fully embraced jihadism. Therefore, these data should be interpreted with care as the generalizability to the present study can be questioned.

2.3 Factors leading to radicalisation and terrorism

There are many factors that can contribute to the process of radicalisation. It should first be noted that the literature rejects the notion of a clear terrorist profile, based on an abnormal or even sociopathic character. Potential perpetrators can be inconspicuous young men in the midst of societies (e.g. De Goede & Simon, 2013). However, there are no single factors that are on their own able to predict who will become a terrorist and who won't. Rather, it is a combination of many of these factors that makes people susceptible to radicalisation, and in the end possibly willing to adopt violence to reach their goals. It should therefore be clear that recognizing Islamic radicalisation can be very hard, and has many obstacles. For example, an orthodox but peaceful interpretation of the Islam can easily be confused with a potential terrorist threat (Dechesne & Van der Veer, 2010). Also, one of the main obstacles for early detection and intervention is a lack of knowledge among frontline social workers and police officers about the processes underlying radicalisation (Weggemans, Bakker, & Grol, 2014). The same often goes for friends and family members as almost everyone in the vicinity of the individuals that left to fight in Syria that were studied by Weggemans and colleagues (2014), were caught by surprise when they found out that these people had actually left.

Several authors have developed several models for explaining radicalisation, with notable models being Borum's (2013) Pathway, Wiktorowicz's (2004) Theory of joining extremist groups, Moghaddam's (2005) Staircase to Terrorism, the NYPD's Radicalisation Process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), and Sageman's (2011) Four Prongs. However, as King and Taylor (2011) argue

after a review of the different theoretical models, no model can be distinguished as being more accurate than any other due to a lack of verifying empirical research. As models without evidence remain speculation, they are best suited for stimulating other research and academic discussion. However, as all models do have some predictive value, this study will incorporate those factors on which there is considerable agreement and those factors that are supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is some disagreement on whether radicalisation is a somewhat fuzzy process that emerges out of a combination of factors, or that it is a linear progressive process with several distinct phases.

When looking at different factors, the first distinction that should be made is that between 'root causes' and 'proximal causes' of terrorism (Newman, 2006; Noricks, 2009). These could also be called 'macro' and 'micro' factors. Root causes are these factors that help to establish an environment in which terrorism is more likely to occur. Proximal causes are closer to the radicalisation itself and refer to an individual willingness to engage in terrorism. They can explain why particular individuals radicalise while others don't, although these factors will never be able to answer the question with certainty (Horgan, 2008). It should furthermore be noted that the distinction between root and proximal causes is not always clear, as is the distinction between factors themselves. For the sake of completeness, there might be some overlap in the factors described below.

2.3.1 Root causes

With regard to root causes of radicalisation and terrorism, the following factors are discussed in the literature:

Perceived illegitimacy of authorities

A first factor is the delegitimation of the state. When a regime is seen as illegitimate, the likelihood of political violence increases. This often occurs during a period of political or social change within the state (Noricks, 2009) or during international events such as foreign occupation (Pape, 2003). A perceived illegitimacy of authorities is also seen as important by Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos (2013). They argue that mistrust towards authorities may both lead to and be the result of radicalisation. Related to this, government repression of certain groups is another agreed upon factor that may change the character of certain groups from nonviolent to violent (Noricks, 2009). In other words, the use of state violence against mobilized groups is an important mechanism in the delegitimation of the state and can legitimize the use of violence by activists (White & della Porta, 1997).

Democracy

There is disagreement about the effects of democracy and political equality on terrorism (Noricks, 2009). One line of arguing is that democracies provide their citizens with increased opportunities to participate in society and for nonviolent solutions of conflict (e.g. Li, 2005), thereby decreasing the chances for terrorism to develop. Other authors argue that political and civil liberties give people freedom of movement and association and easy access to potential targets, thereby increasing the chances for terrorism, while government action is constrained by the rule of law (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001). According to Noricks (2009), there is however agreement on the proposition that the states with an intermediate level of political freedom are more prone to political violence, rather than states that can be classified as the most free or the most authoritarian as political violence needs some freedom to operate while total repression may effectively inhibit dissent. Also, violence erupts mostly immediately after

democratic governance is instated, in particular when states also go through a process of market liberalization (Chua, 2002).

Modernization
Processes of modernization in a society can result in turbulence and social instability (Noricks, 2009). Further, modernization may ultimately weaken the perceived legitimacy of the state as it undergoes rapid changes. On an individual level, modernization can be associated with job loss and weakened family and community ties (Noricks, 2009) which may result in alienation or anomie (Merton, 1938). These factors may contribute to an environment in which radicalisation is more likely to prosper.

Population growth
Population growth can contribute to radicalisation or terrorism especially when there is a youth bulge (Urdal, 2006). Population growth influences the way in which the state can provide services which may lead to perceived state weakness or illegitimacy. It may also lead to social stress and pressures for change.

Economics
According to Noricks (2009), there is agreement that poverty is not predictive of terrorism. Noricks argues there is a U-shaped relation regarding the relation of subsistence and education on political violence, arguing that citizens rebel when their political, social or economic expectations are not met. People in the lower end will be too busy trying to survive while people in the higher end will be satisfied with their lives. Those people in the middle of the 'U' have the highest number of unmet expectations. Related to this, income inequality, rather than merely low income, is said to increase the chances of violence (Sageman, 2011; Wayne Nafziger & Auvinen, 2002).

Human Insecurity
Noricks (2009) argues that low levels of civil liberties, high levels of crime, low levels of education and health care and a lack of subsistence rights may contribute to a breeding ground for terrorism. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) state that poor political rights and poor human rights conditions contribute to terrorism, as do Feldmann and Perala (2004).

Grievances or moral outrage
There is general agreement that political violence is driven in part by some sort of grievance (Noricks, 2009). Humiliation is one of the most cited grievances, followed by a sense of revenge, despair, alienation and impotence (Newman, 2006; Noricks, 2009) or the death of a family member (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006). Foreign policy can also be a source of grievances, such as the U.S. interventions in the middle east (Noricks, 2009). Sageman (2011) agrees and sees a sense of moral outrage as a starting point for radicalisation, and just as Noricks argues that the U.S. invasion of Iraq is an important source of outrage for some Muslims which leads to the Jihadists' perception that the West is waging a global war against the Islam. He also states that many terrorists refer to the suffering of fellow Muslims, and argues that vicarious suffering is an important factor – many Jihadists act or claim to act on behalf of their poor and humiliated brethren. De Poot and Sonneschein (2009) furthermore mention a perceived world-wide injustice against Muslims, or a perceived injustice in the existing social system. More recent foreign interventions are also said to have an influence on

preparedness to join the jihad, such as the coalition attacks on ISIS, but also domestic anti-terrorism measures can be framed as an offensive against the Islam (NCTb, 2008; 2015). The processes can be explained by social psychological theories such as the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which states that individuals derive part of their personal identity from their group membership. An attack on an in-group member (a fellow Muslim) by an out-group member (e.g. an American) can thus easily be framed as an attack on the group as a whole and its individual members.

Relative deprivation and discrimination

Closely related to grievances, relative deprivation is an often cited factor in the terrorism literature (e.g. Borum, 2013; Helmus, 2009; Moghaddam, 2005; Noricks, 2009; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). It can partly find its foundation in the sociological strain theory (Agnew, 1992). A feeling of relative deprivation arises when people assess their own conditions as being undesirable, compare this condition to other groups and decide that their group's disadvantage is an injustice. Weggemans and colleagues (2014) mention that people close to Jihadists that went to Syria observed frustrations about their own societal position or that of their ethnic groups. A crucial point regarding this factor is that deprivation is not absolute but relative; it is the perception that matters, since, as has been discussed, many terrorists come from a middle-class background. Therefore, when researching relative deprivation in this context, it is probably better to examine subjective psychological conditions rather than socioeconomic status. Closely related to this are feelings of discrimination, which refers not so much to a personal evaluation but more to the general group to which one belongs. Perceived social, economic, and political discrimination can play a critical role in the radicalisation process (Dechesne & Van der Veer, 2010; Helmus, 2009). Muslims in Europe may suffer from negative attitudes towards their religion or experience verbal or physical attacks (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2005), or suffer from political underrepresentation or poor education. This may lead to grievances or alienation. However, as long as discrimination is not absolute, it can be argued that those who are perceived to be treated fairly help maintain the idea that there is justice and equality in the social system (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

2.3.2 Proximal causes

With regard to root causes of radicalisation and terrorism, the following factors are discussed in the literature:

Religion

Religion plays a somewhat peculiar role in the radicalisation process. Although radical Salafi ideology provides the overarching inspiration for radicalisation and subsequent attacks (Helmus, 2009), Juergensmeyer (2001) argues that religion can provide the ideology, motivation and structure for violence, but generally does not lead to violence by itself. For religion to lead to violence, it should be combined with movements for political or social change. Meah and Mellis (2008) support this claim and argue that radicalisation is not possible with only a religious dimension, the political dimension plays an equally important role in the process. In most of the cases of Bakker's (2006) sample, faith increased in the months before recruitment. Helmus (2009) also states that Islamic extremists increasingly identify with their Muslim heritage or their Muslim community, thereby becoming increasingly receptive to any perceived attack on their heritage or community (see the elaboration on Social Identity Theory

above). Silke (2008) agrees with this. However, strong knowledge of the faith may also protect against violent radicalisation. Sageman (2011) states that many terrorists don't have a large amount of religious knowledge, which is just what makes them susceptible to a violent and radical interpretation of the Islam as someone with a thorough knowledge of the peaceful principles of the Islam would prove more resilient to radicalisation. King and Taylor (2011) also point to a lack of religious literacy, arguing that the trendy and adventurous dimensions of the jihad are better explanations. In a report on Jihadism by the Dutch NCTV (2014b), a similar statement is made: religious zeal, in the form of a preparedness to fight and die for the Islam, is more important than religious knowledge and education, thereby giving people a 'shortcut' in becoming 'good' Muslims. Interestingly, Bakker (2006) argues that many Islamist terrorists grew up in secular environments and were not brainwashed into terrorisms by their family or culture, which is confirmed by Sageman (2011). Finally, religion can play a role in detecting radicalisation, as in the samples studied by Bakker (2006) and Weggemans and colleagues (2014) an increased interest in religion manifested itself in the visiting of (more orthodox) Mosques, changing eating habits, entering into religious debates, participating in courses on the Quran, trying to convert peers, and visiting certain extremist websites and forums.

The social environment

According to many authors, the social environment plays a critical role in the radicalisation process (e.g. Helmus, 2009; Noricks, 2009; Sageman, 2011; Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). This can be explained by social psychological theories which state that individuals both want to belong to a group and be unique, and membership of Jihadist groups can meet both these needs. Sageman even argues that social bonds come before ideological commitment and he sees the embedding of theological radicalism within a group dynamic as the root cause of radicalisation. As an example, he notes that Muslims that study abroad in Europe might feel homesick and alienated in their host communities, and therefore form groups with peers they meet at mosques. When contact intensifies, cliques may form which further disconnect from the rest of the community, leaving them open for radicalisation. Hegghammer (2006), too, found in his analysis that friends and family were very important in motivating potential Saudi Arabian terrorists to enter Afghan training camps, arguing that group dynamics such as peer pressure and affection within the group were crucial. Bakker (2006), studying European terror networks, also identifies friends and family as an important potential aid to radicalisation, as twenty percent of his sample was related to terrorist organizations through kinship and almost as large a share through friendship. Radical socialization can also occur in prisons (de Poot & Sonnenschein, 2009; Helmus, 2009) and a sense of approval by e.g. friends and family members (Horgan, 2008) or a partner (De Graaf, 2012) can further catalyse radicalisation. The internet is a part of the social environment that deserves special attention, as several authors point to the importance of its role in the radicalisation process (e.g. Hegghammer, 2006; Sageman, 2011). Helmus (2009, p. 80) states that "Web-based technologies (…) increasingly create an environment where groups of like-minded individuals can interact and develop mutually supportive relationships. The internet may thus act as a meeting ground and social milieu no less than a mosque or prison setting". In a report by the Dutch NCTb (2006), the internet is also recognized as an important platform for radicalisation, by facilitating recruitment, providing information and the spreading of propaganda. It is regarded less probable that Jihadists use the internet to conduct attacks, either on the internet itself or on regular targets (cyberterrorism).

Part of the social environment are those persons who carry an ideological or militant frame of reference based on experiences in the Islamic world. These persons can function as role models and were crucial to the formation or continuation of all jihadist groups studied by de Poot and Sonneschein (2009, p. 169). These persons serve as role models and are able to sell a coherent story and have specific qualities, contacts and experiences beneficial to their credibility and social status. The interaction between these role models and Muslims that were educated locally, illegal foreigners and converts is supposed to give a boost to the radicalisation process. This assumption is supported by several authors (Horgan, 2008; Sageman, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Alienation

Alienation is another factor that is mentioned by several authors. A perceived distance to others and a feeling of being disconnected from society are for example mentioned by Sageman (2011), Doosje et al. (2013) and Weggemans et al. (2014), who mention that the subjects, during the radicalisation process, increasingly isolated themselves from society. Also, feelings of apathy and a lack of meaningfulness in their lives were found. This alienation may result from feelings of social, economic, and political discrimination (Helmus, 2009).

Perceived rewards

Seen from a rational-choice perspective, which posits that individuals choose the best course of action depending on preferences and incentives, it seems likely that perceived rewards play an important role in terrorist participation. Perceived rewards can be of a religious (striving to fulfil a divine mandate, establish a caliphate or to become a martyr (Hegghammer, 2006, 2013)), social (increasing one's status or developing friendships (de Poot & Sonnenschein, 2009)), and financial kind. Also, excitement can be seen as a reward (Helmus, 2009) as life as a terrorist can be exciting, dangerous and full of risks which is attractive to young males in particular (Silke, 2008).

Identity issues

Many authors regard some form of identity crisis as a crucial step in the radicalisation process (e.g. Sageman, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Dissatisfaction with old answers may leave people longing for new answers and belief systems (Choudhury, 2007). The search for an identity and a purpose in life leave youth susceptible to radicalisation, with youth seeing joining the global jihad as an attractive destiny, thereby increasing a positive self-image (de Poot & Sonnenschein, 2009; Dechesne & Van der Veer, 2010). This also leaves former criminals or drug addicts susceptible to radicalisation, as they may try to give their live a new direction by joining the jihad (Bakker, 2006; Dechesne & Van der Veer, 2010).

Personality issues

The conventional wisdom is that terrorists can in general not be characterized by personality disorders or mental illness (Sageman, 2011; Silke, 2008). This view has been defended by prominent researchers such as Sageman (2011), who states that group dynamics play a far more important role than mental traits. However, research conducted by Bakker (2006) shows that in his sample, around five percent suffered from mental illness, which is significantly higher than the base rate in Europe of around one per cent. Furthermore, recent research conducted by Weenink (2015) suggests that individuals with histories of behavioural problems and disorders are overrepresented in the sample of 140 people who are considered to have

travelled from the Netherlands to Syria. In the sample, 46% displayed problem behaviour and 6% were diagnosed with mental health problems. Weenink (2015) thus suggests to complement the common social-psychological approaches in terrorism research with a focus on individual psychology.

2.4 Cognitive opening

Some authors mention the necessity of a cognitive opening, in order to fully embrace the Jihadist body of thought (Helmus, 2009; Meah & Mellis, 2008). This cognitive openings brings together several factors and enables people to entertain views that were previously considered extreme. This opening can be prompted in two ways: socialization can gradually open an individual's minds to a radical message, or a crisis can shake certainty in previously accepted beliefs, rendering the individual more receptive to alternative views and perspectives (Wiktotwicz, 2004).

2.5 Typologies of jihadists

The factors described above can lead to four categories of jihadists, according to De Poot and Sonneschein (2009): First, illegal immigrants, motivated by their need for basic life necessities. Second, former or current addicts and people with a criminal record, giving their life a new direction with jihadism. Third, people with existential or identity questions, joining to find meaning in life, social ties and a positive self-image, and lastly there are idealists and political activists, motivated by social discontent. Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje (2015) identify similar categories: the identity seekers, the justice seekers, those that seek meaningfulness and sensation seekers.

2.6 Explaining versus manipulating

With respect to the variables discussed above, one important remark needs to be made. Ellemers (1976) makes a distinction between variables that have strong explanatory value and variables that can be manipulated. The former may powerfully and causally explain why certain phenomena exist but it can very well be that these variables are hard to manipulate, leaving them unsuitable for policy development. He calls this the dilemma of being able to explain a lot or being able to change something. This dilemma also applies to the process of radicalisation as several factors that are incorporated in the model that has been developed in this chapter may causally explain why someone is at an increased risk for radicalisation but leave little starting points for the development of policy. In other words, as Mootz (2006, p. 33) has put it: "insight into relations, even when they are causal, does not automatically lead to the development of policy as the bridge from knowledge to practice is complex. It is not the knowledge of loose signals and indicators that lead to good policy, but the ability to meaningfully link practice, research and policy". Therefore, the rest of this research will focus on investigating and developing that bridge, by studying how indicators of radicalisation are used and perceived in practice.

2.7 Conclusion

After a review of the literature, it can be said that there is a large number of factors of which it is likely that they contribute to Islamic radicalisation. Regarding the root causes, a perceived illegitimacy of authorities, grievances or anxieties and relative deprivation are factors that are supported by many authors. There is less clarity on factors such as democracy or education. Regarding the proximal causes, the social environment including the presence of role models is a critical factor, as are alienation and issues related to identity. Other factors may be a perception of rewards and a desire to change the current situation. The factors that are discussed are incorporated in the model below. It can however be expected that the broad contextual factors have little value in analysing the situation in Hengelo. Therefore, the interviews will focus on the factors that are more relevant, leaving out such factors as modernization or population growth.



Figure 3: a model of radicalisation

3. Methodology

In the previous chapter, the theoretical framework for this study was discussed and a theoretical model with relevant variables was developed. This chapter will focus on the methodological accountability of this study. First, the research design of the study will be discussed. Then, the units of analysis and case selection will be described, followed by an elaboration of the method of data collection and data analysis. The chapter will conclude with some remarks on the validity and reliability of the chosen research design.

3.1 Research design

Since the setting of this study is the municipality of Hengelo, the research design of this study is a case study. Since radicalisation is a complex and multi-facetted concept, some flexibility is needed, as is the ability to come to an in-depth understanding of the concept and the way people deal with it. Therefore, this study uses qualitative methods as the chief strength of qualitative research lies in the depth of understanding it permits according to Babbie (2010). Since this study describes the situation as it is currently perceived in Hengelo, the study has a descriptive character featuring a cross-sectional design with observations that are made at one point in time: June and July 2015.

3.2 Units of analysis and case selection

The units of analysis, i.e. what or whom is studied, in this research are several key actors that in their daily work deal with radicalisation. The interviews are the main data source in this study, so the selection of the respondents had to be a very careful process in which the municipality gave advice. Also, a report of the Dutch association of municipalities in which the most important actors are summed up, was used in composing a list of interviewees (VNG, 2015). To gain a complete view of the field that is studied, it was tried to reach some diversity on several dimensions. First, there is considerable variation in actors' proximity to the signals of radicalisation. Some interviewees are in a position to directly observe possible signals of radicalisation, i.e. are the 'eyes and ears' on the ground, while others were situated somewhat farther away from the source. There is also considerable variation in the nature of the organisations that the interviewees work for. These include governmental organisations such as the police and the municipality but also healthcare organisations and civil society organisations such as a football club and a mosque. Also, some organisations play a repressive role, while the work of other organizations is best characterized as preventive. For a list of interviewees, see table 1. For a schematic overview of the categories of interviewees and their proximity to the signals, see figure 4. Concluding, it can be said that actors from almost all relevant local organisations were interviewed. It should furthermore be noted that, among the respondents, there were three Muslims. Also, two of the functions were held by the same person. During the interview, it was tried to make the distinction between both functions as clear as possible. Finally, two employees from one organisation (SCALA Welzijn) were interviewed simultaneously. They were asked to mention it whenever they agreed or disagreed, in order to increase the quality of the answers.

National Police

Preventing and combating radicalisation has been an important task of the police for years. As a frontline organisation, police officers are the 'eyes and ears' on the ground and thus are able to detect early signals of radicalisation. The police also employs more specialized officers when there is a reasonable level of suspicion towards certain individuals. These officers will

then go in conversation with the suspected individual(s). Both a frontline professional (community officer or *wijkagent)* and a specialized officer (specialist on honour related crime and radicalisation) were interviewed, during separate interviews.

Regional education centre Twente (ROC)
Schools are designated as crucial institutions by the government. First, they play a preventive role since schools are the places where children meet each other on a daily basis, allowing them to understand different backgrounds and cultures and develop a sense of democratic citizenship. Second, schools can play a curative and even repressive role when signs of radicalisation do emerge. Teachers have to be able to recognize these signals and act accordingly. A regional career specialist of a group of vocational education centres, who gets involved when signals of radicalisation are recognized, was interviewed.

School group Carmel Hengelo, part of Twents Carmel College (TCC)
Next to the vocational education, schools in secondary education can play an important role. A care coordinator, working for three locations of a school group in Hengelo, was interviewed. Together with staff members, he is responsible for responding to signals of radicalisation. The school group educates a large variety of students, including many with an immigrant background.

Ayasofya Mosque
Although the process of radicalisation may take place outside of the mosque, the Imam and the religious community nevertheless have an important position in recognizing and responding to possible radical tendencies among their members. The chairman of the board of the only Mosque in Hengelo was interviewed. The mosque mainly serves the Turkish Sunni community.

SC Barbaros
Football clubs and other sport clubs fulfil an important social function as a place where children and adolescents meet. It is also a place where people may discuss their private live, including religious and political convictions. It may therefore be an appropriate organisation in the process of detecting radicalisation. SC Barbaros is a football club in Hengelo. It is open to members from all nationalities but the majority of its members are of Turkish origin. The secretary of the board of SC Barbaros was interviewed.

Humanitas Onder Dak
As has been described in the theoretical framework, people that are in an especially weak or vulnerable position, such as homeless people or current or former addicts, may be susceptible to radicalisation. Organisations that care for these people may therefore be interesting. A social worker from the foundation Humanitas Onder Dak, working with the homeless and people with addiction problems, was therefore interviewed.

SCALA Welzijn
SCALA is a local welfare organisation in the municipalities of Hengelo, Hof van Twente and Haaksbergen. It also offers services to youth in the age of 10 to 24. Youngsters are approached in community centres or on the streets to offer them guidance, to find and develop talents.

Also, with their presence on the streets, youth workers can play an important role in recognizing signals of radicalisation and pass these signals on to the police and other organisations. Two youth workers were interviewed.

Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM)
Although the police is responsible for the practical side of criminal investigations, i.e. collecting evidence and conducting interviews, these investigations are carried out under the authority of a public prosecutor. In the case of a serious offence, the public prosecutor will be in direct charge of the investigation. The public prosecutor may employ various legal means to repress radicalisation. A senior district secretary, who holds radicalisation in his portfolio, was interviewed.

Municipality of Hengelo
Municipalities play an important role in preventing social tension and radicalisation. Although in general the municipality is not a 'front line' organisation, it does play a valuable role in coordinating other organisations and developing policy. The mayor of the municipality of Hengelo was interviewed.

Municipality of Arnhem
The final interview that was conducted differs from the other interviews in that it was not used for the primary data collection but was used to a provide a reflection on the results of this research. Arnhem and The Hague are the municipalities that are at the forefront of radicalisation prevention. As Arnhem is more comparable to Hengelo than The Hague in terms of population and character, the safety advisor to the mayor of Arnhem was interviewed.

Organisation	**Function**
National police	Community police officer
National police	Specialist on honour crime and radicalisation
Regional education centre Twente (ROC)	Career specialist
School group Carmel Hengelo (TCC)	Care coordinator
Ayasofya Mosque	Chairman
SC Barbaros	Secretary
Humanitas Onder Dak	Social worker
SCALA Welzijn	Ambulant youth worker (2x)
Public prosecutor's department	District secretary
Municipality of Hengelo	Mayor
Municipality of Arnhem	Safety advisor to the mayor

Table 1: overview of interviewees



Figure 4: overview of interviewees, by proximity to signals

3.3 Data collection method

In this thesis, two forms of data collection have been used. To answer the first sub-question regarding the factors that contribute to radicalisation, an extensive literature review was conducted. To answer the second and third question, interviews were held with the persons described above. Since radicalisation is a complex phenomenon with many facets, it is highly subject to different interpretations so some degree of flexibility is required. Therefore, a qualitative interview is a more appropriate method of data collection than other methods such as a survey, since surveys are rigidly structured and inflexible (Babbie, 2010). An added benefit of a qualitative interview is the possibility of asking follow-up questions whenever a topic needs further elaboration, which is likely in this case, were respondents describe their own experiences with radicalisation.

A qualitative interview is an interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. Although the interviewer has a general plan and knows what topics should be covered, there is no set of questions that is to be asked in a particular order. The interviewer has to be fully familiar with the questions to be asked. A risk in qualitative interviewing is that the wording of questions may subtly bias the answers that are given. It was tried to overcome this risk by using as neutral wording as possible when asking questions. Kvale (2008) mentions seven stages in interviewing that were also employed in this study. First, the purpose of the interview and the concepts are explored. Second, the interview is designed to best accomplish this purpose, while also considering an ethical dimension, related to e.g. the sensitivity of particular questions. Then, the actual interview is carried out. Afterwards, the interview is transcribed, i.e. literally written down so that the gathered data can be analysed. The results are verified to check the reliability and validity and finally, the results are reported.

The interviews generally consisted of two parts. First, respondents were asked for their personal experiences and the signals they perceived in concrete cases. Second, the signals and factors that are mentioned in the literature were discussed. Respondents were asked to what extent they thought of these factors as being predictors of radicalisation, and to what extent they perceived these factors in Hengelo. In order to avoid bias, the specific signals from the literature were only mentioned when the interviewees did not first mentions these themselves. Since all respondents deal with radicalisation in another way and on another level, the specific questions that were asked varied from person to person, depending on their function, their amount of knowledge and their expertise. For an overview of the interview structure, see the appendix.

To improve the quality of the interviews, several techniques were used, some of which are described in Babbie (2010). For example, all questions were thoroughly introduced and the

use of specific terminology was avoided. Regarding the order of the questions, the more general questions were asked first, followed by more specific questions. It was tried to keep the conversation as close as possible to the actual experiences of the interviewees, to avoid speculation.

3.4 Data analysis

As was already described, one of the phases in interviewing is to transcribe the interviews. These transcriptions were then coded, which entails classifying or categorizing individual pieces of data, coupled with some kind of retrieval system. This allows the researcher to find patterns in the data. The different concepts that were covered in the interview were used as the organizing principle to reach a comparable standardised measure, as described by Saldaña (2009). After the coding was completed, the different variables were systematically compared and analysed, the results of which can be read in the next chapter.

3.5 Validity and reliability

When collecting data, two important aspects in assessing the usefulness of these data are reliability and validity (Babbie, 2010). Reliability relates to the quality of the measurement method in collecting the same data in repeated observations of the same phenomenon. Validity refers to the extent to which the measurement adequately captures the underlying concept. Babbie (2010) makes some remarks regarding the reliability and validity of qualitative interviewing as a data collection method. Compared with surveys and experiments, field research measurements generally have more validity as they provide a large amount of depth that is unavailable to other methods. In this study, validity was also increased by making sure all respondents had sufficient knowledge and experience with the topic. However, although they are in-depth, field research measurements are also very personal, which may limit the reliability of the results. In this study, reliability is further limited by the fact that from most organisations, only one respondent was interviewed. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with some caution. However, it was tried to increase the validity by comparing the results with the municipality of Arnhem.

4. Recognized signals of radicalisation

In the previous chapter, the methodological framework for this study was discussed. Amongst other things, it was described that the data were gathered using qualitative interviews. The results of these interviews will be reported here. This chapter aims to answer the second sub question: "What possible factors and signals of radicalisation are recognized by professionals in Hengelo?" First, the concrete experiences that the interviewees have with radicalisation are reported. Then, the different factors that could lead to radicalisation are discussed, followed by a discussion of other factors that were mentioned during the interviews. Then, some other questions that were asked during the interview will be reported and the chapter will end with a short conclusion.

Some general remarks on the interviews can be made. Something that was remarkable was that all actors agreed that the problem of radicalisation is very grave and that it deserves serious attention. All interviewees were very open-hearted in their answers. Also, all actors seemed well informed and had thorough knowledge on the subject. The chairman of the mosque formed somewhat of an exception in this regard. He explained that, since he and his community did not identify with violent jihadism at all, there was little discussion on IS within the community. The chairman acknowledged that most of his knowledge on radicalisation was gathered through the regular media. With respect to these results, one further remark should be made. Even though the interviewees have considerable knowledge on the subject, every interviewee has his or her own interpretation of the subjects that were discussed. Therefore, although the interviewees provided very valuable information, none of the results discussed below should be interpreted as an objective truth.

4.1 Concrete experiences

When asked for the concrete cases of radicalisation that the respondents had experienced, it was obvious that these cases were very limited. However, all respondents mentioned one specific case, a student from Hengelo who, together with her son, left for Syria in March 2015. Thus far, they are the only confirmed persons to have left for Syria. Because of confidentiality issues, the exact reasons and details of their departure will not be discussed here. Although some signals that she was in the process of radicalisation were perceived, the risk assessment that was performed did not point to an acute threat. The implications of this will be discussed in the next chapter. When asked for other cases, most respondents mentioned that there were some other cases and signals, but the threat level of all these cases was considered to be limited. The representatives from SCALA, for example, mentioned that there were around five boys who had or currently have Jihadist sympathies, and other interviewees speak of a handful of signals. However, all respondents had considerable contact with or knowledge of Muslim youth so they were able to give their opinion on most of the factors, although it should be stated that some of the answers are based on personal perceptions rather than concrete experiences.

4.2 Illegitimacy of authorities

The first factor that was discussed was the (perceived) illegitimacy of authorities. Two aspects were discussed: a structural illegitimacy, i.e. the illegitimacy of the democratic system and its compatibility with sharia law, and the way the government operates and deals with citizens. Interestingly, most of the interviewees barely recognized this as an important factor in the radicalisation process. Although there was some consensus that a lack of recognition for the government could lead to political violence, all respondents agreed that this was not the case

in Hengelo. The overall feeling is that individuals in Hengelo have respect for both local and national authorities and other organisations such as health care providers. Two respondents mentioned that these feelings might not apply to the police as these are seen as illegitimate by some youth, but it is debatable whether this leads to radicalisation. The police specialist further mentioned that, whenever the radicalisation process has started, the feelings don't necessarily apply to the government but to almost everyone and society at large: radicalised youth see everyone that does not follow their specific set of rules as wrong and make little distinction. The mayor argues that rebelling against the government and rebelling against the entire society are two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, the Muslims that were interviewed mentioned the research performed by Motivaction for minister of social affairs Lodewijk Asscher[1]. The result of the research was that most Turkish youth thought of members of IS as heroes. The interviewees stated that Turkish youth disagreed with the results of the research and see it as a deliberate strategy to slander Turkish youth, which has led to declining support for the government in general and the Dutch Labour party in specific. Concluding, although a shared perception of the government as illegitimate is not present in Hengelo, attention should be paid to specific events that influence this perception.

4.3 Grievances or moral outrage

The second factor that was discussed in the interviews was grievances and moral outrage. The aspect that was most discussed in the literature was anger or outrage over the foreign policy of the West, i.e. the invasion of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the interventions against the Islamic State. The Dutch contribution to some of these interventions could also fuel feelings of outrage. Most of the interviewees cited some form of outrage as an important factor in the radicalisation process. This outrage was in part attributed to foreign policy (by 4 interviewees) with the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine and a deep hatred for the United States, mostly for their interventions in the Middle East, as important reasons. According to the career specialist, however, it would make sense to link outrage over international events to education, as many students in the lower levels of education are barely aware of international events and policy. The police specialist mentioned that frustration over foreign policy is often short-lived and easily forgotten, making it neither a necessary nor a sufficient component for radicalisation. Another important source of outrage in the eyes of two interviewees is the difference in portrayal of violent Muslims and violent non-Muslims in the media. Both interviewees mentioned that terrorists of non-Muslim backgrounds are structurally portrayed as 'confused men' while Muslims are portrayed as jihadists. According to the interviewees, many youth view this as a deliberate media strategy to put Muslims in a negative light which leads to a widely shared sense of frustration. Related to this, almost all interviewees mention anger and frustration over negative remarks made by Dutch politicians, most notably Geert Wilders, about the Islam. According to the interviewees, frustrations over these remarks are not likely to directly lead to radicalisation but certainly contribute to a feeling of outrage, deprivation or alienation and a decrease in the legitimacy of the government, thereby leading to a climate in which radicalisation is more likely to prosper.

[1] http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/asscher-ik-snap-dat-turkse-jongeren-balen-van-motivaction-onderzoek~a3797226/

4.4 Relative deprivation and discrimination

Another factor that was mentioned often in the literature was relative deprivation and related to it, (perceptions of) discrimination. The respondents were asked if they, in their daily jobs, perceived signals that Muslim youth felt deprived and/or discriminated. All interviewees mention that feelings of discrimination are shared among many young Muslims. During the interviews it became clear that these feelings could relate to many aspects. For example, one interviewee mentioned that (moderate) Muslims are underrepresented in e.g. talk shows in the media. Several others mention that Muslims feel discriminated on the labour market, as Muslims are frequently rejected because of their name, leading to a feeling of being seen as 'the foreigner'. Regarding the case of the student who left for Syria, one of the interviewees mentioned that a perception of discrimination played an important role in her radicalisation process. This perception was said to function as a legitimation of her radicalisation.

4.5 The social environment

This factor was discussed at length, considering the various aspects involved. The role of friends, family, group dynamics and role models was discussed. There was no consensus on the role of the social environment in the radicalisation process. Four interviewees mentioned that social processes and group dynamics play a central role in the process. They said that radicalizing friends in a social group may accelerate the process and may also influence other persons in the group to radicalise. These groups can interact in cafés, sport clubs, schools and other social environments. On the other hand, four interviewees mentioned that dynamics in a social group are not a necessary condition. The secretary of the public prosecution service contrasts the situation in Hengelo with the situation in e.g. The Hague where networks of friends radicalised simultaneously. In Hengelo, this seems not the case as most radicalised people seem to have done so individually, i.e. as lone wolves, without the influence of their peers. This view is confirmed by the youth workers, who state the handful of youth that were in the process of radicalisation seemed to have done so individually. The youth workers made a comparison with other forms of radicalisation in this respect. Football hooligans, for example, are just as well able to radicalise but are doing this as a results of an inherently social activity, where group dynamics may lead to an escalation of violence, while these group dynamics don't necessarily apply to young Muslims. The career specialist and the specialist of the police also mention that they think it is possible to radicalise individually in this context. When radicalising individually, role models are said to play an important role. The interviewees mainly referred to radical Imams that preach on the internet, and are thus accessible for someone that is radicalising individually. The youth workers also mention that the radicalised youth are, in general, often lacking in social skills.

Regarding the presence of role models, most interviewees agreed that these may play an important role. Three interviewees mentioned that Imams may play an important role, especially those Imams that use the internet to spread their message. The police specialist considered this especially dangerous as children that listen on their own to extremist Imams, tend to hear only one interpretation of the Quran and may mistake that interpretation for the only true interpretation. Key in combatting radicalisation, according to him, is therefore to let youth listen to several Imams so they can contrast different interpretations, thereby leaving them less susceptible to a very radical interpretation. The public prosecution secretary described a role model as not necessarily being one person, but referred to IS as a whole, which applies a lot of propaganda measures, thereby establishing an entire culture which functions as a role model. Some interviewees made some remarks regarding the student that

joined IS. Several interviewees mentioned that she had very little money and therefore probably was unable to travel to Syria herself. This fuels the thought that there was a network or at least one recruiter behind her departure, making practical arrangements and maybe also persuading her. The police specialist mentioned that the activities of role models may very well be an important pull factor. He described the possibility of recruiters taking an advisory role at first, pointing to inconsistencies in behaviour which gradually develop to promoting an extremist body of thought. Finally, they offer youth a chance to get close to God by providing means to travel to Syria.

4.6 Alienation

A perceived distance to others and a feeling of being disconnected from society are, according to the literature, factors that can contribute to radicalisation. Individuals that increasingly isolate themselves from society could therefore require some extra attention. All interviewees recognized a feeling of alienation as an important factor in the radicalisation process. The care coordinator, for example, mentioned that this is one of the first things that can come to attention when someone is radicalising. Some concrete cases in Hengelo that were discussed did indeed not feel a part of society, increasing their tendency to radicalise. The public prosecution secretary mentioned in this respect that it is very hard to come into contact with someone that is radicalising. He also argued that people with a Muslim background are better able to come into contact with these alienated youth. Two interviewees, the community police officer and the chairman of the mosque, point to the relative small scale of the Islamic community in Hengelo as a counterweight for this part of the radicalisation process. This 'village feeling' might inhibit feelings of alienation and when these feelings do arise, it might be easier to spot these feelings than in larger communities where members do not know one another as well. As the chairman of the mosque said, "If someone would try and influence the youth in our community, he would not succeed. We would notice it when they do". Related to alienation, several interviewees mentioned that feelings of not being understood are characteristic of radicalising youth. As has been mentioned before, politicians can play a role in increasing or decreasing feelings of alienation. The career specialist mentioned that remarks made by members of the Freedom Party increase foreigners' feelings that they are not welcome, possibly leading to alienation. This also applied to the mentioned student, according to several interviewees.

4.7 Identity issues

The respondents were asked if they thought some kind of identity crisis played a role in the radicalisation process. Almost all interviewees acknowledge that some form of identity crisis leaves youth susceptible to an extremist message since "you can easily influence the mind of a young person, which is much harder with an adult", according to the chairman of the mosque. The police specialist, for example, said that one of the first things to find out when suspicions of radicalisation arise is whether one has a strong identity or not, because in the latter case, that would make him or her more susceptible to radicalisation. Other interviewees mentioned that persons that were not able to fully develop their identity, or are not very aware of their identity are susceptible. Several respondents pointed at the dangers of a double nationality: conflicts between e.g. Moroccan and Dutch values and norms pose a challenge in forming an identity. Three interviewees further mention an, according to them, important distinction: that between regular adolescent behaviour, e.g. a need for attention, and real jihadist sympathies. According to the career specialist, signals of jihadist sympathies may not

by definition point to a true sympathy for jihadism or a preparedness to travel to Syria, but may also reflect a struggle in forming an identity which is normal in teenagers (in Dutch: 'pubergedrag'). According to this interviewee, it is important to make this distinction which is possible with experience and a conversation. Also, the care coordinator mentioned that the latter will probably make his intentions known in order to get the attention he wants, while the true jihadist will always have a hidden agenda when talking to others, as he wants to mask his intentions. One final important remark was made by the secretary of the football association/the social worker. He mentioned that, in his perception, an increasingly large number of Turkish youth feel more Turkish than Dutch. According to him, this number is much higher than a few years ago. The finding that youth feel more Turkish than Dutch is also found in other research (Staring, Geelhoed, Aslanoğlu, Hiah, & Kox, 2014).

4.8 Perception of rewards

It is possible that youngsters give the impression that they see a life as a jihadist as rewarding. Respondents were asked if they perceived signals of such a view. This was one of the topics in which the interviewees were less clear in giving their opinion. The community officer, for example, did not notice signals of youth perceiving the life as jihadist itself as rewarding, but argues that it would be important to take notice when these signals do emerge. The youth workers, the chairman of the mosque and the mayor did argue that the thrill and excitement aspect of this factor play an important role: a need for adventure and action, more than that which is possible in the Netherlands, might make the life of a jihadist seem rewarding. According to the mayor, the thrill-seeking aspect can be seen as much broader than Islamic radicalisation alone, as other movements such as outlaw motor gangs are also motivated by a desire for thrill and excitement. However, none of the interviewees experienced concrete signals that point in this direction.

4.9 Religion

As was described in the theoretical framework, the role of religion is a peculiar one. The respondents were asked to give their opinion on the role of religion in the radicalisation process, to shed some light on its influence. All respondents agreed that jihadists use their religion to legitimize their violence and that religion in itself is not an inspiration for violence or that the Islam is inherently violent. All Muslim respondents mentioned that the Jihadist belief system is a radical deviation from the Islam, i.e. that the Islamic State has created a new faith that can justify their actions. In that respect, according to them, the Islamic State abuses the Islamic faith. The Muslim respondents therefore believed that, contrary to what many people believe, youngsters that have little rather than much knowledge about the faith are more susceptible to a radical and violent message so that one way to make young Muslims more resilient would be to give them proper religious education. Also, knowledge of the particular school to which one is attracted is crucial, according to the police specialist. This is in particular important as there are several schools that are very orthodox but nonviolent. Investing too much time into the monitoring of these schools would therefore mean a waste of resources. Also, knowledge of the schools makes it possible to predict the radicalisation process. Five of the respondents mentioned that signals that are related to religion do play an important role in recognizing radicalisation. Signals that were mentioned are when a person grows a beard, starts to wear religious clothing when previously only western clothing was worn, has visual expressions of IS (flags, wallpapers, etc.), approaches other people to tell them they are not religious enough or starts to make a very strict distinction between that

what is forbidden (haram) and that which is allowed (halal). Another signal is when a man starts to refuse shaking the hands of women. Interestingly, one of the interviewees mentioned increased visits to the mosque as a signal. This seems contradictory with the fact that the mosques in Twente are relatively moderate. It would seem more likely that a person with radical thoughts would turn to other places where he could further develop his belief, e.g. the internet. This view was supported by three other respondents. Some of these signals are very dubious according to some interviewees. For example, growing a beard may just as well be the result of fashion considerations and an increased deepening in the faith may be a very good thing when it is done to become a good Muslim (i.e., not a violent radical). In other words, one should be very careful in interpreting religious signals and this is something that all actors that are close to the signals agree upon: one or a few religious signals alone are not enough to justify an investigation: there should always be some other component such as politically oriented remarks or the glorification of violence.

4.10 Personality issues

Although the conventional wisdom among many researchers is that personality issues such as psychopathy are typically not factors that are associated with terrorism, recent research suggested otherwise (see paragraph 2.3.2). According to several interviewees, the case of the student suggests that this factor indeed may play an important role. The social worker mentioned that she had passed most health care stations, being emotionally and mentally damaged. This view was confirmed by the career specialist and the mayor. Other interviewees also mention that in several other cases some form of personality problems play a role. However, one of the youth workers argued that in most cases, mental problems are not likely among radicals since the mentally healthy would be more successful in their radicalisation process as they would be better at deceiving authorities and travelling to e.g. Syria. Also, from this perspective, it could be expected that people that are struggling with addiction problems are more susceptible for a radical message. However, according to the social worker at Humanitas, these people generally do not pose a threat as they have more urgent problems to deal with, i.e. their own addiction and the associated health risks. He does recognize that these people might be in a very weak position though, which could make them more susceptible to an extremist message when effort is put into it so some attention is justified.

4.11 Other factors

During the interviews, some other topics in the context of radicalisation were discussed. Some of these deserve special attention. When asked, several respondents pointed to broader social factors. Three interviewees argued that globalisation plays a very important role. Increased accessibility of information means that jihadist propaganda and preaches by extremist Imams can be easily shared. Also, through the internet and television, youth become aware of suffering in the Middle East caused by, in their perception, Israel, president Assad or the United States. This might increase the motivation to join the armed fight. Furthermore, globalisation was said to remove some barriers to join the actual fight as nowadays, it is easier to come into contact with jihadist networks, to travel abroad and to obtain weapons. This factor can be compared to the factor ‘modernisation’ that is incorporated in the model. Other actors mentioned increasing polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims as a factor that might lead to radicalisation. This polarisation can in part be the result of media depicting the Islam as a violent religion or being negative about Islamic leaders. One interviewee mentioned that many Muslims feel that they constantly have to account for the actions of terrorists

whenever they commit an attack. It was said that this is very frustrating or even insulting as most Muslims do not identify with or endorse these terrorists. This frustration in itself does not lead to violent radicalisation but can lead to a feeling of alienation from society, which can be harmful. As could be expected, some factors only applied to certain aspects of life. For example, both interviewees working in the education sector mentioned that radicalising youth showed up less in class, spent less time doing homework and had dropping grades.

4.12 Ethnicity

Weenink (2015) conducted research on radicalisation using a sample of 140 Dutch Jihadists. Among these, 95% had the Dutch nationality. 77% had a second nationality of whom 56% were of Moroccan origin while 9% were of Turkish origin. Thus, Weenink concludes that both nationalities are overrepresented in his sample. However, there is no explanation given for the large difference between the number of Moroccan and Turkish radicals. Information on this difference is valuable though, as in Hengelo, almost 5000 citizens are of Turkish origin while no more than 300 citizen are of Moroccan origin (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2015). The respondents were asked if they thought ethnicity played a role in the radicalisation process. Most interviewees recognized that ethnicity was likely to play a role as some ethnic groups are better integrated than others, thus making them more resilient to a radical message. However, there was some disagreement on the precise role ethnicity plays. Five interviewees mention that Moroccans are more likely to radicalise than Turks. This was partly attributed to the way in which Moroccans are depicted in the media: one interviewee mentioned that Moroccan youth are often portrayed as street-robbers while another respondent argued that Moroccan youngsters are frequently called 'Kutmarokkanen' (literally: cunt Moroccans) and are often treated worse than other members of society. Turkish youth are said to have a better image. However, one respondent contradicted this and argued that Moroccans are the ones that have a better image and referred to the term 'Knuffelmarokkanen' (literally: cuddle Moroccans). One other interviewee further mentioned that, in his opinion, Moroccans generally have less knowledge about their faith than Turkish youth, leaving them more susceptible to a violent message. Furthermore, one interviewee said that a desire to rebel against the government and the rest of society is stronger in the Moroccan community than in the Turkish community while another respondent argued that Turkish people are, in general, socially stronger, which makes it easier for them to integrate. Other research found that the secular tradition of Turkey might make Turkish-Dutch youth less susceptible to radicalisation (Staring et al., 2014). Besides the Turkish and Moroccan community, one of the youth workers mentioned another group that might deserve some further attention: Muslims from the former Yugoslavian region who fled from the Yugoslavian wars and thus have a very problematic past, which might make them more susceptible to a radical message.

4.13 Current threat level in Hengelo

The interviewees were asked to give an estimation of the current threat in Hengelo for radicalisation. Positively, all respondents agreed that the threat level in Hengelo is, as far as they can estimate, limited. The chance that either another inhabitant would travel to join the caliphate or would commit an attack on Dutch soil, is slight, according to them. This leads to the conclusion that there is no acute form of danger. However, the public prosecution secretary did mention that it is possible that the process of radicalisation can suddenly accelerate so a case that seems not dangerous can become an acute danger a few days later.

Therefore, the assumption that the situation is currently safe is probably correct, but placing too much faith in this assumption can be very dangerous.

4.14 Comparison with Arnhem

When asked for the situation in Arnhem, the safety advisor confirmed that the results found in Hengelo were also applicable to Arnhem, most notably mentioning the social environment, identity issues, a lack of religious knowledge and alienation. He argued that these results were applicable to all municipalities and stressed that , although these factors all are to some extent true, it is not possible to establish a generic profile for radicalised people. One important difference seems to be the role of group processes. It was said that in Arnhem, a radicalised network of friends was active, with several links to other persons and groups in the rest of the country. In Hengelo, the interviewees agreed that there was no such thing as a radicalised network.

4.15 Conclusion

The interviews proved to be very valuable in gaining insight into the situation in Hengelo. The model proved to be useful, as all factors were to some extent recognized, be it not by all actors. In other word, the perception of contributing factors differs from person to person, which is an important finding. As an addition to the model, several interviewees mentioned polarization as an important factor. This factor is incorporated in the new model below. Some further changes can be made to the model to make it more suitable for use in Hengelo. The broad contextual factors can be beneficial in understanding jihadism as a phenomenon but have little predictive value on the local level and thus were barely discussed. The factor of perceived rewards was barely mentioned and recognized, with the exception of the thrill seeking component. The other three components were therefore removed. Although the interviewees mostly agreed that the other factors are good predictors of radicalisation, most of these were not recognized in the setting of Hengelo. This means that the risk for the radicalisation of youth in Hengelo probably is quite low. However, some other factors, most notably polarization, perceptions of discrimination and grievances or outrage are present. This means that, although there is no acute danger, there certainly is work to be done.



Figure 5: enhanced model of radicalisation

5. The capacity to recognize signals

In the previous chapter, the second sub question was answered. In this chapter, another part of the interviews will be discussed, namely the interviewees' capacity to pick up signals of radicalisation. Thereby, the third sub question will be answered: *"Are these key actors capable of recognizing signals of radicalisation?"*

The interviewees were asked to what extent they thought they are able to perceive signals of radicalisation and how likely it is that they miss signals. As was discussed, the amount of concrete cases that the interviewees experienced is limited. Most of the answers that are discussed here are therefore more based on expectations than on experience. However, most interviewees agreed that they were able to pick up most if not all signals. The community police officer, for example, mentioned that youth sooner or later have the urge to express themselves on e.g. Facebook, which can then be picked up by the police or other organizations. The specialised police officer trusts his own skills and experience, which, according to him, enable him to pick up signals and respond to these signals correctly. He mentioned that there were several cases in which he succeeded in deradicalising youth with jihadist sympathies. He did, however, argue that some knowledge of the Islamic faith is essential in both picking up signals and responding to these signals, as this helps in understanding the process and increases youngsters' willingness to cooperate. It was said that this knowledge can also be obtained by non-Muslims. The care coordinator agreed with this view. The career specialist contradicted this view a bit and argued that just expressing curiosity and interest in the faith might also open the options for a conversation. The chairman of the mosque further pointed to the small scale of the community and argued that it would be noticed when someone tried to influence the youth in that community. Further enhancing the ability to perceive signals, some respondents mentioned that courses and trainings were offered to the police, schools and municipality officials. The representative from Humanitas argued that there is a sort of safety net of different health care providers which makes it easier to share and respond to signals. Also, all respondents agreed on the importance of cooperation and sharing signals, which makes it easier to set up a network, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

However, some other respondents argued that they believe that it is very hard to accurately pick up all signals. The public prosecution secretary pointed to the fact that the subject is relatively new: the Islamic State, and with it the sudden surge of jihadism, has only been around for a few years, as are knowledge and expertise on the topic of radicalisation. This means that it is not always clear what signals are important. Also, the care coordinator mentioned that observable behaviour is only the tip of the iceberg, and that it is much harder to recognize feelings that lie beneath behaviour. Further limiting the capability to perceive signals are learning effects within radical networks. Several respondents mentioned that signals may change or diminish as soon as they are being focussed upon. For example, current jihadists may no longer grow a beard as this may make them look more suspicious. The police specialist also mentioned that, in order to accurately perceive signals, it is necessary to observe the youngster over a longer time. The youth worker argued that this is an important obstacle in their perception, as they don't see every youngster daily, making it hard to observe changes in behaviour, or hard to notice it when someone e.g. retreats from society. A comparable statement was made by the care coordinator, who mentioned that teachers have to divide their attention over many pupils, so that it is impossible to pick up all signals. Also, not every teacher is as skilful in picking up all signals or in talking to pupils about this subject.

Something that might also increase complexity is the fact that youngsters may attend various places in different municipalities. However, according to the career specialist, this does not lead to much difficulty since the cooperation between actors is good. Rather, she sees the regional cooperation with the 'Veilgheidshuis' as a positive aspect. The mayor shares this view and argues that involving more actors does not lead to diminishing efficiency since by involving more actors, it is better possible to tailor an approach. The experience of Arnhem confirms this, where in some cases, up to 20 actors were involved, which did not lead to diminished effectivity. It could further be hypothesized that, in particular on the side of health care providers, not all signals are shared. Health care providers build up a relationship of trust with their client so it can be possible that they are reluctant to share all signals. However, in the eyes of several respondents, this is not the case since the danger of radicalisation is commonly recognized. This means that, according to them, all signals are shared. The representatives from the health care providers Humanitas and SCALA confirmed this. Also, it was said that the trust bond does not harm the ability to report signals as it is still possible to stay in the role of health care provider. When asked, the safety advisor in Arnhem confirmed that in this respect there is a tension between the administrative approach and the criminal law-based approach, but that this tension can partly be resolved by being very explicit and clear about the fact both approaches are used. Some interviewees pointed to another important consideration. Marking someone as a suspect has grave consequences, especially when someone is incorrectly marked as a suspect: for example, his or her telephone will be tapped, bills wills be checked and the individual will be included in databases of e.g. the NCTV. Actors in the field are aware of this consideration. This might make those responsible reluctant to mark someone as radicalising. As an example, if someone has a broken family, that might be a good post-hoc explanation for a radicalisation process. However, a professional will be reluctant to mark someone as suspected of radicalising based on these considerations since much more concrete suspicions are needed. This attitude can vary from person to person, as for a mayor, there is more at stake than for someone lower in the hierarchy.

The case of the student that left for Syria deserves some special attention. As was said, some signals that she was in the process of radicalisation were perceived but the assessment of these signals did not lead to the perception that the student constituted a direct threat. Several interviewees argued that the assessment that was made with the information that was available was correct, but that there simply was not enough information. The problem therefore was not so much that information is not interpreted correctly but that it is very hard to obtain all the bits of information that enable the government to accurately establish a risk profile. When asked what lessons were learned from this case, the interviewees agreed that it led to the understanding that radicalisation is a complex process in which seemingly irrelevant pieces of information can play a crucial role. The willingness to share information has therefore increased.

When analysing these results, some things are striking. First, although most respondents were fairly positive about their own ability to pick up signals, it was already found out that respondents have different views and different focus points regarding radicalisation. It was also said that it is hard to obtain all the bits of relevant information and that youngsters need to be observed over a longer time, which is not possible for all organizations. This means that there still is a considerable challenge. This is especially true when keeping in mind the discussion in the previous chapters. It was argued that many of the factors that were discussed can provide a good post-hoc explanation about why someone has radicalised, but can hardly predict whether someone will radicalise in the future. This makes it hard to assess what signals

should be shared. In other words, as the safety advisor in Arnhem put it, you already need to have some considerable suspicions toward a person before someone buying a large amount of contact lenses becomes suspicious. It seems that a considerable dose of luck is necessary as the right signal has to be picked up at the right time by the right person. Finally, it was said multiple times that recognizing signals is only the first part of the challenge, as the signals that were picked up also need to be interpreted. Although interpretation did not seem to be the problem in the case that is discussed above, one actor mentioned other cases in which signals were not interpreted correctly, leading to incorrect threat estimations. Furthermore, most actors agreed that, even though signals could be picked up, it is extremely difficult to deradicalise individuals that are already in an advanced stage of radicalisation. Most interviewees believed that, if an individual would really want it, he would be able to find his way to Syria, irrespective of government actions to stop him.

Concluding, although most actors are fairly positive about their own ability to pick up signals, there are still considerable challenges in both picking up and responding to these signals. It was however striking that all actors agreed that both picking up and interpreting signals is only possible with intensive cooperation between several actors. This consideration will be kept in mind in the next chapter.

6. Designing an early warning system

In the previous chapters, the first three sub questions were answered. First, an overview of the factors that contribute to radicalisation was given and a theoretical model that can explain radicalisation was developed. Then, this model was tested by interviewing several key actors, leading to a revised version of the model. Finally, an estimation of the capacity to pick up signals was made. In this chapter, the answers to the first three sub questions will be used to answer the final sub question: *How can the municipal government in Hengelo use this information to develop an adequate early warning system?*

This question will be answered by giving an advice regarding the design of an early warning system. This advice will focus on several key points. First, the current network in which the municipality is a partner will be described. Then, the development of another network with a broader focus will be suggested. Suggestions will be given for the focus points of the network, the actors to be involved in the network, the form of the network and some means to strengthen the effectiveness of the network.

It should be noted that Hengelo is not alone in this respect. Radicalisation is a problem in many municipalities in the Netherlands. In some of these municipalities, the problem started years earlier and is of a much broader scale. As a municipality in which the problem is relatively young and knowledge thus is limited, Hengelo can learn from other municipalities. To serve this goal, the safety advisor to the mayor of Arnhem was interviewed. Also, several other municipalities have developed policy, such as the municipalities of Utrecht (Gemeente Utrecht, 2015), Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015), and The Hague (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014). Furthermore, some guidelines were developed on a nationwide scale, for example by the NCTV (2014a) and the VNG (2015). Where possible, lessons learned from these plans will be used in the advice that is given to Hengelo.

6.1 The current system

Currently, Hengelo uses an early warning system that is focussed on discussing and reacting to concrete signals that are perceived. The so called case meeting (*casusoverleg*) includes the police, representatives from the municipality (from both the security and welfare domain), intelligence services, the public prosecution service, the safety house (*veiligheidshuis*), and, in some cases, the child protection service and the juvenile probation service. These meetings take place once a month and are used to discuss individuals that are suspected of radicalising and to formulate a response to these suspicions. There are not yet structural contacts with organizations such as the mosque, schools, and sport clubs. It should be noted that the existence of the safety house, that actors can contact when they perceive signals of radicalisation, was praised several times.

6.2 Improving the system

The VNG (2015) identifies five areas that can be targeted with policy. First, a breeding ground that can be targeted using existing municipal policy. Second, a group of youngsters that may be searching for an identity and are thus susceptible to radicalisation. Third, specific individuals that may either be radicalising or supplying extremist messages. Fourth, confirmed extremists and people that have returned from e.g. Syria and finally, individuals that have died while fighting for terrorist groups. As has been described, the current system is aimed at the third and fourth phase, and action is only undertaken when there are concrete suspicions regarding one or more individuals. This system is necessary when a response to a concrete case is required, but can only fight symptoms of radicalisation. Based on the results of this

research, the sharing of all signals, including the seemingly insignificant signals, should remain a key priority of this network. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, most interviewees were fairly pessimistic about the means to deradicalise individuals or to stop them from travelling to Syria, and, as one of the interviewees put it, “we are just fighting symptoms”. Although a case meeting will always be a necessity, in this chapter, it is advised to also invest in other areas. It was striking that there is not yet a network that is focussed on non-acute or non-specific suspicions or threats, i.e. the first two phases as described by the VNG. Also, not nearly all actors that are relevant are involved in the network described above. Therefore, a new network can be developed that includes more actors and focusses on sharing knowledge and information on radicalisation, while not limiting itself to formulating interventions for specific suspected individuals. Such an approach would be particularly suited for a municipality like Hengelo, since there are few acute threats so actors have the relative luxury to invest in the entire population rather than in a few individuals. Developing a network that consists of a broad range of actors from both the public and private sphere can be beneficial for several other reasons. First, radicalisation is a phenomenon that can manifest itself in all areas: at school, during sports, at home, etc. Knowledge of the behaviour of a suspected youth in all these areas is necessary in order to make a complete assessment of the radicalisation process of that individual. Therefore, it is important that actors that are involved in all different areas of society know how to find each other so that knowledge and concerns can be shared. Furthermore, as has been described, one of the findings of this research is that most actors have their own perception of radicalisation and this perception differs from person to person. For example, it was striking that none of the Muslim interviewees mentioned signals that are related to religion while some other actors did. It is therefore advisable to facilitate contact between all involved actors in order to stimulate mutual learning and ensure that key actors operate along similar lines. In that way, all involved actors are enabled to grasp the full extent of radicalisation in all its dimensions.

6.2.1 Focus points

Ideally, a network regarding radicalisation would focus on several points. First, knowledge on the factors that contribute to radicalisation, and their translation into concrete signals, should be shared so that actors in the network are able to mutually learn from each other. For an overview of all factors that can be discussed, see chapter 4. One of the striking results from this study was that there are many possible pathways to extremism and that there is no such thing as a generic radical profile. This means that there also is no generic approach in combating radicalisation, which was confirmed by the interviewee from Arnhem: each case needs its own tailored approach. Lub (2013) sums up several possible interventions and their theoretical foundations such as peer mediation and self-esteem enhancement. A second focus point of the network could therefore be the discussion and development of different responses to different forms of radicalisation. A lesson that was learned in Arnhem in this respect is that it is valuable to direct interventions at the few people that still have some legitimacy in the perception of the radicalising youth, i.e. family and friends. On a broader scale, the network could discuss factors that are of a more distal nature, i.e. root or macro causes of radicalisation. For instance, the network could design interventions to decrease social polarisation and foster social cohesion, as a community that is built on trust and mutual respect is much more likely to give early warnings about radicalisation (Murray, 2005, p. 359). As has been discussed before, it is crucial in this regard to distinguish variables that have strong explanatory value and values that can be manipulated (Ellemers, 1976). The network

needs to be aware of changes in the former category, while designing interventions focussed on the latter category. An example of an intervention in this respect is the programme carried out in Arnhem, called 'Together in Arnhem', identifying radicalisation as a social problem, and approaching it from an integration perspective. Meetings were planned with several actors from civil society and youngsters, discussing what the problem of radicalisation is and how it can best be combated. The interviewee was positive about the results and mentioned that several follow-up meetings were planned, including 'neighbour days' and meetings with both young and older people. Especially the inclusion of youngsters in such plans might be very beneficial, as it might lead to a better view of the problem, possible solutions and an increase in legitimacy. Also, the municipality hosted an evening in which it gave information about radicalisation to around 300 citizens. Besides Arnhem, the municipality of Hengelo can learn from other municipalities. Utrecht, for example, takes a very broad approach, including the improvement of anti-discrimination policy, attempts to facilitate intergroup dialogue, strengthening education, and stimulating youth employment. Furthermore, Utrecht tries to stimulate positive reporting in the media, with clear and inclusive use of language as it found out that the media can play an important role in both stimulating and inhibiting radicalisation. Also, as in Arnhem, theme conversations and dialogue evenings are organised (Gemeente Utrecht, 2015). The programmes made in Amsterdam and The Hague are comparable, with the stimulation of contact and dialogue in networks such as the 'salaam/shalom' network in Amsterdam. Also, it is tried to increase feelings of safety by taking visible measures, and civic initiatives are facilitated and stimulated. Comparing this to Hengelo, it is striking that Hengelo mainly invests in the criminal legal or normalising approach. In this respect, it can learn a lot from the municipalities described above by also investing in an integration approach, and by intertwining security and integration agenda's.

Networking as an activity in itself should also be a focus point. Actors need to get to know each other in order to be able to share all signals of radicalisation. Normally, a coordinator at a school would have little reason to contact a board member of a mosque. In this case, however, the board member could provide valuable information and depth to possible signals that are perceived at a school and could check whether these signals are also perceived within the religious community. A statement made by the chairman of the mosque was remarkable in this regard: when asked why there is no structural contact with the municipality, he compared the current situation to a traffic situation, as a traffic situation is generally only made safer when there are casualties. However, in the case of radicalisation this comparison does not seem right as the process of radicalisation can evolve faster than the government can react so a strong network that can be easily approached when the situation threatens to become dangerous is required. Investing in contacts, also when there is no imminent threat, is therefore crucial.

6.2.2 Key actors to be involved

In this research, several actors were interviewed, from both the public and the private sphere. Organizations that were approached are the municipality, the police, the public prosecution service, welfare organizations, schools in both secondary and vocational education, a football club and a board member of the local mosque. During the interviews it appeared that all interviewees could play an important role in recognizing and responding to signals of radicalisation. Furthermore, it was striking that each actor has a different perception of the radicalisation process. It is therefore advisable to involve all these actors in designing an early warning system. An exception to this rule could be the mayor, who might choose to be

informed and share his knowledge though his civil servants. Although in this research a wide range of actors were interviewed, this list is not exhaustive. Therefore, it is advised to involve some more organizations. The regional intelligence service and the national coordinator for security and counterterrorism are already involved in the current system so it would make sense to involve these, too. Furthermore, this research focused on secondary and vocational education. However, it can be hypothesized that students in higher education are also susceptible to radicalisation, and that in their radicalisation process, other factors play a role than in the process of the lower educated. It would therefore make sense to invite representatives from e.g. the Saxion University of Applied Sciences or the University of Twente to discuss different possible routes to radicalisation. Finally, in the literature it is mentioned that a prison can be a setting that contributes to radicalisation as former convicts might want to better their lives by joining the jihad. Therefore, it is advisable to also include prison personnel. Finally, as was pointed out by the care coordinator, it would be very beneficial to include people with a religious background, or with thorough religious knowledge in the network. Including such a person or persons can strengthen the religious knowledge of the entire network. Also, these persons can give some clarifications when concerns arise, e.g. to give some explanation when a suspected youth listens to a certain Imam. It is even a possibility to let such a person join in a conversation with a potentially radicalised youngster, for his or her ability to speak at the same level and in the same way.

6.2.3 Designing the network

There are various ways to facilitate a meeting between the mentioned actors. For instance, a conference can be held where all actors give a short presentation that is followed by questions. Another option would be to hold a round-table style of meeting where all actors can share their viewpoint on the basis of equality. The latter option might be better since some of the interviewees mentioned that an informal setting would probably work best, as a meeting is primarily intended to enable actors to get to know one another, in order to provide contacts when concerns do arise. The Dutch NCTV (2014a) describes some conditions under which a network would best perform. First, relations should be established on a basis of equality with attention to privacy and personal safety. It should be clear what happens when a signal is reported and how the reporter receives feedback. Also, periodic feedback to all participants concerning trends and current affairs is recommended.

6.2.4 Strengthening the network

A first advice in this regard would be to expand and share the knowledge that has been built up. Thus far, an extensive base of knowledge has been built up but this knowledge is not yet shared with everyone, as was discussed. For instance, it was remarkable that much front-line personnel has not yet received any training in recognizing signals of radicalisation. Key actors within the network should be trained in recognizing and responding to signals, or as the safety advisor in Arnhem put it, having the right people in the right place is crucial. Part of the required knowledge can be gained from consultation with other key actors, but it is wise to supplement this knowledge with a training or workshop by a professional. For example, in the municipality of Arnhem, 60 front-line professionals were given a training in recognizing and responding to signals. The municipality can play a role here by making an indication of the type of training that is needed for each actor. An actor that is very close to the signals, for example a community police officer, would benefit most from a training that focusses on concrete signals, while other actors might benefit most from other types of trainings.

However, in the experience of Arnhem, it is also beneficial to give trainings to a diverse public, stimulating mutual learning effects between different professions. The NCTV (2014a) mentions some of these other trainings. For instance, trainings on conflict management and fundamental rights can be offered to teachers and students. Also, trainings on street culture can be offered to professionals working with youth while trainings on democratic citizenship may be valuable for Quran teachers. Furthermore, trainings on identity and defensibility and trainings on how to deal with idealistic youth may prove valuable. In the experience of the interviewee from Arnhem, knowledge on digitalisation and social media is also important, as radicalising youngsters tend to share lots of information via the internet. Therefore, actors within the network should be trained to use the internet and social media in particular to pick up signals of radicalisation. One element is of particular importance in this regard. Several respondents mentioned that it is essential to have some knowledge on the Islamic faith when dealing this radicalisation. This knowledge is, for example, necessary to be able to make a distinction between an orthodox but peaceful interpretation of the Islam and violent intentions. Also, actors that aim to de-radicalise youth should have some knowledge of the faith in order to have some credibility and to be able to point to inconsistencies in youngsters' behaviour and statements. This knowledge can in part be increased by involving religiously oriented actors in the network as described above, but a dedicated training on the subject is also an option. In the experience of Arnhem, representatives from the local religious community can play an important role in establishing contact with youths that are radicalising. However, involving these people should be done with care since, when someone is already at an advanced stage of radicalisation, there is a large chance that he will not view representatives from the local community as legitimate, according to the safety advisor. In these later stadia, it might also be beneficial to introduce more peaceful religious messages to put ones statements in perspective, but this approach alone will not let someone deradicalise.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter described how the current network can be improved by involving more actors from both the public and the private domain. This network should not focus exclusively on discussing individual cases but can share knowledge and design interventions on a broader level. Also, by enabling actors to get to know each other, it becomes easier to share concerns when suspicions do arise. To strengthen the network in its ability to recognize and respond to signals of radicalisation, trainings can be given to the participants within the network.

7. Conclusion

In the previous chapters, the four sub questions that were formulated in the introduction were answered. In this chapter, a summary of these findings will be given so the main research question can be answered: *What signals indicative of radicalisation are present in Hengelo and how should the municipal government respond to these signals?*

A literature study was performed in order to come up with a model that incorporates several factors from the literature that are thought to contribute to an individual's radicalisation. The model uses both root and proximal causes and can be used to assess whether an individual is at an increased risk of radicalising. In-depth interviews were subsequently conducted with several key actors that deal with radicalisation. A model of factors that contribute to radicalisation was discussed with these actors, and it turned out that there was substantial agreement on the factors that were included in the model. Furthermore, it was striking that all actors had their own vision of the most important factors. This was taken into account in the advice that has been written. On a proximal or individual level, the social environment, role models, a violent interpretation of the Islam, personality problems and a need for excitement were considered important factors. Other factors are identity issues, alienation, moral outrage, social polarisation, feelings of deprivation or discrimination and a perceived illegitimacy of authorities. A perception of rewards was barely recognized by the interviewees and was therefore left out of the model, with the exception of the thrill-seeking component. Also, some broad factors such as population growth or globalisation were discussed in the theory and results sections, but have little value in predicting radicalisation on a local level so these too were left out of the model. The factor 'polarisation' was not discussed in the theory but was mentioned by several interviewees so this factor was added to the model. The model that has been developed has strong explanatory value, but it can be expected that actors are reluctant to use it to actually mark an individual as a suspect, because of the consequences of such an act. It can, however, still prove useful in assessing whether an individual is at an increased risk of radicalisation, although more concrete suspicions are needed to actually take action. Also, the model can be useful in improving policy makers' knowledge of the radicalisation process in a more general sense. When this model was applied to the situation in Hengelo, it turned out that most factors were barely present in Hengelo. For example, feelings of alienation and moral outrage were only seldom picked up and the authorities, e.g. the municipality and the police, were said to be generally respected. However, some interviewees mentioned that they frequently pick up signals of social polarisation and feelings of discrimination. It can be concluded that the threat level in Hengelo is relatively low and there is little acute danger. Therefore, investments should be made in decreasing the macro or root causes of radicalisation.

Regarding the second part of the main question, an advice was given to set up an early warning system. The current network, that is used to discuss suspected individuals, can be complemented with a network that includes more actors and has somewhat different goals: sharing knowledge and concerns that are not limited to individual cases. Thereby, investments in the causes of radicalisation rather than its symptoms are made. Also, contacts between actors from all parts of society that deal with radicalisation can be brought together so that information sharing becomes possible. Only then can radicalisation, a complex phenomenon that can manifest itself in a range of different settings, be effectively combated.

8. Discussion

In this study, some important results concerning radicalisation prevention policy on a municipal level were found. In this chapter, some aspects of these results will be discussed. First, the implications of these results for some theories in the field of radicalisation research will be discussed, together with some reflections on radicalisation in general and religion in particular. Then, a few shortcomings of this study and their implications for the results will be discussed. The chapter will end with some suggestions for future research.

The results of this study have some implications for theories in the field of terrorism research. One of the most prominent terrorism researchers, Marc Sageman, points to the social environment as the most important factor and argues that radicalisation is almost always a social process. The results of this study somewhat contradict this, as the student that left for Syria was thought to have radicalised on her own and most interviewees agreed that a social dimension is not a necessary factor for radicalisation: it was said that people can also radicalise on their own. Some other researchers, Meah and Melis, describe radicalisation as a process consisting of two dimensions: a religious and a political dimension. This interpretation seems to simple, as factors such as personality problems and group processes are left out of this dichotomy, but are proven to be important factors in this study. It is also questionable to what extent earlier theories on radicalisation are still relevant in the present day. The Islamic State, which nowadays is the most attractive group to jihadists worldwide, is not only a militant group but also controls its own territory. It is not internationally recognized as a state but in some regards certainly functions as one. In that sense, it differs from other groups such as Al-Qaida since earlier groups were just bands of fighters. In other words, where classic groups such as Al-Qaida will be exclusively attractive to young men wanting to fight, IS can also be attractive to other people looking for citizenship of the Islamic State. This explains why e.g. girls, such as the well-known Bethnal Green girls[2] and the student from Hengelo have recently travelled to Syria. This implies that the attractiveness of IS is possibly explained by other factors than those factors that were used for other groups such as Al-Qaida. With regard to the theory, it can be said that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that is always caused by multiple factors, and none of these factors are necessary nor sufficient factors on their own. When developing policy, this complexity has to be taken into account. Acting too quickly without giving much thought to what radicalisation is and what persons are susceptible to radicalisation, is one of the reasons why the 'Prevent' strategy in the United Kingdom had limited success according to Vidino and Brandon (2012).

As could be expected, the most controversial factor that was discussed is religion. The sensitivity of the topic was made clear in several interviews. Some interviewees did not mention any signals related to religion at all, while other mentioned these as being the most important. When interpreting the results of the interviews, it is most likely that religion does play a role in the process in the sense that religious extremism is the result of other, deeper factors. In other words, the factors that were described may lead to overt and observable religious signals, but religion in itself is not a sufficient factor for violence and jihadism is ultimately fuelled by a violent interpretation of the Islamic faith. Policy makers need to be aware of the religious sensitivity as sudden religious behaviour may point to radicalisation, but at the same time, religious diversity and education should be stimulated in order to create

[2] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3148821/Bethnal-Green-schoolgirls-fled-Britain-join-ISIS-identified-new-video-shot-terror-group-s-capital-Raqqa.html

resilience among religious youth. Only when religious diversity is stimulated, youth are able to place an extremist message into a broader context of an essentially peaceful faith. It is therefore of importance to involve the religious community and its leaders into local radicalisation prevention networks. By actively involving the religious community and stimulating interreligious contact and discussion, the risk of stigmatizing and labelling the entire Muslim community in Hengelo as potential suspects, a risk that is identified by e.g. Lindekilde (2012) and Awan (2012), is also reduced.

The theory that was developed by Ellemers which was discussed in earlier chapter, has some implications for the conclusions of this research. Ellemers argues that many variables may have strong explanatory value, but that some of these variables are less suited to actually base policy upon. Linking this theory to the present study, it was striking that it is hard to make predictions based on these factors, considering the complexity of the problem. When looking back at the case of a radicalized individual, it is fairly easy provide explanations using the described factors. However, this does not mean that knowledge of these factors makes it easy to predict whether someone will radicalise, as all the pieces have to come together and be interpreted correctly. The sum of the factors in the model does not automatically lead to radicalisation. As was discussed, the model can nevertheless be very valuable to policy makers, but the tension described above can be expected to remain one of the most challenging aspects of radicalisation prevention policy.

The results of this study can be very valuable to municipalities that are confronted with signals of radicalisation and the study can aid in developing a network to counter radicalisation. However, some remarks should be made regarding the results of this study. An important weakness that does not only apply to this study but to the entire field of radicalisation and terrorism research is that the empirical basis of the field is limited. Much of the research therefore remains speculation. As Sageman (2014, p. 565) has put it: “Despite over a decade of government funding and thousands of newcomers to the field of terrorism research, we are no closer to answering the simple question of “What leads a person to turn to political violence?”. He argues that this is mainly because of a lack of data for a major breakthrough. That also means that the theoretical validity of this research is fragile. However, it was attempted to keep the validity as high as possibly by only including factors that were empirically tested, or on which there was considerable academic consensus. Still, no model of radicalisation will ever be fully able to predict whether one individual will radicalise or not. At best, statements about an increased likelihood of radicalisation can be made. Even then, chance plays a large role since different factors have to come together at the right time and place. Also, as was already mentioned, most of the studies that were used studied confirmed jihadists, while this research also focusses on those youngsters that are starting to radicalise but have not yet fully embraced jihadism, which may affect validity. Furthermore, one of the findings of this study is that the perception of the factors that contribute to radicalisation varies from person to person. Since only one person was interviewed from each organisation (with two exceptions), the reliability of the results can be impaired since e.g. the chairman of the mosque can have another vision than another board member. This can limit the reliability of the results, as was already described in chapter 3. It should also be noted that only one person and her son left the country to join IS. The amount of other radicalised cases is also limited. In other words, the knowledge that has been built up by the interviewees is based on a limited amount of cases. Answers were thus for a large part based on expectations rather than experience. A final point that applies to all research on crime is that of the dark number of crime (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). As with all criminal behaviour, it will never be able to

calculate precisely how much people are radicalised, especially since radicalisation take to a large degree place in the minds of people. At best, estimations about the prevalence of radicalisation can be made.

Some suggestions for future research can be made. Although a wide range of key actors were identified and interviewed in this study, there are certainly more actors that can be involved in radicalisation prevention, as has been discussed in chapter 6. Some of these actors were approached for this study but were not able to participate, others were intentionally not approached because of time constraints. Including their perception of radicalisation in future studies might prove valuable. Also, something that has not received much attention in this study is that different persons walk different routes to radicalisation. None of the interviewees had much knowledge on this aspect, but some speculated that e.g. the lower educated are more likely to be activated by discrimination or social pressure while the higher educated are more likely to be activated by political discontent. Furthermore, two challenges were discussed: a possible lack of signals and a possible misinterpretation of these signals. However, a third challenge which has not been discussed in this research at length arises when signals are recognized and interpreted correctly, but the legal means to intervene are not sufficient. An example that has been mentioned by one of the interviewees is a case in Limburg where a radicalised person could not be stopped from travelling to Syria since judges were not able to take away his passport. Finally, as was already discussed, the act of marking someone as suspected of radicalisation remains an important challenge. Future research could pay some attention to the questions and challenges outlined above.

9. Literature

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Appendix 1: structure of the interviews

Since a qualitative interview was used, the interviews had a high degree of flexibility. Therefore, the topics that are listed below were not always discussed in the same order. Also, it was tried to keep the conversation flowing in order to avoid bias and steering, so the answers to some questions were already given before the question was asked. However, all topics below were discussed in all interviews. In most cases, specific questions related to the interviewee's function were also asked.

- Function of the interviewee and his/her relation to radicalisation
- Proximity of interviewee to signals that are to be perceived
- Position of interviewee within wider network of radicalisation detection
- Interviewees' concrete experiences with radicalisation
- Interviewees' perception of factors that contribute to radicalisation, and their translation into signals
- Interviewees' perception of his/her ability to pick up all signals of radicalisation
- Interviewees' opinion on the role of the following factors in the radicalisation process (insofar these were not discussed yet) , and the extent to which these factors are present in Hengelo
    - Illegitimacy of authorities
    - Relative deprivation and discrimination
    - Grievances or moral outrage
    - Alienation
    - Identity issues
    - Social environment
    - Personality issues
    - Religion
    - Rewards
- Interviewees' perception of the relation between the factors and if there are 'necessary' or 'sufficient' factors
- Interviewees' perception of the role of ethnicity in the radicalisation process