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## **The ENP – A value promoting policy?**

THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AS A TOOL TO PROMOTE  
EUROPEAN VALUES IN THE WORLD

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**ABSTRACT** The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The policy was established with the aim to secure the European borders and help neighbouring countries, with a conditionality model, to approximate to European values in order to create a “ring of friends” around the European Union Member States. The main opinion among research in the field of Europeanization – and especially the European Neighbourhood Policy – is that this plan failed and the ENP needs a review or should even be abolished. However most scholars focus on the democracy transformation aspect of the policy without taking other goals into consideration. In contrast this paper makes a statement on the effectiveness on basis of as many aspects as possible, namely: *Freedom and Democracy, Rule of Law and Justice, Prosperity, Solidarity and Peace*. This research mainly supports the findings of fellow research concerning democracy transformation, though it also finds that the ENP’s effectiveness is given especially concerning *Prosperity* and *Solidarity*. Furthermore a change from the free elective approach of the policy to a gradual approach is suggested.

**KEY WORDS** European Neighbourhood Policy; European Union; effectiveness; value transformation; value approximation

## **Table of Contents**

### **1. Introduction**

- 1.1 Background
- 1.2 Research Question
- 1.3 Approach

### **2. Theory**

- 2.1 Contextualizing European value promotion in its Neighbourhood
  - 2.1.1 Historical Context
  - 2.1.2 Cultural Context
  - 2.1.3 Political Context
- 2.2 Concluding Remarks

### **3. Methodology**

- 3.1 Research Design
- 3.2 Case Selection
- 3.3 Methods of Data Collection
- 3.4 Methods of Data Analysis
- 3.5 Concluding Remarks

### **4. Analysis**

- 4.1 Moldova
- 4.2 Egypt
- 4.3 Israel
- 4.4 Concluding Remarks

### **5. Conclusion**

### **6. Sources**

### **7. Appendices**

## 1. Introduction

*“The EU wants to be a key partner for all countries in our neighbourhood while defending their right to choose their own way forward. The ENP was created to build new partnerships with the EU's direct neighbours, based on fundamental values, stability and prosperity.”*

– European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, 2015

### 1.1 Background

In his speech Commissioner Johannes Hahn reminded his listeners what the base of construction for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was, namely fundamental values. Value promotion is one of the most important tasks that the European Union (EU) took on, as the Union itself grew extensively over the course of the last decades to a number of now twenty-eight Member States (MS). In order to generate a feeling of togetherness and due to the fact that the EU sees itself as a Union of values, it formulated its values under the *Berlin Declaration* in 2007 to be Freedom, Democracy, Rule of Law, Justice, Prosperity, Solidarity and Peace (European Commission, 2007a). Going back to Mr. Hahn's statement from the beginning it seems obvious that the promotion of these values is not limited to the inside of the EU's borders but also the outside, namely its direct neighbour countries.

Many scholars working on the ENP focus on the underlying concept applied, namely a governance model with an approach of conditionality (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011), thus a sector based cooperation between the EU and the partner state that offers rewards for demanded changes. The governance model based on conditionality is “seen as one of the most successful mechanisms available” (Beichelt, 2012, p. 6) because of its flexibility, as “non-cooperation (in one sector) does not prevent intense cooperation in other sectoral policies” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 887). Furthermore the model requires some degree of self-interest of the partner country and does not simply undermine the state (Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka, & Wetzel, 2011). On the other hand the overwhelming majority of authors evaluates the need of self-interest as the biggest weakness of the ENP, as strong incentives, which are not given due to the lack of EU

membership perspective and insufficiency of provided resources, are needed to encourage partner countries to initiate political change (Beichelt, 2012; T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Emerson, 2011; Freyburg et al., 2011; Gawrich, Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011; Stefan Wolff & Rodt, 2009).

Some scholars like Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) or Börzel and van Hüllen (2014) see the ENP as a tool of democratisation, which is working in a contrary environment, as “the ENP Action Plans (AP) favour stability over (democratic) change” (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1033). Other authors, as for example Wolff and Rodt (2009), place a stronger emphasis on the contributions the ENP can make regarding facilitating conflict resolution.

Gawrich et al. (2010) analysed the effectiveness of the ENP with a broader approach, as they added an economic and a judicial dimension to their study.

While reading academic literature on the ENP it becomes obvious that all authors fall short of analysing the whole range of ENP related fields with regard to the effectiveness of the policy. Surely the articles give a good impression about what is going on under the ENP concerning their area of interest but the reader does not know how effective the policy is working overall.

In the beginning Johannes Hahn was cited, confirming that the ENP is based on fundamental values, which encourages me to write this paper with the purpose to make a statement on the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a tool to promote European values, namely: Freedom, Democracy, Rule of Law, Justice, Prosperity, Solidarity and Peace.

## **1.2 Research Question**

The background information already provides the motivation for doing this research; that is, to make a statement on the overall effectiveness of the ENP that considers all of its dimensions and not only partially reflects on the process of value promotion. Therefore the following main research question was formulated:

- To what extent and how did the European Neighbourhood Policy influence the development of ENP partner states regarding European values?

The research question is supplemented by four relevant sub-questions, whereof the first -

- What are the goals, thus the optimum outcome, of the ENP?

- aims to answer the first part of the research question, namely “to what extent”. By showing the optimum outcome of the ENP, thus the complete implementation of the issues agreed on in the Action Plans, and by comparing it to actually implemented issues, the author will be able to make a statement on the direct impact of the policy.

The second and the third sub-question are very similar as they both seek to answer the same underlying question about the speed of value transformation. The values will be observed at three points in time, leading to the following questions:

- How did the application of the selected European values develop throughout the three points in time?

This question gives insight into the process of value transformation, as for example an approximation towards European values in the first timespan, but stagnation in the second timespan could be an indication for short-term effectiveness, or likewise for medium-term effectiveness.

In order to check for possible third variables, thus other events or developments affecting the value transformation in the country, a fourth question becomes necessary.

- Are other events affecting the development of value application?

This question checks for developments in value approximation of the partner country towards the EU with regard of the demands in the AP and its implementation. Consequently it is possible to find developments in dimensions researched that cannot be explained by implementation of AP goals and thus must be the result of third variables.

### **1.3 Approach**

In order to receive the necessary answers, a longitudinal study measuring at three points in time for three countries will be conducted.

First of all a theory will be developed within the next chapter based on opinions of scholars working on Europeanization and value promotion or more precisely the ENP. The Research Question will be an important guideline in the following chapter as researcher's opinions concerning the general effectiveness, as well as the long and short term effects will have to come to the fore.

In the third chapter the methodology will be discussed. In order to deliver an outcome based on reliable data, the five dimensions used in this study, namely *Freedom and Democracy, Rule of Law and Justice, Prosperity, Solidarity* and *Peace* will be explained and discussed in depth regarding their origin, importance and of course how they will be measured. At the same moment, the measurement, for example the indices, will be explained concerning the collection of data and meaning of the outcome.

The analysis will be the heart of this research, as it delivers a discussion of the data for each country and compares its development to the fulfilment of demands made by the EU in the bilaterally signed AP. Furthermore the development of the dimensions will be evaluated in the light of the theoretical considerations from chapter two of the paper. Additionally the sub-questions will be answered in this section.

Finally the Conclusion section will present the main findings of the paper, as well as the main question of this research. Moreover a statement on my expectations concerning this research project compared to the actual outcome will be made and suggestions for eventual further research will be made.

The current literature evaluated the ENP only partially, for example regarding democracy or security issues only. As the ENP builds on all fundamental European values it is important to consider the rest of indicators, too, as only a complete picture delivers the basis for a good evaluation. The majority of authors of academic literature about ENP agree that incentives are too weak for consistent political change, however they only focused on the democratic dimension. I want to consider as many dimensions of the ENP as possible to make a statement of the general effectiveness of the policy. It might be that – as the literature suggests – it is not effective in democracy promotion due to weak incentives, but it also might be that

changes and improvements in other dimensions, as for example economy and prosperity are made. Consequently the ENP would not be ineffective in total but only partially. I want to find out in this paper if the Neighbourhood Policy is misunderstood as tool of democratisation and therefore I want to widen the focus of analysis on all involved dimensions to find out the strength of the ENP. It may turn out that the policy is not effective concerning democracy, as pointed out in the academic discourse, but that it is very effective concerning the economic dimension or the judicial one. In order to find that out all dimensions of the ENP must be analysed.

At the moment the ENP aims to work on all dimensions of Europeanization at the same time, which is unlikely to succeed, as discussed in the academic discourse. The EU should focus on areas the ENP is performing well and keep on improving these and establish a step by step strategy for the ENP, as transformation in one sector could ease transformation in another sector with the help of spill-over effects. However to make such a suggestion I firstly have to find out if the ENP is performing well in an area, which I try to find out with the research conducted in this paper.

## **2. Theory**

This chapter will serve to give the reader an understanding of the underlying concepts, as well as the European values, which form the basis of analysis for the outcome of this paper. Thereby the focus will be on the origin of the values in the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) after the World War II – historical context –, the individual recognition of and identification with the values by the European people – cultural context – and finally the external promotion of the values under the ENP – political context. The aim here is to show the development of values in Europe, which developed from a partnership of convenience with values that were imposed upon the people towards a conscious promotion of the values that were adopted over time by the people of Europe. Based on the development and today's importance of values in Europe it is reasonable to believe in change in the European Neighbourhood that the ENP had impact on.

### **2.1 Contextualizing European value promotion in its Neighbourhood**

Europeanization is the concept that stands behind this research; nevertheless there are various points of view one can have on this topic. As Birgit Sittermann (2006) points out in her paper there are three predominant ways to understand this concept,



namely in a historical way, in a cultural way and in a political way. She defines Europeanization as a process towards the application “of formal and informal rules [values], procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Sittermann, 2006, p. 6). Consequently Europeanization is an approximation of values - or as Sittermann says ‘formal and informal rules’ - of a third state towards the European Union. The first question that comes up is about the origin of the values and why they are so tightly connected to Europe, which leads to the historical way of understanding the values.

### **2.1.1 Historical Context**

In a historical context the concept of common European values is very young. The first effort in this direction was made in the aftermath of World War II, which “played a significant role for the formation of European Community” (Erdem, 2006, p. 2), as it had revealed the fears of war for the second time within half a century. Thus the war was the trigger for the European politicians, especially the winners of the war, to think about possibilities to achieve sustainable peace on the continent. Therefore the move away from fascist, authoritarian regimes towards a democracy and rule of law-based political system was necessary. During one of his speeches Winston Churchill mentioned that the most important task to do so is to establish a partnership between historic rivals France and Germany (Berger, 2012, p. 7), which was especially important for France, as the French were - after being invaded and occupied multiple times by Germany – afraid that their German neighbour could become dangerous again. Consequently France “forced Germany into bilateral and international treaties in order to keep it controllable” (Berger, 2012, p. 37). The aforementioned treaties were the ECSC and later on the overarching European Communities (EC), at which especially the ECSC contributed to the aim to make war in Europe “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible“ (Schuman, 1950). Schuman’s quotes lines out another European value at this foundation state, which is prosperity. The connection of parts of the economy under the ECSC enabled the members to rebuild prosperity among the people.

### **2.1.2 Cultural Context**

On this first stage of value promotion, which is not so much a promotion but a finding, the actors are nation states. On the second stage, thus values in cultural context, it becomes an individual issue. The internalisation of values among the European people becomes clear when for example looking at the citizens' opinion about EU Membership of Turkey. A majority of more than 65% of the European citizens does not want Turkey to become a member of the European Union (Gerhards & Hans, 2011, p. 746), as the interviewees demanded "that Turkey must systematically respect human rights and improve the state of its economy" (Gerhards & Hans, 2011, p. 748) in order to become an EU member. Furthermore it was argued that the culture, thus the value set, of Turkey differs too much from the EU value set (Gerhards & Hans, 2011). This study shows that values have been internalised by the European citizens, who have a mind-set that is based on these values, which expresses itself for example also in the existence of non governmental organizations (NGO) and interest groups. Even though NGOs do not have direct political influence, they generate input, "in which demands are articulated through interest group pressures, protests, demonstrations, letter writing-campaigns" and social movement activism (Schmidt, 2013, p. 6). Matters of interest of NGOs and interest groups range from human rights promotion, over environmental protection to freedom of the people, thus congruent with European values. Recent examples for individual interest of the citizens in European value promotion are counter-demonstrations to the PEGIDA movement in Germany, who want solidarity with refugees from the Middle East, as well as the annually organized Aldermaston Marches, which started off as anti-nuclear weapons demonstrations and changed over time to a general demonstration for peace in the world.

In sum the European citizens' great awareness of the values of their community developed in the course of the last almost 70 years. The fact that not only states, like in the historical context, promote these values, but also individuals underlines the European character of these values.

### **2.1.3 Political Context**

Europeanization in a political context was already shortly mentioned above as aim of NGOs. Here however Europeanization efforts from the government side will be shown and discussed. After the EU decided to construct a "ring of friends" (Prodi,

2002) around its borders in order to create a buffer zone between non-members and its border, there are two mechanisms that are of interest. The first is described as the misfit theory, which picks out the gap between European policy proposals or demands (like the AP) and domestic traditions as a central theme. According to the theory, which is very popular among researchers, the starting point for Europeanization is always the “recognition of a ‘misfit’ or a ‘mismatch’ between EU requirements and the domestic situation” (Sittermann, 2006, p. 11). However conditionality, thus being rewarded for initiating domestic changes, is an important part in the misfit theory (Sittermann, 2006), as countries initiate change in order to be better off and not to fulfil another’s country expectation without a benefit, which leads directly to the second mechanism essential in Europeanization, namely conditionality. Europeanization was traditionally done by a bottom-up or top-down approach, since the introduction of the ENP however this changed radically to a new form of value promotion, which is the governance model (Beichelt, 2012; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The governance model promotes European and especially democratic values in an indirect way (Freyburg et al., 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) via cooperation with third states. First of all one has to know that cooperation under the governance model is sector based, which ensures a cooperation among at least some fields, as non-cooperation in one field does not block cooperation in another field (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Among the ENP fields of cooperation could for example be Rule of Law, economy and trade partnerships and solidarity issues like benefit systems. The speciality of this system lies in its promotion of democratic principles like accountability, transparency and participation that are directly integrated in the cooperation, so that every cooperation partner necessarily has to act on them (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The model aims at a slow but steady creation of a civic society that is aware of the promoted underlying values and that will eventually spill over to policy fields not cooperated on yet. On the one hand the governance model appears like a good way to promote European interests without directly intervening with a third states traditions, on the other hand third states will need incentives to initiate change and therefore conditionality remains an integral component of Europeanization. Concerning the ENP one can say that the dominant opinion among scholars on the policy and especially its conditionality is that it failed to tie in with its forerunner (the Eastern enlargement) due to mistakes in construction of the policy. They argue that it

offers too little rewards compared to the big demands (weak conditionality) (Emerson, 2011; Gawrich et al., 2010; Tina Freyburg, 2011). Others argue that conditionality seems to be the right way to transform values in third states, as it is “one of the most successful mechanisms available” (Beichelt, 2012, p. 6). Yet according to the scholars, the reward system must be reviewed.

The ENP is currently the main policy in the field of Europeanization for the direct neighbourhood, which was introduced to overcome a dilemma, namely being torn between “over-expanding to the point that its effectiveness as a union is fatally damaged” and “denying one of its founding principles: to be open to all European democracies” (Emerson, 2004, p. 1). Furthermore it was the aim of the EU to create a “ring of friends” (Smith, 2005, p. 1) around the European Member States in political and social terms in accordance with the goals for democracy and development cooperation within the Maastricht Treaty (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 2).

The policy is a trade-off between the EU and its neighbouring countries in which the EU demands an approximation to European values like for example the protection of human rights, equal rights for men and women and an increased investment in social security systems (E.E.A.S., 2007, p. 2) and the EU in turn offers financial aid for the requested sectors and better access to the European single market in order to achieve the goals set (E.E.A.S., 2007, p. 2) or in other words “economic co-operation in exchange for political reforms” (Gawrich et al., 2010, p. 1213). The cooperation is sector based and non-cooperation in one sector “does not prevent intense cooperation in other sectoral policies” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 3).

Despite the good intentions the ENP is criticized in every possible way like the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach used by the policy (T. Börzel & Risse, 2009), which was tried to resolve by various changes of the ENP. The most prominent changes are for sure the establishment of the Eastern Partnership, which supplements the ENP for the Eastern states of the policy, as well as the Union of the Mediterranean, which fulfils the same task for the remaining countries. Additionally the ENP was revised in 2011 with a grant of additional funding and the aim to achieve more differentiation in order to counter the ‘one-size-fits-all’ critique (European Commission, 2011). Furthermore the majority of scholars finds that the policy does not work because of the lack of membership status – therefore criticized as ‘enlargement-lite’ (Emerson, 2011) - of the partner states, ergo too weak incentives for change (Beichelt, 2012; Emerson,

2011; Freyburg et al., 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) and that it pursues conflicting goals (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014). Moreover the ENP is criticized for “being biased towards an EU view” (Gawrich et al., 2010, p. 1212), as the ENP serves to satisfy European security interests regarding illegal migration, drug trafficking etc. (Gawrich et al., 2010, p. 1214), as well as being opportunistic as Emerson (2011, p. 3) observed. The EU negotiated with Libya because of oil revenues, while at the same time declaring the need of progress regarding values. The bias towards the EU view leads to an assumption regarding the main research question, namely that changes in some fields like economy or security are more likely than in others as it affects the EU directly. This assumption gets more weight through the finding of Börzel and van Hüllen, namely that the ENP is “clearly favouring stability over change” (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1033). All these critics lead to the conclusion that change – in this case positive change, thus approximation towards European values – is highly questionable (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014). This view is underlined by the lack of rewards for further establishment of democratic institutions, but also the lack of punishment for non-establishment (Gawrich et al., 2010, p. 1219). In other words the ENP only supports the status quo (Emerson, 2011) without providing a real ambition to improve the democratic situation in a partner country.

The link between the general aim of Europeanization and the specific plan to do so in the direct neighbourhood are the bilaterally signed Action Plans between the EU and the partner state. Action Plans give a guideline of main steps for implementation (Pace, 2007) of issues formerly agreed on. The agreement on goals is done in two steps, whereby the first step includes the agreement on goals between all MS of the EU (Whitman & Wolff, 2010, p. 16), and the second step the agreement between the EU position and the ENP partner state, which can be difficult negotiations due to authoritarian style of countries (especially in the Mediterranean area) and their interpretation “of what ‘common values’ actually mean in practice” (Pace, 2007, p. 667). Since APs are designed along the European values confirmed in the Berlin Declaration, thus Freedom, Democracy, Rule of Law, Justice, Prosperity, Solidarity and Peace, there is actually very few room for interpretation of what is meant by common values. On the other hand it became clear that scholars engaged in this field of research mainly focus on the democracy aspect of the ENP (T. A. Börzel &

van Hüllen, 2014; Freyburg et al., 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) and only few evaluate other dimensions like Security (Stefan Wolff & Rodt, 2009) or Rule of Law and Justice (Gawrich et al., 2010). The outcome is however, excepting the security field, almost always the same, namely the failure of the policy due to too weak conditionality (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Freyburg et al., 2011; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) and the fact that it is biased towards an EU view (Gawrich et al., 2010).

## **2.2 Concluding Remarks**

In sum the different perspectives one can have concerning European values and Europeanization were highlighted. Furthermore the way from value application by the nation states after World War II, over identification with the values by the people and finally the promotion of these values in a political way were pointed out. Firstly, the historical origin and the circumstances of today's European values, which were established as a consequence to permanent wars on the European continent, were explained. Secondly the cultural context was presented and it was pointed out that values became a part of the citizens' culture and mind-set, as they individually and self-motivated engage in the promotion of European values. Finally the political context highlights the importance of the ENP, the recent EU main Europeanization policy, and the conditions that need to be present for an Europeanization process. Additionally the functioning of the ENP was issued and evaluated with the most engaged researchers opinions.

Since the research on the functioning of the ENP is very limited to only some European values, namely essentially democracy, but also security and justice, the purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the effectiveness of the European Europeanization policy, ENP, regarding the whole range of values listed in the Berlin Declaration. Furthermore this research considers the translation and implementation of goals set in the AP to evaluate the success of the policy.

### **3. Methodology**

In order to give answers to the central questions asked by this research it is necessary to give the reader insight to the approach pursued by the author. Therefore this chapter aims to explain the underlying methodology.

In a first step the research design, thus the type of study made with its variables, will be indicated and operationalized. In a second step the case selection will be discussed and justified. Furthermore the reader will find the data collection method and data analysis explained together with the justification for the selected sources. The final step of this chapter consists of a short conclusion that indicates the researcher's idea of getting answers to the research questions.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research at hand was approached with a mixed method of quantitative, as well as qualitative data with a longitudinal design, more specifically an Interrupted Time Series (ITS). The starting point is an empirical research question with an explanatory aim. Furthermore, variables will be used to test a causal proposition, namely the impact of the ENP on the application of European values in ENP partner states. The independent variable in this study is the ENP with its demands formulated in the country specific APs, whereas the dependent variable is the application of European values in the observed countries.

As the aim of this paper is to show the development of application of European values in ENP partner states, thus the comparison of the same data for the same group at different points in time, a longitudinal design is the best way to do so. Furthermore one of the points in time will be located before or very close to the introduction of the first ENP AP in a country, thus an impact of the treatment is not possible or at least very unlikely, which makes the ITS the most applicable study for this kind of research.

#### **3.2 Case selection**

The ENP partner states can roughly be divided into three areas, namely Northern Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe. In order to make a comprehensive statement on the effectiveness of the ENP one country from each region will be chosen, whereby not only the region of origin plays a role but also the type of political regimes, orientation and geographical position that differentiates the countries.

For the Northern African region Egypt has been chosen, as it was an authoritarian state at the adoption of the first ENP AP and the political development in the recent decade shows instability and the establishment of a civic society. Speaking of the civic society and political instability in Egypt the Arab Spring and the academic discussion if it was a result of the ENP or not is also one reason why this country was selected as representative for the first region.

The second region is the Middle East, which is broadly considered as instable and mainly authoritarian. However Israel makes an exemption in this region as the country has a stable democracy and can be considered as western in terms of “self-image, orientation and ties, science and technology, higher education, market economy, procedural democracy and Protestant ethic” (Smootha, 2005, p. 441), which was another incentive to select Israel as representative for the Middle East, as this is a good opportunity to evaluate the possible impact of the ENP on other Western states.

The last of the three regions is Eastern Europe, which will be represented by Moldova. Moldova was selected due to its geographical position, as it is one of two ENP partner states with AP that shares a direct boarder with the EU. Furthermore Emerson and Noutcheval (2004) theorized that the higher the distance to a strong democracy the lower the impact on the country. Since I want to show the effect of the ENP it is important for the purpose of this paper to chose a country as close to the EU as possible. In contrast to the Ukraine, which is the second country with a direct border with the EU and an adopted AP, Moldova was politically more stable than its Neighbour Ukraine since the adoption of the AP and the government was always able to act like for example the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2015), which can be seen as necessity for sustainable and continuous work on the implementation of the AP and thus the approximation towards EU values.

### **3.3 Methods of Data Collection**

The ENP’s impact on value approximation and the general effectiveness of the policy will be evaluated on the basis of several data sets, such as official documents, indices and statistical data. On the one side the independent variable or the treatment in this study, which is the ENP, will be measured with the help of the country specific APs, which will symbolise the optimum outcome of the ENP. On the



other side there is the dependent variable called *value application*. In order to get detailed information on the development of European values in the Neighbourhood the variable was split up into five indicators that are related to the European values stated in the Berlin Declaration. Due to a lack of available data the indicators *mutual respect* and *tolerance* cannot be considered in this study. Furthermore *shared responsibility* becomes part of *solidarity*, *security* becomes part of *peace*, as well as *freedom* and *democracy*, and *rule of law* and *justice* will become a combined indicator each. In consequence the dependent variable *value application* consists of five indicators, namely *Freedom and Democracy*, *Rule of Law and Justice*, *Prosperity*, *Solidarity*, as well as *Peace*.

Since this research is conducted as a longitudinal study the points in time that are of interest will be presented and explained in the following. Owing to the fact that I ultimately want to show a development and trend of the effect of the ENP in value application I had to choose the first point of time at a date that was not affected by the adoption of the ENP AP in order to have a status quo. Since I use the same points in time for all countries and data must be available for the selected years the selection can only happen in a rough way, which means that the earliest point in time that offers data for all indicators will be selected. Furthermore the ENP stands for a transformation process of Europeanization, thus quick changes are unlikely. Therefore the first date in the analysis will be 2006, which will serve as status quo, so the situation in the countries without a manipulation effect of the ENP. In order to grasp all possible effects of the policy it is necessary to locate the last point in time as close to the present as possible to be able to consider the effects of the ENP at the present, thus 2014 will be the end of the timeframe. In 2010 there will be another point of time that shall help to identify short-term developments under the ENP and help to answer the sub-questions of the research question.

The selection of the first and the third point of time is additionally reasoned with the aim to keep the time frame as short as possible in order to reduce the risk of maturation that is likely to occur among longitudinal studies. However there have to be mention limitations concerning the timeframe for two of the indicators, namely *Solidarity* and *Peace*. *Solidarity* will be measured in social protection expenditures, but neither available source offers data after 2012, which makes 2012 the last point in time for *Solidarity*. The indicator *Peace* is based on the Global Peace Index, which offers data from 2007 on, thus for this indicator the first point in time will 2007.

### 3.4 Methods of Data Analysis

The first step towards the analysis is to measure the variables in the right way. Therefore the measurement of the concepts presented in the theory chapter of this paper will be explained and justified in the following.

For the dependent variable both qualitative and quantitative measures have been selected. As highlighted in the second chapter and above the dependent variable was split up into 5 indicators that cover all values the EU wants to improve with the ENP. The first value is *Freedom and Democracy*, which is measured in Freedom House scores from the Freedom in the World index. I chose *Freedom House*, as it is a well-known database with a high reputation that is dedicated to the ranking of currently 195 countries in the world regarding their freedom, democracy and other related aspects. Another reason to select Freedom House as source is the high transparency and openly communicated methodology of the organisation and its database. Furthermore, other databases like the CIRI Index or the Polity IV Dataset as used by Kelly (2006) do not cover the whole range of years of interest and the Polity IV data is additionally hard to read due to the lack of an exact scale.

Secondly *Rule of Law and Justice* is also retrieved from the Freedom in the World study. Even though it was already included in the first indicator it is important to evaluate it separately, as the Rule of Law is an integral part of the APs and the EU MS itself. Therefore an evaluation of the *Rule of Law and Justice* indicator integrated in the democracy indicator would fall short of the significance of this indicator. Moreover, other measurement like the evaluation of law and order by the PSR Group as used in other papers (Kelly, 2006) was not possible here due to the high price access.

The next indicator is *Prosperity*, which is measured in Gross National Income (GNI) that additionally to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or GDP per capita like used by Kelly (2006) considers a country's payments to the rest of the world and vice versa (The World Bank, 2015a). Due to the additional considerations of the GNI it is the best indicator for prosperity in a country, as it only displays the amount of money that is really available. The data for *prosperity* will come from The World Bank's *World Development Indicators* that are based on "the most current and accurate global development data" from well recognized sources (The World Bank, 2015c). The fourth indicator of value application is *Solidarity*, which is measured in the amount of social protection expenditures, as the OECD explains: "Social protection is

a measure of the extent to which countries assume responsibility for supporting the standard of living of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. Benefits may be targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons“ (OECD Data, 2015). Due to the fact that social protection is paid with the taxes of all citizens of a country it symbolises the country’s and citizens’ solidarity with the disadvantaged nationals. The data for this indicator will come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that bases its findings on “Statement(s) of Government Operations and Balance Sheet information, where available, and/or a Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash” (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. vii). Similar to the foregoing sources the IMF is an internationally and independently acting and highly trusted organization, which makes it an appropriate source for data for this research. Finally the last indicator of the dependent variable is *Peace*, which is an indicator that got very little attention in the current ENP literature, which also does not offer any empirical analysis of peace. The measurement of peace in a general context is mainly done in military expenditures or like Barker (1991) did it, in military expenditures and few other indicators. Therefore *Peace* is measured in the Vision of humanity – Global Peace Index (GPI). Since the index consists of 23 indicators the probability of third variables is low, which qualifies it as measure for the peace indicator of the dependent variable of this study.

In a second step the AP as measure for the optimum outcome of the independent variable becomes important. The documents that are retrieved from the EU External Action Service will serve as comparison to analyse if demanded change was actually implemented. Thus the main demands from the APs concerning a certain issue will be pointed out in the analysis and it will be counter checked what has been done in this field in a certain country. The data collected for the dependent variable will thereby support the comparison and give a visual impression if the work done, has actually had impact on the value application in the country observed.

### **3.5 Concluding Remarks**

This section informs the reader about how the author wants to tackle the research questions and how he plans to get results. Firstly it was pointed out that this study is a longitudinal study that seeks to give answers to the research questions in a mixed method approach with qualitative and quantitative data. The data shall be collected from several sources like indices, reports, policy papers and statistical databases.

The points in time for the longitudinal study were chosen regarding the availability of data, as well as the introduction of the first AP for a country. Regarding the countries it was argued that the ENP can be divided into three regions and that it would be interesting to choose countries with different characteristics, in order to make a broad statement on the effectiveness of the ENP. Therefore this study observes Egypt as southern authoritarian state, Israel as western state and Moldova as the only state in this study sharing a direct border with the EU. In the next step it was explained that the final outcome of this study will be based on a comparison between demanded changes under the ENP AP and actually implemented changes, which will be backed by the data for the different indicators for value application.

#### 4. Analysis

This chapter provides the core part of the thesis, as it transfers the theoretical exemplifications from the previous chapters to a practical case. In this instance the analysis will be split up into three sub sections based on the observed countries. The dependent variable of this study – value application – regarding *Freedom and Democracy*, *Rule of Law and Justice*, *Prosperity*, *Solidarity* and finally *Peace*, will be discussed for each country, which will help to achieve the goal of this paper, namely an all-embracing analysis of all included fields under the ENP, in contrast to the current literature that mostly focuses on the democracy aspect of the ENP. The significance of the indicators for this paper is reasoned with its purpose, namely evaluating the effect of the ENP on all confirmed European values as stated in the Berlin Declaration (European Commission, 2007a). Furthermore the following paragraphs will justify the choice and importance of indicators on a historical and constructional background of Europe and the European Union.

The significance of *Freedom and Democracy* in this research is given due to its shaping character of the European Union. On the one hand today's European Union is the best performing economic entity, which is also a result of the European Single Market (ESM) that "refers to the EU as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement [...]" (European Commission, 2015b). Furthermore the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU guarantees freedom of expression and information, as well as the pluralism of the media under article 10, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion under article 11 (European Union, 2000, pp. 10, 11).

On the other hand *Democracy* is the most traditional value in this research, as Rommily (quoted in Ossewaarde, 2013, p. 15) states that the first connection between Europe and democracy was already made in Athens by the ancient Greek orator Isocrates, who introduced the idea of Europe in order to boost the cultural-, thus in the ancient case the political- vitality of ancient Greece towards its enemies. Furthermore the Greek city-state with its notions of government, namely democracy, is, from a sociological point of view, considered to be 'the cradle of European civilization' as stated by Roche (quoted in Ossewaarde, 2013, p. 15).

Aristotle said that: “The rule of law is better than that of any individual”. Following this idea King Henry I bound himself to the law by the Charter of Liberties, which is the basis for the Magna Carta of 1215, which emphasizes “the importance of the independence of the judiciary and the role of judicial process as fundamental characteristics of the rule of law” (Selous & Bassu, 2014, p. 350), making the *Rule of Law and Justice* indicator a very traditional one that is interwoven with European history and therefore is a core value of the EU.

The *Prosperity* indicator gains significance by means of the foundation of the forerunner of the EU, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was designed as a common market for coal and steel, in order to achieve “economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living” (EUR-Lex, 2010, para. 8) and finally became part of the European Union with its Single Market, the currently strongest economic area in the world (The World Bank, 2015d). As described in the Methodology section, Prosperity will be measured in GNI. The individual prosperity of a country is displayed as percentage of a benchmark, namely the average EU 28 GNI (in constant 2005 US\$) from 2014, which amounts to 551.000.862.968,25\$.

*Solidarity* describes the existence of social safety nets, which is a European core value since all EU member states are welfare states. The concept came up in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in Prussia offering old-age pensions, accident insurance and medical care to its citizens and was initially introduced in order to keep citizens loyal to the state (Beck, 1997; Hennock, 2007).

As described in the Methodology part, Prosperity will be measured in Social Protection Expenditures. The individual solidarity of a country is displayed as percentage of a benchmark, namely the average EU 28 Social Protection Expenditures from 2012, which amounts to 142.922.590.128,57€.

*Peace* is significant in what Sittermann (2006) calls the historical context of European value promotion. The main driver for creation of the ECSC was to ensure a lasting peace on the European continent (EUR-Lex, 2010), which becomes very clear by adding the statement of former French foreign minister, Robert Schuman (1950): pooling coal and steel production in Europe would make war between historic rivals

France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”. The European Union preserved this idea and made it part of the Treaty on European Union in article 3(1) TEU, as well as 21(2) TEU (European Union, 2008) and was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 2012 for “advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2012, para. 1).

This part of the research seeks to answer the first sub-question of the main research questions, namely: What are the goals, thus the optimum outcome of the ENP?

As mentioned before the optimum outcome of the ENP is highly dependent on what has been agreed on between the EU and the partner state in the ENP Action Plan. Therefore in this section, demands from the APs concerning the introduced indicators will be presented and compared to actual changes or reactions from the countries. Doing so for all three countries will give good insight into the effectiveness of the ENP in all its width. The mixed approach of analysing the APs and comparing changes to independent sources presented in graphs will also provide a good overview of possible third variables affecting the outcome, which will be discussed at the end of each country section, along with an evaluation of the development of the application of the selected European values throughout the three points in time. Finally there will be a conclusion that sums up the findings for all countries, answers the sub questions of the research question, and relates it to the theory, as discussed in chapter two of this research.

#### **4.1 Moldova**

According to the data for the selected points in time, Moldova is the only country in this study that faced a change in the indicator for *Freedom and Democracy*. The starting point in 2006 shows a value of 3,5, which improves to 3,0 until 2010 and stays stable until 2014 (see Appendix A).

The AP for Moldova mentions explicitly “further strengthening of democracy” (European Commission, 2005b, p. 4) and “ensuring respect for freedom of the media” and freedom of expression (European Commission, 2005b, p. 4) in the priorities for action. Furthermore the AP demands respect for fundamental freedoms also for minorities in Moldova, as well as the freedom of movement for services and workers.

The starting point in 2006 is stamped by the recognition that Moldova has a sound electoral framework, which guarantees for free and fair elections. However the electoral law is imbalanced to the disadvantage of ethnic or regional parties. Furthermore there was only one TV broadcasting station in the whole country and print media was rarely available in rural areas. Journalists face high fines for government criticism, which results in self-censorship. However Moldova announced a media reform, which media representatives welcomed as it may lead to a better press freedom in the future, but also criticised it because it is “not in line with European standards” (Freedom House, 2007b, para. 11). Freedom of expression is generally allowed, but NGOs have to register and government support for interest groups is very poor. Minorities face discrimination, as religious communities have to register with the government and there is for example no occasion where a Muslim group was granted register. Furthermore Roma are facing discrimination regarding housing and work and are victims of police violence (Freedom House, 2007b).

On the one hand the period from 2006 to 2010 showed a downward trend in topics issued by the AP. Minorities were further discriminated and religious groups will need at least 100 members to be significant enough to register (Freedom House, 2008b) and the discrimination towards Roma remains unsolved. Furthermore elections were reported to be media biased, and the government undertook serious attempts to oust the opposition with biased budget allocations (Freedom House, 2009c). On the other hand, which finally led to the increase of this indicator, Moldova lowered the threshold for parliamentary elections, which strengthens small parties and the democratic diversity. Furthermore the government did not intervene in political gatherings ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections. Moreover the media environment improved, so that the number of independent Television broadcasters rose up to three, and the spectrum of opinions in the print media increased, even though the availability in rural areas remains low (Freedom House, 2011c).

In the following years the democratic pluralist electoral culture remained high and even improved, as a pro Roma, thus minority party, made it in the parliament in the 2014 elections. Furthermore the problem of media bias ahead of elections was tackled by introducing rules that demand balanced news coverage. The Freedom of assembly and expression is generally allowed in Moldova, which expresses itself in the growing numbers of protests and demonstrations (Freedom House, 2015c).



The EU formulates its priorities for action regarding the *Rule of Law and Justice* towards Moldova as: strengthening the Rule of Law. The AP suggests several ways to get there, as for example by ensuring the independence of the judiciary, by ensuring the respect for human rights and the implementation of core UN Conventions, as well as ensuring the protection of national minorities and the eradication of ill-treatment and torture (European Commission, 2005b, pp. 4,5,6,7).

For the first two points in time the score is stable at 8, which reflects on the one hand the improvements concerning the judicial independence made by Moldova in 2005, but on the other hand considers the unresolved discrimination of minorities, such as Roma. However concerning the independence of the judiciary, one can say that Moldova did not develop further after the changes in 2005 (see Appendix B). Even though the constitution provides an independent judiciary, the law enforcement is prominent for bribery and corruption. Furthermore the demanded protection of national minorities was not resolved, as religious discrimination, discrimination and police violence against Roma persists (Freedom House, 2015c), although the UN Convention against all forms of racial discrimination was already ratified in 1993. Concerning the core UN Conventions one can say that the ratification is not a problem, since Moldova ratified or signed all core Conventions but one (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2016), whereby three out of nine Conventions were signed after the adoption of the AP (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2016). However the application and respect for the human rights is problematic, which becomes obvious regarding the discrimination of Roma or the ill treatment of convicts (Freedom House, 2015c). Nevertheless the ratification of UN Conventions shows some effect concerning torture in Moldova, which was declared a criminal offence in consequence of the ratification of the optional protocol of the convention against torture (Freedom House, 2007b).

The decrease in the data between 2010 and 2014 to a score of only 7 is thereby reasoned with a high amount of reports about bribery and malfeasance among judges in 2013 (Freedom House, 2014c). However the fight against bribery was not explicitly mentioned in the AP and therefore does not fall into the responsibility of the ENP.

The AP for Moldova prioritises, regarding *Prosperity*, to resume the cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs) to achieve goals like the strengthened growth of the private sector, fiscal sustainability and the improvement of the investment climate through structural reforms (European Commission, 2005b, p. 4). Further, the AP demands structural reforms that increase transparency and predictability of business (European Commission, 2005b, p. 14), and the creation of a suitable environment for companies (European Commission, 2005b, pp. 15, 28). It also includes demands concerning the facilitation of movement of goods (European Commission, 2005b, p. 19), abolishment of “discriminatory measures affecting foreign investment” (European Commission, 2005b, p. 21), and the implementation of PCA commitments (European Commission, 2005b, p. 17). All of the above mentioned demands could be linked to the priorities listed in the beginning of the Action Plan.

At first glance the table shows a positive improvement regarding prosperity related issues in Moldova, but at second glance it becomes clear that the development is a very slow one (see Appendix C). However Moldova worked on the AP’s guideline and was therefore able to implement many of its demands at least partially. Concerning the first point, the fiscal sustainability, the World Bank and the Moldovan Ministry of Finance developed a strong dialogue supported through “technical assistance and investment/policy lending while making the sector more resilient to possible shocks” (The World Bank, 2016b, para. 1). Moreover Moldova was able to make great progress in improving its investment climate and the linked business environment (The World Bank, 2016a; The World Bank Group, 2016c), which was mainly pushed by the Competitiveness Enhancement Project by The World Bank (2016c). According to the Doing Business Report the sentiment in almost all evaluated areas increased, even though transparency and predictability of business must still be worked on (The World Bank, 2016a). Reasons for improvement are also the adjusted business environment, as it is much easier to open a business in Moldova now compared to 2006 (The World Bank Group, 2016b) and it also takes much less time to start a business (The World Bank Group, 2016c). Furthermore the payment of taxes was facilitated through the introduction of an electronic filing system. Moreover getting a credit became much more feasible, after the introduction of the first Moldovan credit bureau. Lastly it became easier to resolve insolvency, as Moldova revised the structure of the insolvency process (The World Bank Group,

2016b). The next point mentioned in the AP is the facilitation of the movement of goods, which was effectively tackled and resolved by making “the economy comply with the DCFTA” (European Commission, 2015a).

One can say that Moldova managed to implement actions proposed in the AP, but the effect may not be measurable in GNI, or it just needs more time to develop. Nevertheless the country worked and achieved great process among the issues discussed in the AP.

The data for the *Solidarity* indicator for Moldova is very limited, as the availability is not given. Although the social protection expenditures compared to the EU countries are very low there is still a positive trend after the adoption of the AP (see Appendix F). The only priority set by the EU, concerning this indicator, is the reduction of poverty (European Commission, 2005b, p. 4). Further the AP suggests improving welfare by increasing the effectiveness of targeting and social assistance in general (European Commission, 2005b, p. 12) and the strengthening of a dialogue that helps to assess the situation, identify key challenges and to develop policy responses (European Commission, 2005b, p. 16).

To increase solidarity in Moldova the government, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, set up a strategy to reduce poverty and increase economic success (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Additionally the *Ajutor Social program* contributes to foster the trend from the graph. The project started in 2010 and reviewed social protection expenditure and consequently revised it. As a result, the coverage of beneficiaries was almost doubled by 2012 (The World Bank, 2014), whereby “about 80 percent of its budget [go] to the bottom population quintile“ (Smolyar, 2015, p. 6). Moldova already reduced the number of people living in poverty before the introduction of the AP, but sustained this trend and reduced poverty after the adoption of the AP even further (Dávalos & Meyer, 2015, p. 7).

Moldova participates in a dialogue on social matters as demanded by the AP. The dialogue is chaired by the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* and takes place “on a monthly basis and rests on 14 conventions that are signed on a national level” (Ciurea, 2015, p. 6), as for example the convention on employees’ wages. The dialogue shows effect for instance regarding the monthly minimum wage, which increased by 26€ since 2006, or the number of people, who are socially insured, which also increased since 2006 (Ciurea, 2015, p. 9).

According to the three points in time the *Peace* indicator in Moldova remained stable over the observed period of time. However minor improvements of the indicator made Moldova the most peaceful country in this comparison (see Appendix I).

Demands from the EU formulated in the AP focus on efforts “towards a viable solution of the Transnistria conflict” (European Commission, 2005b, p. 3), which was declared to be a priority for action. Moreover cooperation at combat of terrorism, through implementation of UN Resolutions, and arms exports of illegal nature and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are demands in the AP (European Commission, 2005b, p. 10).

Moldova made an effort in settling the conflict with Transnistria by resuming the 5+2 negotiations, in 2011 with the region, after they were interrupted for almost six years (OSCE, 2011). The 5+2 negotiations are “chaired by the OSCE, involve the two parties to the conflict, and include the Russian Federation and Ukraine as mediators (the ‘five’). The United States and European Union are observers (the ‘two’)” (United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, n.A., para. 2). The negotiations are also very important regarding the illegal selling of weapons, as illegal weapon smuggle flourishes in Transnistria, although Moldova implemented the Arms Trade Treaty in 2015, which prevents the trade of illegal arms (Răileanu, 2015). Furthermore the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is secured by several treaties and initiatives like the *Security Initiative against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (PSI)*, the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)*, or the *Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, n.A.) and additionally with the implementation of the UN resolution 1540 (The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the UN, 2005). Regarding combating terrorism Moldova fulfilled the demands stated in the AP by implementing both UN resolutions - 1373/01 in 2006 (The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the UN, 2006) and 2011 with the confessions to the content of resolution 1267/01 (European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York, 2011).

In sum Moldova implemented the majority of Action Plan demands for every indicator observed, which gives reason to believe that the ENP had a very strong impact on changes in the country. Concerning the development of the indicators there is no clear pattern between introduction of the ENP and change in the indicator – except that all overall improvements started with a positive change in the first observed period –, as some indicators changed only in the first, some only in the second and others in both periods. Therefore it is not possible to assign the ENP to a certain policy type, as both short-term effects, as well as medium-term effects are visible.

Third variables affecting the development of value application are not visible among the most indicators in Moldova, especially since the EU encourages its partner countries in the APs to cooperate with international agencies in order to achieve the set goals, thus international interference cannot be considered a third variable, as it is part of the AP. Though there is a breach among the *Rule of Law and Justice* variable, as AP demands have broadly been implemented but the score decreases due to the high amount of bribery reports, which can only be explained by insufficiency of the implemented policies or a third variable. Moreover it is thinkable that the Ukrainian conflict, due to its geographical proximity, led to a quicker implementation of AP demands in order to get to the point to be offered an Association Agreement, which could prevent violent conflicts like in Ukraine.

## **4.2 Egypt**

In 2006 the *Freedom and Democracy* in Egypt was rated by Freedom House with 5,5 out of 7 points, thus in the lower third of the scale. One would expect that the freedom in Egypt improves after the adoption of the first ENP AP in 2007, but the level of freedom remains unchanged. Even after the Arab spring and presidential elections the score remained at 5,5 on the 1-7 scale. Since there is no stable change, or no change at all, among the data it is hard to argue that the ENP had any impact on the degree of *Freedom* in Egypt (see Appendix A).

The starting value of 5,5 for Egypt is justified by Freedom House (2007a) with the lasting state of emergency and its consequences. Egypt is not considered an electoral democracy, the state of emergency limits a high amount of basic rights like the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and association, the right to strike on labour related issues, as well as the possibility to join demonstrations, which are rarely allowed. The freedom value for Egypt is the worst in this study, which is

also a result of the predominant ruling party NDP, which has safe majority in the parliament, and the weak opposition that is additionally kept small by attacks of security and pro-government forces. Parties can only be established after having a permission of a national institute and the judicial independence is not given either. Furthermore the ruling party controls the media and punishes regime critical journalists violently. Discrimination is also a problem in Egypt, as many people, like women or followers of non-Islamic religions, are affected. Moreover the Egyptian government interferes with the academic freedom and appoints senior administrators according to their academic interests.

As the graph indicates, there were no improvements over the following years. The suppression of journalists and limitation of freedom of expression went on (Freedom House, 2008a), 2008 the authorities arrested potential candidates for the presidential election (Freedom House, 2009a) and a crackdown on the media in 2010 lead to a high degree of self-censorship of content that is not in accordance with the government or Islam (Freedom House, 2010, 2011a). In the following years Egypt faced an improvement in freedom due to a “robust culture of popular protest”, “enhanced judicial independence” and an “increase in political pluralism” after the ouster of former president Mubarak (Freedom House, 2012a). Furthermore Egypt undertook elections in 2012 that complied with international standards (Freedom House, 2013a). Those positive developments are not visible in the table above as the overthrow of the democratically elected president Morsi and the “increased role of the military” (Freedom House, 2014a) led together with the “complete marginalization of the opposition” and surveillance of communication (Freedom House, 2015a) to anew downgrading of the freedom in Egypt.

The AP however mentions the promotion and protection of freedom several times for instance when demanding protection of “human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 6), the promotion of freedom of thought, freedom of the press and the fight against “all forms of discrimination” (p. 8). Additionally the movement of persons shall be improved as envisioned by the AP (p. 30). On the one hand the AP shows a high amount of dedication to the promotion of freedom, but on the other hand does not mention it once in its priorities for action.

Not one of the freedom related goals set in the AP was achieved in a sustainable way. The fundamental freedom of assembly is still restricted by law, the media is still

controlled by the government or a victim of self-censorship, and equal treatment for the sexes is indeed implemented but is not enforced.

The data for *Rule of Law and Justice* stayed at a low level for the first two points of observation. After the revolts of the Arab spring in 2011 and the following elections there is a small increase among the Freedom House subcategory evaluating the Rule of Law. Nevertheless the situation became worse after overturning the democratically elected president, so the 2014 score is the lowest in this comparison. Again it is hard to believe that the ENP had any direct impact on the changes in this indicator due to the lack of change in the first years (see Appendix B).

The independence of the judiciary is not given, as the Justice Ministry and the President, who appoints the judges, influence it (Freedom House, 2008a). A constitutional amendment from 2007 hinders the ability of the judiciary to “balance against executive excess” (Freedom House, 2008a) and mass trials. Furthermore unjustified imprisonments happen regularly in Egypt (Freedom House, 2015a). The security system remains unreformed after the increase of police violence. Finally not all groups of people are treated in the same way like for example gay men, or women that are according to the law equal to men, but in reality “some laws and traditional practices discriminate against women” (Freedom House, 2015a).

However the AP still mentions “strengthening the rule of law and consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 3) and “the promotion and protection of human rights” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 4) as priorities for action. Furthermore it is stated in the AP that transparency shall be strengthened “through preventive anti-corruption policies and practices” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 28).

The AP did not succeed here as the judiciary is still influenced by the government and Egypt remains a country with corruption on all levels of the state (Freedom House, 2015a).

In comparison to the already reviewed indicators, *Prosperity* is the first that shows a positive development of the values. Whereas Egypt’s GNI in 2006 was only 17,48% of the average EU 28 GNI from 2014 it grew rapidly to 21,54% by 2014 of the same benchmark. Between 2010 and 2014 Egypt was able to improve its GNI again to 23,23% of the known benchmark (see Appendix D).

Taking a look at the Action Plan for Egypt from 2007 an influence on this indicator from the ENP is well possible, as the following priorities for action are formulated: “deepening trade and economic relations through the continued reduction of trade barriers [and] increased access to each others’ markets” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 3), increase of economic integration with the EU, improvement of macroeconomic governance and boost of “industrial development and enterprises capabilities and competitiveness” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 4). Concrete measures proposed in the AP in order to achieve the formulated goals are the reduction of tariff barriers, the further liberalisation of trade (European Commission, 2007b, p. 16) and the acceleration of “the privatisation programme (European Commission, 2007b, p. 11).

Most of the demands concerning the deepening of the trade relations including the reduction of tariff barriers were already initiated in 2004 with the adoption of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement and were supplemented with a further agreement on trade of agricultural and fishery products in 2010. In the consequence Egypt became the major trading partner of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean region and in turn the EU is Egypt’s main trading partner both in import and export (European Commission, 2015d).

The *Solidarity* indicator shows the quickest positive development among all here listed indicators for Egypt. In 2006 Egypt only spent 7,14% on social protection compared to the average EU 28 amount from 2012. However, it increased quickly to 11,37% in 2010 and finally to 14,93% in 2012 (see Appendix G).

Solidarity is one of the priorities of action in EU – Egypt relations. So it is stated that the public finance management shall be improved and the “cooperation on poverty reduction and social development” shall be strengthened, especially by reforms in the health system, the social insurance system, but also by combating illiteracy and furthering improvements in education (European Commission, 2007b, p. 4). Additionally a Poverty Reduction Strategy and an anti-poverty action plan shall help combating poverty (European Commission, 2007b, p. 13).

Egypt tackles the improvement of the public finance management with a tax reform, which was implemented in 2004, thus when the ENP had did not initially started its process (The World Bank, 2010, p. 12). However Egypt adopted a programme in 2007, and a follow-up programme in 2011, that aims at the improvement of education



in Egypt in order to combat illiteracy and to offer a profound education and vocational training (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2012). A legislation reforming the social insurance system, which is “reinforcing solidarity” by offering higher benefits and a “minimum level of benefits for all risks”, was passed in 2010 and was implemented in 2012 (International Social Security Association, n.A.; World Health Organization, 2006). The health care sector was not reformed in the last decade since the introduction of the ENP. Even though the health care in Egypt faced several gains in the past, Egypt plans to reform it in the future in order to provide a fair system and fulfil the “Right to Health” as determined in the new constitution (The World Bank, 2015b, p. 91). The IMF does not cooperate with Egypt concerning the reduction of poverty and the development of a poverty reduction strategy. Egypt also failed to achieve the Millenium Development Goals by the UN, which are also aimed at poverty reduction (United Nations, 2006). The reason for Egypt not following an explicit strategy might be the ENP, as the EU states that “an appropriate anti-poverty strategy should be based on macroeconomic and structural policies that promote sustained economic growth” (European External Action Service, 2007, p. 17). Therefore the ENP, in the case of Egypt, is the anti-poverty strategy, as the AP demands exactly these points. Looking at the *Prosperity* indicator one can see that Egypt is doing well on this topic and therefore this demand can be evaluated as fulfilled (European External Action Service, 2007). Egypt’s style of implementing AP demands is reflected by the positive trend of the graph for this indicator.

Egypt faced a decline in *Peace* in the years between 2007 and 2010, where the index value decreased from 2,068 to only 1,863. The indicator yet again increased, as the 2013 value of 2,382 is higher than the formerly mentioned values (see Appendix I). In the AP the EU makes peace to a priority of action and demands a strengthened dialogue on security, disarmament and arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), supported by the implementation of UN resolution 1540/04, and the fight against material used for weapons of mass destruction (European Commission, 2007b, pp. 3,10).

Egypt did not reform the security sector and the dialogue with the EU remained suspended (European Commission, 2015c, pp. 2,7). The country has a strict disarmament law since 1954, but it lacks enforcement. Additionally the penalties for owning a weapon and ammunition have been increased (Sadek, 2013). In the

domain of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and material to create them, the Northern African country is very engaged and led the proposition for a WMD-Free Middle East in the 1990s. The engagement is underlined by constant pushing of the WMD-Free Middle East negotiations, which were temporarily left by Egypt in 2012 due to a lack of progress (Davenport, 2015; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014), and the ratification of the Treaty of the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2015). On the other hand the country indeed works on the implementation of UN resolution 1540/04, but did not manage to fully implement it yet, nor did Egypt ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), probably because the engagement in nuclear research at two test reactors is also very high (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014).

Summing up Egypt's performance under the ENP one can say that it did not show the effect it aimed at, as only two out of five indicators were affected by changes proposed by the ENP. Due to that reason it is not possible to make a clear statement on the development of value application throughout the three points of time. Both indicators, which are affected by the ENP, show change in the first and the second period. One can say, that changes in the first observed period are common, as they occurred in four out of the five indicators, whereof in three cases the changes were positive. Regarding the second observed period a radical change of the trend under the *Peace* indicator and a strong decrease of the *Rule of Law and Justice* indicator is striking, which suggests the interference of a third variable. Speaking of third variables affecting the development of value application between 2006 and 2014 creates a direct link to the Arab Spring revolts that started in 2011. With the help of the Arab Spring it is possible to explain the radical development of the two formerly mentioned indicators due to the overthrow of a democratically elected President and the failure of the police to enforce security law. Moreover, the strong positive development can additionally be explained by changes, like abolishment of tariff barriers, under the Association Agreement in 2004 and therefore are not solely the achievement of the ENP.

### 4.3 Israel

Israel is getting out of line regarding the *Freedom and Democracy* indicator in several ways. First of all it has by far the best values with 1,5 on the 1-7 scale for all three points in time. Consequently the need to improve is not as high as for the other countries above, which also becomes visible when looking at the *Priorities for Action* section of the AP (see Appendix A).

The next matter that differentiates Israel from the other countries is the amount of the priorities for action, which is much lower. Concerning the *Freedom* indicator, the AP did not make it a priority for action, which is probably owed to the already high standards in the country. Further suggested actions to promote freedom are mainly focused on the fight against anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia (European Commission, 2005a, p. 4 f. ).

The mentioned problems remain in Israel and are still practiced. In 2010 (Freedom House, 2011b) bills were planned “that appeared to discriminate the Arab minority” and in 2011 (Freedom House, 2012b) bills were passed that were targeted against Arabs in Israel “or restrict dissent over Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians”. Racism is a problem that is deeply rooted in the Israeli society, as a poll from 2010 shows where “nearly half of Israel’s high school students do not believe that Israel-Arabs are entitled to the same rights as Jews in Israel” (Kashti, 2010). Arrests of ultra Orthodox Jewish men because of “immodest dress”, as well as arrests of women at the western wall in Jerusalem for religious reasons in 2012 (Freedom House, 2013b) made aware of the problems. However at least the prayer practices at the western wall were adjusted in favour of gender equality in 2013 (Freedom House, 2014b).

Compared to the *Rule of Law and Justice* indicator of the other two countries Israel is performing best (see Appendix B). One reason for the performance is that Israel is the only country in this comparison with an independent judiciary that disagrees with the government on a regular basis. On the other hand the rule of law is not always applied for example when Palestinian Prisoners become victims of torture. Another problem is the Emergency Powers law that provides a basis for “administrative detention without trial” (Freedom House, 2009b). The equality of the citizens is not given, as Arabs feel discriminated and also almost the half of the Jewish population believes that Arabs are not eligible for the same rights as they are. Equality of women

is given in Israel, but nevertheless there are some practices that discriminate against Arab women and religious Jewish women (Freedom House, 2009b).

With the AP the European Union suggests a better judicial cooperation (European Commission, 2005a) including “training for judges, prosecutors and lawyers” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 17) between Israel and the EU with the aim of promotion of shared values like the rule of law (European Commission, 2005a, p. 4), which indicates that the EU sees Israel on an advanced level concerning the development and application of the rule of law and thus big changes and interventions are not necessary. This aim was tackled by the introduction of the European EIDHR policy in 2006 that “promoted rule of law through the modernization of jurisdiction and the training of law enforcement staff such as magistrates and lawyers” (Sarah Wolff, 2012, p. 189).

Israel shows a positive development of its GNI between 2006 and 2010 with an increase of more than 9% (see Appendix E). However it is most likely that the increase in the *Prosperity* indicator has its roots in abolishment of tariffs in international trade like with the EU as agreed on with the Association Agreement between Israel and the EU in 2000. The reason why the development of GNI is not the effect of the ENP, is that Israel failed to implement essential suggestions from the AP as for example the foreign direct investment crashed since 2006 (Index Mundi, 2015) even though the AP suggests to create an investment climate that is favourable to foreign direct investment (European Commission, 2005a, p. 11). Furthermore Israel did not manage to “increase economic integration with the EU by developing trade” flows (European Commission, 2005a, p. 3), as imports from the EU remained at the same level (the Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2016b) and exports to the EU declined by 5% since 2006 (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2016a), even though Israel became trade partner in the *pan-euro-Mediterranean Cumulation of Origin* (European Commission, n.A., para. 4), as requested by the AP (European Commission, 2005a, p. 10).

On the other hand Israel worked overall successfully on a “suitable environment for companies” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 11), as until 2014 the business environment was continuously improved by reducing taxes, simplifying and increasing the speed of cross-border trade and the process of starting a business and resolving insolvency (The World Bank Group, 2016a). However, Israel broke with

its tradition of making the business environment ever more suitable by increasing the taxes in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore the AP demanded a dialogue, which deals with views on economics, between Israel and the EU (European Commission, 2005a, p. 9), which took place for the first time in 2007 (European Commission, 2007c).

First of all Israel is the country in this comparison that comes closest to the EU in terms of *Solidarity* (see Appendix H). Secondly it is striking that improving the solidarity in Israel is almost not issued in the AP and particularly not in the priorities of the same. Actually the AP mentions solidarity one time, when it is mentioned that an “exchange [of] experience on pension and welfare policies including health care and care for the elderly” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 8) is desirable.

Israel and the EU entered into dialogue directly after the adoption of the AP in 2005 by creating ten sub-committees under the ENP, including the “Political dialogue and co-operation” sub-committee and the sub-committee for “Social and migration affairs” (European External Action Service, 2011b, n.A.). Furthermore “delegations from the European Parliament and the Knesset also hold regular inter-parliamentary meetings” (European external Action Service, n.A., para. 4) and thereby fulfilled the demands from the AP.

Israel is the only country in this comparison that shows a real positive development in the *Peace* indicator, but is at the same time the worst performing country here (see Appendix I).

The demands formulated by the European Commission in the countries’ AP concern the enhancement of dialogues and cooperations regarding a resolution of the Middle East conflict, the combat against terrorism and the connected non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Commission, 2005a, pp. 3, 6, 7). Additionally the EU motivates to improve the dialogue between different cultures and religions living in Israel, as well as combating related anti-Semitism (European Commission, 2005a, pp. 3, 4, 5).

Israel’s political dialogue enhancement with the EU was directly affected by the ENP, as the *Political Dialogue and Cooperation sub-committee* was established in 2005 as result of the AP (European External Action Service, 2011a). More dialogues have been established on the understanding between cultures and religions, as for example the Interreligious Dialogue that aims at youth education in ‘understanding

the other side' (Kronisch, 2010, p. 4), or the *Israeli-Palestine political dialogue* (Affairs, 2007). Moreover the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the *Global Forum for Combating anti-Semitism*, which was also a demand in the AP for Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Even though there is a frequent dialogue about how to tackle anti-Semitism there are no changes in the Israeli law that ban anti-Semitism. The only related law is the prohibition of denial of the holocaust, which was already adopted in 1986, thus is not affected by the ENP in any way (n.A., 1986).

Concerning the combat against terrorism Israel lags behinds, as UN resolution 1373 is not fully implemented, but the process is stuck in the Parliament (The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the UN, 2005). However Israel is gradually working on this topic. The next AP demand is the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is also not fulfilled to a satisfying extend, as "Israel is not party to any of the major treaties governing WMD non-proliferation" (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014, para. 2). Moreover Treaties issuing the ban of nuclear tests and the chemical weapon convention have been signed but not ratified (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014).

In summary Israel is the country that the ENP performs second best in this study, whereby the majority of AP demands were implemented in three out of the five indicators. Though the stagnation of the *Freedom and Democracy* indicator cannot be seen as a real fail as Israel was already on a very high "European" level before the start of the ENP. Regarding the development of the application of the values it is striking that there is no decrease in value application throughout the observed period. Furthermore patterns in change are various, thus a clear statement about the medium- or short-term effectiveness is not possible on basis of the data.

An event that might have influenced the development of value application is first of all the Association Agreement with the European Union from 2000, which already initiated change that keeps on until the introduction of the ENP and beyond. Another third variable might be the mind-set promoted by the Israeli people, namely the claim to be western, which is comparable to the Europeanization process in a cultural context, as described in the theory. This claim makes Israel to a country that pursues European values by self-motivation.

#### 4.4 Concluding Remarks

The extensive analysis of the performance and undergone change of the selected countries in the presented indicators and the resulting table (see Appendix J) indicating the analysis' outcome, gives information about the effectiveness of the ENP and furthermore a good fundament to answer the research question and its sub-questions. In order to do so, I would like to start answering the sub-questions and finally come to the main research question in the end.

The first sub-question dealing with the goals and the optimum outcome of the ENP was already answered throughout the text, as the APs were brought up several times. The general goal the EU pursued by introducing the ENP was to secure its borders by sharing its values with its neighbours, so the difference between EU and its direct neighbours will not become too extreme in terms of prosperity and the other indicators listed above. In sum one can say that the optimum outcome differs from neighbour country to neighbour country, as a full implementation of AP demands would be the optimum outcome and the APs are tailor made for each country. In this study, Moldova comes close to the optimum outcome, as it fulfilled the majority of AP demands in all of the five indicators. The other two countries showed good attempts in fulfilling the AP demands, yet fall short of reaching them. In the case of Egypt this means implementation of AP demands in only two indicators, whereby Israel managed to implement the majority of demands concerning three indicators.

The second sub-question concerning the development of application throughout the three points in time is not finally dissolved, as there is no agreeing pattern on change for value application in the three countries. Often the first step towards value application was made immediately after the AP took effect, especially regarding establishing dialogues on certain issues. However there are two indicators that show the same trend in all three countries, namely *Prosperity* and *Solidarity*. For both indicators the trend arrow shows upwards for all points in time, which suggests that, especially the prosperity indicator represents the strongest part of the ENP. Prosperity attracts the observed countries the most to approximate to the EU and its values. This might be in the nature of the ENP as it is designed as a policy using conditionality in order to achieve its goals. Since the incentives for change are the highest among the *Prosperity* indicator it is no surprise that all countries focus on this part of the policy.

The third question about other events affecting the development of value application can be answered with a clear yes. One source for change are the Association Agreements signed by Egypt in 2004 and Israel in 2000. These agreements initiated transformation by approximation towards EU values, for example in the field of economy and the *Prosperity* indicator by reducing tariff barriers, before the introduction of the ENP in both of these countries. Furthermore the Arab Spring influenced the development of value application, especially in Egypt. On the one hand the Egyptian people developed during the Arab Spring a robust culture of protest, which finally led to the ouster of the old president and created a more political pluralism in parliament. The improved judicial independence, international election standards and the new constitution are further points resulting from the Arab Spring and not the ENP. On the other hand there is the fall of former President Morsi, which is also more a result of robust culture of protest that developed during the Arab Spring than something caused by the ENP.

This analysis is in opposition to the predominant opinion among scholars that the ENP is a failed policy. As discussed, the evaluation of the ENP is very limited to democracy in the scientific literature. The purpose of this paper was therefore to show the complete range of European values promoted under the ENP and it succeeded to do so by comparing policy demands and implementations in the three observed countries Moldova, Egypt and Israel, and cross checking with appropriate data. The analysis gives reason to belief that the ENP is successful in parts, even though the transformation towards a democratic system failed in the majority of the observed cases. However it was explained before, that the ENP should not be reduced to democracy promotion only.

Surprisingly Moldova approximated to European values in the majority of indicators involved in this study. This fact is surprising because Gawrich et al. (2010) presented their findings about the success of the ENP in Moldova's neighbour country Ukraine as failed. As both countries share a direct border with the EU and are located in the same area I expected more similar results. In line with that, it also caught my attention that Moldova improved concerning *Prosperity*, contrary to the criticism by Emerson (2011) that trade policies especially in the East of the Partnership are in a bad status. However, Moldova fulfilled the AP demands to a high extent and also improved in terms of GNI. Emerson is right when he states that improvements are



small, but they exist and happened in the time after the ENP had impact on some changes. I would also say that changes occur most likely at first in the *Prosperity* indicator, because the conditionality, which is often described as too weak (Emerson, 2011; Freyburg et al., 2011; Gawrich et al., 2010), is much stronger here, as changes in this field can easily be implemented (for example reducing tax barriers) and promise an extra benefit in the short-, as well as in the long-term. Additionally the motivation to make more countries trading partners of the EU is in the interest of the EU itself, especially in times of financial crises.

Next surprising finding is the bad performance of Egypt, which I expected to be better, as the Arab Spring brought a new constitution, the first elections considered as free and fair and a generally politicised civic culture. I saw Egypt as a Northern African counterpart to what Sittermann (2006) called the 'cultural context' of value promotion in Europe and saw the protests as a form of bringing forward demands (Schmidt, 2013) as it is common in Europe.

The analysis can be concluded by stating that *Prosperity* along with *Solidarity* are the most successful value among the three countries, and that within the three cases Moldova achieved the highest fulfilment rate of ENP Action Plan demands. These findings contradict the literature, which on the one side criticizes the ENP as a failed policy due to weak conditionality, and on the other side give a negative value application development outlook for the countries sharing a border with the EU. The conditionality remains weak, at least for the most indicators, but it is strong enough to cause positive change among the indicators *Prosperity* and *Solidarity*.

## 5. Conclusion

This research paper aimed at answering the main research question, which was about the extent and how the European Neighbourhood Policy influences the development of ENP partner states regarding European values. The Table (see Appendix J) shows that the impact of the ENP differs between the countries. Moldova for example was influenced heavily by the ENP and improved in all considered indicators. Israel also shows a great development in approximation towards EU values in three of the five indicators, thus in the majority of EU values. Additionally the low ENP impact in *Freedom & Democracy* cannot really be considered, as Israel started with very high scores for this indicator and was considered as western before the introduction of the ENP. However Egypt shows low or no impact of the ENP in three of the five indicators, which comes closest to a fail of the ENP and is certainly due to the special situation – the Arab Spring – in the country.

In sum the ENP was successful in two of the three countries observed, and shows positive impact for all countries regarding the indicators *Prosperity*, and *Solidarity*. Scholars in ENP related literature focus on too weak conditionality (Emerson, 2011; Freyburg et al., 2011; Gawrich et al., 2010) and that the EU favours stability over political change (T. A. Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014) – which is a right approach, as one can pursue aims better with a stable regime as with an instable like the case of Egypt in this study shows – and therefore conclude that the ENP failed, which makes a revision or abolition necessary. This study showed that the ENP is successful in promoting European economic and social values foremost, and more values depending on the country. Furthermore it looks like the proximity to the EU plays a role, as Moldova that shares a border with the EU made significant steps towards value promotion. Also Israel that is considered as western did perform better throughout the indicators than the authoritarian and EU-distant Egypt.

Nevertheless one cannot deny that the neighbourhood undergoes heavy changes and faces many conflicts starting directly at the European border in the Ukraine, over the Middle East to Northern Africa with Egypt. Concerning the current situation all over the European neighbourhood it seems obvious that the ENP failed, which is not entirely wrong as this paper presents findings that represent this position in three out of five indicators concerning Egypt, and in two out of five indicators concerning Israel. However this paper did not want to evaluate the general national situation of the ENP

partner states, but the success of the policy. At first glance this might sound like one and the same thing but looking at the composition of the ENP it becomes obvious that it is not, as the cooperation under the policy is sector based (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011), which means that it aims foremost at sectoral improvement and does not pursue an 'all-or-nothing'-approach. Therefore this research focuses on single indicators but also on all indicators involved, which gives the reader an understanding of where the ENP failed indeed, but also where it did not.

Maybe it can be termed bad luck of the ENP that it of all things failed mostly concerning *Democracy and Freedom and Peace*, as failure in these areas are more striking since they can entail violent hostilities. Turning the situation around illustrates this point very well, as failing to improve the economic power of a country might be just as bad as failing to improve the democratic or illegal arms-trade situation in a country, but the outcome would not be as obvious to the outside world, even though the impact on the people in the country might be comparable.

In my opinion the most striking insights revealed in this study is that the ENP did not fail, as described by the majority of scholars that evaluated only the democracy aspect of the policy, but that it is very effective concerning economic and social issues. Knowing this is a step forward in evaluating the ENP, as an abolition of the policy like proposed by Emerson (2011) is not necessary and neither advisable since the ENP is a functioning policy to boost prosperity and social security in a partner country. Furthermore it is an insight that the geographical position plays a role in value approximation under the ENP, which might be linked to the misfit theory as introduced by Sittermann (2006) to this paper. According to the theory one condition for change is the realisation of differences between the partner and oneself, which leads me to the assumption that it is easier for Moldova to realise those differences as they share a border with an EU country and becomes harder the farther a country is away from a EU border. In addition I believe that this paper also showed that a similar mind-set or cultural orientation can also contribute to the realisation of gaps between foreign values and domestic ones, as seen in the case of Israel, with its western self-image (Smootha, 2005), that is performing much better than Egypt.

Still I believe that sticking to the governance approach the ENP pursues (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) is the right way of promoting values in neighbouring

countries, only the way of doing so should be reformed, as the APs cause an overload of tasks for the partner countries, even though it is on them to decide whether they want to co-operate in a certain sector or not. Therefore I agree with Blockmans (2015), who reviewed the current changes for the ENP under the cabinet Juncker I, which are to put more “emphasis on shared interests rather than on the Union’s own values” (Blockmans, 2015, p. 1) and to develop ‘thematic frameworks’. Thereby one could introduce a gradual approach that works on one area first – which might ease the process in another area – before concentrating on another. Following this example the ENP in Egypt could concentrate on Peace with arms control and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the ENP in Israel could focus on Democracy and Freedom, as well as Rule of Law and Justice; whereby shared interests with Moldova are for example Prosperity, Solidarity and Peace. A corner stone to do so is to get rid of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach the ENP follows in order to create a more individualised programme, as it was already attempted in 2011 where a review “had already split the unitary concept of the ENP by creating the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean” (Blockmans, 2015, p. 4).

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
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## 7. Appendices

### 7.1 Appendix A – Freedom and Democracy indicator for the observed countries


	2006	2010	2014
Egypt	5,5	5,5	5,5
Israel	1,5	1,5	1,5
Moldova	3,5	3,0	3,0



(Freedom House, 2015b)

7.2 Appendix B – Rule of Law and Justice indicator for the observed countries


	2006	2010	2014
Moldova	8	8	7
Egypt	5	4	2
Israel	10	11	11



(Freedom House, 2016)

### 7.3 Appendix C – Prosperity indicator for Moldova


	2006	2010	2014
Moldova	0,64%	0,69%	0,85%



(The World Bank, 2015a)

#### 7.4 Appendix D – Prosperity indicator for Egypt


	2006	2010	2014
Egypt	17,48%	21,54%	23,23%



(The World Bank, 2015a)

### 7.5 Appendix E – Prosperity indicator for Israel


	2006	2010	2014
Israel	26,98%	31,42%	36,00%



(The World Bank, 2015a)

## 7.6 Appendix F – Solidarity indicator for Moldova

	2006	2009	2012
Moldova	0,19%	0,29%	n.A.




(Eurostat, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2008, 2009)



### 7.7 Appendix G – Solidarity indicator for Egypt


	2006	2010	2013
Egypt	7,14%	11,37%	14,93%



(Eurostat, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2008, 2009, 2013)

## 7.8 Appendix H – Solidarity indicator for Israel


	2006	2010	2012
Israel	12,15%	15,91%	18,06%



(Eurostat, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2008, 2009, 2013)

### 7.9 Appendix I – Peace indicator for all observed countries

	2007	2010	2014
Moldova	2,059	2,081	2
Egypt	2,068	1,863	2,382
Israel	3,033	3,012	2,725



(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016; The Economist, 2007)

7.10 Appendix J – Table indicating success in each indicator and country

	The ENP did have impact on the discussed indicator and AP demands have been fulfilled to a high extend.
	The ENP did not have impact on the discussed indicator and AP demands have not been fulfilled or only to a low extend.

	Freedom & Democracy	Rule of Law & Justice	Prosperity	Solidarity	Peace
Moldova					
Egypt					
Israel					