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EU Democracy Promotion: Policy change in Morocco and Tunisia after the Arab Spring

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Abstract

As the Arab Spring changed European Union's neighbourhood in the Southern Mediterranean, a new basis for democracy development arose. To display how the European Union (EU) dealt with democracy promotion before and after the Arab Spring, this paper is aimed at identifying a policy shift of EU's Democracy Promotion policies in Tunisia and Morocco. The basis for monitoring such policies in each country is primary as well as secondary literature concerning EU's Democracy Promotion. Therefore, the analysis is meant to identify different strategies of democracy promotion and to apply these to policies of the EU. Consequently, this study tries to answer the question:

To what extent has EU's Democracy Promotion in relation to Tunisia and Morocco changed after the Arab Spring?

A qualitative content analysis is used to check whether there has been a change on the variable EU Democracy Promotion over time. Therefore, the study is a reconstruction of EU's democracy promotion policies from 2005 until 2014. A categorization of policies set-out is made according to strategies of democracy promotion identified by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011). Thus, the classification of policies to the strategies proposed, namely linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion displays the direction and approach used by the EU before and after the Arab Spring. As a result, a possible change from one to another strategy can be related to specific moments in time.

At the end, this study displays that a change of democracy promotion occurred and monitors which strategy has been used before and after the Arab Spring. In addition, the results can be a starting point to evaluate the effectiveness of different democracy promotion strategies used in the Southern Mediterranean.

Keywords: European Neighbourhood; Democracy Promotion; Arab Spring;
Southern Mediterranean; Socialization; Conditionality;

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1. Introduction

Due to the happenings of the Arab Spring in 2011, the European Union (hereafter EU) found itself in a situation of a rapidly changing Southern Mediterranean environment. Associated with public standings against governments and a public call for democratic change, the Arab Spring affected several North African states. As EU member states committed themselves to promote fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law in their neighbouring environment (Article 8, TEU) an even stronger call for a European response arose after uprisings.

Focusing on democracy development, the Arab Spring can be seen as a strong incentive to rearrange EU's targets from stabilizing autocratic regimes towards more democracy promotion in North Africa. With regard to the current refugee crisis being partly a consequence of the Arab Spring, EU's action within North African countries is highly important, to support democracy development on foreign ground. Naturally, the task is not only to safeguard own borders or to support refugees' arriving safely, but also to react to the reasons of taking refuge directly. As van Hüllen (2012), reported that "the events unfolding in the Arab world since December 2010 have dramatically changed the outlook on the 'persistence' of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa" (p. 117), this new credibility for democracy development in North Africa had to be supported by the EU. According to Freyburg (2012) "the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereafter ENP) represents a prominent example of the EU's interest in creating a ring of security and prosperity through functional cooperation with its neighbours" (p. 590). As a consequence, a modification of the ENP and EU's democracy promotion strategies is necessary to adapt towards the changing environment in the Southern Mediterranean. Otherwise, the political and economic gap between Europe and North Africa is likely to stay as it is or to increase. As Kelley (2006) stated, that "Europe's credibility problem in this region also stems from the possibility that efforts to democratize could empower hostile extremist Islamic forces and destabilize the region" (p. 46), the issues brought forward during Arab Spring is a first step stone to increase the credibility of new EU policies in Northern Africa. For this reason, a change of EU's democracy promotion strategies is likely to occur. On that account, Balfour (2012) argued that "the EU has responded to the Arab Spring with a broad range of tools, from humanitarian assistance, the revision of some modalities of long-term programmatic policies, sanctioning measures, and military interventionism on part of some member states through NATO" (p. 29). Thus, the EU has reacted towards the changing environment somehow. Consequently, the aim of this study is to examine when and how the EU changed its democracy promotion policies in the Southern Mediterranean.

To identify which strategies have been used to promote democracy in the Southern Mediterranean this study is based on the EU-Morocco as well as the EU-Tunisia relationship. Morocco, a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy has been a historically ongoing cooperation partner of the EU. Furthermore, it is territorial tied to Europe and has been the first Southern Mediterranean Country with advanced status. On the other hand, the Arab Spring originated in Tunisia after Ben Ali went to exile. As Tunisia has been the first country to held elections after the Arab Spring, it has to be analysed to argue about EU democracy promotion after the uprisings. Additionally, both countries were affected with different degrees of protests during and institutional change after the Arab Spring. Consequently, both countries are relevant for analysing EU democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean. A further clarification of the relevance follows within the section on theoretical framework of this study.

1.1 EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia before 2005

As Morocco and Tunisia represent the countries analysed within this reconstruction of EU's democracy promotion (hereafter EUDP), a clarification of institutions, agreements and regulations in place is necessary. Thus, this section is aimed at monitoring what has been done in regard to democracy promotion in Morocco and Tunisia before 2005.

In 1995, Foreign Ministers of EU Member States and Ministers of the Mediterranean Countries (including Ben Yahia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and Abdellatif Filali, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco) concluded the Barcelona Declaration. The declaration was the set-up for the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) building a framework for bilateral national and regional relations (European Council, 1995). During the following year, the MEDA-Regulation has been ratified by the European Council. The regulation was introduced as an instrument for financial and technical support within the EMP and aimed at supporting the EMP in regard to the general targets of "reinforcing political stability and democracy; creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic and social cooperation; taking due account of the human and cultural dimension" (European Council, 1996, p. 2). In 1995, Tunisia became the first Southern Mediterranean country concluding an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union which entered into force in 1998 (van Hüllen, 2012). Concerning democracy promotion the agreement intended to strengthen political dialogue within the Association Council in regular intervals (European Commission, 1998). On the other hand, the EU-Morocco Association Agreement entered into force in 2000. As a result, these agreements are being a sequence of the Barcelona Declaration and the basis for Association Council meetings with Tunisia and with Morocco.

1.2 Research Approach

Since several EUDP-policies have been set out after 2005, a reconstruction of EUDP is necessary to monitor whether the EU changed its strategy. Therefore, EUDP-policies in Morocco and Tunisia are classified in terms of different strategies used to promote democracy from 2005 until 2014. Taking both, the relations of the EU towards Morocco and towards Tunisia into account, results in a description how democracy promotion is done in a country less affected by the Arab Spring and a country strongly affected by the Arab Spring. To identify a possible policy change concerning EUDP in the Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood, this paper is aimed to answer the following research question:

To what extent has EU's Democracy Promotion Strategy in relation to Tunisia and Morocco changed after the Arab Spring?

This descriptive question is aimed at reconstructing the development of EUDP in regard to Tunisia and Morocco. Within the time frame from 2005 until 2014, the analysis will identify whether or not the EUDP strategy changed after the Arab Spring or at any moment in time from one to another. Especially, the Arab Spring in 2011 mirroring a trial of removing tyranny in Southern Mediterranean countries marks a possible cut-off point towards a change of EUDP. The categorization towards the different strategies linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion identified by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011), enables to classify underlying democracy promotion strategies used by the EU. The results display a change from one to another but also which strategy has been used recently and most frequently by the EU as well as the institutions responsible for policies in EUDP. Therefore, this reconstruction of actual democracy promotion policies highlights which instruments, institutions and regulations the EU used primarily concerning democracy promotion in Morocco and Tunisia. The findings of this thesis will monitor actual policies as well as an application of the underlying models and strategies used to promote democracy by means of actual cases and display a reconstruction of EUDP in both countries.

1.3 Scientific Relevance

Most of the existing literature and scholars debates about EUDP are focused on the EU and its role as an international actor. Only a few studies take actual policies in recipient countries into account. Consequently, this study is aimed at the extension of existing literature regarding EUDP-policies in specific countries: Morocco and Tunisia. Scholars focus has been on the effectiveness of different strategies of EUDP in general, leaving the application of existing literature models to actual cases aside. Thus, a reconstruction of policies actually set-out in Morocco and Tunisia and their application towards the strategies of Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) is highly relevant and adds a new perspective of analysing EUDP to the studies of democracy promotion. The identification of policies in both countries enhances transparency in regard to primary publications of several EU institutions. Due to the fact that there are several EU institutions which published primary documents concerning democracy promotion, literature and policy recommendations' identification displays which policy and how democracy was promoted in each year of analysis. Monitoring different competences of these institutions and the primary literature released, adds transparency as well as frequently used schemes of EUDP to the literature. The application of available knowledge towards policies and agreements concerning democracy promotion results in a starting point for further research on the effectiveness of the strategies used by the EU to promote democracy in Morocco and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it monitors how the EU promoted democracy before the Arab Spring, the extent of a strategy change after the uprisings, the institutions involved as well as which documents were released in Morocco and Tunisia.

At the end, it can be seen as an application of available knowledge, an identification of institutions involved and policies set-out to increase transparency of what is actually done by the EU to promote democracy in Tunisia and Morocco.

2. Theoretical Framework

To answer the abovementioned research question, this section is aimed at clarifying and reviewing the concepts and strategies used by scholars of democracy promotion. Therefore, the section discusses different opinions of scholars about the concepts relating to EUDP. Moreover, an identification of what democracy promotion actually means and which concepts are used in this thesis is done. Besides this, the importance of EU's role as an international actor is discussed and examined in regard to EUDP. Since there are different strategies of democracy promotion, the factors or variables of each strategy are identified. At the end, it is highlighted how democracy promotion is defined and which definition and variables are used during the analysis to answer the research question of this thesis.

2.1 Democracy Promotion & the EU as International Actor

At first a conceptualization of what democracy is has to be clarified. Therefore, the values and institutional settings to be promoted are identified. Most scholars agree on the basic idea of democracy, whereas others specified the values of a liberal democracy in regard to the EU. The conceptualization of democracy in general by Schimmelfennig & Lavenex (2011) covers most aspects:

‘Democracy’ is understood in a very general and simple way as the accountability of public authorities to the people. Accountability mechanisms comprise, inter alia, the accountability of officials to the electorate through free and fair elections, the accountability of governments to parliaments, or the accountability of agencies to public scrutiny. Any activities designed to strengthen accountability, and hence also responsiveness to the citizens, qualify as democracy promotion (p. 888).

Democracy promotion is based on the concept of democracy in general. Thus, promoting values of democracy can be called democracy promotion in the narrow sense of the word or as Schmitter & Brouwer (1999) argued,

Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries (p. 15).

Therefore, the concept of democracy promotion refers to Democracies, GO'S and NGO's promoting any aspect of democracy in non-democratic states or organizations.

Schimmelfennig & Scholtz (2008) stated that most scholars agree that the EU is following “the agency-oriented approach of transition theory, which focuses on strategic constellations and political choices of state leaders and challengers to explain regime change and its outcomes” (p. 189). According to Reynaert (2011) the EU is regarded as a promoter of a “European liberal-style democracy” (p. 624). In that context, Pace (2009) argued that, “democracy promotion becomes embroiled in processes of rational calculation, and EU commitments are inconsistently supported by its actions” (pp. 196).

However, as scholars mostly agree that the EU is promoting values of a liberal democracy, one has to identify which kind of power the EU has as an international actor. The classification of the EU as “civilian” or “normative” power are both relevant concerning EUDP. Thus, the EU as a “civilian” power is concerned with democracy promotion because it is “engaged in civilizing an international system based on military self-help and the balance of power” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 889). Democracy promotion is also relevant for the EU as a “normative” power. Spreading the general norms of the EU globally includes democracy promotion (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The fact that EUDP is relevant for both conceptions is confirmed by Powel (2009), who reports that “whilst EU may claim that promoting democracy is a desirable policy goal in Tunisia and the Mediterranean, evidence suggests that security and stability are of greater importance to EU policy-makers” (p. 207). Safeguarding stability and security can be seen as outcome of “civilian” power. Since the EU is promoting values of a liberal democracy economic development goes hand in hand with democracy promotion in the best case. In the worst scenario, economic interests could leave democracy promotion aside. As Reynaert (2011) argued that, “political and civil right and horizontal separation of power, defined as the core elements of a democracy are mainly supported if they contribute to the functioning of the market” (p. 636). This also refers to the fact that scholars disagree on the status of the EU as a normative power because the EU is promoting democracy dependent on economic benefits. Thus, scholars argue, that the EU is rather interested in stability and prosperity, whereas promoting the values of democracy is often left aside or effectively done when such policies are creating a perspective of a positive economic impact for the EU. For the aim of this paper the EU can be seen as a normative as well as civilian actor while promoting democracy in the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood follows interest of stability and prosperity. A clear categorization towards one type of power is not necessary to argue about policy change, since the different models of democracy promotion involve different views of the EU as international actor.

2.2 The EU and the Democracy Promotion Strategies

Apart from the general idea and thought of the EU as a democracy promoter and international actor, scholars differ in their opinion or classification of EUDP models, instruments and targets. This paper is based on the work of Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) who identified three different strategies of democracy promotion in regard to the EU and the Southern Mediterranean Neighbours: “Linkage”, “leverage”, and the “governance model of democracy promotion”. Linkage refers to “activities that tackle the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the democratic opposition and other civil society actors in the target countries” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 886). In other words, supporting civil society and democratic opposition to promote democracy development in the earliest state. Levitsky & Way (2006) found, that “to a significant extent, then, linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international expectations into domestic demands” (p. 386). On the other hand, leverage is referring to political conditionality as instrument for democratic transitions and reforms. According to Levitsky & Way (2006),

Western leverage refers to incumbent governments' vulnerability to external pressure for democratization. Such pressure may be exerted in a variety of ways, including positive conditionality (for example, EU membership), punitive sanctions (aid withdrawal, trade sanctions), diplomatic persuasion, and military force (p. 382).

On that account sanctions refer to negative conditionality, which is hardly used by the EU. The more recently developed governance model of democracy promotion is describing the setting of specific policies through functional cooperation with target countries (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). In addition, Freyburg (2012) highlighted that,

This new governance model draws on the EU's policy goal of third-country approximation to the EU acquis. The model takes into account that in addition to its substantial body of rules for regulating public policy, the acquis incorporates procedural rules on democratic governance that are also transferred to associated third states (p. 581).

According to Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011), one can identify the different models of democracy promotion while examining the categorical variables of each by means of the following four spheres: The “target systems of democracy promotion”, the “envisaged outcome of democracy promotion”, the “channel of democracy promotion” and the “instrument of democracy promotion” (p. 889).

Thus, it is necessary to examine EU's actions in the field of democracy promotion in regard to these variables. The target of action can be a polity, a society or a sector (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The envisaged outcome is obviously related to the target of EUDP actions and can refer to shaping democratic culture, democratic institutions or democratic governance, whereas the channel relates to the actors involved in actions who can be intergovernmental, transgovernmental or on a transnational level (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The instrument and thus, the way the EU introduces democracy promotion actions or policies can be either socialization or conditionality.

2.3 Socialization & Conditionality as Instruments of EUDP

Before highlighting the limitations and effectiveness of the linkage, leverage and governance model of democracy promotion, one has to examine the instruments of these strategies. Thus, the next section is meant to clarify the instruments of conditionality and socialization.

As Kelley (2006) formulated, that “the core of conditionality, of course, is the existence of incentives” (p. 36), conditionality in this study refers to setting incentives for democracy development which are conditional on the implementation of specific targets. Schimmelfennig & Scholtz (2005) formulated,

In using political conditionality, the EU sets the adoption of democratic rules and practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfil in order to receive rewards such as financial assistance, some kind of institutional association, or – ultimately – membership“ (p. 5).

The type of conditionality used by the EU is positive conditionality. In regard to EUDP, conditionality refers to giving political or economic incentives for the recipient countries if they introduce a specific measure, action or policy (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Sanctioning recipient countries in case they do not adapt certain policies or regulations would refer to negative conditionality. Using negative conditionality within the EUDP has not been evident.

Socialization, on the other hand, corresponds to “a learning process in which an international actor teaches domestic actors democratic norms and practices in order to persuade them of their superiority” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 890). A more general definition of socialization made by Johnston (2001) is that “socialization is a process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse ways of thinking, feeling, and acting” (p. 494). In regard to EUDP, socialization can be seen as spreading the idea and norms of a liberal democracy in a recipient country. Following from the strategies proposed by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011), socialization is targeting society and used to strengthen democratic culture in a recipient country.

Moreover, socialization could also target a sector expecting to foster democratic governance. According to Kelley (2006), “the ENP is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory. Its combination of socialization and conditionality exemplifies how the Commission relied on institutional learning and strategic adaptation from enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain” (p. 48).

However, socialization and conditionality are not mutually exclusive meaning that socialization can lead to the usage of conditionality in the short or in the long-run: People are getting the idea of democracy and adapt the promoted norms, followed by political or economic incentives if recipient countries reform institutions in the direction set-out by countries promoting democracy. According to Levitsky & Way (2005) “leverage is most effective when combined with extensive linkage to the West” (p. 22). Thus, a policy target introduced by the EU can include both instruments used at the same point in time as well as socialization as a forerunner for conditionality.

2.4 Linkage, Leverage & the Governance Model of Democracy Promotion

After clarifying the role of the instruments conditionality and socialization, this section is meant to clarify the positive effects and the limitations of each democracy promotion strategy. Namely, Linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion are the basis for analysing policies in Morocco and Tunisia.

To begin with, the linkage model targeting the society using the instrument of socialization is examined. The linkage model has been part of EU external policies since the 1980s. At the beginning, it was meant to support Latin American countries in regard to democratic transition (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). According to Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) “the effectiveness of the linkage model depends on trans-national support fostering civil society, pro-democratic parties, and modernization“ (p. 897). In other words, the effectiveness of the bottom-up approach is dependent on the openness and autonomy of the society. In case, civil society is isolated and not able to get supported due to a lack of autonomy, the linkage model is not able to support democracy promotion (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Freyburg’s (2011) and Kubicek’s (2011) findings reflect that the linkage model had only minor effects within their analysis of Moroccan state officials and EU support for the Turkish civil society. As the Arab Spring is a result of norm diffusion the analysis is going to clarify whether the linkage model remains a relevant strategy of EUDP.

Secondly, the limits and effects of the leverage model are clarified. After the Cold War the leverage model became the dominant strategy of EUDP in Eastern European and Central European countries (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Setting the incentive of a credible accession in regarding recipient countries has been an effective tool of conditionality and the leverage model of democracy for Eastern and Central European enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (Epstein & Sedelmeier, 2008). As the countries of analysis, Morocco and Tunisia do not have a perspective of membership at the moment accession conditionality does not exist. Epstein & Sedelmeier (2008) argued that “especially in those countries for whom membership is not currently on the EU’s agenda, the incentives that the EU has to offer are less powerful because of a combination of higher domestic costs and fewer sizeable and/or credible rewards” (p. 803). As a result, the effectiveness of the leverage model of EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia is unlikely to be as efficient as during the 2004 enlargement. In respect to this, Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) argued that “as the transition countries will not be considered for membership even in the longer term, leverage is unlikely to be viable” (p. 904). For these reasons, the leverage model is reaching its limits. As a consequence Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) stated that “the promotion of democratic governance may yet turn out to be the EU’s best chance in the short term” (p. 904).

The governance model of democracy promotion has been evident since the early 2000s. Nevertheless, it occurs to be the expected tool to support democracy development after the Arab Spring rather than linkage or leverage. As Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) highlighted,

Less top-down than leverage and less bottom-up than linkage, this functional approach operates at the level of democratic principles embedded in the governance of individual policy fields and unfolds through the deepening of transgovernmental, horizontal ties between the EU and third countries’ public administrations. (p. 887)

As the linkage and leverage model are reaching its limits, the governance model of democracy promotion may offer a new approach to promote democracy. In that context, Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) argued that,


Many regimes in the region are likely to survive the wave of unrest; in these cases, there is hardly an alternative to the governance model. Those countries that experience regime change will continue to cooperate with the EU across a wide range of policy issues and to seek its assistance. (p. 904)

For this reason, the analysis of this paper is used to check whether democratic governance is supported in Morocco and Tunisia. Besides this, it is clarifying how frequently the linkage or leverage strategy still occur within EUDP and thus, whether or not scholars assumptions displayed in these section are able to be confirmed by the findings.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

As a result of the concepts highlighted and discussed in this section, this paper identifies democracy promotion and EUDP to be at least one of the proposed strategies: Linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion (Table 1.1). This chapter has conceptualized democracy and democracy promotion in general and in regard to the EU as democracy promoter. Therefore, the role of the EU as an international actor has been discussed in the light of democracy promotion. Further, this chapter has clarified the different strategies used by the EU as well as the underlying channels, instruments, targets and expected outcomes of such policies. The threefold classification of EUDP by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) is the basis for analysing EUDP-policies in Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, the analysis is inquiring whether scholars' assumptions about the usage, effectiveness and limits of each model can be confirmed.

Table 1.1: Linkage, Leverage & the Governance Model of Democracy Promotion



(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

3. Research Methodology

The methodology of this paper is based on a qualitative content analysis using an unobtrusive data collection method. At first policies concerning EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia have to be identified from 2005 until 2014. Thereafter, every policy identified within primary literature is categorized towards a strategy of Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) used to promote democracy by the EU and the recipient countries. As this results in a typology of policies (Table 2) categorized annually, a change from one to another EUDP strategy is monitored and will be examined during the analysis. This methodological framework enables to reconstruct the development of EUDP and to argue when the EU changed the strategy of democracy promotion. Thus, it is highly relevant to answer to what extent EUDP changed after the Arab Spring. Comparing the findings of both countries, Morocco and Tunisia, monitors not only whether or not there have been different approaches and if another incentive or type of relationship has influenced a change of EUDP.

The first section is going to clarify which data is used and why it has been selected for the analysis. Thereupon, the unobtrusive method of data gathering will be revealed. Thereafter, the operationalization of the main concepts and their measurement is discussed to justify how the analysis is made. At the end, this section states how the analysis will be done in detail.

3.1 Case Selection

With regard to the analysis of EUDP in the Southern Mediterranean, the next section aims at clarifying why Morocco and Tunisia were selected as countries of analysis. Secondly, the section examines how and which primary documents concerning EUDP-policies are gathered.

To begin with, the Moroccan Monarchy has been a historically ongoing cooperation partner of the EU. It is territorial tied to Europe and has been the first Southern Mediterranean Country with advanced status of cooperation with the EU. On this account van Hüllen (2012) formulated that due to “the special position of the Maghreb countries in Euro-Mediterranean relations, Morocco was one of the first countries to negotiate a new EMAA with the EU” (p. 120). In regard to the Arab Spring Morocco has been less affected than Tunisia, as Willis (2014) stated that, “Morocco had already introduced most of the demands for reform that were to be made so forcefully and vociferously by the crowds who were to spill on to the streets of most other Arab state in the opening months of that year” (p. 436).

Concerning the Republic of Tunisia, in which the Arab Spring originated, cooperation had been difficult until the uprisings started.

With respect to van Hüllen (2012) who argued that “the popular uprising that started in 2010 and led to the resignation of Ben Ali in January 2011 was motivated in part by dissatisfaction with the economic situation, undermining popular support for the regime” (p. 132), a new perspective for democracy promotion in Tunisia developed out of the uprisings. Mapondera (2014) stated that, “Tunisia led an entire region’s political transformation through civilian rebellion that has nothing to do with Islam and has further shown the world that indeed united Arabs are capable of creating democratic political systems independently” (p. 8). In other words, it is highlighted that the uprisings are not associated with religious groups but with a public call for democracy from any group of society. As a result of these facts and the parliamentary elections held in 2014, Tunisia can be seen as the continent’s white hope for democracy development after the uprisings.

As the Arab Spring created a new basis for democracy development in the Southern Mediterranean, Morocco and Tunisia are relevant cases to analyse a change of EUDP after the uprisings. Analysing EUDP-policies in both countries, which were affected by the Arab Spring with different degrees of protests, results in having comparison group which safeguards for the threat of a confounding variable.

Thus, the analysis of this paper is based on primary and secondary literature concerning EUDP in Morocco and EUDP in Tunisia. Since EUDP falls under the scope of Article 8 (TEU) it is anchored within the framework of the ENP. However, new institutions and regulations developed in regard to EUDP, are publishing primary literature outside the framework of the ENP. Within the framework, the EU publishes Action Plans for the neighbouring countries. These Action Plans contain a political and economic agenda for short-term and long-term country-specific targets for recipient countries. To identify institutions publishing primary literature outside from this framework, secondary literature is examined in regard to relevant actors involved in EUDP. Therefore, primary literature as well as secondary literature concerning the identification of agreements, policies or meetings concerning EUDP are the basis for the analysis of EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia. The time frame from 2005 until 2014 is relevant because it analyses policies 5 years before and 3 years after the start of the Arab Spring in the beginning of 2011. Taking into account a longer lapse of time before the Arab Spring increases the reliability of the findings because monitoring continuity or discontinuity of EUDP is extended. The shorter time lapse of analysing policies after the uprising is related to the state of current secondary and primary literature on EUDP. Assuming that the expectations for a change of EUDP in Southern Mediterranean countries are higher in countries which have been more affected by the Arab Spring than in countries less affected, the study is based on two cases, namely Morocco and Tunisia.

3.2 Method of Data Collection

To categorize policies in terms of different strategies used to promote democracy in Morocco and Tunisia EU actions between 2005 and 2014 have to be conducted. The data gathering is unobtrusive and based on primary as well as secondary literature concerning aspects of EUDP in both countries of analysis. As the EU and the recipient countries developed several tools and regulations which are published within different institutions, secondary literature is examined to identify in which documents EU democracy promotion policies are set out. After identifying which primary documents from several institutions are concerned with EUDP, an examination of policies set out annually is going to be the basis for the creation of the data set.

At first, one has to highlight which institutions concerning EUDP were in place before the ENP Action Plans for both countries were ratified, to highlight which primary documents are relevant at the start of the analysis. Since there have been Association Agreements between the EU and Morocco as well as the EU and Tunisia, the data gathered is based on publications of these meetings as well as ENP Action Plans set out in 2005 at the beginning of the analysis. Due to the fact that publications are not constantly made within the same institutions, transparency of what has been set out is limited. Since the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Union for the Mediterranean and other institutions are publishing primary documents on EUDP, secondary literature is used, to identify which documents are relevant and concerned with EUDP.

Firstly, Van Hüllen's (2012) paper on "Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia" highlights which institutions developed and published primary literature in regard to EUDP. Secondly, Baracani's (2007) work on the ENP "From the EMP to the ENP: A New Pressure for Democratization?", Martín's (2009) publication on the advanced status of Morocco "EU-Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the 'Advanced Status'?", Kausch's (2009) paper on EU policies in Morocco "The European Union and political reform in Morocco" and Kurki's (2011) work on the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies" are used to identify which primary documents are relevant and which institutions published them.

The EUDP-policies identified as relevant for each year of analysis will be interpreted within a typology as displayed in Table 1.2. As each strategy has its own categorical variables policies will be examined and interpreted in regard to the target, outcome, channel, and instrument. After collecting these data the actual policies examined and interpreted are displayed in Tables 3.1 - 19.2 to be found in the Appendix at the end of this paper. These tables represent all relevant EUDP-policies in Morocco and Tunisia, which are going to be analysed. Using secondary literature as assistance and supplement to analyse and collect primary data, improves the actual data. Therefrom, it is safeguarding for missing documents or the absence of relevant policy actions in regard to EUDP. Besides this, the creation of this data set enhances transparency in regard to primary documents of EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia.

**Table 1.2: Typologies for EUDP Policies
(Linkage, Leverage & the Governance Model of DP)**

Strategy	Policy	Strategy	Policy
Linkages		Leverages	
Target	Society	Target	Polity
Outcome	Democratic Culture	Outcome	Democratic Institutions
Channel	Transnational	Channel	Intergovernmental
Instrument	Socialization	Instrument	Conditionality

Strategy	Policy
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion	
Target	Sector
Outcome	Democratic Governance
Channel	Trans-Governmental
Instrument	Socialization

(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

3.3 Operationalization & Data Analysis of the EUDP

Since this paper is based on models and strategies of EUDP of Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011), this paper is categorizing policies according to a typology (Table 1.2). Democracy promotion refers to the three different models of democracy promotion linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). Therefore, EUDP-policies are classified in regard to their targets, outcomes, channels and instruments used to promote democracy. If a policy fulfils or contains all aspects or categorical variables of a model it can be categorized as such. Thus, the different strategies, linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion are classified with the categorical variables displayed in Table 1.1, Table 1.2 and Table 2 (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011).

A dichotomous measurement of “yes” and “no” to answer whether each categorical variable of a model is fulfilled is used. A policy can only be categorized towards a strategy if all categorical variables can be matched with a policy (measured with a “yes”). If a policy matches different categorical variables of different strategies, it will be regarded as a hybrid model. Therefore, a policy can be categorized as a hybrid of two or three strategies. In case only one categorical variable of a theory scores a “yes” within a strategy, it can be disregarded if more categorical variables of other strategies are met with the measurement “yes”.

The categorization of these policies is made through an inquiry of the variables at several points in time. Therefore, EUDP-policies of each year of analysis are categorized as the usage of one of the proposed strategies by the EU or as a hybrid of the abovementioned strategies. For example, it would imply that a EUDP-policy targeting the society, fostering democratic culture, promoted by transnational actors through socialization would refer to the usage of the “linkage” model. This is due to the fact that four out of four categorical variables are measured with a “yes” and thus, referring to the solely usage of one strategy. A policy targeting the society through a trans-governmental channel using socialization has an expected outcome in regard to democratic culture, can be categorized as a hybrid of the linkage and governance model of democracy promotion. Due to the fact that the linkage model is based on setting first incentives for democracy it will be disregarded after the start of 2011 because the Arab Spring itself created and fostered democratic awareness. Therefore the analysis will focus on the leverage and the governance model of EUDP after the Arab Spring.

At the end, this results in an overview of which strategy has been used in a specific point in time and thus when a change of strategy occurred. Therefore, it enables to draw conclusions in regard to the extent of policy change during the period of observation. Policies are interpreted and thereafter categorized with the typology displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Typology of EUDP-Policies & EUDP Strategies before and after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy	Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005			2011		
2006					
2007			2012		
2008			2013		
2009					
2010			2014		

To identify such an abovementioned policy change, the typology based on the three different models of democracy promotion (Table 2) displays policies from 2005-2014. These EUDP policies are checked according to their target, the expected outcome, the channel and the instrument used to promote democracy in Tunisia and Morocco. Thereupon, the policies are interpreted and categorized in regard to a model or strategy of democracy promotion. This classification is the basis to check whether policies are following a specific strategy over time or when such strategy changes occurred.

Hence, this type of analysis is appropriate to answer the research question and to categorize these policies from 2005 until 2014 towards models of EUDP. The classification of policies and monitoring these annually is necessary to argue about the extent of a changing EUDP after the Arab Spring in both countries. Due to the fact, that a change of strategy can be related to a specific point in time, one can argue when the EU exactly changed its strategy and when it did not. Moreover, the time frame from 2005 until 2014 monitors changes happening before as well as after the Arab Spring. Monitoring the extent of changes before 2011 enables to argue about the extent of changes after the Arab Spring. Therefore, one can argue to what extent the changes occurred over time or whether the amount increases significantly after the Arab Spring.

3.4 Concluding Remarks

This section identified which documents are the basis for analysing EUDP and how they are conducted. Furthermore, the selection process of the countries of analyses, Morocco and Tunisia has been examined and the operationalization highlights on which basis EUDP strategies are classified.

During the analysis, policies of primary literature are identified within Table 3.1 – Table 19.2 laid down in the appendix. Thereafter, these policies are interpreted and categorized towards a strategy of EUDP. These results are monitored in a typology. This typology of strategies used from 2005 until 2014 highlights when strategy changes occurred in each country (Table 20.1 – 21.2). At the end the analysis points out when changes happened and compares the findings of Morocco and Tunisia to argue about the extent of change for each recipient of EUDP.

4. Analysis

This section aims at analysing EUDP-policies and agreements from 2005 until 2014 in regard to different strategies of democracy promotion. Actual policies of analysis are examined following a categorization towards the strategies, namely, linkage, leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion. In case, policies with one of the strategies, the focus is on the composition of the categorical variables. Correspondingly, a policy is regarded as a hybrid. Therefore, a change of strategies can be monitored even if a policy is not exclusively the product of linkage, leverage or the governance model of democracy promotion. Resulting in a reconstruction of democracy promotion the findings will monitor when a strategy changed from one to another. At first, the focus is on EUDP before the Arab Spring to highlight which strategies have been used most frequently. Thereupon, the findings are highlighted. Thirdly, the policies set out after the Arab Spring are examined and classified. At the end the findings of both periods are compared, setting the basis to answer the research question of this study.

4.1 EUDP in Morocco & Tunisia before the Arab Spring

During the EU-Morocco Association Council meeting in 2005, the EU and Morocco agreed on an Action Plan containing provisions and reforms (Van Hüllen, 2012). In regard to democracy promotion the Action Plan sets provisions and targets for democracy promotion. The first target concerning democracy was to “consolidate the administrative bodies responsible for reinforcing respect for democracy and the rule of law” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 4). In short term, the EU and Morocco should exchange their knowledge to support the development of the “regulatory framework governing political parties” (European Commission, 2005a p. 4). Furthermore, administration’s capacity should be extended by enhancing laws on the level of administrative acts as well as supporting the decentralization to enhance the powers of local authorities (European Commission, 2005a). Besides this, the Action Plan targets the judiciary in regard to democracy and the rule of law. The general target is to “step up efforts to facilitate access to justice and the law” (European Commission, 2005a, p.5,). Therefore, judicial procedures should be simplified, shortened and improved. The focus should be on the enforcement of judgements and at reforming legal assistance (European Commission, 2005a). The policies set out by the Action Plan in 2005 are based on the leverage strategy of EUDP. The actors involved are governmental actors. Therefore, the policies are targeting the polity and are meant to democratize institutions of the Moroccan government and judiciary. The EU has granted a reward of more than €75 million to implement the Action Plan (van Hüllen, 2012).

In contrast to Morocco, discussions with Tunisia on democracy promotion and supporting Human Rights had been difficult. Therefrom van Hüllen (2012) argued that “before 2007, partners almost exclusively treated matters related to democracy and human rights in an informal part of the Association Council meetings” (p. 123). However, the EU and Tunisia ratified an Action Plan which set out the following targets in regard to democracy promotion: support political participation of civil society, facilitating exchange between the European and Tunisian Parliament, strengthening support for political parties to safeguard active engagement in democratic development, reform state authorities’ administration’s to increase transparency (European Commission, 2005b). In regard to the judiciary, independency as well as efficiency should be improved (European Commission, 2005b). Due to the fact that supporting political participation of civil society is aimed at democratization of the society, norms of democracy are transferred to the society. Therefore, this policy refers to the instrument of socialization and has to be categorized as usage of the linkage strategy of EUDP. The other policies were concerned with the democratization of institutions targeting the Parliament, parties and state authorities. Thus, the target, the outcome and the channel of cooperation is associated with the leverage strategy of EUDP. Contrarily the instrument used by the EU is socialization because norms are transferred without the usage of conditionality. As van Hüllen (2012) argued that “given the EU’s difficulties in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance with Tunisian authorities, it is not surprising that Tunisia has not received any additional funds under the Democracy and Governance Facilities” (p. 124). Hence, it is argued that the EU is following a hybrid approach of the EUDP while aiming at facilitating exchange between the European and Tunisian Parliament, strengthening support for political parties and reform state authorities’ administration’s.

In 2006, the EU and Morocco Association Council established the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance, “to provide an appropriate institutional framework for implementing and enhancing cooperation”, (European Commission, 2006a, p. 1). According to Kausch (2009) “Morocco was the first ENP partner country to agree to the establishment of a ‘subcommittee on human rights, democratization and governance’ to the EU– Moroccan Association Council” (p. 174). It is composed of representatives from the EU and Morocco, while it is alternately headed by both partners. Formally it has no decision-making powers, but proposals can be submitted to the Association Committee. The committee meetings are held at least once a year (European Commission, 2006a). The creation of a Subcommittee for Human Rights, Democratization and Governance within the meeting is regarded as developing a new democratic institution through an intergovernmental channel because the EU and Moroccan representatives are government actors. The target of this policy is the polity.

Since this subcommittee is a continuation of the general target of the ENP Action Plan 2005 the usage of conditionality affected this development. Therefore, Morocco had an incentive to support further development in the area of democracy and to foster cooperation through this establishment with the EU. Thus, this policy is categorized as using the leverage strategy of EUDP.

In comparison to the EU-Morocco relationship cooperation in the field of democracy and the rule of law had been difficult in Tunisia. Therefore, the EU urged Tunisia to fulfil the targets set out in 2006 (European Parliament, 2006). Due to the discrimination and the repression of freedom association and expression during the World Summit in Tunis 2005, cooperation on democracy and Human Rights were paralyzed and Association Council Meeting were not held until 2007 (van Hüllen, 2012). Therefore, the EU did not take any action in regard to democracy promotion in 2006 and actions cannot be categorized towards leverage, linkage or the governance model of EUDP.

At the end of 2006, the European Council and the European Commission ratified a regulation establishing the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). This funding instrument should support and restore support for civil society. The regulation states that the instrument is aimed at promoting democracy and reforms concerned by funding and supporting civil society organizations which are embedded in issues related to Human Rights and democracy promotion (European Commission, 2007). Therefore, the EIDHR works as a funding instrument supporting and facilitating civil society organization's involvement and cooperation with local authorities as well as governmental institutions in recipient countries. Financially independent and with own objectives the EIDHR is focused on "support to educational institutions, women's groups, and human rights NGOs to rule of law and governance missions, electoral encouragement and observation missions, ICC and justice related missions and organizational support" (Kurki, 2011, p. 355). In addition, the tasks include "to work focused on advocacy of anti-torture policies, to dialogue enhancement and reconciliation work, to disability rights work, to freedom of expression, and civil society support Missions" (Kurki, 2011, p. 355). Hence, EIDHR funds cover most aspects to support civil society in the field of democracy and Human Rights. The EIDHR can be categorized as a policy following the governance model of EUDP because it is targeting the sector of democracy and human rights, to support cooperation between trans-governmental actors. In addition, it is aimed at creating democratic governance through socialization of norms with financial support.

Since Morocco had requested a new status of cooperation during the Association Council in the past years, the EU finally agreed on discussing the issue during a special ad hoc working group to develop a new joint document. Due to the expectation of a new status van Hüllen (2012) argued that it has “overshadowed bilateral relations during those years, fuelling Morocco’s willingness to engage in the EU’s agenda for democracy promotion and thus allowing the EU to exert influence on its domestic political reforms through cooperation” (p. 122). Therefore, the engagement on a joint document might enhance cooperation in 2007. The working group on the advanced status is regarded as leverage strategy of EUDP because it is aiming at the development of democratic institutions and compounded out of government officials. Repeatedly, the instrument setting incentive for cooperation is conditionality since the EU is discussing an advanced status because of the achievements reached during the years before. Furthermore, the EU rewarded progress financially through MEDA and European Neighbourhood Instrument (van Hüllen, 2012). Thus, the EU followed the leverage approach while setting up this working group.

At the end of 2007, political dialogue with Tunisia has been reinforced and the EU-Tunisia Association Council agreed on the establishment of a Subcommittee on Human Rights and Democracy. Although the establishment occurred one year later than in Morocco the structure and composition of the Subcommittee in Tunisia are identical (EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2007). Due to the fact that Tunisia did not get any funds for democracy development between 2007 and 2010, the categorization of the establishment of the subcommittee is displayed as hybrid strategy of linkage and leverage. Although it is targeting the polity through an intergovernmental channel which creates an institution for democracy development, financial conditionality is not the instrument used by the EU. Contrarily, it can be regarded as reinforcement of discussing democratic norms with Tunisia again which refers to democratization of the society as well as socialization as instrument of EUDP. The creation of a Subcommittee on Human Rights and Democracy is a policy which follows the leverage and the linkage model of EUDP.

In 2008, Morocco gained advanced status of cooperation with the EU. Therefore, the Joint EU-Morocco document on the strengthening of bilateral relations/ Advanced Status contains the following policies and areas shaping democracy promotion: Fostering political dialogue, parliamentary cooperation between the EU and the Moroccan Parliament as well as between political parties, deepening of security cooperation, supporting judicial cooperation (adherence to the Council of Europe), fostering dialogue on human rights (gradual adherence to the Council of Europe) and supporting the Instance Équité et Reconciliation by the implementation of a National Human Rights Strategy (EU–Morocco Association Council, 2009).

According to Martín (2009) “the ‘political and strategic dialogue’ is the field where the Joint Document is more innovative in comparison to the existing framework of EU–Moroccan relations. It provides for the holding of ad hoc summits between leaders of both parties, including informal meetings of ministers of foreign affairs” (p. 239). Thus, the framework of cooperation between the EU and Morocco has been slightly extended by the advanced status but failed to introduce new instruments or strategies. However, it rather extended and modernized the framework in place before. In contrast, Martín (2009) stated that “the document provides for closer parliamentary cooperation and a series of concrete cooperation and technical assistance measures to increase security and judicial cooperation” (p. 240), support on reforming the judiciary is extended while parliamentary cooperation can be regarded as a new feature addressed. Apart from this, Kausch (2009) stated that “the roadmap also envisages measures towards the fostering of NGO cooperation, networks and exchange and training among Moroccan and European civil society organizations” (p. 177). Fostering dialogue, parliamentary cooperation and judicial cooperation are categorized as leverage model of EUDP. These policies are targeting government officials through the development of democratic institutions on an intergovernmental basis shared by the EU and Morocco. Due to the fact that the joint document on the advanced status is a result of positive conditionality, all of these policies are matching the criteria of the leverage model of EUDP. Fostering NGO’s and civil society organizations has to be categorized as a policy following the governance model of democracy promotion: The target is the sector of democracy and human rights and the expected outcome should have been democratic governance. With NGO’s and civil society organizations, the policy aimed at connecting transnational actors through socialization measures and support while identifying and adapting norms concerning democracy and human rights.

After Morocco and the EU concluded the advanced status of cooperation, Tunisia asked for the so-called “partenariat renforcé” during the Association Council Meeting in 2008 (EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2008). Thereupon, the EU decided to start negotiations in 2009, because Tunisia had not fulfilled necessary conditions in the area of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, yet (European Commission, 2010a). Since the EU blocked negotiations until 2009, there had been no further progress of democracy development and dialogue between both partners in 2008. Hence, it can be disregarded until the analysis of EU confirmation concerning admission of negotiation on such agreement in 2010.

Thereafter, the EU and its member states ratified the continuation of the EMP, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) during the Paris Summit in July 2008. The UfM, the successor of the EMP is based on the principles of the Barcelona Declaration. Therefore, the renewal of the Barcelona Process should continue the aims of the Declaration and the EMP “by upgrading their relations, incorporating more co-ownership in their multilateral cooperation framework and delivering concrete benefits for the citizens of the region” (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 3). In regard to democracy, the declaration sets out the target of strengthening democracy and political participation as well as respect for the fundamental freedoms and human rights (Council of the European Union, 2008). Due to its structure the UfM is involving governmental actors through an intergovernmental channel. Furthermore, it is targeting governmental acts. The setting up of this institution and becoming a member is not based on a condition set out by the EU, except that members have to be in the territorial entity of the Mediterranean Country or be a member of the EU. Therefore, one cannot argue whether conditionality is used during policies set out by the UfM after its creation. The development of the UfM used the leverage model of EUDP as basis.

During the EU-Morocco Summit in 2010, both partners agreed to set up a joint parliamentary committee as mentioned during the negotiation of the “advanced status” in 2008 (European Commission, 2010b). Parliamentary cooperation should support “developing relations between the Parliaments of the two Parties in the future” (European Commission, 2010b, p. 8). Due to the fact that this policy targets governmental actors and is aimed at the development of a democratic institution through an intergovernmental channel between both parliaments, the EU is following the leverage model of EUDP. Furthermore, parliamentary cooperation had been a target of the advanced status. Thus, the EU had used conditionality before.

In 2010, Tunisia handed it a proposition for the “partenariat enforcé” again. Therefore, the EU agreed to set up a working group to discuss the issue further. The conclusion of an advanced status opens up due to long ongoing cooperation between the EU and Tunisia and would be dependent on progress in regard to targets concerning political as well as judicial reforms set out before (EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2010). Therefore, the EU is following the leverage model of EUDP while creating a working group on the “partenariat enforcé”. The working group consists out of government actors and intergovernmental cooperation of both partners. Furthermore, ratification is dependent on Tunisia’s progress in the field of democracy and human rights, mirroring the usage of conditionality.

4.2 EUDP in Morocco & Tunisia after the Arab Spring

After the start of the Uprisings and Ben Ali's went to exile, the EU published a council conclusion about further actions to be taken on. Therefore, the EU wants to foster democratic transition through supporting further development of democratic institutions and civil society engagement. A new strategy and discussion of a privileged partnership between the EU and Tunisia should be reinforced (Council of the European Union, 2011).

The first actual policy developed after the start of the uprisings has been the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity. This new instrument based on conditionality as the European Commission (2011c) states that "those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. Support will be reallocated or refocused for those who stall or retrench on agreed reform plans" (p. 5). Moreover, there is a condition to become a member of this partnership: "A commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair Elections" (European Commission 2011c, p. 5). In line with the creation of this partnership and the Joint Communication "A New Response for a Changing Neighbourhood" the EU has set out the following instruments and policies to react to the uprising in the Mediterranean: The Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING Programme); The European Endowment for Democracy (EED); the Civil Society Facility as well as supporting "deep democracy" and enhancing media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc. (European Commission, 2011d).

With respect to the SPRING Programme the EU is using a hybrid-approach of the leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion. It is targeting democratic institutions and governance, using conditionality (more-for-more approach) to set incentives to adapt norms reflecting a socialization process (European Commission, 2011e). The establishment of the EED is reflecting a shift to the governance model of EUDP: The EED is targeting civil society and NGO's through a trans-governmental channel. Thereby it is meant to enhance and foster democratic governance (Council of the European Union, 2011). The Civil Society Facility is aimed at developing partnerships between NGO's. Therefore, the EU is following the governance model of EUDP while establishing this institution (European Commission, 2011d). Supporting "deep democracy" refers to the usage of a leverage and the governance model of EUDP because it is targeting democratic governance as well as democratic institutions through intergovernmental and trans-governmental channels (European Commission, 2011d). Supporting media freedom refers to the governance model of EUDP, aimed at fostering access to the internet and other media for the society. Thus, it is using a trans-governmental channel and fostering democratic governance in regard to civil society organizations (European Commission, 2011d).

In 2013, the EU concluded Action Plans with Morocco and Tunisia within the framework of the ENP. Within the time frame from 2013 until 2017 the Action Plan states the following EUDP-policies concerning Morocco: Strengthen role of parliament and government, strengthen role of parties, consolidate holding democratic elections and consolidate and encourage civil society (European Commission, 2013a). Since the first three policies are categorized as policies using the leverage strategy of EUDP because they are targeting the polity, meant to establish democratic institutions and are based on the more-for-more approach. Consolidation and encouraging civil society is targeting sectors and expecting democratic governance as an outcome, while socialization occurs through a trans-governmental channel.

The Action Plan for Tunisia contains the following policies concerning democracy promotion: support the establishment of democratic electoral system through fostering “Independent Public Forum”, ensuring independence of the judiciary and strengthening the role and capacity of civil society (European Commission, 2013b). While establishing an electoral system and ensuring independence of the judiciary are using the leverage model of EUDP, strengthening the role and capacity of the civil society refers to the usage of the governance model of EUDP. The first two policies are meant for democratic institutions while they are targeting the polity and are again based on the conditionality instrument of the more-for-more approach. The latter policy on the civil society targets specific sectors and diffuses norms through a trans-governmental channel.

The financial support for civil society projects e.g. “jamaity.org” and the “Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile” in 2014, refers to the usage of the governance model of democracy promotion (Délégation de l’Union européenne en Tunisie, 2014). Supporting these organization reflects a further shift of a changing strategy. Thereupon, after the proclamation of Tunisian elections in 2014, the EU deployed an Election Observation Mission following the leverage strategy of EUDP (European Commission, 2014). The mission is categorized as such because it is aimed at the polity and targets democratic institutions.

4.3 Findings

This section is meant to illustrate the findings and thus, the strategies used by the EU to promote democracy in each year. At first, the categorization of EUDP-policies before the Arab Spring in Morocco and Tunisia is monitored. Secondly the findings of the period after uprisings are examined and displayed.

4.3.1 EUDP in Morocco & Tunisia before the Arab Spring

As monitored in Table 20.1 EUDP strategies were mainly based on the leverage model of democracy promotion. With the introduction of the EIDHR the EU changed its strategy to the governance model of democracy promotion for the first time. Thereafter, the advanced status for Morocco has been based on the leverage strategy targeting the polity and the usage of the conditionality instrument. Only one policy is following the governance model of democracy promotion. After 2008, the EU-Morocco relationship has been strongly affected by the leverage strategy until the start of the Arab Spring.

Table 20.1: EUDP in Morocco before the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005	Develop a regulatory Framework governing political parties	Leverage
	Support decentralization to enhance powers of local authorities	Leverage
	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures	Leverage
2006	Establishment of Subcommittee on Human, Rights, Democratization and Governance	Leverage
2007	Ad hoc working group on creating a joint document for establishing an Advanced Status of cooperation	Leverage
	Establishment of the EIDHR	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2008	Establishment of the UfM	Leverages
	Foster cooperation with Civil Society organs	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Develop Parliamentary Cooperation	Leverage
	Foster Political Dialogue	Leverage
	Foster Dialogue on Human Rights	Leverage
	Support Judicial Cooperation	Leverage
2009	-	-
2010	Setting up Joint parliamentary Committee	Leverage

In regard to EUDP in Tunisia, Table 20.2 displays that the Action Plan in 2005 was based on the leverage model, whereas the linkage model of norm diffusion has been used once. Thereafter, the EU used the governance model of democracy promotion while establishing the EIDHR. The introduction of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratization and Governance reflect the usage of a linkage-leverage hybrid model of EUDP. The small amount of policies after this establishment is affected by the leverage strategy regarding the establishment of the UfM and negotiations of the “partenariat éforce”.

Table 20.2: EUDP in Tunisia before the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005	Support Political Participation of Civil Society	Linkage
	Facilitating exchange between both Parliaments	Leverage
	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures	Leverage
	Reform State Authorities Administration's	Leverage
	Strengthening Political Parties Support	Leverage
2006	-	-
2007	Establishment of the EIDHR	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratization and Governance	Linkages-Leverages Hybrid
2008	Establishment of the UfM	Leverage
2009	-	-
2010	Start of negotiating “Partenariat éforce”	Leverage

Before the Arab Spring the EU used the leverage model of democracy promotion most frequently in regard to both, Morocco and Tunisia. There have been 13 policies concerning EUDP in Morocco from 2005 until 2010. Only two of these EUDP-policies were following the governance model of EUDP whereas the EU used the leverage model in regard to eleven policies before the Arab Spring. While promoting democracy in Tunisia the EU has set out eleven policies. Therefrom, one policy has been based on the linkage model, one is classified as the usage of a linkage and governance model of democracy promotion hybrid, one as being based on the governance model of EUDP only and eight policies affected by the leverage strategy. At the end, these findings reflect that the EU mainly used the leverage approach to promote democracy before the Arab Spring.

4.3.2 EUDP in Morocco & Tunisia after Arab Spring

Following a deadlock in 2012 the EU changed the focus towards the polity using the leverage model of EUDP in Morocco. From nine policies set out in Morocco from 2011 until 2014 two policies are based on a hybrid strategy of leverage and the governance model of EUDP, four on the governance model of democracy promotion and three on the leverage model. However, the governance model has been the basis for consolidating and encouraging civil society within the ENP Action Plan ratified in 2013.

Table 21.1: EUDP in Morocco after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2011	Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Supporting Deep Democracy	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Leverage
	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2012	-	-
2013	Strengthen Role of Parliament and Government	Leverage
	Strengthen Role of Parties	Leverage
	Consolidate holding democratic elections	Leverage
	Consolidate and encourage Civil Society	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2014	-	-

In regard to Tunisia, eleven policies concerning EUDP have been set out by the EU. Two policies are based on a hybrid of leverage and the linkage model, six policies are following the governance model of EUDP and only three policies are affected by the leverage model. As highlighted in Table 21.2 the ENP Action Plan for Tunisia set out two policies based on the leverage strategy and one policy using the governance model of EUDP. The usage of the governance model went on with supporting civil society projects in 2014. After the proclamation of elections, the EU reacted with the EOM following the leverage approach.

Table 21.2: EUDP in Tunisia after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2011	Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Supporting Deep Democracy	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Leverage
	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2012	-	-
2013	Establishment of democratic electoral system through fostering "Independent Public Forum"	Leverage
	Ensure Independence of the Judiciary	Leverage
	Strengthen the role and capacity of civil society	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2014	Establishment of Jamaity.org	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Establishment of Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile (PASC)	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Election Observation Mission (EOM)	Leverage

As monitored in Table 21.1 and Table 21.2 the EU first EUDP-policies after the Arab Spring were using a hybrid model of leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion in both countries. Due to the fact that two policies in 2011 were based on a hybrid and three on the governance model of EUDP in each country, the EU changed its strategy towards the society and fostering democratic governance.

However, Table 21.1 and Table 21.2 display that the governance model of democracy promotion has been used most frequently after the Arab Spring. EUDP has shifted from using the leverage model mainly towards the usage of the governance model of democracy promotion. In regard to Tunisia, eleven policies concerning EUDP have been set out by the EU. Two policies are based on a hybrid of leverage and the linkage model, six policies are following the governance model of EUDP and only three policies are affected by the leverage model.

4.3 Concluding Remarks

While comparing the EUDP strategies used within the time periods before and after the Arab Spring, one can argue that there has been a change of EUDP. As Table 20.1 – Table 21.2 reflect which strategy has been used most frequently before the Arab Spring and which strategy has mainly been used after the Arab Spring, the findings enable to argue about the extent of policy change.

At first, EUDP changed in different moments in time. Before the Arab Spring the EU mainly based the cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco on the leverage model of EUDP. Therefore, most of the policies were aimed at the polity, based on conditionality and meant to support the development of democratic institutions. Only a few policies in both countries have been based on the linkage or governance model of EUDP as the establishment of the EIDHR or the Subcommittee on Democratization, Human Rights and Governance in Tunisia.

Secondly, one can argue that the linkage model which was used only once, disappears throughout the years of analysis, because norm diffusion is increasingly embroiled within other strategies. Correspondingly, the Arab Spring created individual norm diffusion itself.

Thirdly, one can argue that the EU focused on the leverage and the governance model of democracy promotion rather than on linkage before and after the Arab Spring. The leverage model of democracy promotion has been used most frequently before the Arab Spring, although it is still part of new policies set out. However, the findings reflect the most significant change of EUDP after the Arab Spring: The governance model of democracy promotion became the most frequently used strategy in Morocco as well as in Tunisia.

Taking the findings of both periods into account, one can argue that EUDP has shifted the focus from the leverage model of democracy promotion to the increased usage of the governance model of EUDP. At the end this section has identified, when and how the EU changed democracy promotion strategy in Morocco and Tunisia. Therefore, the findings are used to answer the research question about the extent of policy change after the Arab Spring.

5. Conclusion

As the Arab Spring changed the outlook of EU's environment in the Southern Mediterranean, this study has reconstructed the development of EUDP in regard to Morocco and Tunisia. Therefore, the main research question has been about the extent of policy change concerning EUDP after the Arab Spring. As the findings of the analysis reflect such a change of EUDP in both countries, one can argue that a policy change occurred. Therefore, the first section presents an overview of the findings in Morocco and Tunisia. Secondly, these findings are discussed in regard to their value and scholar's debate on democracy promotion strategies. Thereafter, a clarification in regard to the validity enables to examine the scientific relevance of these findings.

In regard to Morocco, there has been a significant change of strategy. As the EU used mainly the leverage approach before the Arab Spring, the usage of the governance model of EUDP increased after the Arab Spring. However, the leverage approach of EUDP has been a part of democracy promotion after the Arab Spring. Concerning EUDP in Tunisia, the observation displays mainly the usage of the leverage strategy before the Arab Spring. After the uprisings, EUDP changed significantly. At the beginning of 2011 the EU focused on a hybrid strategy of leverage and the governance model of EUDP. Thereafter, the usage of the governance model of democracy promotion has been extended in comparison to policies set-out before the Arab Spring. Therefore, Mouhib (2014) argued that, "the activist EU is exemplified in the EU–Morocco relationship, while the passive EU is manifest in the EU–Tunisia relationship until 2011 and during the Tunisian revolution" (p. 352). This observation changed after the Arab Spring, as the resignation of Ben Ali opened a new door for deeper cooperation and the call for democracy has been reflected during the uprisings. Therefore, Mouhib (2014) observation that "some changes can thus be observed after the emergence of the Arab uprisings: development of new priorities in Morocco, launching of projects in Tunisia" (p. 368), is confirmed by this study.

Hence, the EU reacted to the changing environment explicitly. After the Arab Spring the focus has been extended to the usage of the governance model, as EUDP shifted from democratic institutions to democratic governance. Although the EU still promotes democratic development within the polity and its institutions, supporting NGO's and civil society are the main approach used within EUDP-policies after the Arab Spring. Comparing the development and strategies used, one can argue that the EU has set out more policies in Morocco than in Tunisia before the Arab Spring. After the Arab Spring, EU's cooperation with Tunisia increased and more policies have been set out than in Morocco.

As van Hüllen (2012) argued that cooperation with Tunisia has been difficult before the resignation of Ben Ali, the EU supported reforms and the elections after Arab Spring as well as increased the amount of policies concerning civil society.

In sum, the EU changed its democracy promotion strategy within both countries of analysis. Whereas the findings illustrate that the usage of linkage strategy disappears throughout the years, the EU used the leverage approach primarily before the Arab Spring. After the uprisings, the amount of policies following the governance model of democracy promotion increased. As a consequence, EUDP after the Arab Spring is following either the leverage, the governance model of democracy promotion or a hybrid of both strategies.

Concerning the linkage model of democracy promotion, the argument of Freyburg (2011) and Kubicek (2011) that it had only minor effects, can be confirmed as the usage of the strategy disappears in EUDP throughout the years of analysis. As a consequence of the Arab Spring norm diffusion of individuals occurred anyway and are not part of democracy promotion strategies in Morocco and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Contrarily, the Arab Spring tackled the isolation of civil society as Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) argued, which should foster the effectiveness of the linkage model. Due to the fact that this strategy has not occurred, I am able to argue that the norm diffusion of the linkage model shifted and is to be found within the spheres of democracy promotion using the governance model.

The leverage model of EUDP has been a strategy for policies before and after the Arab Spring. As Epstein & Sedelmeier (2008) argued that the leverage model is most effective in case recipient countries have the prospect of membership, I have to argue that the strategy has been present in EUDP in Morocco and Tunisia before as well as after the Arab Spring. Hence, a confirmation of the argument provided is only possible when analysing the effectiveness of policies using leverage approach of democracy promotion. In contrast to Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) who pointed out that the usage of the leverage strategy will not be feasible for transition countries, the findings reflect that the EU has used this approach nevertheless. Further, Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) argued that the leverage and the linkage approach are reaching their limits. As this can be confirmed in regard to the linkage strategy, the leverage strategy is still relevant for EUDP because it was used before as well as after the uprisings. Besides this, one can argue that even if the usage of the governance model is extended, the leverage approach has to be used for the sake of transforming the polity additionally.

As the usage of governance model in EUDP increased after the Arab Spring, the assumption that it occurs to be the appropriate tool to deal with democracy promotion by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) can be confirmed somehow. As one cannot argue about the effectiveness of this model, this research proofed the extension of policies following this strategy after the Arab Spring.

However, scholar's debate on democracy promotion has been on the EU and its policies in general, whereas these findings represent an adaption of models to actual cases, namely Morocco and Tunisia. As the classification of strategies by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) has been new and necessary to examine policy change and to classify policies, this research adds relevant insights about democracy promotion after the Arab Spring to the literature. Firstly, the creation of a data set concerning EUDP-policies and the underlying models is a basis for further research on the effectiveness of such models and strategies. Secondly, the findings enable to argue that the EUDP changed towards the governance model of EUDP after the Arab Spring, displaying the general direction of EUDP which is relevant for future case studies concerning other recipient countries. In the third place, the findings of this research and the identification of institutions involved in EUDP enhances transparency. Enhancing transparency is highly important because the area of EUDP concerns several institutions and documents which have to be monitored and identified to argue about what actually happened within the EU-Morocco and the EU-Tunisia relationship.

To conclude, this study has reconstructed the EUDP development in Morocco and Tunisia. As the Arab Spring has been an incentive to support democracy development in the Southern Mediterranean, the EU changed the way of promoting democracy. Therefore, a change of EU Democracy Promotion from leverage to the governance model of democracy promotion has been observed. As a matter of act, the findings of this study are a starting point for future research on the effectiveness of the strategies proposed, linkage, leverage and the governance model of EUDP.

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
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Appendix

Table 1.1: Linkage, Leverage & the Governance Model of Democracy Promotion



(Lavenx & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

**Table 1.2: Typologies for EUDP Policies
(Linkage, Leverage & the Governance Model of DP)**

Strategy	Policy	Strategy	Policy
Linkages		Leverages	
Target	Society	Target	Polity
Outcome	Democratic Culture	Outcome	Democratic Institutions
Channel	Transnational	Channel	Intergovernmental
Instrument	Socialization	Instrument	Conditionality

Strategy	Policy
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion	
Target	Sector
Outcome	Democratic Governance
Channel	Trans-Governmental
Instrument	Socialization

(Lavenx & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Table 2: Typology of EUDP-Policies & EUDP Strategies before and after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy	Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005			2011		
2006					
2007			2012		
2008			2013		
2009					
2010			2014		

(Lavenx & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Table 3.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2005

Strategy		Policies		
Linkage		Develop a regulatory framework governing political parties	Support decentralization to enhance powers of local authorities	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures
Target	Society	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No	No	No
Channel	Transnational	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	No	No	No

Table 3.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2005

Strategy		Policies		
Leverage		Develop a regulatory framework governing political parties	Support decentralization to enhance powers of local authorities	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures
Target	Polity	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes	Yes	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 3.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2005

Strategy		Policies		
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Develop a regulatory framework governing political parties	Support decentralization to enhance powers of local authorities	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures
Target	Sector	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No	No	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	No	No	No

(European Commission, 2005a)

Table 4.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2006

Strategy		Policies
Linkage		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

Table 4.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2006

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 4.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2006

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(European Commission, 2006a)

Table 5.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2007

Strategy		Policy
Linkage		Ad Hoc working group on creating a joint document for the establishment of an advanced status of cooperation for Morocco
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

Table 5.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2007

Strategy		Policy
Leverage		Ad Hoc working group on creating a joint document for the establishment of an advanced status of cooperation for Morocco
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 5.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2007

Strategy		Policy
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Ad Hoc working group on creating a joint document for the establishment of an advanced status of cooperation for Morocco
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(Van Hüllen, 2012)

Table 6.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2008

Strategy		Policies				
Linkage		Foster cooperation with civil society organs	Develop parliamentary cooperation	Foster political dialogue	Foster dialogue on human rights	Support judicial cooperation
Target	Society	No	No	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No	No	No	No	No
Channel	Transnational	No	No	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	No	No	No	No

Table 6.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2008

Strategy		Policies				
Leverage		Foster cooperation with civil society organs	Develop parliamentary cooperation	Foster political dialogue	Foster dialogue on human rights	Support judicial cooperation
Target	Polity	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 6.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2008

Strategy		Policies				
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Support Foster cooperation with civil society organs	Develop parliamentary cooperation	Foster political dialogue	Foster dialogue on human rights	Support judicial cooperation
Target	Sector	Yes	No	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	Yes	No	No	No	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	Yes	No	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	No	No	No	No

(EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2008)

Table 7.1 : EUDP Policies Morocco 2010

Strategy		Policy
Linkage		Setting up a joint parliamentary committee
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

Table 7.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2010

Strategy		Policy
Leverage		Setting up a joint parliamentary committee
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 7.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2010

Strategy		Policy
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Setting up a joint parliamentary committee
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(European Commission, 2010b)

Table 8.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2013

Strategy		Policies			
Leverage		Strengthen Role of Parliament and Government	Strengthen Role of Parties	Consolidate holding democratic elections	Consolidate and encourage Civil Society
Target	Polity	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 8.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco 2013

Strategy		Policies			
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Strengthen Role of Parliament and Government	Strengthen Role of Parties	Consolidate holding democratic elections	Consolidate and encourage Civil Society
Target	Sector	No	No	No	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No	No	No	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No	No	No	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	No	No	No	Yes

(European Commission, 2013a)

Table 9.1: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2005

Strategy		Policies				
Linkage		Support political participation of civil society	Facilitating exchange between the both Parliaments	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures	Reform state authorities administrations	Strengthening support for political parties
Target	Society	Yes	No	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	Yes	No	No	No	No
Channel	Transnational	Yes	No	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 9.2: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2005

Strategy		Policies				
Leverage		Support political participation of civil society	Facilitating exchange between the both Parliaments	Improving Independence of judiciary	Reform state authorities administrations	Strengthening support for political parties
Target	Polity	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	No	No	No	No	No

Table 9.3: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2005

Strategy		Policies				
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Support political participation of civil society	Facilitating exchange between the both Parliaments	Improving Independence of judiciary	Reform state authorities administrations	Strengthening support for political parties
Target	Sector	No	No	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No	No	No	No	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No	No	No	No	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

(European Commission, 2005b)

Table 10.1: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2007

Strategy		Policies
Linkage		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	Yes
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

Table 10.2: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2007

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	No

Table 10.3: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2007

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

(EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2007)

Table 11.1: EUDP Policies Tunisia 2010

Strategy		Policy
Linkage		Creation of a working group concerning the „partenariat enforcé“
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

Table 11.2: EUDP Policies Tunisia 2010

Strategy		Policy
Leverage		Creation of a working group concerning the „partenariat enforcé“
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 11.3: EUDP Policies Tunisia 2010

Strategy		Policy
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Creation of a working group concerning the „partenariat enforcé“
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2010)

Table 12.1: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2013

Strategy		Policies		
Leverage		Establishment of democratic electoral system through fostering "Independent Public Forum"	Ensure Independence of the Judiciary	Strengthen the role and capacity of civil society
Target	Polity	Yes	Yes	No
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes	Yes	No
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes	Yes	No
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes	Yes	No

Table 12.2: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2013

Strategy		Policies		
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of democratic electoral system through fostering "Independent Public Forum"	Ensure Independence of the Judiciary	Strengthen the role and capacity of civil society
Target	Sector	No	No	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No	No	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No	No	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	No	No	Yes

(European Commission, 2013b)

Table 13.1: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2014

Strategy		Policies	
Leverage		Establishment of Jamaity.org	Establishment of Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile (PASC)
Target	Polity	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	No	No
Channel	Intergovernmental	No	No
Instrument	Conditionality	No	No

Table 13.2: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2014

Strategy		Policies	
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of Jamaity.org	Establishment of Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile (PASC)
Target	Sector	Yes	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	Yes	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	Yes	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	Yes

(Délégation de l'Union européenne en Tunisie, 2014)

Table 14.1: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2014

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Establishment of Election Observation Mission
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 14.2: EUDP Policies in Tunisia 2014

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of Election Observation Mission
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(European Commission, 2014)

Table 15.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2006/2007

Strategy		Policies
Linkage		Establishment of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

Table 15.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2006/2007

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Establishment of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Target	Polity	No
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	No
Channel	Intergovernmental	No
Instrument	Conditionality	No

Table 15.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2006/2007

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Target	Sector	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

(European Commission, 2007)

Table 16.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2008

Strategy		Policies
Linkage	Establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	
Target	Society	No
Outcome	Democratic Culture	No
Channel	Transnational	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

Table 16.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2008

Strategy		Policies
Leverage	Establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	No

Table 16.3: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2008

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion	Establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

(Council of the European Union, 2008)

Table 17.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	No
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 17.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)
Target	Sector	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	Yes

(European Commission, 2011e)

Table 18.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies
Leverage		Supporting Deep Democracy
Target	Polity	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes
Channel	Intergovernmental	Yes
Instrument	Conditionality	Yes

Table 18.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Supporting Deep Democracy
Target	Sector	No
Outcome	Democratic Governance	No
Channel	Trans-Governmental	No
Instrument	Socialization	No

(European Commission, 2011d)

Table 19.1: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies		
Leverage		Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.
Target	Polity	No	No	No
Outcome	Democratic Institutions	Yes	Yes	No
Channel	Intergovernmental	No	No	No
Instrument	Conditionality	No	No	No

Table 19.2: EUDP Policies in Morocco and Tunisia 2011

Strategy		Policies		
Governance Model of Democracy Promotion		Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.
Target	Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome	Democratic Governance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Channel	Trans-Governmental	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrument	Socialization	Yes	Yes	Yes

(European Commission, 2011c)

Table 20.1: EUDP in Morocco before the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005	Develop a regulatory Framework governing political parties	Leverage
	Support decentralization to enhance powers of local authorities	Leverage
	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures	Leverage
2006	Establishment of Subcommittee on Human, Rights, Democratization and Governance	Leverage
2007	Ad hoc working group on creating a joint document for establishing an Advanced Status of cooperation	Leverage
	Establishment of the EIDHR	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2008	Establishment of the UfM	Leverages
	Foster cooperation with Civil Society organs	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Develop Parliamentary Cooperation	Leverage
	Foster Political Dialogue	Leverage
	Foster Dialogue on Human Rights	Leverage
	Support Judicial Cooperation	Leverage
2009	-	-
2010	Setting up Joint parliamentary Committee	Leverage

(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Table 20.2: EUDP in Tunisia before the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2005	Support Political Participation of Civil Society	Linkage
	Facilitating exchange between both Parliaments	Leverage
	Simplify, shorten and improve judicial procedures	Leverage
	Reform State Authorities Administration's	Leverage
	Strengthening Political Parties Support	Leverage
2006	-	-
2007	Establishment of the EIDHR	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Establishment of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democratization and Governance	Linkages-Leverages Hybrid
2008	Establishment of the UfM	Leverage
2009	-	-
2010	Start of negotiating "Partenariat enforce"	Leverage

(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Table 21.1: EUDP in Morocco after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2011	Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Supporting Deep Democracy	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Leverage
	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2012	-	-
2013	Strengthen Role of Parliament and Government	Leverage
	Strengthen Role of Parties	Leverage
	Consolidate holding democratic elections	Leverage
	Consolidate and encourage Civil Society	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2014	-	-

(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

Table 21.2: EUDP in Tunisia after the Arab Spring

Year	Policy	EUDP Strategy
2011	Establishment of the Support for Partnership, reforms and inclusive Growth (SPRING)	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Supporting Deep Democracy	Leverage-Governance Model of DP Hybrid
	Support to CSO's through Civil Society Facility	Leverage
	Establishment of European Endowment for Democracy	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Supporting media freedom to enhance CSO's access to internet, etc.	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2012	-	-
2013	Establishment of democratic electoral system through fostering "Independent Public Forum"	Leverage
	Ensure Independence of the Judiciary	Leverage
	Strengthen the role and capacity of civil society	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
2014	Establishment of Jamaity.org	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Establishment of Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile (PASC)	Governance Model of Democracy Promotion
	Election Observation Mission (EOM)	Leverage

(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)