

The logo of the University of Twente is located on the left side of the page. It features a stylized yellow structure resembling a flower or a cluster of geometric shapes, with a small yellow cube-like shape below it. To the left of these is a grey, curved, ribbon-like shape. At the bottom left, there is a cluster of black and red dots of varying sizes, with a few red dots scattered below it.

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

Faculty of Behavioral, Management and
Social Sciences (BMS)

The New Dawn of Right Wing European Populism

B.Sc. Thesis

30th June 2016

Nikolas Schulze-Makuch

S1492314

Supervisors

1. Kostas Gemenis
2. Harry de Boer

Abstract

It was rather shocking to many; the degree of success right wing populist parties had following a series of crisis's which have divided Europe. In this essay, the association between various demographic realities and popular support for these parties was measured. By looking at a simple linear regression between these realities we were able to determine that there does indeed exist a negative association between both household income and favorability for right wing populist parties, as well as a negative association between higher level of education and right wing populist favorability. We were also able to demonstrate that those who felt in some ways dissatisfied with the democratic system or even democracy as a whole were more likely to hold favorable views of right wing populist parties. Perhaps most surprisingly, there was no significant association to report with respect to religious service attendance and right wing populist favorability. What follows is an in depth approach which tries to examine the underlying demographic causes for party support.

Key Words: Right Wing, Populism, Extreme Right, Political Parties, Favorability, Europe

Table of Contents

Abstract (2)

Introduction (4-5)

Research Question (5-6)

Case Selection and Sampling (6)

Operationalization (6-7)

What is Populism? (7-12)

Methodology (12-17)

Theory (17-21)

Data Analysis (21-26)

Conclusions (26-27)

Appendix

(Distributions of Parties (31-33)

Charts (34-43)

Tables (43-61)

Bibliography (61-64)

Introduction

“Pundits talk about 'populist rage' as a way to trivialize the anger and fear coursing through the middle class.”- Senator Elizabeth Warren (D) (Leibowitz, 2016).

Unemployment, economic crises, and an unparalleled wave of immigration, there is no doubt the European Union and Europe as a whole are experiencing a series of crises. There has also been a growing resentment against the current political order, from both ends of the political spectrum but the right in particular. A growing frustration with the political establishment, create breeding grounds for populism in general. From marginal fringe parties, in recent years the popularity of the populist right wing has exploded. Across Europe, people seem disillusioned and disappointed with the current political establishment. What are the demographic associations that can explain the growth of popularity with the right and far right populist parties? We have to examine a variety of possible variables, from differences in sex, age, education level, to levels of unemployment and percentage of Muslim population.

In a nutshell, the following will attempt to link various social and political cleavages with favorability and thus, voting behavior. In the book by Russell J, Dalton on the effect of social and political cleavages, we can see primarily from a historical perspective how these cleavages have changed and how the impact of these cleavages has digressed and been manipulated over time. A social cleavage is essentially, the idea that voters separate themselves into blocs, and based on these blocs will vote a certain way. These blocs are sometimes based on common values, but are often being based on factors such as faith, employment status, and level of wealth (Dalton, 1996).

One example of note is the Netherlands and how social cleavages have changed over the course of the 20th century. Dalton notes that prior to the 1960's voting behavior was primarily based on belonging to a particular social group, Protestant vs Catholic, secular vs moralist are certain examples. However, Dalton shows that this may no longer be the case, as many of these cleavages have eroded post 1960's. Dalton has also shown that there has been an almost universal decrease in voting based on class. Between 1945 and 1995 there was

universal decrease in class base voting in the United States, Great Britain and Japan to name some examples (Dalton, 1996).

Dalton has made the case that several once prominent social cleavages such as religion or social class still have an impact in how citizens vote, but social modernization has steadily and continues to lessen the importance of these cleavages. Our aim here is, to understand if right wing populists have managed to turn this around and capitalize on certain demographic changes as an explanation for their recent success.

Research Question

The research question is an explanatory one, since we are looking for the demographic associations for the growth of the far right in Europe. We will be looking at sub-questions and various dimensions of demographic change as well. Such as what is the effect of the level of Education? What about the level of household income, religious observance or perception of the economy in their respective country. Dimensions such as these are important when looking at the growth of the right in Europe, and why right wing populists have more success in some countries as opposed to others. At its core, this paper aims to verify that the growth of right wing populism in contemporary Europe is not coincidental; rather that it can be explained by the shifting demographics, social cleavages and indeed hardships which are currently affecting large parts of Europe.

Our formal research question is

To what degree do various demographic factors influence favorability for right wing populist and extreme right populist parties?

We have several sub questions which can help see what effect specific demographics have on favorability and therefore voting, so to help paint a picture of which groups may feel more inclined, pulled and in any way understood by the platform of these respective parties.

Is there an effect with respect to education level when it comes to favorability for right wing populist parties?

Do people who are more religious and attend Church more often, are they more likely to hold sympathetic views of right wing populist parties?

Are people with lower income in their respective household more likely to have favorable views for right wing populist parties?

Are people who view the democratic process or even democracy as a whole as failing them, more likely to hold favorable views of right wing populist parties

These variables were chosen for reasons largely based on both existing research and a rather unorthodox approach to cleavages. This can be found expressed in greater detail in the Theory section. The variable of education was chosen because broadly speaking, many view those who are involved in right wing populist parties as simple minded or uneducated. Religious observance was chosen because, not only do right wing populist parties so often praise traditional values and their respective preservation within our culture, but parties like PiS or Front National have not been shy from embracing their nations respective cultural and religious heritage (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009).

With respect to household income, a great number of the migrants which are coming to Europe are unskilled. If people feel their very livelihood is threatened, due to the government sanctioned import of cheap labor, there may well be a greater resentment, not only to the reigning government but to globalization and multiculturalism as a whole, which feeds into the rhetoric of many of these parties in question. The final variable to be analyzed is view on the economy. The hypothesis here is, if people view that the economy has not gotten better, or on the contrary gotten worse, they will be less inclined to feel altruism in the way of accommodating migrants and will feel in a sense, unheard, forgotten or left behind by the contemporary ruling government.

Case Selection and Sampling

To analyze the data we will be looking at the estimated effect size and the unstandardized coefficient scale generated by SPSS from a simple linear regression model, when analyzing the relationship between any one of the given variables and the rise of the respective right wing populist party in question. Analyzing the effect size will provide a helpful window to which one can eventually draw conclusions from. Nonetheless, as previously stated the cultural differences and current situations in European countries can be immensely different, thus it makes it all the more critical to account for possible outliers, influential cases and contextual effects. The graphed confidence intervals with the coefficient for B will serve as the primary visual indicators for relationships across the modules, the complete tables and other data is thus available in the appendix.

Operationalization

The data that will be used to explain social demographics of a given country with support for right wing populist parties will come from primarily the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data set. The CSES is a comprehensive data set which collects electoral data from numerous countries and gives the user the opportunity to compare it with demographic data which is also provided. Thus this data is entirely quantitative.

Unfortunately, countries have to actually be willing to fund an election study, which is likely the reason why some countries like Switzerland, Germany and France are consistently studied, and why other countries such as Hungary, appear only once in the CSES data set. The parties that will be studied are those which were available for the subjects to give an opinion about in a survey. As stated before there is not always data for every country and every election module, this is not a problem since this study is looking purely at the demographic favorability relationship. As for the parties, they were graded on a 10 point like/dislike scale by those researched by the CSES. Zero being lowest favorability and Ten the highest. The countries and the respective parties which will be studied are listed at Table #1. Twenty countries are being studied; these countries were chosen because of a presence of both harmonized data within the CSES and right wing populist parties.

In some cases, there are multiple right wing populist parties which can be evaluated by Survey respondents. In others, there are no notable right wing populist parties. Obviously, there will always be populist right to far right organizations in any given country; however, in some cases its presence was not notable enough to solicit an option on the election study. In other cases, it can be very well argued that a party no longer falls into the paradigm of populist right. This is the reason why in some countries there are multiple right wing populist parties, and some countries such as Spain, are completely absent from the data set.

What is Populism?

In this section, Populism itself will be examined and interrogated as an idea. Furthermore its conceptualization and relevance to this specific text will be emphasized and justified. Previously in this paper, the idea of Populism was briefly stated yet not elaborated on. Here, we will dive deeper into the definition. Contemporary intellectuals frame Populism typically in one of three definitions. The first being Populism as an ideology, the second

being, Populism as a method of framing an ideology, more of a conduit through which an ideology is sold to the populace. The third definition is that populism is Traditional Democratic though hostile to Liberalism in a sense. It is important indeed to the greater result and analysis of this paper to make clear and distinct the competing theories and definitions of populism. While the focus here is primarily the results and relationships as opposed to an intellectual discourse as to what we exactly define as Populism, it remains imperative to nonetheless acknowledge and pay tribute to this discussion.

A Populist Ideology?

We are all aware of how Populist parties can re-shape and re-define an election and manipulate not only the election of a nation itself, but the very agenda and policy that it pursues. But is Populism itself an ideology? Such an idea at face value may seem rather ridiculous but when closely examined there is a case to be made. As stated previously Populism is often characterized as the good masses against the corrupt elitist establishment. The political theorist Michael Freeden draws upon a key definition. ‘Thin centered ideology’, unlike harder more dogmatic ideology, thin centered is much more a loosely packed cluster of ideas. Unlike ideologies like Socialism or Capitalism, thin centered ideologies do not offer solutions for the troubles which plague human existence; rather Populism is a malleable ideology which can be stacked on top of another ideology (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

Although there is no canon or strict laws which govern Populism as an ideology it remains one nonetheless. Since Populism is this thin centered ideology, there are much fewer defined concepts and ideals; Populism does not go into depth, on every single topic and ideal in today’s modern political discourse. The Ideology of Populism has only one focus that is the people. The word itself comes from the Ancient Greek, for the people. Despite using this word, Populists rarely cater to all the people; instead they focus and cater on a specific group. As stated at the very beginning there is both left and right wing populism. The United States currently in 2016 is the best example of both left and right wing populism catering to different cleavages and ideas.

As an ideology Populism is much more normative and idealistic as opposed to more pragmatic or realist. The political world is divided into two camps, the corrupt and the pure. Populism holds an ideal of how democracy and ruling should function as opposed to how it really is.

In the context of right wing European Populism, this is typically targeted toward the indigenous Europeans, the lower and middle class. Although Populist ideology uses this catch all term, and presents itself as selling to the democratic values of a nation, in the practical sense this is not really true. There is a sense of irony in this, Populism as an ideology is seen as opposing Elitism and deception in politics, but in practice targets either one end of the political spectrum or the other, targets one social cleavage or the other (Muddle, 2004).

Populism as a framework for ideology

Populism in this sense becomes a mental framework from which we digest, interpret and analyze political realities and come to some sort of thesis or belief partially as a result of this framework. So, we don't believe or not believe in Populism, we either reject or accept its mental framework. (Muddle & Kaltwasser, 2012);(Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The key thing about Populism is its appeal to the people. It sells itself as a movement by the people and for the people. The question here is what movement doesn't sell itself as being a popular movement? Would any movement seriously say, no we are not for the people? Nay, Populism is a framework by which any ideology tries to frame itself within as a way of being more politically advantageous. An interesting line of thought to interrogate, is that Populism may at its core just be a frame for ambitious political entrepreneurs to build a temporary social cleavage in order to channel maximum support. Populist parties and their political entrepreneurs typically emerge during a time of major party de-alignment and often during the time of some crisis, be it political or economic, etc. These political opportunists often use Populist rhetoric to frame an issue which happens to be a hot button political topic. One would hardly call philosophies such as economic liberalism, socialism, egalitarianism etc., as being populist by their nature (Pappas, 2012).

In the hands of these political opportunists, Populist rhetoric can shake up and totally flip the dynamic of the existing political structure. However, Populism in this case is based more on a pragmatic sense of obtaining power and support. From this perspective populism's main objective is to use the existing political mechanisms, ideologies and momentum as a method of framing a new ideology which conceals a larger political objective. Of all the popular definitions of populism this is perhaps the most pragmatic yet cynical, however one that deserves to be examined nonetheless (Pappas, 2012).

Populism, Democracy & Liberalism, a Love-Hate relationship

Much like Populism itself, Liberalism and Democracy are highly contested words with respect to their conceptualization and definition. Like Populism, there are a variety of schools of thought as to what constitutes democracy, liberalism and how we define both of these terms. However, Democracy being a liberal idea, we can define democracy as majority rule and popular sovereignty. Of course, the representative parliamentary system under which we all live is much more complex and Oligarchic than that of Ancient Athens, but perhaps that is the point, under the traditional definition of Democracy the popular demands of the majority are meant to rule and it is only after the corruption of democratic ideals that populism and thus populist parties arise and experience large scale success. In this respect, isn't Populism really the most pure and distilled form of Democracy?

Interestingly enough, Populism is typically against political parties, especially the ruling ones, which it sees as the main democratic actors that contaminate true democracy and foster corruption and elitism. This opposition to the role of political parties in government is indeed a very classical liberal idea. A great many classical liberals such as George Washington were themselves very much against the idea of allowing the participation of political parties in the democratic process. Although the degree of animosity toward political parties does vary from populist to populist, the idea of Populism is very clearly against the current ruling party, and very much in favor of better and reformed parties, although some Populist movements are against political parties on the whole. (Muddle & Kaltwasser, 2012)

Populists on the whole see the people as not being heard, or in some cases even oppressed by the political system. However, Populism really only focuses on blaming the nature of the system as opposed to blaming the people. In the populist mindset the people should have individual liberty and shouldn't necessarily have their day to day life changed and personal autonomy should remain at the center of the individual. While obviously, populist parties can diverge as to what degree of social liberalism they want to embrace, the idea of individual liberty and not changing the people's way of life, is very much part of democratic liberalism. Since Populism at its core demands more hands on democracy and a higher degree of public transparency and rule by the people, it is clear why it can very easily be characterized as being intertwined with liberal democracy. It would be however a mistake to claim that the target of populists are only the political elites, but rather the elites in all their forms.

As emphasized earlier, populists want to maximize the power of people in the political sphere, but it's not only the political elite which undermine that from their perspective. One

can look to France and the success of Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen. The establishment parties are not the only ones who are subjected to attack from the party's platform, but also the media, the excessively wealthy and the academics (Canovan, 1999). Academics have always been accused of being out of touch from the plight of the common man, biased in favor of the left wing, and arrogant. This may seem ignorant, but attacking Academia for its perceived arrogance is nothing new, the Enlightenment French philosopher Michel de Montaigne, was severely critical of Academia's perceived arrogance and it being out of touch from the common man (Hartle, 2003). Again, many of these criticisms may well be legitimate; the bias of media for instance has been well documented. The idea that the wealthiest individuals have too much influence in their respective countries' policy dictation, not surprisingly populist parties tend to almost all be in favor of higher taxation for the wealthy.

It's easy to look at contemporary politics in Europe and argue that the populists, especially the right wing ones are the product of both economic deprivation and xenophobia. This is a gross over simplification; the simple truth is populism has always been a characteristic of western democracy (Jamison, 2014). To a great many people, populism, which is anti-elitist, inclusive and anti-partisan rhetoric, is the purest form of democracy, not unlike that of Classical Athens (Muddle, 2004).

However, while populism has many classical liberal elements, it is important to discern the illiberal elements within right wing populism of which we are studying. Obviously parties such as Golden Dawn are totally illiberal in the sense that they wish to abolish democracy, despite working within it. However, it was already made the case that Golden Dawn was but the most extreme example, this doesn't mean that some more mainstream right wing populist parties don't have illiberal elements, because they do. In the article by Pappas, he draws an interesting distinction, between democratic ideas and liberal ideas. Pappas shows that while yes, Populism is perhaps the purest form of democracy, it is entirely illiberal. The polarizing nature of Populistic politics along with Majoritarianism, are decidedly illiberal, in the sense that it stands in total opposition to classical liberals such as Montesquieu (Pappas 2013).

An interesting example of this in the contemporary sphere is the current situation in Hungary. The current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz party, has basically polarized the country's political field so much so that it has essentially become a two party state. Since the party commands ultra-majority, we can see that in Hungary liberal institutions

have been threatened and in some cases restricted by the government. New laws regulating certain control over the media and human rights violations have moved Hungary away from the traditional Western-model of a Liberal Democracy (Pappas 2013). A similar situation can be seen in current Poland, where the ruling PiS has also placed similar restrictions on the media, judiciary and other traditional institutions.

The debate on the relationship between Populism, Liberalism and Democracy will no doubt continue and interesting new paradigms and arguments will develop in the future as right wing populism continues to grow in Europe. The concluding thoughts on this section are, that the relationship is rather complex, that yes, Populism has some very traditional democratic ideas behind it, such as its anti-elitist, and pro-popular sovereignty rhetoric. Nonetheless, there are many elements particularly more present in the right wing populist branch which contradict Classical Liberal principals such as media-censorship, political polarization and ultra-majoritarianism.

Methodology

Using the data in from the CSES, we can isolate cases that pertain relevance to what is being investigated. We will use filters in order to pick relevant cases; a filter is essentially a restriction which will be applied so to eliminate irrelevant data sets from this thesis. The first filter, being that we will only be using the data that is given by the CSES, although data does not exist for every country and election module of interest, it nonetheless serves to a sufficient purpose, and provides information critical for this study. The key thing here is harmonization; yes it would be theoretically possible to include data from other sources to fill in the gaps however this would mean a more disharmonious data set and possible unreliability because of mixed results.

The second filter to be applied is that we are dealing with countries in Europe; these countries do not necessarily have to be in the European Union. For instance Norway and Switzerland are key countries, with very large and successful right wing populist parties, though they are not in the EU. Since issues like the economic recession and large scale mass migration affected all of Europe and not the European Union alone, it makes sense to take this approach and look at the full picture. Social cleavages and shifting demographics have affected all of Europe. The third filter is perhaps the most self-explanatory but should be stated anyway, we are looking at exclusively right wing populist parties as opposed to populism in general. Although it is rarer in the contemporary European political playground,

left wing populism is significant; however for the intentions and purposes of this study it will be ignored.

The fourth filter is to remove non-democracies from contention, obviously one cannot conduct a study on the rise of certain political movements in Europe, if in that country political expression and voting is restricted. This filter removes countries like Russia and Belarus which are essentially dictatorships and cannot be accurately studied.

The parties which will be studied are right wing populist parties which have been studied by the CSES and graded on a Semantic differential scale (rated 0-10). Obviously these lists fluctuate as parties rise and fall, so not every data set contains the same parties for the same election module.

Country	Module 1	Module 2	Module 3	Module 4
Austria			Austrian Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future of Austria	Austrian Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium	Front National , Vlaams Blok	Vlaams Blok		
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Danish People's Party	Danish People's Party	
Finland			True Finns	
Germany	None	Republicans, Party of Rule and Offensive	NPD	AfD
Croatia			Croatian Party of Rights, Croatian Democratic Alliance for Slavonia and Baranja	Croatian Party of Rights, Democratic Alliance for Slavonia and Baranja
France		Front National	Front National	Front National
Hungary	Justice Life Party			
Ireland			Fianna Fail	Fianna Fail
Netherlands	None	LPF	PVV	
Norway	Progress Party	Progress Party	Progress Party	
Poland	None	Law and Justice, League of Polish Families	Law and Justice, League of Polish Families	Law and Justice
Romania	Greater Romania Party	Greater Romania Party	Greater Romania Party	
Serbia				Serbian National Party

		Slovenian Democratic Party,		
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	Slovenian National Party	Slovenian Democratic Party, Slovenian National Party	
Sweden	None	None	Sweden Democrats	
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	Swiss People's Party	Swiss People's Party	
Greece				Golden Dawn,
Montenegro				Independent Greeks
Czech Republic	Republicans			Democratic Front

Theory

Having explored the various definitions of populism, in this section we will take a rather unorthodox approach to voting theory and electoral cleavages, while providing justification for the investigation of the research questions declared earlier. Politics and society are obviously intertwined. Humans are also obviously social creatures, and therefore obviously congregate into groups based on common ground. What are cleavages? Why are we measuring education as a cleavage?

A crucial distinction to make here is the difference between horizontal and vertical criteria, the horizontal are those which we are primarily looking at, and that is economic and social divisions such as education, income and employment. Whereas vertical consist of more cultural based divisions, such as religion and cultural identity.

Household Income

The first thing to declare would be in cleavage theory, social class, which is mostly determined by household wealth, was always determined to be a cleavage, however the impact of this cleavage has grown weaker since the 1960's. In his work, Russel J Dalton has shown that the effect of class-based voting has been on the consistent decline since 1945 and in 1995 has fallen dramatically all across post-industrial nations. There are various possible explanations for this, such as the education cleavage emerging and creating a new social class with different ideas and aims which are not necessarily synonymous with that of the former upper class and elitist aristocracy of traditional Europe (Dalton, 1996).

Jansen theorizes in his book, the reason why income has played less of a role in social and political cleavages is the increased affluence, comfort and standard of living for the average working man. Since the recovery following the Second World War, the standard of living in Europe has increased to an unparalleled level to any point in human history. This may in turn, explain why income level has become a less important social cleavage, since the average workers have moved away from traditional left wing parties which have been in favor of re-distributive policies. An interesting thing to note, in this respect is the American Catholic de-alignment theory. Throughout most of American history, Catholics traditionally were blue collar immigrants who supported an increase in social welfare and wealth redistribution, and over-whelmingly supported the Democratic Party. However, following the massive increase in household wealth and standard of living, the Catholic vote massively disaligned from the Democratic Party and a large portion of the Catholic vote spread into the Republican Party (Jansen 2011).

The Catholic de-alignment theory illustrates the European situation perfectly, as household wealth and standard of living increased, the less important economic class became as a social and political cleavage. So why are we measuring it here? It was stated before that its importance has diminished year by year, election by election (Jansen 2011).

It is being measured in this thesis in response to the crisis that Europe faces. The economic crisis of 2008 has severely impacted nations such as Greece. Mass migration not only possesses a challenge to the continuation of the welfare state in Europe, but possibly threatens the livelihood of unskilled native European laborers. Furthermore income inequality has become a more discussed and debated political issue, one can see that in United States, one of the most extreme examples of income disparity, Income inequality has been a central theme for populist candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. In *Capital* by Thomas Piketty, he illustrates that the income gap has been getting progressively larger in Europe (Piketty, 2014).

However, in most contemporary literature, social class is measured by occupation rather than income. It was appropriate in this case to take the rather unorthodox approach of measuring the social class cleavage in terms of income, specifically household income. In the article relating to public perception of social cleavage, not only was it discovered that income was the most reliable method for discerning socio-economic status, it was also discovered that in the realm of public spending for programs such as health care or unemployment, that the lower income class was very much more in favor of this sort of public spending (Bussemeyer,

Goerres & Weschle 2009). This may well be due to the fact that they have a much more real fear for the persistence of their own personal welfare and benefits. So if the lower socio-economic class (as measured by income) is much more in fear of going unemployed and losing their benefits as well as in favor of extending benefits to the lower class, why on earth would they ever be in favor of importing largely unskilled labor? Would they be more likely to support anti-immigration parties?

Similarly in the article which examined cleavages in the Far East, income was measured as a social cleavage along with social class. An important and indeed relevant distinction has to be made here, while it was noticed that yes, the wealthier people tended to vote more conservative, it was discovered that those who had little or no income, limited or no property and a gloomy outlook on the future simply just tended to be more radical in terms of their political views (Choe 2003). Is this also a pattern we can see in Europe? It should be noted in terms of pensions or social welfare, many of the more successful right wing populist parties such as Front National have left-of center views when it comes to social welfare, but are more “radical” in terms of Islamic immigration (Betz 1993).

Even though research has shown that economic voting has been on the consistent decline since the end of World War Two, there is sufficient reason to retain it as a horizontal cleavage which may have a large impact when it comes to favorability of right wing populist parties. However, by taking the rather unorthodox view of measuring it in terms of income, perhaps we can come to a different understanding of the association between class based voting and right wing populism.

Level of Education

Traditional scholars have typically shyed away from calling education level a social or political cleavage. It is contested in this thesis that the situation in academia and indeed society has changed as a whole. As Jansen hypothesized in his book “Over-time differences in the association between class and vote are (partly) explained by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters, such as education and gender” Further in his book Jansen shows that the variable of which he controlled for, that was education, was the most significant and had the greatest effect of all the controls when talking in terms of political differences between working class peoples and those in service class (Jansen 2011).

Both Jansen and Dalton, who we have been referenced previously in this work, make use of a term, which would further make the case that level of education can be measured as a cleavage. That term is “Cognitive Mobilization.” What this means, is that a societal emphasis on education and learning, along with large rates of university attendance has allowed people as a whole who have attended university to draw their own conclusions regarding various political, economic and social issues independent of class, religion or any or any traditionally established electoral cleavages. The role of mass media no doubt also has had an impact in this respect, however the point remains nonetheless, that widespread education has resulted into more calculated and issue-driven and oriented citizens. In a sense, educational expansion has blurred the boundaries of cleavages and has redrawn them in recent history and has created a new cleavage with a new identity and interest (Jansen 2011).

This is discussed in great detail, in a study pertaining to Denmark by Stubager. It was demonstrated that given the country’s high level of education and de-alignment from otherwise traditional cleavages, the development of a new cleavage, as education was demonstrated. Since all of the countries which are being studied in this essay have a high level of education in relation to the rest of the world and class based voting is in the decline, it is extremely relevant to base the argument for the education cleavage on Stubager.

With large macro-social development in Europe, education can become a cleavage if political parties take advantage and capitalize on this development. Cleavages can be in part defined as three inter-related elements, a socio-economic element, as well as psychological and organizational. Cleavages do not simply just form arbitrarily, but are formed when there is a great change in all these of these dimensions as a society. The fact that an observable educational cleavage can be seen in Denmark, has shown itself to have significantly impacted the composition of the electorate, the importance of certain issues, and what appears to be the dissolution of the class cleavage (Stubager 2010).

At least since the 1980’s in Denmark this cleavage has been in existence and can be reflected by the linkage that is demonstrated between level of education, favorability for certain parties and values. Stubager clearly demonstrates that higher educated people tend to have more libertarian values, whereas lower educated persons have more authoritarian values. Given the nature of this is essay, this is of tremendous relevance. Furthermore, the results from Stubager have also shown that the more highly educated voters, tend to flock to more traditional parties, whereas those of a lower educational level are attracted to social democrats or the Danish Progress Party.

Fundamentally the society of Western European democracy and indeed any society as a whole has been changing and evolving. If one wishes to understand the demographic realities which have driving impact on favorability of right wing populist parties, one must accept that the former cleavages and political realities which correspond to them may have shifted and changed. To look at level of education as its own social and political cleavage may be unorthodox yet, it is intellectually sound, and can be supported by research like that done Stubager (Stubager 2010).

Religious Observance

Traditionally religion has always been considered a social and political cleavage especially in countries such as Germany or the Netherlands which have a high degree of religious plurality. In the early stages of German democracy and even in the time of the German Empire, for instance, the Catholic minority and the “Centre party” was instrumental in opposing the “Kulturkampf” of Bismarck and played a role in German democracy following the abdication of the Kaiser and prior to the advent of the Third Reich (Blackbourn 1975).

Similarly in the Netherlands, there was an extremely influential Catholic party and there existed both a Catholic and Protestant vote. However, as stated in the abstract, Europe is changing; traditionally a Christian stronghold has experienced steady secularization, and declining Church membership and attendance. Religion has also greatly changed in recent times. Previously segregated, Catholics and Protestants have adopted a more ecumenical and inclusive policy toward one another (Jansen 2011). The Second Vatican Council of 1962 eroded many of the traditional differences between these two churches. Following the Second World War in Germany, the Centre party formed the Christian Democratic Union, in favor of including more Protestants (Blackbourn 1975).

The reason that religious observance rather than simple religious denomination was measured as a cleavage in this thesis, is that in contemporary Europe, especially in the west, religious observance, piety and participation is extremely low. However, many people consider themselves to be culturally Christian despite not being an active member in their respective church. In countries like Poland or Ireland, religious observance is comparatively significantly higher than say Germany or the Netherlands, however comparatively religious plurality in countries such as Poland is much lower. Therefore, based on ecumenism, growing secularism, it makes much more sense to think of practicing religious people as their own

cleavage in contemporary political Europe as opposed to simply looking which denomination Europeans belong to on paper.

System Satisfaction

The inclusion of “faith in the system” as a variable in this thesis is likely the most to be scrutinized by anyone who will likely read this thesis. Broadly speaking “Cynical people” are not defined by any academic as a social or political cleavage. They are correct this is not a cleavage. This fourth variable was included in order to more closely examine the claims made by Pappas and others, that populism, in its right wing form is inherently illiberal. It is also present to examine to what degree people are frustrated with the current democratic system, since it was also previously claimed that Populism can be represented as the purest will of the people.

Thus, it can be seen that System Satisfaction, will be interrogated as a competing alternative theory, that challenges that whatever association may be observed can be explained in terms of frustration and general feelings of neglect by the existing political establishment. In the article by Betz, he paints a picture of not only how the radical right and right wing populist parties appeal to the common man through promises of prosperity, but also how the radical right breeds resentment of political parties and the corruption of the existing political order. This resentment of the current political order can be mirrored by the fact that established parties will usually refuse to work with, cooperate or enter into coalitions with parties that are viewed as extreme right. In a way. This can be seen as feeding the anti-establishment narrative (Betz 1993).

We can also further expand this discussion, when analyzing the study by Oesch, when he attempts to discover the support the working class has for right wing and radical right populist parties. His fifth hypothesis, is similar to the one we will test, but that people who are more dissatisfied with the current democratic system are more likely to protest vote, which in the case of contemporary Europe, would be populist right. The whole idea, is that mainstream political parties, trade unions, churches, social organizations, etc, have largely ignored large portions of the working class culture, and in response these workers, typically have just had spontaneous conscience based on disgust with the current political order (Oesch 2008).

The findings of Oesch are rather startling, of almost of a third of all Flemish people who are dissatisfied with democracy are also supporters of the right wing Populist Party “Vlaams Blok”. A similar pattern was observed in Norway where almost half of all those

dissatisfied with the current political system were supporters of the Norwegian Progress Party. The reverse is also true, of workers who are satisfied with the current democratic system only 9% are supporters of Front National, a figure lower than that in the rest of the country (Oesch 2008).

If the debate that was discussed holds any merit, we can expect to see favorable or at the very least neutral views toward the idea of democracy, however quite negative views toward the idea of the current democratic system. Once again, looking at the United States in 2016, a populist playground. Both Trump and Sanders supporters ride on a platform of restoring democracy, while they themselves and indeed their many supporters have repeatedly claimed that the process is rigged against them. Although this is referring to a party nomination and not an election on the whole, it's an interesting comparison to explore (Baggini 2016).

In intellectual circles, it's easy to have a contemptuous view of those who support right wing populist parties. However, it is essential to entertain the idea, that this is larger reaction, to feeling left behind and unheard by the political process. Thus, perhaps this is not a question of cleavages but of simple high conciseness among those who feel unheard. Thus, an alternative competing theory.

Control Variables

Like the research done by Jansen, in this essay certain control variables will also be included in the data and analysis. Like Jansen, Gender and Age will be controlled for, but obviously since education is being measured as an independent variable, it will not be a control. Religious denomination however, will be a control. The reason why religious service attendance and not denomination is used, is discussed further in the section regarding the justification of religious service attendance. However since denomination is still a central theme to the work by Jansen, it still makes sense to include it as a control, if not as an Independent variable. The inclusion of controls is done to paint a larger and more complete picture of the whole possible association between right wing favorability and demographic reality (Jansen 2011).

The first variable, Gender was a binary variable with one being male and two being female. The second being age, was coded into a four point scale with point one representing the lowest age (20-29) tier and point four being the highest age tier (60+). The third control was a nominal variable of religious denomination, historically speaking religious based voting

was widespread and obviously was and still in some ways exists, a Catholic vote and a Protestant vote for instance. However as Dalton demonstrated these sort of religious identity politics were on the decline (Dalton, 1996). Nonetheless since Jansen controlled for it, and since in most traditional literature denomination is viewed as a traditional social cleavage it had to be accounted for as a possible control variable so we can observe if denomination level voting is still on the decline.

Operationalization of Variables

Education

Firstly one must understand the context and the operationalization of these measurements. The Independent variable in this case, was level of education. In the interest of harmonization it was recoded into a five point scale for each module. Level one, consisted of persons which had completed less than a primary education. Level two, consisted of those which had completed a primary education, three was those who completed secondary education, four consisted of those which had some sort of post-secondary, tertiary or trade education. Finally level five consisted of anyone who had a University degree.

Religious Service Attendance

Much like the variable education, in order to maintain harmonization, the variable of Religious Service attendance had to be recoded, however contrary to the variable education, with respect to Religious service attendance some countries did not ask about this topic in their survey. This was typically in the Nordic countries. Under this category in the data set countries like Denmark and Norway had to be excluded. Furthermore, in Module four this topic is dropped completely from the survey, thus we have no results for Module 4. Excluding the Nordic countries likely does not make much of a difference with respect to the overall findings collected, since these are the most secular countries in the world, overall religious observance is so low, and it's unlikely that a relationship would be found which would conflict with the results here. Although it is problematic that the question was completely dropped from Module four, there nonetheless remains sufficient data from which to draw conclusions from.

Religious service attendance was like Education, recoded into a five point scale. The value of one being never attending religious services, two being annually, three a couple times a year, four is at least once a month and five is weekly attendance.

Household Income

In contemporary Europe, right wing populist parties have embraced a rhetoric against the mass migration. The question then is, are people with a lower household income more likely to vote for these parties? If the majority of labor being imported into Europe is unskilled, would lower paid workers feel more threatened by immigration and thus more likely to view right wing populist parties in a favorable light? Obviously the dependent variable is like or dislike for the respective Populist Party in question, and the Independent variable is household income. It makes more sense to look at household income on the whole, as opposed to individual income. Looking at the whole picture of the household makes the most sense, in this respect students, stay at home parents etc. have a more accurate level of inclusion, since it speaks to their greater standard of living as opposed to a raw number which may not accurately paint the correct picture when discerning their level of welfare (Rydgren, 2008).

Like the variable religious service attendance it was not available in module 4, when conducting this paper in specific. However, with the 3 modules at which there is data critical assertions can be nonetheless made. Firstly we must describe the variable of household income as in how it is measured. Like all previous, it is measured on a 5 point scale, and divided into 5 respective quintiles. Thus, income is divided into 5 groups from lowest to highest. In module one and indeed every other module, the numerical values which define the divisions among quantiles are rather different. Household income was defined as pooled income earned by the household after taxes. In each country this was assessed by its local currency, (pounds, francs, euros, etc.) Furthermore each country set its own parameters as to what qualified as belonging to quantile 1 versus quantile 2.

For instance in module 3, France considers the upper bound cut off for quantile 1 as being at earning more than 1500 euros a month, whereas in Germany it is considered at being above 1000 euros. Obviously this is most likely due to a variety of factors, such as cost of living, average income, etc. In other nations such as Greece or Finland, this is assessed on an annual income. While it is indeed worth mentioning, the differences here, it remains nonetheless valid to use this data, since we are examining if positive perception for right wing populist parties goes up or down as your household climbs the income ladder. The exact

increase of net money is not necessarily the important thing here, the question is, if people live in households which have a significantly higher income, in relation to their countrymen, are they going to be more or less likely to view for the populist right wing in a favorable light?

System Satisfaction

In terms of measurement it is imperative to declare that while we are in a sense measuring the same thing, we are measuring two different aspects of it. Not unlike with Household income and Religious Service Attendance, the 4th module's dataset is completely absent, however in this question the first data set is also absent. In module 2 we are measuring satisfaction with democracy, or as a whole, measuring what people think of democracy as an idea, and how that corresponds to favorability of right wing populism. Whereas in module 3 we are asking a slightly different question, and that is how favorability with respect to the democratic process relates to right wing populist favorability.

In the broad sense of an analysis we are asking to what degree dissatisfaction with the status quo in politics relates to favorability of right wing populist parties. Just like in all the previous questions, the Independent variable was coded into a five point scale. Unlike the others however this was a Likert Scale. Starting with the value of 1 which said totally satisfied, 2 moderately satisfied, 3 neutral, 4 moderately dissatisfied and 5 totally dissatisfied. How survey respondents perceive the current government and its philosophy is an interesting dimension to interrogate as it pertains to right wing populism.

It was alluded to earlier that Golden Dawn in Greece, for instance is totally undemocratic, despite operating within the democratic system. However, compared to the rise of right wing populism all over Europe, Golden Dawn is a drop in a bucket of water. Though arguably the most extreme example, when we discussed the illiberal dimensions of Populism especially that of right wing populism, it is essential to investigate whether right wing populists all carry illiberal rhetoric or just a few.

Analysis of Results


Education and Right Wing Populist favorability

When examining the results collected from analyzing the relationship between favorability toward right wing populist parties and level of education, one can just through the

naked eye observe several patterns and trends. Obviously, all the data sets and charts are available for examination in the appendix

The patterns one can see, is that in almost every case the relationship is significantly negative, with very low values of the direct effect. While there are exceptions, it is without a doubt a negative relationship for the vast majority of cases. There is a great degree of fluctuation with respect to some parties over time. There are a variety of possible explanations for this. One can say that a party may have changed its rhetoric to appeal to more centrist voters. This strategic policy shift can often be adopted by a party once it sees itself as having a serious chance at entering into a government. If the opposite trend is seen, that being that relationship has grown more extreme in a negative sense, one possible explanation is that in the first module, a right wing populist party may be relatively unknown by a large proportion of the population, and then not wanting to appear extreme, subjects may circle a middle number, rather than leaving the response blank. This would explain that as a party grows more known, people in general have a more negative view on it.

One final pattern that one see, is that the relationship grows less extreme over time. If



were to take a look at module four, it is clear that while the relationship is still overall negative, it is in general much less extreme. This can possibly be explained in terms of popularity, more centrist rhetoric or in general a greater frustration with the existing political order. One striking change is the shift of the coefficient size from Module 3 to Module 4 with respect to the Polish PiS. In Module 3 with respect to education, the coefficient was extremely large with -3,976, meaning with every level of education you go up, your opinion of PiS will go down by -3,976 on the 10 point scale. However in Module 4, the coefficient has dwindled down to -.0455 which means there is little difference at all, in terms of level of education achieved and support for PiS. In fact looking at the figure below one can see that in Module 4, across the board the strength of the relationship has dwindled.

While Stubager has given concise arguments for the existence of the education cleavage, with respect to the growth of the populist right we can see closer to present day it has little noticeable effect at all (Stubager 2010). It is important to recognize that the populist rage which has built up in Europe is not necessarily the result of the unintelligent and ill-educated, but likely a very real expression of fear, and moreover dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Religious Service Attendance and the Populist Right Wing.

It's easy to think that the more pious among us are more inclined to vote for parties which so often propagate Christian identity and traditional values. However, by in large there is no relationship for the majority of cases. While there are exceptions, if one were to examine the graphs, the majority of confidence intervals include the value of zero, which shows there is no relationship and the coefficients are quite low. Interestingly enough, with respect to the German NPD in Module three, the relationship between religious service attendance and this party's favorability is actually negative. Although, we can definitely say the rhetoric of the German NPD by no means represents all right wing populist parties and in many ways is an exception, it is not the only party with a negative coefficient when we talk about religious observance. For instance the Swiss People's Party has a coefficient of B at -1,503 in Module 3. Therefore in many cases, those who attend religious services are actually less inclined to have favorable views with respect to right wing populist parties.

One reason why there may be no relationship to report is that in many European countries such as Germany or Poland, there already exist well established Christian parties. Some parties like the German Christian Democrats are largely based on both Catholic and Protestant social teachings and the Christian worldview. Many observers have theorized that European Integration itself is the product of Christianity in its modern form. Although inter-denominational differences do exist, for one Catholics tend to be more in favor of integration than Protestants and in this respect one can see that certain parties such as the German CDU have adopted much more the Catholic theological approach with respect to issues like social justice, integration and immigration. In the paper "Religion and Party choice in Europe" through the results discerned here, we can see that Religious Cleavages are much less of an impact and driving force behind support for Eurosceptic parties than well-established Christian parties (Van der Brug, Hobolt & De Vreese, 2009).

In Europe, especially among the younger generations, Religion is playing a progressively lower impact on contemporary European politics, nonetheless even in a secular Europe, it remains imperative to check for an effect with right wing populist groups. With groups like PiS in Poland, really emphasizing the Christian identity of Poland, it's easy to think why one would assume there is a relationship between Religious service attendance and favorability for right wing populists. The findings in this thesis, show that for the majority of cases there is no relationship or even a negative relationship. The study which examined this relationship "Religion and Party choice in Europe" elaborated on this more, since it went into

greater depth with respect to this variable. While those among us who attend Church on a regular basis are typically more center-right than the secularized people who are more center-left, there is no indication that a significantly larger number of religious people are drawn to the European Right wing populist parties. (Van der Brug, Hobolt & De Vreese, 2009). Data also shows, that while yes religious people are typically more conservative they don't have a more negative view on ethnic minorities than any other social cleavage and are thus not more likely than anyone else to be involved in the far right or right wing populist parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009).

This may have something to do with the institutional Church, in France for instance, despite being anti-abortion and opposed to same sex marriage one of the leading critics against Front National's stance on immigration and ethnic and racial minorities has been the Roman Catholic Church (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). A similar stance toward the anti-immigration rhetoric by the Church can be seen in response to a Pegida rally in Cologne, Germany, where the institutional Church clearly condemned what it saw as bigotry and racial discrimination (Cullinane, 2015).

Interestingly enough, a final study, that we should examine when absorbing the results here, found that people who rarely or never go to Church are more likely to vote for radical right parties. We have to distinguish between those who identify as Christian but don't go to Church and those who don't go to Church because they don't belong to a Church. In this study, it is the former who are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Although this does not refer to right wing populism as a whole, rather just the radical right wing, it is still relevant to include these findings (Werts, Scheepers & Lubbers, 2012).

In conclusion, the results found in this paper suggest no relationship between religious service attendance and favorability for the populist right. Of course, one can always find exceptions to the rule, but on the whole, there is insufficient evidence to say there is any relationship whatsoever, positive or negative. Of course, cleavages are ever shifting, and with increasing de-alignment and the unpopularity of the established parties, it is indeed possible one relationship may develop in future, however at present there is no one to be seen.

Effect of Household Income

The results found with respect to the effect of household income were largely similar to those when examining the relationship between level of education and right wing populist perception. On the whole the relationship was significantly negative and also had very low values for the coefficient of B. As usual there were exceptions, however on the whole one could see that as people's respective household income goes up from quintile to quintile, people are less likely to hold a favorable view of the populist right party(s) in their respective countries. There are indeed many observable patterns such as when time moves forward the differences become less extreme, and that the values tend to be less extreme in the Nordic countries. This may be partially due to the fact that the divide between rich and poor is less extreme, especially in a historical sense.

One can also see that the Austrian people's party is one of the few where there is no relationship between household income and opinion for this party and the coefficient is extremely small. One possible reason for this is that the Austrian People's party appeals to both rhetoric against non-European immigration, while at the same time, chanting economically liberal principles. One final anomaly that is worth looking at in Module 3 is the German NPD. One possible explanation as to why this party is one of the few where there is no relationship between popular opinion and household income in this case, is because this party is so fringe and rare, that support as a whole for this party is so small, there simply exists not enough support for a relationship to be measured, studied or analyzed. One needs only to see the distribution in terms of support for this party in the appendix to really truly grasp how fringe and rare support for it is.

Historically speaking we know that the base of certain populist right parties such as Vlaams Blok, or the German Republicans have been primarily blue collar males. The study by Swank and Betz supports this assertion, as based on individual level survey data which shows that workers who face a very real threat to both employment and income (these people tend to be on the lower quintiles of household income) disproportionately support right and radical right populist movements (Betz, 1993). This is largely a product of globalization, which has in many western nations significantly negatively impacted lower skilled and blue collar workers, especially among the native European tier. These lower skilled workers obviously are more immobile in terms of assets and are more likely to be confronted with the negative dimensions of globalization as opposed to view it in a positive light. (Swank & Betz, 2002)

System Satisfaction

Earlier, in the Operationalization, we alluded to Populism has being inherently illiberal while at the same time possessing several textbook Classical liberal values such as popular sovereignty and anti-elitism. This bizarre position with respect to Liberalism is precisely why it was measured in the final research question as a competing alternative theory. Through the careful analysis of the direct effects we can see that there is indeed a relationship to both dissatisfaction with democracy and dissatisfaction with the democratic system.

With respect to dissatisfaction with the democratic process there is indeed a relationship, those who feel more dissatisfied with the democratic process are more likely to vote for the Populist right wing. However in many cases the confidence interval is within zero, showing there is little in terms of relationship. Compared to dissatisfaction with the democracy the relationship is less significant. One can look at the dissatisfaction with the democracy and see that there is a much more significant relationship between those who view the current process in a negative light and voting for Populist right wing parties (Mudde, 2010). We can see by the values which are represented in the Coefficient of B that the negative association is very much present. An example of this is that for the PiS in where the coefficient for B is at 3,257 for the variable satisfied with democracy. This means the more dissatisfied, one becomes say moving from 3 to 4 in terms of dissatisfaction, according to the results it will have his favorability of the PiS party go up by 3,257 on the ten point scale. A result similar to this can be observed in the vast majority of cases tested for.

Contemporary data somewhat supports, the findings here, which seems to conclude that while European satisfaction with democracy fluctuates, satisfaction with the democratic institutions and the democratic system has always been much lower in comparison. Furthermore, those who vote for parties which are in power (and tend to therefore be more mainstream) not surprisingly show a higher satisfaction with both democracy and democratic institutions (Aarts & Thomassen 2008). Further existing data shows that Europeans in general do not trust their national parliaments and other ruling democratic organs (Mudde, 2010).

In short we can say that dissatisfaction with democracy and the democratic system is congruent with the theory that many who support populist parties simply feel left behind and unrepresented by the contemporary social and political frameworks. When compared to the other results obtained from the demographic variables, we in general can observe a much starker relationship in terms of coefficient size. Therefore, the implications of these findings

show that the greatest effect size comes from those who are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in their respective democracy.

Conclusion

The data here has shown in which demographic groups there tend to be greater support for right wing populist parties. We can see that the lower income earners and lower educated are more likely to hold sympathetic views for right wing populist parties. However, with respect to education the coefficients grow smaller as we analyze data closer to present day. Furthermore those who feel dissatisfied and unheard by the current state of democracy in their respective country are also more likely to vote for the populist right, our data shows that the frustration is geared at both the process itself and Democracy as a whole.

Surprisingly to perhaps the layman but already established in research was that there is by and large no significant relationship between Religious service attendance and voting for the Populist right wing. Obviously there were exceptions, but by in large given the fact that there are already a great many established Christian parties and that the high liturgical Churches are unlikely to support rhetoric which many view as xenophobic, those who attend religious services frequently are not significantly more or less likely to have a favorable view of these parties.


In the abstract, several different concurring crises were alluded to, as these continue to run their course and play a role in our political discussion, time will tell, if this new wave of right wing Populism is only a temporary protest of frustration, as a result of feeling marginalized and angry with the status quo, or if these new parties are here to stay, and if they will gain further support, so they may play a larger role in the future politics of Europe.


Appendix

Distributions of Parties


Below one can see the distributions of the dependent variable, which is the favorability of right wing populist parties, in their respective country at the time specified in their respective model. This was done to illustrate the pre-existing favorability of parties. We can observe a pattern which shows that these are typically skewed toward the left or the zero on the chart, implying strong unfavorability. However, there is some variation; parties with more moderate rhetoric such as the Swiss People's Party have more even distribution than say the German NPD, one of the most extreme examples. One can see both a tremendous variety and observe a similar overall pattern when it comes to the popularity of right wing populism. The implications of these skews show that overall these parties, are by in large still unpopular with

the majority of voters. Although this skewness grows less extreme as we get closer to present day, it is also important to make note that these parties all have a varying degree of rhetoric. Some parties like the Swiss People's Party have an almost normal distribution, likely because they are not only in the government, but have a much more moderate rhetoric than that of the German NPD, which was alluded to earlier and is little more than a fringe Neo-Nazi party. The implications of skewness tell us several things, the first being that right wing populism seems to be getting more mainstream favorability closer to present day. The second tells us that there is a tremendous variety in terms of pre-existing feelings with respect to the parties being studied, therefore one must be mindful of each individual party and its respective public opinion and rhetoric when analyzing the data and charts presented in this study.







Netherlands 2002, LPF




Norway, 2001 Progress Party




Poland 2001, League of Polish Families




Poland, 2001 Law and Justice




Romania 2004, Greater Romania Party




Slovenia 2004, Slovenian National Party




Slovenia, Slovenian Democratic Party




Switzerland, 2003 Swiss People's Party




Austria, 2008 Austrian People's Party




Austria, 2008 Alliance for the Future of Austria




Croatia, 2007 Croatian Party of Rights




Croatia, 2007 Democratic Alliance




Denmark, 2007 Danish People's Party




France, 2002 Front National




France, 2007 Front National




Germany 2005, NPD




Finland, 2007 True Finns




Ireland, 2007 Flanna Fail




Netherlands, 2006 PVV




Norway 2005, Progress Party




Poland, 2005 League of Polish Families




Poland, 2005 League of Polish Families




Romania, 2004 Greater Romania Party




Romania, 2004 New Generation Party




Slovenia 2008, Slovenian National Party




Slovenia 2008, Slovenian Democratic Party




Sweden, 2006 Sweden Democrats




Switzerland 2007, Swiss People's Party




Austria, 2013 Austrian Freedom Party




Austria 2013 Alliance for the future




Austria 2013, Team Stronach




France, 2012 Front National




Germany 2013, AfD




Ireland, 2013 Fianna Fail




Montenegro, 2012 Democratic Front




Poland 2011, Law and Justice




Charts




Module 2, Effect of Education,(with controls) Graph 1




Module 2, Effect of Education (with controls) Graph 2





Module 3, Effect of Education (with controls) Graph 1




Module 3, Effect of Education (with controls) Graph 2










Module 2, Effect of Piety, (with controls) Graph 1




Module 2, Effect of Piety (with controls) Graph 2









Module 2, Effect of Income (with controls) Graph 2




Module 3, Effect of Income (with controls) Graph 1




Module 3, Effect of Income (with controls) Graph 2




Module 2, Satisfaction with Democratic Process, (with controls, Graph 1)




Module,2 Satisfaction with Democratic process (with controls)
Graph 2



Module 3, Satisfaction with Democracy (with controls)
Graph 1





Tables

Parties Module 1, Effect of Education (no control)	Coefficient B Effect of Education (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound 95% (no control)	N
Front National (WAL)	-3,843	-5,255	-2,43	2000
Vlaams Blok (FLAN)	-5,789	-7,159	-4,419	2000
Republicans (Czech)	-2,133	-3,2	-1,066	2178
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,242	-0,837	0,353	1228
Justice Life (HUN)	-3,416	-4,771	-2,061	1524
Progress Party (NOR)	-0,737	-1,128	-0,346	2054
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-5,778	-7,507	-4,049	2030
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-2,826	-3,957	-1,695	2047

Parties (Module 1) Effect of Education *= $p < .05$	Coefficient for B, Effect of Education (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95%	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for religious denomination	N
Front National	-3,471	-4,917	-2,025	9,448	0,062	6,404*	0,012	2000

(WAL)								
Vlaams	-5,904	-7,368	-4,439	35,371*	-0,014	2,264	0,024	2000
Blok (FLAN)								
Republicans	-1,868	-2,952	-0,785	5,972	0,04	2,187	-0,006	2178
(Czech)								
Danish	-0,232	-0,825	0,36	5,695*	-0,057	2,152*	NA	1228
People's								
Party (DN)								
Justice Life	-3,318	-4,772	-1,914	17,096*	-0,019	3,389	-0,011	1524
(HUN)								
Progress	-0,734	-1,13	-0,337	6,86*	0,001	-0,009	NA	2054
Party (NOR)								
Slovenian	-5,338	-7,115	-3,561	35,657*	-0,095	7,817*	-0,079*	2030
National								
Party (SLO)								
Swiss	-2,305	-3,466	-1,144	11,669*	-0,039	6,025*	0,016	2047
People's								
Party								
(Switz)								

Parties Module 1 (no control) Effect of piety	Coefficient B Effect of Education (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound 95% (no control)	N
Front National	-0,147	-1,703	1,408	2000
(WAL)				
Vlaams Blok (FLAN)	-0,118	-1,291	1,055	2000
Republicans (CZECH)	-0,061	-0,901	0,778	2178
Justice Life (HUN)	0,036	-1,145	1,217	1524
Slovenian National	2,426	1,029	3,823	2030
Party (SLO)				
Swiss People's Party	0,658	-0,412	1,728	2047
(Switz)				

Parties Module 1 (with control) Effect of Piety *=p<.05	Coefficient B Effect of Education (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for the Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for religious denomination	N
Front	-0,634	-2,351	1,084	11,613	0,114	4,945	-0,007	2000
National								
(WAL)								
Vlaams	-0,75	-2,112	0,611	7,876	0,156	2,694	0,016	2000

Blok (FLAN)								
Republicans (Czech)	-0,591	-1,535	0,352	0,564	0,051	2,611	-0,017	2178
Justice Life (HUN)	-0,759	-2,092	0,573	7,65	0,031	4,123	-0,031	1524
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	0,477	-1,298	2,253	16,076*	-0,043	8,136*	-0,09712	2030
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	0,443	-0,657	1,543	3,053	-0,037	6,906*	0,005	2047

Parties Module 1 Effect of Income (no controls)	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Front National (WAL)	-3,213	-4,864	-1,563	2000
Vlaams Blok (FLAN)	-2,948	-4,101	-1,795	2000
Republicans (Czech)	-0,906	-1,1618	-0,194	2178
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,98	-1,526	-0,434	1228
Justice Life (HUN)	-1,988	-3,122	-0,854	1524
Progress Party (NOR)	-0,445	-0,735	-0,154	2054
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-5,279	-6,868	-3,691	2030
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-2,477	-3,35	-1,603	2047

Parties Module 1 Effect of Income (with controls) *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for Religious Denomination	N
Front National (WAL)	-2,895	-4,588	-1,203	22,101*	0,069	3,767	-0,007	2000
Vlaams Blok (FLAN)	-2,817	-4,081	-1,554	21,227*	0,028	2,06	0,022	2000
Republicans (Czech)	-0,669	-1,448	0,109	2,864	0,026	2,285	-0,009	2178
Danish People's Party (DN)	-1,041	-1,594	-0,487	8,945*	-0,07*	1,84	NA	1228
Justice Life (HUN)	-1,88	-3,094	-0,665	15,062*	-0,024	3,206	-0,018	1524
Progress Party (NOR)	-0,452	-0,744	-0,161	5,530*	0,011	-0,087	NA	2054
Slovenian National	-4,964	-6,638	-3,289	37,292*	-0,128	6,762*	-0,065	2030

Party (SLO)								
Swiss	-2,428	-3,362	-1,493	15,739*	-0,091	5,671*	0,015	2047
People's								
Party								
(Switz)								

Parties Effect of Education, Module 2	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound (no control)	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	0,37	-1,888	2,629	2223
League of Polish Families (PL)	-8,193	-10,169	-6,218	1793
PiS (PL)	-7,693	-9,449	-5,937	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	-3,753	-5,044	-2,461	1912
Danish People's Party (DN)	-1,336	-1,82	-0,851	2025
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,455	-2,039	-0,87	2051
LPF (NL)	-1,364	-2,275	-0,453	1573
Front National (FN)	-0,732	-1,414	-0,05	999
Swiss People's Party (Switz).	-5,861	-7,623	-4,099	1417
Republicans (GER)	-3,325	-4,126	-2,523	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	-4,382	-5,46	-3,304	3022
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-5,588	-7,933	-3,184	1001
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-5,16	-7,463	-2,858	1001

Parties Effect of Education, Module 2 *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with control)	Upper Bound 95% (with control)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for Religious denomination	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	-0,002	-2,323	2,319	32,054*	0,108	4,579	,179*	2223
League of Polish Families (PL)	-8,436	-10,531	-6,341	39,739*	-0,074	10,897*	-0,088	1793
PiS (PL)	-7,803	-9,671	-5,934	36,210*	-0,05	7,719*	-0,092	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	-2,389	-3,73	-1,047	4,231	,244*	4,891*	-0,032	1912
Danish People's Party (DN)	-1,381	-1,871	-0,89	10,735*	-0,024	0,444	NA	2025
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,417	-2,004	-0,83	6,711*	0,034	1,674	NA	2051
LPF (NL)	-0,938	-1,876	0,001	4,479	,09*	0,774	0	1573
Front National (FN)	-0,642	-1,357	0,073	4,321	0,013	0,652	-0,008	999
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-4,644	-6,464	-2,824	10,796	,2*	4,471*	0,029	1417
Republicans (GER)	-3,028	-3,833	-2,222	4,874	,175*	2,447	-0,003	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	-4,112	-5,199	-3,026	14,350*	0,069	6,606*	0	3022
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-4,943	-7,385	-2,502	16,513*	0,012	13,446*	-0,003	1001
Slovenian Democratic Party	-4,575	-6,939	-2,21	17,557	-0,022	13,443*	-0,012	1001

Parties Effect of Piety, Module 2	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound (no control)	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	-0,327	-1,87	1,216	2223
League of Polish Families (PL)	1,233	-0,657	3,123	1793
PiS (PL)	0,171	-1,514	1,855	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	1,105	-0,208	2,417	1912
LPF (NL)	0,078	-0,427	0,582	1573
Front National (FN)	0,687	-0,284	1,657	999
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,454	-1,048	0,139	2025
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	1,562	0,169	2,954	1417

Republicans (GER)	1,345	0,679	2,011	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	1,052	0,154	1,95	3022
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	1,127	-0,725	2,979	1001
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	1,106	-0,687	2,9	1001

Parties Effect of Piety, Module 2 *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with control)	Upper Bound 95% (with control)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for Religious denomination	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	1,238	-0,441	2,917	29,879*	0,091	4,508	,193*	2223
League of Polish Families (PL)	-0,361	-2,4	1,678	9,816*	0,083	10,599*	-0,165	1793
PiS (PL)	-1,353	-3,172	0,467	12,452	0,097	7,744*	-0,192	1793
Greater Romania Party (RO)	-0,252	-1,611	1,106	-5,158	,289*	5,605*	-0,031	1912
LPF (NL)	-0,075	-0,61	0,46	0,431	,102*	0,916	-0,002	1573
Front National (FN)	0,594	-0,394	1,582	-0,236	0,023	0,761	NA	999
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,48	-1,09	0,129	5,025*	-0,003	0,697	NA	2025
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	0,677	-0,751	2,106	-10,056	,22*	6,230*	0,025	1417
Republicans (GER)	0,96	0,172	1,749	-7,856*	,181*	2,722*	0,003	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	0,67	-0,395	1,734	-1,412	0,082	7,046*	-0,002	3022
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	0,283	-1,962	2,527	-1,862	0,055	14,099*	-0,025	1001
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	0,138	-2,034	2,31	0,897	0,019	14,054*	-0,036	1001

Parties Effect of Income, Module 2	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound (no control)	N
---	---	---	-------------------------------------	----------

Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-3,693	-4,792	-2,595	1417
Front National (FN)	-0,516	-1,17	0,139	999
Republicans (GER)	-2,631	-3,288	1,975	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	-3,37	-4,254	-2,486	3022
League of Polish Families (PL)	-4,358	-5,863	-2,852	1793
PiS (PL)	-4,406	-5,743	-3,069	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	-3,992	-5,108	-2,875	1912
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,735	-1,165	-0,304	2025
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,103	-1,551	-0,655	2051
LPF (NL)	-0,915	-1,493	-0,337	1573
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-4,617	-6,838	-2,396	1001
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-5,617	-7,895	-3,339	1001

Parties Effect of Income, Module 2 *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with control)	Upper Bound 95% (with control)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for Religious denomination	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-2,859	-4,008	-1,71	4,996	,169*	4,913*	0,027	1417
Front National (FN)	-0,456	-1,126	0,214	3,308	0,024	0,95	-0,008	999
Republicans (GER)	-2,313	-2,974	-1,651	3,47	,162*	2,051	-0,014	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	-3,05	-3,943	-2,156	12,085*	0,053	6,099*	-0,015	3022
League of Polish Families (PL)	-3,838	-5,369	-2,307	22,502*	0,031	9,585*	-0,125	1793
PiS (PL)	-3,982	-5,345	-2,619	21,850*	0,041	6,404*	-0,122	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	-2,831	-4,037	-1,625	8,108	,202*	4,538*	-0,029	1912
Danish People's Party (DN)	-0,795	-1,243	-0,348	8,099*	-0,025	0,308	NA	2025
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,06	-1,508	-0,612	5,121*	,040*	1,448	NA	2051
LPF (NL)	-0,722	-1,31	-0,134	3,162	,09*	0,706	0	1573
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-4,155	-6,533	-1,777	21,284	-0,086	12,259*	-0,021	1001
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-5,17	-7,615	-2,726	23,815	-0,075	11,881*	-0,01	1001

Parties Effect of Satisfaction with the Democratic process, Module 2	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no control)	Upper Bound (no control)	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	1,825	-1,357	5,007	2223
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	4,156	1,782	6,531	1417
Front National (FN)	-0,188	-1,271	0,895	999
League of Polish Families (PL)	3,157	0,545	5,769	1793
PiS (PL)	2,628	0,301	4,956	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	1,057	-0,88	2,994	1912
Republicans (GER)	0,773	-0,531	2,077	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	3,105	1,335	4,854	3022
Danish People's Party (DN)	1,799	0,027	3,57	2025 2051
Progress Party (NOR)	1,368	0,432	2,304	
LPF (NL)	0,216	-1,201	1,633	1573
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	0,989	-2,478	4,456	1001
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	0,886	-2,693	4,465	1001

Parties Effect Satisfaction with Democratic Process, Module 2 *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with control)	Upper Bound 95% (with control)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	Coefficient for Religious denomination	N
Vlaams Blok (BEL)	1,664	-1,493	4,821	28,184*	0,11	4,548	,178*	2223
Swiss People's Party (Switz).	3,467	1,101	5,832	-15,41312	,224*	6,031*	0,021	1417
Front National (FN)	-0,203	-1,287	0,881	1,693	0,026	0,858	-0,008	999
League of Polish Families (PL)	2,856	0,265	5,448	0,78	0,094	10,329*	-0,15	1793
PiS (PL)	2,4	0,086	4,714	0,823	0,097	7,207*	-0,15	1793
Greater Romania (RO)	0,819	-1,09	2,727	-7,635	,285*	5,433*	-0,034	1912
Republicans (GER)	0,536	-0,774	1,847	-6,661	,187*	2,768	-0,014	3022
Party of Rule and Offensive (GER)	2,895	1,129	4,66	-5,825	0,077	6,815*	-0,021	3022
Danish People's Party (DN)	1,813	0,842	2,785	1,492	-0,006	0,44	NA	2025
Progress Party (NOR)	1,351	0,417	2,284	-1,18	0,043	1,586	NA	2051
LPF (NL)	-0,005	-1	1,411	0,243	,101*	0,916	-0,001	1573
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	0,542	-2,871	3,955	-0,108	0,02	14,032*	-0,039	1001
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	0,436	-3,09	3,962	-2,19	0,057	14,105*	-0,031	1001

Module 3, Effect of Education	Coefficient for B (no controls)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-10,307	-16,495	-4,119	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,783	-1,165	-0,402	1999
NPD (GER)	-6,441	-8,573	-4,31	4112
True Finns (FIN)	-1,946	-2,868	-1,024	2580
Greater Romaina (RO)	-8,912	-11,011	-6,813	1402
Sweden Democrats (SWE)	-4,506	-6,892	-2,12	1546
Danish People's Party (DN)	-4,59	-5,667	-3,514	1441
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,699	-2,02	-1,374	3793
PVV (NL)	-4,236	-5,098	-3,373	4551
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	-3,869	-5,761	-1,977	1003
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	-4,603	-7,288	-1,919	1003
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-0,545	-2,125	1,035	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-3,526	-5,507	-1,545	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-3,485	-5,491	-1,479	1054
League of Polish Families	0,099	-1,448	1,645	4218
PiS (PL)	-4,17	-4,971	-3,37	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	-,220	-1,905	1,465	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	-1,314	-3,468	,841	1164

Module 3 Effect of Education, Parties *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for the Constant (with constant)	Coefficient for Age (with controls)	Coefficient for Gender (with controls)	Coefficient for Religious Denomination (with controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-12,192	-18,562	-5,822	88,248*	-0,289*	3,492	0	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,743	-1,147	-0,339	4,063	0,004	0,534	NA	1999
NPD (GER)	-6,386	-8,511	-4,26	59,562*	,259*	1,814	-0,001	4112
True Finns (FIN)	-2,101	-3,047	-1,156	11,294*	-0,006	4,858*	0	2580
Greater Romania (RO)	-7,924	-10,114	-5,734	27,76*	0,132	5,762*	0,001	1402
Sweden Democrats (SWE)	-4,619	-7,086	-2,151	40,079*	0,017	5,775	NA	1546
Danish People's Party (DN)	-4,341	-5,414	-3,267	17,464*	,147*	-0,115	NA	1441
Progress Party (NOR)	-1,72	-2,047	-1,393	13,234*	-0,017	-0,31	NA	3793
PVV (NL)	-4,225	-5,112	-3,338	26,7*	-0,068*	3,953*	0	4551
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	-3,344	-5,397	-1,291	16,965*	0,035	3,62	0	1003

Democratic Alliance (CRO)	-4,31	-7,218	-1,401	30,038*	-0,004	7,365	0	1003
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-0,26	-1,982	1,462	5,053*	0,041	0,57	0,002	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-3,996	-6,096	-1,896	29,451*	-0,106	5,223	0	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-3,886	-6,014	-1,758	30,565*	-0,097	4,429*	0	1054
League of Polish Families	1,888	0,296	3,481	15,976*	,337*	9,627*	-0,001	4218
PiS (PL)	-3,976	-4,808	-3,143	15,964*	0,042	4,638*	0	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	,162	-1,848	1,524	2,364	,001	2,34	,001	1164
Alliance for future of Austria (AUT)	-1,244	-3,397	,909	1,049	,004	2,966	,004	1164

Module 3, Effect of Piety Parties	Coefficient for B (no controls)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-1,271	-2,641	0,098	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,046	-0,536	0,444	1999
NPD (GER)	-2,729	-4,02	-1,438	4112
PVV (NL)	-0,386	-1,067	0,296	4551
Greater Romania (RO)	-0,256	-2,048	1,537	1402
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	-0,081	-0,841	0,679	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	-0,055	-1,027	0,917	1164
League of Polish Families (PL)	1,782	0,486	3,078	4218
PiS (PL)	0,351	-0,329	1,031	4218
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	1,332	-0,113	2,778	1003
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	1,587	-0,46	3,634	1003
Fianna Fail (IRE)	0,603	-0,28	1,485	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-0,112	-1,853	1,63	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-0,099	-1,862	-1,664	1054

Module 3 Effect of Piety, Parties *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for the Constant (with constant)	Coefficient for Age (with controls)	Coefficient for Gender (with controls)	Coefficient for Religious Denomination (with controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-1,503	-2,903	-0,104	29,564*	-0,067	9,140*	0	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,236	-0,759	0,288	1,149*	0,021	0,584	0	1999
NPD (GER)	-6,899	-8,445	-5,353	51,884*	,313*	3,783	-0,002	4112
PVV (NL)	-0,386	-1,071	0,289	7,7	-0,018	4,741*	0	4551
Greater Romania (RO)	-1,138	-2,939	0,663	-1,546	0,256	6,975*	0,001	1402
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	-0,183	-0,977	0,612	2,151	0,005	2,399	0,001	1164
Alliance for the Austria (AUT)	-0,172	-1,187	0,844	-2,826	0,01	3,062	0,004	1164
League of Polish Families (PL)	0,026	-1,349	1,401	22,814*	,307*	9,74*	-0,001	4218
PiS (PL)	0,26	-0,985	0,466	2,303*	,105*	4,467*	0	4218
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	0,864	-0,734	2,462	1,014	0,1	3,91	0	1003
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	1,208	-1,054	3,47	9,194	0,079	7,698*	0	1003
Fianna Fail (IRE)	0,449	-0,489	1,387	2,915	0,035	0,456	0,002	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-0,925	-3,133	1,262	17,653*	-0,044	5,253	0	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-0,97	-3,186	1,246	19,308*	-0,037	4,471	0	1054

Module 3, Effect of Income Parties	Coefficient for B (no controls)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Swiss People's Parties (Switz)	-4,837	-6,017	-3,656	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,553	-0,902	0,204	1999
NPD (GER)	-0,083	-1,211	1,044	4112
PVV (NL)	-1,223	-1,741	-0,706	4551
Progress Party (NOR)	-0,54	-0,818	-0,261	3793
Danish People's Party (DN)	-1,498	-2,416	-0,581	1441
Sweden Democrats (SWE)	-2,199	-3,809	-0,589	1546
True Finns (FIN)	-1,324	-1,981	-0,666	2580
League of Polish Families (PL)	-0,882	-2,046	0,282	4218
PiS (PL)	-1,704	-2,312	-1,096	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	0,179	-0,564	0,923	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	-0,735	-1,685	0,215	1164
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	-4,523	-5,988	-3,057	1003
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	-4,466	-6,565	-2,368	1003
Greater Romania (RO)	-3,854	-5,423	-2,285	1402
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-1,181	-2,004	-0,358	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-2,615	-4,809	-0,421	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-2,236	-4,46	-0,012	1054

Module 3 Effect of Income, Parties *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for the Constant (with constant)	Coefficient for Age (with controls)	Coefficient for Gender (with controls)	Coefficient for Religious Denomination (with controls)	N
Swiss People's Parties (Switz)	-5,376	-6,634	-4,118	53,051*	-0,22512	6,254*	0	3163
Front National (FN)	-0,502	-0,858	-0,147	2,461	0,016	0,339	0	1999
NPD (GER)	0,191	-0,951	1,332	37,525*	,254*	2,49	-0,001	4112
PVV (NL)	-1,198	-1,721	-0,675	11,668*	-0,037	4,492*	0	4551
Progress Party (NOR)	-0,562	-0,843	-0,282	8,717*	-0,01	-0,472	NA	3793
Danish People's Party (DN)	-1,046	-1,991	-0,101	3,863	,146*	-0,236	NA	1441

Sweden Democrats (SWE)	-1,99	-3,609	-0,371	28,465*	0,078	4,533	NA	1546
True Finns (FIN)	-1,199	-1,857	-0,541	6,818*	0,016	4,327*	0	2580
League of Polish Families (PL)	-0,04	-1,207	1,127	23,069*	,307*	9,738*	-0,001	4218
PiS (PL)	-1,423	-2,036	-0,809	7,079*	,086*	4,044*	0	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	0,279	-0,487	1,044	0,579	0,006	2,428	0,001	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	-0,645	-1,622	0,332	-0,251	-0,005	2,823	0,004	1164
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	-4,447	-6,018	-2,876	24,351*	-0,019	3,001	0	1003
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	-4,275	-6,621	-2,129	33,243*	-0,038	6,961	0	1003
Greater Romania (RO)	-3,263	-4,845	-1,682	8,04	,209*	6,022	0,001	1402
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-1,141	-2,042	-0,24	10,343	0,009	0,093	0,002	1434
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	-2,925	-5,282	-0,569	26,776*	-0,114	4,53	0	1054
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	-2,459	-4,85	-0,068	26,388*	-0,095	3,85	0	1054

Module 3, Effect of Satisfaction with Democracy. Parties	Coefficient for B (no controls)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	4,622	3,257	5,987	3163
Front National (FN)	0,046	-0,338	0,429	1999
NPD (GER)	2,799	1,704	3,894	4112
True Finns (FIN)	2,686	1,946	3,426	2580
Greater Romania (RO)	6,11	4,673	7,546	1402
League of Polish Families (PL)	-1,468	-2,269	-0,666	4218
PiS (PL)	3,372	2,964	3,78	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	0,071	-0,626	0,768	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	1,404	0,517	2,291	1164
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	6,466	5,135	7,797	1054
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	6,241	4,923	7,558	1054
Croatian Party of Rights (CRO)	3,612	2,233	4,99	1003

Democratic Alliance (CRO)	3,842	1,879	5,805	1003
Danish People's Party (DN)	3,175	2,468	3,882	1441
PVV (NL)	2,702	2,081	3,321	1441
Progress Party (NOR)	3,34	2,988	3,693	3793
Sweden Democrats (SWE)	12,48	12,095	12,864	1546

Module 3 Effect of Satisfaction with Democracy, Parties *=p<.05	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for the Constant (with constant)	Coefficient for Age (with controls)	Coefficient for Gender (with controls)	Coefficient for Religious Denomination (with controls)	N
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	4,499	3,125	5,873	19,581*	-0,118	7,777*	0	3163
Front National (FN)	0,063	-0,323	0,449	0,473	0,02	0,548	0	1999
NPD (GER)	3,265	2,156	4,373	30,1*	,255*	1,823	-0,001	4112
True Finns (FIN)	2,61	1,872	3,348	-3,436	0,02	4,286*	0	2580
Greater Romania (RO)	5,71	4,278	7,142	-24,074*	,216*	5,745*	0,001	1402
League of Polish Families (PL)	-1,885	-2,649	-1,062	28,400*	,321*	10,108*	-0,001	4218
PIS (PL)	3,257	2,849	3,664	-8,279*	,079*	3,753*	0	4218
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	0,007	-0,692	0,706	1,805	0,001	2,345	0,001	1164
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	1,345	0,456	2,234	-6,61	0,013	2,737	0,004	1164
Slovenian Democratic Party (SLO)	6,409	5,061	7,756	-4,473	-0,048	1,425	0	1054
Slovenian National Party (SLO)	6,152	4,818	7,485	-5,155	-0,055	2,33	0	1054
Croatian Party of	3,528	2,145	4,912	-7,942	.084	3,521	-0,001	1003

Rights (CRO)								
Democratic Alliance (CRO)	3,617	1,648	5,587	0,994	0,063	7,439	0	1003
Danish People's Party (DN)	3,087	2,382	3,791	-5,091	0,153	-0,849	NA	1441
PVV (NL)	2,681	2,058	3,304	2,033	-0,04	4,333*	0	1441
Progress Party (NOR)	3,34	2,988	3,693	-0,361	-0,005	-0,485	NA	3793
Sweden Democrats (SWE)	12,463	12,079	12,847	-24,886*	0,036	3,352	NA	1546

Parties Module 4 Effect of Education(no controls)	Coefficient for B (no control)	Lower Bound 95% (no controls)	Upper Bound 95% (no controls)	N
Alliance for the future of Austria(AUT)	-0,079	-0,243	0,086	999
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	-0,683	-0,894	-0,472	999
Front National (FN)	-0,599	-0,721	-0,478	2013
AfD (GER)	-0,147	-0,321	0,026	1888
Golden Dawn (GRE)	-0,287	-0,419	-0,154	1028
Independent Greeks (GRE)	0,111	-0,012	0,233	1028
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-0,185	-0,307	-0,064	1852
Democratic Front (MONT)	-0,24	-0,448	-0,033	966
PiS (PL)	-0,525	-0,737	-0,313	1918
Radical Party (SERB)	-0,507	-0,642	-0,373	1567
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-0,418	-0,522	-0,314	4610

Parties Module 4 Effect of Education (with controls) *= $p < .05$	Coefficient for B (with controls)	Lower Bound 95% (with controls)	Upper Bound 95% (with controls)	Coefficient for Constant	Coefficient for Age	Coefficient for Gender	N
Alliance for the future of Austria (AUT)	-0,081	-0,246	0,083	2,333*	-0,004	-0,209	999
Austrian People's Party (AUT)	-0,683	-0,894	-0,473	5,207*	0,009	-0,365	999
Front National (FN)	-0,692	-0,819	-0,565	6,061*	-0,018*	-0,11	2013
AfD (GER)	-0,162	-0,337	0,013	4,89*	-0,017*	-0,141	1888
Golden Dawn (GRE)	-0,29	-0,455	-0,126	4,155*	-0,001	-0,929*	1028
Independent Greeks (GRE)	0,039	-0,115	0,193	3,747*	-0,01	-0,241	1028
Fianna Fail (IRE)	-0,13	-0,257	-0,003	3,468*	,012*	-0,096	1852
Democratic Front (MONT)	-0,123	-0,338	0,091	2,947*	,028*	-0,193	966
PiS (PL)	-0,455	-0,668	-0,242	3,192*	,024*	0,401	1918
Radical Party (SERB)	-0,57	-0,713	-0,428	4,712*	-0,013*	0,195	1567
Swiss People's Party (Switz)	-0,487	-0,594	-0,381	4,604*	-0,018*	0,222	4610

References

Aarts, K., & Thomassen, J. (2008, March). Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter? *Electoral Studies*, 27(1), 5-18.

Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2009). Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties. *West European Politics*, 32(5), 985-1011.

Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2006). Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(3), 419-443.

- Baggini, J. (2016, May 25). How Rising Trump and Sanders Parallel Rising Populism in Europe. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 33(2), 22-25.
- Betz, H. (1993). The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Politics*, 25(4), 413-427.
- Blackbourn, D. (1975). The Political Alignment of the Centre Party in Wilhelmine Germany: A Study of the Party's Emergence in Nineteenth-Century Württemberg. *The Historical Journal*, 18(4), 821-850.
- Bussemeyer, M., Goerres, A., & Weschle, S. (2009). Attitudes towards redistributive spending in an era of demographic ageing: The rival pressures from age and income in 14 OECD countries. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19(3), 195-212.
- Canovan, M. (2002). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, 47(1), 2-16.
- Choe, Y. (2003). Social cleavage and party support: A comparison of Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom. Huddinge: Södertörns högskola.
- Cullinane, S. (2015, January 5). Cologne Cathedral protests anti-Islamization rally, *CNN*.
- Dalton, R. J. (1996). *Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change*. Sage.
- Ellinas, A. A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 543-565.
- Fennema, Meindert. *Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right Wing Populism in the Western World*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005.
- Gidron, N., & Bonikowski, B. (2013). Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda. *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs: Harvard University*.
- Griffin, R. The `Post Fascism of the Alleanza Nazionale: A case study in Ideological Morphology *Oxford Brookes University*.
- Heinisch, R. (2003). Success in opposition–failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. *West European Politics*, 26(3), 91-130.
- Inbar, Y., & Lammers, J. (2012). Political Diversity in Social and Personality Psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 7(5), 496-503.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2000). The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective. *International Political Science Review*, 21(4), 441-463.

Jamison, D. (2014, December 31). *George Washington's views on political parties in America*. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/31/george-washingtons-views-political-parties-america/?page=all>

Jansen, G. (2011). *Social Cleavages and Political Choices*. Nijmegen: Ipskamp Drukkers.

Leibowitz, S. (2016, February 3). Sen. Sanders' message mirrors Sen. Warren's. *Cap Cod Times*.

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 542–563.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas, threat or corrective for democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C., (2010) The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy, *West European Politics*, 33:6, 1167-1186

Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*, 29(3), 349-373.

Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Pappas, T. (2013). Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist Hungary. *Government and Opposition*, 49(1), 1-23.

Pappas, T. (2012). Populism Emergent: A framework for analyzing its contexts, mechanics and outcomes. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies*.

Panizza, Francisco. *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso, 2005.

Pasquino, G. (2008). Populism and democracy *Twenty-First Century Populism* (pp. 15-29): Springer.

Power, N. (2015). What does the university gender gap mean for the future of our society? | Nina Power., from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/18/gender-gap-women-men-university-tuition-fees>

Rooduijn, M., De Lange, S., & Van der Brug, W. (2012). A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(4), 563-575.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6), 737-765.

- Swank, D., & Betz, H. (2002). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review*, 1(2), 215-245.
- Stubager, R. (2010). The Development of the Education Cleavage: Denmark as a Critical Case. *West European Politics*, 33(3), 505-533.
- Van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S., & De Vreese, C. (2009). Religion and Party Choice in Europe. *West European Politics*, 32(6), 1266–1283.
- Werts, H., Scheepers, P., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right. *European Union Politics*, 1-23.

Data

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 1 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. December 15, 2015 version. doi:10.7804/cses.module1.2015-12-15

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 2 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. December 15, 2015 version. doi:10.7804/cses.module2.2015-12-15

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. December 15, 2015 version. doi:10.7804/cses.module3.2015-12-15

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 4 SECOND ADVANCE RELEASE [dataset]. March 20, 2015 version. doi:10.7804/cses.module4.2015-03-20

