Fee Pieper (s1600036)

The Political Priorities of City Mayors

European Public Administration, University of Twente, Enschede

Date: 29th June 2016

Abstract

This thesis analyses political priorities of mayors as well as the extent to what certain factors might influence them. According to this, the following research question has been derived: ***To what extent are materialist and post-materialist political priorities of European mayors in their term of office explained by generational differences and by local and national contextual factors (such as the size of the municipality, the institutional strength of the mayor, and the dominant national political culture) in the beginning of the 21st century?***

The aim of this study is not only to describe the political priorities of city mayors but also to explain them. Personal factors are assumed to be their causes. Nevertheless, local and national contextual factors as well are considered as influential factors.

The research design is cross-sectional and bases on quantitative data that were collected in 2003 and 2004 within the scope of the European mayor project (Bäck, Heinelt, & Magnier, 2006). The research has potential relevance as it examines factors explaining the sphere of local governance and mayoral leadership.

Keywords: Local governance, mayoral leadership, political prioritization

List of Content

Introduction 1
Theory 3
Main theoretical argument 3
Alternative explanations 5
Institutional strength of the mayor 6
Size of the municipality 6
Dominant national political culture 7
Methodology 8
Research Design 8
Case selection and sampling 9
Operationalization 9
Data analysis 12
Descriptive questions 13
First sub-question 13
Second sub-question 16
Explanatory questions 18
Third sub-question 18
Fourth sub-question 20
Institutional strength of the mayor (Hypothesis 2) 20
Size of the municipality (Hypothesis 3) 21
Dominant national political culture (Hypothesis 4) 23
Conclusion 24
References 27
Appendix 29

List of tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics political priorities…… 13
Table 2: Countries by political priorities (row percentages) (N Valid=2603)……..15
Table 3: Descriptive statistics generation (age in years)……...16
Table 4: Countries by generation (row percentages) (N Valid=2631)…….17
Table 5: Political priorities by generation (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid=2521)….18
Table 6: Political priorities by size of municipality (in absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid=2596)……21
Table 7: Political priorities by dominant national political culture (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid=2140)……..23
Table 8: Political priorities by generation controlled by region (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid=2513)……...29
Table 9: Political priorities by generation controlled by institutional strength of mayor (in absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid=2524)…….30
Table 10: Political priorities by generation controlled by institutional strength controlled by region (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid 2526)……....32
Table 11: Political priorities by size of the municipality controlled by region (absolute numbers, column percentages) (N Valid=2599)…….....35
Table 12: Descriptive statistics institutional strength of the mayor in East European countries……36

List of figures

Figure 1: Causal model of expected effects……...7
Figure 2: frequencies of political priorities in % among mayors (N Valid=2597)……13
Figure 3: Frequencies of generation in % among mayors (N Valid=2626)……16
Figure 4: Causal model of observed effects…….26

Introduction

In his recently published book "If mayors ruled the world: dysfunctional nations, rising cities", Barber (2013) argues that international and national problems are becoming the responsibilities of city mayors as they, rather than the national or supranational level, are capable of coping with these challenges. Barber's ideas are increasingly influential. The importance, for example, is evident from this year's Global Parliament of Mayors, that inspired by Barber's thinking, will meet in The Hague. It provides a platform for mayors to discuss solutions for today's global challenges.

Assuming that Barber and others who emphasize the importance of the mayor's role are right, it is interesting to take a closer look at the political priorities of city mayors. The existing body of literature shows that there is hardly any research on the topic of mayoral political prioritization except for two key sources. The book "The European mayor: Political leaders in the changing context of local democracy" by Bäck, Heinelt and Magnier (2006), especially the chapter by Getimis and Hlepas (2006), and the study "Mayoral Policy Making: Results from the 21st Century Mayors Leadership Survey" by Levine Einstein, Glick and Lusk (2014). The latter address the question of how mayors lead their cities including their political priority setting. Our research aims at filling the gap of knowledge on mayors' political priorities as it does not only describe them but also sets out to explain its roots.

Political priorities are defined as the themes that mayors prioritize in performing their job. It is the basic assumption of this thesis that the mayor as a political leader within local government acts upon personal motives. The personal value orientation of mayors might influence the themes which mayors consider important. Based on Inglehart's (1971) classification of individual value orientation, we distinguish between materialist and post-materialist political priorities of mayors. Materialist priorities relate to issues such as economic growth and development while post-materialist priorities refer to 'quality of life' issues such as sustainability, political rights, and freedom.

Since this research does not only aim at describing political priorities but also explaining them, we want to know why mayors prioritize either materialist or post-materialist issues. According to Inglehart (1971), the context in which people grew up causes variation in individuals' value orientation. Therefore, we expect that the generation of the mayor influence his or her individual value orientation which in return has effects on how the mayor sets his political priorities in office.

However, other scholars (e.g. John & Cole 1999, Elgie 1995, Banfield 1961) have argued that the mayor's decision making does not only take place in his or her individual scope but is rather embedded in a political, institutional framework in which the mayor is bound to rules and regulations. On this basis, the mayor's institutional strength might be a first important factor because it might influence the degree to which a mayor is able to shape the official priorities of his city by his individual values. Furthermore, as the mayor's career (e.g. regarding winning local elections) depends on voter support, the mayor also has to consider the dominant values of the voters and the nature of local problems.

Even though there has not been much research yet, the issue is relevant to be studied due to following reasons. First, it adds scientific knowledge to the existing body of literature on the topic of political prioritization from a new perspective as it studies possible implications of Inglehart's (1971) theory for the political priorities of city mayors and controls for potential contextual factors. Second, as in previous studies, most attention in the context of local governance has been paid to behavioral consequences of the political priorities, in particular, the electorate, this research lays the focus on the individual mayoral prioritization. Third, Levine et. al (2014) recently gave some answers to the question of this study as they concluded that the mayors' partisanship influences their political prioritization. However, their findings draw only on the U.S. American context, and thus, this study adds new knowledge on the political priorities of city mayors in the European context.

To conclude, the knowledge on mayoral political prioritization is particularly important, as, according to Barber (2013), the role of mayors will be of even greater importance in the future. Especially in addressing more complex challenges, city mayors rather than national states possess the better governance tools like civil trust and proximity, pragmatism and face-to-face cooperation. Therefore, this study is useful as it contributes to a better understanding why in particular mayors prioritize either materialist or post-materialist themes in office. If it is known whether and why mayors govern their city rather according to personal or contextual factors, Barber's argument of the powerful mayor can be discussed from another perspective.

As city mayors will not only play an important role within the city walls but rather out on the stage of national and international politics, it is also of social relevance to understanding the factors shaping mayors' political priorities.

This paper examines the following explanatory research question: ***To what extent are materialist and post-materialist political priorities of European mayors in their term of office explained by generational differences and by local and national contextual factors (such as the size of the municipality, the institutional strength of the mayor, and the dominant national political culture) in the beginning of the 21st century?***

The units of analysis are European mayors. The dependent variables are the mayor's materialist and post-materialist political priorities. The explanatory variables relate to personal characteristics of the mayor as well as variables that pertain to the local and the national contexts in which the mayor operates. This research answers the main question based on following four sub-questions:

1. *To what extent do the political priorities of European mayors reflect materialist or post-materialist value-orientations?*
2. *To what extent do generational differences among European mayors exist?*
3. *How are materialist and post-materialist political priorities of mayors related to the generation to which a mayor belongs?*

4. *How are these variables related when we also take other factors such as the institutional strength of the mayor, the size of the municipality and the dominant national political culture into consideration?*

Theory

Main theoretical argument

The aim of this research is to explain differences in the political priorities of mayors. As mentioned above, political prioritization includes those themes mayors consider to be important in performing their job. By definition, prioritization falls within the scope of issues management as latter "is the process through which an organization manages its policy, and identifies potential problems, issues, or trends that could impact it in the future" (Bowen, Rawlings & Martin, 2012: p. 115). According to this, mayors operate issues management while setting priorities among current local themes. Bigelow, Fahey, and Mahon (1993) link the prioritization of issues to the values and interests of stakeholders involved. As mayors also act within the sphere of stakeholders (Grunig, 1984), the values of mayors are considered to be a motive for prioritizing certain themes in office.

Jones (1991) researched on individual ethical decision making in both private and public organizations. Even though priorities of mayors are not of moral or ethical nature per se, decisions among them do imply potential moral or ethical consequences for the citizens (Jones, 1991). Being of theoretical relevance for our study, the research proves that decisions on issues, especially on those of moral nature, are value-based. Proceeding from this assumption, mayors' decisions on themes they consider being important depend on their value orientation. As a starting point, this thesis approaches the political prioritization of a mayor on the individual level.

We assume that the personal value orientation of mayors' might have an effect on the themes they prioritize in their terms of office. Inglehart (1971) points to the argument that generational differences influence individual value orientations. As we assume that latter impact upon the mayor's prioritization in office, his argumentation leads to the expectation that generational differences are likely to go hand in hand with differences in mayors' political prioritization.

This argument is made plausible based on both Inglehart's (1971) scarcity hypothesis and his socialisation hypothesis. The first hypothesis assumes that people who have lived in scarcity tend to place highest values on materialist values rather than on freedom and autonomy. Further, cohorts who have lived in prosperity are expected to rank post-materialist values higher as the indicator for having post-materialist values is the 'taken-for-granted' attitude of survival. The socialisation hypothesis of the author emphasizes that people are shaped by conditions during the pre-adult years and according to them, tend to show either materialist values or post-materialist values and that "these values change mainly through intergenerational population replacement" (Inglehart, 2008: p. 131).

Inglehart (1971) distinguishes between two types of values. Firstly, materialist values and secondly, post-materialist values. Materialist values emphasize economic and physical security (e.g. economic growth, fighting rising prices, maintaining order, fighting against crime), whereby post-materialist values are associated with autonomy and self-expression (e.g. freedom of speech, empowerment of people in governmental decisions, empowerment on the job, importance of ideas). Inglehart and Baker (2000) further defined materialist and post-materialist values by classifying them into the survival and self-expression dimension, whereby the survival dimension contains the materialist values and the self-expression values as well as "subjective well-being, interpersonal trust, political activism, and tolerance of outgroups" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 29).

Referring to Abraham Maslow (1970), Inglehart assumes "that the age cohorts who had experienced the wars and scarcities of the era preceding the West European economic miracles would [emphasize] economic security and […] safety needs" (Inglehart, 1971: p. 991). In general, cohorts who experienced wars and economic hardship tend to prioritize basic needs. People who only experienced prosperity tend to prefer self-expression, individual and social values rather than security and physical values (Maslow, 1970). In this general sense, the theory is also relevant outside Western Europe.

Additionally, this assumption bases on the condition of having experienced the West European economic miracle. In the East, almost all mayors grew up with low levels of prosperity due to the low economic development of the Soviet Union. Consequently, we do not expect the effect of mayors' generations to occur among East European countries.

Hence, we formulate *hypothesis 1a:* Mayors of older generations tend to have materialist political priorities, whereas younger generations tend to have post-materialist political priorities.

Hypothesis 1b: This holds true only for non-East European countries. In East Europe, we do not expect any such a relationship.

Alternative explanations

The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) stresses that individual values and motives are not the only determinants of behavioral choices. According to this, individual behavior is predictable by taking special attitudes towards that intended behavior into account. Firstly, beliefs about the consequences of the intended behaviour. Secondly, beliefs about the likely expectations of others; and lastly, the perceived behavioural control. Hence, not only one's willingness toward a certain action influences the final behaviour, but also the beliefs of relevant others (in one's personal context) as well as resources and capabilities. The latter in turn affects the personally perceived behaviour control that is crucial for the individual self-awareness. Linking this to mayors, we can conclude that the more possibilities and capabilities local leaders perceive, the more confident they become and consequently, the likelier it is that their intended behaviour result in success.

Summing up, we can hold that the composition of personal and external factors affecting mayors' capabilities and self-awareness determines mayors' choices among political priorities in office. Those do not only include capabilities such as education or materialistic resources (e.g. money) but can also ground in socially and environmental developments as well as in hierarchical orders (Jones, 1991).

One of the most known evidence proving that individual behaviour is not only driven by individual ethically and morally values but by external influences is the famous Milgram experiment[1] (Milgram, 1963). Additionally, issues management including political prioritization does not only include the mayor as a stakeholder, but other actors are bringing certain interests to the local government's attention (Bigelow et al., 1993). The mayor's occupation is designed for the interaction with different actors and their interests, and thus, national and contextual factors are considered, as we cannot limit the scope of this research to the individual level of mayors only.

[1] Milgram experiment: Stanley Milgram conducted the experiment in 1961 at Yale University. Experimental subjects were instructed to give electric shocks as punishments to victims being separated from the subject, but still visible through a window. The victims who were privy to the experiment, however, did not get real electric shocks, as their painful reactions were essential part of the experiment. Even though the subject was not aware of these circumstances and thought administering actual painful shocks, they continued increasing the intense of the shocks according to the orders. (Milgram, 1963)

Institutional strength of the mayor. Many scholars have considered national institutional factors influencing the sphere of local governments (e.g. John & Cole 1999, Elgie 1995, Judd 2000, Hambleton 1998, Svara 1994). The evidence shows that the mayor's behaviour, accordingly also his political prioritization, is influenced by the local government system. Thus, the impact of belonging to a particular generation (and having the associated personal values) on the mayor's political priorities is likely to be affected by the mayor's institutional strength. The impact of the mayor's generation (implying certain personal values) on the themes he or she prioritizes in office might be stronger, the most institutional power the mayor has. Among mayors with a weak institutional position, other factors rather than the mayor's value orientation (depending on mayor's generation) define the nature of themes prioritized in office.

The local government system embeds the mayor's scope of action. Dependently on the institutional conditions and power entanglements on both the vertical and horizontal dimension, the mayor has a certain institutional strength composed of factors such as direct elections, control of council majority and the appointment of the municipal chief executive (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006: p. 38). Many scholars have observed the influence of mayor's institutional strength on his role for example Getimis and Hlepas (2006), Magnier (2006) and Denters (2006).

Revisiting to the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), we assume that the institutional position of mayors affects their perceived behaviour control. Strong mayors might have more ability to assert themselves, and consequently, the mayor's value orientation rather than other factors acts upon the prioritization of political issues.

Hence, we formulate *hypothesis 2:* The impact of generational differences on the political priorities of mayors (see hypothesis 1) is stronger, the stronger the institutional position of the mayor is.

The size of the municipality. The people elect the mayor. To be elected or re-elected mayors need to act on their behalf and thus, it is likely that the mayor sets his political priorities according to the needs of society (Elgie, 1995). In this context, mayors might align the issues which they prioritize in office to local problems of the municipality.

Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers (2005) proved that cities and municipalities differ regarding local problems. A city mayor might consider different themes important than a municipality mayor. Hence, we expect the size of the municipality to influence mayors' political prioritization. According to the authors, "established capitalist democratic" countries of Europe show higher disadvantages, especially regarding unemployment and poverty, in urban centers compared to suburbs (Hoffmann-Martinot & Sellers, 2005: p. 436). On the contrary, in East Europe, these disadvantages occur in rural municipalities rather than in central cities. This reverse pattern refers to the late urban, social and economic development in East Europe due to its history of communism. Consequently, the modernization process is limited to the central cities.

Thus, the region within Europe is likely to interact the effect of the size of the municipality on the themes mayors prioritize in office. Since in East European countries, problems of materialist nature exist in rural areas rather than in cities, mayors of small municipalities are likely to prioritize materialist themes. According to the theory, this effect applies reversed in Western European countries. Hence, we formulate following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 3a: The bigger the size of the municipality, the likelier that mayors tend to have materialist political priorities rather than post-materialist political priorities.

Hypothesis 3b: In municipalities located in an East European country, the effect mentioned above shows reversed pattern. Thus, the bigger the size of an East European municipality, the likelier that mayors tend to have post-materialist political priorities rather than materialist political priorities.

Dominant national political culture. Finally, the political culture, in which the local government is embedded, needs to be considered. In a democracy, it might be very well that the political priorities of mayors do not reflect their personal values but those of the voters. In the context of Inglehart's (1971) theory, post-materialism is not only an aspect of the personal values of a mayor but also one aspect of the political culture of a city of a country. Hence, based on Denters' and Klok's (2013) argument that the political orientations of local political office-holders are affected by citizens' value orientation, we examine to what extent the dominant political culture of the citizens (either materialism or post-materialism) impacts upon political priorities of mayors.

Hence, we formulate *hypothesis 4*: If post-materialism rather than materialism characterizes the dominant national political culture, the mayor is likely to have post-materialist political priorities and vice versa.

The following model sums up the expected relations.

Figure 1: Causal model of expected effects



Methodology

Research design

A large N cross-sectional research design is used to answer the descriptive and explanatory questions of this research. The data were collected for more than 2700 mayors across 17 European countries with means of national surveys. Therefore, it was collected at one moment in time (2003/4) without any manipulation.

Internal validity is linked to the three well-known conditions of causality: firstly, the temporary precedence of cause before effect; secondly, a correlation between cause and effect and lastly, the exclusion of third variables influencing the effect (Dooley, 2001). The first condition of causality is given since reversed causation can be ruled out due to reason that it is simply illogical that the political priority of a mayor proceeds his generation. Moreover, we secure – as far as possible – that assumed consequences do not precede the assumed causes in time. The large sample population of European mayors allows for establishing correlations, thus, the second condition of causality is given by the chosen research design too. The third condition, spuriousness, is considered by controlling for three potential factors of influence - the institutional strength of the mayor, the size of the municipality and the dominant political culture. Furthermore, the region, particularly East European and not East European countries controls some relations. It may be true that there are more potential third variables; however, including every potential third variable would exceed the scope of this research. As the model controls some of them, the risk of spuriousness is reduced at least.

The good external validity of the research design is given due to the involvement of the many included countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Although the sampled population is limited to European countries and only 17 European countries are covered, the included countries represent variation in local government systems (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). By this, a certain variety in the sample population is given though, and results of the research can be generalized to European countries in general later on. Moreover, the large N of more than 2700 mayors allows for tentative generalization to the population of European mayors as a whole.

However, with respect to two issues the external validity is limited. On the one hand, the dataset excludes mayors of small municipalities, as only municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants are included. This does not only affect the external validity; it also influences the internal validity since it reduces the variation in the control variable “size of the municipality”. On the other hand, limited response rates of the survey reduce the external validity of the research design. Indeed, there is a great variation in the response rates among European mayors. France for example amounts only a rate of 21%, whereas Denmark amounts to a rate of 76% (Bäck, Heinelt & Magnier., 2006: p. 14).

Case selection and sampling

The data for this research are provided within the scope of the European mayor project (Bäck et al., 2006). These data were collected through a series of national surveys addressing more than 2700 mayors and top local political leaders in 17 European countries in 2003 and 2004 (Bäck et al., 2006). The definition of the political leader ”implies among others that in English cities without a directly elected mayor, it is the council leader that will be included in the study, and in the Irish municipalities it will be the leader of the executive committee” (Bäck et al., 2006: p. 12). However, the term “mayor” is used throughout the survey and the book for reasons of clarifying and comprehensibility. For more information on the sampling procedure, see “The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy” (Bäck et al., 2006: p. 10-16).

The use of these already collected data is a good approach for the following reasons. Firstly, the used survey provides a unique data set serving most of the included variables, and it reflects a representative sample of European mayors. As both the survey and our research address European mayors as units of analysis on the individual level, the dataset perfectly fits the research’s scheme. Secondly, expenditure of time and money is low since the data of the survey is best available, well documented and easily accessible. Thus, the use of these data is highly convenient. Finally, yet importantly, the use of these data allow for cross-sectional analyses with reasonable internal validity and external validity.

Operationalization

Firstly, the basis for measuring the dependent variable “political priorities” in mayor’s term is provided by the survey question “What are the main themes that you wish to be your accomplishments of your service as mayor?” of the European mayor project (Bäck et al., 2006; p. 380). Political priorities are defined as issues mayors consider to be of relevance for their municipality and thus, they prioritize them in their job. According to this definition, the mentioned survey question is a good instrument to measure the variable. The question is then followed by a list of 17 possible priorities and mayors were asked to select a maximum of five of these as their most important political priorities. From all answer possibilities, those addressing post-materialist issues according to Inglehart’s (1971) definition of post-materialist values are selected: to improve the aesthetics of the city (V34), to develop leisure services and cultural offer (V35), to defend the traditional cohesion of the local society (V37), to defend the local lifestyle (V38), to emphasize diversity and tolerance in the local community (V39), to maintain the privileged level of services and well-being which presently characterize the city (V41) and to reduce pollution (V42). All other answer possibilities are not included as no clear classification into the materialist or post-materialist category is possible. Additionally, the item V48 is an open question implying that the given answers are in different European languages. A translate of them is beyond the scope of this study, thus, the item is excluded as well.

The dependent variable "political priorities" is the percentage of post-materialist issues selected by the mayor. To put it in another way, the dependent variable is the count of the number of post-materialist items picked by the mayor divided by the total count of items picked. Originally, the variable is a quasi-interval variable expressing the mayors' political priorities in a number ranking between 0% post-materialist (=100% materialist) and 100% post-materialist. Hence, with each post-materialist answer a mayor has ticket, the degree of prioritizing post-materialist issues in office increases to 20%.

However, for purpose of simplification the variable is transformed into an ordinal variable. The range of the variable is categorized into following groups: 0-19% (pure materialist), 20-39% (rather materialist), 40-59% (divided/mixed), 60-79% (rather post-materialist), 80-100% (pure post-materialist). To sum up, the variable is operationalized by the degree of post-materialist political priorities measured by the mentioned survey question. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable also show that some mayors have selected more than five answers. Nevertheless, this does not pose a problem as it increases the data of the dependent variable rather than decreases it.

Secondly, our main explanatory variable is "generation". Here we are interested in the generation to which a mayor belongs according to Inglehart's (1971) argument. According to him, the variation in individual value orientation is linked to generational differences. We assume the experience with either prosperity or scarcity in the years of breeding to be the decisive factor of either having post-materialist or materialist political priorities. Thus, following trend is expected: mayors of younger cohorts rather than those of older generations have post-materialist rather than materialist political priorities and vice versa. The "generation" variable is measured by the mayor's age. The older mayors are, the older the generation they belong to. The respective hypothesis assumes that generational differences increase, the more extreme the independent variable is distinct. Originally, the variable is a continuous ratio variable. However, for purpose of simplification, it is transformed into an ordinal variable characterized by following age groups: 25-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 years, and 65-78 years. The mayor's age is an adequate measurement of the respective variable operationalized by the survey question V281.

In consequence of the Soviet Union and its impact on the East European countries, the expected effect might be different. As under the Soviet regime the economic situation were characterized by scarcity and the economy of East European countries still lags behind those of the West, we expect the trend that the majority of East European mayors have materialist political priorities. Thus, after testing the first hypothesis uniformly for all European mayors regardless of their belonging country, the relationship is tested while controlling for East European countries. For this, the variable "region" pertaining to East and not East European countries is invoked. "Region" is a dichotomous variable adopting the values 0 = rest of Europe and 1 = East European country. From the countries included in the dataset, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic are determined as East European countries.

Thirdly, the control variable "institutional strength of the mayor" is operationalized by Heinelt's and Hlepas' (2006) POLLEADER typology. This local government typology (see table in the chapter "Typologies of Local Government Systems" by Heinelt and Hlepas (2006: p. 38)) determines, among

others, the strengths of European mayors on different indicators. The table depicts the strength of the mayor for each of the included 17 European countries, whereby the countries adopt a number between 12 (strong mayor) and 0 (weak mayor). The characteristics are as followed: France = 12, Spain = 11, Italy = 10, Greece = 10, Austria = 9, Germany = 9, Belgium = 8, Hungary = 8, Germany (Hessen) = 7, Poland = 6, Denmark = 6, Czech Republic = 5,5, Portugal = 5, England = 5, Ireland = 5, Netherlands = 5, Switzerland = 4, Sweden = 3.

For Germany, Austria and England, there are two different institutional strengths depending on either the region, as in the case of Germany with the Bundesland Hessen, or the electoral system, as in case of England and Austria. However, only Germany and Hessen are treated differently. For England and Austria the above-mentioned strength is generalized to the whole country.

Originally, the independent variable is a continuous ratio variable adopting values from 0 to 12 to 0. Nevertheless, for purposes of simplification, the variable is transformed into an ordinal variable characterized by following strength groups: “weak” = 0-5,9 points on the institutional strength index, “medium strong” = 6-8 points, “strong” = 9-10 points and “very strong” = 11 and 12 points.

Furthermore, the impact of the variable is a matter of interaction effect, as it does not influence the dependent variable directly but rather the relationship of the main independent variable “generation” on the dependent variable “political priorities”.

Fourthly, the variable “size of the municipality” is measured by the number of inhabitants of the mayor’s city or municipality, which is answered by the mayors within the scope of the survey question V283 (Bäck et al., 2006). For means of simplification, the variable is transformed into an ordinal variable. Following categories apply: 10,000–14,999 citizens, 15,000-19,999 citizens, 20,000-29,999 citizens, 30,000-49,999 citizens, 50,000-99,999 citizens and lastly, municipalities with a population size above 100,000 inhabitants.

The interaction effect “region” on the relationship between the independent variable “size of the municipality” and the dependent variable “political priorities” pertains to East European countries and the remaining European countries. The modifying variable “region” is expected to change the relationship between the size of municipality and degree of post-materialist political priorities in terms of East European countries from a negative to a positive relationship.

Lastly, the variable “dominant national political culture” is measured by the citizens’ value orientation in European countries. The inclusion of this variable is based on the argument by Denters and Klok (2013), namely that political orientations of local political office-holders (here: mayors) are affected by citizens’ value orientation. Ideally, we would have liked to use data about the dominant value orientations of the citizens in the mayor’s municipality. These data are, however, not available. Therefore, we resort to the dominant national value orientations, which the EU-Barometer provides for the year 1999. Nevertheless, the data is not available for the countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Switzerland. For England, the EU-Barometer data for UK have been used. Originally, the variable is a continuous interval variable adopting values from 0% post-materialist to 100% post-materialist.

Following values apply: Italy = 2, Germany = 10,2, Belgium = 12, Greece = 1,8, Sweden = 5,1, England = 3,2, Netherlands = 21,7, France = 21, Denmark = 6,3, Portugal = 1,6, Spain = 4, Austria = 2,3, Ireland = 2,7. For reasons of simplification though, the variable is transformed into an ordinal variable with following categories. The first category amounts from 0-2,5%, second category from 2,6-5,1%, third from 5,2-10,2 and the fourth category includes a degree of post-materialist national political culture above 10,21%. In conclusion, the variable "dominant national political culture" is operationalized by the degree of post-materialist national political culture in the particular countries provided by the EU-Barometer.

Data analysis

In order to answer the research question and the sub-questions of this thesis, a data analysis with the statistical software package SPSS is applied. Firstly, the descriptive sub-questions (first and second sub-question) are answered using descriptive statistics with the aid of SPSS. Here we are interested in both the measures of central tendency and the measures of dispersion. The former describes the typical values of the included cases and the latter approaches the deviation of the cases from this typical value. The measure of central tendency imply the mean, whereby measures of dispersion present the range and the standard deviation. (Fisher & Marshall, 2009)

Secondly, the third sub-question approaching the assumed causal relationship between the dependent variable "political priorities" and the key independent variable "generation" is answered by means of a bivariate contingency table analysis. For this, the following assumptions to prove causality are tested. Firstly, the cause (independent variable) precedes the effect (dependent variable) in time. Secondly, an association between the assumed cause (generation) and effect (priorities) can be established. Lastly, possible explanations by third variables need to be ruled out. (Van der Kolk, 2015) The latter assumption is tested by answering the fourth sub-question. In order to do so, hypothesis 2 till 4 assuming effects of third variables are included in the model.

Testing the association between the main independent variable and the dependent variable implies further tests on the expected direction of the relationship, its strength as well as the statistical significance of the relationship (Van der Kolk, 2015). In case the condition of statistical significance fails, potential third variables are considered as influential determinants affecting upon the dependent variable "political priorities" within our model.

The rank correlation of ordinal scale, Kendall's tau (Göktaş, & Işçi, 2011) determines the direction and the strength of the relationship. Its associated ρ-value ranking from 0 (=perfect statistical significance) to 1 determines whether the association is statistically significant. Kendall's tau-b (τb) is used for squared contingency tables, and Kendall's tau-c (τc) is used for non-squared tables (Reiter, 2005).

Descriptive questions

First sub-question. To answer the first sub-question "To what extent do the political priorities of European mayors reflect materialist or post-materialist value-orientations?" an interpretation of descriptive statistics using measures of both central tendency and dispersion is useful (Table 1). 2597 mayors have answered the question about political priorities, 111 have not answered it. The minimum and maximum determine the range of the given values. According to this, the lowest percentage among the cases of having post-materialist political priorities is 0%, and the highest is 100%. That means that there are mayors who have ticked five post-materialist items out of five as well as mayors who have selected not any post-materialist items and those of materialist nature instead. The standard deviation amounts to 21, meaning that the political priorities of the mayors deviate in average with a degree of 20% post-materialist (equals one post-materialist item ticket in the survey) from the mean. This reflects a rather consistent dispersion of mayors' political priorities, and thus, the mean is a reliable expectation value. The mean, amounting to 35,6, is saying that the political priorities of the average European mayor are to 35% post-materialistic. In fact, the majority of mayors prefers materialist political issues in their term of office.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics political priorities

	Valid	2597
	Missing	111
Mean		35,6391
Std. Deviation		21,01189
Minimum		0,00
Maximum		100,00

Figure 2: Frequencies of political priorities in % among mayors (N Valid = 2597)



Figure 2 provides an overview of the frequency distribution of the grouped percentages of post-materialist political priorities. Among the total sample size of 2597 mayors, 36,6% of them have mixed political priorities. These mayors indicate the majority of the total sample size. The political priorities of the second largest amount of mayors, 33,8%, are rather materialistic. The third largest amount of mayors, 14,5%, rank between 60-79% on post-materialist political priorities. 11,3% of the mayors fall under the 0-19% post-materialistic category, and 3,8% of the mayors have pure post-materialistic political priorities. Surprisingly, the frequency analysis of the grouped scores does not assume the mean of 35% post-materialistic political priorities. Most European mayors reflect a mixed value orientation, and thus, have no clear tendency in their political priorities. However, the rather materialistic political priorities group including the mean

of 35,6 is the second biggest represented group. As it precedes the rather post-materialist category, we can conclude that European mayors tend to prioritize materialistic issues rather than those of post-materialistic nature. The fact that more mayors have pure materialist political priorities than pure post-materialist ones' strengths this tendency.

In order to observe differences in the political priorities of mayors among European countries, the one-way ANOVA-test, the Turkey post-hoc test and an analysis of the respective cross table (Table 2) are interpreted. According to the significance level $\rho = 0{,}000$ provided by the one-way ANOVA-test, we can assume that statistically significant differences in the mean of political priorities between the included European countries exist. To identify which countries differ from each other in respect to their mean on political priorities, the Turkey post-hoc test is applied. Its results reveal that Sweden, England and Spain have the most statistically significant differences in the mean on political priorities concerning the remaining European countries.

The cross table (Table 2) represents the countries of the mayors (in the rows) by the categories of political priorities (in the columns). The cells depict the relative percentage of mayors for each country scoring in the respective political priority category. Furthermore, the last column on the right hand side of the table contains the mean on the degree of political priorities for each country. Denmark is not included in the table since no data for Denmark on the respective question is available in the dataset.

At first appearance, the contingency table reflects the dispersion trend observed above. For most of the countries, apply that the strongest representation of mayors is within the divided political priorities group. As concluded with aid of the Turkey post-hoc test, Sweden, Spain and England differ most notably in their means compared to the remaining countries. Sweden scores a mean of 20% on post-materialistic political priorities. Almost 52% of Swedish mayors have rather materialist political priorities, followed by almost 28% pure materialist political priorities. Only 15% of them depict mixed political priorities, which is on average the most represented category. Spain shows a mean of 29%. Though Spanish mayors are strongly represented (37%) in the category of mixed political priorities, they score highest (with more than 50%) among the rather materialist category. England depicts a mean of 43% on post-materialist political priorities and thus, deviates from the total mean towards post-materialist political priorities. Although on average English mayors score high on the degree of post-materialist political priorities, they remain to be among those mayors with mixed political priorities. Noteworthy, despite not included in the results of the Turkey post-hoc test, Switzerland depicts a mean of almost 44% post-materialist political priorities and thus, resembles to the English mayors.

Though the mean of French mayors does not deviate remarkable from the total mean, noteworthy saliences exist. In France, the most mayors have pure materialist political priorities amounting 31% of the French sampling population. Exceptional is that it has the strongest representation in the extreme materialist category, though also a relatively high representation in the extreme post-materialist category (11,9%).

To sum up, the respective sub-question can be answered as followed: To the greater extent, political priorities of European mayors reflect both materialist and post-materialist value orientations as most political priorities of European mayors are mixed. However, a greater tendency towards materialist than towards post-materialist political priorities among European mayors exists. Good examples are Sweden, Spain, and France. On the contrary, England and Switzerland slightly differ from this trend as the average mayor in these countries depicts a larger mean than the average mean of European mayors.

Table 2: Countries by political priorities (row percentages) (N Valid=2603)

		Degree of post-materialist political priorities					
		0-19%	20-39%	40-59%	60-79%	80-100%	Mean
Country	Italy	6,8%	31,5%	38,6%	19,8%	3,3%	37,5165
	Germany	8,8%	36,2%	36,9%	14,7%	3,3%	35,4283
	Belgium	13,1%	32,0%	36,1%	18,0%	0,8%	34,0338
	Switzerland	4,1%	18,4%	44,9%	26,5%	6,1%	43,9205
	Czech Republic	8,1%	43,5%	37,1%	9,7%	1,6%	32,2149
	Greece	5,6%	33,3%	43,1%	16,7%	1,4%	35,9359
	Poland	8%	28,7%	44,0%	16,7%	2,7%	37,4816
	Sweden	27,8%	51,9%	15,2%	5,1%	0,0%	20,8274
	Hungary	12,2%	34,7%	40,8%	10,2%	2,0%	31,4167
	England	5,0%	23,0%	43,2%	22,3%	6,5%	43,6088
	Netherlands	8,2%	40,8%	32,0%	15,0%	4,1%	38,2828
	France	31,0%	20,4%	24,6%	12,2%	11,9%	37,4293
	Portugal	4,5%	34,3%	50,7%	10,4%	0,0%	33,7669
	Spain	6,1%	52,4%	37,2%	3,5%	0,9%	29,1690
	Austria	11,5%	34,6%	42,3%	11,5%	0,0%	32,1795
	Ireland	10,5%	57,9%	26,3%	5,3%	0,0%	27,7778
Total		11,3%	33,8%	36,5%	14,5%	3,9%	35,6391

Second sub-question. To answer the second descriptive sub-question "To what extent do generational differences among European mayors exist?" we have a closer look on the measures of central tendency and dispersion with the aid of SPSS (Table 3). Despite the total N of 2708 mayors, only 2626 mayors have stated their age within the scope of the survey. According to the minimum and maximum, the youngest mayor is 25 years old, and the oldest mayor is 78 years old. The standard deviation of 8,5 is rather homogenous with respect to the range of the included mayors. This confirms the consistency of the mean that can be taken as a reliable expectation value. It amounts to 52 reflecting the average age of all mayors included in the study.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics generation (age in years)

N	Valid	2626
	Missing	82
Mean		52,09
Std. Deviation		8,514
Minimum		25
Maximum		78

Figure 3: Frequencies of generation in % among mayors (N Valid=2626)



Figure 3 summarizes the frequencies of the age groups. Among the 2626 included mayors, 41,8% are between 45 and 54 years old. The second largest age group with 33,5% are the mayors between 55 and 64 years. Only 2,6% of the mayors are between 25 and 34 years, 15,4% are between 35 and 44 years old, and 6,8% are between 65 and 78 years old.

As most European mayors are above 45 years old, the average European mayor can be described as being in his middle age. Also, the mean of 52 confirms this. Moreover, the trend is towards older generations rather than younger generations. This fact can be linked to mayors between 55 and 65 years representing 33,8% of the included mayors, which is the second largest age group.

The one-way ANOVA-test presenting the significance level $\rho = 0{,}000$ proves that statistically significant differences in the mean of mayors' age between the included European countries exist. According to the Turkey post-hoc test, the most noteworthy differences are among English, French and Spanish mayors. The respective cross table (Table 4) is useful for their further observation. It depicts the European countries (in the rows) by the age groups (in the columns). The cells represent the relative percentage of mayors of each country scoring in the respective age group.

The average age of mayors in England is 57 years, followed by the average age of French mayors that amounts to 56 years. Of all European countries, France and England have the strongest relative

representation of very old mayors (more than 20%). This is noteworthy compared to the average percentage of mayors in the age group between 65 and 78 years (6,7%). Both countries support the aging trend among European mayors the most. Nevertheless, Spanish mayors reject the trend of mayors aging as the average mayor tends to be younger (47 years) than the average European mayor. Here, mayors between 35 and 45 years depict the second largest age group.

Regarding the question "To what extent do generational differences among European mayors exist?" it can be concluded that the average mayor is between 45 and 54 years old, more precisely 52 years. This is most apparent among English and French mayors. Spain is the only country in which the average mayor does not confirm the aging trend.

Table 4: Countries by generation (row percentages) (N Valid = 2631)

		Generation (age in years)					Mean
		25-34	45-44	45-54	55-64	65-78	
Country	Italy	2,8%	19,2%	53,1%	20,6%	4,2%	49,84
	Germany	1,4%	15,0%	40,9%	38,9%	3,8%	52,35
	Belgium	2,5%	13,1%	32,0%	39,3%	13,1%	53,93
	Switzerland	2,0%	5,9%	41,2%	47,1%	3,9%	54,57
	Czech Republic	3,2%	28,6%	30,2%	28,6%	9,5%	50,53
	Greece	1,3%	16,7%	50,0%	28,2%	3,8%	51,77
	Poland	2,7%	20,6%	53,2%	23,3%	,3%	49,30
	Sweden	3,8%	14,1%	39,7%	39,7%	2,6%	51,56
	Hungary	2,0%	15,7%	51,0%	31,4%	0,0%	50,05
	England	1,6%	6,3%	31,0%	40,5%	20,6%	57,07
	Netherlands	,7%	4,7%	37,6%	53,7%	3,4%	55,02
	France	,6%	10,4%	28,6%	39,9%	20,5%	56,43
	Denmark	2,0%	5,9%	37,3%	51,0%	3,9%	54,90
	Portugal	4,7%	12,5%	40,6%	31,3%	10,9%	51,36
	Spain	7,8%	25,7%	44,8%	19,1%	2,6%	47,66
	Austria	3,8%	7,7%	46,2%	38,5%	3,8%	52,27
	Ireland	15,8%	15,8%	26,3%	42,1%	0,0%	49,37
Total		2,6%	15,4%	41,8%	33,5%	6,7%	52,09

Explanatory questions

Third sub-question. The third sub-question of our study pertains to the relationship between generation and political priorities. The respective hypothesis (1a) reads as followed: Mayors of older generations tend to have materialist political priorities, whereas younger generations tend to have post-materialist political priorities. The cross table (Table 5) shows the relationship between the variables "generation" and "political priorities" drawn up by SPSS. The latter is presented in the rows, and the former is presented in the columns.

Table 5: Political priorities by generation (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid = 2521)

		Generation (age in years)					
		25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-78	Total
Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	7	38	104	97	43	289
		10,6%	9,7%	9,8%	11,7%	25%	11,5%
	20-39%	24	153	355	280	36	848
		36,4%	39,1%	33,5%	33,7%	20,9%	33,6%
	40-59%	25	133	411	296	56	921
		37,9%	34,0%	38,7%	35,6%	32,6%	36,5%
	60-79%	10	54	154	125	27	370
		15,2%	13,8%	14,5%	15,0%	15,7%	14,7%
	80-100%	0	13	37	33	10	93
		0,0%	3,3%	3,5%	4,0%	5,8%	3,7%
	Total	66	391	1061	831	172	2521
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

- Kendall's τ_b = -0,001; significance ρ = 0,946

As the first step, we need to prove that the cause (in our case the generation) precedes the effect (in our case political priorities) in time. We can easily prove this assumption as there is no other possible time order as the mayor's age proceeding his or her decision-making on political priorities in office. Second, we focus on the association of the relationship. For this, the direction, the strength and the significance of the relationship of the variables are observed (Van der Kolk, 2015). By means of the respective contingency table, a broad determination of the direction of the relationship is possible.

According to hypothesis 1a, the sign is supposed to be negative as we expect a higher age to lower the degree of post-materialist political priorities. Among the rows, we expect the highest percentage of very old mayors (65-78 years) to occur in the pure materialist category, whereas the highest percentage of very young mayors (25-34 years) is expected to occur in the pure post-materialist category. This pattern is, however, not confirmed by the distribution within the cross table (table 5). Among the very

old mayors, the second largest amount of mayors has pure materialist political priorities (25%). Percentagewise, most very old mayors have mixed political priorities (32,6%). Furthermore, any mayor is very young and likewise has pure post-materialist political priorities. For those mayors this holds true are mainly very old as well (5,8%). Among all generations, mayors tend to have rather materialist political priorities or divided political priorities.

For the sign and the strength, more revealing efficient than a simple observation of the table is the interpretation of the respective Kendall's tau-b coefficient. Its associated ρ-value indicates whether any such relationship is statistical significant. Kendall's τ_b = -0,001 and has the significance level ρ = 0,946. Both indicate that there is no systematic correlation between the variables and thus, the null hypothesis is confirmed (= no statistical relationship neither negative nor positive). To sum up, there is no effect of mayors' age on their political priorities.

Nevertheless, this alone cannot be considered as a falsification of hypothesis 1a. After all, it might still be the case that the relationship is statistically insignificant because the inclusion of East European countries, among which we do not expect any such a relationship, attenuates the results (hypothesis 1b). For this purpose, a trivariate contingency table analysis including the Kendall's tau-b coefficients is used to observe the expected trend in East European countries and the rest of Europe (Appendix: Table 8). We would assume a statistical correlation between generation and political priorities in not East European countries, whereas this case is not expected in East European countries.

In not East European countries, Kendall's τ_b = 0,006 and its associated ρ-value = 0,763. In East European countries, Kendall's τ_b = -0,028 and its associated ρ-value = 0,525. According to both coefficients that are not different from zero, we do not observe an effect of mayors' age on their political priorities neither among East European mayors nor among the rest. This falsifies hypothesis 1a and partly hypothesis 1b. In fact, the relationship does not hold true for mayors of East European countries, however, neither among those mayors living in the rest of Europe.

In summary, the findings reject an effect of the mayors' generation on political priorities. This holds true for all European mayors regardless of whether the municipality is located in the East or the rest of Europe.

Forth sub-question. Before leaping to a conclusion on the main argument which we observed before, the following section analyses the relationship of the main argument with due regard to the factors institutional strength of the mayor, the size of the municipality and the dominant national political culture.

Institutional strength of the mayor (hypothesis 2). The second hypothesis reads as followed: The impact of generational differences on the political priorities of mayors (see hypothesis 1a) is stronger, the stronger the institutional position of the mayor is.

Previously we discovered that the expected effect of generation on political priorities occurs neither in East European countries nor in the rest of Europe. It might be the case that the variable "institutional strength of the mayors" modulates the strength of the statistical association and thus, distorts the relationship of mayors' age and political priorities concerning its statistical significance. According to hypothesis 2, the strength of the statistical association is expected to be higher the stronger the institutional strength of the mayor is. This is the reason why a trivariate contingency table analysis is applied (Appendix: Table 9).

The cross table presents the relationship between the variable "generation" and "political priorities" controlled by the variable "institutional strength of the mayor" among all European countries. After all, the cross table is assumed to show a stronger concentration of old mayors having low degrees of post-materialist political priorities among those rows pertaining to a strong or very strong institutional strength. Among the very strong mayors, more than the half of the mayors (52,9%) between 65 and 78 years scored in the pure materialist category.

However, before leaping to a conclusion, the direction and the strength of the modifying effect is determined by means of the respective Kendall's tau-b coefficient. The institutional strength "very strong" has a weak negative effect on the relationship as Kendall's τ_b = -0,123 and its associated significance level ρ = 0,001. This falsifies the null hypothesis and the observed negative and weak relationship between generation and political priorities among very strong mayors is proved to be statistically significant. Among strong mayors the relationship between their age and their political priorities is even weaker as Kendall's τ_b = 0,057. Although the significance level ρ = 0,047, it is well below 0,10 and thus, hardly any strong significance can be assumed. Thus, it is excluded from the future analysis. The same applies to the relationship among medium strong and weak mayors, as they are not statistically significant either.

To sum up, the institutional strength of a mayor seems to have an effect on the relationship between the mayor's age and his or her priorities in office, though the effect remains to be weak. As we have expected, a negative effect is strongest among very strong mayors. Thus, very strong and old

mayors are likelier to have materialist political priorities. Any such an effect is not given among weak, medium strong and strong mayors. We can confirm hypothesis 2.[2]

The size of the municipality (hypothesis 3). For proving hypothesis 3a (The bigger the size of the municipality, the likelier that mayors tend to have materialist political priorities rather than post-materialist political priorities), Kendall's tau-c coefficient is used to examine the strength and the direction of the expected relationship. Its associated ρ-value is used to indicate the statistical significance.

Table 6: Political priorities by size of municipality (in absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid = 2596)

		Size of municipality (in number of inhabitants)						
		10,000-14,999	15,000-19,999	20,000-29,999	30,000-49,999	50,000-99,999	> 100,000	Total
Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	81	61	57	48	19	29	295
		10,2%	13,4%	11,8%	13,4%	7,5%	11,7%	11,4%
	20-39%	246	164	169	122	94	82	877
		30,8%	36,0%	35,1%	34,1%	37,0%	33,1%	33,8%
	40-59%	284	160	169	138	106	94	951
		35,6%	35,1%	35,1%	38,5%	41,7%	37,9%	36,6%
	60-79%	140	62	72	40	24	37	375
		17,5%	13,6%	14,9%	11,2%	9,4%	14,9%	14,4%
	80-100%	47	9	15	10	11	6	98
		5,9%	2,0%	3,1%	2,8%	4,3%	2,4%	3,8%
Total		798	456	482	358	254	248	2596
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

- Kendall's τ_c = -0,040; significance ρ = 0,009

Nevertheless, first of all the cross table showing the relationship between the size of the municipality and mayors' political priorities is described (Table 6). The former is presented as degree of post-materialist political priorities in the rows and the latter is presented as number of inhabitants in

[2] A further analysis of the interaction effect controlled by the East and the rest is redundant since the respective cross table (Appendix: Table 10) includes only cases of weak and medium strong mayors. This is because in the included East European countries Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic there is little variation in the institutional regimes. This is confirmed by the respective descriptive statistics (Appendix: Table 12) representing a mean of 1,8 and a range of 1.

the columns. According to the hypothesis, we expect large municipalities to be ruled by mayors who have mainly materialist political priorities and small municipalities to be ruled by mayors who have mainly post-materialist political priorities. Nevertheless, the percentage differences between large and small municipalities are small among all categories of political priorities.

Of more revealing evidence is Kendall's $\tau_c = -0{,}040$ and its associated ρ-value = 0,009. This is a falsification of the null hypothesis, though the negative relationship is very weak. Despite that, hypothesis 3a is confirmed. It is true that the bigger the size of the municipality is, the likelier that mayors tend to prioritize materialist political issues rather than those of post-materialist nature.

In order to test hypothesis 3b[3], a trivariate contingency table analysis with the variable "region" is applied. We assume the relationship between size of the municipality and political priorities to show reversed pattern in case of East European countries. Thus, among East European countries, the cross table (Appendix: Table 11) is supposed to show the highest representation of mayors with post-materialist political priorities among those ruling a large municipality. On the contrary, the majority of mayors with materialist political priorities is expected to rule small municipalities. These expectations are not confirmed by the pattern of the cross table. Among East European countries, even all nine mayors with post-materialist political priorities are mayors of small municipalities between 10,000 and 14,999 inhabitants. Due to the different large numbers of observations concerning East Europe and the remaining countries, leaping to conclusions only on basis of the cross table is inadequate.

Thus, to determine the sign and the strength of the relationship controlled by the region, the respective Kendall's tau-c coefficient is interpreted. In East European countries, Kendall's $\tau_c = -0{,}146$ and has the associated ρ-value = 0,000. This implies perfect statistical significance, though the observed negative relationship is weak. Against our expectations, in East European countries, the bigger the size of the municipality, the likelier those mayors tend to have materialist political priorities rather than post-materialist political priorities.

For the rest of Europe, Kendall's $\tau_c = -0{,}017$ and its associated significance level $\rho = 0{,}314$. Since $\rho > 0{,}05$ the null hypothesis is confirmed implying that in not East European countries, there is no relationship between the size of the municipality and political priorities.

In conclusion, to small extent larger municipalities lower the degree of post-materialist political priorities of mayors (confirmation of hypothesis 3a). However, this applies only to East Europe but not to the remaining countries. Hypothesis 3b is falsified.

[3] Hypothesis 3b: The bigger the size of an East European municipality, the likelier that mayors tend to have post-materialist political priorities rather than materialist political priorities

Dominant national political culture (hypothesis 4). To test the relationship between the dominant national political culture and political priorities, we have derived following hypothesis: If post-materialism rather than materialism characterizes the dominant national political culture, the mayor is likely to have post-materialist political priorities and vice versa. Thus, a positive effect of degree of post-materialist national political culture on the degree of post-materialist political priorities is expected.

First, the respective cross table (Table 7), presenting the independent variable "dominant national political culture" in the columns and the dependent variable "political priorities" in the rows, is observed.

We expect the highest representation of mayors with pure post-materialist political priorities in the category with a degree of post-materialism more than 10,21%. But again, the percentage differences among the categories of the degree of post-materialist national political culture are rather small. Thus, we assume the respective Kendall's tau-c coefficient to give more indication on the strength of the relationship. Kendall's τ_c = -0,050 and its associated ρ-value = 0,008. The results do not confirm the hypothesis implying a positive relationship. The observed relationship is negative and very weak even though it is statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 4 is rejected. Rather it holds that if post-materialism rather than materialism characterizes the dominant national political culture, the mayor is likely to have materialist political priorities and vice versa. However, this effect is very weak.

Table 7: Political priorities by dominant national political culture (absolute numbers; column percentages) (Valid N = 2140)

		Degree of post-materialist national political culture				
		0-2,5%	2,6-5,1%	5,2-10,2%	>10,21%	Total
Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	35 6,6%	44 9,4%	48 8,8%	130 21,7%	257 12,0%
	20-39%	172 32,4%	205 43,9%	197 36,2%	165 27,6%	739 34,5%
	40-59%	218 41,1%	163 34,9%	201 36,9%	172 28,8%	754 35,2%
	60-79%	94 17,7%	44 9,4%	80 14,7%	85 14,2%	303 14,2%
	80-100%	12 2,3%	11 2,4%	18 3,3%	46 7,7%	87 4,1%
Total		531 100%	467 100%	544 100%	598 100%	2140 100%

- Kendall's τ_c = -0,050 and its associated ρ-value = 0,008

Conclusion

The aim of this study is to describe and to explain political priorities of European mayors in their term of office at the beginning of the 21st century. We can conclude that in general the political priorities of European mayors reflect a mixed value orientation of both materialist and post-materialist nature. However, the political priorities tend to be rather materialist than post-materialist. Furthermore, the average European mayor is in the middle age (52 years old); nevertheless, an aging trend among mayors occurs.

Figure 4 sums up the observed effects of our study. The underlying argument of this study is that the mayor's generation is the main determinant on mayors' preferences for either materialist or post-materialist political issues within the scope of their governance activities. These expectations base on Inglehart's (1971) theory of individual value orientation assuming generational differences as the reason for different value orientations of individuals. The results have shown this holds true only among mayors with a very strong institutional position.

Among those, old mayors are likelier to have materialist political priorities whereas younger cohorts of mayors tend to prioritize post-materialistic issues. This is surprisingly as a very strong institutional position in fact reveals the expected relationship between generation and political priorities. In this context, the predictions by Ajzen (1985) seem to apply. It is plausible to conclude that mayors enjoying very strong institutional positions are abler to align their political priorities in accordance with their personal value orientation as their ability to assess themselves allows resisting other factors. In this regard, future quantitative research on the effect of local leaders' institutional power on their political action is interesting.

In addition, mayors of smaller municipalities tend to have post-materialist political priorities, whereas those ruling larger municipalities tend to have materialist political priorities. However, only in municipalities of East European countries and not in the rest of Europe this effect holds true. The theoretical assumption of a reversed pattern among East European municipalities (Hoffmann-Martinot & Sellers, 2005) is rejected. One might criticize that the representation of East European mayors is too weak compared to the remaining mayors. In this place, a homogenous distribution across Europe of included mayors might have led to different patterns. In addition, the research design does not allow for much variation in the variable "size of municipality" since only cities more than 10,000 inhabitants are included. In this context, the research design shows weaknesses. The findings spare the thoughts for further implications of Hoffmann-Martinot's and Sellers' (2005) argumentation since the study poses the question of whether the differences between East and West Europe mentioned by the scholars have changed or remain.

Moreover, the dominant national political culture explains to some extent differences in mayors' political priorities. According to the results, the more materialistic the dominant national political culture is, the likelier is the mayor to have post-materialist political priorities. Surprisingly, this does not resonate with the underlying theory (Denters & Klok, 2013). This might be due to the misrepresented

data. Unfortunately, data about the dominant value orientation of the citizens of the municipalities was not available and consequently, we resorted to the dominant national value orientation. Nevertheless, extensively concerning about possible explanations is redundant as the effect remains to be very weak. In the first place, more research and especially more data collection on the citizens' value orientation is necessary.

Although the complete confirmation of Inglehart's (1971) theory fails to appear in our study, it is misguided to question Inglehart's approach at the core. At least the relationship could have been proven among mayors with a very strong institutional position. Concerning the question of how mayors govern their city it can be argued now that individual factors alone (Inglehart, 1971) do not influence mayoral political prioritizing, but rather contextual factors do (Ajzen, 1985). Although the determinants institutional strength, the size of the municipality and the dominant national political culture remain to be weak effects, they do influence mayors' political priorities.

Discussing the impact of the study, several strong and weak points need to be specify. Though the expected effects turned out to be weak and partly differ from the theoretical assumptions (compare size of the municipality and dominant national political culture), the research has proven their statistically significance. However, more research is necessary on the question which factors explain differences in political priorities of European mayors. We find fault in the poor research of this field done before and thus, concluded from general theories to our specific peer group of European mayors. This might have resulted in vague findings; nevertheless, they broaden the perspective of both research areas, namely the field of individual value orientation and the field of local governance. Particularly, it yields descriptive knowledge on how European mayors govern their cities as we concluded that factors on the contextual level rather than those on the individual level impact upon mayors' behavior. Here, the large N cross-sectional research design proves beneficial. Contrary to qualitative research, our quantitative study allows for a more extensive and conclusive understanding of differences in local governance among European mayors. However, an even richer data set is supposed to reveal findings that are even more significant, for example a clearer reflection of Inglehart's (1971) theory among the sample. In this context, a more comprehensive correlational research design including a larger N with more variation is desirable. Hereof, the extension of the European mayor project (Bäck et al., 2006) towards a longitudinal research design seems to be a good approach. This would remedy deficiencies of the research design, as a trend survey augurs more response rates.

In discussing Barber's (2013) argument of the importance of the mayor's role, the study gives interesting answers on how mayors govern their city. It might be true that mayors become more important in addressing international and national problems; however, the findings reveal that national and contextual factors affect mayors in their decision on what issues to prioritize on their agenda. One might conclude and criticize that mayors themselves lack on self-determination concerning those political issues which they set on the political agenda. On the contrary, the majority might welcome the limited power of local leaders as it guarantees that mayors set their political priorities according to the

needs and circumstances of the environment and society rather than to their value orientation. This might be the reason why city mayors rather than the national or supranational level are capable of coping with national and international problems (Barber, 2013). Especially in the present days, in which complex problems demand fast solutions, this style of governance promises to reach success.

Figure 4: causal model of observed effects



References

Ajzen, I. (1985). From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckmann (Eds.), *Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior* (pp. 11-39). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Bäck, H., Heinelt, H., & Magnier, A. (2006). *The European mayor political leaders in the changing context of local democracy.* Wiesbaden: Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Banfield, E. C. (1961). *Political influence.* Glencoe [Ill.: Free Press.

Barber, B. R. (2013). *If mayors ruled the world: dysfunctional nations, rising cities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bigelow, B., Fahey, L., & Mahon, J. (1993). A Typology of Issue Evolution. *Business & Society, 32*(1), 18-29. doi: 10.1177/000765039303200104.

Bowen, S. A., Rawlings, B., & Martin, T. (2012). Mastering Public Relations (Vol. 1.0). Flatworld. Retrieved 28.06.2016, from http://2012books.lardbucket.org/pdfs/public-relations.pdf.

Denters, B. (2006). Duo or Duel? The Relations between Mayors and Councils in Democratic Local Government. In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt & A. Magnier (Eds.), *The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (pp. 271-285). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Denters, B., & Klok, P.-J. (2013). Citizen Democracy and the Responsiveness of Councillors: The Effects of Democratic Institutionalisation on the Role Orientations and Role Behaviour of Councillors. *Local Government Studies, 39*(5), 661-680. doi: 10.1080/03003930.2012.670747

Dooley, D. (2001). *Social research methods* (4th ed.. ed.). Upper Sadle River, NJ: Upper Sadle River, NJ : Prentice Hall.

Elgie, R. (1995). *Political leadership in liberal democracies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Fisher, M. J., & Marshall, A. P. (2009). Understanding descriptive statistics. *Australian Critical Care, 22*(2), 93-97. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aucc.2008.11.003

Getimis, P., & Hlepas, N.-K. (2006). Aspects of Leadership Styles: An Interaction of Context and Personalities. In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt & A. Magnier (Eds.), *The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (pp. 177-199). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Göktaş, A., & Işçi, Ö. (2011). A comparison of the most commonly used measures of association for doubly ordered square contingency tables via simulation. *Metodoloski Zvezki, 8*(1), 17-37.

Grunig, J. E., & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing Public Relations. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.

Hambleton, R. (1998). Strengthening Political Leadership in UK Local Government. *Public Money & Management, 18*(1), 41-51. doi: 10.1111/1467-9302.00103

Heinelt, H., & Hlepas, N.-K. (2006). Typologies of Local Government Systems. In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt & A. Magnier (Eds.), *The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (pp. 21-42). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Hoffmann-Martinot, V., & Sellers, J. (2005). Conclusion: The Metropolitization of Politics In V. Hoffmann-Martinot & J. Sellers (Eds.), *Metropolitanization and political change*. Wiesbaden: Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Inglehart, R. (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. *The American Political Science Review, 65*(4), 991-1017. doi: 10.2307/1953494

Inglehart, R. (2008). Changing values among Western publics from 1970 to 2006. *West European Politics, 31*(1-2), 130-146. doi: 10.1080/01402380701834747

Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. *American Sociological Review, 65*(1), 19-51.

John, P., & Cole, A. (1999). Political leadership in the new urban governance: Britain and France compared. *Local Government Studies, 25*(4), 98-115. doi: 10.1080/03003939908433969

Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model. *The Academy of Management Review, 16*(2), 366-395.

Judd, D. (2000). Strong leadership. *Urban Studies, 37*(5-6), 951-961.

Levine Einstein, K., Glick, D. & Lusk, K., (2014). Mayoral Policy Making: Results from the 21st Century Mayors Leadership Survey. Retrieved 29.06.2016, from http://www.bu.edu/ioc/files/2015/01/BUIOC_Mayors-Leadership-Survey_2014.pdf.

Magnier, A. (2006). Strong Mayors? On Direct Election and Political Entrepreneurship. In H. H. Bäck, Hubert; Magnier, Annick (Eds.) (Ed.), *The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (Vol. Urban and Regional Research International, pp. 353-376): VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Maslow, A. H. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (2nd ed., Rev.). New York, NY: Harper and Row

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67, 371-378. doi: 10.1037/h0040525.

Reiter, T. (2005). Kendalls Tau für Kontingenztafeln. Retrieved 18.06.2016, from http://www.reiter1.com/Glossar/Kendall_Tau.htm

Svara, J. H. (1994). *Facilitative leadership in local government: Lessons from successful mayors and chairpersons.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Van der Kolk, H. (2015). A short guide to asking research questions, to hypothesis construction and to basic data analysis using crosstabs [Powerpoint slides]. Retrieved 29.06.2016, from https://blackboard.utwente.nl/bbcswebdav/pid-912826-dt-content-rid-920127_2/courses/2015-201500161-2A/IRM%20Short%20guide%202015%202016%20version%201.pdf

Appendix

Table 8: Political Priorities by generation controlled by region (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid = 2513)

			Generation (age in years)					Total
Region			25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-78	
Rest	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	5	33	83	91	43	255
			9,3%	10,9%	9,7%	12,5%	26,1%	12,1%
		20-39%	21	126	292	244	34	717
			38,9%	41,6%	34,1%	33,5%	20,6%	34,0%
		40-59%	23	96	323	250	53	745
			42,6%	31,7%	37,7%	34,3%	32,1%	35,4%
		60-79%	5	38	125	112	26	306
			9,3%	12,5%	14,6%	15,4%	15,8%	14,5%
		80-100%	0	10	33	31	9	83
			0,0%	3,3%	3,9%	4,3%	5,5%	3,9%
	Total		54	303	856	728	165	2106
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
East	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	5	20	6	0	33
			18,2%	5,8%	9,9%	5,9%	0,0%	8,1%
		20-39%	3	27	63	35	2	130
			27,3%	31,4%	31,2%	34,7%	28,6%	31,9%
		40-59%	1	36	87	46	3	173
			9,1%	41,9%	43,1%	45,5%	42,9%	42,5%
		60-79%	5	15	28	12	1	61
			45,5%	17,4%	13,9%	11,9%	14,3%	15,0%
		80-100%	0	3	4	2	1	10
			0,0%	3,5%	2,0%	2,0%	14,3%	2,5%
	Total		11	86	202	101	7	407
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

- Rest: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0{,}006$; significance $\rho = 0{,}763$
- East: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0{,}028$; significance $\rho = 0{,}525$

Table 9: Political priorities by generation controlled by institutional strength of mayor (in absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid = 2524)

Institutional strength of the mayor			Generation (age in years)					
			25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-78	Total
Weak	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	6	22	22	1	52
			14,3%	10,5%	10,7%	9,7%	2,1%	9,6%
		20-39%	7	21	68	82	15	193
			50,0%	36,8%	34,7%	36,3%	31,9%	35,7%
		40-59%	2	20	77	80	19	198
			14,3%	35,1%	39,3%	35,4%	40,4%	36,7%
		60-79%	3	10	25	36	7	81
			21,4%	17,5%	12,8%	15,9%	14,9%	15,0%
		80-100%	0	0	5	6	5	16
			0,0%	0,0%	2,6%	2,7%	10,6%	3,0%
	Total		14	57	196	226	47	540
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Medium Strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	8	23	12	4	49
			13,3%	8,2%	9,7%	7,9%	19,0%	9,4%
		20-39%	3	31	70	47	4	155
			20,0%	32,0%	29,4%	31,1%	19,0%	29,7%
		40-59%	6	39	101	67	10	223
			40,0%	40,2%	42,4%	44,4%	47,6%	42,7%
		60-79%	4	16	39	20	3	82
			26,7%	16,5%	16,4%	13,2%	14,3%	15,7%
		80-100%	0	3	5	5	0	13
			0,0%	3,1%	2,1%	3,3%	0,0%	2,5%
	Total		15	97	238	151	21	522
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	3	14	32	23	3	75
			17,6%	9,4%	7,3%	7,9%	8,3%	8,1%
		20-39%	5	58	152	97	11	323
			29,4%	38,9%	34,7%	33,3%	30,6%	34,7%
		40-59%	8	54	167	107	11	347
			47,1%	36,2%	38,1%	36,8%	30,6%	37,3%
		60-79%	1	20	75	56	8	160
			5,9%	13,4%	17,1%	19,2%	22,2%	17,2%
		80-100%	0	3	12	8	3	26
			0,0%	2,0%	2,7%	2,7%	8,3%	2,8%
	Total		17	149	438	291	36	931
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Very strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	0	10	27	40	37	114
			0,0%	11,2%	14,3%	24,5%	52,9%	21,5%
		20-39%	9	44	66	54	7	180
			45,0%	49,4%	34,9%	33,1%	10,0%	33,9%
		40-59%	9	20	65	43	15	152
			45,0%	22,5%	34,4%	26,4%	21,4%	28,6%
		60-79%	2	8	15	12	9	46
			10,0%	9,0%	7,9%	7,4%	12,9%	8,7%
		80-100%	0	7	16	14	2	39
			0,0%	7,9%	8,5%	8,6%	2,9%	7,3%
	Total		20	89	189	163	70	531

			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	7	38	103	97	45	290
			10,6%	9,7%	9,7%	11,7%	25,9%	11,5%
		20-39%	24	154	356	280	37	851
			36,4%	39,3%	33,6%	33,7%	21,3%	33,7%
		40-59%	25	133	410	297	55	920
			37,9%	33,9%	38,6%	35,7%	31,6%	36,5%
		60-79%	10	54	154	124	27	369
			15,2%	13,8%	14,5%	14,9%	15,5%	14,6%
		80-100%	0	13	38	33	10	94
			0,0%	3,3%	3,6%	4,0%	5,7%	3,7%
	Total		656	392	1061	831	174	2524
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

- Weak: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0{,}063$; significance $\rho = 0{,}091$
- Medium strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0{,}016$; significance $\rho = 0{,}676$
- Strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0{,}057$; significance $\rho = 0{,}047$
- Very strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0{,}123$; significance $\rho = 0{,}001$
- Total: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0{,}004$; significance $\rho = 0{,}818$

Table 10: Political priorities by generation controlled by institutional strength controlled by region (absolute numbers; column percentages) (N Valid = 2526)

Region	Institutional strength of the mayor			Generation (age in years) 25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-78	Total
Rest	weak	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	5	20	21	1	49
				15,4%	12,8%	11,3%	10,0%	2,4%	10,2%
			20-39%	7	15	58	74	12	166
				53,8%	38,5%	32,8%	35,2%	29,3%	34,6%
			40-59%	2	12	69	75	18	176
				15,4%	30,8%	39,0%	35,7%	43,9%	36,7%
			60-79%	2	7	25	34	6	74
				15,4%	17,9%	14,1%	16,2%	14,6%	15,4%
			80-100%	0	0	5	6	4	15
				0,0%	0,0%	2,8%	2,9%	9,8%	3,1%
		Total		13	39	177	210	41	480
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Medium strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	0	4	4	7	4	19
				0,0%	14,3%	7,3%	10,6%	20,0%	10,9%
			20-39%	1	10	17	19	4	51
				20,0%	35,7%	30,9%	28,8%	20,0%	29,3%
			40-59%	4	11	22	26	9	72
				80,0%	39,3%	40,0%	39,4%	45,0%	41,4%
			60-79%	0	3	11	11	3	28
				0,0%	10,7%	20,0%	16,7%	15,0%	16,1%
			80-100%	0	0	1	3	0	4
				0,0%	0,0%	1,8%	4,5%	0,0%	2,3%
		Total		5	28	55	66	20	174
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	3	14	32	23	3	75
				17,6%	9,4%	7,3%	7,9%	8,3%	8,1%
			20-39%	5	58	152	97	11	323
				29,4%	38,9%	34,7%	33,3%	30,6%	34,7%
			40-59%	8	54	167	107	11	347
				47,1%	36,2%	38,1%	36,8%	30,6%	37,3%
			60-79%	1	20	75	56	8	160
				5,9%	13,4%	17,1%	19,2%	22,2%	17,2%
			80-100%	0	3	12	8	3	26
				0,0%	2,0%	2,7%	2,7%	8,3%	2,8%
		Total		17	149	438	291	36	931
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			0-19%	0	10	27	40	37	114

	Very strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities		0,0%	11,2%	14,3%	24,5%	52,9%	21,5%
			20-39%	9	44	66	54	7	180
				45,0%	49,4%	34,9%	33,1%	10,0%	33,9%
			40-59%	9	20	65	43	15	152
				45,0%	22,5%	34,4%	26,4%	21,4%	28,6%
			60-79%	2	8	15	12	9	46
				10,0%	9,0%	7,9%	7,4%	12,9%	8,7%
			80-100%	0	7	16	14	2	39
				0,0%	7,9%	8,5%	8,6%	2,9%	7,3%
		Total		20	89	189	163	70	531
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Total	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	5	33	83	91	45	257
				9,1%	10,8%	9,7%	12,5%	26,9%	12,1%
			20-39%	22	127	293	244	34	720
				40,0%	41,6%	34,1%	33,4%	20,4%	34,0%
			40-59%	23	97	323	251	53	747
				41,8%	31,8%	37,6%	34,4%	31,7%	35,3%
			60-79%	5	38	126	113	26	308
				9,1%	12,5%	14,7%	15,5%	15,6%	14,6%
			80-100%	0	10	34	31	9	84
				0,0%	3,3%	4,0%	4,2%	5,4%	4,0%
		Total		55	305	859	730	167	2116
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
East	Weak	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	0	1	2	2	0	5
				0,0%	5,9%	10,0%	11,8%	0,0%	8,1%
			20-39%	1	6	10	8	2	27
				50,0%	35,3%	50,0%	47,1%	33,3%	43,5%
			40-59%	0	8	8	5	2	23
				0,0%	47,1%	40,0%	29,4%	33,3%	37,1%
			60-79%	1	2	0	2	1	6
				50,0%	11,8%	0,0%	11,8%	16,7%	9,7%
			80-100%	0	0	0	0	1	1
				0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	16,7%	1,6%
		Total		2	17	20	17	6	62
				100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Medium strong	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	5	19	5	0	31
				22,2%	7,1%	10,4%	5,9%	0,0%	8,9%
			20-39%	2	21	53	27	0	103
				22,2%	30,0%	29,0%	31,8%	0,0%	29,6%

		40-59%	1	28	79	41	1	150
			11,1%	40,0%	43,2%	48,2%	100,0%	43,1%
		60-79%	4	13	28	10	0	55
			44,4%	18,6%	15,3%	11,8%	0,0%	15,8%
		80-100%	0	3	4	2	0	9
			0,0%	4,3%	2,2%	2,4%	0,0%	2,6%
	Total		9	70	183	85	1	348
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	2	5	19	5	0	31
			22,2%	7,1%	10,4%	5,9%	0,0%	8,9%
		20-39%	2	21	53	27	0	103
			22,2%	30,0%	29,0%	31,8%	0,0%	29,6%
		40-59%	1	28	79	41	1	150
			11,1%	40,0%	43,2%	48,2%	100,0%	43,1%
		60-79%	4	13	28	10	0	55
			44,4%	18,6%	15,3%	11,8%	0,0%	15,8%
		80-100%	0	3	4	2	0	9
			0,0%	4,3%	2,2%	2,4%	0,0%	2,6%
	Total		9	70	183	85	1	348
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Rest:

- Weak: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0,073$; significance $\rho = 0,061$
- Medium strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0,022$; significance $\rho = 0,723$
- Strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0,057$; significance $\rho = 0,047$
- Very strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0,123$; significance $\rho = 0,001$
- Total: Kendall's $\tau_b = 0,005$; significance $\rho = 0,812$

East:

- Weak: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0,022$; significance $\rho = 0,853$
- Medium strong: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0,027$; significance $\rho = 0,567$
- Total: Kendall's $\tau_b = -0,027$; significance $\rho = 0,537$

Table 11: Political priorities by the size of municipality controlled by region (absolute numbers, column percentages) (N Valid = 2599)

Region			Size of municipality (in number of inhabitants) 10,000-14,999	15,000-19,999	20,000-29,999	30,000-49,999	50,000-99,999	>100,000	Total
Rest	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	76	54	51	37	15	25	258
			11,6%	14,3%	12,7%	12,3%	6,7%	11,1%	11,8%
		20-39%	208	141	138	108	80	74	749
			31,7%	37,3%	34,3%	36,0%	35,7%	32,7%	34,2%
		40-59%	221	121	139	111	96	88	776
			33,6%	32,0%	34,6%	37,0%	42,9%	38,9%	35,5%
		60-79%	114	53	59	34	22	33	315
			17,4%	14,0%	14,7%	11,3%	9,8%	14,6%	14,4%
		80-100%	38	9	15	10	11	6	89
			5,8%	2,4%	3,7%	3,3%	4,9%	2,7%	4,1%
	Total		657	378	402	300	224	226	2187
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
East	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	5	7	6	10	3	4	35
			3,5%	8,9%	7,4%	17,2%	10,0%	18,2%	8,5%
		20-39%	39	23	32	14	14	8	130
			27,5%	29,1%	39,5%	24,1%	46,7%	36,4%	31,6%
		40-59%	63	40	30	27	10	6	176
			44,4%	50,6%	37,0%	46,6%	33,3%	27,3%	42,7%
		60-79%	26	9	13	7	3	4	62
			18,3%	11,4%	16,0%	12,1%	10,0%	18,2%	15,0%
		80-100%	9	0	0	0	0	0	9
			6,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,2%
	Total		142	79	81	58	30	22	412
			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Degree of post-materialist political priorities	0-19%	81	61	57	47	18	29	293
			10,1%	13,3%	11,8%	13,1%	7,1%	11,7%	11,3%
		20-39%	247	164	170	122	94	82	879
			30,9%	35,9%	35,2%	34,1%	37,0%	33,1%	33,8%
		40-59%	284	161	169	138	106	94	952
			35,5%	35,2%	35,0%	38,5%	41,7%	37,9%	36,6%
		60-79%	140	62	72	41	25	37	377
			17,5%	13,6%	14,9%	11,5%	9,8%	14,9%	14,5%
		80-100%	47	9	15	10	11	6	98
			5,9%	2,0%	3,1%	2,8%	4,3%	2,4%	3,8%

	Total	799	457	483	358	254	248	2599
		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Rest:

- Kendall's τ_c = - 0,017; ρ = 0,314

East:

- Kendall's τ_c = - 0,146; ρ = 0,000

Table 12: Descriptive statistics institutional strength of the mayor in East European countries

N	Valid	416
	Missing	0
Mean		1,8482
Median		2
Std. Deviation		0,35923
Range		1
Minimum		1
Maximum		2

Declaration of Academic Integrity

"I hereby confirm that the present thesis "The Political Priorities of City Mayors" is solely my own work and that if any text passages or diagrams from books, papers, the internet or other sources or in any other way used, all references - including those found in electronic media - have been acknowledged and fully cited."

Enschede, 29th June 2016