

The Migration Crisis: European Solidarity or National Self-defence?

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

This research aims at answering the following question: *How can differences in European solidarity expressions, as stated publically by EU member states' heads of governments, in managing the migration crisis be explained by welfare state theories?* Identifying the different expressions of European solidarity among the EU member states and the factors which determine these differences is of special relevance since the results of this study can contribute to the understanding of the current state and the future of European solidarity in managing the migration crisis. The research is conducted for four member states of the European Union: Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, which represent three different welfare state regimes. The first part of the analysis consists of a content analysis of press releases and newspaper articles which state heads of governments' expressions of European solidarity. In a second step, theories on welfare state regimes are applied in order to explain the differences in solidarity expressions. The results show that member states' expressions of solidarity in managing the migration differ according to their welfare regimes.

Key words: migration crisis, European solidarity, welfare states, European Union

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1. Introduction

In the context of the migration crisis, which Europe faces at the moment, different understandings of European solidarity of the member states of the European Union (EU) become obvious. In current scientific literature on European solidarity definitions vary widely and are often contested. However, most authors agree on one fact, that European solidarity is challenged by recent developments such as the financial crisis or the rise of far-right parties and growing Euroscepticism (Delanty, 2008; Ferrera, 2014; Wodak & Boukala, 2015).

Literature focuses on the one hand on defining what is to be understood by solidarity in the context of the European Union (Karagiannis, 2007; Sangiovanni, 2013). On the other hand, some authors focus on solidarity issues in different contexts as anxiety, the financial crisis or the European asylum system (Boräng, 2015; Delanty, 2008; Ferrera, 2014; Mitsilegas, 2014; Ventrella, 2015). Sangiovanni (2013) for example distinguishes between three forms of solidarity in the European Union - national solidarity, member state solidarity and transnational solidarity – and analyses how these concepts could be connected. Karagiannis (2007) focuses on the development of solidarity within Europe and solidarity of Europe towards other parts of the world and discusses a combination of these two forms. Delanty (2008) creates a link between growing anxiety in European societies and a crisis of European solidarity.

A central point of discussion is the welfare state which is at the heart of national solidarity and appears to be threatened by the growing influence of the European Union on domestic politics (Ferrera, 2014). As stated in Article 80 of the Treaty of Lisbon the principle of solidarity is one of the core values of the European Union and should guide its policies, though it is often missing in practice (Ventrella, 2015). The effects of the financial crisis on the challenged solidarity between European member states have been analysed by Ferrera with the result that “[t]he *coup de grace* to the transformative potential of new EU values was however struck by the Great Recession [...] which has not only – understandably – led to prioritize economic and financial issues, but has also induced institutional reforms aimed at tightening the bolts of executive federalism and at strengthening the primacy of economic governance based on automatic rules” (Ferrera, 2014, p. 231). This shows that the financial crisis led to a prioritisation of economic aspects and federalism over solidarity between the EU member states, hence it can be expected that the migration crisis has similar effects on European solidarity.

The issue of European solidarity among the member states of the European Union is of special social and scientific relevance since the principle of solidarity is among the core principles of the EU and to some extent defines the identity of the Union. As Ferrera (2014, p. 234) points out “the EU and the euro-zone in particular seem dangerously close to losing even the minimal traits of a ‘community’ – in symbolic, political and sociological terms”. If solidarity is challenged or not realised by the member states, the future of the European Union as a political union exceeding a mere economic

grouping is put in question. With regard to the current migration crisis, European solidarity and cooperation between the member states become even more important as a lack of joint action is to the detriment of refugees and their lives who are exposed to dangers, for example while trying to enter the European Union via the Mediterranean Sea (Ventrella, 2015). Therefore, a lack of solidarity not only endangers the future of the European project but also the lives of people seeking refuge.

In current literature minimal attention has been paid to differences in expressions of European solidarity between the member states of the European Union, their causes or implications on the future of the European Union and its values. Although, some factors which might explain differences in levels of European solidarity are mentioned in some texts (Delanty, 2008; Kolvraa, 2016; Sangiovanni, 2013; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Among these factors are unemployment, anxiety, the population size and welfare state regime. However, they are not investigated further (Delanty, 2008; Kolvraa, 2016; Sangiovanni, 2013; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Therefore, an empirical study on factors which might explain solidarity is still missing. Especially in the light of the current migration crisis European solidarity between member states is challenged (Hampshire, 2015). Still, literature has not yet focused on the development of solidarity in the context of the crisis. Hence, this research aims at filling the existing knowledge gap by investigating the different solidarity expressions of EU member states in the context of the migration crisis. Moreover, theories on welfare state regimes are applied in order to explain the differences in solidarity expressions, thus contributing an empirical study to the theoretical expectations on solidarity factors. Theories on welfare states represent the most appropriate approach for the purpose of this study, because they include several of the additional explaining factors as unemployment or anxiety which are suggested by current literature. Thus, knowledge will be extended to closer insights into the current state of European solidarity and its future in managing the migration crisis. The question prevails whether European solidarity or national self-defence dominates in managing the migration crisis.

In order to contribute to the academic debate, the aim of this research is to reveal differences in European solidarity as it is expressed by the EU member states' heads of governments in managing the migration crisis. The focus lies on member state solidarity, the form of solidarity that exists between the member states of the European Union. The differences in solidarity expressions are analysed for a selection of four EU member states – Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Theories on welfare state regimes as developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and further specified by Ferrera (1996) amongst others are applied in order to explain the differences. These theories deal with four types of welfare state regimes which differ in their organisation of solidarity: the liberal welfare state regime, the conservative welfare state regime, the social democratic welfare state regime and the Mediterranean welfare state regime. In order to address these issues the following research question is to be answered: *How can differences in European solidarity expressions, as stated publically by EU member states' heads of governments, in managing the migration crisis be explained by welfare state theories?* To be able to answer this research question the following two sub-questions

are addressed: Which different expressions of European solidarity exist among the EU member states' heads of governments? How can these differences be explained by theories on welfare states? In the first step, differences in expressions of European solidarity by the heads of governments of Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom are identified, thus extending the mainly theoretical knowledge on European solidarity towards closer insights into the current state of solidarity within the European Union. In the second step, the application of theories on welfare state regimes is used to explain the differences, thus contributing to the academic debate on European solidarity in the management of the migration crisis. It is expected that the four selected member states differ in their expressions of European solidarity according to their welfare regime type. In this regard, it is supposed that member states with more comprehensive welfare regimes are more likely to express European solidarity in managing the migration crisis.

The research question is answered by a qualitative analysis in the form of a comparative analysis for the four selected member states and is conducted in two steps. Firstly, the expressions of European solidarity, as stated publically by EU member states' heads of governments, are identified for each of the member states with the help of a content analysis of newspaper articles and press releases of the respective countries. These documents are analysed with the help of a coding scheme for European solidarity. Secondly, theories on welfare state regimes are used to explain the differences in solidarity. Therefore, the characterisations of the welfare state regimes are matched with the respective member state and are used to explain the differences which have been identified earlier.

This paper starts with presenting the current debate on European solidarity and its different forms as they are identified in literature. Thereafter, the concept of European solidarity, as it is used in this paper, is conceptualised. Then, the factors which are suggested in current literature for explaining differences in levels of solidarity between the member states of the European Union are described. Based on these factors, the approach of this study to explain solidarity differences with the help of theories on welfare states regimes is explained and justified. In the methods part, the type of research, the method of data collection and the method of data analysis are described. In the next part the actual analysis is presented. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the results of the analysis and their implications on the European Union and the role of European solidarity in the management of the migration crisis.

2. Theory

2.1 Introduction

In order to find an answer to the question, how differences in expressions of European solidarity can be explained by theories on welfare state regimes, this chapter discusses the main arguments and concepts concerning solidarity issues in the migration crisis. Thereby, closer attention is paid to the concept of European solidarity, illustrating at which levels it can be found, between whom it can be found and which characteristics it has. Moreover, four different types of welfare state regimes – the liberal welfare state regime, the conservative welfare state regime, the social democratic welfare state regime and the Mediterranean welfare state regime – and how they organise solidarity are discussed. The section concludes with linking the concept of European solidarity with theories on welfare state regimes in order to understand how European solidarity between the member states of the European Union functions in the context of the migration crisis.

2.2 European solidarity

In current literature on European solidarity the concept remains rather vague (Sangiovanni, 2013; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Sangiovanni (2013) discusses three forms of solidarity which she regards as essential for the European Union. Firstly, national solidarity defines the relationship between the nation state, its citizens and the residents of the state. The state is obligated to provide central collective goods which guarantee the functioning of the state, but in order to be able to do so “[i]t requires the participation and collaboration of all persons residing in a territory” (Sangiovanni, 2013, p. 10). Secondly, the obligations between the member states of the European Union are defined by the principle of member state solidarity. Member state solidarity is closely connected to the principle of reciprocity. As European integration poses certain risks to the member states, the central point of member state solidarity is to pool these risks in a fair way. Thus, member states accept some constraints to enable the overall well-being of their own citizens and the Union in general. However, there is a limit to what member states are willing to pay in order to “bear for the disadvantages [...] which other member states and their citizens bring with them” (Sangiovanni, 2013, p. 18). Thirdly, Sangiovanni describes transnational solidarity. This form of solidarity deals with the mutual obligations which EU citizens have towards each other (Sangiovanni, 2013). Other authors apply different distinctions between forms of solidarity. Karagiannis (2007) for example distinguishes between solidarity within Europe and solidarity of Europe towards the rest of the world. The underlying general definition of solidarity sees solidarity as “a recurrent specification of social bonds with a political view” (Karagiannis, 2007, p. 5). Solidarity within Europe is understood as a form of social solidarity based on values and interests which is directed at the European society. On the contrary, EU solidarity with the rest of the world is based on humanitarian policies and especially concerned with emergency aid in case of catastrophes. The author argues that instead of separating the

two forms of solidarity, the European Union should aim at promoting social solidarity in both spheres (Karagiannis, 2007).

As the present research aims at analysing solidarity between the member states of the European Union in managing the migration crisis, European solidarity in this paper is understood as solidarity at the European level and between member states. This understanding is in line with Sangiovanni's concept of member state solidarity and emphasises the importance of burden and risk sharing between the member states.

In literature on European solidarity different aspects are mentioned which might explain the level of solidarity among member states. However, in most of the texts the factors are only marginally mentioned and not investigated further (Delanty, 2008; Kolvraa, 2016; Sangiovanni, 2013; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). For her concept of member state solidarity Sangiovanni (2013) describes some factors which determine a member state's relative position and hence its willingness to base its actions on solidarity towards other member states. These factors include the state's population size, its level of development and its welfare state regime type (Sangiovanni, 2013). Since the financial crisis, growing Euroscepticism and nationalism pose new threats to the European identity and the solidarity between the member states of the Union which implies that they also have an influence on the member states' expressions of solidarity. On the one hand, these threats are expressed by the growing influence of far-right parties (Kolvraa, 2016; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). On the other hand, Euroscepticism becomes apparent through increasing immigration restrictions and austerity measures (Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Delanty (2008) outlines the link between growing anxiety in the member states' societies and an erosion of solidarity. Anxiety is especially present when employment is insecure. The factors mentioned above represent different possibilities of explaining manifestations of solidarity. Sangiovanni's (2013) suggestion that the welfare state type influences solidarity is supported by Ferrera (2014). He sees the welfare state as a central point in the debate on solidarity arguing that it changed the nature of politics as it organises distributive justice within a society. Moreover, welfare states reduce conflicts over redistribution (Boräng, 2015) and thus include welfare issues as unemployment or anxiety, i.e. welfare states include some additional factors which are suggested in literature on solidarity. Therefore, as welfare states play an important role in organising solidarity and thereby cover a combination of possible explanatory factors, this research focuses on welfare state regimes in order to explain levels of solidarity within the European Union.

2.3 Four welfare state regimes - Four ways of organising solidarity

As outlined above, theories on welfare state regimes represent the most suitable approach for explaining differences in expressions of solidarity. Furthermore, in the context of the financial crisis it is argued that different welfare state regimes respond in different ways to the consequences of the crisis (Josifidis, Hall, Supic, & Pucar, 2015). In order to assess the member states' welfare regime types, in this paper a typology of four distinct welfare state regimes is applied. As suggested in literature on classifications of welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen's typology of liberal, conservative

and social democratic welfare states is supplemented with the Mediterranean welfare state as the fourth regime type (Ferrera, 1996; Josifidis et al., 2015; Minas, Jacobson, Antoniou, & McMullan, 2014).

Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states focuses on the relationship between the state, the market and the family and allows to form clusters of three different welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). His typology is based on three arguments. Firstly, he describes that welfare state regimes are the results of different historical developments. In this regard, he stresses the importance of political parties. Capitalist societies with a weak political left resulted in liberal welfare state regimes, conservative welfare states are the results of conservative and Christian parties and social democratic welfare state regimes developed in response to strong left parties. Secondly, he argues that consequently these different welfare regimes reflect different political ideologies "with regard to stratification, de-commodification and the public-private mix of welfare" (Emmenegger, Kvist, Marx, & Petersen, 2015, p. 5). Thirdly, Esping-Andersen describes that the distinct welfare state regimes have different consequences with regard to political, economic and social issues (Emmenegger et al., 2015).

According to Esping-Andersen's typology, the *liberal welfare state regime* provides its services and benefits only to those who cannot support themselves (Danforth, 2014). Therefore, the provision of benefits and services in this welfare regime relies strongly on the market. This means that the state plays a weak role and intervenes only when family and market solutions are not sufficient anymore. Support is mainly offered in the form of minimum income schemes (Emmenegger et al., 2015). The benefits are means-tested with strong focus on eligibility requirements, modest and mainly directed at the low-income working-class (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Private welfare schemes are actively encouraged by the state leading to a dualistic social order where the minority depends on state welfare while the majority depends on market-based welfare (Danforth, 2014). From the four countries studied in this paper the United Kingdom can be categorised as a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The *conservative welfare state regime* is described by Esping-Andersen as strongly corporatist. Unlike the liberal welfare state regime, the conservative welfare state regime does not contest the granting of social rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Through social insurance schemes the state aims at preserving the status of its citizens (Emmenegger et al., 2015). The social insurance schemes "are organized according to narrow, occupation-based solidarities" (Danforth, 2014, p. 166). However, based on the principle of subsidiarity, the state intervenes only when the family lacks the capacity to service itself. Social rights are differentiated by class and status leading to limits on the impact of de-commodification and the preservation of class differences (Danforth, 2014). According to Esping-Andersen (1990), Austria and Germany belong to the group of conservative welfare states.

Esping-Andersen's third welfare state regime is the *social democratic welfare state* where "the state plays a larger role for the whole population, combining minimum income for all with generous

benefits for middle-income earners” (Emmenegger et al., 2015, p. 5). Through these universal social rights sponsored by the state, the individual can exist independently from the market and the family. The state aims at securing the citizens’ welfare throughout their entire life course. Priority is given to social equality and economic redistribution. Consequently, in order to promote universal solidarity some social benefits depend on the citizens’ income (Danforth, 2014). The social democratic welfare state regime is only found in the Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Esping-Andersen groups the Southern European and Mediterranean states together with the conservative welfare state regimes, arguing that they merely represent an underdeveloped form. However, this view has been challenged by evidence illustrating that these countries indeed form a fourth welfare regime type (Ferrera, 1996; Josifidis et al., 2015; Minas et al., 2014). Scholars arguing in favour of a fourth regime type do not only consider the relationship between state, market and family, as Esping-Andersen does, but also include the dimension of clientelism. They point out that the Southern European countries focus much more on family in their welfare systems. Therefore, the involvement of the state is lower (Minas et al., 2014). At the same time Ferrera (1996) argues that the Mediterranean welfare states provide the most generous benefits in Europe and cannot be regarded as underdeveloped. Hence, for the purpose of this research the Mediterranean welfare state constitutes the fourth welfare regime type because extending Esping-Andersen’s typology allows for greater differentiation between the European member states.

The *Mediterranean welfare state* is characterised by a corporatist and fragmented income maintenance system. With partially high generosity in certain fields as pensions and at the same time gaps of protection in other fields, the Mediterranean welfare state shows a marked internal polarisation. This means that the core of the labour force benefits from generous protection while only weak protection is provided to the irregular or non-institutional market (Ferrera, 1996). In welfare related fields as National Health Service universalistic principles tend to replace corporatist models. Public and private actors and institutions both take part in the welfare system, while the state is only partly involved. Moreover, the Mediterranean welfare state is based on clientelism and “elaborated ‘patronage machines’ for the selective distribution of cash subsidies” (Ferrera, 1996, p. 17). Furthermore, in Southern European countries the state apparatus is mostly weak and politics are dominated by an ideological polarisation and the presence of a maximalist and divided left (Ferrera, 1996). Out of the countries studied in this paper, Spain can be categorised as a Mediterranean welfare state (Ferrera, 1996; Josifidis et al., 2015; Minas et al., 2014).

As the four welfare state regimes differ in the way they provide protection and benefits for their citizens it can be said that they differ in organising solidarity. Based on the typology of this paper the social democratic welfare state can be regarded as the most comprehensive and universal welfare system, followed by the conservative welfare state and the Mediterranean welfare state in between and the liberal welfare state as the least comprehensive but rather means-testing welfare system.

2.4 Welfare states and solidarity issues in the migration crisis

The definitions of European solidarity and the respective arguments as discussed in the first part of this chapter represent rather theoretical concepts. More context-related analyses linking crises and European solidarity have already been conducted for the financial crisis and showed that help offered to peripheral member states was often presented as a burden for the member states bailing out. Consequently, assistance was only offered under strict conditions and was limited in scope (Ferrera, 2014). Similar observations might be possible for the current migration crisis. Some authors argue that solidarity in practice is especially challenged by the migration crisis since mechanisms of the European asylum policy promote great inequality between the member states (Hampshire, 2015). In a migration crisis European liberal values which form the basis of European solidarity are threatened by growing anti-immigrant and nationalist sentiments in many EU member states. Thus, applying European values in managing a migration crisis is put into question (Boswell, 2000). It is furthermore argued that “concepts of solidarity and trust which focus exclusively on the needs and interests of member states are inadequate to address the requirement for the EU to respect fully human rights” (Mitsilegas, 2014, p. 181). The concept of solidarity which can be found in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is described as exclusionary, securitised and state-centred as it does not consider fair burden and responsibility sharing among the member states. The CEAS puts high pressures on the member states located at the Union’s external border and presents refugees as a threat to the European Union (Mitsilegas, 2014). Others argue that there is an obvious lack of the application of the principle of solidarity in the European Union since member states do not cooperate in the CEAS, but rely on unilateral action and seek to minimise their responsibilities (Ventrella, 2015). As this outlines, in managing the migration crisis European solidarity in practice differs from European solidarity in theory.

Hence, to derive a theorisation of the concept of European solidarity in order to identify expressions of solidarity, a combination of the arguments is necessary. At first, since this research aims at explaining differences in solidarity expressions between member states, European solidarity is to be understood as solidarity at the European level and between member states which is in line with Sangiovanni’s (2013) concept of member state solidarity. Other definitions which focus on national, transnational or international levels do not contribute relevant arguments for the purpose of this research as they incorporate a different context. Secondly, arguments criticising the current CEAS need to be taken into consideration as they illustrate that state-centeredness of actions dominates the setting while cooperation and solidarity are lacking. Finally, this means that European solidarity implies reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states with low levels of state-centeredness of actions. Thus, a member state is solidary in managing the migration crisis when it shares burdens and risks with the other member states, when it cooperates within the European Union and does not put the main focus on its own safeguarding.

As the section on the four different welfare state regimes showed, the different regimes represent different ways of organising solidarity. Hence, it can be expected that they respond differently to the migration crisis. Boräng (2015) gives two different arguments on the effect of welfare regimes on solidarity. The first argument, which also dominates in current migration literature, deals with welfare chauvinism. In the context of welfare chauvinism it is argued that solidarity in the welfare state only covers its citizens while non-citizens and migrants are seen as a threat in the competition for scarce resources and benefits. Consequently, strict immigration policies aim at limiting access to the welfare state (Boräng, 2015). However, in her second argument Boräng (2015) argues that comprehensive welfare states protect themselves from welfare chauvinism. Their institutions do not reinforce conflicts over redistribution but rather lessen them. Moreover, she argues that comprehensive welfare state regimes promote greater solidarity and are thus more likely to accept forced migrants because “accepting forced migrants is an act of solidarity which shares many features with the everyday tasks of the welfare state” (Boräng, 2015, p. 221). Adopting this argumentation, it is expected that a member state’s type of welfare regime influences its expression of European solidarity. This means that member states with more comprehensive welfare regimes are expected to be more likely to express European solidarity in managing the migration crisis.

Therefore, it is expected that social democratic welfare states as the most comprehensive welfare state regimes express the highest level of European solidarity while liberal welfare states are expected to express the lowest level of solidarity in the European Union. The conservative and Mediterranean welfare states are expected to show levels of European solidarity in between the social democratic and liberal welfare state regimes’ expressions of solidarity. Thereby, the conservative welfare state is expected to display a somewhat higher level of solidarity than the Mediterranean welfare state.

2.5 Concluding section

Summarising what has been discussed above, European solidarity, as pointed out by Sangiovanni (2013), lies at the European level and between member states. Moreover, relevant arguments contributed by Ventrella (2015), Mitsilegas (2014) and Ferrera (2014) add that European solidarity is characterised by reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states with low levels of state-centeredness of actions. Welfare state regimes constitute different ways of organising this solidarity in general and in the context of the migration crisis. As proposed by Boräng (2015), it is argued that comprehensive welfare regimes are more likely to express solidarity. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare regimes suggests that the social democratic welfare state regime is the most comprehensive regime and therefore expected to depict the highest expressions of European solidarity. The liberal welfare state regime emphasises means-testing and eligibility requirements and strongly relies on the market. Since the state plays a rather weaker role and this welfare regime is the least comprehensive it is expected to show the lowest expressions of European solidarity. As the conservative welfare state regime aims at preserving the status quo, but at the same time abides the

principle of subsidiarity, it is expected to show levels of solidarity in between the social democratic and the liberal welfare regime. As Ferrera (1996), Minas et al. (2014) and Josifidis et al. (2015) point out the Mediterranean welfare state regime is in some fields highly generous while other fields are not protected at all. The state apparatus is rather weak and clientelism and patronage systems dominate. Hence, the Mediterranean welfare state regimes' expressions of European solidarity are expected to range in between the conservative and liberal welfare state regime. While using welfare regimes as explanations for expressions of solidarity, the aim of the study is not to compare all different regime types with each other, but rather to apply the welfare regimes' characteristics to the states' relations with the other EU member states in managing the migration crisis.

3. Methods

3.1 Introduction

The research aims at answering the question, how differences in member states' heads of governments expressions of European solidarity can be explained by welfare state theories and is conducted in a comparative analysis consisting of two steps. The research focuses on four European member states: Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The first step of the research is conducted as a qualitative analysis based on a content analysis of newspaper articles and press releases which state the European heads of governments' public expressions of European solidarity. In the second step theories on welfare state regimes are used in order to explain the differences in the member states' expressions of European solidarity.

3.2 Case selection

Four member states of the European Union are selected for the analysis. In order to allow for a comparison between the different countries selected the focus lies on Western European member states. For the selection of the units of analysis feasibility and especially feasibility in terms of language had to be considered. The data should be available in the official language of the respective member state in order to prevent biased representation or translation by non-national newspapers which might not be completely objective. However, this implies that due to limitations of language skills only certain Western European member states can be considered. Hence, the selection is limited to member states with data available in German, English or Spanish. As the research uses theories on welfare state regimes as an explanation for the differences in solidarity expressions as many welfare regimes as possible should be covered by the countries studied in this paper. It is expected that the states express different levels of European solidarity according to their welfare regime type. Due to the limitations of language skills it is not possible to include a social democratic welfare state in the analysis, but all other three welfare regimes are covered. Not including the social democratic welfare state does not represent a problem for answering the research question because the study does not aim at comparing different welfare state regimes but rather at using theories on welfare state regimes as an explanation for differences in expressions of European solidarity. Therefore, the countries are selected considering their national language and welfare regime type. In the case of the conservative welfare regime two countries are selected as very different conducts in the migration crisis are obvious. Hence, the member states selected for this research are Austria and Germany for the conservative welfare regime, Spain for the Mediterranean welfare regime and the United Kingdom for the liberal welfare regime.

3.3 Data collection

The collected data should state the European solidarity expressions of the member states' heads of governments. The focus lies on the heads of governments since their office represents the welfare state

and its way of organising solidarity. The expressions of solidarity by the heads of governments are expected to be found in press releases and newspaper articles. National press releases and newspaper articles portray what the heads of governments articulate in public. Therefore, they are selected as the most appropriate data basis for this study. Since the research aims at explaining European solidarity in managing the migration crisis, only newspaper articles and press releases which were published after a peak of the migration crisis in September 2015 are taken into consideration. September 2015 is chosen as the starting point for the time span of this research because at this point of time it became apparent that the European Union was unable to deal with the current situation, tensions between the member states had risen and no consensus on further action could be reached (Hampshire, 2015). Hence, for the time period between September 2015 and April 2016 (the time of writing) for each member state 20 documents are selected. For Germany the data is based on articles by German newspapers and magazines such as “Spiegel”, “Süddeutsche”, “Welt” and “Zeit Online”, articles by German news channels as “Bayerischer Rundfunk”, “MDR”, “n-tv”, Tagesschau” and “ZDF heute” and press releases by the German government including weekly video statements by the chancellor Angela Merkel. For Austria the data is based on newspaper articles by the country’s bigger newspapers such as “Der Kurier”, “Die Presse”, “Der Standard”, “Heute”, “Kleine Zeitung”, “Kronen Zeitung”, “Nachrichten”, “News”, “Österreich”, “Salzburger Nachrichten” and “Wirtschaftsblatt” as well as press releases by the Austrian government. For the United Kingdom the data is based on newspaper articles by the country’s newspapers “Express”, “The Daily Mail”, “The Guardian”, “The Independent”, “The Mirror“, “The Sun”, “The Telegraph” and by the news channels “BBC” and “BT” as well as press releases by the British government. For Spain the data is based on articles by newspapers as “ABC”, “Cadenasar”, “El Diario”, “El Mundo”, “El País”, “El Periodico”, “El Universal”, “Hispanidad”, “Heraldo”, “La Razon”, “Las Provincias”, “La Vanguardia” and “Levante” as well as press releases by the Spanish government and articles by the news channels “Cuatro” and “RTVE”. An overview of the exact data can be found in Appendix 1. The data is based on a variety of sources because only articles referring to the point of views of the heads of governments can be taken into consideration. However, this reduces the number of suitable articles. Thus, the research does not focus on specific newspapers for each country, but rather incorporates articles from a variety of sources in order to identify expressions of European solidarity. By doing so, the danger of a biased representation due to the political leanings of the newspapers can also be minimised.

3.4. Data analysis

In the first step of the analysis a content analysis is conducted for each of the four selected member states in order to identify the differences in expressions of European solidarity which can be found among the selected member states of the European Union. The analysis is based on publically stated European solidarity expressions by the member states’ heads of governments. In order to identify their main statements on solidarity in the migration crisis, a content analysis is the most suitable approach

as it allows for identifying the underlying messages. The content analysis is conducted with the programme “ATLAS.ti”, a programme for qualitative data analysis.

The documents are analysed with the help of a deductive coding scheme. As outlined in the theory section, European solidarity is based on reciprocal burden and risk sharing and a high level of cooperation between the member states. Therefore, these characteristics are used as coding categories. The subcategories are mainly derived from Ventrella’s (2015), Mitsilegas’ (2014) and Ferrera’s (2014) arguments as they point out how action looks like if solidarity is missing. By grouping them into categories, the arguments were adapted to the coding scheme. Furthermore, the scheme is supplemented by Boräng’s (2015) argument that a solidary member state is more likely to accept refugees. Hence, the coding scheme combines the arguments of leading authors with the aim of identifying expressions of solidarity. Burden and risk sharing is determined as the willingness to let in refugees, the sense of responsibility and the amount of support offered to other member states and the European Union. The level of cooperation is determined as the level of actions and the interests which are safeguarded. For each sub-category different characteristics are identified. A member state can show full, limited or no willingness to accept refugees. It can feel fully, partially or not responsible for acting in the migration crisis. Furthermore, support offered can range from full, to limited to no support. The action of a member state can focus on EU level, national level or it might not act at all. The interests safeguarded can either be European or national interest. The detailed coding scheme for European solidarity is presented in Table 1. Since the research question aims at explaining differences in expressions of European solidarity, the purpose of the coding scheme is to identify how the member states differ in their expressions of European solidarity. The coded documents can be found in Appendix 2.

Table 1: Coding scheme for European solidarity

Category	Subcategories	Characteristics	Coding rule	Key Words
Burden and risk sharing	Willingness to accept refugees	Full willingness	There are no limits on admissions of refugees and open borders	Free entry
		Limited willingness	Admissions of refugees are limited and/or borders are controlled	Quota, border controls
		No willingness	There are no admissions of refugees and/or borders are closed	No entry, border closing
	Sense of responsibility	Full responsibility	Burden and risk sharing is seen as a duty of being part of the EU	Duty
		Partial responsibility	It is stressed that not only the member state but also the EU is responsible	Not alone responsible

		No responsibility	Responsibility is denied	Not responsible
	Support offered	Full support	Unlimited and unconditional support is offered	Unconditional support
		Limited support	Support is limited and/or conditional	Limits, conditions
		No support	Support is denied	Refraining from concessions
Cooperation	Level of action	EU level	Joint action is based on EU level	Joint action
		National level	Action is based on national level	National action
		No action	The state does not act	No involvement
	Interests secured	European interests	Focus lies on the functioning of the Union and the external border	European unity, Schengen area
		National interests	Focus lies on the functioning of the state	Safeguarding the state

In a second step, theories on welfare state regimes are applied in order to explain the identified differences in expressions of European solidarity between member states. It is expected that member states with more comprehensive welfare regimes are more likely to express European solidarity. According to literature on welfare state classifications, Austria and Germany are conservative welfare states, Spain is a Mediterranean welfare state and the United Kingdom belongs to the group of liberal welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Josifidis et al., 2015; Minas et al., 2014). As none of the selected member states belongs to the group of social democratic welfare states, it is expected that conservative welfare states express the highest level of European solidarity while liberal welfare states are expected to express the lowest level of solidarity in the European Union. Mediterranean welfare states are expected to show levels of European solidarity somewhere in between the conservative and liberal welfare state regimes' expressions of solidarity. The characterisations of the respective welfare state regimes are used in order to explain the differences in the expressions of European solidarity, because it is expected that the internal organisation of a welfare state influences its relations to the other member states of the European Union and hence its external expressions of solidarity. This means that this part of the analysis aims at finding common features between the welfare states' characteristics and the member states' expressions of solidarity.

3.5 Concluding section

In short, the cases for the research are selected according to the member states' welfare regime type and their official languages. Hence, Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom are studied in this paper. For each of the states 20 articles dealing with public statements of the heads of

governments are collected from a variety of sources. These articles are analysed with the help of the programme ATLAS t.i., where a coding scheme for European solidarity is used in order to identify relevant statements and messages. The coding scheme focuses on the concepts of burden and risk sharing and the member state's level of cooperation which are conceptualised as the characteristics of European solidarity in the theory chapter of this paper. The actual analysis is then conducted by analysing the messages of the coded text passages in light of the research question, i.e. the different expressions of European solidarity of the four member states are identified.

Then, theories on welfare state regimes are used to explain the detected differences of European solidarity expressions in managing the migration crisis. In order to do so, the characterisations of the liberal welfare state regime, the Mediterranean welfare state regime and the conservative welfare state regime are applied to the four selected EU member states Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom and their expressions of solidarity. Thereby, it is searched for common features of the welfare states' characteristics and the member states' expressions of solidarity.

4. Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the analysis. The following two sections discuss the characteristics of European solidarity, i.e. burden and risk sharing and cooperation, for Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom with the aim of identifying the countries' expressions of European solidarity. Thereby, the presentation of the results is orientated on the coding scheme which was used for European solidarity. The results of each subcategory are discussed for each of the countries separately. While doing so, the results are ordered according to the countries' expressions of solidarity in the respective subcategory, starting with the lowest expression of solidarity and finalising with the highest expression. By ordering the countries according to their expressions of solidarity, differences between the countries and between the subcategories can be made explicit. In order to illustrate certain arguments, quotations from the articles analysed are translated into English by the author of this paper. In the fourth section, the differences in the expressions of European solidarity are explained by theories on welfare state regimes by applying the welfare regimes' characteristics to the respective member state. Thereby, the presentation of the results is structured from the least comprehensive to the most comprehensive welfare state regime. The fifth section concludes by discussing the results of the analysis with the aim of answering the research's sub-questions.

4.2 Burden and risk sharing

Burden and risk sharing in managing the migration crisis as conceptualised for this analysis includes the willingness to accept refugees, the sense of responsibility and the support offered to other member states. The results for these characteristics in the light of expressions of European solidarity are summarised in the following.

With regard to the willingness to accept refugees, it is striking that the British Prime Minister David Cameron is especially opposed to take part in a common European asylum system, i.e. he refuses any EU relocation or resettlement scheme and any European asylum quota scheme (4.1, 4.7, 4.13, 4.16)¹. Moreover, he stresses that the United Kingdom is not part of the Schengen area and thus not obligated to comply with its rules. Hence, the United Kingdom keeps its own border controls and immigration policy (4.6). In January 2016 Cameron stated the following:

"It is very important, the principle behind Dublin regulations. That you are able to return people to the country from which they came, where they should have claimed asylum – that is very important. At the heart of our system is the sense that you should be able to claim asylum in the first safe country you reach and that you should be able to send somebody back to that country." (4.3)

This quotation illustrates that Cameron wants the Dublin Regulation to remain in practice in order to maintain the possibility to send refugees back to the EU member states where they first entered the EU

¹ The numbers in brackets refer to the articles where the observations were made. An overview of the reference codes and the corresponding articles is presented in Appendix 1.

(4.3, 4.15). However, he does not refuse completely to accept refugees. On the contrary, the United Kingdom takes in refugees according to its own national plans. As part of these plans, Cameron agreed that the United Kingdom takes refugees directly from camps in Syria or its neighbouring countries, but not from other European countries. The British resettlement plan comprises a quota of 20,000 Syrian refugees who will be resettled over a time period of five years (4.4, 4.8, 4.16). Cameron shows a really limited willingness to accept refugees in the sense that he refuses to take refugees from other European countries. Compared to the other three member states it becomes apparent that the British willingness to accept refugees is the lowest.

The Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann changed his position on admissions of refugees during the course of the migration crisis. In September 2015 he and the German chancellor Angela Merkel decided to allow refugees waiting in Hungary to come to Germany and Austria (1.18). Faymann says that Austria has taken 90,000 refugees in 2015 which equals 1% of the country's population (1.7, 1.13, 1.15, 1.20). In 2016 however his position changed. He points out that Austria will only accept a maximum of 37,500 asylum applications for 2016 of which only 80 will be accepted per day (1.2, 1.4, 1.7, 1.14, 1.15, 1.20). By doing so, he says Austria will take in a proportion of 2.5% of its population within the next five years (1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.12, 1.15). He justifies this approach by arguing that Austria has helped in 2015 but now its capacities are limited and there is no other choice than to reduce the number of refugees coming to the country (1.3, 1.7, 1.16). Apart from introducing these quotas, Faymann closed the border at the Balkan and stresses the importance of national border controls (1.1, 1.5, 1.10, 1.16). He also temporarily suspended the Schengen agreement (1.5). Faymann wants the whole EU to introduce quotas on admissions, arguing that following the Austrian example would allow relocating more than 2 million refugees in the EU (1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.12, 1.15). However, he opposes sending refugees from one member state to another. Instead, he suggests taking refugees directly from outside the EU or from Greece, where most of the refugees enter the Union (1.3, 1.7, 1.15). Therefore, Faymann's willingness to accept refugees is limited. It is striking that he stresses the importance of Austria's quotas and limits on admissions of refugees, introduced border controls and partially closed the Austrian border at the Balkan. Still the limit on admissions is not as low as in the United Kingdom.

With regard to accepting refugees the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy stated the following in April 2016:

“España es un país de acogida, ahora, antes y lo seguirá siendo en el futuro.” (3.1) - *“Spain is a receiving country, now, then, and it will continue being one in the future.”*

This quotation shows that Rajoy is in general willing to accept refugees as he underlines that Spain is a country which takes in refugees and will continue to do so also in the future. Moreover, he points out that Spain is not only willing to accept those refugees who enter its territory but also those who are distributed via a European quota (3.4, 3.15, 3.17, 3.19). He strongly supports the right to asylum as he regards it as an achievement of civilization (3.13). However, admissions of refugees are limited as in

2015 Rajoy agreed to accept a quota of 16,000 refugees (3.1, 3.2, 3.20). In 2016 this quota was reduced to 450 refugees (3.5). He justifies this small number by pointing out that Spain is among the 16 member states which accept refugees while 12 member states do not. As part of the EU-Turkey deal Rajoy emphasises Spain's willingness to accept refugees voluntarily, although without agreeing on a quota (3.7, 3.13). Nevertheless, he points out that the external border should not be open for everyone (3.18). Hence, Rajoy's expressions of his willingness to accept refugees are ambiguous. On the one hand, he underlines that Spain is fully willing to accept refugees. On the other hand, admissions of refugees are limited by a quota which is even lower than in Austria and the United Kingdom.

The German chancellor Angela Merkel strongly opposes the closing of borders within the European Union as well as limits on admissions of refugees (2.10, 2.13, 2.14, 2.17, 2.18). She argues that setting limits does not solve the problem in the long run, to her mind it is self-evident that refuge and help is offered to people in need (2.4). In September 2015 Merkel offered entry to the refugees coming from Hungary in order to follow a humanitarian imperative, as she calls it (2.13). As part of the European two year relocation plan Merkel agrees that Germany accepts refugees (2.12). In addition to the EU-Turkey refugee deal Merkel agrees to take in voluntarily contingents of refugees as soon as the system is working (2.6). Although the German chancellor opposes the closing of national borders, she supports closing the Union's external border for the purpose of keeping national borders opened (2.14). Apart from this, border controls between Germany and Austria were established and she promised to reduce the number of refugees coming to Germany (2.3, 2.8, 2.9). Merkel emphasises that it is important to fight the causes of migration as this results cheaper for the member states than accepting all refugees (2.7). Based on these results it can be said that Merkel expresses for the most part a full willingness to accept refugees as she wants to keep borders opened and does not want to set a limit on the number of refugees who Germany is willing to accept.

These results show that the four member states differ in their expressions of willingness to accept refugees. However, while comparing these public expressions with actual numbers of first time asylum applicants in the EU in 2015², a different impression is created. Within the EU 35.2% of the applications were made in Germany, 6.8% in Austria, 3.1% in the United Kingdom and only 1.2% in Spain. In number of applicants per million inhabitants this equals 5,441 in Germany, 9,970 in Austria, 591 in the United Kingdom and 314 applicants in Spain (Eurostat, 2016).

With regard to the sense of responsibility for burden and risk sharing between the European member states it becomes obvious that the United Kingdom does not take part in any European asylum, relocation or resettlement system and refuses to accept refugees from other European states (4.1, 4.4). Cameron underlines that his country has a special status in the European Union as it is not part of the Schengen area. Therefore, the United Kingdom does not have to comply with agreements

² The number of first time asylum applicants is presented here because the number of granted asylum applications is not yet available for 2015. Moreover, the number of asylum applicants better illustrates how much a MS is affected by the number of refugees seeking asylum as more people make an application than applications are granted.

that are negotiated in this context, including admission quotas (4.4). However, Cameron says that European efforts to deal with the migration crisis need to be well-coordinated as the member states face the same challenge. It is in the British interest to cooperate with the other member states as the crisis might have destabilising impacts on the states (4.4, 4.17). Thus, responsibility of the United Kingdom is only acknowledged to the extent that the EU member states' efforts should be coordinated. Strikingly, further responsibility is denied by pointing out that the United Kingdom does not belong to the Schengen area.

In the case of Austria it becomes clear that the state feels left alone with the migration crisis as Faymann says that Austria cannot take the burden for the whole of Europe by accepting all refugees (1.4, 1.13, 1.14, 1.20). Faymann emphasises that the other member states should not rely on Sweden, Germany and Austria to take action as this illustrates that responsibility is laid on these three states only and solidarity is missing. In order to find a humanitarian solution Faymann argues that the other member states should do more and especially accept more refugees (1.3, 1.9, 1.13, 1.14, 1.20). He blames those countries, which did not accept refugees yet, as responsible for the closure of Austrian borders. Moreover, he threatens to reduce Austria's contributions to the EU budget in order to punish those states which refuse to take in refugees (1.3, 1.9). At the same time, he states that Austria is not able to offer more help (1.16). Although the obligation to help humans is acknowledged, the Austrian chancellor states that the migration crisis is the responsibility not only of the EU but also of Turkey and all other countries (1.11). By emphasising that Austria has done enough so far and that the other member states have to do more, Faymann remarkably seems to shift Austria's responsibility to the other states. This shows that Faymann expresses only partial responsibility in terms of burden and risk sharing. The findings for Austria and the United Kingdom are thus in line with Ventrella's (2015) argument that member states try to minimise their responsibilities in the CEAS.

Rajoy emphasises that Spain is acting in solidarity and with responsibility in managing the migration crisis (3.1, 3.4, 3.11). He points out that the conflict in Syria requires global action (3.18), the migration crisis is an enormous problem for the EU and that Spain is well prepared to deal with it (3.1, 3.5, 3.8, 3.14, 3.18, 3.20). In this context Rajoy points out the willingness of the Spanish people:

“Porque ésa es la voluntad y el deseo de los españoles y porque ése será siempre el empeño de su gobierno.” (3.8) – “Because this is the will and the wish of the Spanish and therefore it will always be the effort of their government.”

As the Spanish people want to cope with the migration crisis, Rajoy says the government will take all necessary efforts. In order to do so, a European immigration and asylum policy is needed (3.11). Rajoy calls Europe a “receiving country” (3.18) which shows that he sees Europe as a unity which is responsible for working together. Nevertheless, he stresses that there are 12 member states which have not accepted refugees yet which shows that Rajoy wants the other member states to assume their responsibility as well (3.18). Since Rajoy underlines unconditionally that Spain is really capable of

and willing to deal with the crisis it can be said that he expresses a full responsibility of burden and risk sharing.

"Meine verdamnte Pflicht und Schuldigkeit besteht darin, dass dieses Europa einen gemeinsamen Weg findet." Sie leite dabei der Gedanke, "dass Europa nicht kaputtgeht". (2.10) – "My damn duty and obligation is that this Europe finds a common way." Thereby, she is led by the thought "that Europe does not fall apart."

This quotation from February 2016 clearly summarises the German chancellor's full sense of responsibility in managing the migration crisis as she regards it as her duty to ensure a common European approach to the crisis. Merkel points out that joint European action is needed in times of crisis (2.3, 2.16). To her mind, the EU is a community of values and solidarity which should share its tasks fairly among all member states, i.e. burdens have to be shared fairly. This means for example that the number of refugees should not only be reduced for some member states but for all of them (2.3, 2.8, 2.16). Moreover, Merkel emphasises that it is important to consider the effects which actions might have on other member states (2.19). She argues that no member state should be left alone in the crisis and asks for solidarity with Greece in order to prevent the state from chaos (2.8, 2.16). She underlines the fact that also the member states which are not directly affected by the crisis should be fully willing to accept refugees and assume their responsibility (2.12). All in all, Merkel expresses a full responsibility of reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states as she underlines that the member states should share the burden fairly, work together in solidarity and assume their common responsibility. Unlike the findings for the United Kingdom and Austria, the findings for Germany do not support Ventrella's (2015) argument as Merkel fully assumes Germany's responsibility instead of minimising it.

The support which the Austrian chancellor Faymann offers to other member states of the European Union in order to deal with the migration crisis is scarce. In the context of support for the EU-Turkey deal on refugees he stresses that Austria is not willing to pay more than a maximum of 57 million € (1.11). Furthermore, he stresses that taking in more refugees than 2.5 % of Austria's population would be wrong and unrealistic (1.13). He points out that Austria has done enough and that the other member states have to act now (1.2). Moreover, he threatens to reduce Austria's contribution to the EU budget if other member states keep refusing to accept refugees. This statement is especially directed at Eastern and Central European member states which, according to Faymann, receive more money than they pay and therefore have to contribute their part as well (1.9). Thus, Faymann expresses really limited support towards the other member states and rather emphasises that they have to take action on their own.

A striking aspect is that Cameron links his willingness to offer support to the European member states to the negotiations over the question whether the United Kingdom will remain in the European Union or not. In this regard, he uses the migration crisis and the threat of "Brexit" in order to enforce his interests and demands (4.5, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19). An example for this strategy is his

conditional support of the NATO missions in the Aegean Sea. The United Kingdom provides military assets as well as expertise and skilled officials to turn refugees back to their points of departure. In return Cameron expects to win support for his EU reforms (4.4, 4.11, 4.14). Apart from supporting the NATO missions, Cameron says that financial support is offered to Turkey (275 million pound), to African countries in order to address the causes of migration (200 million pounds) and to Syrian refugees (100 million pounds) (4.1, 4.9). Another 17 million pounds are offered to France in order to deal with the problematic situation in Calais (4.10). So far the United Kingdom has given 1 billion pounds for financial aid, but falls behind the other member states of the European Union in accepting refugees (4.8, 4.13). This becomes especially obvious as Cameron refuses to take part in a European asylum system (4.3, 4.7, 4.13). Moreover, he does not support the EU-Turkey deal, refusing to take part in offering incentives to the Turkish government as giving visa-free access to Turks (4.6). Therefore, it can be said that, like Ferrera (2014) showed for support offered during the financial crisis, Cameron's support for other member states in the migration crisis is conditional and moreover limited to financial support and the provision of military assets.

Rajoy states that Spain is fully willing to collaborate with the other member states in managing the migration crisis (3.17, 3.19). He points out the importance of acting in solidarity (3.8, 3.18). Concerning the EU-Turkey deal Spain will contribute to the costs for repatriating irregular migrants together with the other member states (3.9). Apart from the general emphasis on solidarity, Rajoy offers support to Greece, inter alia for border controls and the Greek asylum system (3.13, 3.18). Hence, it can be said that Spain offers full support to the other member states as the relevance of solidarity is underlined.

With regard to support offered by Merkel to other EU member states a clear focus on support for Greece becomes obvious. She points out that no member state should be left alone in the crisis. Support for Greece is particularly important with regard to the efforts which have been made to support Greece in the financial crisis. According to Merkel, it would not make sense to let Greece down now (2.1, 2.8). Apart from her explicit reference to the Greek state, the German chancellor points out that European solidarity is needed which should aim at joint action and reducing the number of refugees for all member states (2.8, 2.16). Merkel does not make concrete reference to support for other member states than Greece, but as she underlines that no member state should be left alone, it can be said that she offers full support for the EU and its member states in the context of the migration crisis. Hence, Ferrera's (2014) argument is only supported by the findings for the United Kingdom and Austria which see support for other member states as a burden and thus limit it, while the findings for Spain and Germany contradict his assumption.

This section of the analysis dealt with the first aspect of European solidarity and showed that the four member states differ in regard to the degree of burden and risk sharing which they pursue. The United Kingdom and Austria express a really limited willingness to accept refugees, i.e. quotas are introduced and borders controlled. Spain's willingness is ambiguous. On the one hand, Rajoy

states his full willingness to accept refugees while on the other hand admissions of refugees are more limited than in Austria and the United Kingdom. Germany is the only member state expressing a full willingness to accept refugees. The findings for the United Kingdom and Austria support Ventrella's (2015) argument that member states minimise their responsibilities in the CEAS. It is striking that the United Kingdom denies responsibility for burden and risk sharing by pointing out that it does not belong to the Schengen area, while Austria seeks to shift responsibility towards the other member states. However, Ventrella (2015) is contradicted by the findings for Spain and Germany which assume their responsibility and point out the importance of solidarity. Austria offers the lowest level of support to other member states, arguing that they have to act on their own. As suggested by Ferrera (2014), the United Kingdom's support is limited in scope and conditional as it is linked to support for Cameron's demands for EU reforms in order to prevent exit from the EU. But again, the argumentation is not supported by the findings for Spain and Germany which offer full support to the other member states and especially to Greece.

Thus, Austria and the United Kingdom support the theoretical expectations by showing a lack of solidarity and not taking part in burden and risk sharing in the context of the migration crisis. However, the findings for Germany and Spain do not meet Ventrella's (2015) and Ferrera's (2014) expectations as both member states promote reciprocal burden and risk sharing.

4.3 Cooperation

The second aspect of European solidarity is cooperation. As conceptualised for this analysis, cooperation includes the level of action and the interests which are secured. The results for these characteristics are summarised in the following.

In the case of Austria, Faymann says that action on EU level would be the ideal in managing the migration crisis. Member states should not let refugees pass from one member state to another but should act together. A common approach to European asylum policy is needed. This should include common border security, hotspots at the external border to distribute refugees fairly and joint repatriation of refugees (1.16, 1.17). However, in March 2016 Faymann stated the following:

“Ja, ich wollte immer eine europäische Lösung. Aber viele EU-Länder haben sich darauf verlassen, dass drei Länder – Österreich, Deutschland und Schweden – Flüchtlinge aufnehmen. Es stellte sich immer mehr heraus, dass die EU-Maßnahmen einfach nicht ausreichen und die Länder absolut nicht solidarisch sind. [...] Es ist eine Notfall-Maßnahme, und es wäre für Österreich unverantwortlich, noch länger auf eine gemeinsame EU-Lösung zu warten.“ (1.3) – “Yes, I have always wanted a European solution. But many EU countries relied on three countries – Austria, Germany and Sweden – to accept refugees. It turned out more and more clearly that EU measures are not sufficient and that the countries are not solidary. [...] It is an emergency solution and for Austria it would be irresponsible to wait even longer for a common EU solution.”

This quotation shows clearly that Faymann regards it as necessary to take national action in order to secure Austrian interests. He argues that European action is not sufficient and does not provide adequate results (1.3, 1.4, 1.10, 1.19). As Austria is not capable of dealing with the crisis on its own,

Faymann justifies that the state has to take its own actions, i.e. introducing quotas, securing its borders and temporarily suspending the Schengen agreement (1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.12, 1.19). This shows clearly that Faymann prefers to rely on national action. It is striking that to his mind European action is not enough leaving Austria on its own. In order to protect the state he says that he has no other choice than to act unilaterally. These findings agree with Ventrella (2015) who argued that due to a lack of solidarity in the CEAS member states do not cooperate but rely on unilateral action.

Cameron supports action on EU level only in terms of external border control and action outside the European Union, i.e. in Syria and its neighbouring countries (4.20). He stresses that European action has to be well-coordinated and concrete in order to fight causes of migration. For example Cameron suggests relaxing export rules for Jordan with the aim of building more jobs for refugees there (4.20). Furthermore, he pressed EU leaders for more patrol ships in the Mediterranean to turn back refugees before entering European territory (4.15). Apart from the action on EU level mentioned above Cameron prefers the United Kingdom to act on national level. Staying out of EU action is mainly motivated by preventing an increase in the number of refugees coming to the United Kingdom (4.7). As Cameron stresses, the United Kingdom is not part of the Schengen area, therefore it keeps its own border controls and immigration and asylum policies (4.4). The United Kingdom takes action in the refugees' countries of origin in order to fight the causes of migration, i.e. it offers help to stabilise the region, ensure jobs and to strengthen the economies. In addition, financial support is given to Syrian refugee camps in the Middle East (4.7, 4.8, 4.13). Furthermore, Britain has its own resettlement programme for Syrian refugees (4.1, 4.4, 4.6, 4.13, 4.15). All in all, Cameron's approach of relying on national rather than European action seems to be linked to national interests of keeping the number of refugees coming to the United Kingdom low.

The Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy strongly advocates joint EU action for managing the migration crisis (3.1, 3.9, 3.15, 3.20). His motivation is to secure the EU's basic principles (3.1). He points out the necessity to have a common immigration and asylum policy (3.3, 3.9, 3.11) which should be based on cooperation and dialogue with the transit countries as well as the refugees' countries of origin (3.9). Moreover, he wants the EU to establish hotspots at its external borders (3.20). Remarkable is that Rajoy suggests a kind of "Marshall Plan" which should be implemented by the EU in the countries of origin in order to increase their levels of well-being with the aim of fighting the causes of migration (3.3, 3.6). For the moment, Rajoy regards the EU-Turkey deal on refugees as the best solution for the crisis and appreciates that the 28 member states managed to agree on joint action (3.8, 3.18). Apart from action on EU level, Rajoy also promotes action on national level to give financial support to Syria's neighbouring states Jordan and Lebanon (3.18). Therefore, it can be said that Rajoy strongly supports action on EU level, especially in order to fight causes of migration in collaboration with the affected countries. National action is only taken to support the efforts of EU action.

The German chancellor Merkel clearly advocates joint action of the EU member states in order to deal with the migration crisis (2.1, 2.2, 2.8, 2.17). According to Merkel, action on European level is the only possible approach, national action is no alternative (2.10, 2.13, 2.16). She regards it as her duty that the EU finds a common solution to the crisis (2.10). As a common strategy on EU level Merkel suggests securing the external border while considering humanitarian and military aspects (2.1, 2.5). To do so, it is relevant to reform the Dublin System in a way which adapts it to the situation and makes it future-orientated (2.8). Apart from this, the Union should find a long-term solution to the migration crisis. This implies to fight the causes of migration in order to decrease the number of refugees (2.3). She underlines that Europe is a rich continent which is stronger when it works together and thus can manage the crisis jointly (2.2, 2.16). Aside from action on EU level, Merkel also promotes German national action in the field of development aid for Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq (2.5). Moreover, she seeks political solutions to the crisis with the aim of fighting the causes of migration (2.9). Thus, unlike suggested by Ventrella (2015), Merkel strongly advocates joint action on EU level with a special focus on securing the external border and the Schengen area. National action which is taken by the German government can be seen as additional action in order to support the efforts of European action.

Austria's action in the management of the migration crisis only partially aims at securing European interests. Faymann regards the crisis as a challenge for the European Union. He states that he does not want the EU to become a non-binding meeting and that the interests of the "European family" matter (1.1, 1.9). Thus, he seems to be worried about the functioning of the Union. Moreover, Faymann states that controlling the external border is the only way for a common European solution. However, this is linked to national interests as he points out that the Schengen area matters for Austria (1.12, 1.15). As European action is not sufficient, Faymann sees national action as self-defence for securing Austria's interests and the functioning of the state (1.1, 1.4, 1.17, 1.19, 1.20). Faymann wants to assure that Austria is not turned into a kind of hotspot by those member states which let refugees pass through their territories. Therefore, securing the national borders is of special importance for Faymann (1.5, 1.10, 1.15). This shows that Faymann gives clear preference to national over European interests. European interests matter only as far as they are linked to Austria's interests.

According to the British Prime Minister, the migration crisis is the biggest problem which the European Union faces at the moment. Ending the crisis is in the interest of the EU because it would prevent more refugees from coming to the Union (4.9, 4.20). Although Cameron threatens that the United Kingdom might leave the EU, he states that it is in the interest of both, the European Union and the United Kingdom, that the United Kingdom stays in the EU as it has a lot to offer in times of crisis (4.2). Moreover, it is in the interest of the British to support their European partners as the migration crisis has destabilising effects on the member states (4.4). Nevertheless, Cameron's main focus lies on securing British national interests as he insists on maintaining national border controls and keeping the number of coming refugees low (4.4, 4.15). He argues that the migration crisis puts pressure on public

services, thus he is apparently worried about the functioning of the state (4.5). Staying out of a common European asylum system also secures British national interests as the United Kingdom remains its power to send refugees back to the member state where they first entered the EU (4.15). It is remarkable that Cameron uses the migration crisis in order to push through national interest and demands in the negotiations over EU reforms (4.2, 4.5, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19). Concluding it can be said that Cameron secures those European interests which are linked with national interests as reducing the number of refugees, but he does not secure interests which focus exclusively on the functioning of the Union. On the contrary, his main focus lies on securing national interests. The findings for Austria and the United Kingdom agree with Mitsilegas (2014) who points out that the concept of solidarity in the CEAS focuses on the needs and interests of the member states.

With regard to the interests the German chancellor Merkel tries to secure a focus on securing the external border in order to preserve the functioning of the Schengen area is obvious (2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.10, 2.14, 2.15, 2.19). Merkel's main interest in securing the external border is to keep internal national borders open to ensure the free movement within the common market (2.14). She wants the member states to consider the effects of national action on their European partners since closing national borders is a detriment to the other member states (2.10, 2.13, 2.17, 2.19). Instead of national action, fair burden sharing is in the interest of all EU member states (2.19). Merkel stresses the relevance of preserving European principles and achievements as well as securing the European idea (2.2, 2.10, 2.14). Furthermore, Merkel links European interests with national German interests as she points out that the well-being of Europe is needed for the well-being of Germany. This is due to the fact that Germany profits the most from the free movement within the Schengen area (2.1, 2.2, 2.8, 2.16). Reducing the number of refugees is also a German interest because fighting the causes of migration is eventually cheaper than accepting all refugees who might come in the future (2.4, 2.16). To summarise it can be said that Merkel's main focus lies on securing European interests as she wants to preserve the Schengen area as well as European principles and achievements. Nonetheless, securing European interests is also linked to securing Germany's national interest because Merkel underlines that German well-being is linked to the well-being of the European Union.

The Spanish head of government Rajoy focuses on securing European interests in managing the migration crisis. He regards the crisis as the most important issue the EU faces at the moment and which will have impacts on its present and future (3.12, 3.17). He points out that European unity and principles have to be secured (3.1). Rajoy underlines that national borders should not be closed and that it is important to secure the external borders (3.17). He states that it is necessary to increase economic and political integration within the EU (3.18). This is remarkable because Rajoy is the only head of government who not only aims at maintaining the current status but also suggests increasing the influence of the Union. Furthermore, he points out that Spanish and European interests are best secured together (3.18). Hence, it can be said that his focus fully lies on securing European interests which also allows to secure Spanish national interests.

This section of the analysis dealt with cooperation, the second aspect of European solidarity, and showed that the United Kingdom and Austria prefer to rely on national action while Germany and Spain strongly advocate a European approach to the migration crisis. Ventrella's (2015) argument that member states prefer to rely on unilateral action is supported by the findings for Austria and the United Kingdom as they show that Austria sees national action as a kind of self-defence and the United Kingdom pursues its own plans in the migration crisis. Yet, the German and Spanish heads of governments favour action on EU level and regard national action as a supplement to the European efforts. Hence, these findings do not agree with Ventrella (2015). As Austria and the United Kingdom focus on securing national interests in the context of the migration crisis, the findings agree with Mitsilegas (2014) who points out that the concept of solidarity in the CEAS focuses on the needs and interests of the member states. But again the findings for Germany and Spain disagree with Mitsilegas (2014) because both member states focus on securing European interests. National interests are in so far secured as they are intertwined with European interests.

Thus, as in the case of burden and risk sharing, the results for Austria and the United Kingdom support the theoretical expectations of Ventrella (2015) and Mitsilegas (2014) as they show that the member states do not express solidarity but focus on national action and interests. The results for Germany and Spain again contradict the expectations as both countries promote high levels of cooperation within the EU.

4.4 Welfare regimes and differences in solidarity expressions

The following section uses the characterisations of the liberal, Mediterranean and conservative welfare state regimes to explain the member states' expressions of European solidarity.

The United Kingdom can be categorised as a liberal welfare state and is therefore expected to express the lowest level of European solidarity. Based on the results of the analysis it can be said, that David Cameron indeed expresses a low level of European solidarity in the context of the migration crisis. He does not put forward reciprocal burden and risk sharing. His willingness to accept refugees is limited as he refuses to take refugees from other European countries and only offers to take them directly from camps in Syria and its neighbouring states. His support for other member states of the EU is limited to financial and military assistance and moreover conditional on support for his demands for EU reforms. He denies responsibility towards the other member states as he points out that the United Kingdom is not part of the Schengen area. As liberal welfare state regimes focus on means-testing and eligibility requirements it is not surprising that the United Kingdom does not take part in reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states. Liberal welfare states offer only support to those who cannot support themselves (Danforth, 2014; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Therefore, the United Kingdom's efforts in managing the migration crisis are not directed at the other EU member states, but rather at the Syrian refugees and the affected regions. Since the United Kingdom does not belong to the Schengen area, it can be argued that the member states do not meet the eligibility requirements for British support. However, it is unexpected that if British support is offered,

this is conditional on support for British demands. In terms of state-centeredness of actions it is obvious that Cameron prefers national over EU action which he only regards as necessary for securing the external border and fighting the causes of migration. With regard to the interests Cameron seeks to secure the focus lies on national interests as preventing refugees from coming to the United Kingdom. European interests are only secured if they are linked to British national interests. In liberal welfare states the role of the state is rather weak, the majority depends on welfare benefits and services offered by the market. The state only intervenes when other solutions are not sufficient (Emmenegger et al., 2015). Transferring this logic to actions and interests in the migration crisis, it can be argued that action on EU level is only taken when national action is not sufficient. As long as national interests can be secured by national action, the United Kingdom does not have to express European solidarity in managing the migration crisis. Hence, David Cameron does not express European solidarity in managing the migration crisis, but rather relies on unilateral action.

Spain belongs to the group of Mediterranean welfare states and is therefore expected to express levels of European solidarity ranging between the liberal welfare state United Kingdom and the conservative welfare states Austria and Germany. Based on the analysis' results it can be said that Mariano Rajoy expresses European solidarity in managing the migration crisis. With regard to burden and risk sharing, he is willing to accept refugees but only in a limited number based on quotas. Nevertheless, his feeling of responsibility towards fair burden sharing is high as he emphasises that Spain is fully willing to collaborate and capable of dealing with the crisis. Moreover, he also offers full support towards Greece and implicitly to the other member states. Rajoy's actions are not state-centred as he strongly advocates European joint action, especially with regard to fighting the causes of migration. In managing the crisis, he focuses on securing European interests as unity and achieved principles. Hence, it can be said that Rajoy expresses European solidarity in the crisis which is only limited in terms of admissions of refugees. These results are in line with the characterisation of the Mediterranean welfare regime which is highly generous in some fields but also displays gaps of protection in other fields (Ferrera, 1996). The high expressions of European solidarity especially in regard to the feeling of responsibility and cooperation with the other EU member states can be explained by the high generosity of Mediterranean welfare states. The lower willingness to accept refugees which is limited by the introduction of a quota on admissions can be explained by the characteristically weak state apparatus which reduces Spain's capability to host refugees and administer the relocation process. Moreover, Mediterranean welfare benefits are mainly directed at the core of the labour force, while only weak protection is provided to the irregular or non-institutional market (Ferrera, 1996). As refugees are not part of the labour force the welfare regime's internal polarisation can also explain the low number of admissions of refugees.

Austria and Germany both belong to the group of the conservative welfare state regimes. These welfare regimes are considered as comprehensive welfare systems and are therefore, as suggested by Boräng (2015), expected to display the highest expressions of European solidarity of the

four member states analysed in this paper. Based on the results of the analysis it can be said that the German chancellor Angela Merkel indeed expresses a high level of European solidarity in managing the migration crisis. Opposing closings of borders and quotas on admissions of refugees she expresses a full willingness to accept refugees. She shows full responsibility of reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states as she stresses the importance of collaborating, assuming responsibility and sharing burdens fairly. Although her references to support offered to other member states mainly refer to support for Greece, her general statement, that no member state should be left alone, illustrates that Merkel is willing to offer full support to other member states in the crisis. This is in line with the conservative welfare states' characteristic of granting social rights to everyone expressing great solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This argument can be extended to the European Union where the conservative welfare state Germany does not question the granting of solidarity and support to the other member states and is thus fully willing to take part in reciprocal burden and risk sharing. Merkel makes clear that national action in managing the migration crisis is no option, the member states have to work together in order to find long-term solutions. Thereby, Merkel puts special emphasis on securing the Union's external border. With regard to the interests Merkel wants to secure a focus on securing the Schengen area is obvious. She clearly prioritises European interests, but also acknowledges that German national interests are linked with European interests as the well-being of the Union is necessary for the well-being of Germany. This can be explained by the structure of the conservative welfare state's social insurance system which aims at preserving the status of its citizens (Emmenegger et al., 2015). It can be argued that Merkel supports action on EU level in order to preserve the status of the German state and thus the status of the German citizens. Hence, it can be said that Germany is solidary in managing the migration crisis because Germany wants to share burdens and risks fairly among the EU, Merkel stresses the importance of joint action and her main focus lies on safeguarding European interests. Thus, in the case of Germany, Boräng's (2015) expectation that a conservative welfare state as a comprehensive welfare state expresses high levels of European solidarity is met.

However, the findings for Austria differ. Based on the analysis' results it can be said that the Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann expresses nearly no European solidarity in managing the migration crisis. With regard to burden and risk sharing his willingness to accept refugees is really limited. He introduced quotas on the number of admissions which will be accepted, established border controls and closed the Austrian border at the Balkan. He shows only partial responsibility for burden and risk sharing among the EU member states as he emphasises that Austria has done enough so far and demands the other member states to do more in the crisis. By doing so he shifts responsibility away from Austria to the other member states. Moreover, the Austrian chancellor does not offer support to the other member states of the Union. On the contrary, he points out that they have to take action on their own. However, he is willing to give financial support in the context of the EU-Turkey deal on refugees. The low level of burden and risk sharing can be explained by the fact that

conservative welfare states do not offer universal benefits, but rather intervene when the family lacks the capacity to service itself (Danforth, 2014). In the context of the EU it can be argued that Austria does not see the necessity to offer more help as Faymann regards the other member states as capable of acting on their own in managing the migration crisis. In terms of cooperation, it is obvious that Faymann relies on national action as he states that European action is not sufficient and forces Austria to take action on its own as a form of self-defence. This seems to be linked to securing Austrian national interests. European interests matter only so far as they are linked with national interests. In order to secure national interests it is important for Faymann to control Austria's borders. This can be explained by the intent to preserve the status of Austria and its citizens which is, as pointed out above, a central aim of the conservative welfare state's social insurance system (Emmenegger et al., 2015). National action can thus be understood as a form of preserving Austria's status and its interests. All in all, it can be said that Faymann does not express much European solidarity in the migration crisis. In terms of burden and risk sharing he is willing to accept a limited number of refugees, but does not offer any support to other member states. He prefers to take national action over collaborating with the other member states of the European Union and is mainly concerned with securing Austrian national interests. Hence, in the case of Austria it is unexpected and surprising that the state, although it belongs to the conservative welfare states, does not express more solidarity than liberal and Mediterranean welfare states. On the contrary, Austrian expressions of European solidarity are lower than in Spain and are rather similar to the low ranging British expressions. Thus, the findings for Austria disagree with Boräng (2015).

4.5 Concluding section

The results of the analysis show that the expressions of European solidarity differ among the public statements of Austria's, Germany's, Spain's and the United Kingdom's heads of governments. The expressions of European solidarity by the Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann and the British Prime Minister David Cameron show the lowest expressions of solidarity in managing the migration crisis. Both heads of governments emphasise the importance of national action in order to secure national interests. For the most part, the United Kingdom is not willing to contribute to reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the member states of the EU. Austria's efforts in burden and risk sharing are also minimal, but unlike the United Kingdom, Austria is willing to accept a limited number of refugees who entered the EU. The German chancellor Angela Merkel and the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy express much higher levels of European solidarity. Both underline the importance of joint action on EU level and aim at securing European interests in managing the migration crisis. Moreover, they promote reciprocal burden and risk sharing among the EU member states. Thereby, it is striking that Merkel's expressions of European solidarity are encompassing as she does not set limits on solidarity towards the other member states. The Spanish solidarity is limited to the extent that Rajoy's willingness to accept refugees is limited as low quotas on admissions of refugees were introduced. Portraying the current state of solidarity in the European Union, it can be said that the United

Kingdom and Austria express the lowest levels of European solidarity in managing the migration crisis, while Germany expresses the highest level of European solidarity. Spain also expresses solidarity in the crisis, but due to some limitations its expressions of solidarity range between Germany and the other two countries.

These different expressions of European solidarity can be explained to a great extent by the respective welfare state regimes. The United Kingdom as a liberal welfare state focuses on means-testing and eligibility requirements and thus does not express solidarity towards the other member states which are able to act on their own. Spain as a Mediterranean welfare state expresses high generosity, but due to its weak state apparatus and an internal polarisation of the welfare state admissions of refugees remain rather low. Germany as a conservative welfare state is a more comprehensive welfare state which displays high solidarity and tries to secure its status by cooperating with the EU. However, Austria which is also categorised as a conservative welfare state does not express much European solidarity. This might be due to the feeling that national interests, i.e. the status of Austria and its citizens, need to be protected by national action. Yet, it is unexpected and surprising that Germany and Austria although representing the same type of welfare state regime differ so much in their expressions of European solidarity.

5. Conclusion

Based on the results of the analysis the research question, how differences in expressions of European solidarity in the migration crisis can be explained by theories on welfare state regimes, is answered as follows.

Firstly, the analysis showed that European solidarity expressions indeed differ among the heads of governments of Austria, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom and give closer insights into the current state of European solidarity within the European Union: Of the four analysed member states, Germany depicts the highest level of European solidarity, stressing the importance of joint action and securing the external border. Germany is followed by Spain which in general expresses solidarity, but also shows some limitations in regard to burden and risk sharing, especially in terms of accepting refugees. Nevertheless, Spain advocates joint action and puts emphasis on fighting the causes of migration. Strikingly, Austria and the United Kingdom both do not express much European solidarity in managing the migration crisis, but rather rely on unilateral action. Their motivation is to secure their national interests in managing the migration crisis. Therefore, the United Kingdom refuses to take part in reciprocal burden and risk sharing within the EU and follows its own national plans. Austria is at least willing to accept a limited number of refugees, but sees national action as self-defence for securing national interests in the migration crisis.

Secondly, theories on welfare state regimes allow to a great extent to explain the different expressions of European solidarity. The internal characteristics of the welfare state regimes can also be found in their external relations to other member states of the European Union. As liberal welfare states focus on means-testing and eligibility requirements with a weak role of the state, the United Kingdom does not consider the other EU member states as in need of British solidarity. Spain which is categorised as a Mediterranean welfare state expresses European solidarity in managing the migration crisis, but displays limits in regard to admissions of refugees. This is due to the characteristically weak role of the state and the internal polarisation of granting benefits and protection in Mediterranean welfare states. As conservative welfare regimes represent the most comprehensive welfare regimes in this analysis and do not contest the granting of social rights, it is in line with the regime's characteristics that Germany expresses full solidarity towards the European member states. Collaborating within the EU allows for securing the status of the German state and its citizens which is a central aspect of conservative welfare states' social insurance systems. Yet, it is unexpected that Austria which is also categorised as a conservative welfare state differs completely in its expressions of European solidarity from the German expressions. Unlike Germany, Austria aims at securing its status by relying on national action and does not see the necessity of supporting the other member states as they do not lack the capacity of acting on their own.

Hence, theories on welfare state regimes can explain differences in expressions of European solidarity to a great extent by applying their internal characteristics to their relations within the European Union. Thereby, less comprehensive welfare states, as liberal welfare states, express less

European solidarity in managing the migration crisis as more comprehensive welfare states. However, in the case of conservative welfare regimes the fact that they are more comprehensive does not always mean that they express more solidarity than the other welfare regimes as the remarkable differences between the Austrian and German expressions of solidarity point out.

These findings contribute relevant insights for the debate on solidarity in the European Union as they portray exemplarily the current state of European solidarity and incorporate it into the context of the migration crisis. Moreover, welfare states as possible explanations for European solidarity expressions were studied for the first time, thus supporting theoretical assumptions by empirical findings. Relating the findings of this paper to other authors, it is interesting to see that arguments criticising the CEAS are especially supported by the findings for less comprehensive welfare regimes, while the findings for more comprehensive welfare states, with the exception of Austria, do not support these arguments. Ventrella (2015) argued that due to the lack of the application of the principle of solidarity member states do not cooperate with each other. Instead they rely on unilateral action and seek to minimise their responsibilities. This argument is strongly supported by the findings for the United Kingdom and Austria, which rely on unilateral action and for the most part refuse to take part in burden and risk sharing among the EU member states. Ferrera's (2014) argument goes into the same direction, as he points out that help for other member states is mostly seen as a burden. Therefore, support is conditional and limited. This is in line with Austria's perception of taking the burden for the whole EU, resulting in national action as self-defence, as well as the British linking of support in the crisis to their demands for EU reforms. However, these arguments are not supported by the findings for the more comprehensive welfare states Germany and Spain as they prefer action on European level and stress the importance of solidarity between the member states. Yet, the findings for three of the four countries agree with Boräng's (2015) argument that comprehensive welfare states promote greater solidarity and are thus more likely to accept forced migrants. The United Kingdom as a liberal and ergo non-comprehensive welfare state does not express solidarity, Spain as a more comprehensive welfare state expresses solidarity, but also displays limitations to admissions of refugees and Germany as the most comprehensive welfare state shows full solidarity and willingness to accept refugees. However, the findings for conservative welfare states are ambiguous as Austria does not show much solidarity in the crisis and limited the number of refugees it is willing to accept. In this sense, the findings of this paper disagree with Boräng. Therefore, more research on comprehensive welfare states is necessary. Future research could focus on the factors and circumstances under which comprehensive welfare states express solidarity or prefer to defend their national status. Thereby, research could focus on welfare chauvinism or Euroscepticism. Due to limitations of language skill this research could only study a limited number of EU member states and was not able to include the social democratic welfare regime, which can be found in the Scandinavian countries. Hence, future research should also investigate expressions of European solidarity by social

democratic welfare states. Furthermore, analyses including all EU member states are necessary in order to develop deeper knowledge on solidarity in the European Union.

For the future of European solidarity in managing the migration crisis it will be important to see whether European solidarity or national self-defence dominates. Since this research showed that some member states as Austria feel left alone in the crisis and react with unilateral action, joint action of the member states and solidarity are necessary for finding a common long-term solution to the migration crisis and to prevent the European project from falling apart. Reforms of the CEAS should distribute burdens and risks more equally among the member states in order to encourage cooperation within the European Union. Instead of shifting responsibility from one member state to another, the member states of the EU should act as a union and act in solidarity. In order to do so, reforms of the Dublin System are necessary, because under the current system the member states located at the external border are put under high pressure while other member states are not affected at all (Mitsilegas, 2014).

The issue of solidarity and the continuity of the European project is of great current significance as the British referendum on leaving the European Union showed that a lack of solidarity can not only lead to the preference of national action but also to a possible exit from the Union. Hence, the European member states should rethink their understandings of being a member of the EU and express more solidarity towards each other, not only in the management of the migration crisis, but in general. Moreover, in a globalised world facing global challenges and risks, solidarity should not be limited to a certain region but rather encompass the whole world. This means for the European Union that it should not seal itself off and that, as suggested by Karagiannis (2007), it needs to assume its responsibility towards the rest of the world.

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Appendix 1: Data

1. Data Austria

Source	Title	Date	Retrieved from	Document name in ATLAS t.i.	Reference code
Bundeskanzleramt Österreich	Bundeskanzler Faymann: "Harte Auseinandersetzung für mehr Gemeinsamkeiten in der EU"	17.02.2016	http://www.austria.gv.at/site/cob__62108/currentpage__0/6597/default.aspx	P17: Ö17	1.1
Der Kurier	Viel Kritik an Österreichs Obergrenze	19.02.2016	http://kurier.at/politik/inland/fluechtlinge-grenzmanagement-in-oesterreich-sorgt-fuer-aufregung/181.962.389	P3: Ö3	1.2
Der Kurier	400.000 Flüchtlinge – Kanzler drängt auf deutsches Limit	05.03.2016	http://kurier.at/politik/eu/400-000-fluechtlinge-kanzler-draengt-auf-deutsches-limit/185.084.969	P11: Ö11	1.3
Die Presse	Faymann: Griechenland agiert "wie ein Reisebüro"	28.02.2016	http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/4935080/Faymann_Griechenland-agierte-wie-ein-Reiseburo	P9: Ö9	1.4
Der Standard	Faymann-Interview sorgt international für Verwirrung	17.01.2016	http://derstandard.at/2000029210423/Fluechtlinge-Faymann-Interview-sorgt-international-fuer-Verwirrung	P7: Ö7	1.5
Der Standard	Faymann gegen "unsinnige, fahrlässige" EU-Asylpolitik	23.02.2016	http://derstandard.at/2000031633850/Faymann-gegen-unsinnige-fahrlaessige-EU-Politik	P14: Ö14	1.6
Heute	Druck vor EU-Gipfel steigt - Flüchtlinge: Faymann fordert Deutschland heraus	06.03.2016	http://www.heute.at/news/politik/Fluechtlinge-Faymann-fordert-Deutschland-heraus;art23660,1264752	P8: Ö8	1.7
Kleine Zeitung	Faymann zu Kritik aus Berlin: "Können auf Ratschlag verzichten"	23.02.2016	http://www.kleinezeitung.at/s/politik/innenpolitik/4931734/Fluchtlingskrise_	P2: Ö2	1.8

			Faymann-zu-Kritik-aus-Berlin_Konnen-auf		
Kronen Zeitung	EU- Gelder: Faymann droht Osteuropa mit Kürzung	17.12.2015	http://www.krone.at/Oesterreich/EU-Gelder_Faymann_droht_Osteuropa_mit_Kuerzung-Fluechtlingskrise-Story-487388	P13: Ö13	1.9
Kronen Zeitung	Faymann bei Renzi: Streit um Grenzzaun am Brenner	12.02.2016	http://www.krone.at/Oesterreich/Faymann_bei_Renzi_Streit_um_Grenzzaun_am_Brenner-Fluechtlingskrise-Story-495854	P5: Ö5	1.10
Nachrichten	Flüchtlinge - Faymann: "2016 wird noch härter als heuer"	18.12.2015	http://www.nachrichten.at/nachrichten/politik/innenpolitik/Fluechtlinge-Faymann-2016-wird-noch-haerter-als-heuer;art385,2063377	P4: Ö4	1.11
Nachrichten	Tusk bei Faymann: "Zurück zu Schengen"	01.03.2016	http://www.nachrichten.at/nachrichten/politik/aussenpolitik/Tusk-bei-Faymann-Zurueck-zu-Schengen;art391,2165164	P18: Ö18	1.12
News	Flüchtlinge: Fayman beharrt auf Obergrenze Trotz eindringlicher Kritik .seitens der EU	18.02.2016	http://www.news.at/a/eu-grenzen-fluechtlinge	P19: Ö19	1.13
News	Obergrenzen gelten ab heute: Österreich stellt sich gegen EU	19.02.2016	http://www.news.at/a/fakten-obergrenzen-oesterreich-eu	P16: Ö16	1.14
News	Faymann: Österreich nicht das "Wartezimmer der EU" Beharrt in der Flüchtlingsfrage auf eingeschlagener Linie	01.03.2016	http://www.news.at/a/fakten-faymann-%C3%B6sterreich-wartezimmer-eu-6253772	P20: Ö20	1.15
Österreich	EU-Gipfel: Faymann bleibt hart	17.03.2016	http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/	P12: Ö12	1.16

			EU-Gipfel-Faymann-bleibt-hart/228312541		
Salzburger Nachrichten	Faymann gesteht bei Flüchtlingen: "Wir machen nur Notlösungen"	19.01.2016	http://www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/dossier/fluechtlinge/sn/artikel/faymann-gesteht-bei-fluechtlingen-wir-machen-nur-notloesungen-180988/	P15: Ö15	1.17
Salzburger Nachrichten	Flüchtlinge - Faymann: Deutschland folgt Österreich	17.02.2016	http://www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/dossier/fluechtlinge/sn/artikel/fluechtlinge-faymann-deutschland-folgt-oesterreich-184478/	P10: Ö10	1.18
SPÖ Pressedienst	Ministerrat – Bundeskanzler Faymann: Flüchtlingskrise kann nicht an österreichischer Grenze gelöst werden	No date	http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20160223_OTS0149/ministerrat-bundeskanzler-faymann-fluechtlingskrise-kann-nicht-an-oesterreichischer-grenze-geloest-werden	P6: Ö6	1.19
Wirtschaftsblatt	Flüchtlinge: Faymann - "Österreich hat Vorbildliches geleistet"	27.02.2016	http://wirtschaftsblatt.at/home/nachrichten/newsletter/4935091/Fluechtlinge_Faymann-Osterreich-hat-Vorbildliches-geleistet	P1: Ö1	1.20

2. Data Germany

Source	Title	Date	Retrieved from	Document name in ATLAS t.i.	Reference code
Bayerischer Rundfunk	Regierungserklärung zur Flüchtlingspolitik Vom Rückgang "nicht täuschen" lassen	16.03.2016	https://www.br.de/nachrichten/regierungserklaerung-merkel-fluechtlinge-bundestag100.html	P11: D11	2.1

CDU	Merkel: EU-Gipfel mit der Türkei ist entscheidende Wegmarke	16.03.2016	https://www.cdu.de/artikel/merkel-eu-gipfel-mit-der-tuerkei-ist-entscheidende-wegmarke	P14: D14	2.2
Die Bundeskanzlerin	Video-Podcast der Bundeskanzlerin #32/2015	03.10.2015	https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Podcast/2015/2015-10-03-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5	P7: D7	2.3
Die Bundeskanzlerin	Flüchtlingszuzug ist "Chance von morgen" – Neujahrsansprache der Kanzlerin	31.12.2015	https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Podcast/2015/2015-12-31-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5	P8: D8	2.4
Die Bundeskanzlerin	Video-Podcast der Bundeskanzlerin #05/2016	06.02.2016	https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Podcast/2016/2016-02-06-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4	P5: D5	2.5
Die Bundeskanzlerin	Video-Podcast der Bundeskanzlerin #12/2016	09.04.2016	https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Podcast/2016/2016-04-09-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3	P6: D6	2.6
Die Bundesregierung	EU-Türkei-Flüchtlingsgipfel Ein qualitativer Schritt nach vorne	08.03.2016	https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Reiseberichte/2016-03-07-eu-tuerkei-gipfel.html	P19: D19	2.7
Die Bundesregierung	Regierungserklärung zum EU-Gipfel Gemeinsam die Flüchtlingskrise lösen	16.03.2016	https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/03/2016-03-16-regierungserklaerung.html	P20: D20	2.8
Die Welt	Merkels Wettlauf gegen die Zeit - das hat sie vor	19.01.2016	http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151202819/Merkels-Wettlauf-gegen-die-Zeit-das-hat-sie-vor.html	P17: D17	2.9
MDR	Interview zur Flüchtlingspolitik Merkel: "Meine verdammte Pflicht, dass Europa einen Weg findet"	29.02.2016	http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/politik/inland/merkel-interview-anne-will-100.html	P15: D15	2.10
NTV	Gemeinsame Lösung der Flüchtlingskrise- EU beruft neuen	19.02.2016	http://www.n-tv.de/politik/EU-beruft-neuen-Sonderrat-mit-Tuerkei-ein-	P18: D18	2.11

	Sonderrat mit Türkei ein		article17033466.html		
NTV	Flüchtlinge in Europa umsiedeln - Auch Merkels Solidarität hat Grenzen	11.03.2016	http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Auch-Merkels-Solidaritaet-hat-Grenzen-article17191811.html	P2: D2	2.12
Süddeutsche Zeitung	Merkel lehnt Kurswechsel in der Flüchtlingspolitik ab	28.02.2016	http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlingspolitik-merkel-lehnt-kurswechsel-in-der-fluechtlingspolitik-ab-1.2884828	P10: D10	2.13
Spiegel Online	Flüchtlingskrise: Merkels härtester Gipfel	07.03.2016	http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/angela-merkel-kaempft-beim-eu-gipfel-um-ihren-kurs-a-1081050.html	P4:D4	2.14
Tagesschau	EU-Treffen zur Balkan-Flüchtlingskrise Schnelle Hilfe, strenge Maßnahmen	25.10.2015	https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/fluechtlinge-eu-111.html	P16: D16	2.15
Tagesschau	Streit um Flüchtlingspolitik Merkel setzt weiter auf Europa	16.03.2016	https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/merkel-regierungserklaerung-125.html	P9: D9	2.16
ZDF Heute	Warum Merkels Argumente nicht überzeugen	29.02.2016	http://www.heute.de/fluechtlinge-bundestkanzlerin-angela-merkel-zwischen-souveraenitaet-und-schwachen-argumenten-42481546.html	P12: D12	2.17
ZDF Heute	Flüchtlingspolitik: Merkels mögliche Kehrtwende	07.03.2016	http://www.heute.de/eu-will-auf-gipfel-mit-tuerkei-die-balkanroute-schliessen-kommentar-zu-fluechtlingspolitik-von-kanzlerin-merkel-kehrtwende-42574658.html	P13: D13	2.18
Zeit Online	Östliche EU-Staaten stellen sich gegen Merkel	15.02.2016	http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-02/visegrad-staaten-treffen-fluechtlingskrise-balkanroute-jean-asselborn	P1: D1	2.19
Zeit Online	Die EU folgt jetzt Merkels Plan	18.03.2016	http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-03/fluechtlinge-eu-tuerkei-deal-merkel-kommentar	P3: D3	2.20

3. Data Spain

Source	Title	Date	Retrieved from	Document name in ATLAS t.i.	Reference code
ABC	Rajoy reclama unidad sobre los refugiados y alerta de los «aprendices de mesías»	06.04.2016	http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-rajoy-reclama-unidad-politica-estado-sobre-refugiados-201604061021_noticia.html	P1: ES1	3.1
Cadenasar	Rajoy asegura que gracias a él se evitó una devolución masiva de refugiados	06.04.2016	http://cadenaser.com/ser/2016/04/06/politica/1459944129_935463.html	P21: ES21	3.2
Cuatro	'Plan de Acción con Turquía'	07.03.2016	http://www.cuatro.com/noticias/espana/Mariano_Rajoy-PP-UE-Turquia-reuniones-gestion-refugiados_0_2143050209.html	P8: ES8	3.3
EITB	Rajoy dice que España es 'responsable' con los refugiados	06.04.2016	http://www.eitb.eus/es/noticias/politica/detalle/3964774/rajoy-congreso-espana-es-responsable-refugiados/	P17: ES17	3.4
El Diario	Rajoy ofrecerá acoger a cerca de 450 refugiados pese a comprometerse a dar asilo a más de 17.000	07.03.2016	http://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/Rajoy-Bruselas-proximamente-Espana-refugiados_0_492050809.html	P3: ES3	3.5
El Mundo	Mariano Rajoy, sobre la crisis de los refugiados: 'Hay que hacer un Plan Marshall como EEUU en Europa'	10.09.2015	http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/10/55f12e3b22601d44428b4570.html	P2: ES2	3.6
El Mundo	La UE expulsará a Turquía a los refugiados que lleguen a Grecia	08.03.2016	http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2016/03/08/56de226e46163f46418b457a.html	P6: ES6	3.7
El Mundo	Rajoy afirma que España moderó el acuerdo migratorio entre la UE y Turquía	06.04.2016	http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2016/04/06/5704c03de2704e463b8b459c.html	P10: ES10	3.8
El Pais	Rajoy pide a Sánchez excluir la crisis de los refugiados del debate	12.03.2016	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/03/12/actualidad/1457812624_483884	P11: ES11	3.9

	partidista		.html		
El Pais	La oposición acusa a Rajoy de vulnerar el mandato del Congreso	06.04.2016	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/04/06/actualidad/1459923693_195959.html	P5: ES5	3.10
El Periodico	Rajoy promete que España será solidaria con los refugiados	05.09.2015	http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/internacional/sanchez-exige-rajoy-que-lidere-ayuda-los-refugiados-4483440	P18: ES18	3.11
El Universal	Rajoy confía que UE tome en serio crisis de refugiados y solucione su raíz	23.09.2015	http://www.eluniversal.com/noticias/internacional/rajoy-confia-que-tome-serio-crisis-refugiados-solucione-raiz_30779	P19: ES19	3.12
Gobierno de España	Rajoy informa de los acuerdos de la Cumbre UE-Turquía para afrontar la crisis de los refugiados	08.03.2016	http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Paginas/2016/080316rajoycumbre.aspx	P7: ES7	3.13
Hispanidad	Rajoy pone como ejemplo a España en la crisis de los refugiados. ¿Mucho, no?	06.04.2016	http://www.hispanidad.com/rajoy-pone-como-ejemplo-a-espana-en-la-crisis-de-los-refugiados-mucho-no.html	P15: ES15	3.14
Heraldo	Rajoy: "Si hay país preparado para responder al reto de los refugiados, es España"	06.04.2016	http://www.heraldo.es/noticias/nacional/2016/04/06/rajoy-hay-pais-preparado-para-responder-reto-refugiados-espana-840891-305.html	P16: ES16	3.15
La Razon	Rajoy acusa a Sánchez de «partidismo» con la crisis de los refugiados	13.03.2016	http://www.larazon.es/espana/rajoy-pide-a-sanchez-excluir-a-los-refugiados-del-debate-politico-partidista-GK12180060#.Ttt1IxEr7hLeIa6	P14: ES14	3.16
Las Provincias	Rajoy defiende el acuerdo de la UE: "El objetivo es salvar vidas y proteger fronteras"	06.04.2016	http://www.lasprovincias.es/politica/201604/06/rajoy-defendera-pacto-sobre-20160406011201-rc.html	P9: ES9	3.17
La Vanguardia	Mariano Rajoy da cuenta de la gestión de los refugiados	11.04.2016	http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160406/40919191502/mariano-	P4: ES4	3.18

			rajoy-congreso-en-directo.html		
Levante	Rajoy resalta sus condiciones al pacto UE-Turquía	07.04.2016	http://www.levante-emv.com/espana/2016/04/06/rajoy-defiende-pacto-refugiados-congreso/1400481.html	P20: ES20	3.19
RTVE	La oposición reprocha a Rajoy el incumplimiento de los acuerdos sobre refugiados	06.04.2016	http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20160406/oposicion-reprocha-rajoy-incumplimiento-acuerdos-sobre-refugiados/1331780.shtml	P13: ES13	3.20

4. Data United Kingdom

Source	Title	Date	Retrieved from	Document name in ATLAS t.i.	Reference code
BBC	Migrant crisis: EU splits exposed as talks take place	23.09.2015	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34332759	P7: UK7	4.1
BT	David Cameron: We are making progress on EU negotiations	10.12.2015	https://home.bt.com/news/uk-news/migration-crisis-could-push-the-uk-into-voting-to-quit-eu-says-david-cameron-11364028061611	P11: UK11	4.2
Express	David Cameron rallies AGAINST controversial EU plans to open Britain to more refugees	22.01.2016	http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/636956/David-Cameron-European-Union-refugee-crisis-EU-referendum-Ukip	P13: UK13	4.3
GOV.UK	Oral statement to Parliament PM Commons statement on European Council meeting on migration	21.03.2016	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-european-council-meeting-on-migration-21-march-2016	P6: UK6	4.4
The Daily Mail	British public could think 'Oh Christ, push Europe away', Cameron warns as Poland rejects demand to curb migrant benefits	10.12.2015	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3354001/I-m-British-voter-Cameron-warns-migrant-crisis-push-UK-leave-European-Union.html	P5: UK5	4.5

The Daily Mail	Britain will not take any more migrants under the EU's deal with Turkey to try and stop the migrant crisis, Cameron insists as he arrives for new talks in Brussels	17.03.2016	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3497172/Britain-not-migrants-EU-s-deal-Turkey-try-stop-migrant-crisis-Cameron-insists-arrives-new-talks-Brussels.html	P12: UK12	4.6
The Guardian	Britain should not take more Middle East refugees, says David Cameron	03.09.2015	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/david-cameron-migration-crisis-will-not-be-solved-by-uk-taking-in-more-refugees	P4: UK4	4.7
The Guardian	David Cameron says UK will fulfil moral responsibility over migration crisis	03.09.2015	http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/03/david-cameron-says-uk-will-fulfil-moral-responsibility-over-migration-crisis	P16: UK16	4.8
The Guardian	David Cameron 'to use £475m of UK aid budget to ease migration crisis'	12.11.2015	http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/12/david-cameron-to-use-475m-of-uk-aid-budget-to-ease-migration-crisis	P3: UK3	4.9
The Guardian	Cameron pledges £17m to help France deal with the migration crisis in Calais	03.03.2016	http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/mar/03/cameron-pledges-17m-to-help-france-deal-with-the-migration-crisis-in-calais-video	P15: UK15	4.10
The Guardian	Migration crisis: UK to join Nato refugee patrols in Aegean	07.03.2016	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/07/uk-military-to-join-nato-refugee-patrols-in-aegean	P2: UK2	4.11
The Guardian	David Cameron: send more patrol ships to turn refugee boats back to Libya	18.03.2016	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/refugee-boats-david-cameron-early-intervention-libya-migrants-mediterranean-eu-leaders	P20:UK20	4.12
The Independent	Refugee crisis: David Cameron says Europe must get better at sending migrants home	23.09.2015	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-david-cameron-says-europe-must-get-better-at-sending-migrants-home-10513581.html	P21: UK21	4.13

The Mirror	David Cameron offers police and patrol ships to combat migrant crisis in bid to save EU deal	18.02.2016	http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/david-cameron-offers-police-patrol-7390449	P18: UK18	4.14
The Mirror	David Cameron to pay Turkey £500m protection money to stem flow of migrants into Europe	07.03.2016	http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/david-cameron-pay-turkey-500m-7513236	P9: UK9	4.15
The Sun	PM vow to help victims Cameron pledges to take in more Syrian refugees	04.09.2015	http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/6621413/David-Camerons-vow-to-help-Syrian-refugees.html	P14: UK14	4.16
The Telegraph	David Cameron: Migrant crisis could force Brexit as voters say 'get me out of here'	09.12.2015	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/12042559/migrant-crisis-could-force-brexit-says-david-cameron.html	P17: UK17	4.17
The Telegraph	Europe's migrant crisis leaves David Cameron a referendum race against time	26.01.2016	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news-topics/eureferendum/12121742/Europe-s-migrant-crisis-leaves-David-Cameron-a-referendum-race-against-time.html	P1: UK1	4.18
The Telegraph	David Cameron to force EU crunch meeting as migration crisis deepens	30.01.2016	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news-topics/eureferendum/12132039/Migration-crisis-deepens.html	P10: UK10	4.19
UK Reuters	Cameron urges EU to relax Jordan trade to help refugees	20.01.2016	http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-britain-eu-idUKKCN0UY00N	P8: UK8	4.20