

Bachelor Thesis

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Friedrich Paulsen
University of Twente, NL: s0122386
WWU Münster, D: 313654

Supervisor: Prof. Jaap de Wilde
Co-Reader: Prof. Ramses Wessel

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The impact of EU`s policies on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa

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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction: Content of the thesis

The following ba-thesis present the results of efforts trying to develop a stock-check of those EU's policies which try to promote democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the effects of further EU policies influencing processes of democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore the researcher is focussing not only on the immediate international promotion of democracy by the European Union; he is also faced with the need to take into account those policies which are influencing democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa in a mediate way. Democracy and the protection of human rights have already been declared goals of western donors' foreign policies during the time of the cold war - however these goals have been subordinated as less important policies with regard to the global competition between communism and capitalism. The reforms caused by Michael Gorbatschow led to an "opening window of opportunity" (Burnell, 1993: 6) which caused the growing importance of the promotion of democracy and human rights as a core element of development policies of western donors, today known under the signature of good governance.

Contemporaneously to these processes of change – the implosion of the Soviet Union and the growing importance of democracy in international relations - the European Community, later European Union, became a more and more important player in international politics. The European Union started to fulfil - apart from its original function of integrating inside and immediately around its borders - functions regarding regional and practical problems far beyond its borders. Growing expectations flanked and strengthened the European Union, which is today more or less constrained to an active, unitary and self-confident role in international politics (Hill 1993: 307). While for a long period of time dictatorship was regarded as the usual political system of developing countries (Löwenthal 1986: 266)¹, in the beginning 1990ies it came to processes of political reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. These political reforms which predominantly have to be regarded as consequences of movements of political protests because of the failure of the authoritarian policies inside the respective countries, are according to Huntington known as a „third wave“ of democratisation (Tetzlaff 1995: 117; Huntington 1992: 579)².

Impressions and effects of democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa are contradictory until today. Africa's democratisation has to be seen as a process caused through exogenous and endogenous effects – consequently policies of the EU matter. Besides that the European Union as a central actor declares the promotion of democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa at least

¹ Löwenthal (1992, p.266): „Man kann geradezu sagen, dass in diesen Ländern innerhalb gewisser Grenzen zwischen dem Ausmaß pluralistischer Freiheit und dem Tempo der Entwicklung eine Antinomie besteht: Jeder Grad an Freiheit wird mit etwas Verlangsamung der Entwicklung, jeder Grad an Beschleunigung mit etwas Verlust an Freiheit bezahlt. Das ist in der Natur des Prozesses unvermeidlich“.

² Huntington (1991, p.16) enumerates several waves of democratisation. The first wave (1828-1926), the second wave (1943-1962), two opposed waves (1922-1942 and 1958-1975) and the third wave starting in the late eighties.

rhetorically to one of its goals. Therefore the core interest of research of the present paper is to answer the following question: How do EU's policies influence the process of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa?

1.2 Research questions and objectives

The planned study will try to analyse the influence of EU's policies on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa from a particular perspective. The conclusion will come back to the question if the EU is following a particular approach of democracy in its international promotion of democratisation. Therefore the researcher has to get insights into different concepts of democracy and the different means and policies of the EU influencing democratisation in countries of Sub-Sahara Africa.

In order to answer the central research question, which is formulated at the end of the introduction, six sub-questions are placed. The sub-questions will try to relate to (a) the way of measuring democracy and democratisation, (b) the different concepts of democratisations on the basis of the different ways of measuring democratisation, (c) the particular features of democratisation in the context of Sub-Sahara Africa, (d) the experiences of western donors with regard to development and the importance of democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa, (e) the policies of the EU which try to promote democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa and (f) further EU policies which influence democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa.

Consequently the sub-questions are:

(a) Which indexes exist to measure democracy? The first sub-question tries to give a selected overview about methods of measuring democracy. It puts the focus on the particular indicators of democracy and democratisation to define central aspects and core elements of democracy and democratisation.

(b) What kind of democracy is measured by each index? The second sub-question elaborates that each presented method of measuring democracy is shaped by a particular concept of democracy. In how far these concepts differ and which different factors to promote and to initialise democratisation are defined by the concepts should be described.

(c) Which regional features of democratisation exist with regard to Sub-Sahara Africa? The selected indexes of measuring democracy are generally shaped by universal ideas of democracy and do not regard any regional aspects, for example cultural or religious norms and values, which could influence processes of democratisation vitally. Therefore the third sub-question will put the focus on experiences with democratisation particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa.

(d) Is the good governance approach a consequence of a process of policy learning with the result that democracy is regarded as necessary for development? The fourth sub-question tries to analyse in a critical way why western donors – including the EU – belief in positive effects of the promotion of democracy, why democratisation is today a central claim and

condition in international development policies and in which concept of democracy the good governance approach is rooted.

(e) Which EU-policies with the aim of promoting democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa exist? The fifth sub-question tries to list up and analyse those policies of the EU which are trying to promote directly democracy and democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa. That includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Development Cooperation Policy, containing conditional trade preferences and several positive measures.

(f) Which further policies influence democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa? The last sub-question puts the focus on those EU policies which have a mediate influence on processes of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa by shaping macro-economic-conditions. Such policies are the European Trade Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy. Are these policies coherent with the goal to promote democracy? Which kinds of interests dominate these policies?

1.3 Methodology

The six sub-questions build the fundament of the three main chapters of the present ba-thesis. The first and the second sub-question generate a chapter trying to define democracy by measuring democracy (Chapter 2), the third and fourth sub-question generate a chapter describing regional features and experiences of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa (Chapter 3) and the fifth and sixth sub-question generate a chapter analysing the EU's actions (Chapter 4). The results of each chapter and the relevant information for the next chapter and the overall-conclusion of the elaborations of each chapter are pointed out by a sub-conclusion at the end of each chapter. The present ba-thesis consequently try to develop answers to the main research question step by step. The overall-conclusion is summarizing the results with regard to the main research question at the end of the thesis.

The analysis of different indexes of democracy and democratisation should elaborate central elements to define democracy and democratisation. The selection of three indexes out of several indexes tries to represent three different ways of measuring democracy with regard to the methodological access (qualitative or quantitative), the number of indicators, the way of operationalisation and the respective conceptualisation of democracy of each index. These elaborations should set the understandings of democracy and democratisation of the whole thesis – the policies and impacts of the EU on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa (Chapter 4) should be analysed in the frame of the definitions and understandings of democracy given by the first chapter (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 should analyse the special conditions of democratisation in the regional context of Sub-Sahara Africa and the experiences of former approaches of development policies which excluded questions of governance. With regard to the last decades – since 1960 - different approaches shaped the development cooperation of western donors. The actual paradigm – good governance – is more or less based on the failure of former approaches. The results are essential with regard to the final assessment of the EU-policies with regard to their impact on

democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa (Chapter 4). The overall-conclusion will connect the results of each single chapter to give answers to the overall research question: Is the promotion of democracy by the European Union rooted in one particular concept of democracy (Chapter 2 and 4), is the promotion of democracy taking historical experiences and regional features into account (Chapter 3 and 4) and is the promotion of democracy by the European Union coherent with other EU policies (Chapter 3.1 and 3.2)?

The methodological approach of the present paper is purely literature based referring to the different methods of research. The high amount of publications, studies, concepts, essays and legislations make an own empirical research unnecessary. The different sub-questions need, however, the analysis of different sources.

- Primary sources are mainly used to elaborate the fifth sub-question. As such the EC-Treaty, documents of the commission, the budget lines or other documents of institutions of the European Union are analysed.
- Secondary sources are mainly used to elaborate the other sub-questions, for example existing qualitative or quantitative studies concerning the implementation of positive measures by the European Commission in Malawi and Zimbabwe or concerning the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU on the macro-economic situation of countries in Sub-Sahara Africa.
- Theoretical literature is embedding and flanking the research, particularly with regard to the different concepts of democracy.

2. How to define democracy with regard to measurements of democracy?

The intention of western donors to support and promote democratisation through their development cooperation implies that measurable indicators to evaluate the process of democratisation and the respective institutional arrangements have a vital importance. Today a number of indexes exists which try to achieve to measure the level of democratisation in a particular country³. Therefore these indicators of several indexes to measure democratisation are having a special importance for the present research.

The following chapter will (1) present a number of international recognised indexes of the measurement of democracy and their indicators. Furthermore it will shortly reflect the methodological accesses of these indexes. By a second step (2), the selected and briefly presented indexes will be analysed regarding to the particular conceptualisation of democracy, which generates the basis of each index. Democracy as a universal value is today propagated by the western donor organisations and the organisations representing African states, for example the Organisation of African Unity. Just the

³ The Index of democratisation of Vanhanen, the polity-records of Ted Gurr and Keith Jagers, the Freedom House Index of Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung or the Indice de Desarrollo Democratico de America Latina of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung can be enumerated. For an overview see Calaminus, 2006.

current multiple use of the terms democracy or democratisation shows, that these expressions always have to be regarded in the context of the respective conceptualisation of democracy.

The following chapter will try to achieve the necessary concentration on central aspects of a democratic system and democratisation without ignoring the existing high number of different conceptualisations of democracy. The sub-conclusion will then put the results together to make clear the most important interrelations, differences and overlaps.

2.1 Which indicators exist to measure democracy?

2.1.1 Vanhanens Index (VI) of measuring democracy

The Finnish scientist Tatu Vanhanen is regarded as one of the most important researchers in the field of measuring democracy, because he proved with great consequences the empirical relevance of quantitative measurement (Traine 2000). Since the 1970ies, Vanhanen has been developing an index which is containing - in its fifth and actual version - measurements of democracy in 187 countries from 1810 till 2000⁴. The index is conceptual rooted in Dahl's concept of polyarchy: It is separated into "public contestation" and "right to participate". Contestation and participation are two necessary parts of democracy and can not be compensated reciprocally (Vanhanen 2000: 191). Vanhanen tries to measure the grade of democratisation of a country in a continuum and defines through his index a grade of threshold of democracy.

The Vanhanens Index operationalises "public contestation" and "right to participate" with only one single indicator for contestation and one for participation. The indicator of contestation counts the votes for those parties which lost the last elections. Consequently the portion of votes for the strongest party is subtracted from 100. The indicator of participation is defined by the election turnout of the last elections in a relation to the whole population – not only that part of the population which is entitled to vote⁵. It is obvious that the Vanhanens Index is only taking quantitative and objective indicators into account. The index contains a zero point because both indicators can potentially reach zero. The values of both indicators are multiplicatively connected and then divided by 100. The index varies consequently in a scale from 0 to 100; the higher the number, the more democratic is a country. Vanhanen constructs two sub-thresholds to determine whether a country is democratic or not: Firstly, a country in which one party is getting more than 70% of the votes can be described as only partly democratic⁶. Therefore the indicator of contestation has to reach at least the value of 30. Since Vanhanen refers his indicator for participation - turnout - to the whole population, 10% as sub-threshold is relatively low.

⁴ Cp. all materials around the Vanhanen Index under <http://www.prio.no/cwp/vanhanen/>.

⁵ In parliamentary systems the elections of parliament are observed, in presidential systems the presidential elections and in systems containing parliamentary and presidential elements both elections are observed (Vanhanen 2000: 188)

⁶ Vanhanen is justifying that through referring to Gastil, the founder of Freedomhouse (Vanhanen 2000: 193).

The validity of this method to measure democracy is questionable, if each of the two sides of democracy is described by only one indicator. In terms of contestation basic rights like freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly or associational freedom are not gathered (Schmidt 2000: 401)⁷. These rights are however even part of minimalist definitions of democracy. In terms of the indicator for participation it can be criticized that the measurement of turnout describes the factual usage of a formal right, but says nothing about the quality of that formal right and the usage. It is not clear if the elections are free and fair. Further research on elections has already shown that small turnout can also be explained as an expression of contentment of citizens with their political system (Schreyer/Schwarzmeier 2000: 99). The group the indicator of participation is referring to – the whole population in terms of turnout – is problematic. Values of countries that have a high part of citizens who are not entitled to vote – for example because of their age – are systematically lower as in countries with an opposite age structure. People with an age between 0 and 17 constitute 48,3% of the African population while in Europe only 19,9% of the inhabitants are younger than 18 - consequently the countries of Sub-Sahara Africa under-perform systematically⁸. The Vanhanen Index favours fragmented party systems, in which the winners get less than 50%. Two-party systems are therefore often described as less democratic, but even if a system is highly fragmented, it is doubtful, if the quality of democracy is higher. Does it make a difference if the winning party gets 20% or 40% of the votes?

2.1.2 Freedom House Index (FHI)

Since 1972 the US-American non-profit-organization Freedom House has been developing a ranking about freedom and democracy in recently 193 sovereign states and territories yearly⁹. These rankings of freedom are not immediately a measurement of democracy, but Raymond Gastil, one of the founders of the yearly study “Freedom in the World”, stresses the interrelations between freedom and democracy: “The survey’s origins are reflected in the use of freedom rather than democracy as the criteria for the rating system. Although (...) the survey was essentially a survey of democracy”(Gastil 1993: 22). Democracy is understood as a political idea, less as a system of political organisation (Braizat 2000: 231).

The Freedom House Index distinguishes among two concepts of democracy: Firstly the one, which is the immanent idea of democracy of the whole ranking, and secondly the one of electoral democracies. Even though the measurement of electoral democracies reflects only a minimalist aspect of democracy, the FHI has an immanent concept of democracy underlying all of its investigations. Electoral democracies are characterized by regular, secret and safe elections without deceits, by a multi-party system, by a

⁷ Lauth 2004: 247 represents an opinion of the minority: He sees such rights included into the Vanhanens Index.

⁸ Cp. United Nations World Population Prospect under <http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp> (07.09.2006)

⁹ Cp. all materials around the Freedom House Index under <http://www.freedomhouse.org/teplate.cfm?page35&year=2005>

general right to vote for all adults and by free media and an open political election campaigning (Puddington 2006). Since this mainly procedural definition of democracy is only a completion and not part of the actual indications, the following explanations will focus on the ideas of democracy of the freedom-rankings. Democracy is understood as the real possibility to use political and civil rights and as such an integral part of the Indexes' concept of freedom¹⁰. According to Raymond Gastil the Freedom House Index is less dealing with institutional and lawful arrangements, but therefore more with effective procedures than most other discussions about democratic freedoms (Gastil 1993: 22). Consequently the concept is yet overtopping a minimalist concept of democracy (Gaber 2000: 116).

The operationalisation of the Index takes place through two checklists, containing ten questions about political rights and 15 questions about civil rights¹¹. The subdivisions of these checklists can be regarded as complex indicators: In terms of political rights fair and free elections, political pluralism and participation and the functioning of the government are enumerated, in terms of civil rights freedom of religion and opinion, associational and organisational freedom, rule of law and individual rights and personal autonomy are enumerated. All questions are qualitative questions calling for a subjective appraisal. The characteristics of each variable have to be assigned on an ordinal scale (zero points means "not existing", four points means "fully existing". Points can be added or subtracted, if for example even in a traditional monarchy rights of participation are realized or in a country specific ethnical groups are discriminated or pursued. Altogether zero to 100 points can be franchised for all questions. These are translated into an ordinal scale dividing countries into "free" (1 to 2,5 points), "partly free" (3 to 5 points) and "not free" (5,5 to 7 points).

2.1.3 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index was published for the second time in 2005 after it was firstly published in 2003 by the German Bertelsmann foundation in cooperation with the Centrum for Applied Political Research (C.A.P) in Munich¹². It contains two indexes – on the one hand the Status-Index to measure the quality of democracy and market-economy and the Management-Index to measure the efforts and capacities of political leadership (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005). The BTI, which analyses 119 countries of transformation, is measuring first of all rule of law, socially

¹⁰ „Freedom is the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination“ (cp. Freedom House: Methodology, in: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005>, 20.09.2006).

¹¹ The number and kind of questions varies since the 1980ies. Because of that Freedom House is criticized (Lauth 2004: 269; Schmidt 2000: 409): Intertemporal comparisons become more difficult.

¹² The Bertelsmann Stiftung is a foundation holding 75% of the stocks of the Bertelsmann media company. While the foundation describes itself as political independent, critics call it too much anchored in neoliberalism. Besides the Bertelsmann Transformation Index the foundation publishes for example yearly the Bertelsmann Standort Ranking valuating the economic and monetary policies of several countries.

responsible market economy and the state and direction of the process of transformation in the respective country.

The status-index defines a democracy based on market-economy as goal of a successful process of transformation. Consolidated democratic market-economies are therefore not part of the measurement¹³. Because of the connection between market-economy and democracy the status-index differs from other methods of measuring democracy and can not be defined as measurement of democracy because of this over-specification¹⁴, caused by the combination of both ideas. However, the very selective operationalisation of both concepts makes it possible to concentrate on the political transformation, which means the measurement of democratisation. The fundament of the BTI is obviously shaped by European ideas and is in far parts congruent with the criteria of Copenhagen – even through the BTI stresses the universal value of democracy based on rule of law and a social responsible market economy. “As the human rights have a universal value, the defined criteria of rule of law and democracy are also holding a universal value. It is not acceptable, if this criteria is relativised through a pretended inviolability of cultural identity” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: 81).

The index defines the threshold assignments “democracy”, “defect democracy”, “strongly defect democracy”, “moderate autocracy” and “autocracy”. Democracy is described as the existence of political rights inclusive the right to vote, free competition in elections and the acceptance of human rights and laws in face of politics. Autocracies are characterized as states, “in which no free and fair elections take place or in which the exercise of power is not controlled democratically” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: 98). The remaining categorizations are orientated on the theories developed by Wolfgang Merkel who shaped the expression of “defect democracies” (Merkel et al 2003). Basis of the actual measurement are five different dimensions: Performance of the state, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, political and societal integration. Those dimensions have to be fulfilled as normative goals by states. This understanding “which is widely overtopping the periodically holding of elections” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: 22) is, in contradiction to the other indexes, including the monopoly of power by the state.

The BTI is operationalised through 19 dimensions and 58 indicators. 34 indicators are part of the status index, 18 part of the political and 16 part of the economical transformation. According to the five dimensions of democracy indicators are constructed through four questions per dimension, only the dimension “stability” is measured by only two questions. The indicators are complex and continuously qualitative indicators; consequently they call for subjective appraisal¹⁵. The standardization, which is necessary

¹³ Those countries are excluded, which hold the donor status according to the development committee of the OECD.

¹⁴ For an explanation of the concepts of over-, under-, and misspecification cp. Munck/Verkuilen 2000: 5ff. Munck/Vertuilen stress particularly the problem of including market economy into a measurement of democracy.

¹⁵ Questions are for example: In hoe far the rulers are elected through regular, free and fair elections? Does an independent judiciary exist?

because of the objectivity and comparability of the results, is realized through country studies, which are generated by regional coordinators, secondary reviewers and a board of experts (BTI-Board).

2.2 Which kind of democracy is measured by each index?

There is an „existing high number of unsatisfying attempts of defining democracy, which mostly stress one element as particular outstanding: sovereignty of the people, equality, participation, rule of the many, separation of powers, tolerance, legitimation of rule, basic rights, rule of law, the welfare state, general elections, pluralism and so on“ (Guggenberger 1991: 70-71). Terms such as freedom, equality, equity, security and welfare also play a role as core of democracy (Koch 1994: 111-114; Legum 1986: 1984; Kpundeh 1992: 22-23).

Even if important elements of democracy can be stated here: The high number of democratic ideas and conceptions can not completely be reported by this thesis. Nevertheless each way of measuring democracy, presented in the previous chapter, is based on a particular concept of democracy and democratisation. The following sub-chapter will try to assign the indexes and their indicators to the respective conceptualisation of democracy.

2.2.1 The Vanhanen Index and the concept of polyarchy by Robert Dahl

The Vanhanen Index measures as central dimensions “public contestation” and “right to participate” - both dimensions are central contents of the concept of polyarchy by Robert Dahl, even if regarding to the right to participate the concept of Dahl implies more indicators than the Vanhanen Index. Both ideas of democracy are shaped universally, references to special characteristics caused by culture are lacking. The Vanhanen Index consequently represents the minimalist definition of democracy which is based on the concept of Dahl. The minimalist definition of democracy is, apart from political contestation and pluralism, not regarding the separation of powers, rule of law and the capacity of democratic institutions as further particular categories of democracy.

The substantiation of democracy by Dahl is consequently not regarded as the answer to the platonic question “who should rule” (the people!). It is more than that regarded as the possibility to prevent abject government. “Democracies are consequently not popular government by the people, they are an institution preventing dictatorship. Democracies are not allowing the accumulation of power; they try to limit state power. It is vital, that a democracy includes the possibility to change government without bloodshed, if it violates its rights and obligations; but also if the people are valuating its policies as bad or missed” (Popper 1988: 13). By that, Popper meets the point which is described as the “fundamental problem of politics” by Dahl: How can the citizens inhibit that their leaders are becoming tyrannies? The answer of Dahl is: Those, who are not leading, have to exercise control over their leaders. The constellation of social processes facilitating this is called polyarchy. Concretely, polyarchy is the number of institutions, which are necessary and sufficient to inhibit the growth of

dictatorship. In this context polyarchy is a minimal variant of defining democracy as a tool to make totalitarian utopias impossible.

As basis to develop more specific concepts or as an implicit root concept, polyarchy has become the mostly cited reference in the empirically orientated measurement of democracy (Berg-Schlosser 2004: 52). The practical advantage of the concept is that it describes a concept which is - in contrast to democracy - not an ideal vision. Polyarchy describes a concept which tries to come as close to ideal democracy as possible through institutional arrangements that can be reached in reality (Temelli 1999: 27). As such institutional arrangements of polyarchy (1) associational freedom, (2) active right to vote and the right to stand for elections, (3) freedom of political competition, (4) freedom of the media and (6) free, fair and regular elections have to be enumerated (Dahl, 1989; Schmidt 1995: 265-266).

The suppositions to construct these institutional arrangements are defined by Dahl through the fulfilment of five suppositions, for example the separation of powers, the independence of the courts or rule of law. According to Dahl these five conditions are the basic and original conditions that can not be causally led back to anything else. It becomes obvious that the theory of Dahl is descriptive and not based on any norms or values that could be regarded as deductive conditions to achieve the institution of democracy. The concept of Dahl tries to hinder authoritarian autocracies and the Vanhanen Index measures through its two indicators two conditions which proof the absence of totalitarian rule. The concept of polyarchy and the index of Tatu Vanhanen are consequently getting close to concepts of the rule by elites, which is again in a problematic relationship to other ideas of democratic rule. Therefore Satori calls polyarchy as a basis for his concept of democracy based on the rule of elites and sees Dahl in one line with authors like Mosca, Pareto, Croce and Schumpeter.

2.2.2 The Freedomhouse Index and development as freedom by Armatya Sen

The basis of the conceptualisation of democracy of the Freedomhouse Index is “electoral democracy”, which is by its theoretic and normative definition even more minimalist than the institutional minimum defined by polyarchy (Merkel 2004: 1). In a wider understanding democracy in the sense of the Freedomhouse Index means the real use of political and civic rights. Democracy is consequently not only the formal existence of a number of institutions; it expresses effective processes and doings. Consequently the conceptualisation of democracy, which is underlying the Freedomhouse Index, is widely overtopping the minimalist approach of democracy. Contents of the Index are the existence and the real use of political and civic rights, which are regarded as far as universal, as they are all part of the UN-Charta of Human Rights. According to different measurements of democracy the Freedomhouse Index is particularly interesting because it is breaking open the rigid consideration of indicators of elections and right to vote through its idea of civic rights and freedom as a part of democracy (Calaminus 2006: 55). Even if the FHI is by that overstepping the

minimalist variant of democracy, participative elements get a strong accent through six questions of the survey.

According to the capabilities approach of Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, poverty can be defined as a deprivation of capabilities (Sen 2002: 15). Poverty is, in such an understanding, not only the lack of financial, material or natural resources. Development is according to Sen a product of social, political and economical freedoms of the individuals, flanked by security and transparency. Sen consequently regards democracy as incentive system for responsibility of the governing elites and at the same time as protective system for the marginalized groups of the poor and strengthening their "empowerment" (Sen 1999: 12)¹⁶. An important concern of the FHI is to examine which personal freedoms are guaranteed to the people in a state, how the people can use these rights in reality and in how far the usage of these rights is limited by the state or other actors (Lauth 2003: 269). Democracy is by the FHI understood as the real possibilities to use political and civil rights¹⁷. Sen expresses that „democracy has to be seen as a set of opportunities, and the use of these opportunities calls for analysis of a different kind, dealing with the practice of democracy and political rights“ (Sen 1999: 155). The FHI is furthermore consistent with the understanding of Sen because it is measuring not only central criteria of democracy like the rule of law, responsibility of the government and the freedom of opinion and associational freedom. It is also stressing the right of self-rule of political minorities and marginalized groups (Calaminus 2006: 55).

Consequently the argument that there is a contradiction between development and liberty (Löwenthal 1986: 266;)¹⁸ and the argument, poor countries could not afford democracy is more or less relativised by Sen. The German newspaper Handelsblatt expresses: "Leading economists are slowly but surely coming to the realization that the old principle that democracy complicates or even hinders economical development, is wrong. [...] The newest analysis show according to the Havard-economist Dani Rodrik that ruling elites who are not accountable are blocking political reforms in favour of their personal interests are responsible for lacking economical development, not the existence of democratic participation and democratic reform" (Handelsblatt No. 173, 9.9.1998: 10).

If poverty and underdevelopment are understood as a deprivation of capabilities, the conceptualisation of democracy by the Freedomhouse Index, which measures next to political rights also individual rights, a measurement considering these ideas. The Freedomhouse Index for example also measures personal autonomy and individual rights, which is particularly operationalised through the questions about personal social freedoms and business/property freedom. By such a conceptualisation democracy gets the

¹⁶ Sen (1999, p.3): " Auch Menschen in wirtschaftlicher Not brauchen eine politische Stimme. Demokratie ist kein Luxus und kann nicht auf das kommen eines allgemeinen Wohlstandes warten".

¹⁷ „Freedom is the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination“ (cp. Freedom House: Methodology, in: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005>, 20.09.2006).

function of a lever in development: Democracy hatches poverty-reducing development. The focus is hereby not only on economical development, more than that it is the challenge „to make democracy work for ordinary people“ (Fidel Valdez Ramos, cited from Sen 1999: 155). Such a claim is widely overtopping the idea, that democracy could just be constructed by the creation of institutional arrangements.

3.1.1 The Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the concept of democratic market economy

The BTI is conspicuous because of its immanent connection between market economy and democracy. The BTI is based on the idea that in the long run it is not possible to divide a society into parts which develop independently: Democracy or market economy. Tetzlaff expressed in 1993, that „the capitalist way of production has to be regarded as the twin sister of the democratic world revolution“ (Tetzlaff 1993: 40). The BTI defines democracy as „the approximation to the model of democratic market economy“ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: 85) and wants to measure the quality of democracy during the process of transformation. The conceptualisation of the BTI assumes that democracy and market economy need each other reciprocally. This is complying with the idea that it is possible to try to ignore the interrelation of market economy and democracy for a time, but after a critical displacement between both either the political systems is adapting the rules of the economical system or the economical growth is significantly slowing down.

Nevertheless each generalisation regarding the connection between democracy and development has been proved as not testable: The success of south-east Asian Tiger states showed that political stability supports economic growth, but that political stability is not conterminous with democracy (Nuscheler 2005: 455). In so far the contradiction between development and democracy can also be considered as doubtful because more economical development is not automatically leading to more democracy. Munoz stresses, that economical upswing strengthens the stability of an existing political system irrespective if it is democratic or not (Munoz 2001: 29). With regard to empirically contradictory examples it is impossible to draw scientifically causalities between economical growth and democratisation.

The theories of the mutual dependencies between market economy and democracy are mainly stressed by those, who regard democracy first of all as the political system favoured by an, according to monetary income, broad middle class – consequently democracy is supported and forwarded by the growth of a broad middle class. If economical upswing should forward democracy, the consequence is that a just and equitable distribution of wealth and social security is a necessary supposition. Economic upswing including a fair wealth distribution carries out the growth of a broad middle class, which claims democracy (Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1996), which was expressed by Lipset already in former times as follows: „The more

well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy“ (Lipset 1960: 48)¹⁹.

The BTI analyses in each of its standardized country studies the seven dimensions „socio-economical level of development“, „market and competition“, „currency and stability of prices“, „private property“, „welfare regime“, „performance“ and „sustainability“ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: 45). If these indicators would stand alone – without the measurement of „democracy“ and „management of transformation“ – the BTI could be regarded as tending to the neo classical antithesis. However, the BTI stresses that political actors are regarded as vital for the progress of a political transformation and democratisation. Consequently, individual behaviour of the ruling elites inside and shaped by institutional arrangements is important in the frame of the BTI, but also the recognition of a welfare regime and the mechanisms of distribution of wealth which could lead to a broad middle class claiming democracy. The particular interrelations of institutions and market mechanisms and the importance of such interrelations for democracy will be the content of chapter 3.2.

2.3 Sub-conclusion

With regard to the two sub-questions and the further research, three relevant points have to be enumerated to draw a sub-conclusion. After the analysis of the three selected indexes, their indicators and the respective conceptualisations (1) core elements of democratic systems can be defined, (2) the way of explaining the necessity of democracy in the frame of each conceptualisation can be defined and (3) conditions favouring and initiating democratisation with regard to each conceptualisation can be summarized. The definition of core elements, different reasons for and the extend of democracy and respective conditions favouring democratisation is relevant for the further research to elaborate, if the promotion of democracy by the EU is rooted in one particular concept of democracy or a mix of different approaches. It has to be stated, that the three presented indexes and the respective underlying concept of democracy differ in some points from each other, but complete each other in some other points.

A minimalist version is focusing on a particular number of criteria, which have to be fulfilled. The following points can be defined as core elements of the minimalist definition of a democratic system:

- **Contestation** means the existence of political competition to guarantee that the citizens can choose between political alternatives. That implies the existence of a multi party system, free media, free campaigning and associational freedom.

¹⁹ Measured by five indicators for socio-economic development – income, mass-communication, industrialisation, urbanisation, education – Lipset proved such an inference in the case of Anglo-Saxon states, Latin America and Europe. Generally the thesis remains as contested with regard to the very poor states of Sub-Sahara Africa (Diamond 1999; Bredow/Jäger 1997; Dahl 1998; Greven 1998; Berg-Schlosser 1999; Merkel/Puhle 1999; Basedau 2003).

- **Participation** means the possibility of political participation for the overtopping majority of the adults in a country. That implies regular, secret, free and fair elections.

In a wider sense, which is overtopping the minimalist definition of democracy, the following points should be added as core elements of a democratic system. These points are breaking open the concept of electoral democracy which is merely focussing on the fulfilment of institutional arrangements:

- Particularly the measurement of the FHI includes the **adherence to human and civic rights** as essential for democracy. This view is taking into account that the construction of formal rights and institutional arrangements does not guarantee, that these rights are used in reality and that everybody holds according to Sen the possibility to use his rights. That includes the right of self-rule of political minorities and marginalized groups.
- The BTI stresses economic freedoms as vital, because it regards democracy and **market economy** as dependent from each other. This connection rendered empirically as not proved.

As most important arguments for the necessity of the support of democracy and democratisation, several points have to be stated:

- According to the concept of polyarchy the vital reason for democracy is the **prevention of autocratic rule**. Measurements rooted in this concept like the VI define democracy by the absence of authoritarian rule. Democracy is not understood as a normative goal itself.
- Sen defines democracy as an **incentive system** for responsibility of the governing elites. Ruling elites who feel accountable and who have to remain in political competition won't block political reforms and will perform better than without political competition.
- Sen defines democracy as a **protective system** for marginalized groups like the poor. Democracy strengthens their political empowerment - the possibility to represent and formulate own interests through organisational capacity and to hold ruling elites accountable.
- Democracy could last but not least be regarded as **a normative goal itself**. Democracy is - according to the FHI - as a political idea a necessary element of human and civic rights and facilitates the highest grade of freedom.

The question which conditions favour democracy and what makes democracy work is also contested:

- The BTI connects democracy immediately with market-economy. A causal connection is contested and not tested empirically until today. However it has to be held down that, according to Lipset and Huntington, who see the growth of a **broad middle class** as precondition of democracy, economic growth does only favour

democracy if the respective wealth is distributed in a just an equal way. That stresses the necessity of a *welfare regime*.

- Democracy itself claims, according to Sen, particularly in developing countries the need to make democracy work for ordinary people. That implies the necessity to increase the set of opportunities and freedoms by strategies of *empowerment*, the fulfilment of *basic needs* and a concentration on *poverty reduction*. Such an understanding of democracy is obviously surmounting the existence of simple institutional arrangements.
- Democracy is – according to the minimalist version – possible through the creation of a set of institutional arrangements. That implies the concentration on *institutional capacity building* and the support and organisation of vital moments of democratic processes, for example elections or the monitoring of elections. The BTI is in so far consistent to such a concept, that the creation of institutional arrangements is regarded as a supposition for making democracy work.
- The BTI also stresses the necessity of the dimension of management of the process of transformation and defines the state and individual actors – the political elites - as the most important actors to manage such a process of transformation. The guarantee of a *state monopoly of power* and the *reliable performance of democratic institutions* is vital.

3. Which historical experiences and regional features of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa do exist?

The previous chapter presented several concepts of democracy and showed how democratisation moves on. Therefore the following chapter will (1) try to elaborate the conditions and problems of processes of democratisation which are typical for Sub-Sahara African states. Furthermore (2) the signature of good governance, which is today promoted by the European Union and apart from other things claiming for democratisation in developing countries, should be analysed. That is relevant for the further research, because it explains because of which concrete experiences and developments the western donors - including the European Union - made the promotion of democracy under the signature of good governance to a leitmotiv of their international action and development policies. That part of the present chapter is therefore mainly concentrating on the failure of previous approaches of development policies while chapter 4.1.2 will additionally list up the importance of the breakdown of the competition of systems between east and west in 1989/1990 for the actual efforts of the EU to promote democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa. The results of the elaboration of experiences and regional features of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa should make it possible to use the results of the previous chapter without ignoring policy-experiences in development policies and the conditions of the particular framework of countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. The following detailed analysis should prevent the danger of falling into a relativism which might be justified by the observation of cultural differences.

3.1 The African context matters

3.1.1 Which regional features of democratisation do exist with regard to Sub-Sahara Africa?

Democratisation is process and as such holding another character than democracy as a current status (Hofmeier/Mehler 2004: 64). Conditions of processes for creating and implanting democratic systems and societies have however always been an implicit part of theories of democracy. Particular efforts of research in political science in the late 1980ies which put the focus straight on processes of democratisation and transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems can today be seen as the starting point of the research on transition of political systems, a sub discipline of political science (O'Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead 1986). The fact that until the late 1980ies only two of the 45 African states – Botswana and Mauritius - could be described as electoral democracies caused the assumption, that Sub-Sahara Africa as one of the poorest and most underdeveloped world regions was not mature for democracy. The link to traditional leadership was often used as a justification for „one-man leadership“ (Illy 1980; Jackson/Rosberg 1982; Sithole 1989). The strong ethnical, religious and regional fragmentation of the young African states has been used as an argument for one-party systems, which should be able to strengthen nation-building and national unity (Meyns 2000: 148; Macpherson, 1967). While during a long period dictatorship was regarded as the usual political system of developing countries (Löwenthal 1986: 266)²⁰, in the beginning of the 1990ies it came to processes of political reforms in Sub-Sahara Africa.

These political reforms which predominantly have to be regarded as consequences of movements of political protests because of the failure of the authoritarian policies inside the respective countries, are according to Huntington known as a „third wave“ of democratisation (Tetzlaff 1995: 117; Huntington 1992: 579)²¹. Internal rage as a consequence of the unsatisfying economic situations, an endemic corruption and the autocratical political class were regarded as main reason for those political reforms, but they have been flanked by international changes. The end of the competition of systems between socialism and capitalism guided the way to development cooperation less orientated on security-political motivated thinking but more interested in the promotion of human rights and democracy (Wagner, 1993: 12; Lettwich, 1993: 609)²². At that point such factors which are today

²⁰ Löwenthal (1992, p.266): „Man kann geradezu sagen, dass in diesen Ländern innerhalb gewisser Grenzen zwischen dem Ausmaß pluralistischer Freiheit und dem Tempo der Entwicklung eine Antinomie besteht: Jeder Grad an Freiheit wird mit etwas Verlangsamung der Entwicklung, jeder Grad an Beschleunigung mit etwas Verlust an Freiheit bezahlt. Das ist in der Natur des Prozesses unvermeidlich“.

²¹ Huntington (1991, p.16) enumerates several waves of democratisation. The first wave (1828-1926), the second wave (1943-1962), two opposed waves (1922-1942 and 1958-1975) and the third wave starting in the late eighties.

²² Lettwich (1994, p.336): „Western governments and the major international institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, regularly supported “bad governance” and cruelly authoritarian regimes“. Cp. DAC (1991, p.10): “There were sometimes perceived strategic and commercial interests which prompted governments to extend substantial aid to autocratic regimes with doubtful development and human rights records“. The end of the Cold War, by altering foreign policy objectives, has brought major changes also in aid objectives (...). Accordingly, donors

known as the signature of good governance became stronger and more important²³. Furthermore a huge number of authoritarian African leaders were afraid of the so-called Ceausescu-effect of inglorious resignation (Meyns 2000: 150). Empirically it has to be concluded: Until 1989, 38 of the former 45 states of Sub-Sahara Africa were civil or military one-party systems. Within only one year the number of states introducing democratic reforms increased from four to 20 and within three years to 30 states (Reiff 1998: 42). Africa was effected by a transformation process but it has to be mentioned that this process was not unitary, linear and sustainable but marked by relapses and the remaining of processes of transition in forms of hybrids between democracy and dictatorship²⁴ or just the extreme of state decay, for example in the DR of Kongo.

Democratisation stands more than somewhere else in the world in Sub-Sahara Africa under the pressure of factors which have to be regarded as contrary to political stability: Economic and social crises, mass poverty, ethnical conflicts and the dependence on international financial organisations like IMF or World Bank. Just because of these constraints, the claims for democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa are just described as a “democratisation of powerlessness” (Hippler 1994: 39). Furthermore the classification of 54 states as “partly free” (Freedom House, Freedom in the World: www.freedomhouse.org) by Freedom House points out, that a high number of states in Africa is somewhere between democracy and autocracy. Without legitimation through increasing quality of standards of life, the legitimation constructed by elections is quickly becoming fragile (Nuscheler 2005: 425), even more if governments decay into corruption and misuse of power. Herein a fundamental dilemma of processes of political transformation becomes clear, which is rooted in the existence of traditional structures parallel to modern, formal democratic structures: The necessity of strategic patronage networks of the relevant actors which is in a blatant contradiction to the declared goals of the political reforms (O’Donnell 1992: 24).

3.1.2 The phenomena of neopatrimonialism – why do so many processes of transformation remain as hybrids between democracy and authoritarian rule?

The construction and structure of African institutions and organisations in the political system demonstrate different particular features: Ethnical and clientelistic networks capture an exceptional large importance because financial resources and exhaustive formal organisation is mostly lacking (Erdmann 1999: 379). Particularly in terms of African parties there is only a very weak basis of formally registered members, which causes a strong

now find it less expedient to overlook economic mismanagement and poor governance by recipient countries” (World Bank, 1993, p.49).

²³ The World Bank study “From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A long term Perspective Study” published in 1989 which appointed a “crisis of government” (World Bank, 1989, p.60) as responsible for lacking development in Sub-Sahara Africa is regarded as the starting point of the ascent of Good Governance.

²⁴ According to Erdmann (2003, p.267), a hybrid between democracy and dictatorship called neopatrimonialism is typically for several African states. Neopatrimonialism is described as an interlocking of patrimonial rule according to Max Weber and modern forms of rule.

financial dependence of the party on public financing (Erdmann 1999: 378). Ideologically and programmatically parties in African political systems are often only loosely bound. According to Erdmann, African parties are in their majority not able to outreach the level of general and partly populist incantations of development in face of present and serious economical and social problems (Erdmann 1999: 381).

The so-called neopatrimonialism rediscovers the patrimonialism, which Max Weber describes as traditional leadership. In patrimonialism the leader bases his power only on his faithful and personal responsible administrative and military staff (Weber 1922: 583), and projects this idea on current political systems in Sub-Sahara Africa. Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid, which means the partly parallel and the partly interlocked existence of patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule (Erdmann 2001: 296). The speciality of neopatrimonial rule is the formal acceptance of the separation of private and public issues which does however not exist in practise. "The patrimonial practice infiltrates the legal-rational system and distorts its logic of functioning" (Erdmann 2001: 3).

That becomes obvious in expanded political clientele relations and networks of patronage, whereby the patron transfers public resources and services – which are available for him because of his position - to his client rather than private resources and services. In terms of economical development the consequence of such behaviour is that public positions are used to accumulate individual and private wealth through a process of informal privatisation (cp. Erdmann 2001: 3). Besides that a political position is also used to determine the rent-seeking income of third persons. The recruiting to certain positions takes place rather on a basis of loyalty expectations than on the basis of qualification – structures of patronage proliferate therefore even in the lowest political and administrative levels of government. An in comparison to western countries endemic corruption is distinctive for such countries. In all areas where the state acts as an economic actor rent-seeking is present.

Consequently it is obvious, that African politics and democracy always have to be regarded in a field of tension. But the vital point of the debate about democracy is furthermore the lacking compatibility of the respective way of defining democracy in western countries and in Africa²⁵. The South Commission under Willy Brandt proclaimed that western ideas of democracy cannot be used and introduced with the same scales and expectations in African countries. Size, history and cultural differences lead to different systems of values of the population; because of that the immediate transmission of western norms of democracy becomes impossible (Süd-Kommission 1991; Zinecker 2003). Such an understanding leads to a relativism, which could bring the debate about democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa however ad absurdum: It should not be held back that a broad set of concepts and marks of democracy and democratisation exists²⁶.

²⁵ The former president of Tansania, Julius Nyerere, said: „Der Norden redet nicht über Demokratie - der Norden redet über seine Interpretation von Demokratie (...). Wir sollten über Demokratie reden, nicht über die Form“ (cited from Hofmeier, 1990).

²⁶ An overview about all relevant schools of theories gives Breytenbach, 1996: pp. 14-23.

In face of a pervasive use of the term of democracy, an agreement on central characteristics of democracy and democratisation is indispensably necessary. In such a field of tension the particular use and risk of the different indexes to measure democracy is substantiated.

3.4 The good governance approach: A consequence of a process of policy learning?

The western donors declared through good governance democratic rule and democratic change in countries of Sub-Sahara Africa as their normative goal²⁷. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) took up as an agency of the entire continent the term of democracy for the first time in the year of 1990. Their "African Charter for democratic participation in development and transformation" was a declared belief into the failure of African authoritarian political elites. The establishment of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) took up the necessity of democracy and democratic change again and developed for the first time a mechanism, which tries to introduce a mutually evaluation of criteria such as democratisation by African countries²⁸. That brook off the taboo of the mutual non-interference in internal-African policy by African countries. After the end of the cold war in 1989/1990 the perception of political conditions in developing countries changed: They have no longer been regarded as exogenous factors. Political conditions became the intrinsic content of development assistance. The possibility to support democratic reforms or to hustle authoritarian regimes to reforms was described as an "opening window of opportunity" (Burnell, 1993: 6) for western donor countries.

The contradictory results of the partly by endogenous and partly by exogenous factors caused third wave of democratisation show today at least, that it was more or less a political boom without conditions for stability. The development assistance policy of the European Union adapted the promotion of democracy after the breakdown of the system competition between the real existing socialism and the capitalism in 1989/1990. The promotion of democracy and democratic institutions in developing countries was beforehand rarely a content of the agenda of development policy. The importance of good governance, rule of law and democracy was however also originated by a policy learning of the western donor states and donor organisations, which results from the failure of former approaches, for example the structural thesis. The structural thesis dominated development theories from the fifties up to late seventies. This model accents structural rigidities as main restraints of development²⁹:

²⁷ Good governance can be described as a leitmotiv (Stevens/Gnanaselvam 1995: 97) of current development assistance policy of western donors containing the call for democratisation, human rights, market economy, rule of law and effective poverty reduction policies.

²⁸ This mechanism is called African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and stands for a board of all-over Africa accepted notabilities who should evaluate among other things the grade of democracy in African countries on a voluntary basis (<http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm.php>, 23.09.2006)

²⁹ The structural thesis contains the model of dualism, dependencia and the model of asymmetric trade (Wagner 1996: 127ff). Colclough (1991: 22) mentions as most important theorists: Lewis, Chenery, Hirschmann, Myrdal, Rodney, Seers, Senghaas.

- Vicious circle as a consequence of lacking capital leading to less productivity, a low GDP per capita, no savings and no investment (Wagner/Kaiser 1995: 52ff);
- Inefficient structures of technology and less factor substitution, leading to a modern economic sector not integrated into the (traditional) society, called dualism (Wagner/Kaiser 1995: 38ff);
- Socio-cultural sets of norms which are contrary to an economic rational behaviour practiced in industrialized countries (Hirschmann 1981: 5).

In terms of the structural thesis such structural rigidities hindered the fast and quantitative reaction of economic systems on changing markets. Consequently, the operativeness of markets with free price formation in developing countries is doubtful. Instead of market economy and price mechanisms, the motor of development ought to be the state as over-all planner of allocation of investments, controlling of economy, foreign trade and correcting failing markets. Vehicles of development are, in terms of the structural thesis, industrialisation focusing on the single market, substitution of importations and a high level of protection by tariffs.

In the early eighties the neo-classical anti-thesis grew up and induced a changeover (Toye 1993: 54) in development theories³⁰. The reasons for this changeover can be seen on different levels:

- The structural thesis rendered increasingly as not testable (Wagner, 1993, p.50). “The crisis of the economies based on the substitution of imports in Latin America and the apparent success of South-East Asian economies based on export” (Menzel 1992: 126) caused and underpinned the criticism on the structural thesis.
- The accentuated role of the state in controlling economy led to a huge and inefficient public sector. Protection by tariffs and regulation of prices was more and more seen as welfare losses causing state-interventions (Toye 1993: 70). The assumption of market failure was replaced by government failure³¹.
- Furthermore the neo-classical anti-thesis abolished the idealistic view of the state. Why politicians and officials should, opposite to other citizens, act common-wealth orientated (Krueger 1993: 56)?
- The efficiency of decentral allocation of investments by the market increasingly proved to be more useful than allocation by state planning (Lal 1983: 74).

According to the neo-classical anti-thesis, the rigidness accentuated by the structural thesis are rather caused by “irrational state interferences, mainly barriers of foreign trade and the financing of inflationary budget deficits” (Lal 1985: 13). Consequently, the supposition of long-term economic

³⁰ Toye (1993) described his studies with the verbalism “Counter-Revolution”.

³¹ Krueger (1990, p.9): “The fact is that, by the 1970s and early 1980s, governments in most developing countries were mired down in economic policies that were manifestly unworkable. Whether market failures had been present or not, most knowledgeable observers concluded that there had been colossal government failures. In many countries, there could be little question but that government failure significantly outweighed market failure.”

growth in developing countries should be pushed by the short-term achievement of allocation-efficiency by the market. The first credo was: Get the prices right. The state should, by minimal action only, guarantee efficient markets for goods and capital. Above all, the freedom of decisions should completely be given to private subjects of economy, consequently the second neo-classical credo was: Get the property rights right. New strategies of development, subsumed under the “Washington Consensus”³², contained:

- Monetary stabilisation, which means fiscal discipline with a budget deficit not under 2%, a lowering of state expenses and a tax system stimulating investments;
- Orientation of developing countries on foreign trade, which means the degradation of trammels of trade, equal treatment of foreign and domestic firms and competitive exchange rates to cause a growth of exports (Nuscheler 1995: 59);
- The establishment of free markets, which means the privatisation of state-driven enterprises, deregulation, the strengthening of property rights and positive interest rates to avoid the flight of capital (Williamson 1993: 1329).

The success of measures based on the neo-classical theory in developing countries, which implemented programmes orientated on the Washington Consensus, have been highly ambivalent. Particularly disappointing was the effect on developing countries in Sub-Sahara Africa (Streeten 1993: 34). The until this point in time less regarded representatives of the so-called new institutional economy explained the unexpected failure of neo-classical policies in Sub-Sahara Africa with the different institutional arrangements in each developing country³³. Institutions are in this framework understood as “the rules of game in society, formal expressed the restrictions of human interactions created by humans” (North 1993: 3). That means all kinds of normative rules, but also formal institutions like governmental organisations, jurisdiction, banks, the police or the health sector (Richter/Bindseil 1995: 133). The neo-classical anti-thesis defined the minimal role of the state, but did not ensure the state institutions in developing countries to be able to implement reforms effectively. In retrospective “the lack of the formal order in developing countries, in which efficient markets work” (North 1992: 81) was responsible for the ambivalent results of neo-classical policies. Since then “get the institutions right” (Feldmann 1995: 44) has consequently been regarded as supposition for “get the prices right”.

This kind of neo-institutional synthesis dissolved the dogmatic contradiction between free markets versus the state and contained the following recommendations for developing economies:

³² Williamson (1990, p.50) called a consensus in development assistance policy stipulated between three organizations in Washington D.C.: World Bank, International Monetary Fund and US-Government.

³³ For an overview of the new institutional economy see Eggertson (1990).

- A reduction of costs of transaction through market-economy orientated institutions and the rule of law, both regarded as public goods. This exalts the safety of investments and lowers the costs of “using the market” (Richter/Bindseil 1995: 44). An existing legal order could cause increasing economies of scale, because the necessity of finding specific rules for each economic transaction escapes (North, 1988: 38).
- A reduction of costs of information through transparent, credible and calculable public policies (Klitgaard, 1995: 3). Democracy, including free elections and a multi-party system, is regarded as the most efficient way of making public policies efficient through contesting parties.

The European Union used this new concept to underpin the Good Governance approach and defined the state as supplier of rules – the postulates of the new institutional economy and the EU’s focus on state accountability, information and transparency have been on a wide scale concurring³⁴. On the bilateral level the claim for democratic systems in developing countries, formulated by the DAC, was also unisonous with the neo-institutional synthesis³⁵.

3. 5 Sub-Conclusion

With regard to the two sub-questions and the further research two important points have to be stated. Firstly (1) there is a broad set of regional features which makes it impossible to transfer the models and concepts of democracy as described by the previous chapter immediately to African countries. These Sub-Sahara Africa-specific features are relevant with regard to the targeted stock-check of the impact of EU’s policies on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa – to ignore these features could diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of those policies which try to promote and support democratisation in the respective countries. Secondly (2) the analysis of the origin of the current leitmotiv of development cooperation – good governance – made it possible, to enumerate several historical experiences with regard to the importance of democracy for existing and former paradigms of development cooperation. Such experiences could - through a process of policy-learning - lead to the good-governance approach and are relevant because they affect and influence the policies of the international donors and the acceptance of democracy for donors and recipient countries as leading paradigms.

As typical conditions and problems of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa the following points have to be enumerated:

- The so called third wave of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa was released by internal and external factors. External factors matter, but ***internal support of democratisation*** by particular stakeholders

³⁵ “With democracy spreading, autocratic governments in many developing countries have been put on the defensive. It has become harder to defend the one-party systems which in the past have been idealistically supported in Africa (...). The signals being given are that allocation decisions henceforth will be more influenced in the past by a country’s record on human rights and democratic practice” (OECD 1990: 11).

seems to be an essential precondition. The protests inside the African countries at the beginning nineties caused by the bad performance of African ruling elites, have been a necessary condition for democratic change and successful external support.

- The conditions under which democratisation in Sub-Sahara African countries should move on are highly problematic and often counteractive to the original goal: Social crises, mass poverty, ethnical conflicts and the dependence on international financial organisations cause a so-called *democratisation of powerlessness*. The socio-economic environment in Sub-Sahara African states has to be described as problematic with regard to factors favouring democracy.
- It is obvious that the results of processes of transformation and democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa are not linear and unitary. A dilemma of processes of transformation in African countries is the necessity of a strategic policy of patronage, which deforms the logic of the functioning of modern democratic institutions which are necessary for democratisation. This phenomena is called *neopatrimonialism*. The Sen approach has to be regarded as a vital completion: Democracy as a system, which gives a political voice to the marginalized poor in African States can lead to a situation in which the people call for a social and efficient policy which is not shaped by rent-seeking.

According to different approaches of development assistance policy and the role of democracy according to theses approaches three points should be enumerated:

- The so-called *structural thesis failed*. A model of modernisation based on the thesis of the contradiction between democracy and development is with regard to Sub-Sahara Africa disproved. Democracy is, according to Sen, an incentive system which causes poverty reducing development.
- The so-called *neo-classical anti-thesis failed*. Structural adjustment robbed young democracies its legitimation by macro-economic claims destroying the supplement of basic needs and thwarted the efforts of local stakeholders campaigning for democracy. Structural adjustment, which is at odds with the Sen approach, promoted poverty and decreased people's capabilities. Functioning institutions guaranteeing efficient markets did not exist in Sub-Sahara Africa.
- The good governance approach is close to the idea of market economy bounded to democracy. Getting prices right by getting institutions right together with democracy is seen as a system producing the best policies - *Good governance combines the Sen idea with the BTI approach*. Economic upswing through integration into the world market is with regard to democratisation only sustainable, if democratic, legal and social institutions legitimate the government, for example by poverty reducing actions. Increasing people's capabilities by *poverty reduction and empowerment* consequently sustains democratic transformation.

4. What is the EU's action?

The upgrading of the promotion of democracy as a goal of foreign policies and the more and more important role of the European Union in international politics lead to the original core of research of the present paper. The promotion of democracy by the European Union is in the frame of the present research not understood as the sum of all policies exercised by the member states; it is understood as all policies which have an impact on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa implemented by EU-institutions and implemented as common measures. The different policies of the member states are of course essential factors influencing the common policies of the European Union, but a full explanation and analysis of these policies would definitely burst the frame of the present paper.

The European Union embeds the promotion of democracy through its foreign policies differently. The present chapter will firstly (1) analyse all policies, which immediately and by official declaration try to promote democracy in countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. Consequently, the promotion of democracy is the way, in which the European Union formulates its claim for democracy, if it wants to achieve democratisation through its role as a model for democratisation, as a trendsetter or through pressure and the sum of all projects and programmes which are financed and implemented in the area of good governance, democracy and protection of human rights. The chapter includes, according to the positive measures, two examples, which will try to illustrate in a concrete and comprehensible way the practical problems of the implementation of practical principles. A second step (2) should focus on those European policies and practices, which are not bounded immediately to the goal of achieving democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa but which do have a mediate impact on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa. As examples the European foreign trade policy, mainly with regard to tariffs and other trammels of trade, and the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union as an according to its intention domestic policy will be analysed.

4.1 Which European policies to promote democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa do exist?

4.1.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced by the treaty of Maastricht. With a reference to „common values“ and the „protection of common interests“ article 11 (1) expresses: „The development and strengthening of democracy and the respect for human rights and basic freedoms“ are goals of the European Union. In the framework of the CFSP three sectors of the promotion of democracy have to be enumerated. These are - in different ways and up to a different extend - relevant for developing countries.

Firstly, the decision on the use of instruments of the CFSP has to be mentioned, which cause and lead to further and stronger decisions including actions in the area of international relations. An example for such action is

the common position of the Council from May 25th 1998 (Council of the EU 25.05.1998). Referring to the Lome-convention and its implications in terms of human rights and democracy the common position strengthens, that the activities of the EU are bounded to the principles of respecting human rights, good governance and democracy. To reach these goals the European Union defines that on the one hand „in the case of negative changes (...) reasonable reactions,, (Council of the EU 20.05.1998) are a tool of its politics, on the other hand the council stresses the possibility of an extension of the cooperation with all those countries, which orientate themselves to democratisation, good governance and human rights (Council of the EU 20.05.1998, Art. 4). Secondly, public declarations, diplomatic demarches and the possibility to order all diplomats accredited in the EU to consultation have to be enumerated as further tools. Diplomatic demarches are normally very discrete. In opposite to such a procedure declarations want to gain public attention. Public declarations generally are held in the belief, that the behaviour of governments could be influenced or just to show that the European Union is not inactive or incuriously with regard to a particular problem (Nolting 2003: 121). These declarations are used more frequently than the already mentioned instruments of the CFSP, because they do not need the complex way of coordination, mentioned before (see Art. 12 EU-Treaty). The declaration on Sudan from May the first 1995 made by the responsible secretary general can serve as a good example for the typical character of such a declaration. It expresses the concerns of the EU with regard to the humanitarian crisis, which has been worsened by the armed conflicts, that made the existing humanitarian cooperation of the EU becomes impossible. The conflict parties were asked to „find a settlement of their dispute“(Declaration of the EU concerning Sudan, 01.05.1998). As third tool concrete measures to promote and support democracy have to be mentioned. Here the CFSP is concentrating on activities with a high symbolic meaning and the promotion of democratisation in a very narrow sense, for example the monitoring of elections or material support of elections. Such activities have been decided by the Commission for example in face of Zimbabwe or the DR Congo. Positive measures to promote democratisation are however not only part of the CFSP – these measures exceed the borders of single departments. A more detailed analysis of such measures is part of chapter 4.1.3.

4.1.2 The European Development Cooperation Policy

The following sub-chapter is tries to analyse the development cooperation policy of the European Union with special attention to the aspect of promotion of democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa. Furthermore it should become clear, how the promotion of democratisation becomes a more and more important part of the measures and declarations of the development policy of the EU. The positive measures to promote and support democratisation financed by the European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU budget are part of the following chapter (Chapter 4.1.3), even if these measures are of course part of the development cooperation policy of the European Union. It should be achieved by the following sub-chapter to reflect the general guidelines of development policies of the European Union on the background of an actual and ambitious document of the

European Commission from 2005, the so called EU-Africa-Strategy. By this analysis it will be possible to regard the rhetorical claims of the EU in relation to the practise of the EU's development policies.

4.1.2.1 Democratisation as part of the EU Africa-Strategy

The so called „Strategy of the European Union for Africa“ (KOM 2005 489)³⁶, decided by the European Commission, stresses the necessity of a harmonisation of all measures and policies (KOM 2005 489: 8), the self-obligation of African states to respect human rights and democratic principles as a supposition of cooperation (KOM 2005 489: 22)³⁷ and the necessity of the creation of a socio-economic environment favouring democratisation in the respective countries (KOM 2005 489: 29). The document stresses furthermore the mutual necessity and the interrelation of development cooperation and the promotion of democratisation and plausible strategies of poverty reduction flanked by a promotion of small scale private enterprises as mediate suppositions of democratisation (KOM 2005 489: 28). Main actors are the leading political elites whose „lawful, responsible and effective governance“ (KOM 2005 489: 28) is regarded as a key for the configuration of the aspired processes. As a consequence, external actors should only support already existing movements in African states. As concrete starting point to support democratisation the Commission enumerates the creation of an environment favouring democratisation. Under the title “state reform“ (KOM 2005 489: 29) the concrete points “decentralisation“, “increasing the capacity of police and the legal system“, „increasing the capacity of public administration“ and “capacity-building in the national parliaments“ are mentioned. Through the realization of these points among others the reduction of corruption should be possible. As another core element gender-equality is enumerated (KOM 2005 489: 31). Under the title of “plausible poverty reduction“ (KOM 2005 489: 37-40) the points “expansion of the education system“, “increasing health services“ and „increasing the access to drinking water“ are enumerated. Under the title “economic empowerment“ (KOM 2005 489: 33) the points “better access to markets“ and “supporting small scale enterprises“ are mentioned. Spongy and less concrete, without an enumeration of hints for the implementation, remains the claim for an “initiative to promote responsible governance“ (KOM 2005 489: 30). Another aim of the EU is an enlargement of the cooperation with actors of civil society.

4.1.2.2 Democratisation as part of preferential trade systems

De facto, European development cooperation policy is essentially trade policy and as such concentrated on a number of privileged states, the so called ACP-states which are to an extent of nearly 100% former European colonies³⁸. The cooperation is constructed in a very complex and

³⁶ The EU-Africa-Strategy was decided by the Council in 2005: It is the first strategy regarding Africa as a whole and claiming for coherence of policies and different sectoral strategies.

³⁷ This line of thoughts is described by the EU as “ownership” and is at the same time a hedged belief of the EU to political conditionality of cooperation. The document of the Commission makes clear that the fulfilment of particular conditions get the EU's support – at the same time it is also stressed, that the fulfilment of these criteria is a necessary precondition of cooperation.

³⁸ All countries of Sub-Sahara Africa are however ACP-states.

heterogeneous way. Direct proceeds out of European development aid are in comparison to the proceeds out of trade with the EU, very low for the ACP-states. Furthermore, the ACP-states differ very much from each other according to size and population. However, they are similar according to their structure of trade. More than other comparable developing countries they are all dependent on the export of unprocessed primary goods and all ACP-states have to be regarded as LDCs (Least Developed Countries). Since the 1960ies the ACP-states are mostly holding a privileged trade access to the European market, which is based on a non-reciprocal basis (Tod 2000: 121). The respective Treaties of Lome contained furthermore programmes to stabilize the proceeds gained through the export of unprocessed raw materials and unprocessed agrarian goods. These programmes intervened only in the case of the export of unprocessed goods and only in the frame of fixed quotas. As a result, all countries which decreased their quotas by the diversification of their economies were punished. Structural dependencies increased; the integration into global strings of adding value was impossible (Kappel 1999: 67).

Through the Lome 4 treaty decided and inured in 1991, in a narrow temporal relation to changes of the global-political situation, it came to a political conditionalisation of the trade privileges by Article 5 of the agreement on human rights (Heinz/Lingau/Waller 1995: 2)³⁹. In the framework of development cooperation conditionality describes the practise to bound development aid on particular conditions, which are formulated by the donor country, to influence the political, social and economical developments inside the recipient country not only by granting financial resources. In other words: Conditionality is used to induce the recipient country to actions and a behaviour which wouldn't be implemented by the recipient country without any pressure. Concepts of conditionality generally exist between unequal partners, whereby the dependency of the recipient country from the donor can be pronounced differently (Halm 1997: 11). Through the Lome 4 mid term review in 1994 the Article 366 was added into the treaty. Article 366 introduced a mechanism of sanctions for the case of violations of human rights or democratic principles. The revolutionary successions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe released the development assistance policy from the dominance of geo-political interests. "The breakdown of communist states in Eastern Europe means, that western countries no longer have to fear to lose clients and partners in the South to communism" (Lettwich 1993: 609). Consequently, the developing countries lost their geo-political importance. However, at the same time the donor's justification for supporting authoritarian regimes was obsolete too⁴⁰. In December 1990 the DAC announced the principle of participative development and a vital link between democracy and an effective poverty reducing policy (OECD 1991: 43)⁴¹. At the same time protests against

³⁹ „In the past we gave support to the likes of Amin, Bokassa or Mobutu. That will never happen again. We want to build a self-confident, new African bourgeoisie based on democracy and the rule of law" (Manuel Marin, EU-Commissioner for Development in 1993).

⁴⁰ „The end of the Cold War, by altering foreign policy objectives, has brought major changes also in aid objectives (...). Accordingly, donors now find it less expedient to overlook economic mismanagement and poor governance by recipient countries" (World Bank 1993: 49).

⁴¹ That European countries have been willing to use this new margin became clear through a number of statements of leading politicians since 1990. In June 1990 the British foreign minister

autocratic governance and mismanagement in African states took place, leading to a new orientation of the European development cooperation policy. This new orientation can consequently not be regarded completely as the imposition of democracy and human rights to states in Sub-Sahara Africa, it also has to be regarded as a support for partial successful movements of democratisation in Africa (Ansprenger 1997: 135). When the EU was founded, the intention of democratisation got a new basis through the reworked Article 177 (2) EC-Treaty: „The policies of the Community contribute to the general goal to develop and consolidate democratisation, rule of law and the respect for human rights and basic freedoms”.

The Cotonou-Agreement which replaced the Lome treaties in 2000 has to be understood as an essential integrant of today’s European development cooperation policy. The Cotonou-Agreement included new policies into the cooperation. The promotion of gender equality, democratic principles and human rights – in short, the requirement-profile created under the signature of good governance, which is today expected from governments of developing countries by western donors – became integrant and condition of European development cooperation, because in the case of the violation of one of these principles states could be excluded from the cooperation (Lister 2002: 45). The Cotonou-Agreement, which was negotiated between EU member states and the ACP-states in February 2000, continued however the basic approach of the Lome process (Menck 2000: 229). The Cotonou-Agreement tries in three different ways to support the promotion of democracy. Firstly, references to democratic principles and the protection of human rights penetrate the whole text. Here the treaty refers particularly to other international treaties and agreements - by that the basis of legitimation is strengthened and furthermore the content is put into more concrete terms⁴². The preamble of the agreement stresses already that it is decided „in respect of the fact, that a political environment in which peace, security and stability, respect for human rights and democracy and rule of law and furthermore a responsible governance are integral contents development“. In the same breath the preamble stresses that „the creation of such an environment is mainly the response of the respective countries“. Secondly, the Cotonou-Agreement contains a special chapter about the “political dimension”: Article 8 of this chapter tries to revive the issues mentioned by the preamble through a political dialogue. Participants in such a dialogue should also be regional organisations and organisations of the civil society. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and rule of law are risen to „substantial parts of Agreement“ by the Article 9 (2). Thirdly Article 96 of the Agreement defines a mechanism of consultation which intends as a special measure the suspension from the Cotonou-Agreement. As well as the outset of a consultation (15 days after the request) as the maximal length of a consultation (60 days) prevents an intended procrastination of the process of consultation. In spite of these three elements a paradigm shift of

Douglas Hurd expressed, that potential recipient countries have to respect “pluralism, public accountability, rule of law, human rights and market economy” (ODI 1992: 1). French president Francois Mitterand expressed, that “real democracy, a multi-party system, free elections and human rights” (IDS 1993: 7) is anticipated and will be supported by French development assistance.

⁴² To mention just a few: Charta of the United Nations, Declaration of Human Rights

European development cooperation could not be stated. „As far as the political aspect is concerned, there is no denying that the new Convention modernises relations between the EU and ACP states“ (Camara Santa Clara Gomes 2000: 13) with the goal of a stronger politicisation which has already been implemented since the Lome 3 treaty.

The European Union realizes through the agreements on trade preferences - actually the Cotonou Agreement - those points which are claimed by the Commission through the Africa-Strategy (KOM 2005 489) only partly. According to the goal to integrate the ACP-states in the world market to increase their economical conditions a clear and transparent timetable to realize reciprocal trade is lacking. Changes with regard to this question only seem to be possible through external pressure by the WTO – the WTO is however criticising the whole system of trade preferences. The goal of integration into the world market is immediately connected to the goal to increase the access to markets of producers in African countries, which makes the opening of markets on both sides necessary⁴³. The currently discussed European Partnership Agreements (EPA`s), which should replace the existing trade preferences of the Cotonou-Agreement – as a consequence of the pressure of WTO - intend to establish exceptions on a bilateral level then again which foster and protect the agricultural production inside the EU.

4.1.2.3 Democratisation through poverty reduction

Because the Africa-Strategy of the EU calls for an socio-economic environment favouring democratisation and the approach of Armatya Sen, who sees increasing capabilities of the people as precondition and element to sustain democracy, the role of poverty reduction in the EU`s development policy has to be regarded as relevant. In the framework of the general orientation of development cooperation on poverty reduction since the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through the United Nations, the Cotonou-Agreement has been adapting the reduction of poverty as a key to democratisation and development and enumerates aspects of institutional support which is consistent with the points mentioned by the document of the Commission (KOM 2005 489). With regard to poverty reduction the European Union introduced in 2001 the initiative „everything but arms“ (EBA). LDCs should get tariff-free access to the markets of the EU, excluding in the case of weapons. Also countries which are not part of the group of ACP-states have been included. Despite the fact that importations from these countries (LDCs) account for less than 1% of the whole importations of the EU, the programme was resolutely rejected by the agricultural lobby-associations in the EU (Schilder 2001: 88). As a consequence, today the initiative is called the „everything but farms“-programme, because it does not only exclude arms, but also sugar and rice for example⁴⁴. The EU - however - introduced tariff-free contingents for importation.

⁴³ European Trade Policy and its impact on democratisation and the respective socio-economic environment is part of Chapters 4.2.1

⁴⁴ European Agricultural Policy and its impact on democratisation and the respective socio-economic environment is part of Chapters 4.2.2

Today, the state-orientated development cooperation of the European Union is bounded to the fulfilment of conditions by the governments of states in Sub-Sahara Africa. This leads to the risk that resources of development cooperation are granted to those countries which can already refer to successes and the countries with the strongest need for democratisation are not considered (Dearden/Salama 2001: 254). In the frame of the so called new European Strategy for Mediterranean Countries or in frame of the promotion and integration of the new eastern member states resources are used, which weight down the intended poverty reduction of the EU in favour of stronger neighbourhood policies. That shows a general problem which is contradictory to the goal of poverty reduction: In 1980/81 the five most important recipients of development aid of the EU have been India (9,6 Mio. USD), Sudan (4,1 Mio. USD), Egypt (3,6 Mio. USD), Bangladesh (3,5 Mio. USD) and Senegal (3,4 Mio. USD), almost exclusively countries which can be counted as „the poorest of the poor“. In 2000/01 the main recipients have been former Yugoslavia (9,3 Mio. USD), Turkey (3,3 Mio. USD), Bosnien-Herzegowina (3 Mio. USD), Tunesia (2,6 Mio. USD) and Marokko (2,4 Mio. USD) (OECD 2002: 305); almost all of them are immediate neighbour countries of the EU which do not show as blatant problems of poverty as the LDCs.

4.1.3 Positive Measures to promote democracy

The politicisation of the EU`s development assistance policy also contains projects and programmes which afford positive and immediate constructive contributions to the processes of democratisation. The basis for activities favouring the respect for human rights and democratisation in foreign countries was generated by a decision of the Council in 1991 (Heinz/Lingau/Waller 1995: 5; Hartmann 1995: 426). The positive measures are financed by the European Development Fund or by the budget of the EC⁴⁵.

A document of the Commission (European Commission DG 13 1998) defines the different fields of activities where positive measures of the European Union can be financed and implemented. The document is developed by the Direction being responsible for the ACP-EU cooperation; it is directed to all potential partners. The present research will only focus on the three guidelines formulated by the budget lines and explicitly directed to Sub-Sahara Africa⁴⁶. The document, which can be regarded as the first evaluation of positive measures (Heinz/Lingau/Waller 1995), shows the recognition on activities, which immediately affect the doings and behaviour of governments and secondly on activities, which are directed to strengthen civil society and its organisations. Activities of the first group are the support of the process of democratic decision making, the strengthening of rule of law and the support of good governance. The measures to support and cooperate with civil society contain human rights, conflict prevention, the support and empowerment of marginalized people and the support of

⁴⁵ In the 1990ies the former budget line B7-5053 was substantiated with regard to the contents and geographic orientation.

⁴⁶ Compare budget lines B7-7020, B7-7021, B7-7100

independent media. Legal advice is understood as a part of capacity building.

4.1.3.1 Measures of the European Development Fund (EDF)

With regard to the ACP-countries the European Development Fund (EDF) is the most important instrument of financing of the European development cooperation. The amount of financial resources is negotiated between the EU and the ACP-states, the contributions of each member state of the EU to the fund are again part of negotiations between the member states (Cox/Koning 1997: 15). The second step is the distribution of the financial resources among groups of states or single ACP-states and the following distribution of the finances among different sectors of possible activities⁴⁷. Both steps are a content of negotiations of the European Commission and the government of the recipient country. The procedure, leading to a financing agreement in the frame of the EDF is highly complex. In face of the high integration and subsumption of decision-making in the EU it is memorable, that each project financed by the EDF needs the consent of each single member state of the EU. On sides of the recipient country a National Authorising Officer (NAO), usually a high official from the Ministry of Finances, administrates the granted finances and transfers them to the respective projects. The EDF is so far attractive as financing source for the ACP-states because the extend of payments is relatively huge and the runtime of the projects is quite long (Nolting 2003: 125).

In the present sub-chapter one example for a project financed by the EDF shall be presented: The project „Promotion of the Rule of Law and Improvement of Justice“, which is a relatively extensive programme with a budget of 8,5 million Euros. The programme is an agreement between the EU Commission and the government of the Sub-Sahara African state Malawi. Since 1975 Malawi receives a support through the EC-ACP cooperation. In 1996, the first projects cooperating with actors of the Malawian civil society were realised (Nolting 2003: 154). In the period between 1991 and 1995 finances accounting to 120 million Euros have been granted to Malawi. One percent of this amount was supposed for the promotion of democratisation, which shows, that the promotion of democracy is – expressed by the numbers of the financial flew – a part of European development cooperation with comparably low importance.

The programme „Promotion of Rule of Law and Improvement of Justice“ (RoL) defines its general goals as to „promote the rule of law and greater access to justice in Malawi by strengthening and modernising those legal institutions primarily responsible for the administration of justice, resolving disputes, protecting human rights and consolidating democracy“ (No 5780/MAI, Annex 2). The most important beneficiaries of the RoL are the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the prisons, the Law Commission and the faculty for law of the University of Malawi. Concrete objectives of the cooperation with these different, but throughout state-run institutions are:

⁴⁷ A part of the resources is used for multilateral programmes, which is taking EU's idea to promote regional integration into account.

- Increase of the number and quality of Malawian judges and legal experts;
- Increase of the capacity of the High Court and stronger attention to international standards in the decision-making of the High Court;
- Modernisation and humanisation of the prisons to improve the life-threatening conditions;
- Introduction of a Law Commission, which proves the consistency of Malawian laws with the human rights and the Malawian constitution.

First impulses to implement such a programme have been conversations between the secretary of state of the Malawian Ministry of Justice and the head of delegation of the European Commission. A demand analysis which caused expenses accounting to 354,000 Euros, financed by the British Council, generated the basis of the application. The amount of donations was negotiated in 1997: The authors of the demand analysis claimed for 17 million Euros while the European Commission suggested a volume of two million Euro in the first instance (Nolting 2003: 170). Single points of the demand analysis which have not been included into the RoL programme have been implemented and financed by the British DFID in the following years.

18,6% of the whole sum of the RoL programme are flowing straight to a Project Management Unit (PMU), which took over the administrative response of the project implementation. The award of contract was won by a Dutch consultancy company because of the relatively high expense for administrative issues and a lack of intercultural competences of the PMU criticised by Malawian NGOs (Nolting 2003: 172). It is furthermore conspicuous, that civil-society actors are not playing any role in the implementation of the RoL programme. A research showed that the motivation of the Malawian representatives have to be described as only moderate – in contradiction with the principle of ownership the representatives of the EU in the respective boards have mainly been responsible for progress and continuation of the process (Nolting 2003: 171). A closer analysis of the history of the RoL programme makes clear that regular evaluation, monitoring and reporting about the state of the programme did not even exist, after first measures of the programme had already been realized. It has to be seen as critical that reports to the European Union are exclusively made by the Dutch consultant agency – a profit-orientated enterprise - and not by independent institutions. Furthermore, the appraisal exists that, because of personal bottlenecks and overwork, reports and evaluations about the success of EDF-projects are often elaborated in a merely superficial way or even not read in the headquarter of the Commission in Bruxelles (Nolting 2003: 172).

4.1.3.2 Measures of budget lines

The financing of positive measures by budget lines is different to the financing by the European Development Fund. The EDF is negotiated for five years. As a consequence of obstructions of the flow of finances it can happen, that the implementation of projects needs up to ten years (Reisen

1999: 28). The EU budget, on the one hand, is decided yearly. That leads to the chance to consider contemporarily experiences won through the practice of the project-implementation of single positive measures. Furthermore, the budget lines differ from EDF projects, according to the influence single governments of EU member states can exert. The member states have a strong influence on the annual negotiation of the budget - they do not have influence on particular projects. The governments of recipient countries are besides that not taking part in the process of the negotiations of particular positive measures. In difference to the EDF, civil society organisations like NGOs are taking part in the process of contracting and implementation. However, in every case the financing of a measure in the civil society sector has to be tolerated by the government of the respective country. Principally the consent of the government of the country receiving the money is necessary if the financing of a project by the EDF is agreed. The financing of democracy-promoting measures is therefore only possible if the government feels obligated to the promotion of democracy or if it is pushed to such behaviour by coordinated pressure of the donors. While projects of the promotion of democracy are completed in that manner in states with democratically legitimated governments by the EDF, this is done in autocratic countries exclusively through cooperation with NGOs via budget lines.

As a consequence of the - in international comparison - bad performance of the Zimbabwean government in the fields of democracy and human rights, positive measures of the European Union in Zimbabwe are exclusively financed by budget lines. While in the 1990ies in Zimbabwe still numerous projects financed by the EDF existed, cooperation on the bilateral level between the Zimbabwean government and the European Commission was finished at the beginning of the decade because of the precarious situation of democratisation in Zimbabwe. As a consequence, projects of the EU now are limited on cooperation with civil society. In the following, one positive measure, which is financed by a budget line and implemented in cooperation with a civil society actor to educate and train election observers monitoring the elections, is exemplarily presented.

The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association was founded in 1992 and was registered in 1993 as a non-profit organisation. The association's goal is "to develop a culture of human rights in Zimbabwe, to promote, protect and defend human rights in Zimbabwe in order to empower all people through networking, education programmes, publications, legal aid and lobbying" (Zim Rights). A financing agreement to support the work of ZimRights - more concrete information about elections and educational measures, research work about existing unfairness and its causes and the influence on political decision-makers by lobbying - was decided in 1998. The European Commission supported single measures like the production of information and training materials, workshops for multipliers and workshops for the training of the election observers by an amount of 220000 Euros (Financing Agreement B7-7021/ZIM/ELE/156/98:8 Annex 2). Further details of the programme have to be mentioned: The multiplier training was accompanied by a community theatre, which contains elements of the promotion of gender equality. The production of the manuals for the

election observers took place in the three important languages of the country; Shona, Ndebele and English. The use of groups of community theatre is a method which is regarded as efficient in rural areas with a high rate of illiteracy. The description of the project stresses that „community theatre will be applied to ensure an awareness of people’s rights to make informed choices when elections are conducted. Experiences gained through the Community Theatre Project will be used throughout this project” (Financing Agreement B7-7021/ZIM/ELE/156/98: 8-10).

Theatre performances however have only been used as a component of the coach training which appears inadequate with regard of the plan to train and educate only 45 selected persons. In a country with a high level of education in regional comparison, it should be presumed that such a small circle of participants has already basic knowledge. The project goal to reach a woman quota of 50% is ambitious and can have – in the long run - positive consequences because the reputation of women is increasing if they act as election observers (Nolting 2003: 240). The publication of the manual in the three different languages is a meaningful effort to prevent existing mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion of ethnical nature in the implementation of the project. However, 1500 manuals were printed in each language although 77% of the Zimbabweans speak Shona and 19% of the Zimbabweans speak Ndebele (Sithole 1994: 156). Furthermore, the manuals were printed before it was clear who concretely will become election observer. This procedure of the European Union discriminates the majority and is counterproductive because it is possible that no qualified election observers are found who can immediately use the available materials.

The starting point of the cooperation between the European Union and Zim Rights was the fact that election observers in Zimbabwe have so far been insufficiently trained. Besides that their number is insufficient to facilitate the inclusion of all municipalities into the election monitoring. Furthermore, irregularities concerning the elections in 1995 did not play any role in the reports of the election observers at that time. The programme which was embedded in a time frame of 18 months was decided through the signing in December 1998. However, the beginning of the work was not possible before the first payments in June 1999. The delay must be regarded as very problematic in so far that with regard to the day of elections in Zimbabwe in March 2000⁴⁸ it was not possible to miss the aims of the project because of a lack of time caused by delayed payments.

The largest single item of the planned budget was the purchase of two vehicles; 34000 Euros were estimated for that purpose (Financing Agreement B7-7021/ZIM/ELE/156/98: Annex 2). The European Commission requires in such cases the acquisition of European cars. Since in that case the money would only have been sufficient for only one vehicle, the acquisition of South African Toyotas was suggested by Zim Rights. When the commission agreed on that suggestion, the intermediate depreciation of the currency (ZIM \$) led to the fact, that it was only possible to buy two technically inferior Mazdas (Nolting 2003: 243). The entire

⁴⁸ The decision, to exercise the elections just in June was however notified shortly before the original date of elections.

project request had to be rewritten, because a television and a video recorder for documentation purposes had been purchased by Zim Rights. The bureaucratic expenditure, which is required during a conversion of only less than 0,5% of the promotion sum by the European Commission, is likewise problematic. These ratios, high administrative expenses and lacking flexibility therefore have to be regarded as problems; emergency facility in cases of an acute need to act does not exist.

4.2 Which further policies influence democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa?

In the following these policies of the European Union should be examined which do not immediately call for the goal of democratisation in developing countries, but which influence by all means the processes of the democratisation and/or the surrounding environment of such processes in Sub-Sahara African countries. This is particularly important because the Africa-Strategy of the European Commission (KOM 2005 489) stresses the importance of a socio-economical environment favouring democracy. Taking the economic power of the European Union with its 370 million inhabitants and a very high influence and participation in world trade into consideration it becomes clear, that nearly every decision and action of the European Union had international consequences (Nolting, 2003: 91)⁴⁹. In the frame of its development cooperation the EU developed - as regarded in chapter 4.1 - instruments to promote democracy, good governance and human rights⁵⁰. The most vital problem according to these instruments is the coherence with other policy areas of the EU. Their influence on democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa has to be taken into account as well.

4.2.1 The European Trade Policy

Preferential trade systems like the Cotonou-Agreement as a content of European development cooperation have already been part of the present thesis⁵¹. The recognition of trade policy apart from these preferential systems seems to be surprising. Trade policy is the policy in which the institutions of the European Union have the most competences compared to all other foreign relations. As the biggest trade power in the world (Bretherton/Vogler 1999: 48) the EC is holding a potentially high influence on the macro-economic situation of its trade partners, particularly if these trade partners process the major part of their trade with the EU. Concerning the Sub-Sahara African countries, this is just the case and, consequently, trade might be "the most important policy in the scope of responsibilities of the European Union which is having influence on developing countries" (Reisen 1999: 48). The absolute position of power of the EC in trade is often strengthened by the relatively weak position of the trade partners in Africa. While for the EC the trade relations with an African country only constitute a small fraction of the entire external trade activity, the exchange of goods and services of an African country with the EC can easily have a

⁴⁹ Today, the EU is the most important block of trade world wide and even for developing countries, particularly African countries, the most important partner of trade. The realisation of a customs union and a common single market strengthened the economic power of the EU in the world (Paulsen 2006: 13; Reisen 1999: 48; Bertherton/Vogler 1999: 48).

⁵⁰ See chapter 4.4

⁵¹ See chapter 4.1.2.2

very high importance (more than 50%). As a consequence of this asymmetry in opposite to the African developing countries two mechanisms result which are very relevant with regard to the promotion of democracy. Outgoing from a position of power the EC/EU can formulate conditions which aim to an improvement of human rights and democratic participation. This consciously used means of conditionality in development cooperation exercised by the European Union was already described in a previous chapter. In the following the focus will be taken on the second and much more indirect mechanism, which concern the legitimacy and stabilization of new democratic regimes in Sub-Sahara Africa by shaping the socio-economic environment in the respective countries sustaining democratisation by European trade policy.

According to the Conference on World Trade in Doha/Quatar in 2001, the European Union (EU) generally promotes a fair and universal World Trade System inside the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The European Unions` goal in terms of foreign trade policy is, based on Article 131 EC-treaty, “the harmonising of world trade, the step by step elimination of barriers inside international trade and the degradation of customs barriers” (Folmer 1995: 20). Currently the Commission of the EU negotiates about foreign trade policy on the base of a mandate of the European Council of Ministers, adopted after the third WTO ministers` conference in Seattle, 1999. Since 1999 the WTO ministers` conferences in Seattle 1999 and Cancun 2003 failed because of international civil society protests. Particularly NGOs` criticise that only the European Union`s rhetoric have changed after the conference of Doha in 2001 – the practice in any case is still contradictory to the rhetoric.

The EU Africa-Strategy focuses on the socio-economic environment favouring democracy and enumerates as a sub-goal the support of small-scale enterprises. Empowerment and increased capabilities are as much as the importance of the participation of broad layers of the population on economic upswing vital for sustaining democracy⁵². Therefore it is appropriate to analyse the European trade policy from the micro-perspective of a potential investor in a Sub-Sahara African country. If a person owns economical resources which can be used for investment into the export he/she has to pay attention to a long list of different measures influencing the costs of transaction. This list includes instruments of the EU`s foreign trade policy, but also factors like institutional uncertainty (Schmidt-Trenz 2000: 67) which influence the decisions of potential investors negatively.

- Prohibitive customs barriers of the European Union: The system of buying up European products by the Common Agricultural Policy equalizes automatically the difference between the world market`s prices and the immobilized price inside the European Union.
- Quantitative restrictions: In the case of about 18 spheres of products the EU restricts the influx by quantitative contingents (Herrmann

⁵² See chapter 2.3

1989: 34). That is for example valid for textiles, cars, steel, shoes, electronic machines and toys.

- Level and structure of tariffs: The level and structure of tariffs differ very much. Goods with a very high technologic requirement are generally tagged with low tariffs; industrial products which could be produced with less technology are tagged with high tariffs. Tropical products and raw materials are tagged by very low tariffs or just no tariffs. Generally it is visible, that the higher the grade of processing, the higher the level of tariff. Consequently the processing of raw materials in the country of origin is not profitable.
- Rule of country of origin: The level of the tariff depends on the country of origin. In case of products coming from the AKP-countries the EU grants free market access if 45% of aggregate value added of the product carried out in the country of origin. Such rules lead to a huge bureaucratic effort; as a consequent such contingents are not even full exhausted.
- Common Standards: An exporter to the European Union has to know and fulfil a broad set of norms and prescribed information to protect consumers – for example in the case of beef. If such norms are not fulfilled, the influx to European markets is illicit.
- Subsidies: Every potential exporter from a developing country who offers an obviously cheaper good than exporters from the EU, have to ask themselves, if the competitiveness of the EU-internal supplier is achieved through state subsidies. In terms of coal, steel and ships the EU still allows that the member states try to receive their national production in spite of increasingly powerful external suppliers (Voigt 2001: 39).

This big set of different rules shows that, despite of free trade areas and the GATT, increasing liberalisation and increasing protectionism seem to be two sides of one medal. In these areas where the European Union grants free admittance to markets, raw materials and tropical products, new investments are mostly not profitable because markets are saturated. A potential investor in a developing country chooses in a lot of cases presumptively the most profitable alternative if he decides to transfer his capital to a bank in an industrialised country to get a durable secured yield. Consequently flight of capital is a major problem in developing countries; a diversification of industries – a major supposition of economical development - in the developing countries is missing. It can be stated, that the trade trammels of the European Community have a negative impact on the socio-economical environment of processes of democratisation and on the sustainable stabilization of new democratic regimes in states of Sub-Saharan Africa.

4.2.2 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union

Through the CAP, state intervention into the market for agricultural products, the risk of European farmers is limited. The EU stabilises the prizes of agricultural products. Consequently, this induces the farmers to produce uncompetitive products (Bale/Koester 1984: 76). The complex mechanism of price management protects the prices inside the Union by

high tariffs on imported agricultural products. The guaranteed selling price for agricultural products led to a huge overproduction without any relation to the demand. Guaranteed prices hindered the normal price mechanism, which ought to lead to reduced production under conditions of free trade (Kay 1998: 68). Only through high export subsidies it was possible to the surpluses on the world market. As export-import-slucice the price system of the CAP influences the world market in a dual way. The EU locks itself off from agricultural imports by impeding the competitiveness through tariffs. At the same time the EU limits the competitiveness of other countries by selling highly subsidized products on the world market. During the 1960s the European Community institutionalised the protective system and created a more and more perfect system of tariffs and quotas for the lobby of agricultural producers. The economic structure of agriculture, on the basis of the production mean land, does not exclude the possibility of “exit” (Hirschmann 1970) to the farmer, the search for alternative possibilities of income. Thus the farmer chooses the function “voice” (Hirschmann 1970), active lobbying on all political levels in Europe. Consequently, the process of “inventive destruction” (Schumpeter 1975) is overrode.

Relevant is yet the impact of the CAP on developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have comparative advantages in the case of agricultural products. These advantages can not be skimmed because European markets are not accessible for producers from these countries. The success of the so called privileged partnership of the ACP-states which offers customs-free entrance of a number of agricultural products and raw materials to European markets is debatable: Those ACP states, which have been cooperating with the EU for a long time, present in international comparison a particularly worse successes of development (Wiemeyer 1998: 181). The customs-free entrance of unprocessed products to Europe caused a massive extension of production, which advanced the worsening of terms of trade, but not the diversification of economies because a customs free entrance for processed products does not exist yet. Beside this first evident influence of the CAP on developing countries, the EU exports its own subsidized agricultural products to developing countries and inhibits immediate the build up of an effective agricultural production. A suitable example is the export of meat to West African countries, which sabotaged the domestic production of chicken meat, a few years before promoted by EU development assistance. Finally, as third impact of the CAP on developing countries it has to be mentioned that the EU with its import of a few selected agricultural products, like soy beans or tapioca complicates the self-supply of developing countries and causes further over-production in the EU (Schwarz 2004: 44).

4.4 Sub-Conclusion

With regard to the sub-questions and the following overall-conclusion in the next chapter three points have to be stated as a sub-conclusion. The analysis of various documents and treaties of the EU and EC showed, that (1) the promotion of democracy is - at least rhetorically - a goal of the foreign actions of the EU. A gap between rhetoric and practise and several practical problems (2) can however be stated after an analysis of the

implementation of measures and policies to promote democracy. After focusing on the impact of other policies like trade policy or agricultural policy it has to be summarized (3) that an integrated and coherent approach of the EU about how to promote democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa is lacking.

The promotion of democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa as an important goal of foreign actions is deeply rooted in public declarations, treaties and pronouncements of the European Union:

- The development and strengthening of democracy is part of the most important treaties establishing the European Union: The treaty of Maastricht (Article 11), the EU-Treaty and the failed EU-Constitution (Chapter 4 of the Constitution). The promotion and support of democracy and democratisation in countries of Sub-Sahara Africa have to be described as a ***contractual protected and independent goal*** of the EU.
- The ***Cotonou-Agreement*** as most important document of European development cooperation contains democratisation and the protection of human rights as important principles and threatens with the exclusion from preferential trade in the case of violation of these principles. Thus it becomes visible, that the EU is using ***political conditionality*** as a tool of the promotion of democracy mostly in a negative way.
- The ***EU-Africa-Strategy***, presented in 2005, has to be regarded as a ***very ambitious but unproved*** project. Democracy and the need of democratisation are mentioned and important element of the Africa-Strategy. As the first document trying to include all policies concerning Sub-Sahara Africa, it is a reaction on the claim for a more coherent and concerted policy and the first document of the EU regarding Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole.

As central problems and conspicuous contradictions of the promotion and support of democratisation the following points have to be stated:

- Whenever political conditionality is used as a tool of the promotion of democracy, ***negative measures dominate***. The amount provided for positive measures promoting democracy is relatively low regarded in relation to the high rating of democracy and democratisation of democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa by several official documents of the EU. As a result, the promotion of democracy by the EU is mainly implemented in cases in cases where it can be implemented without changes of own EU-policies.
- The EU-measures trying to promote democratisation do normally ***exclude civil society*** actors. The major part of projects is negotiated exclusively between governmental agencies and only implemented by governmental stakeholders, which is contradictory to the requirements of the EU-Africa-Strategy. As a consequence, the analysis of the implementation of positive measures shows a ***lack of ownership and empowerment*** and can be regarded as ***top-down process***.

- A more narrow analysis of positive measures shows additionally, that the positive measures of the EU are shaped by **considerable deficits**: Inefficiency, inflexibility, delay of the payment of confirmed money, too high administrative expenses and a lack of independent evaluation reduce the success of the positive measures.
- According to the capabilities-approach of Sen, poverty reduction is inherently connected to democratisation, but **the sectoral distribution of financial resources of the development assistance of the EU does not show the orientation on poverty reduction**. The poor and marginalised people are not targeted by the state-focussed programmes of the EDF. The allocation of financial resources is more and more displaced in favour of EU-neighbourhood policies and not concentrating on Sub-Sahara African LDC`s.
- The system of preferential trade **does not focus on the just and equal distribution of wealth in the respective advantaged countries**. An equal and just distribution is regarded as a vital supposition of democratisation caused by economic upswing.

It becomes questionable if democratisation is really regarded as so important as in the treaties and agreements. As a consequence it is possible to state, that most of the policies trying to promote democracy and democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa are not able to surmount the level of symbols. The state-focussed EDF as a means connected to the treaties of preferential trade and the whole system of preferential trade rather supported existing political systems than political reforms forwarded by civil society. However, the EU-Africa-Strategy remains as a very ambitious and hopeful approach, because it tries to strengthen the coherence between the different policies of the EU concerning immediate as well as mediate democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa. Coherence of EU policies is an important point because of several factors:

- It is precarious, that **the impact of these policies of the EU on a socio-economic environment in Sub-Sahara African states favouring democracy is negative**. The preferential tariffs in the frame of the trade agreements with the ACP-states sabotaged the industrialisation and diversification of economies in Sub-Sahara Africa. The dependence of those states on the export of unprocessed goods led to worse successes in development.
- A broad set of tariffs and other trammels of trade make **investment in export-orientated production in Africa unattractive and cause a flight of capital** – the orientation of Sub-Sahara African states on European markets hindered furthermore a regional integration of markets - integration on more or less the same level. Concretely, the European trammels of trade cause a **deprivation of capabilities** of local people, which is at odds with the approach of Sen. It is critical, that this trend seems to be continued through the European Partnership Agreements (EPA`s).
- The elimination of the EU export subsidies for agricultural over-production, which is harmful to the self-supply with agricultural goods in African states, is not foreseeable. That shows that **mechanism of public pressure and organised interests in the EU**

are with regard to economic interests higher than with regard to a democracy favouring socio-economic environment in countries of Sub-Sahara Africa.

It can be held down, that through negative conditionality and positive measures the EU is generally trying to support movements of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa- in the long run, however, the EU contributes vitally to a socio-economic environment in countries of Sub-Sahara Africa which is damaging processes of democratisation, particularly the internal legitimation and stability of such processes by sabotaging economic prosperity. Besides that, a poverty-reduction in practise is not implemented by the EU's policies and the future EPA's does as little as the preferential trade systems support a promotion of the respective poor and marginalized people in the LDC's. The problem of the paralyse of democratisation in Africa is therefore aggravated by the EU. Democratisation is described as a "democratisation of powerlessness" (Hippler 1994: 34).

5. Conclusion

The final conclusion tries to relate the results of the three main chapters to the central question of research: How do EU's policies influence the process of democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa? It can be summarized that (1) the promotion of democracy by the EU is not rooted in one particular concept of democracy and democratisation, (2) the promotion of democratisation of the EU is only partly taking historical experiences and regional features into account and (3) the impact of EU policies on democratisation is, as a consequence of lacking coherence of the EU's policies, highly contradictory.

A conceptual classification of EU policies and declarations to promote and support democratisation proved ambiguous:

- According to the European Treaties *the promotion of democracy seems to be regarded as a normative goal itself*. With regard to the only EU document regarding Africa as a whole – the EU-Africa-Strategy – the rhetoric concerning democracy and democratisation combines the idea of market economy, reliable democratic institutions and poverty-reduction including empowerment and capacity building.
- The adaption of good governance as a result of the neo-institutional approach shows that the *EU is acknowledging the need for reliable and functioning democratic institutions*. The positive measures of the CFSP and the EDF try to support the strengthening of formal state institutions. Cultural problems and differences summed up under the signature of neopatrimonialism are however not considered. Consequently the practice of the EU's promotion of democracy seems to be rooted in the institutional approach of Dahl, believing in the *universal transferability of democratic institutions*.
- Consequently *the promotion of democracy of the European Union is not clearly fixed to one particular approach*: Institutional support

according to the idea of Dahl is implemented by the CFSP, but remains symbolic. By many policies, if they focus on democratisation or not, the EU violates principles formulated by the Africa-Strategy, for example the creation of a socio-economic environment favouring democratisation in the respective countries.

The good governance approach – described as a combination of the Sen-approach and the idea of democracy as a twin sister of market economy – is used by the EU in terms of the Cotonou Agreement. Practically it is however only used in cases of negative political conditionality, what means the exclusion from preferential trade. The following stock-check of the policies trying to support democratisation makes clear, that the EU is taking historical experiences and regional features only partly into account:

- The European Union implements the promotion of democracy according to the concept of ***good governance only in those cases where a change of own policies and behaviour is not necessary.***
- ***Positive measures to promote democracy don't pick up the claims of good governance;*** the concrete promotion of democracy proves as top-down orientated, state-focussed, inefficient and not able to spread empowerment and ownership.
- The EU-Africa-Strategy takes as the first document the necessity for a coherence of policies into account.
- However the continuation of preferential trade through the European Partnership Agreements (EPA`s) shows, that the ***EU is not willing to implement a paradigm change*** in its policies to promote democracy.
- ***The EU does not take the necessity of poverty reduction and equal distribution of wealth for democratisation into account.*** Increasing capabilities and the participation of broad layers of the population in economic growth are not achieved by the measures of the EU. The systems of preferential trade do not touch mechanisms of wealth distribution, the positive measures do not focus on marginalized and poor people and the allocation of financial resources for development cooperation shifts away from LDC`s to neighbourhood policies.

The Africa-Strategy shows that the EU starts to pay an increasing attention to three points which are vital for the development in Sub-Sahara Africa. It starts to commit itself to poverty-reduction and it acknowledges its responsibility for socio-economic conditions favouring democratisation in Sub-Sahara African countries and to a stronger coherence of its own policies. The future EPA`s are however the best examples to show, that positive rhetoric is not continuously implemented: Regarding EU`s policies to promote democratisation in Sub-Sahara Africa, a lack of consistency must be stated. Besides that, lacking coherence of policies is apparent:

- The impact of European Trade Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy on a socio-economic environment favouring democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa is negative. ***Successes and efforts of those policies and strategies focussing immediately on democratisation are consequently corrupted by other European Policies.***

- *The system of preferential trade, which is regarded as a measure of European development cooperation*, proved as contradictory. Even if the actual Cotonou-treaty is penetrated by democratic principles, the agreement and the future EPA`s hinder regional integration and industrialisation. That continues the problem of a “democratisation of powerlessness” (Hippler 1994: 39).

It can be concluded, that the EU tries to promote, support and enforce democracy through political conditionality and positive measures. At the same time the EU hinders in the long run the success of movements and processes of democratisation by shaping an environment which does not favour democracy and democratisation in Sub-Sahara African states.

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