

# UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

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Safety

## **COPING WITH THE THREAT OF TERRORISM**

**A STUDY ABOUT DIFFERENT FACTORS THAT  
PLAY A ROLE IN THE ASSESSMENT AND  
INDUCEMENT OF EFFICACY**

Master thesis

Psychology of Conflict, Risk and Safety


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*'Education is the power terrorist fear most'*

*-Malala Yousafzai-*

*'The terrorist thought they would change my aims and stop my ambitions, but nothing changed in my life except this: weakness, fear and helplessness died.*

*Strength, power and courage were born.'*

*-Malala Yousafzai-*

## **Acknowledgement**

First of all I would like to say that during the whole study I looked forward to this moment. The moment that I can do research about and learn from a subject that is interesting to me, but most of all I hoped that people could implement the outcomes and that it would elicit behaviour change. I always have been fascinated by how people cope with outside threats. Threats that people have no influence on. However, in my opinion you can have influence on how you deal with threats and feelings of helplessness. I hope that this research adds to the small body of literature about coping mechanism concerning threats like terrorism.

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. J.M Gutteling. The door to Dr. Gutteling's, or better said Wi-Fi-connection, was always open whenever I had a question about my research or ran into trouble about my writing. He always gave me enough feedback and steered me in the right direction so that I could continue, but allowed this paper to be my own work. Last but not least I would like to thank my friend, Ban Al Hassany, for helping me with SPSS. I honestly don't know what I would have done without your valuable input concerning SPSS.

So, I present to you my first official scientific research. I hope I made a right first step towards science.

Mayes Katab

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## **Abstract**

This study examined three different factors that could play a role in the assessment of efficacy regarding terrorism threat. The three factors were risk perception, proximity and religion. It was expected that people who have higher risk perception about terrorist attacks and were more religious had higher efficacy. Further, it was believed that proximity played a role in people's risk perception and efficacy regarding terrorism, meaning that there could be a significant difference between people who live close to a place where a possible terrorist attack could happen than people living further away. To examine this, the researcher conducted a questionnaire survey (N= 247). As predicted, people who had higher risk-perceptions and were more religious showed higher efficacy. Furthermore, the results revealed a significant difference in risk perception concerning proximity. However, this effect was not found regarding efficacy. This research supports earlier research on coping mechanisms and on the impact of fear appeal within risk communication and corresponding inducement of efficacy as a result.

## 1. Introduction

One of the most recognized security threats of the last two decades is terrorism. Terrorism is a ‘premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups, or clandestine agents.’ (Davies & Beech, 2012, p.208). Despite the fact that terrorism is politically motivated one other important reason, which is actually parallel with the political motive, is creating panic and fear. For example, Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist leaders used audio recording to threaten countries with ‘killings and kidnappings’ if they did not answer to the commands (Iyer, Hornsey, Vanman, Esposito & Ale, 2015). The fear and panic that they create gives the terrorists some kind of power that they use to pursue their actions.

Acts of terrorism have a long history, although it seems as if terrorism is something created in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The term terrorism was first used during the French revolution. French revolutionaries’ actions against their enemies were referred to as terrorism (Tilly, 2004). Going back in the history even further, 3000 years to be exact, Greek soldiers used terrorist-like actions (e.g. killing innocent people to achieve political or religious aim) to attack their victims (Fisher & Ai, 2008). These historical facts insinuate that people are trying to deal with the threat of terrorism for over a millennium.

In this paper the researcher wants to explore which possible factors can induce higher self-efficacy when people are experiencing fear of a possible terrorist attack. This study will therefore address the following research question: *Which factors can be considered during the assessment of efficacy, when one experiences a high risk perception of the threat of a future terrorist attack?* In this research there are three factors that are being examined. The first one is risk perception, the second one is proximity and the last one is religiosity.

### ***Examples terrorist attacks***

Over the last decade the world has been plagued by several terrorist attacks. In London on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2005, in Oslo and Utoya on July 15, 2011 and the most recent attacks were in Paris on 13 and 14 November, 2015 and Brussels on March 22, 2016, or in Iraq on July the third were at least 292 people were killed just to name a few. The list of terrorist violence is longer when the numbers of attacks around the world are taken in consideration. These attacks indicate the globalization of terrorism and triggered broad media coverage of the socioeconomic-political damage (Fisher & Ai, 2008). Socioeconomic and political damage

are not the only consequences of terrorist attacks, mental health is also affected by terrorist attack. Most people feel some level of fear due to the terrorist threat when they watch the news and hear about yet another terrorist attack that has recently occurred. This level of fear and threat can have a negative effect on the mental health of the individuals affected (Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, Hindocha, Tattersall, & Fischer 2013). Gigerenzer (2004) even found in his research that people in the United States avoided travelling by airplane after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the consequence that fatal car accidents significantly increased. In the research of Yum and Schenck-Hamlin (2005) it is mentioned that even people who do not experience a traumatic disaster like a terrorist attack still can feel a level of fear and threat about it possibly happening when they take perspective.

Research on coping with this “symbolic threat” (Updegraff, Silver & Holman, 2008, p. 710) showed that finding meaning in terrorism is associated with reduced levels of PTSD symptoms. In other words, people who could find a way to explain the terrorist events were less likely to report feelings of fear after the event than people who could not make sense of the situation. When people found meaning, it mostly came in three forms: assigning the disaster or someone’s loss to God’s will, assigning it to fate or finding something positive in the loss (Updegraff, Silver & Holman, 2008).

### ***Theory’s and models***

In their research Kastenmüller et al. (2013) used Terror Management Theory (TMT) to explain the expected impact of reminders of death such as a terrorist attack (symbolic threat). TMT insinuates that the need for self-protection is biologically inside human beings (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986 in Kastenmüller et al., 2013). People are capable of perspective taking and self-reflection. They are also very aware of the fact that traumatic events like terrorist attacks and the possible consequences, like death, are inevitable. TMT assumes that when people think about their own mortality this will lead them to experience fear. This means that the central view of TMT is that when people are well aware of their mortality they have an instinctual need for self-protection. This awareness of the unavailability of their own death can lead to immobilizing terror if they use strategies to keep awareness of their mortality (Kastenmüller, 2013; Skitka, Bauman & Mullen, 2004). Strategies that help people cope with the awareness of mortality could, for example, be taking the advices that the government provide about possible threats serious and adoption of any possible recommended behaviour.

Terrorism-induced fear can lead to an increased perception of threat of a possible

future attack (Skitka, Bauman & Mullen, 2004). When people experience higher levels of fear, and therefore having a higher risk perception for a possible terrorist attack, it is important to find a way to deal with this fear. The general public has usually no understanding of the risk and this can influence the public's response to a disaster. Therefore it is important to understand the way that people make risk judgements, and what their level of fear and threat is as consequence of an attack (Sheppard, Rubin, Wardman & Wessley, 2006). In their research Sheppard et al. (2006) say that this kind of knowledge can offer comprehension into the public's attitude and behaviour.

One model that can give an insight in people's behaviour and in how people deal with a fearful situation is the Extended Parallel Process model (EPPM). According to the EPPM there are two cognitive estimates that people make when they are confronted with a fearful situation. The first one is appraisal of the threat and the second one is the appraisal of the efficacy of the message's recommended responds' (Witte, Myer & Martell, 2001, p; 24 in Gore & Bracken, 2005). The aim of the EPPM is to explain what the effect of fear appeal is on individuals. According to the EPPM there are two ways to deal with a (possible) threat. If there is a high efficacy and threat is perceived as threatening, *danger control* will be the result (trying to solve the problem). If the threat is perceived as threatening but the efficacy is low, *fear control* will be the result. Maladjusted coping mechanisms of fear will be used such as denial ('it will not happen'), defensive avoidance ('I'm not going to waste my time on it') or reactance ('it's just a government plan again') (Witte & Allen, 2000; Verroen, Gutteling & de Vries, 2013). The EPPM states that when people experience a high self-efficacy, high response efficacy and a high threat, people are more willing to deal with their fear and the threat (Verroen, Gutteling & de Vries, 2013; Gore & Bracken). Efficacy is categorized into self-efficacy and response efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to "perceived capability to manage one's personal functioning and the myriad environmental demands of the aftermath occasioned by a traumatic event" (Benight and Bandura, 2004, p. 1130). Response-efficacy refers to the belief that performing the suggested behaviour will reach the efficient outcome (Bandura, 1977 in Kuang & Cho, 2016).

### ***The risk perception factor***

An important element that can be considered when assessing one's own efficacy about dealing with the threat or fear for a future terrorist attack is the effect that the authority and media have on the public people. For instance when people, who are concerned about a possible future attack, receive through the media that a terrorist attack is likely to happen, fear



will inevitably increase. The media can influence people's opinion through the presentation and manner of the information they broadcast (Gadarian, 2010). This can be a positive but also a negative aspect. It can be negative because the media is not always neutral and can increase fear by presenting false information or presenting the information in a manner that provokes fear. In contrast, the influence that the media has on people can also be positive. The government can use the media to encourage and support people and give them valid information and advice about what to do when a disaster is happening or is supposedly going to happen in the near future. Fischhoff (as cited in Sheppard et al., 2006) based risk communication in relation to terrorist attacks on three themes 1) managing risks well so as to have a credible message to communicate, 2) create appropriate communication channels and, 3) deliver decision relevant information (Sheppard et al., 2006, p.226). The third theme is explained in more detail in the EPPM. What Fischhoff (as cited in Sheppard et al., 2006) stated in the third theme is that it is important to deliver information that is relevant for people so that they can make the right decisions that will eventually help them to deal with a (possible) disaster. Nevertheless, Fischhoff (as cited in Sheppard et al., 2006) did not explain that people sometimes have the need to have some kind of control about the danger they are in or could be in. This control can be achieved by making sure that the risk information that is giving will increase the self-efficacy and response-efficacy. By focusing on increasing the self- and response-efficacy, risk-communication can reach a higher level. This means making sure that people are dealing with danger control instead of fear control (Gore & Bracken, 2005). Gore and Bracken (2005) also found in their research that the higher the efficacy message, the more people will move towards danger control which ultimately is the goal.

Research showed that low self-efficacy is associated with depression (Schwarzer & Scholz, 2000, p; 373 in Fischer et al ,2006), while Ellison (as cited in Fischer et al, 2006) stated that higher levels of self-efficacy are related with positive emotions. These are all important aspects for the government to maintain during a high-risk situation, such as a terrorist attack, to keep the public updated and to give them valid and useful information that can reduce uncertainty, fear, or victimisation that people might feel in these situations. In high-impact incidents in which for example people should be evacuated, people can be advised about what to do (eg. stay inside, close windows, etc.) through the media. This is called *action perspective* (Verroen, Gutteling & de Vries 2013). There are several behavioural responses that can be conducted. An example is not making unnecessary travels by car or by airplane in a high stake situation. Several researchers have shown that effective public communication support suitable protective actions in high risk situations, enable relief efforts,

maintain public confidence and trust in the authorities that are responsible for safeguarding the wellbeing of the public and comfort people who are not directly at risk by reducing false information and fears (Gray & Ropeik, 2002; Sheppard et al., 2006; Becker, 2004; Henderson, Henderson, Raskob, & Boatright, 2004).

Fischhof (2006) mentioned that one of the important things about risk communication is having a credible message to communicate. This could gain people's trust in the information that is giving. Trust is believed to reduce social uncertainty and have an influence on the acceptance of risk and risk information. Earle (2004) showed in his research that trust is the primary route to cooperation and that trust can't be ignored when talking about risk communication. The government/authority must react to the threat of terrorism in order to safeguard the public and to give the ability to take self-protective actions.

In a study conducted by Wray and Jupka, (2004) people were asked what actions they would take, hypothetically, if a terrorist attack would happen. Most people responded that they would seek for more information, check on their family members, locate food and take necessary actions to protect their families. When analysing the public responses to the government communication in regards to a potential terrorist threat, it is important to consider the public perception of risk, threat and fear that they would face. Gray and Ropeik (2002) say in their research that these high-risk perceptions that produce fear, are recognised to have important impacts on physical health. Kievik and Gutteling (2011) found in their research that people who have higher levels of risk perception also have higher levels of intention to take risk mitigating and preventive behaviour than low levels of risk perception. They have also found that risk communication that contained high-risk information and promoted self-efficacy was the most effective way to increase the intention of the main public to take self-protective actions.

These previous studies have shown the importance of risk communication in a fearful situation such as a possible future terrorist attack. The studies have also shown that people who have a higher risk perception are more determined to take preventive actions. This could mean that the people who experience a higher risk perception are more resilient for a possible threat. This will lead them to have a higher response-efficacy, which means the consideration that the suggested behaviour will help them deal with this threat. Based on the previous studies the first hypotheses can be formulated as:

*1. People, who experience a high-risk perception about a possible terrorist attack, have higher response-efficacy.*

### *The proximity factor*

Another factor that can be considered when assessing one's own efficacy in regards to dealing with the threat or fear for a future terrorist attack is the proximity to the attack. Do people who live closer to capital cities or near government buildings feel a higher level of risk and fear for a terrorist attack and do they have a higher self-efficacy because of the proximity to a possible attack? Exploratory study conducted by Sackett and Botterill (2006) suggests that proximity to a terrorist attack can increase negative perceptions of safety. That means that the closer someone is to an attack the more negative risk-perceptions people will have. Furthermore, terrorist behaviour has an influence on people's decisions (Sönmez & Greafe, 1998, in Floyd, Gibson, Pennington-Gray & Thapa, 2004). This insinuates that people pay attention to the proximity of a previous attack and that this might have an influence on the level of fear they will have for a possible future attack. When people pay more attention to terrorist behaviour they will come to know from previous attacks that they witness on the news that most of the attacks were in the capital cities or another big city in the country. Also, terrorist attacks mostly take place near government places or public places where there are usually a higher concentration of people. After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, several studies have shown that physical proximity to the World Trade Centre predicted post traumatic stress symptoms (Hasin, Keyes, Hatzenbuehler, Aharonovich & Alderson, 2007). In their research Hasin et al. (2007) showed that physical proximity to the world trade centre was the main predictor for alcohol consumption and PTSD symptoms. Even for people who were not directly affected by the attack. Also, older children who watched news coverage in regards to violence were more frightened and perceived themselves more vulnerable when they watched a news story which is more local and near to them (Smith & Wilson, 2000). In another study conducted by Spence et al (2011) it was revealed that individuals who were closer to the 9/11 attacks, reported more fear than those who were further away.

In contrary, the study from Spence et al. (2011) showed that the need for comforting information following the attacks were greater for individuals who lived further away from the attack. This may indicate that proximity to a place where a future attack is possible is not always an indicator for a higher fear level. The people who do experience a higher level of fear were more motivated to take self-protective measures. In their research, Gibson, Lemyre and Lee (2015) found that when people prepare for possible threats or emergencies like terrorism threat, risk perception is an important factor in the decisions that people make to take self-protective measures. In the study of Spence et al. (2011) self-protective measures were looking for information that is comforting.

The previous studies have shown that proximity to an attack can be an important factor to consider when assessing one's efficacy in regards to dealing with the threat or fear for a future terrorist attack. Therefore, based on the previous studies the second hypothesis can be formulated in two parts:

*2A: People who live closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack is likely to happen have higher response-efficacy and self-efficacy than people who live further away*

*2B: People who live closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack is likely to happen have higher risk perception than people who live further away.*

### ***The religiosity factor***

A third factor that can be considered when assessing one's own efficacy in regards to dealing with the threat or fear for a future terrorist attack is religiosity. Allport (as cited in Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Jonas & Frey, 2006) makes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness. Intrinsic religiousness is characterized by the striving for meaning and value. In contrast to intrinsic religiousness, extrinsically religious people have a utilitarian approach to religion; they use religion to protect the self, find solace, and gain social standing (Fischer et al., 2006, p. 366). Several studies have found that intrinsic religiousness is more positively correlated to mental health outcomes like personal adjustment, self-regulation and self-control. Furthermore, people report lower levels of fear and concern about death when they consider themselves intrinsically religious (Fischer et al., 2006). Another study has shown that religious beliefs can have a positive influence on self-efficacy. The study showed that religious beliefs were thought to support self-efficacy for patients who need rehabilitation (Omu & Reynolds, 2014). Omu and Reynolds (2014) found that patients who felt closer to God had more self-confidence and were more positive about completing and succeeding the challenges they had to overcome. Fischer et al. (2006) found in their study that self-efficacy from non-religious people reduced when there was a high salience of terrorism. Furthermore, Fischer and Ai (2008) found in their study that people tried to cope with terror threat by turning to religion.

In summary, terrorism is a stressful event and several studies have shown that religiousness is an essential and influential factor that can increase people's positive emotions and efficacy. Based on the previous studies the third hypotheses can be formulated as:

*3. The higher people score on the religiosity scale, the higher their self-efficacy would be when they feel threatened by a terrorist attack.*

## **2. Method**

### **2.1 Design and procedure**

The study was a cross sectional study design. It was a randomized response method and the sampling was stratified because 2 different areas, Overijssel and Randstad (mostly the areas around Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag) were studied. The reason why those areas have being studied is because the two areas are believed to be the opposites of each other in terms of proximity to a possible terrorist attack, in which Randstad is believed to be more at risk of an attack than Overijssel. Like mentioned in the introduction, capital cities, places near government buildings or other big cities in the country are mostly terrorist targets. By examining those different areas in the Netherlands the researcher could make a clear distinction between the two in terms of risk perception, self-efficacy, response-efficacy, proximity and religiosity.

In June and July, 2016 data was collected through an online questionnaire, Qualtrics. Participants were recruited mainly through social media. They had the opportunity to read a brief introduction in Dutch in regards to the purpose of the research. They were then instructed to answer the Dutch questionnaire as honestly as possible. Furthermore, it was stated that the responds will be kept anonymous and that their answers were only known to the researcher. The duration of filling in the questionnaire took 5 to 10 minutes.

### **2.2 Participants**

The recruitment took place among women and men between the age 18 to 56+ years, from the local network of researcher. Participants were recruited from universities, high schools, social networks in Overijssel and in the Randstad. The results were based on the total group of participants. In total 247 participants participated in this study whereof 182 were women and 65 were men. The sample as a whole was relatively young. Most of the participants (N =127) were between the age of 18 and 25. Not all 247 participants answered all of the questions presented to them in the questionnaire. It was decided not to totally remove incompletes, but to use the available data per concept, resulting in a varying N (number of participants) for every hypothesis.

### **2.3 Measures**

After the participants finished reading the aim of the research they were asked to fill in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on a previously validated questionnaires, (Kievik

& Gutteling, 2011; Ter Huurne, 2008, Karadeniz, 2016). The questionnaires, unless otherwise stated, measured responses on five-point Likert-type scales, with extremes *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5). The questionnaire yielded very reliable results (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.87). The questionnaire can be found in appendix A.

### **2.3.1 Risk perception**

Risk perception was measured using a 13-item scale. Participants were asked to specify how severe and dangerous a terrorist attack is, how high the likely is that a terrorist attack will take place in the Netherlands in the future, and what the effect of a terrorist attack will have on the general public or citizens living in the possibly affected area. Participants had to indicate how risky they thought terrorist attacks are for them and how high the chance is they thought it would happen to them personally. The items were used in the study conducted by Kievik and Gutteling (2011) and yielded very reliable results (Cronbach's alpha = 0.94). They were also used in the study conducted by Ter Huurne (2008) and yielded very reliable results (Cronbach's alpha = 0.92). In this study the items also generated reliable results (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.85). The items were collected to the variable 'risk perception'. An example of one of the items is: 'I live in a place where the probability of a possible terrorist attack is'. The participants could choose one of these options: 'small, medium or high' to answer.

### **2.3.2 Self-efficacy**

Level of self-efficacy was measured using a very reliable (Cronbach's alpha = 0.96) 7-item scale that was used in the flood risk study of Kievik & Gutteling (2011). In this terrorism study the items produced less reliable results (Cronbach's alpha = 0,68). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they thought they could prepare themselves for a possible future terrorist attack. An example of one of the items is: 'I am confident that I can look up information about this subject that can help me deal with my fears'.

### **2.3.3 Response efficacy**

Response efficacy was measured using a very reliable 13-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.95) that was used in the study of Kievik & Gutteling (2011). Correspondingly in this study the results produced reliable results (Cronbach's alpha = 0,84). Response efficacy measured the extent to which respondents believed that performing the suggested behaviour will reach the efficient outcome like protecting oneself from negative consequences of a possible terrorist attack in the future. An example of one of the items is: 'When the

government provides information about “what to do during a possible future terrorist attack”, I will have sufficient information about what to do during a terrorist attack’.

#### **2.3.4 Proximity**

Proximity was measured in two different ways: 1) a self-reported assessment (risk proximity), and 2) by asking respondents where they live. Risk proximity was measured using a 3-item scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,79). The participants were asked explicitly if they thought that a terrorist attack was likely to happen near their residence or their workplace.

At the beginning of the questionnaire the participants were asked where they live. These responses were recoded into three groups: 1) Randstad (N=125, 2) Overijssel (N=73), 3) Other (N=49).

Hypothesis 2A used the variable proximity in different ways. In the first analyses all three groups were compared. In the second analyses the groups Other and Overijssel were put into one group based on being at low-risk in those particular places in the Netherlands regarding a possible terrorist attack. People living in the Randstad are considered to be at high-risk for a possible terrorist attack. At face value inspection of these areas where people in the group ‘other’ lived or worked warranted this combination of respondents in one group. The list of residences of the participants can be found in appendix B.

#### **2.3.5 Religiosity**

Religion was measured by assessing if the people who indicated to be more religious had higher self-efficacy in regards to dealing with a possible future terrorist attack than people who indicated not to be religious. The extent of the religiousness of the participants were measured using a very reliable 6-item scale (cronbach’s alpha=0.98) that was used in the study conducted by Karadeniz (2016). In this study the items produced a very reliable result as well (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96). An example of one of the items is: ‘ my faith is very important to me’.

### 3. Results

Table 1 presents the correlations of the variables used in this study with corresponding mean scores and standard deviation.

Table 1  
*Correlations between the variables with corresponding mean scores and standard deviations*

	1 (n=217)	2 (n=240)	3 (n=240)	4 (n=232)	5 (n=247)
1. Response- efficacy	1				
2. Risk perception	.24**	1			
3. Risk Proximity	.22**	.92**	1		
4. Self- efficacy	.34**	-.14*	-.14*	1	
5. Religion	.03	-.04	-.04	.57**	1
Mean	39.33	24.41	10.55	20.23	17.11
Standard deviation	7.63	5.81	3.67	5.46	8.73

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The highest positive correlation between the variables can be found between the variables risk proximity and risk perception,  $r = 0.92$ ,  $n = 24$ ,  $p < 0.01$  and between the variables religion and self-efficacy,  $r = 0.57$ ,  $n = 232$ ,  $p < 0.01$ . The latter means that the higher the score on religiosity scale the higher the score on self-efficacy. The variable response-efficacy had the highest mean ( $M = 39.33$ ,  $SD = 7.63$ ).



### ***Results hypothesis 1***

Hypothesis 1 predicted that people who experience high-risk perception in regards to a possible terrorist attack have higher response efficacy. A Pearson correlation coefficient was performed using the variables risk perception and response efficacy. The correlation test showed that there was a positive correlation between the variables ( $r = 0.24$ ) and although this correlation is considered small, it was highly significant ( $p < 0.01$ ,  $N = 217$ ). This means that the higher people's score on risk perception the higher the score on response efficacy, also see figure 1 for reference. Furthermore, response-efficacy helped to explain almost 6 per cent of the variance in participant's scores on risk perception. These findings support the first hypothesis.



*Figure 1* Correlation of response-efficacy with risk perception

### ***Results Hypothesis 2***

Hypothesis 2A predicted that there is a significant difference in response-efficacy and self-efficacy between the people who live closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack is likely to happen (Randstad) then people who live further away (Overijssel and Overige). The hypothesis stated that people who live in close proximity (Randstad) have higher response and self-efficacy than the people who live further away (Overijssel and Overige). The variable proximity was divided into three groups with the first analyses that were performed. An one-way between-groups analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore the impact of first response-efficacy and second self-efficacy. Participants were divided into three groups according to their hometown (Group 1: Overijssel (N= 73); Group 2: Randstad (N=125); Group 3: Overige (N=49). The test showed that there was no significant difference between

the three groups on response-efficacy ( $F(2, 214) = 0.40, p = 0.67$ ). The test showed the same results for self-efficacy ( $F(2, 229) = 0.46, p = 0.63$ ). The one-way anova showed that there is no significant difference in response-efficacy and self-efficacy between the people who lived closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack is likely to happen than people who lived further away. The researcher wanted to see if the same results would emerge if the groups were divided into Randstad en Overijssel, meaning that Overige and Overijssel would become group 1 (Overijssel) and Randstad group 2 (see method section 2.3.4). In this case the means were compared using an independent sample t-test. Response-efficacy and self-efficacy were the dependent variables and the variable proximity was the independent variable. The results showed that there was a small difference in the mean scores of the variable response-efficacy between the people who lived in the area of Overijssel ( $M = 39.43, SD = 7.16, N = 110$ ) and the people who lived in the area of Randstad ( $M = 39.23, SD = 8.12, N = 107; t(215) = 0.19$ ), however these differences were not significant ( $p = 0.85$ ). The magnitude of the difference in the means was also very small (eta squared = 0.0002).

Correspondingly, the results showed a small difference in the mean scores of the variable self-efficacy between Overijssel ( $M = 19.89, SD = 5.21, N = 118$ ) and Randstad ( $M = 20.58, SD = 5.70, N = 114; t(230) = -0.96$ ), this too was not significant ( $p = 0.34$ ). The magnitude of the difference in the means was likewise very small (eta squared = 0.004). This means that it does not matter where people live, the difference in response-efficacy and self-efficacy does not differ significantly. These results showed no support for hypothesis 2A.

Hypothesis 2B predicted that the people who lived closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack is likely to happen have a higher risk-perception than people who lived further away. An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the risk proximity scores for people living in Randstad and Overijssel. The dependent variable was risk proximity and the independent variable was proximity. There was a significant difference in scores for Randstad ( $M=11.13, SD=3.76$ ) and Overijssel ( $M=9.98, SD=3.49; t(238)=2.46, p = 0.02$ ). The magnitude of the difference in the means showed a small effect (eta squared = 0.02). The results indicate that people in Randstad have a higher risk perception than the people who live in Overijssel. These results support hypothesis 2B.

### ***Results hypothesis 3***

The last hypothesis predicted that the people who scored higher on the religiosity scale have a higher self-efficacy than people who scored lower on the scale when they feel threatened by a

terrorist attack. A two-way between-groups analysis of variance with interaction effect was conducted to explore the impact of risk perception and religion on levels of self-efficacy. It was decided to divide the group in three because a religiousness scale was used and the researcher wanted to use the participants results in three different degrees. Participants were divided into three groups according to their scores of risk perception (Group 1: low; Group 2: middle; Group 3: high) and their scores on religiousness scale (Group 1: low; Group 2: middle; Group 3: high). The independent variables were religion and risk perception. The dependent variable was self-efficacy. Table 2 displays that there was not a statistically significant main effect for risk perception ( $F(2, 223)=1.78, p=0.17$ ). There was a significant difference between religion and self-efficacy ( $F(2, 223)=45.41, p < 0.01$ ) and the effect size was very large (partial eta squared=0.29). The interaction between risk perception, religion and self-efficacy is not significant ( $F(4, 223)=0.60, p=0.67$ ). The results give partial support for the third hypothesis. This means that in general the higher people's score on religiousness the higher their score on self-efficacy, but not per se only when they feel threatened by a terrorist attack.

Table 2  
*Two way analyses of variance between religion, risk perception and self-efficacy*

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2076.22 <sup>a</sup>	8	259.53	12.06	.00	.30
Intercept	90884.53	1	90884.53	4223.51	.00	.95
Risk perception	77.36	2	38.68	1.80	.17	.02
Religiosity scale	1954.37	2	977.18	45.41	.00	.29
Risk perception * Religiosity scale	51.46	4	12.86	.60	.67	.01
Error	4798.67	223	21.52			
Total	101807.00	232				
Corrected Total	6874.89	231				

a. R Squared = .302 (Adjusted R Squared = .277)

#### **4. Conclusion & Discussion**

This study examined if the factors risk-perception, proximity and religiosity played a role in the assessment of efficacy with regards to terrorism. The results showed that people who have a higher risk perception in regards to a possible terrorist attack have a higher response-efficacy. This finding is in line with the results of Kievik and Gutteling (2011). They were among the first to demonstrate a relation between risk perception and response efficacy. Risk communication is a key factor here. Risk communication should contain enough high-risk information and at the same time promote efficacy so that the general public take self-protective actions and believe that those action *do* help. Furthermore, the people who lived in the Randstad differed significantly with the people living in Overijssel regarding risk perception. This means that the people living in the Randstad were more likely to think that a terrorist attack could happen in the near future in their area. This is in line with the idea that proximity to a city where a possible terrorist attack could happen, increase risk-perception (Sackett & Botterill, 2006). A possible explanation for this higher risk perception could be that people may perceive themselves as more vulnerable when they watch the news about terrorist attacks in other countries and see that capital cities, places near government buildings or other big cities in the country are most likely to be targeted by terrorists. This is in line with the findings of Smith and Wilson (2000). When people consider themselves as being in close proximity to a place where a possible terrorist attack could happen, higher risk-perception could emerge. This effect could also be explained by the TMT. This theory indicates that when people are reminded of their own death (e.g. terrorist attack on television), this will lead to more fear. When people experience more fear they are more likely to experience higher risk-perception.

However, people who live near places where a terrorist attack is more likely to happen do not have higher efficacy than people who live further away. A possible rationalisation for this finding could be found in the EPPM. Like mentioned in the introduction, according to the EPPM there are two ways to deal with a threat: danger control and fear control. Gore and Bracken (2005) among others, showed in their study that high fear appeal with a high efficacy message leads to danger control. That means that people will try to solve the problem. When people consider a certain situation threatening and subsequently create higher risk perceptions but there is no effective efficacy message presented, fear control will be the result. This could be the case here. People who live closer to a place where a possible terrorist attack could happen may use fear control to deal with their fear. This means that they probably use denial

(‘it will not happen’), defensive avoidance (‘I’m not going to waste my time on it’) or reactance (‘it’s just a government plan again’) (Witte & Allen, 2000). By using fear control, they are not really dealing with the problem but avoiding the problem. This behaviour will result in lower levels of efficacy. Another explanation for the non-support of the hypothesis could be that there is no difference in efficacy between the Randstad and Overijssel because even though the risk-perception between the two areas may differ, they both feel the need to have some sort of control about the situation to deal with a *possible* threat. If this is the case, they all can take perspective and this ‘symbolic threat’ can probably make them have a certain efficacy level. This makes it irrelevant where people live (close or further away from a possible attack). The efficacy level is in this case probably not based on proximity. Besides, people in general do not have high beliefs in regards to their abilities with respect to increasing their own self-efficacy when it comes to possible threats like terrorism. A reason for that could be that people get very little information about what to do about their fears or feelings of helplessness when thinking about a terrorist attack.

Nevertheless, people who consider themselves religious, believed more in their own ability to reach a goal than non-religious people meaning they had a higher self-efficacy. This finding is in agreement with the results from Omu and Reynolds (2014). They found that patients who felt close to God had more self-confidence about being successful in the challenges that they had to overcome. Religious people, from whatever religion, learn to put their trust and faith in God or another higher power that they believe in. This psychological process could explain why religious people have higher self-efficacy. They are taught that they always can do something about feeling helpless when they feel threatened or fearful. This could be praying or searching for other ways that may reduce their fear, like for instance trusting in the government’s advices when it comes to threatening situations. It could be the case that religious people believe that their religion is the efficacy message that they need to increase their self-efficacy. This corresponds with the initials of EPPM in which it is explained that people, who consider a certain situations threatening and therefore have higher risk perception, increase their self-efficacy when a powerful efficacy message is presented.

The findings in this study showed that high risk-perception, proximity and religiosity all play a role in the assessment of efficacy. So what do we learn from these results? First of all, terrorism can affect people’s sense of efficacy because everybody can be the next victim. However, the results in this study showed that there are different ways to enhance people’s level of self-efficacy. The first important implication is that the findings of this study made clear that high levels of risk-perception lead to higher levels of response-efficacy. This means

that the people who are responsible for providing risk communication should make sure that there is enough fear appeal within the risk message so that people are aware of the risk. This awareness will increase the intention of the general public to implement self-protective behaviour. This could be applied for all threats, not only for terrorism threat.

Secondly, this study contributed to a small body on literature on proximity to threats. When providing risk communication, proximity should be taken into consideration. Although the findings in this study did not indicate significant difference between people who are considered to be living closer to a possible terrorist attack and the people living further away, it is important to reflect on the difference in reaction between the two regarding threats.

Thirdly, the findings in this study add force to the small body of literature to position the role of religiosity within models of coping (Fischer et al, 2006). To the researcher's knowledge, Fischer et al (2006) study was the only study that related higher efficacy to religiosity. This study confirmed that religiosity is a factor that increases people's efficacy so that it could help them cope with threats like terrorism.

Some limitations of this study have to be mentioned. First of all it has to be mentioned that it could be possible that the sample size was not large enough to demonstrate significant differences in means between the studied variables and in particular the one's who showed no significant effects. Second, the researcher asked the participants to write down their postal code and hometown. Some participants wrote down false postal codes. This made it hard for the researcher to locate the residence of the concerned participant, which resulted in not using the participant's responds in hypothesis 2A. The researcher would recommend asking participant's residence instead of postal code. Third, it should be mentioned that response-efficacy was measured by asking the respondents about their intention to implement a certain recommended behaviour. The intention that a person would have to implement a certain behaviour does not always resemble their actual behaviour. This probably means that response-efficacy is not always equal to people's intention. So this might give a biased outlook on the level of response-efficacy that is measured. Last but not least, the results are restricted to people living in the Netherlands. Thankfully, there has not been a terrorist attack here. But it makes you wonder if the results could be generalised to countries where there has been a terrorist attack before. Therefore, it is recommended for future research to make a distinction between people living in a country who has the unfortunate experience of being the target of terrorist and the people living in a country that has not been a target. It would be interesting to see if the levels of efficacy would be higher in countries that have been the target of terrorism. Even though the media gives a pretty extensive coverage of the terrorist

attacks that had happened in other countries, there is still a difference between what the media demonstrates and real life events.

This study have shown, among other things, that the government or whoever is responsible for the wellbeing of all people not always give the right or efficient information that will help people to deal with their fear. Risk communication is not always presented with the right and strong efficacy message. It is possible that authorities do not always recognize what to communicate to people about possible threats without creating unnecessary panic. People are told what to look out for but not exactly what to do when there is a national disaster like a terrorist attack or any other hazards for that matter. It has to be said that it is challenging to advise people what to do or where to go before/during a terrorist attack or other danger. However, authorities could utilize the experiences of victims of terror or other hazards to gain knowledge as to what they thought should have happened with respect to safety protocols or other actions before, during and after the disaster. It is maybe impossible to always be prepared for a terrorist attack, but the researcher thinks that by letting victims of terrorism attacks have a say in risk and safety protocols it only would enhance risk-messages. Based on the current study, risk communicators are well advised to use the experiences of victims of terror attacks or any other hazards and to evoke fear appeal in their messages, which will lead to higher risk-perception by the general public. Higher risk-perception corresponding with a high efficacy message are important factors for increasing efficacy during a threatening situation.

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## Appendix A

### *Questionnaire*

Beste respondent,

Ik vraag hierbij om uw medewerking voor een onderzoek in het kader van het afronden van de Master Psychologie van de conflict, risico en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Twente. Dit onderzoek richt zich op de verschillende factoren die een rol kunnen spelen bij het efficiënt kunnen omgaan met dreiging of angst die men mogelijk kan voelen voor een toekomstige terroristische aanslag. Het invullen van de vragen zal niet meer dan 5 minuten van uw tijd kosten. De gegevens die door u verschaft zijn en de resultaten van de vragenlijst, zullen vertrouwelijk worden behandeld en uitsluitend voor dit onderzoek gebruikt worden. U hoeft nergens uw naam in te vullen en mag ten alle tijden stoppen met het invullen van de vragenlijst. Ik vraag u vriendelijk om zo eerlijk mogelijk te antwoorden! Alvast bedankt voor uw medewerking!

Vriendelijke groet,

Mayes Katab

#### 1. Geslacht

- Vrouw (1)
- Man (2)

#### 2. Leeftijd

- 18 - 25 (1)
- 26 - 35 (2)
- 36 - 45 (3)
- 46 - 55 (4)
- 56 + (5)

3. Vermeld hier de vier cijfers van u postcode en u woonplaats (bv. 7559 NW, Hengelo)

4. Als allereerst zou ik graag willen weten hoe belangrijk uw geloof voor u is?

	Helemaal niet van toepassing (1)	Grotendeels niet van toepassing (2)	Deels wel/ deels niet van toepassing (3)	Grotendeels van toepassing (4)	Helemaal van toepassing (5)
Ik zie mijzelf als gelovig (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ik ben opgegroeid in deze religie (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mijn geloof is belangrijk voor mij (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ik neem veel deel aan religieuze activiteiten (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mijn geloof speelt een grote rol als ik belangrijke beslissingen moet nemen (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mijn geloofsovertuiging heeft veel invloed op het leven van alledag (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. Ik zou graag willen weten hoe u denkt over de risico's van een mogelijke toekomstige terroristische aanval. De eerste twee vragen gaan over de risico's van een terroristische aanslag in het ALGEMEEN.

	Helemaal niet (1)	Nauwelijks (2)	Enigszins (3)	Nogal (4)	Heel erg (5)
Hoe RISKANT vindt u een terroristische aanslag in het algemeen? (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hoe ERNSTIG vindt u een terroristische aanslag in het algemeen? (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6.

	Zeer klein (1)	Nogal klein (2)	Niet klein/ Niet groot (3)	Nogal groot (4)	Zeer groot (5)
Hoe groot acht u de KANS op een terroristische aanslag in Nederland? (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

7. Ik zou aan de hand van de volgende vragen graag willen weten in hoeverre u te maken denkt te hebben met de risico's van een eventuele toekomstige terroristische aanslag. De vragen 8 tot en met 10 hebben alleen betrekking op de risico's van een terroristische aanslag voor u **PERSOONLIJK**.

	Ze er klein (1)	Nogal klein (2)	Niet klein/ niet groot (3)	Nogal groot (4)	Ze er groot (5)
De kans dat er in mijn leefomgeving een terroristische aanslag plaatsvindt is (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

8.

	Helemaal niet (1)	Nauwelijks (2)	Enigszins (3)	Nogal (4)	Helemaal eens (5)
Als er een terroristische aanslag in mijn omgeving zou plaatsvinden, dan zou ik me persoonlijk betrokken voelen (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9.

	Helemaal oneens (1)	Enigszins oneens (2)	Niet eens/niet oneens (3)	Enigszins eens (4)	Helemaal eens (5)
Ik woon op een plek waar de kans op een terroristische aanslag aanwezig is (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ik werk op een plek waar de kans op een terroristische aanslag aanwezig is (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Waar ik woon is een terroristische aanslag in de toekomst zeker mogelijk (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

10. Hoe voelt u zich wanneer u denkt aan de mogelijkheid dat u te maken krijgt met een terroristische aanslag?

	Helemaal niet (1)	Nauwelijks (2)	Enigszins (3)	Nogal (4)	Heel erg (5)
Gespannen (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Angstig (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nerveus (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bezorgd (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Boos (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



11. Hoe gaat u om met het risico van een terroristische aanslag? Ik heb er vertrouwen in..

	Helemaal oneens (1)	Enigszins oneens (2)	Niet eens/niet oneens (3)	Enigszins eens (4)	Helemaal eens (5)
Dat ik informatie kan zoeken over dit onderwerp waar ik wat aan heb (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat ik mezelf goed kan voorbereiden op een risico zoals een terroristische aanslag (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat ik adequaat kan reageren wanneer er een terroristische aanslag plaatsvindt (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat ik, als het eventueel nodig is, anderen kan helpen (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat mijn religie mij sterk houdt tijdens zo'n ramp (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat mijn religie mij helpt wanneer ik me angstig of bedreigd voel door een terroristische aanslag in de nabije toekomst (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dat de	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

overheid mij adequate informatie geeft over hoe te handelen in zo'n nood situatie (7)					
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12. In hoeverre bent u het eens met de onderstaande stellingen? Door informatie die de overheid geeft over hoe te handelen wanneer er een hoge dreiging is voor een terroristische aanslag, dan..

	Helemaal oneens (1)	Enigszins oneens (2)	Niet eens/ niet oneens (3)	Enigszins eens (4)	Helemaal eens (5)
Weet ik voldoende over wat ik zelf kan doen om me goed voor te bereiden op een terroristische aanslag (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Weet ik voldoende over wat ik moet doen bij een terroristische aanslag (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Voel ik me gespannen (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dan kan ik mezelf beter beschermen tegen zo'n ramp als een terroristische aanslag (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Voel ik me gerustgesteld (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Kan ik adequaat reageren op een ramp zoals een terroristische aanslag (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

13. Wanneer ik informatie van de overheid krijg over ‘wat te doen tijdens een eventuele toekomstige terroristische aanslag’ dan,

	Zeer klein (1)	Nogal klein (2)	Niet klein/ niet groot (3)	Nogal groot (4)	Zeer groot (5)
Is de kans dat ik informatie ga zoeken over dit onderwerp (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik informatie over mogelijke terroristische aanslagen in ons land in de gaten houd (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik het laatste nieuws hierover op zoek (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik alerter ben, wanneer de overheid aangeeft dat de kans op een terroristische aanslag groot is (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik alert blijf en verdachte zaken meld (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik de gegeven adviezen opvolg (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is de kans dat ik me houd aan gegeven adviezen (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

***Caption (legenda) questionnaire***

Question 3	Proximity
Question 4	Religion
Question 5,6,7,8,9 and 10	Risk perception
Question 9	Risk proximity
Question 11	Self-efficacy
Question 12 and 13	Response-efficacy

## Appendix B

### *Postal code respondents (measure proximity)*

1.	OV	7513
2.	OV	7511
3.	OV	7417
4.	OV	7451
5.	OV	7552
6.	OV	7329
7.	OV	7552
8.	OV	7687
9.	OV	7641
10.	OV	7555
11.	OV	7544
12.	OV	7521
13.	OV	7558
14.	OV	7546
15.	OV	7524
16.	OV	7603
17.	OV	7558
18.	OV	7553
19.	OV	7546
20.	OV	7521
21.	OV	7623
22.	OV	7623
23.	OV	7523
24.	OV	7412
25.	OV	7552
26.	OV	7681
27.	OV	7523
28.	OV	7442
29.	OV	7645
30.	OV	7513
31.	OV	7543
32.	OV	7461
33.	OV	7559
34.	OV	7513
35.	OV	7495
36.	OV	7559
37.	OV	7621
38.	OV	7642
39.	OV	7553
40.	OV	7461
41.	OV	7552
42.	OV	7544
43.	OV	7556
44.	OV	7772
45.	OV	7521
46.	OV	7557

47.	OV	7544
48.	OV	7553
49.	OV	7424
50.	OV	7544
51.	OV	7541
52.	OV	7511
53.	OV	7544
54.	OV	7412
55.	OV	7574
56.	OV	7557
57.	OV	7558
58.	OV	7556
59.	OV	7543
60.	OV	7513
61.	OV	7552
62.	OV	7559
63.	OV	7559
64.	OV	7608
65.	OV	7558
66.	OV	7513
67.	OV	7609
68.	OV	7557
69.	OV	7544
70.	OV	7545
71.	OV	7522
72.	OV	7545
73.	OV	7542
74.	Overige	5613
75.	Overige	5703
76.	Overige	7329
77.	Overige	7103
78.	Overige	8431
79.	Overige	7672
80.	Overige	7671
81.	Overige	6716
82.	Overige	7333
83.	Overige	6543
84.	Overige	9718
85.	Overige	4703
86.	Overige	8245
87.	Overige	9725
88.	Overige	5231
89.	Overige	6525
90.	Overige	5613
91.	Overige	5038
92.	Overige	6415
93.	Overige	8161
94.	Overige	6433
95.	Overige	7872
96.	Overige	5235

97.	Overige	7323
98.	Overige	7938
99.	Overige	6971
100.	Overige	3771
101.	Overige	7881
102.	Overige	6538
103.	Overige	4105
104.	Overige	9932
105.	Overige	2651
106.	Overige	9602
107.	Overige	1541
108.	Overige	8922
109.	Overige	7323
110.	Overige	4780
111.	Overige	4824
112.	Overige	8603
113.	Overige	5507
114.	Overige	5912
115.	Overige	4702
116.	Overige	5708
117.	Overige	8710
118.	Overige	5152
119.	Overige	4002,
120.	Overige	4707
121.	Overige	7335
122.	RS	3402
123.	RS	2312
124.	RS	1068
125.	RS	2321
126.	RS	3160
127.	RS	1812
128.	RS	1083
129.	RS	2324
130.	RS	2904
131.	RS	2532
132.	RS	1944
133.	RS	1703
134.	RS	3022
135.	RS	1213
136.	RS	1055
137.	RS	3751
138.	RS	3454
139.	RS	2312
140.	RS	2562
141.	RS	1754
142.	RS	2532
143.	RS	2430
144.	RS	1102
145.	RS	1079
146.	RS	2397



147.	RS	1093
148.	RS	3512
149.	RS	3522
150.	RS	2517
151.	RS	3404
152.	RS	2225
153.	RS	1019
154.	RS	1073
155.	RS	2021
156.	RS	3526
157.	RS	3317
158.	RS	3552
159.	RS	3533
160.	RS	3074
161.	RS	1183
162.	RS	1013
163.	RS	1055
164.	RS	1055
165.	RS	1061
166.	RS	1075
167.	RS	1401
168.	RS	1098
169.	RS	1064
170.	RS	2541
171.	RS	1061
172.	RS	2625
173.	RS	3816
174.	RS	3079
175.	RS	1273
176.	RS	1011
177.	RS	3600
178.	RS	3902
179.	RS	2625
180.	RS	3042,
181.	RS	3562
182.	RS	2571
183.	RS	2533
184.	RS	2533
185.	RS	3076
186.	RS	7521
187.	RS	2515
188.	RS	2801
189.	RS	3124
190.	RS	2525
191.	RS	2286
192.	RS	1501
193.	RS	2721
194.	RS	3081
195.	RS	7788
196.	RS	1056

197.	RS	2000
198.	RS	2600
199.	RS	2525
200.	RS	3524
201.	RS	2334
202.	RS	3552,
203.	RS	2562
204.	RS	1052
205.	RS	3554
206.	RS	2543
207.	RS	2545
208.	RS	1079
209.	RS	1069
210.	RS	3543
211.	RS	3582
212.	RS	1012
213.	RS	3062
214.	RS	3014
215.	RS	3077
216.	RS	3543
217.	RS	2272
218.	RS	1073
219.	RS	2342
220.	RS	2522
221.	RS	2526
222.	RS	2525
223.	RS	3067
224.	RS	2522
225.	RS	2548
226.	RS	2541
227.	RS	2595,
228.	RS	2274
229.	RS	2611
230.	RS	2586
231.	RS	2729
232.	RS	2512
233.	RS	2515
234.	RS	2565
235.	RS	2285
236.	RS	2526
237.	RS	2544
238.	RS	2545
239.	RS	1475
240.	RS	2493
241.	RS	2496
242.	RS	2516
243.	RS	2497
244.	RS	1015
245.	RS	1078
246.	RS	7521

247. RS 3014

*Caption*

OV= Overijssel (N=73)

Overige (N=49)

RS = Randstad (N=125)

Table 4

*Frequencies: SPSS output*

	Frequency	Percent
overijssel	73	29,6
randstad	125	50,6
overige	49	19,8
Total	247	100,0