Dispute escalation by developing states in the World Trade Organization : a rational choice explanation

Dresvyannikova, Valensiya (2016) Dispute escalation by developing states in the World Trade Organization : a rational choice explanation.

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Abstract:Academic inquiries into the subject area of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism are currently gaining societal significance due to the indeterminate future of this international organization. In particular, existing research on dispute escalation, especially in cases involving developing plaintiffs, can be advanced by an application of theoretical models from such branches of academia as Public Administration and Political Science. The present thesis applies Bueno de Mesquita’s rational choice game-theoretic model of decision-making to the behaviour of developing plaintiffs in a WTO dispute in order to predict and explain the occurrence of panel requests. An analysis of 159 cases shows that plaintiff’s preference for political gains, rooted in his democratic level, and the interaction between plaintiff’s and respondent’s salience levels are statistically significant predictors of dispute escalation to the panel stage; however, these effects are enabled by a specific contextual variable and only occur in disputes with high plaintiff salience.
Item Type:Essay (Master)
Faculty:BMS: Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences
Subject:70 social sciences in general, 88 social and public administration, 89 political science
Programme:Public Administration MSc (60020)
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/essays/71264
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