EUROPEAN IMAGINARIES: DEAD END OF FURTHER INTEGRATION?

Analysis of the Imaginaries of the European Heads of State and
Government and the European Commission

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This thesis analyses the imaginaries of important political decision makers of the European Union in the context of the refugee crisis and interprets them according to theories of European integration. Speeches, interviews, statements and press releases of the 28 heads of state and government of the European Member States and two Commissioners of the European Commission are analysed through qualitative content analysis. The aim is to derive prospects for European integration from the expressed imaginaries. For the interpretation, the theories neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are applied. The study's results show that the imaginaries of the largest group of national heads of state and government remain blurred without clarification, which position is taken with regard to European integration, while the imaginaries of the Commissioners are mainly characterised by support of further integration. According to both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, the interpretation of the imaginaries leads to the conclusion that the prospects for further European integration remain limited. Only in those policy fields directly related to the immediate crisis further cooperation can be expected.

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1. Introduction

The refugee crisis in Europe has been of the most discussed issues in the media in the past months. The number of migrants entering Europe has been rising for a few years but only since the death of the Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi on the 2nd of September 2015 in the Aegean sea the migrant influx into Europe has received major attention (El-Enany, 2016; Finch, 2015). Due to the shift in awareness it is now labelled a "crisis" and is seen as probably one of the most challenging tasks for the European Union (EU). In this context key political decision makers in the EU have controversially discussed the crisis' consequences for the EU and their perspectives on the EU. The concept of imaginaries captures which underlying visions politicians express in their statements in regard to future prospects of the EU since imaginaries describe "how things usually go, […] [and] how they ought to go" (Taylor, 2002, p. 106). Hence, an imaginary of the EU entails an individual's understanding of how the EU is now and what he or she desires the EU to be like. The perspectives of political decision makers on the EU provide important insights, which need to be included in the discussion on European integration. This study fills the gap in the academic debate by analysing the imaginaries of political decision makers and interpreting them according to theories of European integration.

In this study a new concept of European imaginaries, which focuses on the individual's understanding of the European Union and its integration process, is developed based on the work of Taylor (2002, 2004). The new concept of European imaginaries contrasts previous conceptualisations such as the one by Keith (2013) as it does not focus on European values but on the individual's understanding of the European Union. The concept adds new insights to theories of European integration, namely how political decision makers imagine the EU and its future as well as what aims they pursue in regard to the EU. Even though the concept imaginary has widely been applied in different contexts already (Dobbernack, 2010; Levy & Spicer, 2013; Ponte & Birch, 2014; Stephens, Atkinson, & Glasner, 2013), it has not been taken into account in the academic debate on European integration yet. By interpreting the imaginaries of important political decision makers, this study enables an outlook on future prospects of European integration. Hence, the study offers first insights on how recent developments in the context of the refugee crisis can possibly influence European integration.

So far the debate on theories of European integration shows a gap on the recent refugee crisis. However, there has been an ongoing academic debate on the financial and economic crisis, namely on the consequences for the European Union and how different theories of European integration fit the subsequent changes (e.g. Falkner, 2016; Ioannou, Leblond, & Niemann, 2015; Menon, 2014; Tosun, Wetzel, & Zapryanova, 2014). Several authors have argued that the further integration during the crisis can be best explained by neofunctionalism (NF) using the concepts of spill-over effects and path dependency (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2014). In contrast, other scholars have emphasised that the management of the crisis was mainly marked by intergovernmental negotiations and decisions, which is best explained by liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (Schimmelfennig, 2015).

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This study extends the academic debate to the refugee crisis by applying both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism for the interpretation of European imaginaries. By linking the imaginaries of decision makers with theories of European integration, this study not only introduces imaginaries of political decision makers as important new insights in the academic debate on European integration, but also fills the gap in the discussion of how theories of European integration interpret recent developments of the refugee crisis. Thus, the study offers new insights for scholars of European integration theory and extends previous theories.

The study is of social relevance since it gives an overview of currently existing European imaginaries of political decision makers in the EU. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis national and supranational politicians have discussed the (future) role of the EU controversially. The study will clarify how political decision makers actually imagine and support the further integration process of the EU. It analyses how their imaginaries on European integration differ from each other and highlights in which respect the imaginaries show common ground for further cooperation. The study is expected to give insights on how imaginaries of European politicians in power could shape the EU in its further development in line with important theoretical understandings of the EU. Consequently, the study will contribute to the European society's deeper understanding of what prospects European integration still has in times of uncertainty caused by the financial and economic crisis (Keith, 2013), the refugee crisis and the forthcoming Brexit.

In order to analyse the expressed imaginaries and interpret them with theories of European integration, the following research question is addressed: *Which prospects for European integration can be derived from the imaginaries of political decision makers expressed in the context of the refugee crisis?* This research question is of interpretive nature since the actual consequences of the expressed imaginaries cannot be assessed yet. The analysis is structured according to the following sub-questions:

 a. *Which imaginaries have been expressed by political decision makers in the European Union?*
 b. *Which prospects for European integration can be derived from these imaginaries?*

The two sub-questions follow from the main research question since the interpretation of the imaginaries requires two steps: firstly, the study gives an overview of the different European imaginaries political decision makers expressed in the context of the refugee crisis. In the second step, theories of European integration are applied to derive prospects from these imaginaries. The interpretation is based on key theoretical understandings of European integration theory, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Even though the theories are no longer the only theories in the focus of the academic debate on European integration, they remain key reference points (Ioannou et al., 2015). They have been selected for the interpretation of the imaginaries since they include insights on the impact of supranational and national actors on the European integration process. Furthermore, they have been applied to explain the management and consequences of the economic and financial crisis as well

(Niemann & Ioannou, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2014, 2015). Consequently, the two theories enable an interpretation of the imaginaries in line with widely acknowledged concepts of European integration.

The study's focus on imaginaries of political decision makers of the EU was chosen since Strauss (2006) explained that focusing on real subject's imaginaries would be of more value than examining abstract imaginaries. The 28 heads of state and government[1] of the European Member States were chosen due to the fact that in the economic and financial crisis the Member States turned out to be crucial actors for the immediate crisis management (Falkner, 2016). Representatives of the European Commission were included in order to integrate the perspective of the supranational EU institutions as well. Accordingly, the study focuses on the European national heads of state and government and the European Commission as influential actors in shaping the European Union and its further development. The context of the research question is the European refugee crisis. Therefore, the time setting was set from September 2015, when the awareness of the migrant influx rose after Aylan Kurdi's death, until April 2016 when the analysis was conducted. The context is important since the refugee crisis is the cause of the controversial debate on the EU in the media.

In the following, the existing theories and empirical findings on imaginaries and European integration relevant for the interpretation are discussed. Thereby, the focus is laid on how imaginaries can be conceptualised and how the concept can be connected with theories of European integration and the crisis setting. Afterwards the methods of the analysis are explained. The research question is answered applying qualitative content analysis to identify the imaginaries of the decision makers. Deductive coding with a predetermined coding scheme is used to analyse the qualitative data. The data consists of political speeches, interviews, statements and press releases, which are retrieved from official websites of governments, the European Union and newspaper websites. The analysis follows the two sub-questions, firstly the imaginaries are identified and compared. In the second step, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are applied to interpret the imaginaries and to derive prospects for European integration from them. In the conclusion, the main findings are summarised and an outlook about the study's practical implications is given.

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[1] For 25 member states, the imaginaries of the heads of government are analysed. Only in the cases of France, Lithuania and Romania, the head of state instead of the head of government is included in the study as these countries are represented by the heads of state in the European Council (European Union, n.d.). For further elaboration see 3.2 Case Selection.

2. Theory

    2.1. Introduction

In order to derive prospects of European integration from imaginaries of political decision makers, firstly imaginaries are conceptualised. Additionally, it is outlined why imaginaries serve as important insights in the context of European integration. Secondly, a new concept of European imaginaries is developed. Subsequently, the main argumentation of theories of European integration concerning imaginaries is summarised. The focus is laid on neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as two key theories of European integration. Special attention is paid to how the theories of European integration can be applied to interpret the imaginaries. Finally, the context of the crisis and its theoretical implications for the study are elaborated.

    2.2. The Concept of Imaginary

There is a range of theories on imaginaries since they have been conceptualized by different authors (Strauss, 2006). Key contributions have been written by Anderson (1983), Taylor (2002, 2004) and Castoriadis (1987). Strauss (2006) points to the fact that the authors all see the imaginary as a positive, imaginative creation. However, the concepts still differ to some extent, especially in regard to their idea whether imaginaries spread across groups. Castoriadis (1987, p. 90) conceptualizes the (social) imaginary as "the final articulations the society in question has imposed on the world, on itself, and on its needs, the organizing patterns that are the conditions for the representability of everything that the society can give to itself." Castoriadis emphasises that a society holds (only) one imaginary. Additionally, he sees imaginaries as something very abstract since he believes that imaginaries do not exist in a form, in which they can be clearly defined and distinguished (Castoriadis, 1987). Anderson's theory differs to Castoriadis' in one important aspect. For Castoriadis an imaginary is the central world view of a particular group but for Anderson imaginaries can spread across groups, especially across borders of nation-states (Anderson, 1983; Strauss, 2006). In the study imaginaries of political decision makers in the European Union are analysed. Due to deep integration processes in the EU today, the spreading of imaginaries across national borders is anticipated. Accordingly, as the result of border-transcending imaginaries, in the analysis it can be expected that some decision makers' imaginaries reveal to be similar or shared tendencies in the imaginaries become apparent. Therefore, Anderson's idea of imaginaries is appropriate for the study.

Taylor built on Anderson's work and extended it. For Taylor (2004, p. 23) imaginaries are "ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations". Therefore, imaginaries are descriptive as well as evaluative of their social surroundings and its processes. The imaginary is a common understanding which enables collective action and provides a common understanding of legitimacy (Taylor, 2002). He argues that a range of social imaginaries exists at the same time while being shared among different groups or societies (Levy

& Spicer, 2013). Taylor sees imaginaries as communicated via images, stories and legends (Taylor, 2002). According to him imaginaries could be seen as the background understandings of society. Hence, through imaginaries the society defines social problems as well as governmental action to address and solve these (Dobbernack, 2010). Accordingly, by studying imaginaries expressed in the context of the refugee crisis the background understanding of the society, i.e. how individuals envision the EU, can be revealed. Additionally, in Taylor's work imaginaries are not seen as something abstract but as ideas and framings expressed by individuals (Strauss, 2006). Consequently, imaginaries can be assessed using framings and statements of individuals within a person-centred approach. However, it is important to stress that imaginaries go further than the direct background understanding of an individual (Taylor, 2004) due to the imaginaries' indefinite nature. The study only touches on a limited part of the imaginaries, which are very complex since they compromise "that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation" (Taylor, 2004, p. 25).

The study of imaginaries reveals underlying perceptions and framings of society and not actual developments of reality (Stephens et al., 2013). However, previous theoretical findings have emphasised the impact of imaginaries in influencing actual (political) developments (Dobbernack, 2010; Levy & Spicer, 2013; Ponte & Birch, 2014; Stephens et al., 2013). Accordingly, imaginaries of political decision makers can serve as important insights in connection with theories of European integration since the imaginaries reveal what expectations and aims the decision makers pursue in regard to the EU. Furthermore, Stephens et al. (2013) assessed how underlying imaginaries shape institutions and institutional structures, in their case public stem cell banking. They found that the different institutional structures of stem cell banking in the UK and Spain could be explained by different underlying imaginaries expressed by the institutions' staff. Consequently, imaginaries can explain how actors shape their environment as far as their influence allows them to. The same theoretical argumentation is used in order to derive prospects for European integration from the imaginaries. The EU is seen as an institutional structure, which is being shaped among many other factors by its own actors' imaginaries. To sum up, the concept imaginary is applied as the imaginaries of political decision makers of the EU reflect their background understanding of the EU and its integration process. Their imaginaries reveal which aims the political decision makers pursue in regard to the EU and how they envision its further integration process.

2.3. The Concept of European Imaginaries

The focus of the study lies on the decision makers' European imaginaries, i.e. their background understanding of the European Union and its integration process. In this study, European imaginaries are constructed with the focus on how the European Union itself and its integration process are envisioned by individuals. This conceptualisation contrasts Keith's (2013) concept of European imaginaries elaborated in his comment on the book "Land of Strangers", in which he describes European imaginaries with regard to migration and politics of difference. He emphasises differences in Europe,

such as different welfare regimes, forms of citizenship and geographical boundaries. Thereby, he refers to values widely-recognised as European values. In his point of view, European imaginaries are in times of globalisation best understood from an outside perspective. In contrast to his concept, this study conceptualises European imaginaries with a stronger focus on the European Union itself and an internal European perspective. It is not a study of European values such as "deliberative democracy, civil society, enlightenment rationality" (Keith, 2013, p. 30), but a study of the background understanding individuals have of the European Union and its future development. As imaginaries define how people imagine their social surrounding, how they evaluate it and which underlying expectations they hold, in this study imaginaries in regard to the development of the European Union are approached with a scheme applied in public opinion investigations. Public opinion on the European Union can be distinguished into static and dynamic support for the EU as well as into refusal of European integration overall (anti-integration). Dynamic support stands for the demand of further European integration towards an ever closer union. Static support means that the European Union is supported as it is now, but no further integration is endorsed. Anti-integration stands for the perception that integration already went too far (Rose & Borz, 2016). Accordingly, the following three ideal types of European imaginaries are developed. The imaginary of dynamic support reflecting support for further integration, the imaginary of static support, which means that the EU's status quo is supported and the imaginary of anti-integration, which entails the refusal of European integration.

Rose and Borz (2016) show that the majority of European citizens does not support further integration to an ever closer union. About a quarter supports further integration (25 percent, dynamic support), while about a third thinks integration already went too far (32 percent, anti-integration). The largest group of European citizens supports the EU as it is now (34 percent, static support). Only about 9 percent express that they have no opinion on European integration.[2] Hence, based on the expectations and opinions of the citizens they were elected to represent, it can be expected that the imaginaries of the heads of state government should represent similar static support for European integration.[3] However, Rose and Borz (2016) also found that with access to more information on the EU people are more likely to share the view that integration went too far. Accordingly, it can even be expected that the heads of state and government being well-informed representatives will show even less support for the EU than the citizens. The European institutions, on the other hand, support further integration (Rose & Borz, 2016). Therefore, it can be expected that the imaginaries of the European Commission will reflect dynamic support for the EU. Consequently, it is expected that in the analysis very different imaginaries on the EU and its further development will be found as the decision makers come from different backgrounds. Additionally, it is anticipated that clear dividing lines between the European Commission

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[2] The results from the European Election Study 2014 were used for the exact percentages (Rose & Borz, 2016).
[3] Rose and Borz (2016) show that the public opinion results from 2009 only changed minimally in the post-election study of 2014. Therefore, it can be assumed that only minor shifts in public opinion occur over time and public opinion on the EU remains relatively stable until today.

and heads of state and government will become apparent as both represent different actors at the EU level.

> **Theoretical Expectations about the European Imaginaries of Political Decision Makers:**
> - The imaginaries of the largest group of heads of state and government are expected to reflect the static support of the majority of European citizens for the EU.
> - The heads of state and government as well-informed representatives are expected to show even less support for the EU than the European citizens.
> - The imaginaries of the European Commission are expected to reflect dynamic support.
> - It is expected that very different imaginaries of the political decision makers will be found in the analysis.
> - It is expected that clear dividing lines between the European Commission and the heads of state and government will become apparent.
> - It is expected that some decision makers' imaginaries reveal to be similar or shared tendencies in the imaginaries become apparent due to border-transcending imaginaries (see 2.2).

2.4. European Imaginaries and Theories of European Integration

In the following, it is elaborated how the theories of European integration can be connected with the concept of European imaginaries and how their lines of argumentation can be applied to interpret the European imaginaries. Theories of European integration describe and explain integration processes, while the European imaginaries describe the actual opinions and perspectives of individuals on the EU and European integration. The interpretation of the imaginaries is based on neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, two dominating theories of European integration. Following their lines of argumentation, the study derives prospects for European integration from the expressed imaginaries of political decision makers. These prospects of European integration are interpretations of the imaginaries since the real consequences cannot be assessed yet. In order to do so, it is elaborated how European imaginaries can be included in the argumentation of theories of European integration and how these theories would interpret different constellations of European imaginaries of political decision makers.

Following neofunctionalism, European integration is a dynamic and progressive process which leads to supranationalism "as a result of endogenous interdependencies, spillovers and path-dependencies" (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p. 327). Three different types of spill-over which foster integration can be differentiated: functional, political and cultivated spill-over (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Functional spill-overs occur due to interdependencies of policy areas. The functional pressure that one policy aim can only be achieved if another policy area becomes integrated as well leads to further integration.

However, these functional pressures only have an impact to the extent to which they are perceived by key actors (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Hence, according to NF it can be expected that if the majority of the European imaginaries of the national and supranational decision makers reflect dynamic support for the EU, they will more likely implement political decisions supporting further integration and competence transfer to the EU level. This prospect of European integration also holds when applying the mechanism of political spill-over. Political spill-over occurs when national elites perceive that "problems of substantial interest cannot be effectively addressed at the domestic level" anymore (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 198). Eventually this process leads to a learning process, whereby elites shift their support from the national to the supranational level. The process refers to non-governmental elites, which are not included in the study, as well as to governmental elites. Accordingly, it can be assumed that if the imaginaries of the national decision makers, as representatives of the governmental elites, mainly show dynamic support for the EU, this could reflect a political spill-over and be the result of a gradual learning process. Hence, it can be expected that if the majority of the imaginaries of the national decision makers reflect dynamic support, there are good prospects for European integration as the national decision makers will more likely support further European integration as a result of political spill-over. Additionally, cultivated spill-over refers to the process that European institutions themselves promote supranationalism to benefit from the integration process. Once the institutions have been established they use their autonomy to foster even more integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Especially the Commission uses its agenda-setting power to facilitate further integration (Niemann, 1998). Correspondingly, it can be expected that if the imaginaries of the Commissioners reflect dynamic support for the EU, the prospects of European integration increase as they will foster cultivated spill-over.

According to liberal intergovernmentalism, European integration is not a dynamic process but rather the consequence of rational choices made by national decision makers who respond to growing international interdependence.

> In a nutshell, LI argues that national preferences are shaped by the economic interests of powerful domestic groups in a situation of international interdependence; substantive agreements reflect the constellation of national preferences and bargaining power; and the design of international institutions is a function of the kind and size of co-operation problems they are supposed to manage. (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 178)

The national heads of state and government, and therefore their imaginaries, are decisive for the future development of the EU since they hold the bargaining power in the European Council about competence shifts to the EU and the EU's institutional design (Moravcsik, 1993). The European institutions, on the other hand, do not play an important role in fostering integration (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Hence, their European imaginaries are not seen as important.

In the two-level game between the EU and its Member States bargaining between Member States with diverging national preferences can present an obstacle to further European integration (Tosun et al., 2014). Hence, diverging European imaginaries expressed by national decision makers can hamper further integration. This can be explained by including European imaginaries of political decision makers into the three-step model of Moravcsik (2008): In the first step national preferences are aggregated and determined domestically as responses to policy interdependence (national preference formation). The imaginaries expressed by the heads of state and government can be placed within the national preference formation as they are either input for the national discussion or already the result of it. The heads of state and government are the decision makers in the European Council and most likely pursue their own imaginaries in the negotiations. Due to this reason and to simplification matters, the imaginaries of the heads of state and government are treated as the result of the national preference formation in the study. In the second step, intergovernmental bargaining at the EU takes place in which the states with relative bargaining power dominate and the states with less bargaining power only receive side-payments (interstate bargaining). The bargaining power of a state can be defined as its "issue specific asymmetrical interdependence" (Moravcsik, 2008, p. 166) or its preference intensity. In the interstate bargaining the heads of state and government engage in order to achieve results in their own interest. The heads of state and government pursue to shape the outcome of the negotiations according to their European imaginaries. As a result of the intergovernmental bargaining, EU institutions are adopted and some sovereignty is transferred to the supranational level in order to increase the compliance of commitments made (institutional delegation). The imaginaries of the Commission can be allocated within the third step of the model as the Commission is an EU institution set up through institutional delegation. In the model, the Commission is not attributed a decisive role.

In the study, the bargaining power of the national heads of state and government is determined using the net payments Member States contribute to or receive from the European budget. The classification of Member States into net payers and recipients serves to distinguish levels of bargaining power as net recipients have to fear losing substantial payments, if the net payers threaten to cut down their contribution to the European budget during international negotiations. A similar dependency became apparent during the Euro crisis between solvent and debtor countries, where solvent countries especially Germany had high and debtor countries low bargaining power (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Additionally, the net payers can also offer side-payments to the net recipients in order to push through their position in international negotiations (Moravcsik, 2008). Hence, there is a dependency of the net recipients on the net payers, which among many possible other factors serves to distinguish Member States with higher and lower bargaining power.

Consequently, applying liberal intergovernmentalism to derive prospect of European integration from the imaginaries, the following conclusions would be drawn: If the study's analysis shows that the imaginaries of the national decision makers would predominantly diverge (e.g. half showing dynamic

support and the other half anti-integration), the prospects for further compromises and European integration would be very low according to LI. However, if the imaginaries mainly show corresponding national preferences in favour of further integration, the prospects for European integration would be very high. The bargaining power of the Member States is crucial for understanding intergovernmental bargaining. Accordingly, the imaginaries of the heads of state and government with greater bargaining power are more decisive for the further development of the EU than the ones of the countries with lower bargaining power. As there is a dependency of the highest net receiving on the highest net paying Member States, the imaginaries of the heads of state and government representing the highest net payers are the most important for the European integration process. Hence, their imaginaries determine the prospects for European integration according to LI. If the representatives of the highest net paying Member States agree on further integration, the prospects for European integration are high. If they show diverging European imaginaries, the prospects for European integration are low. To sum up, according to LI the imaginaries of national decision makers are very relevant for the further development of the EU, while the imaginaries of the European Commission are not (Tosun et al., 2014).

2.5. Imaginaries and the Crisis Context

Imaginaries expressed in the context of the refugee crisis are studied. In the context of the refugee crisis decision makers extensively discussed their views on the European Union and its prospects for the future. Ioannou et al. (2015) observed a similar development in the financial and economic crisis as they explain:

> Few events over the past few decades have given rise to an amount of debate and speculation concerning the state of the European Union (EU) and the future of European integration as the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007. (p.155)

Hence, the crisis context is important as it initiated a controversial debate on the EU in the media and served as a trigger for decision makers to formulate their European imaginaries either directly or indirectly.

Furthermore, the crisis context is important as crises are attributed different roles in the theories of European integration, which are applied to interpret the European imaginaries. Crises play an important role in the theory of neofunctionalism "since they are expected to overcome the entropy otherwise typical for regional integration organisations and lead to spillover processes that enhance either the scope or the level of integration" (Falkner, 2016, p. 221). NF suggests that during crises further integration takes place. The mechanism of functional spill-over, for example, was "amplified during the [economic and financial] crisis because the institutional framework did not include crisis management tools" (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 203). Therefore, the context of crisis does not only represent the cause why the controversial debate on the EU in the media was initiated, but also a trigger for further integration according to NF. For liberal intergovernmentalism, crises are important as well since they

can result in new international interdependencies. Accordingly, national preferences can change during crises, leading to renegotiations at the European level (interstate bargaining). In the economic and financial crisis, for example, new negative international interdependencies arose which were resolved by more integration of the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Therefore, according to LI especially European imaginaries expressed in the crisis context serve as important insights as renegotiations at the EU level are possible.

2.6. Conclusion

Imaginaries can be conceptualised as background understandings of society (Taylor, 2002, 2004). A new concept of European imaginaries has been developed with three ideal types of European imaginaries: dynamic support, static support and anti-integration. Theories of European integration do not explicitly refer to these imaginaries. However, as outlined above their lines of argumentation can be used to interpret the imaginaries of political decision makers and to derive prospects of European integration from them. According to neofunctionalism mainly the mechanisms of spill-overs and supranational institutions, such as the Commission as the agenda setter, are decisive for the integration process. Hence, the imaginaries of the two Commissioners are important for further integration. In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalism emphasises the importance of interstate bargaining and state preferences. According to LI, especially the imaginaries of heads of state and government with great bargaining power are decisive for the European integration process. Accordingly, the theories of European integration offer different insights to derive prospects for the further development of the EU from the imaginaries. Additionally, the two theories attribute a role to the crisis context. According to neofunctionalism crises can trigger further integration, while according to liberal intergovernmentalism crises can also lead to further integration due to arising negative international interdependencies.

3. Methods

   3.1. Introduction

In the following, the methods chosen for the analysis and the interpretation of the imaginaries are elaborated. The study applies a qualitative approach since studying imaginaries requires in-depth analysis of statements and not quantification. Content analysis was chosen since it "focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text" (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Thereby, it allows to identify imaginaries which are not always explicitly stated by decision makers but rather indirectly referred to as underlying background understandings. By using deductive coding previous theoretical findings can be validated and extended (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

   3.2. Case Selection

Imaginaries of important political decision makers in the EU are studied. As important decision makers the heads of state or government of the European Member States as well as representatives of the European Commission were chosen. Both data about the imaginaries of national and supranational decision makers was included as these actors are attributed important roles in the European integration process by NF and LI. By selecting data about these decision makers the interpretation of imaginaries of key European actors is enabled. It has been found that the main "trouble-shooting" during the economic and financial crisis was performed by Member States within the European Council (Falkner, 2016). As the study's analysis is conducted during a crisis context as well, a special focus is laid on the Member States, which have shown to be important actors during crises in the EU. Additionally, according to liberal intergovernmentalism the Member States play a decisive role since they negotiate about competence transfers and institutional design of the EU in the European Council (Moravcsik, 2008). Hence, as imaginaries of key national political decision makers the imaginaries of the Member States' representatives in the European Council were chosen. These are for most Member States the imaginaries of the heads of government. Only in the cases of France, Lithuania and Romania, the head of state is the representative in the European Council (European Union, n.d.). Therefore, for France, Lithuania and Romania the imaginaries of the heads of state and for the remaining Member States the imaginaries of the heads of government are analysed. Additionally, according to neofunctionalism the European Commission holds a decisive role in fostering further integration in the EU (Niemann, 1998). Consequently, imaginaries of the European Commission were included in the study as the European Commission represents an important supranational decision maker. For the European Commission, Commissioners were selected who are concerned with the management of the refugee crisis since they represent the Commission's position during the refugee crisis. Thus, the imaginary of Dimitris Avramopoulos as the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship as well as the imaginary of Jean-Claude Juncker as the Commission President were included in the study.

3.3. Data Collection

In order to derive prospects of European integration from the imaginaries of political decision makers, statements and positions of the decision makers need to be analysed since imaginaries can only be found in framings and positions expressed by persons. Previous works of other scholars also used interviews and media data for analysing imaginaries (Levy & Spicer, 2013; Stephens et al., 2013). The qualitative data for the study was collected via the internet. Political speeches and interviews, which were previously conducted by others and published in newspapers, were chosen. Due to feasibility it was not possible to conduct own interviews with the decision makers. Additionally, direct quotes in newspaper articles and press releases are taken into account since often not entire interviews and speeches were translated into English, but only a few direct quotes. For each decision maker documents (or in some cases videos) were selected, which referred to the refugee crisis and preferably to the EU as well. They were found by using the search engine Google search. The number of documents included varies for the decision makers as for some extensive interviews and speeches were accessible and for others only direct quotes in newspaper articles. Therefore, the number of sources was increased for a decision maker when only little information was provided by the first documents, i.e. only few direct quotes with a link to the refugee crisis and the EU. During the analysis only direct quotes and statements are considered in order to capture literal statements of the decision makers. By using only direct quotes misleading indirect quoting or biases through rewording are reduced. Furthermore, only documents in English are considered for the analysis in order to enable a comparison based on one language. Analysing documents in the same language has the advantage that there are no language barriers and no translation is needed.

56 documents of the 145 under study were retrieved from official government websites and official websites of the European Union directly (see Appendix A). The remaining 89 of the 145 documents (or videos) were retrieved from websites of newspapers, television broadcasters or news agencies. A larger amount of media sources than official sources was included since they offered more data in English. Whenever possible official sources were included and given priority. There was no selection based on the type of media source to find sufficient direct quotes of every decision maker referring to the refugee crisis and the EU. Still, it is important to consider that the media do not transmit neutral information but show information biases. However, Korthagen (2015) found that the biases to report increasingly negative news, which are dramatized and fragmented, are not as strong in the media attention for governing officials as for unofficial actors. Therefore, it is assumed that the sources offer a sufficient overview of the imaginaries expressed by the heads of state and government and Commissioners as they are governing officials, especially as only direct quotes are taken into account for the analysis. Sufficient interviews and publications have been found on the topic since it has been controversially discussed in the media since September 2015 (see Appendix A). The time span for the data was set from September

2015 until April 2016.[4] The time setting "since September 2015" was set according to the specific date of Aylan Kurdi's death on the 2nd of September 2015 which led to a shift in perception of the migrant influx in Europe (El-Enany, 2016; Finch, 2015). Therefore, Aylan Kurdi's death represents one particular date since when the refugee influx has been labelled as "crisis" and is typically referred to as the beginning of the refugee crisis. April 2016 was set as the analysis was conducted at that point of time. Different statements of the European decision makers expressed during the time frame (September 2015 – April 2016) were selected.

3.4. Data Analysis

By using the method of qualitative content analysis the interviews, political speeches, press releases and quotes are analysed. Only by using qualitative content analysis the imaginaries can be identified and analysed since the method enables in-depth analysis of statements. Following Hsieh and Shannon's classification of three different approaches to content analysis (2005) directed content analysis is used. This means that the coding process is structured by deductive coding, in which the coding scheme emerges from existing theory and research. Coding proceeds with a predetermined coding scheme. By using directed content analysis existing theory can be validated and conceptually extended. Therefore, the approach is appropriate for the study since it aims at extending existing theories on European integration and imaginaries by connecting them. Furthermore, deductive coding enables to structure the process of analysis. For the analysis the programme Atlas.ti is used to order the data. As outlined in the theory chapter (2.2) "imaginary" is operationalised according to Taylor's conceptualisation of imaginaries (Taylor, 2002, 2004). Framings and positions of the decision makers with direct link to the refugee crisis and the EU are coded. The aim is to find the subject's underlying understandings of "how things usually go, […] [and] how they ought to go" (Taylor, 2002, p. 106) in regard to the European Union expressed in the context of the refugee crisis. It is not attempted to capture every detail and aspect of the decision makers' imaginaries, but rather key messages and tendencies since only a limited number of sources can be included.

To answer the first sub-question which imaginaries have been expressed by political decision makers during the refugee crisis a coding scheme is predetermined (see Table 1). The design of the coding scheme follows Mayring's (2000) example of a deductive coding scheme. In his article, he describes methods of conducting "systematic, rule guided qualitative text analysis" (Mayring, 2000, p. 1). By including example phrases and coding rules into the coding scheme it is exactly determined when to assign a text paragraph to a code. Separate definitions of each code as in Mayring's example (2000) are not included in the coding scheme as the definitions mainly resemble the coding rules, which are provided. When first starting the analysis, keywords were also included in the coding scheme. However, during the first coding it turned out that the coding rules were more specific and clear about which

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[4] If the decision maker in office changed during this period, the decision maker who was in office longer during the time span September 2015 – April 2016 was chosen.

passage can be coded. This is mainly due to the fact that the decision makers use different framings or words for the same content. Juncker, for example, declares that he wants to protect the open Schengen area as follows: "We must not risk Schengen and thereby also our domestic freedom" (Juncker 4)[5], while Orešković (1) states: "Open borders are the right principle for Europe." Both refer to the open Schengen area and demand its protection but use different terms and wording. Hence, coding rules which focus on the content rather than on specific words proved more useful.

Table 1: Coding Scheme – European Imaginaries

Category	Code	Coding rule	Example Phrase
Dynamic support	**New EU measure supported**	A new EU measure (which inhibits further cooperation) is supported or proposed.	"This is why, today, the Commission is also proposing a permanent relocation mechanism, which will allow us to deal with crisis situations more swiftly in the future." (Juncker 1)
	Dynamic European crisis management	European crisis management explicitly in connection with new measures is referred to or more EU involvement in crisis management is demanded.	"The logic of national sovereignty cannot prevail over joint European rules when it comes to the refugee problem" (Tsipras 4)
	Further integration	Further integration is explicitly supported.	"Faced with these challenges, I am convinced that if we do not move ahead with integration, we shall stop or slip back" (Hollande 4)
Static support	**Preserve status quo**	The EU as it is now or components such as Schengen are mentioned as worth to be preserved.	"Preserving Schengen is not only in the interest of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, but also countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands." (Sobotka 6)
	Static European crisis management	European crisis management is referred to or demanded (but not in connection with any new measure).	"Fortunately, we are not alone. We are working together with other countries. We are a part of the EU's response." (Løkke Rasmussen 2)
	Threat to the EU	The crisis and its consequences are referred to as a threat or challenge to the EU.	"Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have explosive consequences for the whole of Europe" (Orbán 1)
Anti-Integration	**Criticism of EU**	The EU, EU institutions or (proposed) EU measures are directly criticised.	"The fact that Brussels tolerates and promotes a culture of breaching treaties. The Maastricht criteria, Schengen, Dublin – nothing applies any longer." (Orbán 2)
	Border control	National border protection and closure of internal EU borders are referred to as necessary means.	"We must also step up controls at our borders massively" (Faymann 3)
	National threat	The crisis and its consequences are referred to as a threat or challenge to the own nation state.	"We will not expose our countries to the devastating pressure of millions that would come." (Borisov 4)

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[5] All references to the data refer to the lists of sources in Appendix A.

The labels of the main categories emerge from the study of Rose and Borz (2016) on public opinion of European citizens. The basic classification into the three categories dynamic support, static support and anti-integration are directly taken from the previous study as they resemble the three ideal types of European imaginaries. Likewise, the codes of the categories are partly directly derived from the definitions of Rose and Borz (2016) of dynamic, static support and anti-integration. These are: "further integration" and "new EU measure supported" for dynamic support, "preserve status quo" for static support and "criticism of the EU" for anti-integration. The additional codes were added in order to adapt Rose and Borz' (2016) findings to the specific setting of the European refugee crisis, in which the data was collected. The code "dynamic European crisis management" was added to capture the demand for more EU involvement in the management of the refugee crisis belonging to the category of "dynamic support". The code "static European crisis management" was included as the counterpart of "dynamic European crisis management" to cover the demand of a European solution of the crisis but without the demand of further integration. Similarly, "threat to the EU" was included for static support as the wish to preserve the status quo of the EU defines static support. It is argued that when a decision maker sees the crisis as a threat to the EU, he or she wishes to preserve it. Otherwise the decision maker would not point out the risks of the crisis to the EU and its status quo. The code "border control" was included to capture when national interests are put before the wish to preserve the status quo of the EU, i.e. the freedom of movement in the EU. Thus, the demand to control borders between neighbouring EU Member States is seen as anti-integration, even if these are not internal Schengen borders. Even border control and closure between EU Member States represents a step away from the European idea of a union with open borders and depicts single-handedly action of one nation state. "National threat" was added as the counterpart to "threat to the EU". It emphasises the national perspective in the crisis management as the nation state is seen to be in danger and the decision maker thereby emphasises national and not common European interests. Both codes belong to "anti-integration".

In the following, the three categories of the coding scheme are explained. The first category "dynamic support" refers to the imaginary, in which further European integration is envisioned. A European solution for the refugee crisis is aimed at by implementing new measures on EU level, which includes further cooperation at EU level ("dynamic European crisis management"). Likewise, new EU measures are proposed ("new EU measure supported") and further integration is endorsed ("further integration"). The second category "static support" represents an imaginary, in which the EU is not supported as enthusiastically. The status quo of the EU is supported ("preserve status quo") and a European solution of the crisis is demanded but without new European measures and further cooperation ("static European crisis management"). The crisis is seen as a threat to the status quo of the EU ("threat to the EU"). The third category "anti-integration" contrasts the other two. The imaginary reflects no or very little support for the EU and the EU is explicitly criticised ("criticism of EU"). The nation state and the crisis as a threat to it are emphasised as national interests are in the focus ("national threat"). Hence, also border controls and even closure of internal EU borders to protect the nation state are referred to ("border

control"). To illustrate how the coding scheme is applied to the data, the following quote of Orešković, the head of government of Croatia, is used: "It is important that we are together and that we as a Europe have to sort this out together." (Orešković 2). This quote is assigned to the code "static European crisis management" belonging to the category of static support since Orešković demands a European solution without referring to new measures, which fits the respective coding rule.

As Mayring (2000) suggests the coding scheme is revised during the analysis. Thus, all coded passages are re-read after the first coding in order to check them against the revised coding rules and ensure reliable coding. During the first coding of the data the coding rules were adapted and specified.[6] After coding all documents, for each decision maker it is determined to which extent the different categories of the imaginaries are present in his or her statements.[7] It is examined which categories are prevailing and which categories are only addressed to a lesser extent. In order to do so the messages of all his or her statements are considered and special attention is paid to aspects the decision maker stresses explicitly. Thereby, for each decision maker it is gauged individually, which category (or categories) are prevailing in his or her statements. If this is not possible, the imaginaries remain blurred and not assignable to any category. Subsequently, the imaginaries are compared and conclusions are drawn about prevalent imaginaries and shared tendencies. The findings are compared with the expectations formulated in the theory chapter (2.3). In the comparison with the theoretical expectations, the imaginaries, which remain blurred and not assignable, need to be left out as no conclusions can be drawn on how they support or oppose European integration. Including them would only distort the comparison. Likewise, comparing the expectations with the findings is not very meaningful as some decision makers remain between two categories but the study on public opinion, on which the expectations are based, only used clear categories (dynamic, static support, anti-integration, don't know). Still, the comparison is included in the analysis to give an overview of how the imaginaries of the decision makers relate to the theoretical expectations.

Subsequently, the second sub-question, which prospects of European integration can be derived from these imaginaries, is answered. The two theories neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are applied to interpret the findings on the imaginaries of political decision makers in the EU. Thereby, prospects of European integration are derived following the theoretical argumentation formulated in the theory chapter (2.4). These prospects of European integration are interpretations of the imaginaries and cannot be tested in the analysis since the actual consequences of the expressed imaginaries cannot be

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[6] The code "new EU measure supported" was first coded according to the following coding rule: "A new EU measure (which inhibits competence transfer) is supported or proposed.". This rule was broadened to "A new EU measure (which inhibits further cooperation) is supported or proposed." as further cooperation already depicts a step towards a greater role of the EU and possibly deeper integration in the future.

[7] The focus does not lie on the possible development of the decision maker's imaginary in the given time frame (September 2015 – April 2016), even though the concept of imaginary is dynamic. Since the time frame is only very short it can be expected that the imaginaries did not change fundamentally from September 2015 until April 2016.

assessed yet. The prospects serve as an outlook on the further integration process in line with key theories of European integration. Finally, the answers to both sub-questions are summarised.

3.5. Conclusion

Firstly, the data (see Appendix A) is coded according to the predetermined coding scheme (see Table 1) using the programme Atlas.ti. After the coding, the analysis proceeds with the detailed analysis of the imaginaries of the decision makers. The imaginaries of the decision makers are assigned to one or two categories, which are prevailing in their statements. Subsequently, the imaginaries are compared and conclusions about prevalent imaginaries and shared tendencies are drawn. Thereby, the findings are compared with the expectations formulated in the theory chapter (2.3). In the second step of the analysis, the results on the imaginaries are interpreted applying neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as two key theories of European integration. The aim of the analysis is to derive prospects for European integration from the imaginaries. At the end of the analysis the main findings are summarised.

4. Analysis

    4.1. Introduction

In the following chapter, the two sub-questions of the research question are answered applying the methods elaborated in the previous chapter. Firstly, in order to answer the first sub-question which imaginaries have been expressed by political decision makers in the EU, the imaginaries of the 28 national heads of state and government and the European Commission are analysed. The main findings of the analysis on prevalent imaginaries of the heads of state and government and the Commissioners are summarised. Subsequently, the imaginaries of the national and supranational decision makers are compared and important tendencies, which become apparent are described. Thereby, it is examined whether the theoretical expectations formulated in the theory chapter fit the findings (2.3). In order to answer the second sub-question, which prospects for European integration can be derived from the imaginaries, the analysis proceeds with the interpretation of the imaginaries applying first neofunctionalism and then liberal intergovernmentalism. Finally, the main findings are summarised.

    4.2. Imaginaries of the National Heads of State and Government

In the following, the imaginaries of the national heads of state and government are described and assigned to one or two prevailing categories. Subsequently, the imaginaries are compared with the expectations formulated in the theory chapter (2.3). The analysis of the imaginaries of the national heads of state and government shows that the heads of state and government generally refer much to the EU and its involvement in the refugee crisis.[8] The majority of heads of state and government states which opinion they have on the EU and its crisis management, both positively as well as negatively. Only the imaginaries of five heads of government remain relatively vague as the heads of government only refer rarely to the EU. These are the imaginaries of Boyko Borisov (Bulgaria), Nicos Anastasiades (Cyprus), Juha Sipilä (Finland), António Costa (Portugal) and David Cameron (United Kingdom). This could possibly be due to the selection of data. However, during the data collection for each decision maker it was made sure that no sources offering more and detailed direct quotes with reference to the refugee crisis and the EU were left out. Therefore, it can be argued that the five heads of government actually refer less to the EU's involvement in the refugee crisis than the other heads of state and government. Interestingly, three of the heads of government with vague imaginaries only express static support and anti-integration in regard to the EU (Borisov 1-4; Cameron 1, 2, 4, 5; Sipilä 1-4). Only Anstasiades (Cyprus) and Costa (Portugal) of the five heads of government express dynamic and static support in their few comments on the EU (Anstasiades 1-3; Costa 1-4). As the other three heads of government with vague imaginaries rather oppose the EU or only show static support, it is argued that remaining vague about the EU can depict less support for the EU. Remaining vague can be a form to convey that the heads of government do not value the EU as an important actor in the crisis management and mainly

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[8] See Table B1 (Appendix B) for a detailed listing of the different aspects found in the statements of each head of state/government, important quotes and prevalent imaginaries.

emphasise the national perspective.[9] As the imaginaries of the five heads of government still offer few insights, they are included in the further analysis even though the imaginaries are relatively vague compared to the rest of the imaginaries.

Table 2: Prevailing European Imaginaries of the National Heads of State and Government[10]

| Prevailing Imaginary	Dynamic Support	Dynamic/ Static Support	Static support	Static support/ Anti-integration	Anti-integration
Head of State and Government	Michel (BE), Anastasiades (CY), Merkel (DE), Rõivas (EE), Hollande (FR), Renzi (IT)	Bettel (LU), Costa (PT)	Orešković (HR), Kenny (IE), Straujuma (LV), Muscat (MT), Rutte (NL), Cerar (SI)	Borisov (BG), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Sipilä (FI), Szydło (PL), Cameron (UK)	Orbán (HU), Fico (SK)

Blurred imaginary: Faymann (AT), Sobotka (CZ), Tsipras (EL), Rajoy (ES), Grybauskaitė (LT), Iohannis (RO), Löfven (SE)

As Figure 1 and Table 2 show, most of the imaginaries of the heads of state and government clearly show one or two prevailing categories, except for the ones with blurred imaginaries. The imaginaries of six heads of state and government clearly belong to the category of dynamic support for the EU. These are the imaginaries of Charles Michel (Belgium), Nicos Anastasiades (Cyprus), Taavi Rõivas (Estonia), François Hollande (France), Angela Merkel (Germany) and Matteo Renzi (Italy). Michel (Belgium), Rõivas (Estonia), Hollande (France) and Renzi (Italy) explicitly demand further integration in the EU (Hollande 1, 4, 5; Michel 1, 5; Renzi 1, 4 ,5; Rõivas 3). Anstasiades (Cyprus) and Merkel (Germany) explicitly stress the demand for stronger EU involvement in the crisis management and support the proposals of the Commission for new measures in connection with the crisis (Anastasiades 1, 2; Merkel 1, 2, 5). The imaginaries of all six decision makers are mainly characterised by dynamic support for the EU, even though they express static support as well as criticism of the EU and concerns about the crisis as a national threat (anti-integration) (Anastasiades 1, 3, 4; Hollande 1-5; Merkel 1-5; Michel 1-4; Renzi 1-5; Rõivas 1-4). The imaginaries of two heads of government remain in-between static and dynamic support. Xavier Bettel (Luxembourg) and António Costa (Portugal) address elements of both dynamic and static support, but do not emphasise one of the categories explicitly to assign them clearly to either one (Bettel 1-5; Costa 1-4).

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[9] In the case of David Cameron, the (at that time) upcoming referendum on the Brexit could be a possible explanation for him not positioning clearly in regard to the EU. But this hypothesis would need further analysis and elaboration, which is not possible in the extent of this study.
[10] Country abbreviations in alphabetical order - AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, UK: United Kingdom

Figure 1: Prevailing European Imaginaries of the National Heads of State and Government

Source: Own compilation (created with Mapchart.net)

A large group of imaginaries of heads of state and government fall under the category of predominantly static support for the EU. Tihomir Orešković (Croatia), Enda Kenny (Ireland), Laimdota Straujuma (Latvia), Joseph Muscat (Malta), Mark Rutte (Netherlands) and Miro Cerar (Slovenia) mostly express support for the status quo of the EU. Kenny (Ireland) and Rutte (Netherlands) do not express any statements opposing or criticising the EU at all, while addressing only dynamic and static support for the EU (Kenny 1-4; Rutte 1-4). Kenny even supports a lot of new EU measures (Kenny 1, 2, 4). But as Ireland is not part of the EU asylum and immigration policy or the Schengen area and Kenny does not express the wish to change the special status, his imaginary is assigned to static support. Likewise, on the one hand, Rutte also expresses support for new EU measures (Rutte 2, 3), on the other hand he explains that the EU needs to step back in some fields and that cooperation is only partly desired (Rutte 2). Therefore, his imaginary is also assigned to static support. As Muscat (Malta) explicitly expresses his support for the status quo of the EU and opposes the idea of an ever closer union, his imaginary is characterised predominantly by static support as well.

> Europe is not one, it is a union of 28 different voices. It is a choir and not a single singer. That's fine. It's what we are. It's not a huge drawback, and I don't think it should be like America. (Muscat 1)

Similarly, Orešković (Croatia) mainly expresses support of the EU as it is now (Orešković 1-3, 5), while also emphasising that Croatia will protect its national interest and that border control at internal EU borders could increase (Orešković 3, 5). It stands out that he always puts negative statements about the EU in relative terms to elements of static support, e.g. he points out the principles of communication and cooperation as the basis for crisis management (Orešković 5). Therefore, and as he only expresses one aspect of dynamic support, his support for the Turkey-EU agreement (Orešković 4), his imaginary is assigned to the category of static support. Straujuma (Latvia) addresses aspects of all three categories, but static support clearly prevails in her imaginary as only few other aspects are addressed by her (Straujuma 1-5). Cerar (Slovenia) also predominantly emphasises static support, without expressing any dynamic support and only one aspect of anti-integration, i.e. the wish to protect national borders until the European crisis management works (Cerar 1-5).

The imaginaries of five heads and government remain in-between static support and anti-integration without a special emphasis on either category. These are the imaginaries of Boyko Borisov (Bulgaria), Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Denmark), Juha Sipilä (Finland), Beata Szydło (Poland) and David Cameron (United Kingdom). The five heads of government do not express any dynamic support for the EU, while only addressing elements belonging to static support and anti-integration without a special emphasis on either (Borisov 1-4; Cameron 1, 2, 4, 5; Løkke Rasmussen 1-4; Sipilä 1-4; Szydło 1-4). Of the imaginaries of the 28 national heads of state and government, only two are predominantly characterised by refusal of the EU (anti-integration). These are the imaginaries of Viktor Orbán (Hungary) and Robert Fico (Slovakia). Fico (Slovakia) formulates harsh critique of the EU (Fico 1-4). Likewise, Orbán (Hungary) criticises the EU, while underlining that his focus is the national threat and that the EU only consists of the national interests of its Member States (Orbán 1-4).

Strikingly, the largest group of heads of state and government express no clear imaginary in regard to the EU. There are seven heads of state and government, who address aspects belonging to all three categories of European imaginaries without emphasising any in particular (Faymann 1-6; Grybauskaitė 2-7; Iohannis 1-6; Löfven 1-5; Rajoy 2-5; Sobotka 1-7; Tsipras 1-5). Therefore, their imaginaries remain blurred and not assignable to one or two categories of either dynamic support, static support or anti-integration. These imaginaries are of Werner Faymann (Austria), Bohuslav Sobotka (Czech Republic), Alexis Tsipras (Greece), Dalia Grybauskaitė (Lithuania), Klaus Werner Iohannis (Romania), Mariano Rajoy (Spain) and Stefan Löfven (Sweden). The blurred imaginaries convey the impression that the heads of state and government either have no stable position on European integration or deliberately do not disclose it. The reasons for this may vary and cannot be elaborated due to the extent of this thesis. However, in the case of Faymann (Austria) a change of mind becomes apparent. In his first statements in September and October 2015, he stresses a very positive imaginary of the EU (Faymann 1, 2, 4) while in his later statements in January more criticism and a negative imaginary towards the EU becomes apparent (Faymann 3, 6). This observation supports the idea that the blurred imaginaries reflect that the

heads of state and government do not have a stable position in regard to the EU with revisions of opinions over the period of only a few months. However, as it was not possible to collect data covering the whole time span from September 2015 until April 2016 for each decision maker, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed for the other six heads of state and government with blurred imaginaries.

As an interim conclusion, it becomes clear that the heads of state and government differ in their overall support for the EU with imaginaries ranging from vast dynamic support to overall negativity towards the EU. This partially wide difference can be illustrated by comparing the two contradicting visions of the EU by Renzi (dynamic support) and Orbán (anti-integration). Renzi demands a "Europe not as the sum of national self-interest" (Renzi 1) while Orbán sees the EU as "made of the totality of national interests" (Orbán 2). Furthermore, it is remarkable that the largest group of heads of state and government does not show a clear prevailing imaginary in the light of the extensive statements they made on the EU. To explain this finding, further research on the development and influences of imaginaries is necessary. Likewise, five heads of state and government only referred very few times to the EU. Hence, a significant share of the national heads of state and government does not clarify how they see the EU and its further development. It stands out that only two national heads of state and government express refusal of European integration overall.

The results of the analysis show that the expectations formulated in the theory chapter (2.3) only partly fit the findings. It was expected that the largest group of heads of state and government reflect the static support of the majority of European citizens for the EU. 13 of the 21 heads of state and government with assignable imaginaries predominantly support the EU as it is now (either belonging to the categories of dynamic/static support, static support or static support/anti-integration). Therefore, the expectation that the largest group of heads of state and government share the static support of the EU is met. Furthermore, it was expected that the heads of state and government as well-informed representatives will even show less support for the EU than the European citizens. About a third of the European citizens thinks that integration already went too far and about a quarter shows dynamic support for the EU. Comparing this to the imaginaries of the heads of state and government, the expectation proves wrong. A third of the imaginaries of the heads of state and government is characterised predominantly by anti-integration (belonging either to static support/anti-integration and anti-integration), while more than a third is predominantly marked by dynamic support (either belonging to dynamic support or dynamic/static support). Therefore, the imaginaries of national heads of state and government do not prove to show less support for the EU than the citizens, but even more support. The same share of heads of state and government as European citizens oppose European integration (one third), while an even larger share of the heads of state and government than of the European citizens supports further integration (more than a third). However, the comparison of the expectations and findings is very inaccurate since the imaginaries of seven heads of state and government cannot be taken into account in the comparison as

they remain blurred and since the categories of the public opinion results, on which the theoretical expectations were based, are not exactly the same as the categories of the imaginaries (see 3.4).

4.3. Imaginaries of the European Commission

The analysis of the imaginaries of the Commissioners Jean-Claude Juncker (President of the European Commission) and Dimitris Avramopoulos (Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship) lead to the result that both Commissioners support the EU and further integration, while also addressing criticism of the EU (Juncker 1-5; Avramopoulos 1-5).[11] Juncker emphasises the need of further European integration extensively (Juncker 1,3), while Avramopoulos only proposes new measures and ways of cooperating in the EU without demanding further integration explicitly (Avramopoulos 1-3, 5). Therefore, Juncker's imaginary is assigned to the category of predominantly dynamic support, while Avramopoulos' remains between dynamic and static support. Juncker states: "There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union. We have to change this. And we have to change this now." (Juncker 1). He proposes a large number of new measures and ways of cooperating further in the EU (Juncker 1-4). Avramopoulos promotes all these measures in his field of responsibility, while stressing many aspects of static support, such as the wish to preserve the open Schengen area, as well (Avramopoulos 1-5). He formulates his wish to preserve the status quo of the EU as follows: "This crisis [...] is a crash test for the European institutions in their relations with member states. We must not, through this crisis, follow the road of re-nationalisation." (Avramopoulos 5).

Comparing the imaginaries of the Commissioners with the expectation formulated in the theory chapter (2.3), interestingly it becomes apparent that the it is only partly met. The theoretical expectation was that the imaginaries of the representatives of the European Commission will reflect dynamic support for the EU. The imaginaries of both Commissioners are characterised by dynamic support to some extent. Juncker's imaginary of the EU fully matches the expectation as he expresses overall support of further integration. But as Avramopoulos' imaginary remains in-between dynamic and static support, the expectation was not met to full extent. But, as outlined above, the comparison is not very meaningful as the categories of the study, on which the theoretical expectations were based, are not exactly the same as the categories of the imaginaries (see 3.4). As an interim conclusion, on the one hand both Commissioners express dynamic support for the EU. On the other hand, unexpectedly, it becomes apparent that Avramopoulos does not express the same dynamic support for further integration as Juncker even though being a representative of the Commission.

4.4. Comparison of the Imaginaries of the National and Supranational Decision Makers

Comparing the imaginaries of the national heads of state and government and the European Commission, the imaginaries of the heads of state and government show a great range of perspectives

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[11] See Table B2 (Appendix B) for a detailed listing of the different aspects found in the statements of the Commissioners, important quotes and prevalent imaginaries.

on the EU, while the imaginaries of the two Commissioners are relatively similar. Interestingly, the largest group of national heads of state and government does not clarify their position on further integration of the EU. This contrasts the imaginaries of the two Commissioners, which are assignable to categories. Additionally, one of the second largest groups of heads of state and government supports further integration of the EU, while the other second largest group supports the EU as it is now. These groups reflect equal support for the EU as the two Commissioners express. The third largest group falls under the category in-between static support and anti-integration. Hence, the heads of state and government show great differences in the imaginaries, while the Commissioners remain in the realm of support for the EU. Overall, it becomes apparent that of all national and supranational decision makers, only two clearly express the opinion that European integration already went too far with nearly no support for the EU at all.

It was expected that in the analysis very different imaginaries on the EU and its further development become apparent (see 2.3). As outlined above, there is a range from imaginaries predominantly characterised by dynamic support to imaginaries mainly marked by the opinion that European integration already went too far. Therefore, the expectation is confirmed. Unexpected in this regard was, that the largest group of national decision makers does not take a clear position in regard to European integration, i.e. addressing all categories of support and refusal. Furthermore, it was anticipated that clear dividing lines between the Commission and the heads of state and government become apparent (see 2.3). This expectation is only partly met. The Commission and 14 heads of state and government show the same support for the EU, predominantly dynamic and static. However, the imaginaries opposing European integration stand in contrast to the imaginaries of the Commission. Hence, dividing lines between the national heads of state and government and the Commission which support the EU and the national heads of government opposing the EU become apparent. As only Fico and Orbán predominantly emphasise the view that European integration already went too far, a dividing line between the two national heads of government and the Commission with the majority of national heads of state and government arises. The other five heads of state and government who also predominantly stress aspects of anti-integration at least address static support for the EU as well and remain in-between both categories, therefore not clearly taking a position against the EU (static support/anti-integration). Furthermore, a dividing line between the Commission and eight heads of state and government supporting further integration of the EU (dynamic support and dynamic/static support) and 13 heads of state and government favouring to preserve the EU as it is or opposing integration overall (static support, static support/anti-integration, anti-integration) becomes apparent. Hence, dividing lines between groups of heads of state and government and the Commission become apparent, but the imaginaries of the Commission also show great similarity with the imaginaries of a large number of heads of state and government.

Table 3: Shared Tendencies in the Imaginaries of the Decision Makers[12]

Shared tendencies in the imaginaries	Expressed by the following heads of state and government	Expressed by the following Commissioners
Common European solution needed	Faymann (AT), Michel (BE), Borisov (BG), Anastasiades (CY), Sobotka (CZ), Merkel (DE), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Tsipras (EL), Rajoy (ES), Hollande (FR), Orešković (HR), Kenny (IE), Grybauskaitė (LT), Muscat (MT), Rutte (NL), Costa (PT), Iohannis (RO), Löfven (SE), Cerar (SI) (19)	Juncker, Avramopoulos
Crisis seen as a threat to the EU	Faymann (AT), Bettel (BE), Borisov (BG), Sobotka (CZ), Merkel (DE), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Rõivas (EE), Rajoy (ES), Tsipras (EL), Hollande (FR), Orbán (HU), Grybauskaitė (LT), Muscat (MT), Rutte (NL), Costa (PT), Iohannis (RO), Löfven (SE), Cerar (SI), Fico (SK), Cameron (UK) (20)	Juncker, Avramopoulos
Crisis seen as a threat to the own nation state	Faymann (AT), Anastasiades (CY), Sobotka (CZ), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Tsipras (EL), Sipilä (FI), Orešković (HR), Orbán (HU), Szydło (PL), Löfven (SE), Cerar (SI), Fico (SK), Cameron (UK) (13)	-
Demand to preserve Schengen	Faymann (AT), Michel (BE), Borisov (BG), Sobotka (CZ), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Tsipras (EL), Rajoy (ES), Hollande (FR), Orešković (HR), Orbán (HU), Kenny (IE), Renzi (IT), Bettel (LU), Straujuma (LV), Szydło (PL), Iohannis (RO), Löfven (SE) (17)	Juncker, Avramopoulos
Demand of national border control	Faymann (AT), Borisov (BG), Sobotka (CZ), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Orešković (HR), Orbán (HU), Iohannis (RO), Löfven (SE), Cerar (SI) (9)	-
Demand of joint protection of the external EU borders	Michel (BE), Anastasiades (CY)[13], Sobotka (CZ), Merkel (DE), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Rõivas (EE), Hollande (FR), Kenny (IE), Grybauskaitė (LT), Bettel (LU), Straujuma (LV), Szydło (PL), Cerar (SI), Fico (SK) (14)	Juncker, Avramopoulos
Refusal of mandatory quota	Sobotka (CZ), Rõivas (EE), Orešković (HR), Orbán (HU), Grybauskaitė (LT), Szydło (PL), Iohannis (RO), Fico (SK) (8)	-
Support of mandatory quota	Faymann (AT), Merkel (DE), Tsipras (EL), Kenny (IE), Renzi (IT), Löfven (SE) (6)	Juncker, Avramopoulos

In the Theory chapter (2.2), it was also anticipated that due to deep integration processes in the EU today imaginaries spread across national borders. This becomes apparent in the shared tendencies of the imaginaries of the national heads of state and government (see Table 3). These tendencies are partly even shared between heads of state and government predominantly emphasising different categories. Remarkably, more than two-thirds of the heads of state and government demand a common European

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[12] Country abbreviations in alphabetical order - AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, UK: United Kingdom

[13] Merkel and Anastasiades express their support for all measures proposed by the Commission in regard to the refugee crisis, which includes the proposed Common European Border and Coast Guard system.

instead of a national solution for the refugee crisis. Löfven, the head of government of Sweden, for example, explains: "We have to find a way to cooperate, finally it is about shared responsibility. If we share responsibility we can handle it." (Löfven 3). Furthermore, it stands out that more than two-thirds of the heads of state and government explain that the refugee crisis depicts a threat or challenge to the EU, which can question its status quo, while only about half of the heads of state and government express concerns about the crisis threatening the own nation state. Likewise, the demand to preserve the Schengen area without internal borders is also widely spread. Straujuma, the head of government of Latvia, puts it as follows: "Our interest is to protect [the] Schengen area and to avoid the formation of new divisions of Europe" (Straujuma 2). More than the majority of heads of state and government shares this view, while only nine heads of state and government explain that national border protection of internal EU borders is needed to protect the own state.

Furthermore, half of the heads of state and government explicitly demand joint protection of the external borders of the EU, either by setting up the new measure of a European Border and Coast Guard or by strengthening existing structures such as Frontex. Interestingly, mandatory quota to distribute refugees in the EU is explicitly opposed by eight heads of state and government, while only six explicitly support it. The remaining 14 heads of state and government do not express their opinion on the quota in the statements collected for the study. These shared tendencies illustrate that the tendencies of supporting the EU's status quo or even supporting new cooperation in fields related to the immediate crisis prevail over national perspectives in the imaginaries of the heads of state and government. For example, more heads of state and government demand to preserve the Schengen area and joint external border control than national border control. Likewise, more heads of state and government see the crisis as a threat to the EU than to their own nation state. Only in the case of mandatory quota, more heads of state and government refuse European cooperation than support it. Hence, mandatory quota appears to be a measure not widely supported and a special case as it entails greater competence transfer to the EU than the other measures.

It is remarkable that the imaginaries of the Commissioners also include many tendencies apparent in the imaginaries of the heads of state and government considering that clear dividing lines between the European Commission and the national heads of state and government were anticipated (see Table 3). The Commissioners also demand a common European solution, see the crisis as a risk to the EU and wish to preserve the open Schengen area. These three tendencies are also shared by the great majority of the national heads of state and government. Furthermore, both Commissioners support the common protection of external EU borders, which is supported by half of the heads of state and government, while the Commissioners' demand of mandatory quota is only supported by six heads of state and government and opposed by eight.

To sum up, the comparison of the imaginaries of the Commission and the heads of state and government shows that the Commission supports the EU in line with eight heads of state and government (dynamic

and dynamic/static support), but that the Commission shows greater support for the EU than most of the national heads of state and government. Interestingly, there are many shared tendencies in the imaginaries of both the heads of state and government and the Commissioners. They illustrate that the tendencies of supporting the EU's status quo or even supporting new cooperation in the fields related to the refugee crisis prevail over national perspectives. To answer the first sub-question, which imaginaries have been expressed, the analysis shows that the imaginaries expressed by political decision makers vary from prevailing support of further integration to refusal of integration overall. The largest groups of decision makers, including heads of state and government and the Commissioners, either express no clear imaginary on European integration or support further integration. But the imaginaries of a large share of national decision makers also only reflect the support of the status quo of the EU or refusal of European integration.

4.5. Neofunctionalism: Limited Prospects of Spill-over Effects

In the following, prospects for European integration are derived from the imaginaries of the political decision makers to answer the second sub-question. In order to do so, theories of European integration are used to interpret the findings on imaginaries, which have been elaborated above. The theories neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are applied to give an outlook on the possible further development of the EU. These prospects of European integration are interpretations of the imaginaries and cannot be tested in the analysis since the actual consequences of the expressed imaginaries cannot be assessed yet.

According to neofunctionalism, European integration is a dynamic process, which is driven by spill-over effects. As outlined in the Theory chapter (2.4), spill-overs can be differentiated into three kinds: functional, political and cultivated spill-over. Functional spill-overs occur due to functional pressures and interdependencies of policy areas. In the imaginaries of the national and supranational decision makers the wish to preserve the open Schengen area and the perception that the refugee crisis threatens or at least challenges the EU, are shared by a great majority. Strikingly, a vast majority of the imaginaries also includes the support of a common European solution to tackle the crisis, while about half show the demand of common external border control. The support of a common solution and joint external border control can be seen as a functional spill-over in order to preserve the open Schengen area and the status quo of the EU. As migration and the open Schengen area are two interdependent policy fields, new cooperation is perceived as necessary by the majority of decision makers in order to preserve the Schengen area and thereby the status quo of the EU, which they see challenged in the refugee crisis. As Anastasiades (Cyprus) puts it: "In fact, the EU has no other option than becoming more actively involved and visible in the search for a solution to these problems." (Anastasiades 2). Hence, functional pressure for new cooperation was amplified during the refugee crisis as described by Niemann and Ioannou (2015) for the economic and financial crisis.

Even heads of state and government, whose imaginaries reflect that no further integration is endorsed (static support, static support/anti-integration, anti-integration) support a common solution[14] and demand external border control[15]. One striking example is the head of government of Slovakia, Fico. His imaginary is predominantly characterised by refusal of further European integration, but still he demands the new measure of a European Border and Coast Guard: "We will not complicate this with discussion about sovereignty. The Schengen border is our border." (Fico 2). Hence, according to the mechanism of functional spill-over, as the majority of decision makers perceives that a common European solution for the refugee crisis and common external border control are necessary means, it can be expected that they will be implemented. However, overall dynamic support for further European integration is not expressed by the majority of decision makers. Therefore, further integration does not seem to be perceived necessary due to functional pressure. Only eight of the national decision makers and the two Commissioners support further integration. Therefore, it is not expected that decisions supporting overall further integration of the EU will be implemented soon. But it remains to be seen which new functional pressures arise due to the cooperation in the fields of migration and border control, which are expected to proceed in order to protect the open Schengen area.

According to NF, political spill-overs take place when national elites perceive that issues of substantial interest can only be effectively addressed at the supranational level. In a subsequent learning process, they shift their support from the national to the supranational level. In the case of the imaginaries of the national heads of state and government, as representatives of the governmental national elites, this learning process does not become apparent for the majority. Only eight imaginaries reflect explicit support for further European integration, which could be the result of a gradual learning process and political spill-over. Rõivas, the head of government of Estonia, for example, states: "As Jean-Claude Juncker said in his annual State of the Union address, we need more Europe, and more union in this union." (Rõivas 3). The imaginaries of 13 heads of state and government are characterised by the wish to preserve the status quo of the EU or even refusal of European integration (static support, static support/anti-integration, anti-integration), while the imaginaries of seven heads of state and government do not show a clear position in regard to European integration at all. Therefore, for the majority of 20 heads of state and government the gradual learning process and shift of support to the supranational level does not become apparent. But it can still occur that the imaginaries of the remaining 20 national decision makers change, when they perceive that issues of substantial interest can only be addressed at the European level. A large majority of the national decision makers demands a common European solution for the refugee crisis expressing that they do not see national alternatives. This tendency could be seen as a first starting point, possibly leading to political spill-over in the future. But as only the

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[14] These are Borisov (BG), Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Orešković (HR), Kenny (IE), Muscat (MT), Rutte (NL) and Cerar (SI).
[15] These are Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Kenny (IE), Grybauskaitė (LT), Straujuma (LV), Szydło (PL), Cerar (SI) and Fico (SK).

imaginaries of eight heads of state and government are characterised by dynamic support, political spill-over does not seem to have widely occurred within the governmental elites of the European Member States (yet). Accordingly, it can be expected that further integration of the EU will not be promoted by most of the governmental elites of the European Member States as a result of political spill-over.

The mechanism of cultivated spill-over refers to the process that European institutions themselves promote further integration. For cultivated spill-over dynamic support by the Commissioners is required since the promotion of further integration by the Commission is a pre-condition for cultivated spill-over to function. Both imaginaries of the Commissioners reflect (inter alia) dynamic support. Juncker, the president of the Commission clearly points to his vision of a deeper integrated EU: "there is not enough Union in the European Union and not enough Europe in the European Union, with Member States thinking that the refugee crisis can be solved by working alone, as nations." (Juncker 2). Avramopoulos' imaginary does not explicitly include the demand of further integration. However, he still promotes all new EU measures in his field of responsibility and thereby fosters integration as well. As the imaginaries of both Commissioners reflect dynamic support, it can be expected that they will use their agenda-setting power and facilitate further integration. As already apparent in their imaginaries, they mainly do so by proposing and promoting new measures of further cooperation, e.g. the mandatory quota for the relocation of refugees in the EU, the European Border and Coast Guard system, the list of safe countries of origin and hotspots. Accordingly, it can be expected that cultivated spill-over takes place. Hence, the Commission will use its capacities to foster further integration, even if this means that only incremental new cooperation methods are proposed and small steps towards integration are taken.

Overall, according to neofunctionalism the following prospects for European integration can be derived from the imaginaries. Functional spill-over is expected occur in the way that new measures of cooperation will be implemented in the fields of migration and border control to react to new functional pressures, which arose in the crisis, to preserve the open Schengen area. However, overall further integration due to functional pressure is not expected as only eight of the national decision makers and the two Commissioners support further integration. Additionally, political spill-over can only be observed in the case of the eight heads of state and government with imaginaries characterised by dynamic support. The majority of the imaginaries of the heads of state and government only shows this transfer of support in regard to the refugee crisis by supporting a common European solution. It remains to be seen whether the cooperation in the refugee crisis can serve as a first starting point for further political spill-overs in the future. Cultivated spill-over is the only spill-over mechanism, which can be expected to work without restrictions as the imaginaries of both Commissioners reflect support for further integration and as both propose many new measures of cooperation in the EU. It can be expected that the Commission will use its capacities to foster further integration. Hence, according to NF, the prospects for European integration, which can be derived from the imaginaries of political decision makers in the EU, remain limited, but with some perspectives.

4.6. Liberal Intergovernmentalism: No Agreement between Powerful Decision Makers on Further Integration

According to liberal intergovernmentalism, European integration is not a dynamic process, but the consequence of rational choices by national decision makers. The national heads of state and government and their bargaining power play a decisive role in the European integration process as they represent the Member States in the European Council, while the European institutions do not play an important role in promoting further integration following the assumptions of LI. Therefore, to derive prospects for European integration from the imaginaries applying liberal intergovernmentalism, the imaginaries of the Commissioners are not considered as important insights. The European Commission's support of further integration, even though found in the analysis, is left out in the following. According to LI, diverging imaginaries of national decision makers can impede further integration. As outlined above, the imaginaries of the largest group of heads of state and government remain blurred without indicating which position is taken in regard to European integration. No outweighing majority of imaginaries of national decision makers shows dynamic support, static support or refusal of European integration. Hence, as there is no overall agreement between national decision makers on how to support European integration, the prospects for further compromises and further integration of the EU are very low. But this expectation is not precise yet since the bargaining power of the Member States and therefore of the national heads of state and government still needs to be taken into account. In order to determine which national heads of state and government hold greater bargaining power, the Member States are divided into net payers, which hold great bargaining power, and net recipients with low bargaining power. The four largest net payers hold the greatest bargaining power, while the four largest net recipients have the lowest bargaining power. Consequently, the imaginaries of the respective Member States are the most important or the least important for the process of European integration.[16]

As illustrated in Table 4, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the highest net payers, hence holding great bargaining power, while Poland, Hungary, Greece and Romania are the highest net recipients with low bargaining power. Interestingly, it becomes apparent that the imaginaries of the four heads of state and government with high bargaining power turn out to be more positive about the EU than the imaginaries of the heads of state and government with lower bargaining power. The heads of state and government of the two highest net payers, Merkel (Germany) and Hollande (France), both express predominantly dynamic support for the EU. Merkel, for example, explains:

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[16] In 2014, net payers from highest to lowest were: Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland. Net recipients from highest recipient to lowest were: Poland, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Portugal, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Spain, Slovakia, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Malta, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Ireland (European Commission, 2016).

In the refugee crisis we must not give in to the temptation to fall back on national government action. On the contrary, what we need now is more Europe. More than ever we need the courage and cohesion that Europe has always shown when it was really important. (Merkel 2)

The imaginary of Rutte (Netherlands), representing the fourth highest net payer in the EU, shows static support and only Cameron representing the United Kingdom, the third largest net payer, formulates an imaginary remaining in-between static support and anti-integration. In contrast, the imaginaries of the largest net recipients are more negative. Szydło representing Poland, the highest net recipient, expresses an imaginary remaining in-between static support and anti-integration. In contrast to Merkel's statement she declares:

The refugee crisis also reminds us that we shall be clear on the issue of solidarity. [...] However, one cannot call solidarity the attempts to export the problems that some states had brought up, without any involvement of other states to be burdened with them. (Szydło 1)

The imaginary of Orbán, who represents Hungary the second largest net recipient, is even characterised by overall refusal of further European integration. Additionally, Tsipras and Iohannis, representing the third and fourth highest net recipients Greece and Romania, do not clarify their position on the European integration process. It stands out that no imaginary of the representatives of the four highest net recipients reflects unrestricted static or dynamic support for the EU. This finding appears unexpected as the highest net recipients could be expected to support European integration to further benefit from net payments of the EU budget.

Table 4: Imaginaries of the National Decision Makers divided into Net Payers and Net Recipients[17]

Prevailing Imaginary	Dynamic support	Dynamic/ static support	Static support	Static support/anti-integration	Anti-integration	Blurred imaginary
Head of state/ government of net paying member state	Michel (BE), Merkel (DE), Hollande (FR), Renzi (IT)	-	Rutte (NL)	Løkke Rasmussen (DK), Sipilä (FI), Cameron (UK)	-	Faymann (AT), Löfven (SE)
Head of state/ government of net receiving member state	Anastasiades (CY), Rõivas (EE)	Bettel (LU), Costa (PT)	Orešković (HR), Kenny (IE), Straujuma (LV), Muscat (MT), Cerar (SI)	Borisov (BG), Szydło (PL)	Orbán (HU), Fico (SK)	Sobotka (CZ), Tsipras (EL), Rajoy (ES), Grybauskaitė (LT), Iohannis (RO)

Green = great bargaining power; Red = low bargaining power

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[17] Data from 2014 was used for the classification into net payers and net recipients (European Commission, 2016). Country abbreviations in alphabetical order - AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, EL: Greece, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: Latvia, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, SK: Slovakia, UK: United Kingdom

Following the assumptions of LI, the prospects of further integration derived from the imaginaries are higher than before considering the bargaining power of the Member States. The heads of state and government with high bargaining power show more positive imaginaries towards the EU than the heads of state and government with lower bargaining power. They can use their superior position in intergovernmental bargaining at EU level and push through further integration. They can threaten to cut down their contribution to the European budget, leading to the loss of substantial payments for the net recipients. Furthermore, they can offer side-payments to the net recipients in order to increase their willingness to support further integration. But as only two imaginaries of the heads of state and government with high bargaining power show support for further integration, it remains to be seen who of the national decision makers with high bargaining power enforces his or her imaginary. Considering Germany's leading role in the Euro crisis (Schimmelfennig, 2015), it is very likely that Merkel's position will play a significant role in the negotiations, which increases the prospects for European integration. Still, as not all imaginaries of the representatives of the four largest net payers support further integration, the prospects for further integration remain low. However, it stands out that three of the four heads of state and government with great bargaining power support the demand of a common European solution for the refugee crisis. Only Cameron (United Kingdom) does not refer to a common European solution. Accordingly, the prospects for further cooperation in the fields of migration and other policy areas relating to the immediate crisis are quite high. Similar to Schimmelfennig's (2015) observation during the economic and financial crisis, new negative international interdependencies arose in the refugee crisis, which are expected to be addressed by more integration in the respective fields. Altogether, according to LI, it is clear that Szydło (Poland), Orbán (Hungary), Tsipras (Greece) and Iohannis (Romania) will not take a leading role in the interstate bargaining over further integration in any field. Hence, deriving prospects for European integration their imaginaries are not very important.

To sum up, according to liberal intergovernmentalism the prospects of European integration increase as the imaginaries of national decision makers with high bargaining power, especially Merkel representing Germany, show dynamic support for the EU or at least no overall refusal of European integration. However, the imaginaries of two national decision makers with great bargaining power only reflect support for the EU's status quo or even show facets of anti-integration. Hence, the prospects for European integration still remain low according to liberal intergovernmentalism. Only the prospects for further cooperation in the field of migration and other policy areas relating to the immediate crisis are quite high as three of the four decision makers with great bargaining power demand a common European solution for the refugee crisis reacting to new negative interdependencies.

4.7. Conclusion

The imaginaries expressed by the heads of state and government vary from vast dynamic support to refusal of integration overall. The largest group of national decision makers does not clarify their position on further integration with their imaginaries remaining in-between dynamic support, static

support and anti-integration. Only the imaginaries of two heads of government are predominantly characterised by anti-integration. The imaginaries of the two Commissioners reflect dynamic support for further integration, even though Avramopoulos does not stress the aspect of further integration as much as Juncker. Deriving prospects for European integration from these imaginaries following neofunctionalism, cultivated spill-over is expected to work without restrictions. Functional spill-over is only expected in the field of migration, while political spill-over is only apparent for the eight heads of state and government with imaginaries showing dynamic support. Hence, according to neofunctionalism there are some chances for new cooperation at EU level, but overall the prospects for further integration remain limited. Following liberal intergovernmentalism, the prospects for further integration also remain relatively low as only two of the four heads of state and government with great bargaining power support further integration. But as Merkel, representing Germany with outstanding bargaining power, supports further integration, there are still some prospects. Furthermore, according to LI, integration in the field of migration is possible as new negative international interdependencies arose during the refugee crisis.

5. Summary and Conclusion

Overall, the analysis shows that neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism offer different lines of argumentation for the interpretation of the imaginaries of political decision makers in the EU. However, according to both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, the prospects for further integration remain limited, but with some chances, especially in the policy fields directly related to the immediate crisis management. Following neofunctionalism, some mechanisms of spill-over, which lead to further integration, can be expected. Cultivated spill-over, whereby the European Commission fosters further integration is expected to occur without restrictions since the imaginaries of the Commissioners reflect dynamic support for the EU. Functional spill-over is only expected in the fields of migration and border control as reaction to new functional pressures, which arose during the refugee crisis. It remains to be seen whether the cooperation in the current refugee crisis will be a first starting point for political spill-over to occur. So far only the imaginaries of eight heads of state and government show a shift of support to the EU level, which could be seen as the result of political spill-over. Hence, according to neofunctionalism, the European Commission is expected to use its capacities to foster further integration. Besides that, there are only prospects for further integration in the fields directly related to the refugee crisis.

According to liberal intergovernmentalism, the prospects for further integration also remain low as the imaginaries of the national decision makers with great bargaining power do not correspond on support for further integration. But as the imaginary of Merkel, head of government of Germany with dominating bargaining power, is characterised by support of European integration, there are still some chances for further integration. It remains to be seen whether she can facilitate her bargaining power to push through new ways of cooperation at EU level, hence leading to further integration. Furthermore, as the demand of a common European solution of the refugee crisis is part of the imaginaries of three of the national decision makers with great bargaining power, further cooperation in the policy fields directly related to the refugee crisis is very likely. Thereby, the national decision makers are expected to react to new negative international interdependencies, which resulted from the refugee crisis. Overall, the interpretation along both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism leads to similar conclusions about further integration of the EU, only the lines of argumentation and the mechanisms by which integration is expected to occur differ from each other. Following neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, integration is very likely in the policy fields directly related to the refugee crisis, but overall further integration to an ever-closer union seems to be hampered due to different reasons.

The results of the study contribute to two different academic debates. First of all, the study offers a new concept of European imaginaries and broadens the field, in which the concept of imaginary has been applied. Secondly, the study extends the academic debate on European integration to a new crisis setting and includes imaginaries of political decision makers as new insights into theories of European integration. In regard to previous works on imaginaries, the study offers a new conceptualisation of

European imaginaries providing insights on the understanding individuals have of the EU. This contrasts, for example, Keith's idea of European imaginaries (2013) since he focuses more on the European values. Furthermore, the study confirms Anderson's assumption that imaginaries can spread across groups and especially across borders of nation-states (see Anderson, 1983; Strauss, 2006). As anticipated, as the result of border-transcending imaginaries the decision makers' imaginaries reveal similarities and reflect shared tendencies. Furthermore, the study gives an overview of European imaginaries of important political decision makers in the EU. Thereby, it extends previous research on imaginaries to a new field since the imaginaries of EU decision makers have not been studied before, even though the concept of imaginary has widely been applied in different contexts already (Dobbernack, 2010; Levy & Spicer, 2013; Ponte & Birch, 2014; Stephens et al., 2013). The analysis shows that further research on the development of imaginaries is required. Further research could elaborate why and how the imaginaries of the decision makers evolved over the given time span, for example the imaginary of the Austrian head of government Faymann. Furthermore, influences on imaginaries in the context of the EU need to be studied, for example, whether the economic support of the EU for the own state or other political factors such as the Brexit referendum are decisive for imaginaries of political decision makers to form. Thereby, it could be analysed why representatives of the highest net receiving Member States show more negative imaginaries towards the EU than the representatives of the highest net payers. Additionally, it requires further analysis why the imaginaries of a significant share of the national heads of state and government remain blurred and vague with no or limited clarification on how the EU and its further development is supported.

In regard to theories of European integration, the study extends the academic debate to the context of the refugee crisis and broadens the theoretical argumentation by including important new insights, i.e. the imaginaries of political decision makers in the EU. Thereby, the study shows that both theories of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are applicable to interpret developments in the context of the refugee crisis. This finding corresponds with Schimmelfennig's contributions to the debate on European integration (2014, 2015), who also applied both theories to events of the economic and financial crisis. Additionally, the study affirms that amplified functional pressure arose during the refugee crisis in the EU as Niemann and Ioannou observed (2015) in the economic and financial crisis. Likewise, in the analysis it is found that new negative international interdependencies resulted from the refugee crisis, which corresponds with Schimmelfennig's findings (2015) which describe the same for the economic and financial crisis. Consequently, the findings of the study accord with different previous observations of other scholars of European integration theory. The study leads to the conclusion that considering the imaginaries of political decision makers expressed in the refugee crisis, the EU has only limited prospects of further integration. It remains to be seen how other scholars of European integration theory assess the perspectives of further integration in the light of the current refugee crisis.

As the analysis shows, further European integration is only expected in specific policy fields directly related to the refugee crisis. Besides that, the prospects for further European integration remain low. As the European institutions favour further integration, the results show that that there is need for them to act, especially in times where the Brexit vote of the United Kingdom creates new uncertainties for the EU. To ensure more cooperation at EU level, they need to concentrate on promoting the EU and further integration. One practical implication of the study for the European institutions is the need to spread a more positive idea of a united European Union. One way to do so is by implementing campaigns pointing out the benefits of the EU. As especially the representatives of the highest net receiving Member States express more negative European imaginaries, promotion of the EU in these countries could be of special importance, for example by education programmes on the EU in schools or advertising clips on television. Additionally, the European institutions, especially the European Commission, should focus its efforts on policy fields directly related to the refugee crisis, in which cooperation is widely supported by national decision makers and hence more likely to proceed. By pushing cooperation in these fields, the European institutions could prove the effectiveness of the EU and highlight the benefits of European integration. Overall, the study has shown that most of the imaginaries of the national decision makers do not reflect support for further integration and if the European institutions want to change this, action is required.

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The following documents and videos were used for the analysis.

Table A1: Selected Sources: National Heads of State and Government

Country	Head of State/ Government	Referred to as:	Title	Date of Publication	Source	Website	Date of Access
Austria	Werner Faymann	Faymann 1	Austrian Chancellor Faymann: 'Memories of Our Continent's Darkest Period'	14.09.2015	Spiegel Online	http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe /austrian-chancellor-slams-hungary-over-refugee-crisis-a-1052567.html	21.05.2016
		Faymann 2	Austrian Chancellor Warns Against Possible EU Collapse Amid Migrant Crisis	25.10.2015	Sputnik News	http://sputniknews.com/europe/20151025/ 1029067261/austria-faymann-warns-migrant-crisis-eu-collapse.html	21.05.2016
		Faymann 3	Austria imposes asylum cap to 'shake up' Europe	20.01.2016	EU Observer	https://euobserver.com/justice/131928	21.05.2016
		Faymann 4	Austria Slams Hungary Over Its Refugee Stance, Budapest Strikes Back	06.09.2015	Sputnik News	http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150906/ 1026655504/hungary-austria-refugees-crisis.html	21.05.2016
		Faymann 5	New Fences on the Old Continent: Refugee Crisis Pushes Europe to the Brink	04.03.2016	Spiegel Online	http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe /border-closures-spell-refugee-back-up-in-greece-a-1080643.html	21.05.2016
		Faymann 6	Austria Suspends Schengen, Warns EU is Threatened	18.01.2016	Newsweek	http://europe.newsweek.com/austria-suspends-schengen-warns-eu-threatened-416820?rm=eu	21.05.2016
Belgium	Charles Michel	Michel 1	Brexit Will Call Everything Into Question, Says Belgian Prime Minister	27.02.2016	The Wall Street Journal	http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2016/02/27/e verything-will-be-called-into-question-belgian-prime-minister-talks-brexit/	21.05.2016
		Michel 2	Belgium shows solidarity and welcomes 250 refugees	07.09.2015	FPS Chancellery of the Prime Minister	http://www.premier.be/en/belgium-shows-solidarity-and-welcomes-250-refugees	21.05.2016
		Michel 3	Reception of asylum seekers: the federal government takes action!	04.09.2015	FPS Chancellery of the Prime Minister	http://www.premier.be/en/reception-asylum-seekers-federal-government-takes-action	21.05.2016
		Michel 4	State of the Union: "We are on the right track!"	13.10.2015	FPS Chancellery of the Prime Minister	http://www.premier.be/en/state-union-we-are-right-track	21.05.2016
Bulgaria	Boyko Borisov	Borisov 1	Bulgaria PM: Problem with refugees at standstill, even worse	29.01.2016	Focus Information Agency	http://www.focus-fen.net/news/2016/01/29/396565/bulgaria-pm-problem-with-refugees-at-standstill-even-worse.html	22.05.2016
		Borisov 2	PM thanked everyone who joined Bulgaria's aid for Greece's refugee camps	13.03.2016	Focus Information Agency	http://www.focus-fen.net/news/2016/03/13/400407/pm-thanked-everyone-who-joined-bulgarias-aid-for-greeces-refugee-camps.html	22.05.2016

		Borisov 3	EU, Balkan leaders agree on joint plan to tackle wave of asylum seekers	26.10.2015	RT	https://www.rt.com/news/319659-eu-refugee-crisis-plan/	22.05.2016
		Borisov 4	Refugee crisis: The map that shows how Europe is becoming a fortress to keep people out	27.10.2015	The Independent	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-migrants-map-shows-how-europe-is-becoming-a-fortress-to-keep-people-ou-a6707986.html	22.05.2016
Croatia	Tihomir Orešković	Orešković 1	BILD-Interview with Tihomir Orešković | "It's like playing with Lego: Europe needs a plan!"	02.03.2016	Bild	http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/englischsprachig/interview-with-tihomir-oreskovic-44784888.bild.html	22.05.2016
		Orešković 2	European Council - February 2016 (Day 1), Arrival and doorstep Orešković (HR)	18.02.2016	Council of the EU press office	http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/video/shotlist/arrival-and-doorstep-orekovi-hr	22.05.2016
		Orešković 3	In Brussels, PM Orešković and European Leaders Discuss Migrant Crisis	18.02.2016	Total Croatia News	http://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/2515-in-brussels-pm-oreskovic-and-european-leaders-discuss-migrant-crisis	22.05.2016
		Orešković 4	Oreskovic says deal with Turkey good for refugees, Europe and Greece	18.03.2016	About Croatia	https://about.hr/news/croatia/oreskovic-says-deal-turkey-good-refugees-europe-and-greece-14561	22.05.2016
		Orešković 5	Oreskovic says Croatia will protect its national interests in migrant crisis	19.02.2016	About Croatia	https://about.hr/news/croatia/oreskovic-says-croatia-will-protect-its-national-interests-migrant-crisis-10944	22.05.2016
Cyprus	Nicos Anastasiades *(both president and head of government)*	Anastasiades 1	Statement by the President of the Republic after his meetings with the European Council President, Mr Donald Tusk	11.09.2015	Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus	http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/C4DA326BCE93ABE2C2257EC0002422E5?OpenDocument	22.05.2016
		Anastasiades 2	Speech by the President of the Republic Mr N. Anastasiades at the EPP Statutory Congress "EPP values and EU foreign policy"	22.10.2015	Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus	http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/42CE368427E2E6C5C2257EF40033CE0E?OpenDocument	22.05.2016
		Anastasiades 3	Remarks by President of the Republic following his meeting with the President of Austria, Dr Heinz Fischer	03.11.2015	Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus	http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/8C6846C128DDAAE0C2257EF40035FE8B?OpenDocument	22.05.2016
		Anastasiades 4	Statements to the Media by the President of the Republic and the President of the European Council	15.03.2016	Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus	http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/35970573D85CCDCDC2257F7800244B97?OpenDocument	22.05.2016
		Anastasiades 5	Statement by the President of the Republic, Mr N. Anastasiades, after the Summit of the European Council, in Brussels	18.03.2016	Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus	http://www.presidency.gov.cy/Presidency/Presidency.nsf/All/B59A2984B9FE7E88C2257F7E0032E34A?OpenDocument	22.05.2016
Czech Republic	Bohuslav Sobotka	Sobotka 1	Speech on the migration situation delivered by the Prime Minister to the Chamber of Deputies on 21 January 2016	01.02.2016	Government of the Czech Republic	http://www.vlada.cz/en/clenove-vlady/premier/speeches/speech-on-the-migration-situation-delivered-by-the-prime-minister-to-the-chamber-of-deputies-on-21-january-2016-139768/	22.05.2016
		Sobotka 2	Comment by Prime Minister Sobotka on Migration Crisis and Migrant Quotas	23.09.2015	Government of the Czech Republic	http://www.vlada.cz/en/clenove-vlady/premier/speeches/comment-by-prime-minister-sobotka-on-migration-crisis-and-migrant-quotas--135004/	22.05.2016
		Sobotka 3	PM Sobotka: I welcome the fact that we have agreed on specific steps which, unlike quotas, will help us to manage the migration crisis	24.09.2015	Government of the Czech Republic	http://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/pm-sobotka-i-welcome-the-fact-that-we-have-agreed-on-specific-	22.05.2016

						steps-which--unlike-quotas--will-help-us-to-manage-the-migration-crisis-135220/	
		Sobotka 4	Czech PM says ready to protect Balkan borders in migrant crisis	14.02.2016	Reuters	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-visegrad-idUSKCN0VN0UV	22.05.2016
		Sobotka 5	Czech Prime Minister chastises Merkel over refugee crisis	23.12.2015	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/czech-prime-minister-chastises-merkel-over-refugee-crisis/a-18935902	22.05.2016
		Sobotka 6	"Closing of borders could renew conflicts in Balkans"	01.02.2016	B92 Radio	http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2016&mm=02&dd=01&nav_id=96889	22.05.2016
		Sobotka 7	Prague abandons plans to sue EU over refugee quotas	25.09.2015	EurActiv	http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/prague-abandons-plans-to-sue-eu-over-refugee-quotas/	22.05.2016
Denmark	Lars Løkke Rasmussen	Løkke Rasmussen 1	Statement of Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen at press briefing concerning the current migration situation in Denmark January 4, 2016	04.01.2016	Statsministeriet	http://www.stm.dk/_p_14281.html	22.05.2016
		Løkke Rasmussen 2	Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen's Opening Address to the Folketing (Danish Parliament) on 6 October 2015	06.10.2015	Statsministeriet	http://www.stm.dk/_p_14252.html	22.05.2016
		Løkke Rasmussen 3	Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen's New Year Address 1 January 2016	01.01.2016	Statsministeriet	http://www.stm.dk/_p_14284.html	22.05.2016
		Løkke Rasmussen 4	Refugee crisis spills to Denmark, government hopes moves on to Sweden	07.09.2015	Reuters	http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-denmark-idUKKCN0R71ZX20150907	22.05.2016
Estonia	Taavi Rõivas	Rõivas 1	Taavi Rõivas: holding together as a country, nothing is impossible	30.09.2015	ERR Estonian Public Broadcasting	http://news.err.ee/v/opinion/f2b8a5aa-f503-49f2-b178-64fd5cbcb56b/taavi-roivas-holding-together-as-a-country-nothing-is-impossible	22.05.2016
		Rõivas 2	Rõivas: Estonia is ready to contribute to resolving the European refugee crisis	09.09.2015	Republic of Estonia Government	https://valitsus.ee/en/news/roivas-estonia-ready-contribute-resolving-european-refugee-crisis	22.05.2016
		Rõivas 3	Speech delivered on the implementation of Estonia's European Union Policy by Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas at the Riigikogu, 17 November 2015	19.11.2015	Republic of Estonia Government	https://valitsus.ee/en/news/speech-delivered-implementation-estonias-european-union-policy-prime-minister-taavi-roivas	22.05.2016
		Rõivas 4	Estonian PM says refugee crisis main topic for EU this year and in 2016	17.11.2015	Postimees Estonian News	http://news.postimees.ee/3402717/estonian-pm-says-refugee-crisis-main-topic-for-eu-this-year-and-in-2016	22.05.2016
Finland	Juha Sipilä	Sipilä 1	PM Juha Sipilä Addresses the Whole Nation: 'Now Is the Last Moment to Put Finland Back In Shape.'	17.09.2015	Finland Today	http://finlandtoday.fi/prime-minister-juha-sipila-addresses-the-whole-nation-no-is-the-last-moment-to-put-finland-back-in-shape/	22.05.2016
		Sipilä 2	Prime Minister's New Year's Message 31.12.2015	31.12.2015	Finnish Government	http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/paaministeri-uudenvuodentervehdys-31-12-2015?_101_INSTANCE_3qmUeJgIxZEK_groupId=10616	22.05.2016

		Sipilä 3	Prime Minister Juha Sipilä's speech during a topical parliamentary discussion on foreign policy 20 October 2015	20.10.2015	Finnish Government	http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/paaministeri-juha-sipilan-puheenvuoro-eduskunnan-ulkopoliittisessa-ajankohtaiskeskustelussa-20-10-2015?_101_INSTANCE_3qmUeJgIxZEK_groupId=10616	22.05.2016
		Sipilä 4	PM: EU hasn't made good on its refugee crisis promises	20.09.2015	Yle Uutiset	http://yle.fi/uutiset/pm_eu_hasnt_made_good_on_its_refugee_crisis_promises/8318693	22.05.2016
France	François Hollande	Hollande 1	'Europe cannot wait for others to solve our problem for us': France's president urges EU solidarity in terror fight	06.04.2016	Business Insider	http://www.businessinsider.com/franois-hollande-bild-interview-2016-4?IR=T	25.05.2016
		Hollande 2	Speech by the President of the Republic before a joint session of Parliament (Versailles, November 16, 2015)	16.11.2015	France Diplomatie	http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/parisattacks-paris-terror-attacks-november-2015/article/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-before-a-joint-session-of-parliament	25.05.2016
		Hollande 3	European Union/Turkey/migration – Press conference by M. François Hollande, President of the Republic, following the meeting of heads of state and government from the European Union and Turkey (excerpts)	15.03.2016	Embassy of France in London	http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Progress-on-EU-migration-crisis-significant-President	25.05.2016
		Hollande 4	François Hollande and Angela Merkel face MEPs	07.10.2015	European Parliament	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150929IPR94921/Fran%C3%A7ois-Hollande-and-Angela-Merkel-face-MEPs	25.05.2016
		Hollande 5	Merkel, Hollande call for 'more Europe' in dealing with refugees	07.10.2015	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-hollande-call-for-more-europe-in-dealing-with-refugees/a-18766659	25.05.2016
Germany	Angela Merkel	Merkel 1	Angela Merkel defends Germany's handling of refugee influx	15.09.2015	The Guardian	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/angela-merkel-defends-germanys-handling-of-refugee-influx	22.05.2016
		Merkel 2	Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to the European Parliament	07.10.2015	The Federal Government	https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Reden/2015/2015-10-07-merkel-ep_en.html?nn=393812	22.05.2016
		Merkel 3	'I will do my damn duty' on refugees, says Merkel	29.02.2016	The Local	http://www.thelocal.de/20160229/i-will-do-my-damn-duty-on-refugees-says-merkel	22.05.2016
		Merkel 4	Merkel: 'I have no plan B' on migrant crisis strategy	29.02.2016	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-i-have-no-plan-b-on-migrant-crisis-strategy/a-19081119	22.05.2016
		Merkel 5	Merkel: EU summit 'first real chance' to solve refugee crisis	16.03.2016	The Local	http://www.thelocal.de/20160316/merkel-eu-summit-first-real-chance-to-solve-refugee-crisis	22.05.2016
Greece	Alexis Tsipras	Tsipras 1	Greek prime minister Tsipras says its position in Europe is 'a blessing and a curse'	06.03.2016	Business Insider Deutschland	http://www.businessinsider.de/bi-de-interview-with-alexis-tsipras-2016-3?r=US&IR=T	22.05.2016

		Tsipras 2	Greek PM Tsipras threatens to block EU refugee decisions if left alone in crisis	24.02.2016	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/greek-pm-tsipras-threatens-to-block-eu-refugee-decisions-if-left-alone-in-crisis/a-19071595	22.05.2016
		Tsipras 3	Greece says Europe in nervous crisis over migrants, needs to share burden	06.03.2016	Reuters	http://in.reuters.com/article/greece-migrants-pm-idINKCN0W80KN	22.05.2016
		Tsipras 4	'Europe between a rock and a hard place,' Greek PM tells Paris press	12.03.2016	Ekathimerini (Kathimerini English Edition)	http://www.ekathimerini.com/206926/article/ekathimerini/news/europe-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-greek-pm-tells-paris-press	22.05.2016
		Tsipras 5	Tsipras 'ashamed' of Europe's handling of refugee crisis	30.10.2015	Press TV	http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2015/10/30/435600/Greece-EU-Tsipras-refugee-crisis	22.05.2016
Hungary	Viktor Orbán	Orbán 1	Migration crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness	03.09.2015	The Guardian	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness	22.05.2016
		Orbán 2	Hungary's prime minister says accepting Syrian refugees 'also means importing terrorism, criminalism anti-Semitism and homophobia'	25.02.2016	Business Insider Deutschland	http://www.businessinsider.de/viktor-orban-interview-refugee-migrant-hungary-2016-2?r=US&IR=T	22.05.2016
		Orbán 3	Hungary may deploy army on borders after Sept. 15 to keep out migrants	05.09.2015	Reuters	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-borders-idUSKCN0R50G920150905	22.05.2016
		Orbán 4	'All the terrorists are migrants'	23.11.2015	Politico	www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/	22.05.2016
Ireland	Enda Kenny	Kenny 1	Statement by the Taoiseach following the March meeting of the European Council Dáil Éireann, 22 March 2016	22.03.2016	Department of the Taoiseach	http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach's_Speeches/Statement_by_the_Taoiseach_following_the_March_meeting_of_the_European_Council_Dail_Eireann_22_March_2016.html	22.05.2016
		Kenny 2	Statement by the Taoiseach in advance of the December meeting of the European Council, Dáil Éireann, 16 December 2015	16.12.2015	Department of the Taoiseach	http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach's_Speeches/Statement_by_the_Taoiseach_in_advance_of_the_December_meeting_of_the_European_Council_Dail_Eireann_16_December_2015.html	22.05.2016
		Kenny 3	Statement by the Taoiseach in advance of the October meeting of the European Council Dáil Éireann, 7 October 2015	07.10.2015	Department of the Taoiseach	http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach's_Speeches/Statement_by_the_Taoiseach_in_advance_of_the_October_meeting_of_the_European_Council_D%C3%A1il_%C3%89ireann_7_October_2015.html	22.05.2016
		Kenny 4	Taoiseach Enda Kenny describes refugee crisis as 'human catastrophe'	03.09.2015	Belfast Telegraph	http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/republic-of-ireland/taoiseach-enda-kenny-describes-refugee-crisis-as-human-catastrophe-31500186.html	22.05.2016
Italy	Matteo Renzi	Renzi 1	Europe isn't working for this generation	21.01.2016	The Guardian	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/21/italy-reforms-europe-not-working-generation?CMP=share_btn_tw	22.05.2016

		Renzi 2	Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi responds directly to Independent's call to help refugees with warning against unilateral foreign policy	11.09.2015	The Independent	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italian-prime-minister-matteo-renzi-responds-directly-to-independents-call-to-help-refugees-with-10495695.html	22.05.2016
		Renzi 3	Italy's PM Matteo Renzi Criticises Franco-German Dominance In European Union	28.01.2016	NDTV	http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/italys-pm-matteo-renzi-criticises-franco-german-dominance-in-european-union-1271110	22.05.2016
		Renzi 4	'We will not allow them to destroy Europe': Renzi	30.01.2016	The Local	http://www.thelocal.it/20160130/we-will-not-allow-them-to-destroy-europe-renzi	22.05.2016
		Renzi 5	Matteo Renzi, Italian Premier, Pushes for a Place at Europe's Power Table	28.01.2016	The New York Times	http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/world/europe/matteo-renzi-italian-premier-pushes-for-a-place-at-europes-power-table.html?_r=1	22.05.2016
Latvia	Laimdota Straujuma *(until February 2016)*	Straujuma 1	Prime Minister at the European Council: Europe should have a targeted focus on tackling the causes of migration	24.09.2015	Ministru kabinets	http://www.mk.gov.lv/en/aktualitates/prime-minister-european-council-europe-should-have-targeted-focus-tackling-causes	22.05.2016
		Straujuma 2	Prime Minister: Our interest is to protect Schengen area	17.12.2015	Ministru kabinets	http://www.mk.gov.lv/en/aktualitates/prime-minister-our-interest-protect-schengen-area	22.05.2016
		Straujuma 3	Prime Minister rules out extra refugees for Latvia	16.11.2015	LSM Public Broadcasting of Latvia	http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/politics/prime-minister-rules-out-extra-refugees-for-latvia.a155213/	22.05.2016
		Straujuma 4	Latvia clings to 'voluntary principle' on refugees	08.09.2015	LSM Public Broadcasting of Latvia	http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/politics/latvia-clings-to-voluntary-principle-on-refugees.a144674/	22.05.2016
		Straujuma 5	Prime Minister: it's it our best interest to safeguard Schengen zone	18.12.2015	BNN Baltic News Network	http://bnn-news.com/prime-minister-its-interest-safeguard-schengen-zone-136391	22.05.2016
Lithuania	Dalia Grybauskaitė	Grybauskaitė 1	Speech by President Dalia Grybauskaitė at the United Nations General Assembly „The United Nations at 70: the road ahead for peace, security and human rights"	29.09.2015	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/activities/speeches/speech-by-president-dalia-grybauskaite-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-the-united-nations-at-70-the-road-ahead-for-peace-security-and-human-rights/6590/23796	25.05.2016
		Grybauskaitė 2	Baltic Leader: E.U. Unity a Necessity	20.04.2016	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/president-in-the-media/baltic-leader-e.u.-unity-a-necessity/8237/25044	25.05.2016
		Grybauskaitė 3	Cooperation with Turkey is necessary to tackle the migration crisis	07.03.2016	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/24804	25.05.2016
		Grybauskaitė 4	The EU must implement its decisions	18.02.2016	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/24701	25.05.2016
		Grybauskaitė 5	Tougher Refugee Stance Key to Lithuania to Avoid EU Instability	22.01.2016	Office of the President of the	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/president-in-the-media/tougher-	25.05.2016

					Republic of Lithuania	refugee-stance-key-to-lithuania-to-avoid-eu-instability/24579	
		Grybauskaitė 6	European Council: additional measures to manage the migration crisis	17.12.2015	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/24413	25.05.2016
		Grybauskaitė 7	EU is tackling the migration crisis at its roots	23.09.2015	Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania	https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/23764	25.05.2016
Luxembourg	Xavier Bettel	Bettel 1	A spring tide of refugees could be even bigger than last year's, European leader says	11.01.2016	The Washington Post	https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/11/a-spring-tide-of-refugees-could-be-even-bigger-than-last-years-european-leader-says/	22.05.2016
		Bettel 2	In his speech at the Valletta Summit on migration, Xavier Bettel urges ministers to adopt a "two-way" solution to the issue of migration from Africa	11.11.2015	Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg	http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/11/11-lavalette-bettel/index.html	22.05.2016
		Bettel 3	Xavier Bettel meets with Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of Holland, for talks devoted mainly to the "refugees problem" and the "migration crisis" in Europe	09.09.2015	Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg	http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/09/09-bettel-visite-rutte/index.html	22.05.2016
		Bettel 4	Xavier Bettel presented a preliminary review of the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU at the closing of the European Council	18.12.2015	Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg	http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/12/18-ce-bettel-bilan/index.html	22.05.2016
		Bettel 5	Migration crisis tabled during Luxembourg PM's London visit	27.10.2015	Luxemburger Wort	http://www.wort.lu/en/politics/battle-crisis-with-close-cooperation-urges-bettel-migration-crisis-tabled-during-luxembourg-pm-s-london-visit-562fa2760da165c55dc4c108	22.05.2016
Malta	Joseph Muscat	Muscat 1	Joseph Muscat	09.09.2015	Alain Elkann (Times of Malta)	http://alainelkanninterviews.com/joseph-muscat/	22.05.2016
		Muscat 2	Italy, Malta call for global approach to refugee crisis	03.09.2015	Malta Today	http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/56761/italy_malta_call_for_global_approach_to_refugee_crisis	22.05.2016
		Muscat 3	[WATCH] 'Building walls won't solve anything' - Muscat	23.09.2015	Malta Today	http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/57456/eu_pushing_for_stricter_compliance_with_common_asylum_policy	22.05.2016
		Muscat 4	Refugee crisis	PM hopes to lay foundations for 'new system' during Valletta Summit	07.09.2015	Malta Today	http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/56893/refugee_crisis__pm_hopes_to_lay_foundations_for_new_system_during_valletta_summit	22.05.2016
Netherlands	Mark Rutte	Rutte 1	Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte I Future of Europe I Annual Meeting 2016	23.01.2016	World Economic Forum	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuThZwVaTAs	23.05.2016
		Rutte 2	Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte to the European Parliament	20.01.2016	Government of the Netherlands	https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2016/01/20/speech-by-prime-minister-mark-rutte-to-the-european-parliament	23.05.2016

		Rutte 3	Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte "cautiously optimistic" before EU Summit	17.03.2016	Friedrich Naumann Stiftung	https://fnf-europe.org/2016/03/17/dutch-prime-minister-mark-rutte-cautiously-optimistic-before-eu-summit/	23.05.2016
		Rutte 4	Dutch PM: Islamic State can't change our way of life	26.11.2015	EU Observer	https://euobserver.com/justice/131277	23.05.2016
Poland	Beata Szydło	Szydło 1	Exposé of Prime Minister Beata Szydło	18.11.2015	The Chancellery of the Prime Minister	https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/expose-of-prime-minister-beata-szydlo.html	23.05.2016
		Szydło 2	Prime Minister Beata Szydło in Brussels: the agreement on the migration crisis is good	18.12.2015	The Chancellery of the Prime Minister	https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-beata-szydlo-in-brussels-the-agreement-on-the-migration-crisis-is-good.html	23.05.2016
		Szydło 3	Prime Minister Beata Szydło: EU made huge step towards easing migrant crisis	08.03.2016	The Chancellery of the Prime Minister	https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-beata-szydlo-eu-made-huge-step-towards-easing-migrant-crisis.html	23.05.2016
		Szydło 4	Poland will not take in any immigrants: PM Szydło	23.03.2016	Radio Poland	http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/245910,Poland-will-not-take-in-any-immigrants-PM-Szydlo	23.05.2016
Portugal	António Costa	Costa 1	Portugal wants more refugees to help revive dwindling population	22.02.2016	EurActiv	https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/portugal-wants-more-refugees-to-help-revive-dwindling-population/	23.05.2016
		Costa 2	Portugal to Syrians: Come West	22.03.2016	Politico	http://www.politico.eu/article/portugal-to-syrians-come-west-refugee-crisis-portuguese-prime-ministerantonio-costa/	23.05.2016
		Costa 3	Portuguese premier says challenges call for 'more Europe'	10.04.2016	Ekathimerini (Kathimerini English Edition)	http://www.ekathimerini.com/207770/article/ekathimerini/news/portuguese-premier-says-challenges-call-for-more-europe	23.05.2016
		Costa 4	PM underlines refugee willingness	25.02.2016	The Portugal News Online	http://theportugalnews.com/news/pm-underlines-refugee-willingness/37552	23.05.2016
Romania	Klaus Werner Iohannis	Iohannis 1	The speech adressed by the President of Romania on the occasion of the annual meeting with the representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Bucharest	21.01.2016	Președintele României	http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/discursuri/the-speech-adressed-by-the-president-of-romania-on-the-occasion-of-the-annual-meeting-with-the-representatives-of-the-diplomatic-corps-accredited-in-bucharest	25.05.2016
		Iohannis 2	President Iohannis on migrant crisis: Things among partners are not solved by force, but in agreement	16.09.2015	Romanian National News Agency AGERPRES	http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2015/09/16/president-iohannis-on-migrant-crisis-things-among-partners-are-not-solved-by-force-but-in-agreement-12-07-53	25.05.2016
		Iohannis 3	President Iohannis: European Council does not allot more migrants to Romania	18.03.2016	Romanian National News Agency AGERPRES	http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2016/03/18/president-iohannis-european-council-does-not-allot-more-migrants-to-romania-19-56-15	25.05.2016
		Iohannis 4	President Iohannis says he wants more consistency, vision and strategy from EU	21.01.2016	Romanian National News Agency AGERPRES	http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2016/01/21/president-iohannis-says-he-wants-more-consistency-vision-and-strategy-from-eu-15-04-33	25.05.2016

		Iohannis 5	President Iohannis to attend EU-Africa Summit, Valletta summit on migration	11.11.2015	Romanian National News Agency AGERPRES	http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2015/11/11/president-iohannis-to-attend-eu-africa-summit-valletta-summit-on-migration-13-01-34	25.05.2016
		Iohannis 6	President Iohannis arrives in Brussels to attend extraordinary European Council meeting	23.09.2015	Romanian National News Agency AGERPRES	http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2015/09/23/president-iohannis-arrives-in-brussels-to-attend-extraordinary-european-council-meeting-19-30-34	25.05.2016
Slovakia	Robert Fico	Fico 1	Fico: EU's migration policy is 'ritual suicide'	26.01.2016	EurActiv	http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/fico-eu-s-migration-policy-is-ritual-suicide/	23.05.2016
		Fico 2	Slovak PM: 'It's impossible to integrate Muslims'	08.01.2016	EurActiv	http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/slovak-pm-it-s-impossible-to-integrate-muslims/	23.05.2016
		Fico 3	Slovakia takes EU to court over migrant quotas	24.11.2015	EurActiv	http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/slovakia-takes-eu-to-court-over-migrant-quotas/	23.05.2016
		Fico 4	Slovakia pushes ahead with legal action over EU refugee quotas	01.10.2015	EurActiv	http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/slovakia-pushes-ahead-with-legal-action-over-eu-refugee-quotas/	23.05.2016
		Fico 5	Slovakia's premier says EU will either resolve refugee crisis or lose unity	09.02.106	Press TV	http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/02/09/449403/Slovakia-Fico-EU-refugee-crisis	23.05.2016
Slovenia	Miro Cerar	Cerar 1	Slovenian initiative to stop irregular migration is yielding the first results	22.02.2016	Government of the Republic of Slovenia	http://www.vlada.si/en/media_room/government_press_releases/press_release/article/slovenian_initiative_to_stop_irregular_migration_is_yielding_the_first_results_57649/?tx_ttnews[backPID]=25&cHash=5237df1cdde5a209aee4c7d8e3cd4bfa	23.05.2016
		Cerar 2	Our State Must Become a Promotor of Sustainable Economic Growth and Development	16.12.2015	The Slovenia Times	http://www.sloveniatimes.com/our-state-must-become-a-promotor-of-sustainable-economic-growth-and-development	23.05.2016
		Cerar 3	Slovenia PM: Refugee wave like 2m entering U.S. in a day	26.10.2015	CNN	http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/10/26/slovenia-intv-amanpour-miro-cerar-full.cnn	23.05.2016
		Cerar 4	Slovenia Wants to Discuss Refugee Crisis with New Croatian Prime Minister	02.01.2016	Total Croatia News	http://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/1970-slovenia-wants-to-discuss-refugee-crisis-with-new-croatian-prime-minister	23.05.2016
		Cerar 5	Slovenia threatens to CLOSE borders with HUGE fence to stem flow of migrants	24.10.2015	Express	http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/614352/migrant-crisis-slovenia-close-borders-to-stop-refugees-Miro-Cerar	23.05.2016
Spain	Mariano Rajoy	Rajoy 1	Mariano Rajoy defends right to asylum as "inherent to democratic and civilised countries"	16.03.2016	Gobierno de España, La Moncloa	http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/Paginas/2016/20160316-interview-teleci.aspx	23.05.2016
		Rajoy 2	Mariano Rajoy says all his decisions were aimed at "preserving the general interest"	03.04.2016	Gobierno de España, La Moncloa	http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/Paginas/2016/20160403-rajoy-salvados.aspx	23.05.2016

		Rajoy 3	Statement by President of the Government prior to European Union-Turkey Summit	07.03.2016	Gobierno de España, La Moncloa	http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2016/20160308-statement-europe.aspx	23.05.2016
		Rajoy 4	Statement by President of the Government following European Union-Turkey Summit and meeting of members of European Council	08.03.2016	Gobierno de España, La Moncloa	http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2016/20160308-statement-follow.aspx	23.05.2016
		Rajoy 5	Spain resists EU pressure to take in 6,000 asylum seekers	01.09.2015	El País	http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/09/01/inenglish/1441099525_412620.html	23.05.2016
Sweden	Stefan Löfven	Löfven 1	CNBC Transcript: Interview with Stefan Löfven, Prime Minister of Sweden	20.01.2016	CNBC	http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/20/cnbc-transcript-interview-with-stefan-loefven-prime-minister-of-sweden.html	23.05.2016
		Löfven 2	Speech by Prime Minister Stefan Löfven at European Parliament	09.03.2016	Government Offices of Sweden	http://www.government.se/speeches/2016/03/speech-by-prime-minister-stefan-lofven-at-european-parliament/	23.05.2016
		Löfven 3	Collective responsibility key to addressing refugee crisis, says Swedish prime minister	23.01.2016	Euronews	http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/23/collective-responsibility-in-europe-key-to-addressing-refugee-crisis-says/	23.05.2016
		Löfven 4	Löfven urges EU to deal with the reasons for the refugee crisis	23.09.2015	Radio Sweden	http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6262676	23.05.2016
		Löfven 5	Germany, Sweden call for EU-wide response to refugee crisis	08.09.2015	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/germany-sweden-call-for-eu-wide-response-to-refugee-crisis/a-18701366	23.05.2016
United Kingdom	David Cameron	Cameron 1	PM statement in Madrid on aid for Syria and EU reform	04.09.2015	GOV.UK	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-in-madrid-on-aid-for-syria-and-eu-reform	23.05.2016
		Cameron 2	Migration and EU reform: PM statement in Lisbon	04.09.2015	GOV.UK	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/migration-and-eu-reform-pm-statement-in-lisbon	23.05.2016
		Cameron 3	Exclusive: David Cameron on Donald Trump, ISIS and Welcoming Refugees to Europe	22.01.2016	Mic Network	https://mic.com/articles/133261/exclusive-david-cameron-on-donald-trump-isis-and-welcoming-refugees-to-europe#.lSJrpeIQ9	23.05.2016
		Cameron 4	Full text: David Cameron's 2015 Conservative conference speech	07.10.2015	The Spectator	http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2015/10/full-text-david-camerons-2015-conservative-conference-speech/	23.05.2016
		Cameron 5	Refugee crisis could lead to UK leaving EU, David Cameron says	10.12.2015	The Independent	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/refugee-crisis-could-lead-to-britain-leaving-eu-david-cameron-says-a6767526.html	23.05.2016

Table A2: Selected Sources: European Commission

Commissioner	Name	Referred to as:	Title	Date of Publication	Source	Website	Date of Access
President	Jean-Claude Juncker	Juncker 1	State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity	09.09.2015	European Commission	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm	23.05.2016
		Juncker 2	14th Norbert Schmelzer lecture – Lecture by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, 'The European Union – a source of stability in a time of crisis'	03.03.2016	European Commission	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-583_en.htm	23.05.2016
		Juncker 3	Speech of President Juncker in Passau, Germany – Discussion 'Menschen in Europa': "Euro, Russia, Refugees – which perspective for the European Union?"	08.10.2015	European Commission	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5824_en.htm	23.05.2016
		Juncker 4	BILD-Interview with head of EU-commission Juncker | „History will prove Angela Merkel right"	16.02.2016	Bild	http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/jean-claude-juncker/im-bild-interview-44588872.bild.html	23.05.2016
		Juncker 5	EU could fail if refugee crisis is not tackled, Juncker says	16.01.2016	The Irish Times	http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eu-could-fail-if-refugee-crisis-is-not-tackled-juncker-says-1.2498819	23.05.2016
Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship	Dimitris Avramopoulos	Avramopoulos 1	Avramopolous: Refugee crisis a 'crash test' for Europe	11.09.2015	EurActiv	https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/interview/avramopolous-refugee-crisis-a-crash-test-for-europe/	23.05.2016
		Avramopoulos 2	Closing remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the EP Plenary session: The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration	12.04.2016	European Commission	http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/avramopoulos/announcements/closing-remarks-commissioner-avramopoulos-ep-plenary-session-situation-mediterranean-and-need_en	23.05.2016
		Avramopoulos 3	Speech by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the EESC plenary debate on the European Agenda on Migration	16.03.2016	European Commission	http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/avramopoulos/announcements/speech-commissioner-avramopoulos-eesc-plenary-debate-european-agenda-migration_en	23.05.2016
		Avramopoulos 4	EU Commission warns of 'disaster' if migrant talks fail	26.02.2016	Deutsche Welle	http://www.dw.com/en/eu-commission-warns-of-disaster-if-migrant-talks-fail/a-19077944	23.05.2016
		Avramopoulos 5	New EU migrant plans ready next week - Avramopoulos	01.09.2015	Reuters	http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-eu-avramopoulos-inter-idUKKCN0R14MT20150901	23.05.2016

Table B1: Overview of the Imaginaries of the National Heads of State and Government

Country	Head of State / Government	Prevailing Imaginary	Elements of Dynamic Support	Elements of Static Support	Elements of Anti-Integration	Important Quotes
Austria	Werner Faymann	dynamic/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, in the documents of September more dynamic support, later static support and anti-integration)	demands common European solution in connection with new measures: supports quota (wants to push it through with qualified majority voting); supports hotspots; proposes new EU fund with which costs of asylum applicants should be shared; proposes introduction of sanctions for countries which "violate principles of solidarity" (Faymann 1)	wants to preserve Schengen and EU as a whole; sees crisis as a threat to it	demands border controls as Schengen is not working (but also says "one cannot solve the refugee problem with barbed wire" (Faymann 4), added that "those who do not assist in resolving the refugee issue will have to reckon with the financial consequences in the future. (Faymann 4)); criticises EU's structures as unable to manage crisis	"It is all tied together. It is one and the same European Union. [...] There are, for good reasons, penalties against budget offenders who don't abide by the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact. In order to cope with the movement of refugees we need penalties against those who violate principles of solidarity." (Faymann 1) "Now the speech is about either a common Europe or about a quiet collapse of the European Union. One path is burdensome, difficult and supposedly long and the other one would lead to the chaos" (Faymann 2) "As such, I am proposing a fund to which every EU member contributes, just like with the bank bailouts. The money should be used to cover the costs of the asylum applicants." (Faymann 5) "It is extremely troubling that the EU's complicated structures have prevented it from resolving important issues like the avalanche of refugees or the financial crisis more quickly" (Faymann 6)
Belgium	Charles Michel	dynamic support (also elements of static support and anti-integration, but explicitly names further integration as desirable)	supports further integration (at different speeds); supports a EU-wide distribution plan of asylum seekers, Turkey agreement and hot spots in Greece, common approach to external border control; demands common approach for the crisis management in connection with many new measures	wants to preserve Schengen and EU; wants to cooperate and demands solidarity at EU level	explains that Belgium needs to be protected from having a camp similar to Calais	"Then there's the ever-closer union. It's true that it's very symbolic, rather than legal. But in my eyes, it's an important symbol because it shows there's this confirmation of a Europe at various speeds." (Michel 1) "The best way to protect Schengen is to implement our refugee strategy as soon as possible, [...]." (Michel 1) "These are Europe's external borders, not only Greece's. The Europeans have to give the means to control this external border." (Michel 1) "All Member States must show their willingness to cooperate and to show solidarity, otherwise socio-economic solidarity will simply prove to be impossible." (Michel 2)

Bulgaria	Boyko Borisov	static support/anti-integration

(but remains vague with few references to the EU) | not expressed | hopes for a European solution; wants to preserve EU ("This is the only way to become a big European family." (Borisov 2)) | demands border controls in order to protect Bulgaria; sees crisis as national threat | "We will continue, we have to have a European position. We do not want to have countries left fence-free, which to be awash with all the refugees in the future. Protecting our nations we also think about the European solidarity and we hope that our European colleagues and partners will be more active when they solve these issues because the fact that we turn to be right does not bring us any satisfaction. The problem remains the same, it has even worsened" (Borisov 1)
"We will not expose our countries to the devastating pressure of millions that would come." (Borisov 4) |
| **Croatia** | Tihomir Orešković | static support

(with anti-integration elements, but always puts them in relative terms to elements of static support, only one element of dynamic support) | supports Turkey-EU agreement | wants to preserve Schengen; demands common EU solution (demands distribution but criticises quota); believes in European compromise | "Nobody in Europe will close borders, but they could get a little tighter now" (Orešković 3); sees Croatian interests under threat in crisis and wants to protect them (but points to communication as main principle) | "Open borders are the right principle for Europe. Permanently closing the borders would greatly harm the European Union, and not only economically […]" (Orešković 1)
"There will be a European solution, not a German, French, or Hungarian solution. We are a family in the EU, so sometimes there is a difference of opinions. Differences make you stronger, Europe will define a joint solution." (Orešković 1)
"Croatia will protect its national interests but the main message is that cooperation is necessary with Austria, Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia and that we should have open communication so as to be able to react on time" (Orešković 5) |
| **Cyprus** | Nicos Anastasiades | dynamic support

(but remains vague with few references to EU; explicitly demands more EU involvement, but as long as vital national interest are respected, i.e. Turkey-Cyprus relationship) | favours common European approach and Juncker's proposal of new measures; supports new measures and European crisis management (more EU involvement) | demands common approach in addressing root causes of the crisis | sees Turkey-EU agreement (consequence of refugee crisis) as threat to nation | "No EU member state can be left alone to deal with this crisis." (Anastasiades 1)
"Cyprus is ready to facilitate the EU's efforts in every way possible." (Anastasiades 1)
"In fact, the EU has no other option than becoming more actively involved and visible in the search for a solution to these problems." (Anastasiades 2)
"In this regard [referring to the EU-Turkey agreement], I explained to President Tusk that it is unwarranted, counter-productive and not to mention unacceptable to shift - not by President Tusk - the burden of responsibility for the migration crisis on my shoulders, or on the shoulders of the Republic of Cyprus." (Anastasiades 4) |

Czech Republic	Bohuslav Sobotka	dynamic/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, no category is emphasised explicitly enough to define one as prevailing)	supports hot spots and new agreements with third countries; supports common European Border and Coast Guard and "all instruments helping to rein in migration into the European Union, especially by means of boosted and rigorous protection of the exposed parts of the external border" (Sobotka 1)	wants to preserve EU (and status quo, e.g. does not file lawsuit against EU quota to reduce tensions); crisis seen as a threat to Europe (security threat); demands to preserve Schengen	points out that Czech Republic could be affected by crisis; explains Czech Republic is prepared for implementing border controls; but "While we do stand ready to close part of our borders if needs be, the Czech Government would much prefer to find a common European solution." (Sobotka 1); increases own border control (but aims at preserving Schengen); criticises EU quotas; rejects centrally managed migration policy	"Migration can only be tackled by a united Europe, not by individual countries acting in isolation. I am keen to dispel the illusion and reject some of the proposals that crop up very frequently espousing the notion that we should wash our hands of the migration crisis by exiting the European Union." (Sobotka 1) "Even though I am not in favor of and disagree with the imposition of quotas and even though the Czech Republic voted against this measure, the migration crisis must not open a rift within the European Union. I do not want to file lawsuits, which would further escalate the tensions." (Sobotka 2) "We reject the pressure to accept a centrally managed migration policy, which only strengthens the radicals and can damage the idea of Europe" (Sobotka 5)
Denmark	Lars Løkke Rasmussen	static support/anti-integration (special case as Denmark is not part of EU asylum and immigration policy)	not expressed	crisis as a threat to the EU; supports European crisis management, especially in protecting external borders, but stresses that Denmark wants to stay outside of European common asylum and immigration policy; wants to preserve Schengen and EU	emphasises how Denmark is threatened by high number of refugees coming in, reintroduces border controls to protect Denmark from threat; sees law and order under threat in Denmark (elaborates in detail how refugees threaten Denmark); criticises EU asylum system as broken	"Denmark and Europe are currently in an extraordinary situation. Our borders are under a double pressure." (Løkke Rasmussen 2) "Secondly, the EU shall not determine how many asylum-seekers that Denmark accepts. We stand outside – and will remain outside – the EU's common asylum and immigration policy. Also after the referendum on 3 December." (Løkke Rasmussen 2) "Fortunately, we are not alone. We are working together with other countries. We are a part of the EU's response." (Løkke Rasmussen 2) "And we are pushing to find a solution within the EU.[...] The point is: When Europe cannot control its external borders, we see that the open borders within Europe close again. To the detriment of growth and prosperity." (Løkke Rasmussen 3) "I think it is clear for everyone that the European asylum system is under huge pressure and in fact broken in some cases" (Løkke Rasmussen 4)

Country	Leader					
Estonia	Taavi Rõivas	dynamic support (as overall further integration is demanded, but also mentions elements of static support and critique of missing EU solutions)	supports revision of European asylum system and resettlement scheme, common European border guard system; demands further integration overall (especially in crisis management); demands common European central budget	Sees the refugee crisis as a threat to the EU; wants to preserve the EU and its freedoms	criticises quota as not viable solution to the refugee crisis and missing common solutions	"Restoring internal border controls is a result of a missing general solution or its weakness, and this is an area that would need much more Europe." (Rõivas 3) "I wish to emphasise that cooperation in Europe, unity and solidarity help Estonia and other member states as well. There is no European policy that would not have European freedoms and the idea of solidarity engraved in its fundamental logic. Europe is not a friend only during good times, same goes for Estonia." (Rõivas 3) "As Jean-Claude Juncker said in his annual State of the Union address, we need more Europe, and more union in this union." (Rõivas 3)
Finland	Juha Sipilä	static support/anti-integration (but remains vague imaginary with few references to EU)	not expressed	Points out that Finland is active in European crisis management; demands stronger use of the EU's foreign policy measures	Sees high refugee number as a threat to Finland; criticises Dublin system as not working	"Finland will bear its international responsibility for the influx of refugees, and the government is also in a continuous state of operational readiness and active at the EU level." (Sipilä 1) "The situation is not over, however; we must continue our efforts both at the EU level and on the domestic front." (Sipilä 2) "The entire chain [of the Dublin system] is full of leaks"(Sipilä 4)
France	François Hollande	dynamic support (as he explicitly demands further integration to overcome crisis, less elements of static support and only few criticism)	demands possibility for member states to integrate further and faster (integration at different speeds); supports the EU-Turkey agreement, hotspots, relocation in EU and humanitarian aid to Greece; demands further European integration to overcome crisis	wants to uphold the Schengen rules; sees crisis as threat to the EU and Schengen; demands European answer to the crisis and common protection of the external borders	criticises that EU's response to the crisis as too late (long process of decision making at EU level) and that EU underestimated consequences for Europe	"I am in favor of a subsequent initiative that provides those countries that stand for a faster and further integration with the respective possibilities. Others, who do not belong to the Eurozone and do not want to join it, have to be fully recognized as EU members. But they must not slow down the further development of the EU." (Hollande 1) "The answer can only be a European one. Everything else would mean the end of Schengen and a return to national borders – a historical step backwards. [...] This would have meant the end of the European Union as France and Germany imagine it, that is, the end of joint responsibility and solidarity." (Hollande 1) "And if Europe does not control its external borders – we are seeing this before our very eyes – that means a return to national borders, when it's not walls and barbed wire. That will mean the dismantling of the European Union." (Hollande 2) "Faced with these challenges, I am convinced that if we do not move ahead with integration, we shall stop or slip back" (Hollande 4)

Germany	Angela Merkel	dynamic support (as she explicitly demands more Europe in crisis management and declares she is in full agreement with EU institutions on their proposals (Merkel 2), also static elements and some criticism)	demands more Europe in crisis management; supports EU measures proposed by the Commission: e.g. supports financial aid of EU fund to Syria, EU-Turkey negotiations, hotspots and quota	wants to find collective solution and sees crisis management as European task; sees crisis as a threat to the EU (challenge to values and interests of the EU); wants to preserve EU and its values	criticises Dublin system as not working and that burden sharing in the EU is not proceeded fairly	"The entire European Union is called upon to address these challenges. In the refugee crisis we must not give in to the temptation to fall back on national government action. On the contrary, what we need now is more Europe. More than ever we need the courage and cohesion that Europe has always shown when it was really important. Germany and France are ready to act accordingly." (Merkel 2) "We are in full agreement on this with the President of the European Commission, who has put many important proposals on the table, proposals that we now need to implement systematically." (Merkel 2) "Let's be honest, the Dublin procedure in its current form is obsolete in practice. The intention behind it was good, of that there can be no doubt. But, all in all, it has not proven viable when faced with the current challenges at our external borders. I therefore advocate the adoption of a new approach based on fairness and solidarity in sharing the burdens." (Merkel 2) "Europe has not covered itself with glory in how, as a union of 28 members states with 500 million citizens, it has struggled with fairly sharing the burden." (Merkel 5)
Greece	Alexis Tsipras	dynamic/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, no category is emphasised explicitly enough to define one as prevailing)	demands mandatory burden sharing among member states, relocation of refugees (i.e. quota) and new measures to solve crisis; demands common European rules in crisis management instead of national sovereignty	demands the compliance with EU treaties; demands common approach; sees developments during crisis as threat to the EU (only partial application of EU law, dividing lines between member states, deployment of fences); wants to preserve European values and Schengen area	sees national threat as Greece is first country of arrival (overwhelmed with the task of protecting EU's external border); critique of EU ignoring the crisis and its crisis management	"As with the financial crisis, it is now important for us and the whole of Europe to show solidarity and to solve the problems together." (Tsipras 1) "However, I think that the refugee crisis is even more dangerous for Europe, because it existentially threatens the entire EU. If our shared values are now being questioned by some [leaders] and if rules suddenly only apply for some [countries], this is no longer much of a community. We have to strongly resist this development." (Tsipras 1) "We will not accept turning the country into a permanent warehouse of souls with Europe continuing to function as if nothing is happening" (Tsipras 2) "The logic of national sovereignty cannot prevail over joint European rules when it comes to the refugee problem" (Tsipras 4) "I feel shamed as a member of this European leadership, both for the inability of Europe in dealing with this human drama, and for the level of debate at a senior level, where one is passing the buck to the other" (Tsipras 5)

Country	Leader					
Hungary	Viktor Orbán	anti-integration (mainly criticises EU and EU measures, underlines national threat, only a few remarks on static support), special remark: nationalist vision of EU "I think that Europe is made of the totality of national interests." (Orbán 2)	not expressed	sees crisis as threat to the EU (especially as he links refugees with terrorism); sees refugee crisis especially as a threat to European Christianity; wants to preserve Schengen	harshly criticises EU's immigration policy and blames it for the refugee crisis; criticises that EU is breaching treaties, EU negotiations with Turkey and that EU "is only reacting, reacting, crisis after crisis, instead of having a concept" (Orbán 4); demands border control and emphasises that Hungarian citizens need to be protected from refugees (which he links with terrorism); opposes mandatory EU quota and wants to file lawsuit against it	"Europe's response is madness. We must acknowledge that the European Union's misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation." (Orban 1) "At the moment, the danger of an explosion is rather due to the chaos in Brussels and the paralysis of the Union." (Orban 2) "We should be united instead of arguing with each other, especially since there are very different signals coming from Brussels: multi-culturalism, disorder and breach of treaties." (Orbán 2) "We do not want these illegal migrants. We do not want to import problems that appeared in Germany. And we do not accept anyone trying to force us to so." (Orbán 2) "It's not 150,000 (migrants coming) that some want to divide according to quotas, it's not 500,000, a figure that I heard in Brussels, it's millions, then tens of millions, because the supply of immigrants is endless" (Orbán 3) "We would like to save the liberties … including the free movement inside the European Union" (Orbán 4)
Ireland	Enda Kenny	static support (also some elements of dynamic support, but special case as Ireland is not part of EU asylum and immigration policy and Schengen area, Kenny has not expressed that he wants to change special status)	voluntarily "opted in" into relocation mechanism; supports mandatory quota (but important to consider that it would not apply for Ireland, only voluntary "opt in"); supports EU-Turkey agreement, hotspots and EU aid to third countries	supports collective efforts; sees crisis as a challenge for EU; wants to preserve Schengen (even though Ireland is not part of it); wants to uphold cooperation with Frontex	not expressed	"But I would like to stress that Ireland has made an important contribution to date including [...] our decision to voluntarily 'opt in' to the relocation measures." (Kenny 1) "Ireland has consistently called for solidarity, both externally and internally, in shaping the European Union's responses to the migration issue. We have aimed, in our approach, to be both compassionate and practical, seeking to alleviate suffering as well as tackling root causes." (Kenny 3) "The past experience is that countries will not measure up if they're asked to do so purely voluntarily, so it may well be that they're going to have to work out a formula here, to say what numbers are appropriate for each individual country." (Kenny 4)

Italy	Matteo Renzi	Dynamic support (as he explicitly demands further integration and sees "Europe not as the sum of national self-interest", Renzi 1)	demands new measures instead of Dublin system (e.g. mandatory quota); wants different pace of EU (faster) and stronger EU, i.e. "Europe not as the sum of national self-interest" (Renzi 1)	wants to preserve EU and Schengen	criticises current Dublin system and power structures of EU (domination of France and Germany)	"The Dublin rules, which require refugees to claim asylum in the country where they first land, need to be changed urgently if we want to save the European project. Italy was the first to say it, and when we did, not many shared our view." (Renzi 1) "We need to change pace now. We are not asking for this because Italy needs it, but because Europe needs it. And my country, finally stable after years of political tension, does not intend to fall short of the moral obligation that we have towards finally building a future for Europe." (Renzi 1) "We say with force, decisiveness and courage that those who want to destroy Schengen want to destroy Europe. And we will not allow them to" (Renzi 4)
Latvia	Laimdota Straujuma *(until February 2016)*	Static support (since explicitly states that only voluntary resettlement is supported and static elements prevail over dynamic support and anti-integration)	welcomes Commission proposal to strengthen external border controls further (wants to strengthen the Eastern European border) and common list of safe countries of origin	wants to preserve Schengen and prevent further dividing lines in the EU; does not believe that closing internal EU borders is helpful; believes that Latvia has to show solidarity with other EU countries and take in refugees (but only on voluntary basis); wants to cooperate on return system	points out how much work Commission has to do in crisis management	"In deference to the possibility that the European Commission (EC) will on Wednesday come up with the suggestion that EU countries take in additional refugees, Latvia's position is to oppose mandatory quotas and remain on a voluntary basis while expressing solidarity and support in efforts to tackle the problem." (Straujuma 4) "The refugee flows in the EU are not controlled at all. The people in Sweden, Germany are not registered, their fingerprints are not recorded. The European Commission has much work to do. The war refugee flow should be monitored" (Straujuma 3)

Lithuania	Dalia Grybauskaitė	dynamic/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, no category is emphasised explicitly enough to define one as prevailing)	wants that EU focuses on humanitarian aid; supports the EU-Turkey agreement and European Border and Coast Guard; supports common decision taken to manage refugee crisis	believes that European solution is needed for refugee crisis but one "that is equally acceptable for all Europeans" (Grybauskaitė 2); sees crisis as an unprecedented challenge to the EU; points out that rising populism in EU is caused by refugee crisis and that unstable political environment is created; opposes mandatory quota and instead favours voluntary measures	criticises EU's management of the refugee crisis; explains that due to public resistance to refugees unstable political environment is created	"E.U. countries might not always agree on all the details of the proposals on how to tackle the crisis. But we agree on one thing – European unity is not a choice. It is a necessity if we are to secure the E.U. external borders, remove the internal ones and provide dignified help to those fleeing war." (Grybauskaitė 2) "Lithuania believes in the system based on solidarity, not obligatory quotas. A binding permanent relocation mechanism without fully secured E.U. external borders would mean an additional pull factor for irregular migration. It will not reduce the flow of migrants to the E.U." (Grybauskaitė 2) "Europe has decided on a number of measures to contain the migration crisis and we must turn them into action." (Grybauskaitė 4)
Luxembourg	Xavier Bettel	Dynamic/static support (as he does not emphasise one of the categories explicitly)	new measures supported (common list of safe countries of origin, hotspots, permanent relocation mechanism in the EU, not necessarily quota but if no other agreement is reached quota are supported); demands common rules in crisis management; wants reforms which make EU more efficient	demands to preserve EU and its values (not to give in to far-right populism); wants to preserve Schengen acquis and to find common EU solutions ("national solution is no solution", Bettel 3), wants to find solution in JHA Council; explains how crisis management proceeded during presidency of Luxembourg; wants to strengthen external border control; calls for solidarity in the EU	not expressed	"National solutions are bad solutions. Only a European solution is a good solution." (Bettel 1) "If we have 28 different regulations with 28 new borders and walls, it's not the Europe I want. We need to find common solutions." (Bettel 1) "We are in a difficult situation and we have not emerged from the crisis", stated Xavier Bettel, while calling for a "demonstration of that solidarity" because, otherwise, the European project will become "very fragile"." (Bettel 4)

Malta	Joseph Muscat	static support (due to the statement that EU should remain a "union of 28 different voices", Muscat 1)	demands new system and institutions to manage migration, new rules instead of Dublin, legal means and resources for migration	sees crisis as historic challenge for EU and for the whole EU not just the Mediterranean; wants to preserve status quo of the EU (wants no federation of Europe like USA, not a single country, preserve diversity); demands common European solution for crisis; wants to show solidarity with other member states	criticism of current EU rules [Dublin]	"What is of paramount importance is to create a context, to create the institutions, to create the tools for a much more wide-ranging engagement with this phenomenon; to actually try to create a system and manage the system." (Muscat 1) "Europe is not one, it is a union of 28 different voices. It is a choir and not a single singer. That's fine. It's what we are. It's not a huge drawback, and I don't think it should be like America." (Muscat 1) "it is not a question of building walls and no country will solve this crisis on its own. We must find a European solution." (Muscat 3) "Our aim is to lay the foundations for a new system to manage this new phenomenon, the dimensions of which are hardly comparable to anything before." (Muscat 4)
Netherlands	Mark Rutte	Static support (as he explains that EU needs to step back in some parts, cooperation only in parts desired, cf. Rutte 2)	supports EU-Turkey agreement, hotspots	crisis as a threat to the EU; demands shared responsibility and believes that no state can solve crisis alone; puts focus of Dutch presidency on refugee crisis; sees EU involvement as essential in crisis management	not expressed	"We're all in this together, and we've got a lot of balls in the air at once. It's precisely at difficult times like this that we need that shared sense of responsibility." (Rutte 2) "The question is how to build a better Europe: a Europe that makes the best choices and achieves the most benefits for its people. Certainly, in some areas, the EU needs to step back. And the Commission is now addressing this to good effect. But there are also areas in which we aren't yet making the most of EU cooperation." (Rutte 2)
Poland	Beata Szydło	static support/anti-integration (as she does not emphasise one of the categories explicitly)	not expressed	wants to preserve Schengen, to protect external borders of EU jointly and cooperation with third countries; wants to prevent dividing lines in the EU; does not support new measures of resettlement in the EU	Emphasises national threat as crisis is seen as a problem brought in by other nations and immigrants as security threat	"The refugee crisis also reminds us that we shall be clear on the issue of solidarity. Solidarity consists in sharing good practice and being ready to provide support in emergency or crisis situations [...] However, one cannot call solidarity the attempts to export the problems that some states had brought up, without any involvement of other states to be burdened with them" (Szydło 1) "To me, the most important thing is that as part of our joint message there's an amendment made by me to the effect that there will be no additional commitments as regards resettlement apart from those that had been agreed upon" (Szydło 3)

Portugal	António Costa	Dynamic/static support (but remains vague with only few references to the EU)	demands more Europe in crisis management (without fronts between member states)	believes that management of crisis is a shared responsibility of European leaders; sees crisis as a threat to European values; aims at finding European solutions; wants to support European solution by taking in refugees voluntarily	not expressed	"We believe that the solution to the common concerns we face requires more Europe and not less Europe, and in that process there should be no 'fronts' of some countries against or in favor of others" (Costa 3)
Romania	Klaus Werner Iohannis	dynamic/static support/anti-integration (strong criticism on EU, but still blurred imaginary as all three categories are addressed and no category was particularly emphasised)	wants Romania to join Schengen area; supports EU-Turkey agreement and hotspots; demands support mechanism for African countries to stop refugee influx	believes in long-term merits of the EU; sees refugee crisis as the main challenge to the EU; wants to cooperate on EU level in crisis management (tackle root causes and protect external borders and monitor alternative routes to West Balkan); demands solidarity within EU (but in balance with responsibility); does not support permanent quota and demands that relocation is only voluntary	criticises EU and demands better functioning of the EU's mechanisms; demands greater coherence, vision and strategy of the EU, efficient management and a union closer to its citizens; "Romania wants rigorous checking at its own borders" (Iohannis 5); criticises decision on mandatory quota being taken by qualified majority voting and refuses quota; supports controls at own borders	"As President, however, I must be honest and say that I expect more from the functioning of the European mechanisms. I want more coherence from the European Union, more vision, and more strategy. The European project is not just a slogan, and the European Union is not just a set of bureaucratic mechanisms. A united Europe is the materialised vision of a world that is more prosperous, more united and closer to its citizens. I want more efficient management within the European institutions, greater coherence, better planning, and more rigour in what concerns the European agenda." (Iohannis 1) "We are for solidarity inside the EU, we are solidary with the member states affected by this crisis. [...] That is why I don't believe this crisis can be solved by a bureaucratic or bookkeeping, mathematical approach, but only through open dialogue, through consultation with the member states, through a consensual decision, taking into account principles and values, context and realities." (Iohannis 2) ""I believe in the principle according to which all member states are equal, and such a procedure, whichever it may be, must be decided upon starting from this principle, through dialogue and not through a rigid bookkeeper's or bureaucratic approach. I reaffirm Romania's solidarity with the other European states and that it will continue to stay involved in solving the refugee crisis." (Iohannis 4)

Slovakia	Robert Fico	anti-integration (due to harsh critique of EU, but with two elements of dynamic and static support)	supports the proposed European Border and Coast Guard	Sees the crisis as a threat to the EU which could lead to its collapse	anti-integration prevails: harshly criticises EU management of the refugee crisis (e.g. EU underestimated refugee crisis) and criticises permanent quotas (wants to file law suit against it); emphasises that refugees depict threat to Slovakia (as he links refugees with terrorism)	"I feel that we in the EU are now committing ritual suicide and we're just looking on" (Fico 1) "The Slovak government is of the opinion that the EU and some member states have underestimated and failed to mitigate the risks of unmanaged migration (…) Today only the weather protects us from further migration flows" (Fico 2) "2016 will be the year when the EU will either bring the migration crisis under control or collapse." (Fico 5)
Slovenia	Miro Cerar	static support (with elements of anti-integration, i.e. threat of nation, but static elements prevail)	not expressed	demands common EU crisis management; wants to preserve European values, security in the EU and EU; emphasises that external border protection is important; wants to find solutions in countries of origin	sees high refugee numbers as a threat to Slovenia, therefore supports border control until EU crisis management works	"But I also believe in Europe. And I do believe that the world cannot live without Europe. The world needs Europe and it needs its values, its spirits, its culture. So I don't want to think in terms of falling apart of the Europe even if I said that it was just a warning because I want to see this Europe to find a united way to solve the issue, to find a common approach and to show that it can be effective in finding a solution and implementing it." (Cerar 3) "Slovenia must be prepared for even more difficult scenarios, but together with other European countries we are working together to solve the refugee crisis. If we succeed, we will remove the wire fence and I will be a very happy man" (Cerar 4)
Spain	Mariano Rajoy	Dynamic/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, no category is emphasised explicitly enough to define one as prevailing)	supports EU-Turkey agreement, new European asylum policy, hotspots	elaborates how European crisis management should take place; sees crisis as threat to EU (major issue affecting EU at the moment); wants to preserve status quo (no closing of borders)	criticises slow decision making of EU and slow implementation of measures (relocation of refugees)	"It's infuriating", he explained, but decisions taken by the European Union are unfortunately not taken as quickly as I would like" (Rajoy 2) "[...] at the same time, we must make an effort to resolve this strange - for want of a better word - situation that has arisen in Europe: Austria is closing its borders, as are Macedonia and Croatia." (Rajoy 3) "What we are doing right now is good, but this is not the kind of policy that the EU needs in the long run. We need to develop asylum and immigration policies, otherwise we will go through similar situations again in future" (Rajoy 5)

Sweden	Stefan Löfven	dynamic support/static support/anti-integration (blurred imaginary, no category is emphasised explicitly enough to define one as prevailing)	emphasises that new EU immigration system is needed (with permanent, mandatory relocation within Europe); states that only through common asylum system Schengen can be uphold; emphasises that obligatory quota need to be followed (referring to Slovakia); supports EU-Turkey agreement	wants to preserve EU from collapse and to preserve Schengen; wants collective crisis management of all 28 member states and to show solidarity within EU	criticises EU's ability to cope with refugee crisis, slow action within EU and EU asylum system as not working; explains that high refugee numbers are a burden for Sweden which forced Sweden to take unilateral action	"We are a number of member countries in the European Union, we need to do this much, much better. So the refugee crisis, in Europe, is much about that we haven't handled it together as 28 member states." (Löfven 1) "We must move from chaos to control, otherwise we risk the future of European cooperation as we know it." (Löfven 2) "And looking ahead, it is time to admit that the Dublin Regulation is not working and must be replaced. [...] Sweden will work for a new asylum system in the EU that is based on equal distribution, and in which asylum is sought in the EU – not in an individual country. Quite simply, if we are to share an external border and have free movement between our countries, we must also share a system of asylum reception." (Löfven 2) "We have to find a way to cooperate, finally it is about shared responsibility. If we share responsibility we can handle it" (Löfven 3)
United Kingdom	David Cameron	static support/anti-integration (but remains vague with few references to EU; special case as UK is not part of EU asylum and immigration policy)	not expressed	sees refugee influx as a threat to the EU; wants to cooperate with EU (but does not explain precisely how); predicts reaction of the public in the short term to demand to leave the EU due to crisis as threat and in the long term to cooperate to solve challenges	describes (possible) high refugee influx to UK as a threat; harsh critique of the EU (as being too big)	"[…] and we'll continue to pursue all of those avenues and work with our partners in the European Union, and elsewhere, to deliver the comprehensive approach that's necessary to bring this crisis to an end." (Cameron 1) "We all know what's wrong with the EU – it's got too big, too bossy, too interfering." (Cameron 4) "The short term reaction can be 'get me out of here', the longer term reaction is 'we must find a better way of working with our partners because we share the same challenges." (Cameron 5)

Table B2: Overview of the Imaginaries of the European Commission

Commissioner	Name	Prevailing Imaginary	Elements of Dynamic Support	Elements of Static Support	Elements of Anti-Integration	Important Quotes
President	Jean-Claude Juncker	dynamic support (as demands further integration and new measures explicitly, but with strong static elements and some criticism)	explicitly demands more Europe and more European measures in asylum policy; proposes common list of safe countries of origin, European Border and Coast Guard system, common resettlement programme, permanent relocation mechanism within EU (i.e. quota), further harmonisation of asylum policies and EU trust fund for third countries; announces common legal migration package; emphasises how EU has already cooperated with new measures in place (relocation quota, Frontex, aid to third countries, Turkey agreement); demands stronger EU in foreign policy and implementation of a European finance minister	demands common European action; strongly points out that EU's achievements so far need to be preserved and that they are under threat due to crisis; sees internal market and Schengen area threatened by isolated action of member states (border closure)	criticises low solidarity in Europe and that EU distinguished refugees according to religions; criticises that voluntary relocation mechanism is not working; criticises that EU only takes relatively small number of refugees in	"Because our European Union is not in a good state. There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union. We have to change this. And we have to change this now." (Juncker 1) "We need more Europe in our asylum policy. We need more Union in our refugee policy." (Juncker 1) "That is because Europe is not acting like it should. It is because there is not enough Union in the European Union and not enough Europe in the European Union, with Member States thinking that the refugee crisis can be solved by working alone, as nations. But only a European response can solve a Europe-wide problem that has been imported to Europe from other parts of the globe. Isolated national action, although sometimes understandable, in not welcome because when one country secures its own borders, this (a) does not solve the refugee problem and (b) will destroy the internal market completely." (Juncker 2) "We will only be successful if we work together more closely and cooperatively and if we do not destroy any trust. We must not risk Schengen and thereby also our domestic freedom." (Juncker 4)

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(since he pushes further integration by proposing new measures in his area of responsibility, but includes many elements of static support and does not directly demand further integration) | supports new measures: relocation quota, list of safe countries of origin, hotspots, reform of Dublin regulation, permanent relocation system, common European Border and Coast Guard; demands revision of the Common European Asylum system and Blue Card directive; demands larger budget for European crisis management | wants to maintain "dialogue of trust with the member states" (Avramopoulos 1); perceives that crisis puts EU and values under pressure; wants to preserve open Schengen area (refuses closure of border in the EU); demands collective action; sees crisis as crash test for EU | criticises shortcomings of EU asylum system in place | "I believe that they [the member states] all came to realise that we have to respond to this humanitarian crisis together. It's a sort of crash test for Europe." (Avramopoulos 1)
"We need a policy that does not lead to closing borders, putting at risk Schengen. You know my position on fences, and also the closure of borders. I believe in building bridges, not walls." (Avramopoulos 2)
"To conclude, the migration and refugee challenges can only be addressed collectively. More than ever we need solidarity between the Member States and involvement at all levels of different stakeholders, including civil society and social partners." (Avramopoulos 3)
"If we believe that unilateral action is more effective than European action, then we are demolishing our common home." (Avramopoulos 4)
"This crisis ... is a crash test for the European institutions in their relations with member states. We must not, through this crisis, follow the road of re-nationalisation. Because this might be the beginning of the end of all these achievements that we have all made over the last 50 years." (Avramopoulos 5) |

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this thesis and the work reported herein was composed by and originated entirely from me. Information derived from the published and unpublished work of others has been acknowledged in the text and references are given.

Marie Wolf   Münster, 29th June 2016