



Counter Jihadism on a local level

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The implementation of the national Dutch policy 'Program Integral Approach Jihadism' on a municipal level.

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Abstract

In this paper, the main research question is: *“which actions have municipalities chosen in implementing the national Dutch policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’, and which factors explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities”*? This question is answered with the use of the Theory of Planned Behaviour from Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein. The theory suggests that behaviour (in this research the level of compliance with the action program) is influenced by the attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control of the actor. These concepts, from the municipalities, were researched via conducted interviews with policy officers. Three propositions were researched with this data, which all suggest a relation between the earlier formulated theoretical concepts, and the level of compliance with the action program. Neither the proposition suggesting a relation between the attitude of a municipality and the level of compliance nor the proposition suggesting a relation between the subjective norm and the level of compliance were confirmed in this context. The proposition which suggests a relation between the perceived behavioural control and the level of compliance is confirmed to a high extent in this context, and therefore the differences in action among Dutch municipalities in implementing the national policy could be explained: due to differences in the availability of instruments and means.

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Glossary.

AIVD	=	General Intelligence and Security Service
Alderman	=	In the Netherlands the ‘College van Burgemeesters en Wethouders’
NCTV	=	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
OM	=	Public Prosecution Service
Rijksoverheid	=	Dutch Government

1. Background.

“In March 2013 the terrorist threat level in the Netherlands was raised from limited to substantial, largely in response to the significant increase in Dutch jihadists leaving the country and heading for conflict zones in Syria” (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2014).

As more and more concerns are expressed on the rising Jihadist threats in the Netherlands (Nieuwsuur, 2014), it is necessary to conduct researches not only about the development itself but also the policies counter-acting the threats. An example of a policy document in context of this problem made by the Dutch government, the Rijksoverheid, is the ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’ (Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme) which was published on the 29th of August in 2014 (Rijksoverheid, 2014). This policy to counter Jihadism in the Netherlands consists of a variety of measures, both for the local level and the national level. In this paper the focus will be on the local measures, as the research will be about the local level of the governmental bodies coped with the implementation of the policy so far and how municipalities have chosen to treat the policy on a local level. The main research question of this thesis will therefore be: *“which actions have municipalities chosen in implementing the national Dutch policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’, and which factors explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities”?*

1.1. The policy process.

In the main research question, a premise is stated that municipalities have discretionary space to differ from the original policy of the Rijksoverheid. As Michael Lipsky argues ‘street level-bureaucrats’, among which municipalities, are committed to provide good services, however it is not possible to serve all clients (in this case the inhabitants of the municipalities, but also the Rijksoverheid and other municipalities, etcetera) as they would do in an ideal situation. Because of this, they develop ‘*patterns of practice, routines and simplifications*’ in order to deal with for example shortages of resources and the high demand of their services (Erasmus, n.d.). In other words, municipalities could use this discretionary space and initiate less, different or more actions than stated in the policy for a couple of reasons. It is however of most importance that these actions are helping the Rijksoverheid reaching its goals. Whether the Rijksoverheid reaches its goals depends on two factors: the ‘quality’ of the policy itself and how the actors, in this case the municipalities, cope with the policy. These options are illustrated in Coleman’s boat model shown in figure 1. In this figure, arrow A illustrates the quality of the policy itself (will the implementation of the policy lead to the announced goals of the policy?) and arrows B, C and D at the bottom of the boat are about how the different actors cope with the policy. In this bottom, three types of research reside:

“How Macro Factor X creates constraints on actors (arrow B), how actors choose actions under the constraints (arrow C) and how actions accumulate to the macro level (Arrow D)”
(Sato, 2016).




Figure 1, Coleman's boat (Sato, 2016)

The focus of this research will be on arrow C: which actions were initiated by the actors (the Dutch municipalities) in order to carry out the policy of the Rijksoverheid. As the national government does not execute some of the parts of the policy self, it can dependent on how the municipalities implement the policies.

There are some sub-questions that will arise from the main research (as mentioned earlier in this paper: *“which actions have municipalities chosen in implementing the national Dutch policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’, and which factors explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities”?*), the context and the focus on arrow C of the Coleman boat. The main research question consists of two parts: descriptive (the first part) and explanatory (the second part). The sub questions for the research will be:

1. What are the local measures mentioned in the policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism (Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme)?
2. Which actions are initiated by the different Dutch municipalities?

These first two sub-research questions are descriptive (by describing the policy itself, the responsibilities and expectations of the municipalities, the instruments and resources either handed by the government or already in the hands of the municipalities and how the municipalities have brought this into action). The last sub-research question, formulated below, is explanatory: a link is made between practice and theory in order to explain the difference between the municipalities in

implementing the policy.

3. Which factors could explain the differences between the Dutch municipalities in actions taken to implement the policy?

1.2. Scientific and social relevance.

This research is scientifically relevant as it adds on the information on how decentralized bodies implement national policies and the research puts the existing theories about this topic in practice. It also adds on the overall evaluation which is planned to be published by the. A plan of action has already been made for this evaluation, which shows that they are planning to not only interview the municipalities but different institutions connected to the policy as well (Inspectie veiligheid en justitie, 2016). It however is good to have a more in-depth understanding into what the municipalities think about the policy, how other important stakeholders might feel about policy and whether the municipalities have enough means for implementing the policy. With these factors known, causes can be determined of the extent to which the municipalities carry out the policy.

This paper is socially relevant because, as the National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Safety state, *“the biggest terroristic threat for the Netherlands and multiple other countries is at this moment Jihadist terrorism”* (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid- Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, p. 8). The organization of Jihadism is getting more professionalized, and in the year of 2013, more than a hundred persons went from The Netherlands to Syria to fight along the lines of the war (AIVD, 2014, pp. 11-14). The minister of Safety and Justice from the time that the policy was implemented, I.W. Opstelten, and the minister of Social Affairs and Employment, L. Asscher, expressed their concerns regarding this matter in the letter that came with the proposal of the policy:

“Jidahism forms a substantial threat for the national safety of the Netherlands and for the international law and order. Not only in the Netherlands, but also in the world concerns grow about the different experienced and possible problems” (Opstelten & Asscher, 2014, p. 1) *translated from Dutch to English.*

Lastly, this paper is socially relevant because the Rijksoverheid publishes progress documents every three months. In these documents the ministries state what the progress has been until so far and what still needs to be done. These statements are also made about actions that need to be

implemented locally. These claims are, however, one-sided and not about what the municipalities experience and how they cope with the implementation. Does the Rijksoverheid for example know whether the means of the municipalities are sufficient to accomplish all goals stated in the policy document? How do the actions initiated on a local level differ between municipalities and why are these actions different?

1.3. Structure of the paper.

In the first upcoming chapter, chapter two, a theoretical framework will be provided. All concepts that will be used in this research and their definitions will be discussed, next to all theories which will be used in order to find a conclusion and an answer on the sub-research questions and the main question. In the end, three propositions will be formulated.

In the third chapter, the used data and the documents analysed in order to arrive at a conclusion will be illustrated. The way these documents and data will be analysed will also be explained. An explanation will be provided why these methods are the best to use in this context, and what other possibilities may have been which did not make the cut. The main concepts explained in chapter two will be operationalized and conceptualized. Next to this, the to be used theory will be put in the context of the main research question, the sub questions and the propositions.

In the fourth chapter, a combination of the theory, the used methods and the results of the research will be combined in order to give a result analysis. This chapter will be the combination of the theory, the methods and the results. Answers will be found on the sub-questions and the propositions will be confirmed or not. On the basis of these answers and possible confirmations, an answer will be formulated on the main question.

In the fifth chapter a conclusion will be drawn. Possible recommendations will be provided to the municipalities and the Rijksoverheid, and a discussion will be held in order to see what may have gone different in this research. Next to this, some recommendations will be given about how other researchers conducting the same, or similar, researches could improve or built further upon this research.

2. Theoretical framework.

In this chapter, a framework will be provided on which theory will be used in order to answer the main research question and the sub-questions. The reasons why this theory is applicable for this research are discussed, and a linkage between the theory and this research will be made. In the end, three propositions will be formulated in the context of the theory.

2.1. Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behaviour.

In order to answer why there are differences in action between municipalities, reasons of acting out certain behaviour need to be analysed. What are the possible reasons the municipalities chose to either fully comply with the directions of the Rijksoverheid or not? The Theory of Planned Behaviour of Icek Ajzen together with the related Theory of Reasoned Action published by Ajzen and Fishbein will be used as a line of reasoning for the data analysis. These theories describe the causes of the intentional behaviour, which is the antecedent of actual behaviour.

The Theory of Planned Behaviour *“has been widely used as a model for the prediction of behavioural intentions and/or behaviour”* (Madden, Scholder Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992, p. 1), and is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action. These theories explain why actors behave a certain way and both claim that actions and behaviour are planned and rational. The Theory of Reasoned Action entails that actors let their behaviour depend on not only their personal beliefs but also of a social aspect. The Theory of Planned Behaviour is an extension in the way that Ajzen also claims that behaviour is influenced by the perceived behaviour control of the actors. As Carroll & Freberg state, the theory of planned behavior is *“one of the more well-established persuasion theories from psychology that can be applied to corporate reputation management is the Theory of Planned Behaviour”* (Carroll & Freberg, 2017). Next to this, as De Boer mentions in his research ‘institutional change and professional autonomy’:

“The models of reasoned action and planned behaviour are attractive because they are relatively simple, have been applied frequently with diverse disciplines, deliver satisfying results in general and a much attention has been paid to the measurability” (de Boer, 2003, p. 120, translation).

In this chapter, the theories will be presented. It is good to state that every element mentioned in both theories will be ‘translated’ to the context of this research. Although very appropriate to use in this kind of researches, certain adjustments need to be made in order to be able to use these theories as line of reasoning. More about this will be stated in chapter 3.

2.2. The elements according to the Theory of Reasoned Action.

The Theory of Reasoned Action was first introduced in 1975, and “*posits that behavioural intentions, which are the immediate antecedents to behaviour, are a function of salient information or beliefs about the likelihood that performing a particular behaviour will lead to a specific outcome*” (Madden, Scholder Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992, p. 3). These beliefs are divided into two distinct sets: *behavioural beliefs* and *normative beliefs*. Behavioural beliefs influence the attitude of the actors towards the intended behaviour, whereas the normative beliefs influence the subjective norm of carrying out the intended behaviour. These two elements are displayed in figure 2, and will be presented in the upcoming sub-chapters.




Figure 2, Theory of Reasoned Action (Madden, Scholder Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992, p. 4).

2.2.1. The attitude.

As shown in figure 2, the behavioural beliefs (the attitude) influence the attitude of the actor on the intended behaviour and therefore the actual behaviour. This attitude is linked to the beliefs of the actor “*about the likely outcomes of the behaviour and the evaluations of these outcomes*” (Ajzen, Behavioral Interventions Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 2006, p. 1). As Fishbein and Ajzen state,

“People hold beliefs about the positive or negative consequences they might experience if they performed the behaviour. These outcome expectancies or behavioural beliefs are assumed to determine people’s attitude toward personally performing the behaviour- that is, their positive or negative evaluation of their performing the behaviour in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 20).

The attitude of an actor is a combination of two variables. The first one is *the beliefs about the expected outcomes of the to be carried out behaviour*. In other words, how does the actor feel about

the consequences of the behaviour and the behaviour itself? The second one is the *evaluation of the expected outcomes of behaviour*. This means the strength of the different beliefs about the behaviour. An example would be someone who wants to go on a holiday, during which s/he can relax and make friends. The person in question could find ‘making friends’ a more important consequence than relaxing. Therefore, this belief weights heavier on the decision whether to carry out the behaviour (going on a holiday) or not. These two elements make up for the attitude of an actor towards the behaviour.

The relation between the attitude of an actor and the behavioural intention, and therefore the actual intention, is that the more favourable the attitude is (in favour of the attitude to be carried out), the stronger the behavioural intention should be (Ajzen, Behavioral Interventions Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 2006, p. 1)

2.2.2. Subjective norm.

The second factor that influences the behavioural intention is the subjective norm. This element is related to the opinion of people important for the actor. The theories assume that the actor will let the perception of what other people think of the behaviour to be carried out influence the behaviour itself. As Fishbein and Ajzen themselves state:

“People form beliefs that important individuals or groups in their lives would approve or disapprove of their performing the behaviour as well as beliefs that these referents themselves perform or don’t perform the behaviour in question. In their totality, these injunctive and descriptive normative beliefs produce a perceived norm, that is, perceived social pressure to engage or not engage in the behaviour” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 20).

The subjective norm is not what other people or institutions think of the behaviour, but what the perception of the actor is of what the people or institutions think. The subjective norm consists of two components. The first are the *normative beliefs*. These are the views of others in the actor its direct surroundings – in the perception of the actor –about the behaviour. The second component is *“the motivation of the actor to conform to the views of these reference groups”* (de Boer, 2003, p. 124, translation). This is the extent to which the actor is willing to compromise its behaviour to the opinions of others, which is a ‘decision’ of the actor. This decision is influenced by which institution or person it is. For a teenager friends may for example be more important than the opinion of teachers. These two elements are combined together into the subjective norm. The normative beliefs of all the institutions and/or institutions in the direct surroundings of the actor, ‘times’ the motivation of the actor to conform to these specific views (*the perception of these views*) make up for either a negative or positive subjective norm.

The relation between the subjective norm of an actor and the behavioural intention, and therefore the actual intention, is that the more favourable the subjective norm is (in favour of the attitude to be carried out), the stronger the behavioural intention is (Ajzen, Behavioral Interventions Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 2006, p. 1).

2.3. Additional element according to the Theory of Planned Behaviour.

As stated earlier, the Theory of Planned Behaviour is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action, in the sense that one more element is added on the figure. Because of this, a new figure emerges, which is displayed in figure 3.




Figure 3, Theory of Planned Behaviour (Madden, Scholder Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992, p. 4).

The perceived behavioural control of an actor is included into the model as another independent variable influencing the behavioural intention as well as the behaviour. As Montaño and Kasprzyk state in their paper ‘*Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behaviour and the integrated behavioural model*’: “TPB (Theory of Planned Behaviour) adds perceived control over the behaviour, taking into account situations where one may not have complete volitional control over a behaviour” (Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2008, p. 70). In other words, the behaviour of an actor is not only influenced by what the actor wants and what others might want (the attitude and subjective norm), but also what is possible.

2.3.1. Perceived behavioural control.

As Fishbein and Ajzen state; *“People also form beliefs about personal and environmental factors that can help or impede their attempts to carry out the behaviour. In their aggregate, these control beliefs result in a sense of high or low self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 1997) or perceived behavioural control with regard to the behaviour”* (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 21). In other words, the perceived behavioural control is the perceived control the actor has on the behaviour: does he/she have enough resources to carry out the behaviour? Examples for this are the availability of money, whether the actor is physically able to carry out the behaviour or whether the actor has enough knowledge acquired in order to carry out the behaviour. As figure 3 shows, the perceived behavioural control both influences the behavioural intention and the actual behaviour. This is because not only does it influence the behavioural intention in the sense that when the actor already takes the control into consideration when deciding whether to carry out the behaviour or not, but also because it can influence the behaviour in a more sudden sense. An example could be that the actor would have enough money and transportation to go on a holiday, however he/she can break a leg and therefore would not be able to go in the end. As Madden, Scholder and Ajzen formulated this concept:

“Perceived behavioural control is included as an exogenous variable that has both a direct effect on behaviour as an indirect effect on behaviour through intentions. The indirect effect is based on the assumption that perceived behavioural control has motivational implications for behavioural intentions... The direct path from perceived behavioural control to behaviour is assumed to reflect the actual control an individual has over performing the behaviour” (Madden, Scholder Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992, p. 4).

The relation between the perceived behavioural control and the behavioural intention is defined as followed: *“the greater the perceived control, the stronger should the person’s intention to perform the behaviour in question be”* (Ajzen, Behavioral Interventions Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, 2006, p. 1).

2.4. Behavioural intent and actual behaviour.

As shown in both figure 2 and 3, there is a relation between the behavioural intent and the actual behaviour. As Ajzen states in his paper about the Theory of Planned Behaviour: *“As a general rule it is found that when behaviours pose no serious problems of control, they can be predicted from intentions with considerable accuracy (see Ajzen, 1988; Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988)”* (Ajzen, The theory of planned behaviour, 1991, p. 8). There is some discussion about this statement in literature, for example in Sheeran’s ‘Intention- Behaviour’ (2002). However, as Sheeran himself states: *‘it seems likely that intentions will remain the key psychological predictor of behaviour for social and applied psychologists for the foreseeable future. Thus... I must end this chapter by calling for more research to*

address the issues raised here” (Sheeran, 2002, p. 29). Because there is no other predictor (yet) for behaviour, together with the statement written by Ajzen, the choice has been made to only focus on the variable of ‘actual behaviour’ and not on the intention. This choice was strengthened by the fact that the action program was published in 2014, three years before this analysis is conducted. This means that behavioural intentions from three years ago need to be researched in the to be conducted interviews and desk research, which may be quite difficult.

2.5. The propositions.

Propositions will be tested in this research in order to answer the second part of the main research question (how can we explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities?). These propositions will be based upon the relation between the independent variables (attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control) and the dependent variable (the behaviour). In order to formulate these propositions, the theoretical concepts first need to be translated into the framework of this research paper. The definitions in context can be found in table 1.

Theoretical concept	Definition in context
Attitude	The degree to which a municipality has a favourable or unfavourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the action program as proposed by the Rijksoverheid.
Subjective norm	The perceived social pressure to implement the action program or not.
Perceived behavioural control	The perceived ease or difficulty of implementing the action program.
Behaviour	The extent to which the municipality complies with the implementation of the ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’.

Table 1, definitions in context

With the relation between the dependent variable and independent variables in mind, three propositions can be formulated:

Proposition 1. The more positive the attitude of the municipality is towards the national policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy.

Proposition 2. The more positive the subjective norm of the municipality is towards the national policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy.

Proposition 3. The more positive the perceived behavioural control is of the municipality within the framework of the policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy.

On the basis of these propositions and definitions of the theoretical concepts, the diagram in figure 4 can be presented. The expectation is that the independent variables, the left side in the causal diagram, will have a positive effect on the dependent variable (the behaviour). An example would be that if a municipality experiences a lot of social pressure to implement the action program, the extent to which the municipality complies will increase. When a municipality has a unfavourable evaluation of the action program, the extent to which the municipality complies will decrease.




Figure 4, causal diagram

The attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control and the behaviour of municipalities will be researched with the help of this causal diagram. On the basis of this information extracted from the research, the propositions get either confirmed or not. These confirmations or ‘non-confirmations’ will then help answering the last part of the main research question: where do the differences in action between the municipalities derive from? Maybe municipality A and municipality B (with different implementation levels) have more or less the same attitude towards the policy, however their availability of means would be different. With the confirmation of the proposition, which suggests a relation between perceived behavioural control and behaviour, the conclusion can be drawn that (maybe amongst other factors) the availability of means causes differences in action between municipality A and B. If however the proposition does not get confirmed in this context, nothing can be said about the relation between the perceived behavioural control of a municipality and the behaviour they conduct, and therefore that conclusion cannot be drawn.

3. Data and documents.

Both existing data (from desk research) and original data will be used in this paper. In this sub-chapter, an explanation is given on what data will be used, and how. First, the research design is going to be illustrated. The pros and cons will be weighted against each other. After that, the conceptualisation and operationalization of the different concepts and variables will be provided. The third sub-chapter will provide information on how the cases were selected and which criteria were applied in order to get this selection. In the end, the way the data will be analysed is explained and information is given on the validity and reliability of this research design.

3.1. Research design.

The propositions formulated in chapter two will be tested in a case study: the study will be about one specific case instead of a research with the intention to generalise the information and statements made. One positive side of case studies is that scientists are able to “*collect a lot of detail that would not normally be easily obtained by other research designs... a lot richer and a greater depth*” (psud43, 2012). Next to this, case studies can be the basis for experimenters to create new ideas and produce novel hypotheses for testing (psud43, 2012). When is a situation suitable for a case study? As Yin states in his paper ‘*Case study research*’:

“...Case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2013, p. 1)

Strategy	Form of research question	Requires control over behavioural events?	Focuses on contemporary events?
Experiment	How, why	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes
Archival analysis	How, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes/No
History	How, why	No	No
Case study	How, why	No	Yes

Table 2, the different types of research strategies (Yin, 2013, p. 6).

As illustrated in table 2, the characteristics of a case study are also applicable in this research: there is little control over the events as an individual, and the focus is upon a contemporary *phenomenon* in real life (Jihadism on a local level). The ‘how’ question evolves in the first part of the main question, because an analysis will be conducted in how the municipalities cope with the policy and

which actions they have initiated. The ‘why’ question evolves in the last part; ‘why is there a difference in actions taken by the municipalities? This also shows that the research will be both descriptive (what actions are chosen) and explanatory (which factors might contribute to the differences?). There are three concerns about case studies, as Yin states, which all have to be kept in mind while conducting the research. First, the concern exists that *“case study teaching is confused with case study research. In teaching, case study materials may be deliberately altered to demonstrate a particular point more effectively. In research, any such step would be strictly forbidden”* (Yin, 2013, p. 10). This could be avoided by reporting all evidence and data fairly (by recording and transcribing all interviews), and to be aware of possible biases. A second frequent problem with case studies is the perception that a scientific generalisation is not possible out of one single case study. Yin’s answer on this perception is as followed: *“Scientific facts are rarely based on single experiments; they are usually based on a multiple set of experiments... the same approach can be used with multiple-case studies”* (Yin, 2013, p. 10). This research will therefore be one of many case studies about central government policies implemented on a local level and how local governmental bodies ‘deal with this’ (*do they agree with the situation and the policy, is it feasible and do they think they have the means to realise the goals and the responsibilities?*), which together might lead to some sort of generalisation. The third common complaint according to Yin is *“... that case studies take too long and they result in massive, unreadable documents”* (Yin, 2013, p. 10). This is indeed true for some case studies, and again this is something to keep in mind during the writing of the paper. The statement that case studies take too long will not be applicable to this study because it will be conducted in ten weeks. This study is therefore quite a comprehensive study in comparison to some case studies, which take multiple months or even years. This however does cause some limitations to the research design and case selection as well.

3.2. Conceptualisation and operationalization.

The method to collect data for this case study will be a combination of interviews and ‘desk research’ of a variety of existing documents. The existing documents will primarily be published by the Rijksoverheid in the framework of the action program, such as an aid document for municipalities about how to tackle extremism and what measures to take in order to prevent apprehensions in the area. Other existing data might be documents published by the municipalities in the framework of the action program and their taken measures to counter Jihadism, and data about the situation in the areas. These will also include data about numbers of potential Jihadists. The original collected data however needs some conceptualisation in order to determine what is included and what is not, and operationalization is needed in order to determine how this information is gained. Both the conceptualisation and operationalization will be illustrated in the upcoming sub-chapters. The complete operationalization and conceptualisation table can be found in appendix number one, the definitions of the different theoretical concepts in the framework of this

research are illustrated in table 1 in chapter 2.

3.2.1. Attitude.

The attitude of municipalities is the first concept that might provide information on the cause of differences in action between municipalities. As Ajzen states in his paper about the Theory of Planned Behaviour, “attitude... refers to the degree to which a person has a favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour in question” (Ajzen, The theory of planned behaviour, 1991, p. 10). In the context of the main research question, the behaviour in question is the implementation of the action program. This is the reason why, in chapter 2, attitude is defined as: *‘The degree to which a municipality has a favourable or unfavourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the action program as proposed by the Rijksoverheid’*.

The Rijksoverheid formulated goals in the Action Program, and the VNG (the association for Dutch municipalities) formulated problems to overcome. These were used in order to determine the attitude of the municipality towards the Action Program: the favourable or unfavourable attitude is caused, in this context, by the perception of importance of the possible consequences and whether the formulated measures contribute to the achievement of the goals. The goals of the Rijksoverheid are: *“Protecting the democracy and the constitutional state, fighting and weakening the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands and taking away the breeding ground for radicalisation”* (Rijksoverheid, 2014, p. 2). As the first stated goal is more of a national issue, the last two goals are used in the interview questions about whether the participant (and therefore the municipality) thinks the policy contributes to the achievement of these goals. The challenges to overcome formulated by the VNG (Gielen, 2015, pp. 1-2) are: the growing social tensions and social commotion, a growing breeding ground for sympathizers, (potential) expatriates (in this context people moving from the Netherlands to e.g. Syria to fight for the IS) and possible returnees. These challenges are used as an inspiration for the rest of the interview questions about the extent of the contribution of the policy measures to the stated goals. As shown in table 3, the evaluation of expected outcomes of behaviour of the municipality will be measured by asking the interviewee to rate the importance of the goal on a scale from to five, one being not important and five being very important.

Attitude	Operationalization and conceptualisation. <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to...</i>
Beliefs about expected outcomes of behaviour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The weakening of the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands/your municipality? - The elimination of the ‘breeding ground’ for radicalisation and sympathizers? - The elimination of the increasing social tensions and social distress Netherlands/your municipality? - A possible diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs targeted on ethnical minorities? - A possible increase of work pressure of the municipality? - The earlier signalling of possible expatriates?¹
Evaluation of expected outcomes of behaviour	<p><i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The weakening of the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands/your municipality? - The elimination of the ‘breeding ground’ for radicalisation and sympathizers? - The elimination of the increasing social tensions and social distress Netherlands/your municipality? - A possible diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs targeted on ethnical minorities? - A good integration of ethical minorities in the municipality?² - The possible increase of work pressure of the municipality? - That the political organ is unanimous about this subject?

Table 3, operationalization and conceptualisation of attitude.

3.2.2. Subjective norm.

As Ajzen explains, the subjective norm “refers to the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behaviour” (Ajzen, The theory of planned behaviour, 1991, p. 10). The subjective norm relates to the perception of the actor of what others think of the to be carried out behaviour (the implementation of the action program). This is why, in chapter 2, the subjective norm is defined as *‘the perceived social pressure to implement the action program or not’*. Actors and stakeholders potentially important for municipalities seem to be other municipalities (for cooperation purposes), inhabitants of the municipality, Rijksoverheid, the political parties in the city council and political parties in the ‘cabinet’ of the city council (college van B&W). Questions about these stakeholders can be found in table 4. A question about the perception of the opinion of the Rijksoverheid is not included. As the Rijksoverheid is the writer of the Action Program, it can be assumed that the Rijksoverheid is positive about the Action Program. As shown in this table, the motivation to comply will be measured by asking the interviewee to rate the importance of the opinion of the different stakeholders and actors on a scale from one to five, one being not important and five very important.

¹ The evaluation of this belief has unintentionally been dropped out of the interview form, and therefore is left out of the data analysis.

² The question about the belief of the integration of ethnical minorities has unintentionally been dropped out of the interview form, and therefore is left out of the data analysis.

Subjective norm	Operationalization and conceptualization.
Normative beliefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What do you think the inhabitants of this municipality think about this policy? - Are there conducted researches about the opinions of the inhabitants concerning this policy? - What do you think other municipalities think about the Action program? - Have there been exchanges of opinions between the Dutch municipalities? - What do you think political parties think from the B&W think about this policy? - What do you think that the oppositional political parties think about this policy?
Motivation to comply	- How important do you, or the city board, find the previously named opinions, ranking from 1 (totally unimportant) and 5 (very important)?

Table 4, operationalization and conceptualization of subjective norm.

3.2.3. Perceived behavioural control.

The last independent variable influencing ‘behaviour’ in the model of the Theory of Planned Behaviour is the perceived behavioural control. The perceived behavioural control “*refers to the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles*” (Ajzen, The theory of planned behaviour, 1991, p. 10). This definition is placed into the context of this research paper, stated in chapter 2: ‘*The perceived ease or difficulty of implementing the action program*’. Possible difficulties with implementing the action program for municipalities might be a lack of knowledge, money, manpower or time. Although money, manpower and time are quite intertwined (with money you could buy manpower, with manpower you have more time), it is good to know where the emphasize may lay with a municipality and where the constriction might begin to develop in the process. Because of this, the interviewees will be asked to rate the availability of these recourses on a scale from one to five, one being completely insufficient and a five very sufficient, as shown in table 5.

Perceived behavioural control	Operationalization and conceptualization.
Money	To what extent does the municipality have enough money to carry out the Action program?
Manpower	To what extent does the municipality have enough manpower to carry out the Action program?
Knowledge	To what extent does the municipality have enough knowledge to carry out the Action program?
Time	To what extent does the municipality have enough time to carry out the Action program?

Table 5, operationalization and conceptualization of perceived behavioural control

3.2.4. Behaviour.

In order to put the theory of Fishbein and Ajzen into practice, ‘behaviour’ needs to be conceptualised. A definition is already given in chapter 2: ‘*the extent to which the municipality complies with the*

implementation of the 'Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism'. A conceptualisation could be provided with the help of a model of Christine Oliver (shown in figure 5). In this model, behaviour is divided into five sorts or 'strategies': acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate. The first strategy she formulates is 'acquiesce', which translates to the full cooperation (either consciously or unconsciously) of the institutional process (Oliver, 1991, p. 152). Moving further from acquiesce means that more and more active resistance is given, which ends in being manipulative. Being manipulative would show in trying to "*actively change or exert power over the content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or enforce them*" (Oliver, 1991, p. 157).

Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes

Strategies	Tactics	Examples
Acquiesce	Habit	Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms
	Imitate	Mimicking institutional models
	Comply	Obeying rules and accepting norms
Compromise	Balance	Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents
	Pacify	Placating and accommodating institutional elements
	Bargain	Negotiating with institutional stakeholders
Avoid	Conceal	Disguising nonconformity
	Buffer	Loosening institutional attachments
	Escape	Changing goals, activities, or domains
Defy	Dismiss	Ignoring explicit norms and values
	Challenge	Contesting rules and requirements
	Attack	Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure
Manipulate	Co-opt	Importing influential constituents
	Influence	Shaping values and criteria
	Control	Dominating institutional constituents and processes

Figure 5, strategic responses to institutional processes

These categorizations of types of behaviour will help with answering the main research question because in order to make conclusions about *why* the actions are different, a conclusion first has to be made of *how* the measures are different. The way this ranking order will be used in this research paper will be different from the original. The conceptualisation and operationalization decided upon in this context are illustrated in table 6.

Strategic response in theory	Behaviour in context	Conceptualization and operationalization <i>Which of the next situations comes most close to the policy of the municipality?</i>
Acquiesce	Full compliance	1. The municipality implemented the policy completely according to the guidelines of the Rijksoverheid.
Compromise	Compliance	2. The municipality carried out the policy to a great extent, but some adjustments have been made.
Avoid	Bargaining	3. The municipality implemented the policy, however only after the policy has been adjusted in consultation with the Rijksoverheid.
Defy	Minimalize	4. The municipality reluctantly implements the policy and implements it with minimal efforts.
Manipulate	None to low compliance	5. The municipality deliberately made little to no effort to implement the policy of the Rijksoverheid.

Table 6, operationalization and conceptualization of behaviour

The reason some behaviours are put more moderately than in the model of Oliver, is because the estimated chance that a municipality would actively manipulate the policy implementation on this subject is minimal, and therefore not included into the conceptualisation. A more refined conceptualisation will be used in order to be able to, if needed, differentiate more between the municipalities. `

3.3. Case selection.

The population of the research, as already stated, exists of the Dutch municipalities and the Rijksoverheid. The Rijksoverheid does not need to be interviewed, as the data will be extracted from various existing documents. For the municipalities however interviews need to be held in order to get an overview of the actions taken by and the behaviours of the municipalities. There are 388 municipalities in the Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2017) all ranging between about 900 inhabitants (Schiermonnikoog) and 835.000 inhabitants (Amsterdam) (Toponderzoek, 2016). It is not possible to include all Dutch municipalities in the inquiry and therefore a sample has to be made of six municipalities (more is not possible due to time limitations). It is possible that municipality officials working on the policy on a local level have a certain bias towards the policy: maybe they fundamentally disagree with the approach, or they feel like such a policy needs to be controlled on a central level. In order to prevent a personal bias to intertwine with the ‘professional perceptions’ towards the policy, the aim is to interview two officials of each municipality. This will therefore make a total of twelve interviews in an ideal situation. This municipality selection will not be a random selection, because then the representation of other municipalities will not be correct. This type of selection with a small-N sample is justified by Seawright and Gerring:

“Given the insufficiencies of randomization... the argument for some form of purposive case selection seems strong. It is true that purposive methods cannot entirely overcome the inherent unreliability of generalizing from small-N samples, but they can nonetheless make an important contribution to the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose the most appropriate cases for a given research strategy” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).

Because of topographical differences, an ideal division of the six municipalities would include a balanced regional distribution. To keep other factors such as political preferences and population size under control, the aim is also to have municipalities with the same voting behaviour in the national elections of March 2017, with more or less the same amount of citizens. The last specification to keep in mind is the fact that 18 municipalities across the Netherlands received extra funds (a total of €6,3 million) to tackle the problems of extremism and Jihadism (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2016). Because of these extra resources a couple of municipalities have (shown in table 7), the aim is to interview a municipality with extra money given by the Rijksoverheid and one without, for every area.

Region	Municipality
North	Almere, Amsterdam, Zwolle, Haarlemmermeer, Huizen
Middle	The Hague, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Delft, Zoetermeer, Gouda, Schiedam, Amersfoort, Culemborg, Leiden
South	Arnhem, Nijmegen, Tilburg

Table 7, municipalities that receive funding (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2016).

Six municipalities with more or less the same amount of citizens (between 140.000 and 160.000 citizens) and the same voting behaviour during the national elections were selected (Reedijk, 2017) (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2017). Two interviews with each of these municipalities is the goal to collect the needed representative data.

3.4. Data analysis.

In the end, the ideal result will be twelve transcripts of six different municipalities. Some more operationalization is needed in order to order the gathered data. The first choice has been made to make use of the transcripts, which were checked and maybe adjusted by the interviewed municipality officers. The second choice has been made to make use of open coding without the use of a program such as ATLAS.ti. The coding will be done by hand in the document itself, because the interview form is very structured. This will make sure that it is clear where to find which variable in the interview transcripts. All the different units in the transcripts will be given different colours. In this way, it is immediately clear where something is stated about which unit. There will be no usage of a second independent coder, as

proposed by for example Montgomery and Crittenden in their '*Improving Coding Reliability for Open-Ended Questions*' (Montgomery & Crittenden, 2016). The interview transcripts will be read a lot of times due to the construction of the data analysis, what will make sure that checks will be done with an extensive time interval (as a sort of interactive coding process). The reliability of the coding process remains assured in this way.

There are three possible ways to treat the extracted data. The first one is to transform the qualitative data into quantitative data in the way that, amongst others, De Boer applied in his '*Institutional changes and professional autonomy*' (translated into English). The way he operationalized the different data is by multiplying the beliefs about the expected outcomes of behaviour and the evaluation about expected outcomes of behaviour. This is showed in figure 6.

INDEXVARIABLE	Effect		Norme- ring		(deel) attitude
Bestuurskracht	1.33	x	1	=	1.33
Democratisch gehalte	- 0.20	x	0	=	0
Wetenschappelijke relevantie	1.00	x	3	=	3.00
Spreiding verantwoordelijkheden	0.25	x	3	=	.75
Maatschappelijke relevantie	1.33	x	2	=	2.67
Academische vrijheid	- 1.33	x	2	=	-2.67
				Σ	5.08
TOTALE ATTITUDE				$\Sigma/6$	0.85

Figure 6, first way of processing the data (de Boer, 2003, p. 181)

On the left side of the table shown in figure 6, the different possible consequences and goals are stated (beneath 'indexvariable'). In this context these would be 'weakening the movement', 'elimination of the breeding ground', 'growing political tensions', etcetera. The effect is the converted rating (the belief of the interviewee about the contribution of the behaviour to that specific goal and/or consequence), and the 'normering' is the evaluation about expected outcome (how important is it). In this way of data analysis, the result is 0,85, which says something about the specific attitude towards the behaviour. This way is especially good in the case of a big amount of interviews, because many results will be transformed into one exact number. In this context however, with fewer amount of sample units, it might not be the best option.

The second option would be to use a 'traffic light system' in combination with calculating the 'means' of every concept, for every municipality. This option is illustrated in appendix number four. The way the data will be transformed is into pluses and mines. If a municipality is rather positive about the contribution of the action program to the formulated goal or possible consequence, a '+' will be noted. When a municipality is rather negative, a '-' be noted. Lastly, if a municipality is neutral a '+/-' will be noted. As the diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs, an increase of work pressure and

possible growing political tensions, are negative consequences, the plusses (yes, it diminishes the effectiveness of other policies) are written down as negative (a minus) and mines (no, it does not diminish the effectiveness of other policies) are written down as positives (plusses). In the end, for every possible consequence a +, +/- or – is noted. All of these will be added up per municipality, and a ‘mean’ is calculated. Every +/- counts as one plus and one mines. If there are more plusses, a green light will be filled in into the table (causes no restrictions on the implementation process), a mean of +/- will be transformed into a yellow light (might cause restrictions) and a mean of mines into a red light (causes restrictions). This will be done both for the beliefs, as well as for the normative beliefs. For the evaluation, motivation and perceived behavioural control, a mean out of the ratings will be calculated. A mean of one out of five will be noted as a red light. A mean of a two, three or four will be noted as yellow lights and a mean of five out of five will be transformed into a green light. This is a solution for the sample size problem of the first version, as this option can be applied in this context with this amount of sample units relatively easy. The negative aspect however is that this type of table does not exactly show where the problem of a municipality lies. Because only means are included into the table, nothing can be said about for example where the problem lies of a possible red coloured normative belief. Are the inhabitants negative about the action program, or the aldermen of the municipality? Another problem caused by this option is that the beliefs and evaluations, as well as the normative belief and motivation to comply, are not linked together anymore, because only the means are illustrated.

The third option is a solution to this problem, and is illustrated in appendix number five. It still makes use of the traffic light system, however in a different way. The beliefs about the expected outcomes of behaviour and the evaluation of them are combined into different lights for every possible consequence or formulated goal. The same will be applied for the subjective norm (combination of the normative beliefs and the motivation to comply). Different combinations and therefore different conclusions can be made and drawn between the different plusses or mines and the ratings of evaluation and motivation. The interpretations and ‘calculations’ of these combinations can be found in appendix number six. The choice has been made to primarily make use of the third option and not to quantify the data, because with this option it is clear where exactly the problem lies per municipality and which goals and/or consequences are not positively met. The second option will be used as complementary information. In order to show how the different combinations of the attitude (the beliefs and evaluation) as well as the subjective norm (normative beliefs and motivation to comply) were interpreted, a table is included into appendix six.

3.5. Reliability and validity.

Besides the concerns stated earlier related to using a case study, there are some other reliability and validity related issues which may occur when using this research design. These need to be kept in mind when analysing the data and drawing a conclusion. First of all, it may be that the interviewees hold back on the ratings and statements they make. For example, the interviewees might be cautious with the

question whether the municipality possesses enough means to implement the action program. If, in the end, the conclusion is drawn that the municipalities have plenty of means, it might affect the policy officers negatively due to e.g. budget cuts (even though the data is treated anonymously). Secondly, people could be cautious to choose extremes when rating something. In this case, the ratings of one out of five and five out of five will be less likely to be chosen, which might lead to untruthful answers. This is the reason why, besides the ratings, the statements made when going deeper into the subject were also taken into consideration when interpreting the data. Lastly, a problem might occur when not many municipalities want to cooperate due to lack of information. If this were the case, available secondary data will be searched (policy documents from municipalities, the Rijksoverheid) or the case selection criteria will be broadened (smaller and bigger municipalities, less geographical distribution, etcetera).

4. Data analysis.

In this chapter, the three sub-questions formulated in chapter 1 will be answered. In the first sub-chapter, the emphasis will be on the first sub-question: what are the local measures mentioned in the policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism? In the second sub-chapter, the different variables belonging to the municipalities will be described based upon the interview transcripts. This description will give an answer on the second sub-question: which actions are initiated by the different Dutch municipalities? The third sub-chapter will answer the last sub-question: which factors could explain the differences between the Dutch municipalities in actions taken to implement the policy? In the end, an analysis is done in context of the main research question: which factors explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities?

4.1. The formulated measures for the municipalities.

In the Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism, measures are formulated for both the national level (e.g. offering consular help to Dutch embassies in adjacent countries) as well as for municipalities, companies and schools (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid- Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie). One specific document was dedicated to measures to implement by the municipalities: the document ‘*Preparation for social tensions and radicalisation*’ (translated from Dutch to English). The measures included in this document are divided into two parts: there are nine measures to implement before any specific signals are known (preventive measures), and three measures to implement after specific signals are known by the municipality (repressive measures) (Rijksoverheid, 2015). All of the measures are illustrated in table 8,

Before signals	After signals
1) Appointment of a file holder.	10) Have case review meetings when concrete signals exist.
2) Building up a relationship with the Islamic community.	11) Make an individual, personal approach.
3) Civil servants should have the right knowledge. If needed, make use of trainings from NCTV (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism) .	12) Make sure that family do not follow the steps.
4) Make up a preventive approach and policy strategy together with local partners.	
5) Organise a signal meeting ‘polarisation and radicalisation’. Together with the police, youth work, schools, etcetera.	
6) Connect to as much existing structures as possible, such as a safety house.	
7) Use the knowledge and experience of municipalities in the region.	
8) Make arrangements about how the different parties share information.	
9) Give the municipal council information on time about the policy ambitions in the approach of radicalisation.	

Table 8, Measures formulated by the Rijksoverheid, translated from Dutch to English (Rijksoverheid, 2015).

As described on the website of the National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Security, the action program exists of *“measures that are on one hand focused on fighting and weakening the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands, and on the other hand focused on the prevention of radicalisation. These repressive and preventive measures are applied in conjunction”* (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid- Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie). The organisations responsible for the implementation of the action program are the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. As stated on the website of the National Coordinator of Security and Counterterrorism, *“The other ministries also cooperate, just like the police, the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) and the OM (public prosecution office), and a lot of municipalities. Other organisations and people outside of the government contribute, such as social institutions, mosques, imams, teachers and parents. The NCTV coordinates the implementation of the action program”* (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid- Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie).

4.2. The gathered data.

When contacting the six selected municipalities, it was difficult to get a hold on the policy officers who are responsible for implementing the action program. People working at the municipality referred to other people a lot, because it is a part of multiple departments. One municipality did not respond, another municipality did not want to cooperate due to time constraints. In the end, four municipalities did want to cooperate. One of them had two policy officers working on this topic (municipality B), who both agreed to be interviewed. The other three municipalities all did not know another policy officer who knew enough about this policy paper and who was willing to cooperate. It is not the ideal situation, however in the end five interviews were conducted. Looking at the results from municipality B, the two interviews were quite similar and therefore it is chosen to pursue with the data analysis with the available interview transcripts.

In this sub-chapter, the different interview transcripts will be analysed and short summaries will be given per variable as mentioned in chapter 3. This means that in every sub-chapter, a conclusion is drawn about which light and symbol will be used in the final data analysis. When referring to the interviewees, the choice has been made to refer to ‘he’ or his’, even though the policy officer in question could be female. This is done to make sure that the anonymity of the participants is ensured. Next to this, from now on no referencing will be done to the source of the interview transcripts. Other references might be used if applicable. Line numbers will be provided in order to show where the information can be found. It is also necessary to mention that all the interviews were conducted in Dutch, and therefore the used quotes are translated into English.

In the appendix three tables were added (three, four and five), including all the necessary information retracted from the interview transcripts. One of the appendixes, number three, includes all the 'raw data'. In appendix number four and five the processed data can be found. The way all of the data is interpreted in general is explained in chapter three.

4.2.1. Municipality A.

Municipality A has been implementing measures counteracting Jihadism since 2013 (line number 24), one year before the action program of the Rijksoverheid was published. The problem seemed bigger than initially thought, and therefore the municipality took actions to counteract it. Because the municipality has a relative high problem in comparison to other municipalities (highest amount of known Jihadists of all the interviewed municipalities), the municipality received extra funding. The interviewee from municipality A is a policy officer and program director on the topic of radicalisation.

4.2.1.1. Behaviour.

As the municipality had already implemented different measures when the document was published, the Rijksoverheid contacted the municipality A to ask advice for the action program. In the eyes of the policy officer, the type of behaviour resembling the behaviour of the municipality is type C (*The municipality implemented the policy, however only after the policy has been adjusted in consultation with the Rijksoverheid*). As he argued, 'Generally we implement what is included into the action program. We included it in our own plans. These are changed over the years and in consultation with NCTV, but also with the ministries. But always in consultation and they [the implemented measures] are generally the same as the ideas of the NCTV and the ministry of Security and Justice' (245-250). The argument that the adjustments were made was backed up by the argument that the municipality and the Rijksoverheid have different interests: 'what works in The Hague or Amsterdam, does maybe not work here. So... There are definitely things that we implemented differently' (91-93). Therefore, the municipality adjusted some measures in order to fit the action program on a local level. The measures that the municipality implemented from which the policy officer is aware are the component of training professionals in order to detect possible extremists in an earlier stage (measurement number 3 in table 8) and the case review meetings (measurement number 10) (24-41). Concluding, municipality A adjusted some of the measures into the situation of the municipality itself. This however is always done in consultation with the NCTV and the Rijksoverheid. Looking at table 8, the amount of implemented measures is not that much.

4.2.1.2. Attitude.

In general, the policy officer who was interviewed from the municipality was under the impression that the action program does not include any precise measures that they have to carry out (36-37). As the policy officer stated, he does not know precisely what is included into the action program (52), but they translated everything to the local situation (39-40). The policy officer did state that training the professionals, such as the police and teachers, does contribute to the diminishemnt of the breeding ground

of radicalisation and sympathizers. This is at the same time a goal which is found to be very important and rated a five out of five (99-100). In other words: what is known to be included in the action program of the Rijksoverheid seems to be contributing to the goals, and therefore the attitude seems to be rather positive. The positive belief is strengthened by the fact that that goal was rated with a five out of five, and therefore a green light was used.

4.2.1.3. Subjective norm.

The opinion from other stakeholders and actors least important for the municipality seems to be the opinions of other municipalities, which was rated with a one out of five (194-198). This will not cause any restrictions on the implementation process of the municipality, and therefore is given a green light. The importance of the opinions the inhabitants, the aldermen and the opposition in the city council were all rated with a three out of five. As the policy officer argues, the inhabitants do not worry about this subject (152-158), and therefore neither a plus nor a minus was given to this stakeholder in appendix 3. As for the aldermen, there is some discussion between the different parties about how much attention is enough (169-174) however the perception is that the quality of the action program is found to be sufficient (175-176). The policy officer argued that the parties in the opposition of the city council all think differently about the topic and therefore it is hard to make one statement about the opinion of the opposition (178-183). The municipality does not know very clear what the different stakeholders think of the action program, and this does not have any effect upon the extent to which the municipality implements the measures of the action program. The subjective norm is dependent on the opinions of the aldermen and the inhabitants, as nothing could be said about the oppositional political parties and the perceptions of other municipalities do not matter to municipality A. Only the inhabitants were given a yellow light, because it may cause restrictions due to the medium evaluation and neutral belief (not positive).

4.2.1.4. Perceived behavioural control.

When the question was asked whether the municipality has enough instruments and means available for the implementation of the action program, the policy officer stated that money is not the problem. He was however under the impression that it will be a problem in the future. On a scale from one to five, one being not sufficient and five very sufficient, 'money' was rated with a four (108-116):

“For now it is enough. The difficult thing is.. the money will be reduced in a couple of years. It will definitely be less. We will have to look what we can pursue in our own policy. That will be a challenge with all the budget cuts and re-organisations... the question is what will remain, Everything that you built up now has to be sustainable. That is going to be difficult, I think” (224-229).

Knowledge, as well as time, was scored a four out of five in context of sufficiency. The policy officer works on this policy for five days per week (117-119), and this shows that they do spend a lot of time on the implementation. Next to this, manpower is given a three (line number 217-218). Although a three might seem as just enough, the policy officer states that he does not see the availability of means and instruments as a restriction on the implementation of the action program (yet) (232-233). Furthermore, the policy officer stated that the policy suits the general policy of the municipality. During the time the 'aldermen plan' (collegeplan) was presented, Jihadism was not a problem in the municipality and therefore no policy was included into this plan (234-241). Because of this, it is not contradictory to the general policy line. Concluding, the availability of means does not cause a problem for now, however the policy officer emphasized the fact that it might influence the behaviour in the future (223-229). Because of this, and as none of the means were rated with a five out of five, yellow lights were used for the availability of all the means.

4.2.2. Municipality B.

Municipality B is a municipality where Jihadism is not a present problem. As the interviewees state, the subject is not a priority of the aldermen (college van B&W) because of this (188-197). The municipality did not receive any extra funding from the Rijksoverheid, and did not apply for it either. Two separate interviews were conducted for this municipality. One policy officer was part of the social domain, the other from the security domain. For one of the employees, it was hard to remember what was included into the action program. This is because he once saw the document when it was launched, but not after that. After talking about the different measures, answers were nevertheless given to the questions. It is good however to keep in mind that the full picture of the action program may not have been represented.

4.2.2.1. Behaviour.

When the question was asked which statement the first policy officer felt like it most suits the situation of municipality B, the first policy officer argued that he had a hard time picking one. He immediately denied that it was A (*The municipality implemented the policy completely according to the guidelines of the Rijksoverheid*), because the municipality did not take over all of the measurements as proposed by the Rijksoverheid (interview 1, 242). He also denied it was B (*the municipality carried out the policy to a great extent, but some adjustments have been made*) because he did not want to call the actions of the municipality 'carried out to a great extent' (interview 1, 242-243). The third and fourth option (*the municipality implemented the policy, however only after the policy has been adjusted in consultation with the Rijksoverheid* and *the municipality reluctantly implements the policy and implements it with minimal efforts*) were not applicable either because they did not adjust the policy and they did not consult with the Rijksoverheid. The last option (*the municipality deliberately made little to no effort to implement the policy of the Rijksoverheid*) did not feel right either (interview 1, 244-245).

The second interviewed policy officer thought B was the statement that suited the best. *'We implemented most of the measures, despite the fact that we have little resources'* (interview 2, 291-294). As he explained, the measures implemented by the municipality are strengthening contacts with the mosques (measure 2 in table 8), initiating contacts with other municipalities about this topic (measure 7) and the training of the professionals (measure 3) (interview 2, 171-183 and 291-321). However, as he argued earlier on in the interview, the municipality reduced the implementation to the minimum (interview 2, 269-270), and that the measures are implemented to the extent to what is possible with the available means (interview 2, 235-236). Because of this statement, the choice has been made to link municipality B to statement D, with a focus on the fact that they minimalized every measure to its core. The side note needs to be made that the municipality did not implement the measures reluctantly, which is part of statement D. The municipality did not have the right means to implement it to its full extent, next to the fact that the aldermen did not make it a priority and the lack of problems in the municipality.

4.2.2.2. Attitude.

When the question was asked whether the action program contributes to the diminishment of the Jihadist movement (which was rated to be very important in the eyes of the first policy officer, interview 1, 102-105): in his eyes, the action program was in general very minimalistic, and there is too much responsibility on the local level and not enough for the Rijksoverheid (interview 1 36-37). The measures that he thought were good were nothing new because the municipality already implemented these measures (interview 1, 50-51). On top of this, he stated that the action program lags behind and that the measures seem like *'dweilen met de kraan open'*, which literally translates to *'mopping with the tap open'* (interview 1, 66-67). This means that the action program solves the problems without working on preventing them. His main problem was that the program is too focused on the curative and security side instead of the prevention of polarization (interview 1, 66-69 and 187-188). Another problem he mentioned was the possible negative effect it will have on the family who is left behind in the Netherlands after a person leaves for Syria. He stated that these people will be victimised even more, and that cultural values and norms are not taken into account in the action program (122-132). The positive note is that the action program will, in his eyes, contribute to the earlier signalling of potential expatriates (interview 1, 80-84). Next to this, he believes that the implementation of the action program will not increase the working pressure to the extent that it is restricting (interview 1, 139-154).

His colleague from the security department backed all of these arguments up. As he stated, *'in order to weaken the Jihadist movement, you need to focus more on the preventive side... it [the action program] is too repressive... more needs to be done at the front'* (interview 2, 17-29). When asking about the evaluation of the expected outcomes, he stated that he finds this goal very important, however the *'aldermen'* (college van B&W) chose not to prioritize the topic due to the fact that the problem is not present in the municipality (interview 2, 76-93). He also argues that the action program will not take

away the breeding ground for Jihadism, although he finds this goal very important (interview 2, 30-38). The positive aspects he mentions are that he is under the impression that the measures will contribute to the diminishment of tensions between groups in the municipality, which he finds very important (interview 2, 99-105). Next to this, he argues (like his colleague) that the measures will contribute to the earlier signalling of potential expatriates (interview 2, 66-72). To summarise both of the made statements concerning the attitude of the municipality, in general the beliefs about the expected outcomes are all rather negative in the sense that the measures do not or nearly contribute to the formulated goals. This shows in the amount of +/- and '-' and the yellow and red lights used in appendix three, four and five. The only green lights were used for growing political tensions (will not cause restrictions on the implementation of the action program). The possible increase of work pressure leans towards a green light, as well as the positive attitude towards the elimination of increasing social tensions. As the first interviewee stated that there are no social tensions in the municipality, it will be interpreted as a green light (causes no restrictions). The only problem in interpreting the data is caused by the possible diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs, due to one minus and one plus. As the first interviewee works at the department of the social domain, he might see it clearer that this action program influences policy programs about integrating minorities negatively. Therefore, this is interpreted as a red light rather than a yellow light.

4.2.2.3. Subjective norm.

One thing that the colleagues agreed upon is that the opinions of the inhabitants of municipality B are not important for their policy implementation process, as it is a security issue (interview 1, 185-190 and interview 2, 201-212). Because of this, green lights were used to show that the perception of the opinion of inhabitants will not restrict the municipality on implementing the action program. The opinion that matters the most for these policy officers, and therefore the municipality, is the opinion from the aldermen (college van B&W) (interview 1, 198-202 and interview 2, 220-226). This perception of the opinion differs between the two policy officers. Both policy officers do not know exactly what the political parties of the aldermen think of the action program, however they both pointed out it is not a political issue and it is not a priority of the aldermen (which resulted in reluctance of the policy officer in the security domain) (interview 1, 177-182 and interview 2, 184-200). To summarise, it was hard for the policy officers to think of what other stakeholders might think about the action program. The possible restrictions show in the transcript of the second interviewee, concerning the other municipalities and oppositional political parties and especially the opinion of the aldermen. It is known that the aldermen did not make the topic a priority, and therefore it might cause restrictions in the implementation of the action program.

4.2.2.4. Perceived behavioural control.

The main problem concerning the instruments available for implementing the measures proposed by the Rijksoverheid is the lack of money and manpower. As the interviewee of the security domain argued, *'because there is no extra money, we cannot implement everything that is included into the program... the more money you have, the more manpower you can put on this subject'* (interview 2, 230-238). His colleague backs up this statement: *'if we had to implement the complete action program, I rate it (the availability of money) with a one out of five... And manpower is, in this case, money'* (interview 1, 218-219). Especially the policy officer from the security domain stated that he finds it *'a shame that it did not become a priority, because that would mean something else would be cancelled. But now, it just was added with something else. Just with the rest, because of which it is all a bit much'* (interview 2, 128-136). Because of the lack of money and manpower, they also lack time. As a consequence, the municipality implements what is exactly enough for the current situation (interview 2, 264-268). Because of these statements, the perceived behavioural control of municipality is interpreted as insufficient, which shows in the use of the amount of '+/-' and '-', and the amount of red and yellow lights.

4.2.3. Municipality C.

Municipality C is a municipality which most of all has concerns about right-wing extremism, and less issues concerning Jihadist extremism. It is however stated as an increasing problem in the document published under the name 'implementation program integral safety 2016': *'the concerns of the citizen regarding radicalisation and at the moment Jihadism in particular, is increasing. Citizens look at the government- municipality and the Rijksoverheid- for protecting their security. The social consequences of radicalisation are big, and an effective approach is essential. Municipality C feels responsible with the approach of Jihadism. A clear role division between municipality and Rijksoverheid, a clear position of the mayor, a clear framework and a balanced approach of both the repressive and the preventive side are necessary'* (translated from Dutch to English). The person interviewed from municipality C is a senior policy officer on the topic of security and policy advisor on the topics of public order and security.

4.2.3.1. Behaviour.

The policy officer in question could not choose between option A (*the municipality implemented the policy completely according to the guidelines of the Rijksoverheid*) and B (*the municipality carried out the policy to a great extent, but some adjustments have been made*). The municipality was approached by the NCTV and the Rijksoverheid to have a deliberation about what to do in the region from which municipality C is a part of (9-18). However, as the policy officer stated, they enacted some measures similar to the ones included into the action program before the program was published: *'we enacted them [measures] immediately when the problem arose. We did find out that there was some deferred maintenance. The contacts were less than they are now. We strengthened those, partly because of this [the publication of the action program]'* (36-39). The measures implemented by the municipality that are

also part of the action program are strengthening the contacts with mosques (40-45, measure 2 in table 8) and the enactment of case review meetings (89-95, measure 10). On top of this, the municipality implemented some measures that are not part of the action program. Because of this, the choice has been made to link the municipality to behaviour type B. As the policy officer argued:

'The policy of the Rijksoverheid is quite clear, and does give a helping hand to handle this matter... on the other hand... we have the right to make choices on a local level. If we think that we do have a good relationship with the Islamic community whilst other municipalities do not have that, than we dare to do something with that... We will not hold back on involve this community to the full extent in dilemmas in the framework of this theme' (355-363).

When the measures implemented by municipality C are compared with the amount of measures included into the action program illustrated in table 8, there are quite a lot of measures missing.

4.2.3.2. Attitude.

Similar to what was stated by the policy officers working for municipality B, the policy officer interviewed from municipality C argued that the action program is very focused on the repression of the problems and not enough on the prevention (24-35). The interviewee however is in general positive about the extent to which the action program will contribute to the weakening of the Jihadist movement and the elimination of the breeding ground of Jihadists (70-103). Both of these goals are important to him, and were rated with a four out of five. When the question was asked why he did not give it the top score of a five, he argued that *'the problem is quite small in this region.... You have to handle matter proportional. It is not the top priority in this municipality, but a very high one'* (177-182). Although the work pressure rises, he does not see it as a negative aspect. *'I think this is a priority subject. If needed, something else needs to make way for it. It did not get that far yet, but if choices have to be made than it will be a clear one'* (113-119). Considering all statements made and the ratings done by the policy officer, there are no possible restrictions due to the attitude and therefore green lights were used (with the foot-note that the action program is too focused on the repressive side).

4.2.3.3. Subjective norm.

The policy officer argued that the opinion that matters the most to the municipality, is the opinion of the aldermen (304-308). His perspective is that they support the policy (262-265). The choice has been made not to present the policy to the city council (what goes against measure number 9), and therefore it is not known what the parties in the opposition think about the policy. The opinions of the inhabitants of the municipality do not matter that much to the policy officer, because *'we do not even know them.... I really think that this is a task of the government. Whether the society is fully informed about this topic, or agrees*

with it, I find less relevant on this topic' (274-280). Because the stakeholders that are important for the municipality are positive about the action program, green lights are used for the attitude.

4.2.3.4. Perceived behavioural control.

When asking about the means available to implement the measures proposed by the Rijksoverheid in the action program, it seemed like there was not a big lack of any of the mentioned instruments. The policy officer was content, but emphasized the fact that they applied for the extra funds and did not get it. Money, manpower and time were all rated with a three out of five. *'We are working with the available capacities, and it is fine'* (332). As he explained, because of the trainings organised by the Rijksoverheid, their knowledge rose from a zero to a five (338-343). Because of these statements and ratings, and the usage of the word 'fine' instead of sufficient, yellow lights were used for money, manpower and time. Because the policy officer was positive about the knowledge level, a green light was used to show there will be no limitations in the implementation process of the action program due to the knowledge level for municipality C.

4.2.4. Municipality D.

Municipality D does not have any expatriates as far as they know, however they do have some issues concerning radicalisation (106-109). The municipality did not apply for extra funding from the Rijksoverheid (291-295). The policy officer who was interviewed is part of the department of education, labour market and participation, which also includes 'diversity'. When talking about the action program, the policy officer did not know exactly what was included into the action program and what was, however after talking about a couple of measures he did know whether the municipality did implement the measure or not.

4.2.4.1. Behaviour.

For the policy officer it was quite clear on which behaviour type must be linked to the municipality: B (*the municipality carried out the policy to a great extent, but some adjustments have been made*). As he argued, *'I do think that we did not implement it [the action program] the way it is formulated, but that we do some things differently'* (341-342). The policy officer of municipality D stated that the municipality makes use of this unit, created by the Rijksoverheid (13-16). The measures implemented by the municipality which belongs to one of the twelve measures described in table 8, are: case review meetings (measure 10), engaging contacts with the Islamic community (measure 2) and providing trainings for professionals in the municipality (an extension of measure 3) (30-35). Next to this, the municipality is part of a network of cities with which they decide upon the strategy in the region (measure 7) (72-78). As however the policy officer stated, the municipality does not have an established action program (a 'checklist') concerning this topic. The municipality adjusts her actions to the needs of the city (65-71).

4.2.4.2. *Attitude.*

It was hard to talk about the perceptions of the policy officer about the contribution of the action program on the described goals, because as he stated, *'it is only effective if we do something about it... so I think I will have to say yes to everything'* (24-29). In his opinion, the contribution of the measures to the described goals depends on the implementation level of the municipality itself. The questions about the attitude were still asked, and in the end it seemed like the policy officer did have an opinion about some of the stated possible effects. For example, he argued that because of the action program other policy programs would not become less effective. It was even mentioned that it would strengthen each other, because *'we think more about the topic... we are going deeper into the matter'* (44-46). No limitations are expected due to this belief and evaluation and therefore green light was used. Another positive aspect of the action program in the eyes of the policy officer, is that the action program contributes to the weakening of the Jihadist movement, because there are knowledgeable people available for answering questions the municipality might have concerning this specific topic (6-23). This importance of this goal was rated with a five out of five by the policy officer (100-108), and therefore a green light was used. The policy officer does think the work pressure increases because of the action program in his own perception: *'more time needs to be cleared for this subject (154)*. However *'the reality is that... if you ask my boss or me, you get two different answers'* (149-154). In an earlier statement the policy officer said the increase of work-pressure would get rated with a one out of five and no more hours were linked to this policy (136-142). This together with the statement made by the policy officer, 'time' is marked with a yellow light as well.

4.2.4.3. *Subjective norm.*

Municipality D works a lot with its inhabitants on the subject of radicalisation and Jihadism. As the policy officer explains, the municipality *'works via underground contacts. So yes, that [the opinion of the inhabitants] is very important. Not that much what they think, but how they play a role in it... This policy is about the citizens, how they feel, how they interact, so in that sense they are the centre'* (204-224). Which is also made clear is that when the inhabitants do not agree with the policy, the municipality will have to carry it out anyway (216-244). Because of this explanation, and the interpretation of the rest of the answers, the importance of the opinion of the inhabitants is rated with a two. The impression of the opinions of the inhabitants is that they do not know what precisely is done to counteract Jihadism, and therefore will think that more needs to be done (163-168), which causes the 'traffic light' to turn out yellow (negative belief however the municipality is not that motivated to comply). When asking for other important stakeholders possibly influencing their decision-making, it was remarkable to learn that the aldermen do not matter that much for the policy: *'I noticed that the cabinet that we have now... that it does not matter that much from which party you are a member of, because with this subject we always get all the members on our side'* (240-244). The policy officers also did not let the aldermen make decisions on this matter, as the policy needs to be based on the needs of the city (247-256). Therefore, he rated the

importance of the opinion of the aldermen with a two out of five and colour for the aldermen turned out green (will cause no restrictions on the implementation of the action program). This, again, with the footnote that the perception is that the aldermen find the action program to be too much focussed on repression (186-192). The opinion most important for municipality D, contrary to the other municipalities, is the opinion of the opposition in the city council. The policy officer states that they want to let people find the middle ground to make sure that people can live together in the municipality (275-286). A statement made earlier in the interview is that the policy officer is under the impression that the opposition does not agree with the action program, because the PVV (a right-winged party) does not agree on spending money on this topic. This combination turns out as a red light, because it possibly causes restrictions on the implementation process.

4.2.4.4. Perceived behavioural control.

The municipality did not apply for extra funding from the Rijksoverheid; the available money for this subject is not a sustainable solution in the eyes of the policy officer. As he states, *'you only get some money temporarily to do something nice with it'* (296-300). However, as he argues, the amount of money available now, is enough and therefore rates it with a three out of five (291-302). Knowledge is also rated with a three. As he states, *'if you compare it with other municipalities, I think we are relatively very knowledgeable. But that does not say that we think we have enough knowledge. So... I rate it with a three out of five'* (309-312). The availability of means and instruments from municipality D is coloured yellow, because it is neither very positive and neither very negative.

4.3. The measures implemented by the municipalities.

The statements and interpretations formulated in the previous sub-chapters show that the municipalities have a lot in common within the framework of actions. The actions mostly from the action plan, shown in table 8, are: measure two (*building up a relationship with the Islamic community*), three (a lot of municipalities make use of the trainings from NCTV), five (*organise a signal meeting together with the police, youth work, schools, etcetera*) and ten (*have case review meetings when concrete signals exist*). The other measures mentioned in table 8 have barely or not been implemented. Measure nine (*give the municipal council information on time about the policy ambitions*) has even been counteracted, as municipalities (B and C) explicitly did not inform the city council on the policy concerning Jihadism and extremism. The measure about which three of the municipalities are very positive is the trainings organised by the NCTV, with the side note from municipality D wishes to have trainings about how to integrate the measures into the 'normal policy' of the municipality (313-317). Furthermore, most of the municipalities already initiated policy measures to counteract possible radicalisation before the action program was published. Because of this, the mentioned measures in the action program were not that new for the policy officers. The difference now is that the measures have a label. This is shown to be true for

municipality A (*working on this topic since 2013, 17-33*), municipality B (*'it is nothing new for us', interview 1 50-52*) and municipality C (*implemented measures due to right-wing extremism, 80-82*).

Another general common statement made by the policy officers is that the measures mentioned in the action program are too repressive and too much focused on the security side of the story, and not enough focused on the prevention of radicalisation and polarisation. This was stated by municipality B (interview 1 63-79 and interview 2, 24-29), C (24-35) and D (187-196).

4.4. The propositions.

As formulated in chapter two, there are three propositions. With the information subtracted from the interviews, together with the made interpretations shown in appendix three and five, the three propositions can be either confirmed or not. The first proposition is *'the more positive the attitude of the municipality is towards the national policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy'*. The attitude of municipality A was positive, which shows in appendix five, and conducts a behaviour that is similar to behaviour type C (*bargaining*). Municipality B leaned more towards attitude type D (*minimalize*) without being reluctant, and the attitude was not positive neither negative (same amount of reds as greens). The behaviour type of both municipality C as municipality D belong to type B (*compliance*). Municipality C does not have any yellow or red lights connecting to the attitude, municipality D only has a yellow light for the variable of the increase of work pressure. Concluding, the municipalities with the highest level of compliance of the action program are municipality C and D. These however differ in their attitude, and municipality A is despite its lower level of compliance more positive in their attitude than municipality D. Taking all of these statements into account, the conclusion can be drawn that proposition number one is not confirmed in this context.

The second proposition has been formulated as: *'the more positive the subjective norm of the municipality is towards the national policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy'*. When looking at the 'traffic light summary table' in appendix five, municipality A (*bargaining*) only has a yellow light connected to the subjective norm of the inhabitants. The rest are all green lights (no restrictions on the implementation process of the action program). Municipality B (*minimalize*) does have a variety of colours for the subjective norm, it is mostly positive (with the side note that the topic is not a priority of the aldermen). As for municipality C (*compliance*), the subjective norm has completely green lights. Municipality D (*compliance*) leans towards a green light for the subjective norm (no restrictions), however it still has one red light for the oppositional political parties and the inhabitants (municipality C and D show the same behaviour type, however have different subjective norms). Taking all of these statements into account, the conclusion can be drawn that proposition number two has not been confirmed in this context.

Lastly, proposition three is formulated as: *'the more positive the perceived behavioural control is of*

the municipality within the framework of the policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy'. One conclusion that can be made about the perceived behavioural control of all the municipalities is that the availability of means is not high. Only the knowledge of municipality C is linked to a green light, the rest all show yellow or even red lights. Starting with municipality A (*bargaining*), all of the instruments were 'rated' with yellow lights. Municipality B, which shows a 'lower' level of implementation, has a variety of lights connected to the perceived behavioural control. It leans towards the red (constraints on the implementation of the action program) because there are four yellow and four red lights. Until now the proposition seems to be true in this context, because municipality B shows both lower perceived behavioural control and a lower level of implementation. The proposition still seems to be true when shifting towards municipality C (*compliance*). The only difference between municipality A and municipality C seems to be the knowledge level. Municipality C rated it with a green light, and is also connected to a higher level of implementation. It does however get less reliable when looking at municipality D (*compliance*). It does have only yellow lights, likewise for municipality A, but still shows a higher level of implementation. Taking all of these statements into account, the conclusion can be drawn that proposition number three is confirmed to a high extent in this context.

4.5. The factors explaining differences in behaviour.

With the information displayed in the previous sub-chapter, more can be said about the possible factors explaining the differences in the behaviour types between municipalities. The only proposition confirmed in this context (to a high extent) is proposition number three: *'the more positive the perceived behavioural control is of the municipality within the framework of the policy, the more the municipality complies with the national policy'*. Because of the fact that no connection is drawn between both the attitude of a municipality as well as the subjective norm of the municipality, and the actual behaviour that is carried out by the same municipality, the differences in behaviour cannot be explained by these variables in this paper. Because of this, the variance in behaviour between the four municipalities (with municipality C and D showing the same level of compliance) can, from a theoretical point of view, only be explained (to a great extent) by the differences in the perceived behavioural controls.

There are still some other factors that might explain the differences in compliance, which are not included into the theoretical framework. One of them could be that some municipalities had a higher concentration of problems concerning Jihadism and extremism (for example municipality A) than the other municipalities. It would be logical to deny a certain relation between the extent to which the problem is present and the behaviour when looking at the table in appendix five, because municipality A does not show the highest level of compliance with the action program but does have the highest extent of problems concerning Jihadism out of the interviewed municipalities. However, the differences in the extent to which the problem is present also causes that municipalities might have to go 'outside of the

book' and implement measures by themselves in order to tackle the problem. This was the case for municipality A, as they started implementing measures years before the publication of the action program.

Next to this, a statement that often was made by the different municipality officers was that the action program was too much focused on repression of the problems and not enough on prevention. This was not included into the interview protocol because it could not have been foreseen that this would be such a common thought. This perception might cause municipalities to implement less measures formulated in the action program and implement more measures focused on prevention. This will especially apply for the municipalities where the problem is not or barely present. These municipalities, such as municipality B, need measures that are more focused on the prevention of radicalisation and polarisation.

5. Conclusion.

The main research question of this paper has been: “which actions have municipalities chosen in implementing the national Dutch policy ‘Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism’, and which factors explain the differences in action among Dutch municipalities?” Three sub-questions were researched in order to break down the main research question, and the Theory of Planned Behaviour was used to create a theoretical framework (Ajzen and Fishbein). From the answer on the first sub-question, concerning which local measures were mentioned in the policy of the action program, the conclusion can be drawn that the Rijksoverheid formulated (in an extension of the action program, called ‘preparations for social tensions and radicalisation (translated) (Rijksoverheid, 2015), twelve measures focused on the local level. There are nine measures to implement for the local government before any concrete signals exist, and three measures after concrete signals. As the Rijksoverheid stated, the measures have a balance between two focuses: repressive and preventive.

In order to be able to give an answer to the second sub-question, concerning the actions initiated by the municipalities, five interviews were conducted with policy officers working at four different municipalities. It became clear that the municipalities have more or less the same view towards the action program. First of all, three out of four municipalities stated in one or another way that they did not know very clearly what is and what is not included in the action, and that the action program is quite vague (municipality A, B and D). Statements such as *‘I read it when it came out five years ago, but never again after that’* were made. Next to this, three out of four municipalities stated that, in their opinion, the action program was too focused on repression of the problems and not enough on prevention (municipality B, C and D). The actions that were mostly implemented which are included into the action program are: initiating or strengthening the relationship with the Islamic community, make use of the trainings of the NCTV, gathering case review meetings when concrete signals are known and there are signal meetings together with the police, youth work, schools, etcetera. The measure stating that the municipality should inform the city council about the course of action was mostly ignored, as municipalities consciously did not present it to the city council members.

Confirming or refuting the formulated propositions formulated in chapter two can answer the last part of the main research question and the third sub-question; both concerning the factors possibly explaining the differences in actions taken. In the data analysis, two propositions were not confirmed in this context. The first proposition, which suggests a relation between the attitude of the municipalities towards the action program and the level of compliance with the national policy, and the second proposition suggesting a relation between the subjective norm and the level of compliance. Due to the fact that these were not confirmed, nothing can be said about whether these concepts cause any differences in the behaviour (the level of compliance with the action program) of

the municipalities. The proposition that was confirmed in this context is the third proposition, which suggest a relation between the perceived behavioural control and the level of compliance of a municipality. Confirming the proposition in this context means that, in the theoretical framework, the differences between municipalities in behaviour are caused by the variety of availability of means and instruments.

5.1. Policy recommendations and further outcomes.

As mentioned earlier in the conclusion, the majority of the policy officers stated that in their opinion the action program was too focused on repression and not enough on the necessary focus on prevention. The only municipality who did not state this was municipality A, which might be explained by the fact that the problem of Jihadism and radicalisation is bigger in comparison to the other municipalities. The extent of the problem in municipality A needs repressive measures while the others need more preventive measure. A recommendation for the Rijksoverheid might be to differentiate in the action program more between municipalities with medium to big problems concerning Jihadism and radicalisation, and municipalities with none to little problems. Another recommendation would be to look into the reasons why municipalities chose not to inform their city councils about their action plans and policy programs concerning this topic. Although informing city councils is included as a measure into the action program, municipalities (B and C) deliberately choose not to do this. Other outcomes of this research were that the majority of the municipalities were under the impression that the action program was published too late (stated by municipality A, B and C), since they implemented measures before the action program. These measures were roughly the same as the ones included into the action program, and therefore some policy officers felt that the measures were nothing new. The first often stated positive aspect about the action program in the eyes of the municipalities is that the NCTV trainings improves the knowledge levels of the policy officers and other important actors. As the policy officer from municipality C even stated: their knowledge level rose from a one to a five out of five (338-343). The second positive aspect is that most of the policy officers notice that the improved contact with the Islamic community in their municipality helps with that community feeling more integrated and heard.

5.2. Discussion and research recommendations.

It is good to keep some limitations of the research in mind concerning the operationalization, data-collection and analysis. First of all, the ideal situation of twelve interviews over six municipalities has not been met. In the end, four municipalities have been interviewed, which is still the majority of the ideal sample unit size. However, more interviews are needed to draw a generalising conclusion about the situation of these types of municipalities in the Netherlands in this context. Thus, a recommendation for further research is to either take more time to contact municipalities or to broaden the case selection criteria. The second limitation of the research is what was stated earlier when discussing the validity and reliability issues concerning the research design: the issue that people are not inclined to choose extremes

in a rating. This was confirmed during the interviews when a policy officer from municipality B stated: *'I don't really rate... With me it [ratings] is actually never higher than a four'*. Although care is taken to also include the made statements next to the ratings into the data analysis, a recommendation for future research in this context and theoretical framework would be to also to analyse documents such as budgets of the municipalities (if available). On top of this, a possible way to improve upon this research is to also check with the Rijksoverheid how much money is necessary to implement all measures to its full extent and cross-check this with the municipalities (what is their budget, do they feel as this is sufficient?) This could not be done in this paper due to time constraints.

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Appendix 1. Complete operationalization table.

Theoretical Concepts	Definition in context	Variables	Measurement
Attitude	The degree to which a municipality has a favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the action program as proposed by the Rijksoverheid.	<i>Beliefs about expected outcomes of behaviour.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the weakening of the Jihadist movement in the Netherlands/your municipality?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the elimination of the 'breeding ground' for radicalisation and sympathizers?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the elimination of the increasing social tensions and social distress Netherlands/your municipality?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the elimination of the increasing social tensions and social distress Netherlands/your municipality?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the diminishing of effectiveness of other policy programs targeted on ethnical minorities?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to a possible increase of work pressure of the municipality?</i> - <i>To what extent do you think that the action program contributes to the earlier signalling of possible expatriates?</i>
		<i>Evaluation of expected outcomes of behaviour.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>How important do you, or the city board, find the previously named goals and consequences, ranking from 1 (totally unimportant) and 5 (very important)?</i>

Subjective norm	The perceived social pressure to implement the action program or not.	<i>Normative beliefs</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>What do you think the inhabitants of this municipality think about this policy?</i> - <i>Are there conducted researches about the opinions of the inhabitants concerning this policy?</i> - <i>What do you think other municipalities think about the Action program?</i> - <i>Have there been exchanges of opinions between the Dutch municipalities?</i> - <i>What do you think political parties think from the B&W think about this policy?</i> - <i>What do you think that the oppositional political parties think about this policy?</i>
		<i>Motivation to comply</i>	- <i>How important do you, or the city board, find the previously named opinions, ranking from 1 (totally unimportant) and 5 (very important)?</i>
Perceived behavioural control	The perceived ease or difficulty of implementing the action program.	<i>Money</i>	- <i>To what extent does the municipality have enough money to carry out the Action program?</i>
		<i>Manpower</i>	- <i>To what extent does the municipality have enough manpower to carry out the Action program?</i>
		<i>Knowledge</i>	- <i>To what extent does the municipality have enough knowledge to carry out the Action program?</i>
		<i>Time</i>	- <i>To what extent does the municipality have enough time to carry out the Action program?</i>

Behaviour	<p>The extent to which the municipality complies with the implementation of the 'Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism'.</p>	<p><i>Which of the next situations comes most close to the policy of the municipality?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>A. The municipality implemented the policy completely according to the guidelines of the Rijksoverheid.</i> <i>B. The municipality carried out the policy to a great extent, but some adjustments have been made.</i> <i>C. The municipality implemented the policy, however only after the policy has been adjusted in consultation with the Rijksoverheid.</i> <i>D. The municipality reluctantly implements the policy and implements it with minimal efforts.</i> <i>E. The municipality deliberately made little to no effort to implement the policy of the Rijksoverheid.</i>
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Appendix 2. Interview questions form (*Dutch*).

1. *Wat is uw functie en op welke wijze bent u betrokken bij de uitvoering van het beleid?*

Attitude

Beliefs about expected outcomes of behaviour.

2. In het Actieprogramma van de Rijksoverheid worden drie doelen aangehaald, waaronder het bestrijden en verzwakken van de Jihadistische beweging in Nederland en het wegnemen van de voedingsbodem voor radicalisering. Verder heeft de VNG andere mogelijke uitdagingen vastgesteld. In hoeverre denkt u dat de uitvoering van het beleid in uw gemeente bijdraagt aan:
 - a. Het verzwakken van de Jihadistische beweging in Nederland/uw gemeente
 - b. Het wegnemen van de voedingsbodem voor radicalisering en sympathisanten
 - c. Het wegnemen van de toenemende sociale spanningen en maatschappelijke onrust tussen ethische/religieuze groepen in uw gemeente.
 - d. Een afname van de effectiviteit van ander beleid van de gemeente dat is gericht op etnische minderheden
 - e. Het vergroten van de werkdruk van het gemeentelijk apparaat
 - f. Het vroeger signaleren van eventuele uitreizigers.
 - g. Groeiende politieke spanningen in uw gemeente.

Evaluation of expected outcomes of behaviour

3. Hoe belangrijk vindt het gemeentebestuur (de gemeente) de volgende mogelijke effecten? Geef een rapportcijfer met 1 absoluut niet belangrijk en 5 erg belangrijk.
 - a. Verzwakken van de Jihadistische beweging in Nederland/uw gemeente
 - b. Het wegnemen van de voedingsbodem voor radicalisering
 - c. Het wegnemen van spanningen tussen (ethische/religieuze) groepen in uw gemeente
 - d. Een afname van de effectiviteit van ander beleid van de gemeente dat is gericht op etnische minderheden
 - e. Een goede integratie van etnische minderheden in uw gemeente
 - f. Welk gewicht wordt er toegekend aan het feit dat de werkdruk van het gemeentelijke apparaat wordt vergroot door dit beleid?
 - g. Hoe belangrijk is het dat de politiek waar mogelijk eensgezind is?

Subjective norm

Normative beliefs

4. Hoe denkt u dat de inwoners van deze gemeente denken over dit beleid?
5. Zijn er onderzoeken gedaan naar de meningen van inwoners?
6. Hoe denkt u dat andere gemeenten denken over dit beleid?
7. Zijn er uitwisselingen met andere gemeenten hierover?
8. Hoe denkt u dat de politieke partijen uit het college van B&W denken over dit beleid?
9. Hoe denkt u dat de oppositie in de gemeenteraad denkt over dit beleid?

Motivation to comply

10. Hoe zwaar wegen in uw ogen de opvattingen van de inwoners van deze gemeente over dit beleid?
11. Hoe zwaar wegen in uw ogen de opvattingen van andere gemeenten over dit beleid?

12. Hoe zwaar wegen in uw ogen de opvattingen van politieke partijen uit het college van B&W over dit beleid?
13. Hoe zwaar wegen in uw ogen de opvattingen van de oppositie in de gemeenteraad over dit beleid?

Perceived behavioral control

14. In hoeverre beschikt de gemeente in uw ogen over de volgende middelen om het beleid zoals voorgesteld door de Rijksoverheid uit te voeren? Kunt u een rapportcijfer geven waarbij een 1 onvoldoende is en een 5 voldoende?
 - a. Geld
 - b. Mankracht
 - c. Kennis
 - d. Tijd
15. In hoeverre is de gemeentelijke politiek intern verdeeld over de aanpak en/of uitvoering van dit beleid?
16. In hoeverre past het beleid bij het algemene beleid van het college?

Behaviour

17. Welke van de volgende situaties over de uitvoering van het beleid past het beste bij uw gemeente?
 - a. Vooralsnog heeft de gemeente het Rijksbeleid geheel conform de richtlijnen van de Rijksoverheid uitgevoerd.
 - b. Vooralsnog heeft de gemeente het Rijksbeleid in grote mate uitgevoerd maar er zijn een klein aantal aanpassingen gemaakt.
 - c. De gemeente heeft het Rijksbeleid uitgevoerd maar pas nadat in onderling overleg met het Rijk het uitvoeringsbeleid is bijgesteld.
 - d. De gemeente voert het Rijksbeleid met 'frisse tegenzin' uit en beperkt zich een tot een minimale inspanning.
 - e. De gemeente heeft bewust geen tot nauwelijks inspanningen geleverd om het Rijksbeleid uit te voeren.

Appendix 3. Summary of analysed variables.

Theoretical concept	Variables	Goals and possible consequences	A	B		C	D
Attitude	Beliefs about expected outcomes of behaviour.	Weakening of the movement		+/-	-	+	+
		Elimination of the breeding ground	+	+/-	-	+	
		Elimination of increasing social tensions		-	+/-	+	
		Diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs ³		-	+	+/-	+
		Increase of work pressure ⁴		+	-	-	+/-
		Growing political tensions ⁵		+	+	+	+
	Evaluation about expected outcomes of behaviour.	Weakening of the movement	5	5	4	4	5
		Elimination of the breeding ground	5	5	4	4	5
		Elimination of increasing social tensions	4	X	4	5	4
		Diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs.	1	5	2	X	X
		Increase of work pressure	3	2	3	1	2
		Unanimity of municipal politics	2	4	4	1	3
Theoretical concept	Variables	Stakeholders	A	B		C	D
Subjective norm	Normative beliefs.	Inhabitants	+/-	+	+	X	-
		Other municipalities	+/-	+	+/-	+	X
		Aldermen	+	+	+/-	+	-
		Oppositional political parties	X	+	+/-	X	-
	Motivation to comply.	Inhabitants	3	1	2	2	2
		Other municipalities	1	2	3	1	3
		Aldermen	3	5	5	4	1
		Oppositional political parties	3	2	2	4	4
Theoretical concept	Variables		A	B		C	D
Perceived behavioural control	Money.		4	1	2	3	3
	Manpower.		3	1	2/3	3	2
	Knowledge		4	4	3/4	5	3
	Time		4	1	1/2	3	2
Theoretical concept	Variable		A	B		C	D
Behaviour	Level of implementation		C	D		B	B









































X= does not apply according to the policy officer.

³ As the diminishment of effectiveness is a negative consequence, the plusses (yes, it diminishes the effectiveness of other policies) are written down as negative (a minus) and mines (no, it does not diminish the effectiveness of other policies) are written down as positives (plusses).

⁴ Footnote 3 has also been applied to the possible consequence of increase of work pressure (a negative consequence).

⁵ Footnote 3 has also been applied to the possible consequence of growing political tensions (a negative consequence).


Appendix 4. Data analysis table, option 2.

		<i>Municipality A</i>	<i>Municipality B</i>		<i>Municipality C</i>	<i>Municipality D</i>
Attitude	<i>Beliefs about expected outcomes of behaviour.</i>					
	<i>Evaluation about expected outcomes of behaviour.</i>					
Subjective norm	<i>Normative beliefs.</i>					
	<i>Motivation to comply.</i>					
Perceived behavioural control	<i>Money.</i>					
	<i>Manpower.</i>					
	<i>Knowledge</i>					
	<i>Time</i>					
Behaviour	<i>Level of implementation</i>	C	D		B	B

Appendix 5. Data analysis table, option 3.

Theoretical concept	Goals and possible consequences	A	B		C	D
Attitude	Weakening of the movement	
	Elimination of the breeding ground	
	Elimination of increasing social tensions		
	Diminishment of effectiveness of other policy programs	
	Increase of work pressure	
	Growing political tensions	
Theoretical concept	Stakeholders	A	B		C	D
Subjective norm	Inhabitants
	Other municipalities
	Aldermen
	Oppositional political parties
Theoretical concept	Instruments	A	B		C	D
Perceived behavioural control	Money.
	Manpower.
	Knowledge
	Time
Behaviour	Level of implementation	C	D		B	B

Appendix 6. Combinations and interpretations.

Evaluation and motivation to comply	Belief and normative beliefs	Colour	Explanation
1	+		Does not cause any problems due to the lack of importance, even though the action program contributes to the goal.
1	+/-		Does not cause any problems due to the lack of importance
1	-		Does not cause any problems due to the lack of importance
2	+		Does not cause any problem due to the positive belief
2	+/-		May cause problems due to the (still low) evaluation and neutral belief (not positive).
2	-		May cause problems due to the (still low) evaluation and negative belief.
3	+		Does not cause any problem due to the positive belief, quite important evaluation.
3	+/-		May cause problems due to the medium evaluation and neutral belief (not positive).
3	-		May cause problems due to the medium evaluation and negative belief.
4	+		Does not cause any problem due to the positive belief, important evaluation.
4	+/-		May cause problems due to the important evaluation and neutral belief (not positive).
4	-		Causes problems due to the important evaluation and negative belief.
5	+		Does not cause any problem due to the positive belief, very important evaluation.
5	+/-		Causes problems due to the highly important evaluation and neutral belief (not positive). For this importance level a positive belief is needed.
5	-		Causes problems due to the highly important evaluation and negative belief. For this importance level a positive belief is needed.
1-5	X		Not applicable, and therefore does not cause any problems.