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Signals of Radicalization among Dutch Muslim youth:
Comparing theory with practice

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
Abstract

This study focused on the radicalization process and the signals that can be observed during the different stages of the process. It is important and relevant to have a good model of the different phases of the radicalization process with associated signals, that can be used by first line practitioners to interpret if Dutch Muslim youth may be radicalizing. Therefore, in this Master thesis a literature based model is proposed that divides the radicalization process into three different phases: 1) sensitivity, 2) group membership, and 3) action, with associated signals. Next the model is tested with a survey among first line practitioners ($N = 80$): community officers, youth workers, and high school teachers. The survey consisted of three parts: 1) general information, 2) a card-sorting task, whereby the participants had to group different literature based signals of the radicalization process that were included in the model that is proposed in this current study, and c) a task, whereby participants had to indicate per signal how useful a signal is to recognize in which phase of the radicalization process a radicalizing youngster is. Results show that first line participants distinguish more than three phases. The first two phases of the proposed model largely correspond with the results of both tasks. Notable is the strong difference that the first line practitioners made between 'mental preparation for attack' and 'performing an attack' in the third action phase of the proposed model.

Keywords: radicalization, process, phases, signals, terrorism

Signals of Radicalization among Dutch youth

Comparing theory with practice

Radicalization and society

Islamic State (IS), a Jihadist militia, has many foreign fighters that radicalized in their home country and got involved as terrorists in the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The number of foreign fighters participating in the war in Syria increased enormously, since the first reports in 2011 (Anker, 2017; Bakker, Paulussen & Entenmann, 2014). According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), Europe counts around four thousand jihadists that fight for IS, whereof 30% has returned from Syria to their home country (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016). In 2015, the Netherlands counted 220 jihadists that were fighting in Syria or Iraq. Of those 220 Dutchmen, presumably 42 were killed and 40 have returned to the Netherlands. With the end of the caliphate this number will only increase (Bergema & Koudijs, 2015). Governments worry about the presence of (former) IS fighters in their countries. Especially about the risk for terrorist attacks when some of them return (Bakker et al., 2014). Terrorism is an important issue in terms of the safety of citizens and the Open Society[1], (Doosje et al., 2016), and radicalization of Dutch Muslim youth (Van den Bos, Loseman & Doosje, 2009).

The process towards terrorism is called *radicalization*. Radicalization can be defined as "the progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and developing an extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act" (Silber and Bhatt (2007, p. 16)). This means that radicalization is the process leading to terrorism, and takes place for every form of terrorism. Radicalization is a phased process with no clear-cut timetable associated with the process, with an incubation period that lasts months till years (Schmid, 2013; Precht, 2007). Moghaddam (2005) uses a metaphor of a staircase. Every floor (phase) leads to more radicalism, with terrorism at the highest floor. Not every person will climb the staircase all the way to the top, some individuals remain at particular floors. Every floor has its own behaviour and psychological processes.

To prevent Dutch Muslim youth from radicalizing, there are roughly two groups involved during the process of signalling, interpreting, and countering the radicalization process of Dutch Muslim youth:

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[1] Open Society, "a society characterized by a flexible structure, freedom of belief, and wide dissemination of information" (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017)

1. The first group is more corrective (e.g., intelligence services or special departments of the National Police): this group is trained and has a lot of knowledge about the radicalization process;

2. The second group is more preventive (first line practitioners such as teachers or youth workers): this group might encounter someone who might be radicalizing. Later called first line practitioners.

In the Netherlands there are several social programs and interventions for first line professionals (e.g., teachers or social workers) to prevent radicalization (NJI a, n.d.; Rijksoverheid, n.d.). Prior literature is based at information of the first group, inclusive different models of the radicalization process. This literature is based on case studies (Precht, 2007), open source data (Hegghammer, 2013), and both qualitative and quantitative research wherein radical Islamists and Dutch youth participated (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Van den Bos et al., 2009). Only one of the studies include signals based on experiences of first line practitioners, but this group is very important to signalize if someone is radicalizing as first line practitioners are the ears and eyes in the field. In addition, most of the studies are based on cases of young men and a few women that passed all phases of the radicalization process, until the last phase (real acts of terrorism). Hence a lot of cases wherein persons did not end as a terrorist are not included. Because most studies do not include the experiences of first line practitioners, we assume that there is a need to study what signals first line practitioners use to recognize if a person might be radicalizing.

To meet this assumption, the aim of this current study is to develop a literature based model of the radicalization process with associated signals and test in what way literature contradicts and/or complements with the signals of the radicalization process that first line practitioners use to recognize if a Dutch Muslim youngster might be radicalizing. Therefore, the following research question will be answered: to what extent do the different models of the radicalization process and their associated signals mentioned in the literature align, contradict, and/or complement the signals of radicalization that first line practitioners indicate?

Radicalization, a phased process

Previous research has tried to sketch a psychological and demographic profile of 'the terrorist'. It turned out that there is no such thing as a typical profile of a terrorist (Bakker, 2006), there is also no typical psychological profile of a terrorist' characteristics (Borum,

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2014), terrorists do not have an abnormal psychopathology (Humaidi, 2012), and there is no relation between demographic features (e.g., age and education level) and radicalism (Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006). As described above, terrorism is rather the final stage of a radicalization process.

No single factor can be indicated as a cause of radicalization. Instead, different factors are often of influence at the start of the radicalization process (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Van den Bos et al., 2009; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Doosje et al., 2016; Borum, 2014; Schmid, 2013; Precht, 2007; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2009; Doosje, Loseman & Van den Bos, 2013). Furthermore, how fast an individual passes the different phases of the radicalization process often differs too (Precht, 2007).

The models that are described Appendix A (page 34) show a certain overlap as well as some differences. However, roughly three phases can be distinguished: sensitivity for radical thoughts, followed by processes of group forming, and finally, eventually real acts of terrorism. Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of these three different phases of the radicalization process that are distinguished after the literature research.


Figure 1. Schematic overview of the three phases of the radicalization process

Phase 1: Sensitivity

All models start with approximately the same situation: a person is sensitive and sympathetic for radical thoughts, due to feelings of injustice (a problem is not identified as bad luck, but as 'not fair' or 'not right') (Borum, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Van den Bos et al., 2009; Schmid, 2013; Doosje et al., 2016). Research shows that youth between approximately 14 and 23 years old are sensitive for feelings of injustice, because they might have difficulties to interpret social signals. They think quickly that other people do not respect them and they feel quickly attacked, because of the development phase of the brain that is responsible for making rational considerations which develops more slowly than other areas of the brain (NJI b, n.d.).

Borum (2003) divides this sensitivity for radical thoughts over two phases. In the first phase of his model, a social or economic unfavorable situation is being framed as 'not right',

then the situation is framed as discriminating. Also Wiktorowicz (2004) splits a person's sensitiveness for radical thoughts in two different phases. In his first phase, due a personal crisis, a person get doubts to the previous worldview and becomes sensitive for new ideas which might lead to a new worldview ('cognitive opening'). In the second phase *group membership* a person is seeking for meaning, by for example looking more deeply into a religion, or through so called 'guided religious seeking' whereby members of a radical group directly 'guide' an individual into the radical group. It is important to note that this guided religious seeking is also part of the group forming process, as discussed later in section "phase 2: group membership".

Many Muslims use the Islam to pursue for a sense of identity and to frame the world around them. A frame is the worldview of a person, including norms, values, and an understanding of the world (Snow, as cited in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010).

Also the model developed by Moghaddam (2005) starts with a situation that seems to be unfair towards a Muslim. The individual describes a causality to the unfair situation and, in the second phase, the individual seeks for a way to fight against the unfair situation. Likewise, Precht (2007) points out that the experience of discrimination, which is an unjust situation, is a factor that plays a role in the sensitiveness of a person for radical thoughts. Van den Bos et al. (2009) assume that a feeling of injustice has a crucial role in the radicalization process in combination with an unfavorable social situation of a young individual (e.g., when a young individual has the feeling to be disadvantaged by the society). Feelings of injustice can lead to anger towards the society, which in turn can provoke intentions to and displaying violent behavior. Generally, this happens in the first place when people react strongly at uncertainties that they have to face in modern society. For example Non-Western immigrant youth face uncertainties about their personal identity because they have to live with two cultures; the culture of their motherland and the culture of the country they live in. And in the second place when they have the feeling that their social group is threatened by other social groups.

Also Sinai (cited in Schmid, 2013) endorses that the radicalization process starts with sensitivity for radical thoughts due a cognitive opening (because the religious or political concerns of an individual), feelings of discrimination, or ideological factors.

Finally, also the recent presented model by Doosje et al. (2016) start with 'sensitivity' as the first phase, but they make as described above, a difference between micro-, meso-, and macro levels. At the micro (individual) level, the seek for significance and personal

uncertainty are important factors. The meso- and macro level are not included in the later proposed model below, this choice will be explained later.

Besides the feeling of injustice, the social environment plays an important role too. Factors in the social environment are: 1) the perception of radical thoughts of an individual, 2) the relative lack of Muslim debate on Islamic terrorism in the West (Precht, 2007), and 3) the presence of a radical group (Sinai in Schmid, 2013). However, these factors are not included in the model that is proposed in section "hypotheses and the current study", because these are not signals that can be recognized by first line practitioners in the field to interpret if an individual is radicalizing or not. Also, the factors personal traumas and living environment of Precht's model (2007) are not included in the proposed model, because as mentioned earlier, other research show that terrorists do not have an abnormal psychopathology (Humaidi, 2012) and there is no relation between demographic features and radicalism (Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006). As pointed out above, the meso- (group) and macro level (society) of the model of Doosje et al. (2016) are not included in the later proposed model. At meso level fraternal relative deprivation, feeling of injustice as a result of negative social comparison between their group and another reference group (Cho, Seo, Lee & Choi, 2014), and influences of the in-group play an important role. At macro (societal) level large social factors, like globalization and the large influence of the West, plays a role. The choice has been made to not include these two levels, because both signals cannot be recognized by first line practitioners to interpret as whether an individual is sensitive for radical thoughts or not.

Phase 2: Group membership

Based at the different models of the radicalization process, the *sensitivity* phase is followed by a process of group forming. This second phase is called *group membership*. Within this second phase, roughly two processes can be distinguished: 1) the process of forming a group, and 2) increased group bonding (Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Van den Bos, et al., 2009; Schmid, 2013; Doosje et al., 2016).

Literature describes different motivational factors that drive individuals to join a terrorist group. These motivational factors include both push and pull factors. Borum and Fein (2016) describe that the fundamental push and pull factors come both from internal reflection and external influences. From a social point of view, radical ideas or radical ideologies offer possible benefits for young people: you belong to a group, you get friends, appreciation,

protection, and you have a place to talk about frustrations and feelings of injustice (NJI b, n.d.). But different factors (for example duration of the process, prior experiences, prior knowledge of the Islam, and counter pressure of relatives) can also serve as a pull factor (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

As described above, 'guided religious seeking' is also part of the group forming process, as radical groups often directly 'guide' seeking individuals into their group with several activities that endorse socialization processes. The sensitivity to extremist ideas and the search for identity can influence an individual's attitude of the world, also called 'reframing', which means that an individual changes his view of the world around him. The first step in the process of forming a group, is that the worldview that is presented by the radical group ('frame alignment') attracts the interest of the seeker and finds resonance with the seeking individual's interest (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Therefore it is important that, as Sinai describes in the second phase of his model, there is an opportunity, as for example contacts with a radical group (Schmid 2013). Precht (2007) divides the *group membership* phase in two separate phases: 1) conversion, and 2) conviction. During the conversion to the radical group, a person identifies him or herself with the radical Islam resulting in a change of identity or behavior. Precht distinguishes three forms of conversion (see Table 1). The conversion phase is followed by conviction, as described below. Now, a (in-) group is formed ('we'), with an out-group ('them'), that is 'we' versus 'them'.

The process of forming a group is followed by increased group bonding. By indoctrination and religious lessons (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Precht, 2007), the new group members become more active followers of radical ideas (Van den Bos et al., 2009). Members of the out-group are blamed for the perceived injustice (Borum, 2013; Moghaddam, 2005). At this point, according to the second floor of Moghaddam's staircase model (2005), some group members are already radicalized. In the model presented by Doosje et al. (2016), at micro level a person is very motivated to show the group his loyalty, which converts into following the patterns of the group. These findings are endorsed by Vinci (2006).

Then, potential radicals disengage themselves from their social environment and identify even more with the radical group (Precht, 2007). According to Wiktorowics (2004), someone becomes a real group member when the individual has the same mind-set as the radical group.

Again, the meso- and macro levels of the model presented by Doosje et al., (2016) are not included, because these levels do not produce signals that can be recognized by first line practitioners to interpret whether an individual is radicalizing or not.

One model does not include a group forming/membership phase. In the model, presented by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008), the first phase 'feelings of injustice' is directly followed by the phase 'constructing a moral justification to fight'. Although, as is described above, individuals reframe their attitude of the world during the group's forming process, it is assumed that framing a moralistic motive to fight is part of the next *action* phase. Also Sinai (sited in Schmid, 2013) includes factors in the mobilization phase of his model, which can be interpret as group forming, whereof it is assumed that these factors belong to the *action* phase: skills (provide by, for example training) and preparedness to take action on behalf of the radical group. It is assumed that constructing a moral justification to fight, training of skills, and preparedness to take action are part of the next *action* phase, because these are probably psychological processes to prepare for doing real acts of terrorism.

Phase 3: Action

The third phase can be divided in roughly two parts: 1) mental preparation to do acts of terrorism (Borum, 2003; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Doosje et al., 2016), and 2) acts of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Van den Bos et al., 2009; Schmid, 2013). Before doing real acts of terrorism, human beings take psychological steps as mental preparation to be able to perform cruelties to other human beings.

First the third and fourth floor of Moghaddam's staircase model (2005) are taken together. Individuals take moral disengagement from society and moral engagement towards the radical group. In the previous phase, the norms and values of the radical group are adopted which allows the use of violence by the terrorists. Because there is also a strong sense categorical thinking ('we' against 'them'), the terrorist's organization becomes legit. Several psychologic processes take place which prepare an individual to perform terrorist attacks: a moral justification is constructed, the victims are blamed ('it is their own fault'), dehumanizing of the enemy, displacing responsibility or diffusing responsibility, downsizing the effects for the enemy (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Doosje et al., 2016), and stereotyping the enemy 'you're evil' (Borum, 2003). The death of a friend or relative can work as a trigger factor on micro level. On meso level, also making a testament can work as mental preparation for acts of terrorism (Doosje et al., 2016).

Finally, real acts of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Schmid, 2013) or being part of the terrorist organization (Van den Bos et al., 2009) form the last step in the radicalization process. This last step includes factors as training of skills (e.g., use of arms), planning an attack, preparing an attack, and perform an attack on behalf of the terrorist group.

Hypotheses and the current study

The described phases of radicalization, result in a model of the radicalization process with signals that are assumed to be associated with the different psychologic processes that take place in every phase (see Figure 2).


Figure 2. Radicalization model with for every phase the signals that can be distinguished

The aim of this current study is to develop a model of the different phases of the radicalization process and corresponding signals that is easy to use to recognize and interpret signals of radicalizing Dutch Muslim youth by first line practitioners. For this reason, the proposed model will be validated among first line practitioners working with Dutch Muslim youth. It is tested how many phases first line practitioners will distinguish and which signals they will assign to the same phase. This led to the following hypothesis:

> *H1a: First line practitioners will group the signals of the radicalization process in three phases;*

H1b:First line practitioners will cluster the signals of the radicalization process in the same phases as they are classified in the proposed model by the researchers;

H2a: First line practitioners can interpret the different phases of the presented model with use of the associated signals of the radicalization process to determine in which phase a radical might be.

Method

Participants

In total, 45 men (56.3%) and 35 women (43.8%) participated (N = 80). Their ages were between 22 years to 64 years old (M = 41.33, SD = 12.22). Of the 80 participants, 87.5% was Dutch. Followed by Turkish (3.8%), Moroccan and Surinamese (both 2.5%). Also 3.8% reported to be from another population group (New-Zealand's, Brazilian, and Dutch/Moroccan). Most of the participants reported that they had higher professional education as highest education level (50.0%), followed by, university (22.5%), and secondary vocational education (11.3%). 13.8% Did not follow another study after high school, and 2.5% did something different (the first year a higher professional education and a master of education). A majority of the respondents had rarely or never contact with radicalizing Muslim youth during their work (63.8%), 31.3% had never contact with radicalizing Muslim youth, and 5.0% had monthly contact with radicalizing Muslim youth.

There were 121 additional participants who started this online study, but not all participants were included in the final sample due to the following reasons: 15 participants did not accept the ethical considerations, 52 participants did not finish the survey[2], 4 participants filled in the survey from another role, and 2 participants did not fill in any question. The participants that did not accept the ethical considerations were excluded, the 52 participants that did not fill in the whole survey were only included for the questions that they finished, the 4 participants that did fill in the survey from another role were excluded, and the 2 participants that did not fill in any question were excluded as well.

To obtain a complete view and to be able to compare the different signals of the radicalization process, an attempt was made to include different groups of first line

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[2] Because of the low number of respondents, participants are also included during the analysis when they completely filled in one of the two tasks, or a part of the second task. In case they did not fill in the task, they will automatically be recognized as missing data.

practitioners in this study. The choice has been made to include first line practitioners that worked closely with Dutch youth that might be at risk for radicalization, namely: community officers, youth workers, high school teachers, and the Imam/religious communities of mosques. This is substantiated below. By choosing these different first line practitioners, signals of the radicalization process would be collected from professionals working in different positions. This is important, because it is plausible that first line practitioners of different organizations have different attitudes towards the radicalization process and have another relation with Muslim that might radicalize than other first line practitioners. Following the original research agenda it was planned to include 25 participants for each group. Unfortunately, this aim was not fulfilled, as discussed below. Participants were recruited using quota sampling through direct emailing or emailing by the route of contact persons at different organizations. Because the study was conducted among Dutch-speaking participants, the survey was in Dutch to exclude interpretation errors that could be attributed to a language barrier.

National Police

One of the tasks of the National Police is to prevent and combat radicalization of Muslim. They do this by preventing and combating criminal activities that disperse our society. The National Police use different models for signalizing radicalizing Muslim. To be able to use these models, they need certain information. Community officers or *wijkagent*[3], have an important role, they are the eyes and ears of the police on the street. Their task is to know what happens in a community and to keep it save. By collecting information from the community, a community officer is often able to detect problems early on or even to prevent them. This also applies for radicalization processes (Kop and Moors, 2015). Therefore community officers represent the police in this study. Community officers were recruited by the route of contact persons at the National Police. The response rate was unknown and it was also unknown in what kind of neighborhoods these community officers work.

In total, 23 community officers were included, 17 (73.9%) men and 6 women (26.1%). Their ages were between 29 years to 61 years old ($M = 45.78$ $SD = 10.40$). 95.7% Of the Community officers was Dutch and 4.3% was Dutch/Moroccan. Most of Community officers reported that they did not follow another study after high school (47.8%), followed by secondary vocational education (34.8%), and higher professional education (13.0%). 4.3%

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[3] 'Wijkagent', the Dutch word for a to a specific community / neighborhood assigned police officer.

Did only the first year of a higher professional education. Most of the Community officers worked in their current function for longer than ten years (26.1%), followed by 1 year (21.7%), 6 years (17.4), and 10 years (8.7%). During their work most Community officers have rarely or never had contact with radicalizing Muslim youth (65.2%), 17.4% has monthly contact with radicalizing Muslim youth, and 17.4% has never had contact.

Youth workers

Youth workers are often named as the eyes and ears of a neighborhood. Sometimes they are confronted with radical ideas that some youth have. It is important that they create an open atmosphere where they can start a dialog with youth, parents and schools. Often youth workers work ambulant or based in a district center [4]. District centers were looked up via Google.com. If contact details could be found at the website of a district center, youth workers were recruited via direct emailing. If not, youth workers were recruited by the route of a general email address of the district center. Given this sampling strategy, the response rate was unknown.

In total, 22 youth workers were included, 10 men (45.5%) and 12 women (54.5%). Their ages were between 22 years to 64 years old (M = 35.77 SD = 10.30). 81.8% Of the youth workers was Dutch, followed by Turkish (9.1%), Moroccan (4.5%), and Brazilian (4.5%). Most of the youth workers reported higher professional education as highest education level (90.9%), 4.5% reported secondary vocational education, and 4.5% reported university. Most of the youth workers worked in their current function for ten years or longer (36.4%), followed by 2 years (27.3%), 10 and 5 years (both 9.1%%). They reported to have rarely or never had contact with radicalizing Muslim youth (77.3%) or never (22.7%) during their work.

High school teachers

Schools are an important institution of the government where youth meet each other and become acquainted with different social backgrounds, views, norms and values. All dilemmas and themes that play a role in society are also presented at schools. As extremism and radicalization are social themes, these are also problems that have to be dealt with at school. First, schools have a preventive role by counteracting differences between students with

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[4] District center, a place for neighborhood residents that focuses on contributing to the overall quality of life of the neighborhood or village. It is often owned by the municipality or a private institutions, such as a foundation.

different social backgrounds, enlarge the defensibility of students against radical ideas, et cetera. Second, schools have to react at and combat the diffusion of radical ideas (Zannoni, van der Varst, Bervoets, Wensveen, Bolhuis, and Torre, 2008). Therefore, high school teachers have to know what the signals of radicalization are at micro level. Schools were looked up via Google.com. It was tried to approach high school teachers of schools from all over the Netherlands, but besides that no selection criteria or method was used. High school teachers were recruited via direct emailing, the contact details were found at the websites of the schools. In total 670 e-mails were sent, the response rate was 7.46%. Of the in total 50 high school teachers that responded, only 35 were included. The other 15 teachers were excluded because they did not fill in the (one of the two) tasks that were important for this study.

In total 35 high school teachers were in this research included, 18 men (51.4%) and 17 women (48.6%). Their ages were between 22 years to 60 years old ($M = 41.89$ $SD = 13.39$). 85.7% of the teachers was Dutch, followed by Suriname's (5.7%), Turkish, Moroccan, and New-Zealand (all 2.9%). About half of the teachers reported university as highest education level (48.6%), the other half did higher professional education (48.6%). On participant reported a master of education as highest education level (2.9%). Most of the teachers worked in their current function for more than ten years (48.6%), followed by 2 years (11.4%), 1 and 8 years (both 8.6%), 3 years (5.7%), 10 years, 9 years, and 3 years (all 2.9%). They reported to have rarely or never had contact with radicalizing Muslim youth (54.3%) or never had (45.7%) during their work.

Mosque community

Mosques provide several functions: a religious function, social-cultural function, educative function, and a binding function between the Muslim society and the rest of the society. In addition to the educative function, the lessons also form the norms and values of the Islamic culture (Kanmaz & Mokhless, 2002). Therefore the mosque community has an important role by observing and reacting to signals of radicalization. Potential participants in this study therefore were members of the mosque, such as the Imam, the chairman of the board, and volunteers who are in the board or in several committees. It is very important to include the mosque community in this study, because radical ideas have their ideological base in the Islamic religion and Muslim might interpret signals different than first line practitioners with another background. Unfortunately no members of the mosque community filled in the

questionnaire. Different ways were tried to get in touch: via umbrella organizations (e.g. Stichting Islamitische Organisatie Nederland, Overkoepelende Shiitische Vereniging, Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën, Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, Turkse Islamitische Culurele Federatie, Vereniging Imams Nederland), Al Nisa (an Islamic women's organization), and with the help of several Muslim acquaintances. Only the Muslim acquaintances were positive and wanted to help contacting the Imam, the chairman of the board, and volunteers who are in the board or in several committees. Unfortunately no Imam, chairman, or active volunteers wanted to fill in the survey. Most people of the target audience did not understand the explanation of the survey due to a language barrier. When they understood, they were not allowed to make the decision on their own to participate. There were two standard answers that were given: "I am not allowed to fill in the questionnaire if it contains politic issues" and "I have to discuss it with the Imam". Unfortunately only one Imam was reached, he did not understand the importance of this study and did not want to participate. Also here, language barriers were of a big influence.

Materials

This study compared the signals of the radicalization process that were described in literature with the signals of the radicalization process that were indicated to be important by first line practitioners. The research design that was used in this study is a survey, because it is a well suited research design to collect and describe the opinions of the participants. The survey was a self-completion questionnaire that was designed in Qualtrics and contained three parts: a part for general information about the participant, a categorization task, and a task where the participants had to scale different signals per phase of the radicalization process. Qualtrics was used because it has the opportunity to computerize the total questionnaire and to build in that respondents have to fill in everything in a certain order.

The first part was meant to collect general information about the participants, such as in which role (e.g. police, youth workers, teachers or active at a Mosque) they work closely with Muslim youth, sex, age, and finally demographic background.

The aim of the second part was to measure how many phases of the radicalization process the respondents would distinguish, based at their own knowledge and experience, and which signals of the radicalization process they associate with each phase. This was tested with a card-sorting task, also called 'card sorting', whereby the participants had to group different literature based signals that were included in the designed model. Card sorting is an

method that can help sorting a domain of concepts. In a card-sorting task, participants are given a set of items that they have to group, based on certain criteria of similarity. Research has shown that card sorting can be used for both real life and online research, both give the same results (Bussolon, Missier & Russi, 2006).The items that the participants of this study had to group, were the signals that were used in the proposed model (see Figure 2): e.g. feelings of injustice, change of identity (personal and religious), or dehumanizing the enemy. Because the aim of the task was to examine the knowledge of the first line practitioners about the different phases of the radicalization process and the different signals that could be used to recognize radicalization, the choice was made to use an open card-sorting task, which means the participants could make as many groups as they wanted (with a maximum of 10). To get a complete view as possible, at the end of the task the participants had the possibility to criticize or complement the task.

The aim of the third part of the questionnaire was to validate the proposed model by testing if the participants recognize the signals of each phase of the radicalization process. Therefor the participants received information about the radicalization process that was described in literature and about the model that was proposed in this thesis. The participants received the same list with signals of the radicalization process that was used for the card-sorting task in the second part of the survey. The same list with signals was presented for every phase in the model. Then for each phase, participants indicated per signal how useful that signal was to recognize in which phase of the radicalization process a radicalizing youngster is.

Procedure

The survey was designed with the online questionnaire program Qualtrics and was set out via email (see Appendix B, page 39). To begin with, the participants were informed about the aim of this research. Also a short definition was given of the term 'radicalization' that was used in this current research. Furthermore, the participants were informed about the expected time to complete the questionnaire, that they could stop at any time if they did not want to finish the questionnaire, and that their data would be saved anonymously for a scientific purpose. If the participant clicked on "agree", the questionnaire started with the first part of the survey with the following overall questions: *"In which role (e.g., police, youth workers, teachers or active at a Mosque) do you work closely with Muslim youth?"*, *"What is your sex?"*, *"What is your age?"*, and finally *"What is you demographic background?"*.

Next the participants started with the second part, the card-sorting task. The participant got a list of literature based signals of the radicalization process, as described above in the "material" section. The participants had to group these signals; each group represented a phase of the radicalization process. The task contained the following description: *"Next you will see a literature based list of signals of the radicalization process. As explained in the introduction text, the radicalization process consists of different phases. Please divide all signals in different groups, each group will represent a phase of the radicalization process. You are free to decide how many groups you want to make – this can be one to many."*

The third part started with a short description of the radicalization process about the radicalization process that is described in literature, and the model that was designed in this current study. The participants had to scale all the signals in the model for every phase of the proposed model (1: sensitivity; 2: group membership; 3: action), based on submitted theory. They could indicate the fit of the signal to each phase in a range from 1 (*"Strongly disagree"*) up to 7 (*"Strongly agree"*). As an example, the question was asked for the first phase (Sensitivity): *"The following signals are given. Scale for every predictor if it is a predictor for the first phase (Sensitivity) or not. 1 Means "Strongly disagree" up to 7 "Strongly agree"."* This question was repeated for the *group membership* phase and for the *action* phase. After finishing the questionnaire, the participants were thanked for their contribution. They also had the opportunity to give feedback at the questionnaire.

Results

Task 1

The observed data was nominal, therefor the data was analysed in a qualitative way. To be able to do this, the data was transformed from the raw data to a table that was more easy to interpret. At first the raw data contained binary code; 1 meant that a signal of the radicalization process was placed in the group (e.g. group 1), 0 meant that a signal was not placed in e.g., group 1. To make this raw data more insightful, it was counted how often a signal was placed in every group (see Appendix C, page 55). Figure 3 is a graphical representation of Table 1. Each axis represents a group, as the participants could form maximum 10 groups the graph contains 10 axes. The coloured peaks show how often a certain signal of the radicalization process was placed in a group. For example, 'loss of a

relative/friend' was placed about 35 times in group 1 and 15 times in group 2. Therefor this signal formed a peak at group 1.

Against the expectation of hypothesis 1a the participants did not distinguish three groups, but as figure 4 shows, five groups; as group 1 till 5 shows one or more peaks. The first group shows a big peak for the signals 'personal uncertainty', 'seek for significance', and 'loss of a relative/friend'. The second group shows a peak for 'Muslim identity crisis'. The third group shows a peak for 'holding someone responsible for the injustice', 'downsizing the effects for the enemy', and 'planning an attack'. The fourth group shows also a peak for 'downsizing the effects for the enemy' (this signal was placed equal times in the third and fourth group) and a peak 'dehumanizing the enemy'. And the fifth group shows a peak for 'planning an attack' and 'preparing an attack'. When looking at group 6 till 10, there are no such peaks anymore as for the first five groups.


Figure 3. Frequencies of the different signals of the radicalization process per group

Each signal of the radicalization process was listed in the phase in which it was placed the most by the participants (see Table 2), because this was at that moment the best strategy to distinguish groups out of the data. Table 2 presents the same results as figure 3, only with exact numbers. When a signal was placed equal times in two different phases, it was counted for the first phase. Unfortunately there was no strong argumentation for this choice, just that

(based at the data) signals had to be placed in one group to be able to distinguish different phases with corresponding signals. For example, 'Muslim identity crisis' was placed 24 times in the first phase and 24 times in the second phase. Therefor the signal was placed in the first phase.

The signals of the radicalization process that were placed in the first phase by the participants corresponded, in line with hypothesis 1b, largely to the signals of the first phase of the proposed model. As can be seen in Table 1, 'personal uncertainty' was placed the most in the first phase (53 times), followed by 'seek for significance' (39 times) and 'feelings of injustice' (36 times). Notable is that 'loss of a relative/friend' was placed 35 times in the first phase. This is notable because literature suggests that the loss of a relative or friend is an important driving factor to fight in the *action* phase – this observed signal is thus inconsistent with the literature. Last but not least was 'Muslim identity crisis' placed in the first phase for 24 times.

The prediction of hypothesis 1b were again almost met for the second phase, as the signals of the radicalization process that were placed in the second phase correspondent totally with the proposed model. The signal that was placed the most in the second phase was 'joining like-minded people', namely 28 times. Followed by 'change of identity (personal and religious)' (24 times), 'more radical interpretations of the Islam' (24 times), and 'holding someone responsible for the injustice' (22 times). Solely one of the signals, which was formerly placed in the second phase by prior research, was placed in the third phase by the participants of this study. This signal was characterized as 'very motivated to show loyalty to the group'.

For the third phase hypothesis 1b has not been met. The signals that were placed in the third phase were 'very motivated to show loyalty to the group' (21 times), 'downsizing the effects for the enemy' (17 times), and 'displace responsibility' (14 times). Although the last two signals belonged in the third phase following previous literature, the other signals of the third phase were placed by the participants in the next two phases.

For the last two phases hypothesis 1b is not met, as these phases were not in the proposed model. However, the signals that were placed in the fourth and fifth phase were associated with the last phase of the radicalization process. Only one signal was placed in the fourth phase, namely 'dehumanizing the enemy' (20 times). As final phase the fifth phase

which contained two signals: 'preparing an attack' (19 times) and 'planning an attack' (13 times).

Table 2

Frequency table of the number of times that a signal of the radicalization process is placed in a phase. When a signal is placed equally in two phases (e.g. 'Muslim identity crisis' is placed 24 times in phase 1 and also 24 times in phase 2), it is placed between brackets

Phase	Signal	Frequency	Phase in literature
1	Feelings of injustice	36	1
	Personal uncertainty	53	1
	Muslim identity crisis	24	1
	Seek for significance	39	1
	Loss of a relative/friend	35	3
2	(Muslim identity crisis)	24	1
	Change of identity (personal and religious)	24	2
	Holding someone responsible for the injustice	22	2
	More radical interpretations of the Islam	24	2
	Joining likeminded people	28	2
3	Very motivated to show loyalty to the group	21	2
	(Holding someone responsible for the injustice)	22	2
	Displace responsibility	14	3
	Downsizing the effects for the enemy	17	3
4	Dehumanizing the enemy	20	3
	(Downsizing the effects for the enemy)	17	3
5	Preparing an attack	19	3
	Planning an attack	13	3

Task 2

The prediction of hypothesis 2a has not been met. To test if first line practitioners can interpret the different phases of the presented model with use of the associated signals of the radicalization process to determine in which phase a radical might be, the participants were asked to indicate for each phase (1: sensitivity, 2: group membership, 3: action) per signal of the radicalization process how useful that signal is to recognize for the regarding phase of the radicalization process. The participants had to scale the signals in a range from 1 (*"Strongly disagree"*) to 5 (*"Strongly agree"*). To test if the scored signals show the same factors as expected following the proposed model, a factor analysis is performed the *sensitivity*, *group membership*, and *action* phase separately.

We used two criteria for the factor analysis: the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and the significance of Bartlett's test of sphericity. For the *sensitivity* phase the KMO was 0.78, above the recommended 0.5 and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($X^2(105) = 614.00$, $p < 0.001$). For the *group membership* phase the KMO was 0.64, also above the recommended 0.5 and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($X^2(105) = 401.39$, $p < 0.001$). The KMO of the *action* phase was 0.74, and also the Bartlett's test was significant ($X^2(105) = 462.48$, $p < 0.001$). Because all three phases met both criteria, it seemed to be suitable to perform a factor analyses with all 15 signals.

The choice has been made to use a principal components test, with Direct oblimin rotation ($\Delta = 0$), because the primary aim of the factor analysis was to identify multiple correlated factors underlying all 15 signals that are included in the theoretical model proposed in the introduction. For the *sensitivity* phase, initial eigenvalues show that the first four factors explained 32.9%, 23.8 %, 7.7%, and 7.5% of the variance respectively, together 71.2%. For the *group membership* phase, initial eigenvalues shows that the first four factors explain 24.7%, 19.7%, 10,3%, and 8.1% of the variance respectively, together 62.8%. The fifth factor had an initial eigenvalue just over one and clarified 6.9%. Lastly the *action* phase, initial eigenvalues shows that the first four factors clarify 37.9%, 12.3%, 9.4%, and 8.6%, cumulative 68.3%. Also the *action* phase had a fifth factor, which also had an initial eigenvalue just over one and clarified 6.7%. The choice has been made to use the four factor solution, which explained for all three phases 62.8% of the variances or more, because: 1) there is literature that supports four factors (Borum, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Precht, 2007; Van den Bos, Loseman & Doosje, 2009), 2) for both the *group membership* and *action* phase the initial eigenvalue of the fifth factor is just over 1 (meaning that there is not a lot of variance in the factor), and 3) probably the most important reason, it makes it much more easier to interpret the data.

For every phase all signals loaded on one of the four factors (all loadings of phase 1 > .58; all loadings of phase 2 > .40; all loadings of phase 3 > .48). Because Task 2 tested all 15 signals with a Likert-scale for the *sensitivity*, *group membership*, and *action* phase, the results of three separated factor analyses (one for each phase) needed to be interpreted. Taken together, the four factors across the three factor analyses showed a consistent pattern and could be interpreted as: 'identity', 'group formation', 'mental preparation for an attack', and 'attack'. Hence the prediction of hypothesis 1a is also not confirmed by the results of the second task.

Factor 1 'identity' included the signals: 'identity crisis', 'more radical interpretation of the Islam', and 'change of identity'. These signals formed together with 'the loss of a relative or friend' one factor in the results of the *group membership* phase (all loadings > .47) and *action* phase (all loadings > .56). In the *group membership* phase the first factor also included the signal 'feelings of injustice' with a loading of .62, but this signal did not load on this factor in the *sensitivity* phase (.20) and *action* phase (-.01). For the *sensitivity* and *group membership* phase, the reliability of a scale that included the four items on the first factor was unacceptable ($\alpha < .50$, $\alpha = .55$), whereas it was acceptable for the *action* phase ($\alpha = .80$). After a check-up of the data analysis it is concluded that the reliability could be improved by omitting the signal 'loss of a relative or friend'. A re-analysis without this signal improved the reliability for the *sensitivity* phase ($\alpha = .61$) and *action* phase ($\alpha = .81$), but reduced the reliability of the *group membership* phase ($\alpha < .50$). Given this pattern of results and given that the literature suggests that the signal 'the loss of a relative or friend' belongs to another phase of the radicalization process, this signal was omitted from the first factor.

Factor 2 'group formation' includes the signals: 'personal uncertainty', 'seek for significance', 'joining like-minded people', 'very motivated to show loyalty to the group', 'feelings of injustice' and 'holding someone responsible for the injustice'. In the *sensitivity* phase, the signals were divided over two factors; 'very motivated to show loyalty to the group' and 'joining like-minded people' formed one factor (both loaded > .78) and the other four signals loaded in another factor (all loadings > .67). In the *group membership* phase, the signals were even divided over three factors. 'Very motivated to show loyalty to the group', 'joining like-minded people', 'personal uncertainty', and 'seek for significance' (all loadings > .39) formed one factor, but 'holding someone responsible for the injustice' (.84) and 'feelings of injustice' (.62) loaded both very high on different factors. In the *action* phase almost all signals formed one factor (all loadings > .48). Only 'seek for significance' loaded in another factor with .39), but this signal loaded also with .40 on the same factor as the other signals. Because at every phase most of the signals loaded in the same factor, it is concluded that these signals form together one factor. The reliability of the second factor in the *sensitivity* phase was sufficient ($\alpha = .78$). The reliability of the second factor for the *group membership* phase was also acceptable ($\alpha = .67$), and for the *action* phase the reliability was good ($\alpha = .85$).

Factor 3 'mental preparation for attack' includes the signals: 'displace responsibility' and 'downsizing the effects for the enemy'. In the *sensitivity* phase, these two signals loaded

together with the signals of the fourth factor (all loadings > .78), but they formed in both the *group membership* phase and *action* phase a factor on their own with loadings of > .78 in the *group membership* phase and >.91 in the *action* phase. The reliability of the third factor in the *sensitivity* phase was good with α = .89 and even excellent for the *group membership* phase (α = .91) and *action* phase (α = .90).

Factor 4 'attack' includes the signals: 'dehumanizing the enemy', 'preparing attack', and 'planning attack'. As described above, these signals loaded together with the signals of factor 3 in the *sensitivity* phase, but formed in both the *group membership* and *action* phase a separate factor (all loadings > .67 for the *group membership* phase an all loadings > .61 for the *action* phase). The reliability of the fourth factor was excellent in the *sensitivity* phase (α = .93), and sufficient in both the *group membership* phase (α = .76) and *action* phase (α = .64).

To check if there is a significant difference between the four factors for the first phase labelled *sensitivity* in the literature, second phase *group membership*, and third phase *action*, a series of one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs has been conducted. For the first phase *sensitivity*, Mauchly's test showed that the assumption of sphericity has not been met, $X^2(5)$ = 68.30, $p < .001$, which means that the variances of the differences between the factors are not equal. Therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .61). Following the assumption that there is a difference between the four factors for the *sensitivity* phase, the results indeed showed that there is a significant difference between the four factors, $F(2, 128) = 41.95$, $p < .001$. For the *sensitivity* phase it was expected that the signals of the first factor would score the highest. However, conversely this expectation the results showed that the signals of the first factor ($M = 3.53$, $SD = .83$) scored lower than the signals of the second factor ($M = 3.67$, $SD = .70$). But contrasts showed that there was no significance difference between the first two factors, $F(1, 70) = 1.92$, $p > .170$. On the other hand, following the expectations, contrasts did show that the signals of the third factor ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 1.24$) scored lower than the signals of the second factor ($M = 3.67$, $SD = .70$); $F (1, 70) = 41.37$, $p < .001$. Also the signals of the fourth factor ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.46$) followed the expectation and scored lower than the signals of the third factor ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 1.24$); $F(1, 70) = 23.77$, $p < .001$.

For the second phase *group membership*, Mauchly's test also showed that the assumption of sphericity has not been met, $X^2(5) = 38.56$, $p < .001$. Therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .77). Following

the assumption that there is a difference between the four factors for *group membership*, the results indeed showed that there is a significant difference between the four factors, $F(2, 145)$ = 16.33, $p < .001$. For the *group membership* phase it was expected that the signals of the second factor would have the highest score. Because this expectation for the second phase is not very specific, a pairwise comparison is been made between the four factors. Following the expectation that the scores of the signals of the second factor would be the highest, this was indeed the case ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .54$). Despite the fact that the scores of the signals of the first factor ($M = 3.81$, $SD = .64$) were indeed lower than the scores of the signals of the second factor ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .54$), the difference was not significant ($p = 1.00$). Likewise, the differences between the second factor ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .54$) and third factor ($M = 3.61$, $SD = 1.05$) was not significant ($p = .246$) However, the second factor ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .54$) scored significant higher than the fourth factor ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.07$, $p < .001$).

For the third phase *action*, Mauchly's test showed that the assumption of sphericity has been met, $X^2(5) = 7.86$, $p = .164$, which means that the variances of the differences between the factors are equal. Following the assumption that there is a difference between the four factors for the *sensitivity* phase, the results indeed showed that there is a significant difference between the four factors, $F(3, 177) = 29.65$, $p < .001$. For the *action* phase it was expected that the fourth factor would have the highest scores, followed by the third and second factor, with the lowest scores for the first factor. The results followed these expectations completely. The fourth factor did indeed have the highest score ($M = 4.52$, $SD = .08$), and also the difference between the fourth and third factor ($M = 4.07$, $SD = .13$) was significant ($p = .001$). Also the score of the second factor ($M = 3.59$, $SD = .11$) was significant lower than the score of the third factor ($M = 4.07$, $SD = .13$), $p < .001$. Finally the first factor had indeed the lowest score ($M = 3.45$, $SD = .13$), but again the difference between the first factor and the second factor ($M = 3.59$, $SD = .11$) was not significant ($p =. 172$).

Discussion

In this research, the radicalization process is investigated; a phased process with signals that are associated with the different psychologic processes that take place in every single phase. The aim of this research, to develop a literature based model of the radicalization process with associated signals and test in what way literature contradict and/or complement with the signals of the radicalization process that first line practitioners use to recognize if a Dutch Muslim youngster might be radicalizing. The result is a three-phased model: 1) sensitivity, 2)

group membership, and 3) action with for each phase signals that can be recognized to indicate in which phase of the radicalization process an individual might be (see Figure 3).

It was expected that first line practitioners would distinguish three phases, in line with the literature based proposed model. This expectation is not met. The first line practitioners distinguished in the card-sorting task five different phases instead of three. However, the first two phases formed by the first line practitioners corresponded almost fully with the first two phases of the proposed model (*sensitivity* and *group membership*), which also aligns partly with the second expectation.

Finally, it was expected that first line practitioners would recognize the signals of the radicalization process that are associated with the different phases in the proposed model. There is no evidence found that they recognize the signals for each phase. However, the results show that the first line practitioners do distinguish four different factors out of the tested signals: 'identity', 'group formation', 'mental preparation for attack', and 'attack'. The first two factors are a mix of signals that are associated with a single phase in previous research, the last two factors both only include signals that are associated with the *action* phase. But, the *action* phase is divided into more 'mental preparation for attack' and 'attack' (real acts of terrorism).

Radicalization through the eyes of first line practitioners

In the first task, first line practitioners distinguished five different phases. This is not in line with the literature based model that is proposed in this study. However, there are several models with more than three phases (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Borum, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Van den Bos et al, 2009). Even though the first line practitioners distinguished more phases, the first two phases that they distinguished are in line with the proposed model. There is only one exception, the participants placed the signal 'loss of a relative or friend' in the first phase while literature associates this signal with the third *action* phase (Doosje et al, 2016). It may be that this signal can be interpreted in two ways: 1) the loss of a friend or relative may cause feelings of injustice or the feelings of someone towards the world around him/her, or as Doosje at al. (2016) describes in their model 2) it can function as a trigger to take action. In case of the first explanation it is assumed to be logical that first line practitioners associate this signal with the start of the radicalization process, while it is according to previous research a signal of the *action* phase.

The third phase that is distinguished by the first line practitioners appears to be some kind of a phase that is in between group forming and real acts of terrorism. In the third phase one signal of *group membership* ('very motivated to show loyalty to the group') and two signals of *action* ('displace responsibility' and 'downsizing the effects for the enemy') are placed together in one phase. If the signal 'very motivated to show loyalty to the group' would be let out, the third phase formed by the participants of this study could be (maybe taken together with the fourth phase) interpreted as 'mental preparation for attack'. Although this third phase that is distinguished by the first line practitioners is taken together with real acts of terrorism in the proposed model (phase 3, *action*), some studies also separated it in their models (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

The last two phases that are distinguished by the first line practitioners form together the third *action* phase in the in this study proposed model. In the division of the first line practitioners there is a difference between more 'mental preparation for attack' (for example dehumanizing the enemy) and real acts of terrorism (such as planning an attack). This is in line with some previous presented models (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007). On the other hand, the choice to take these two processes together in one phase (as is done in the in this study proposed model) is endorsed by one of the most recent studies by Doosje et al. (2016).

In the second task, four factors are distinguished: 'identity', 'group formation', 'mental preparation', and 'attack'. These results are in line with the results of the first task and partly in line with the proposed model. The first two factors are a mix of signals that are associated with a single phase in previous research, the last two factors both only include signals that are associated with the third *action* phase. Only, the *action* phase is divided into 'mental preparation for attack' and 'attack'. Where literature makes a clear difference between being sensitive for radicalization and processes of group forming (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Precht, 2007; Schmid, 2013; Doosje et al. (2016), the results do not show the same pattern. Based on the results of this study, it can be discussed whether the first two factors are even different factors or that they should be taken together. In that case, the first factor 'identity' is much more influenced by the second factor 'group formation' than probably assumed in previous done research (as well as in this research) and vice versa.

Remarkable is that the results of the second task do not show a factor that clarifies the start of the radicalization process (for example a 'cognitive opening', the first phase *sensitivity* in the proposed model), that is not in line with the results of the first task and the results of

previous studies (Van den Bos et al., 2009; Doosje et al., 2016; Borum, 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005; precht, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Schmid, 2013). The first line participants divided those signals over the factors 'identity' and 'group formation'.

When taken a closer look at the relevance of the factors for the three phases of the proposed model, it is remarkable that the participants find the second factor 'group formation' of higher relevance for the first phase than the first factor 'identity'. This result is not in line with the proposed model and is also not endorsed by literature. This might come, because group formation is easier to observe and it is probably a more clear sign that an individual might be radicalizing.

Though the first line practitioners made a difference between 'mental preparation for an attack' and 'attack', both of these factors are of high relevance for the third *action* phase of the proposed model, according the results. Different studies make a distinction between processes of 'mental preparation for an attack' and 'real acts of terrorism' (Precht, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). Because both the results of this master thesis and different previous studies make a difference between 'mental preparation for attack' and 'attack', it may be a good idea to make a two different phases out of the third *action* phase.

Proposed model of the radicalization process

As described in the section "radicalization, a phased process: a literature study", there are multiple models of the radicalization process. But, as noted in the section "radicalization and society", most of this literature is based on the first (corrective) group (Precht, 2007; Hegghammer, 2013; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Van den Bos et al., 2009). This can be a reason for the differences between the results of previous presented studies and this current study. Furthermore, it is important to note that most cases are young men (few women) that have passed all phases of the radicalization process. Therefore, the cases of young men and women that did not pass all phases are not included in the results of previous studies, that can have influence at the developed models.

Although the first line participants did not recognize the first phase *sensitivity* of the proposed model in this master thesis in the second task, they did however in the first task. Despite of the results of the second task, based at previous studies assumed to be proven that different factors cause sensitivity of individuals for radical thoughts and the results of the first task (Borum, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Precht,

2007; Van den Bos et al., 2009; Schmid, 2013; Doosje et al., 2016), there will be no change in the first phase of the proposed model in this master thesis.

As mentioned above in the discussion of the second task, it may be a good idea to divide the third phase *action* into two different phases: 1) 'mental preparation for attack' and 'attack'. Because the results of a master thesis show a strong difference between the two suggested phases, and different previous studies (Precht, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

Strengths, limitations, and further research

In this research, 80 first line practitioners participated (23 community officers, 22 youth workers, and 35 high school teachers). It is a strength that so many first line practitioners participated in this research. As second strength is the diversity of the participants in this current study. Three different groups of first line practitioners are represented. We assume that every group has their own interpretation of the signals that are associated with the radicalization process, as every group has a different background (for example study), different environment where they meet with Dutch Muslim youth (such as a school or a district centre). The division of the groups of participants is not ideal, which may have influenced the results. It could be that high school teachers do not have a lot of knowledge about the radicalization process and youth workers have, as most of the high school teachers reported that have almost never or never had been in contact with radical Muslim youth, which could have made the results less reliable. However, this is just an assumption.

Afterwards, there are a few points of discussion at the survey that is used in this study. Firstly, the question for the first task. Aim of the task was that the participants would sort the different signals in phases, with a maximum of 10 phases. It was suggested that the first phase was radicalized the least and phase 10 the most, but not literally mentioned in the question of the task. For that reason there is a chance that participants did not understand the question, but it is assumed that the question was clear. Secondly, the form of the question did not met the aim of the question. It was intended to perform a cluster analysis, but that was not possible with the form of the collected data. Therefore it is recommended to change the format of the question into a Likert-scale, so that a cluster analysis can be performed and the results can be statistically tested. Lastly, it would be recommended to enlarge the group of participants for future research. Because that would make it possible to label the groups of first line practitioners and to take a closer look at the differences and similarities of the results between

the groups. As well to look for correlations between social demographic factors (such as education level or profession) and the results. Still, with the current used card-sorting task, participants have much more latitude to form groups out of the given signals. Furthermore a card-sorting task steers the participant less than a Likert-scale.

There is hardly any research done on the signals of the radicalization process, wherein first line practitioners participated. This might be because the opinion of first line practitioners of this subject do not necessarily have to be reliable, as first line practitioners often do not have a lot of knowledge about the radicalization process. Still, testing if the current proposed model is recognized by first line practitioners is a form of validation and we assume that it is important to test in what way literature contradict and/or complement with practice. Further research is needed to focus at the division of the third phase *action* that first line practitioners separate into two phases.

Moreover, further research is needed to study if the proposed model (eventually with the previous suggested extra phase) is useful for first line practitioners and if it meets the needs of first line practitioners in their daily jobs to recognize a possible radical. In addition, extra training might be necessary as a lot of participants do not have experience with radicals. A short guide might be needed with an explanation of radicalization and the different phases that are distinguished with associated signals, and how these signals have to be interpret.

It is important and relevant to have a good model of the different phases of the radicalization process with associated signals, that can be used by first line practitioners to interpret if Dutch Muslim youth may be radicalizing. Therefore, in this Master thesis a literature based model is proposed and tested among first line practitioners. Two results are worth to become extra attention: 1) participants associated the signal 'loss of a relative or friend' with the first phase *sensitivity* instead of the third phase *action*, and 2) an outstanding result of both tasks is the division that is made between 'mental preparation for attack' and 'attack' in the third phase *action*.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Relevant models of the radicalization process that are the base of the proposed model in the current study

Literature shows that there are several models that describes the radicalization process. The most relevant models are briefly discussed. One of the first was a model developed by Borum (2003), that describes four steps of the radicalization process towards terrorism:

1. Framing a social or economic unfavorable situation as being "not right";
2. Framing the unfavorable situation as discriminating ("it is not fair");
3. Keeping another person or group responsible for the injustice treatment ("it is your fault");
4. Stereotyping and dehumanizing the other person or group ("you are evil" or "you are not a human being to me").

The second model that was of considerable influence, was a four phased model of Wiktorowicz (2004), and introduced the concept of "cognitive opening":

1. Cognitive opening - Due a personal crisis, a person got doubts to the previous worldview and becomes sensitive for new ideas that might lead to a new worldview;
2. Religious seeking – A person seeks for a meaning in his or her life in a religion. This can take two forms:
   a. People can go deeper into their religion (e.g. go more often to the mosque);
   b. Members from a radical group can "guide" a seeking individual, especially when an individual has a cognitive opening towards radical ideas;
3. Frame alignment – The ideas that are propagated by the radical group find resonance with the seeking individuals interests;
4. Socialization – During the last phase the individual gets religious lessons and experiences different activities to become indoctrinated and adopt the norms, values and identity of the radical group.

The first three phases must all three be completed for the fourth phase. Wiktorowicz also points out that Muslims without knowledge about their religious background are more sensitive for radicalization than Muslims with knowledge about their religious background, because Muslims without a proper religious background are persuaded easier to change an old

view of the world for a new view that is considered more true. This new view of the world can be self-initiated or by a radical group.

The third model is the phased model, developed by Moghaddam (2005). Moghaddam uses a metaphor of a staircase to explain the six phases of his model of the radicalization process towards terrorism, for Muslim in both Western and non-Western countries:

1. Ground floor – A person interpreters his or her situation and describes causality to the unfair situation;
2. First floor – Actively seeking for options to counter the unfair situation;
3. Second floor – Distinguish an in- and out-group and blaming the out-group for the injustice. At this point some individuals are already radicalized;
4. Third floor – Adopting the norms and values of the radical organization and moral relinquishment from society;
5. Fourth floor – Strong distinction between in- and out-group. Justifying categorical thinking and adopting the structure of a terrorist organization;
6. Fifth floor – Terrorist acts, e.g. performing attacks.

As described above, not every person will climb the staircase all the way to the top, some individuals remain at particular floors.

Precht (2007) developed after a review of intelligence services that are accessible for the public, public investigations, literature, legal documents of selected court cases, and meetings with other researchers a model that describes the radicalization process, from pre-radicalization to terrorism (see Table 1). He concluded that there is a typical pattern in the radicalization process, and indicates four overlapping phases:

1. Pre-radicalization – During this phase it is not necessary that a person is devoted to the Islam or even practices the Islam;
2. Conversion – Identification with and transposition towards radical Islam, this can take three forms;
3. Persuasion and indoctrination - During this phase individuals join a group;
4. Action – Terrorist acts, e.g. planning and executing an attack.

Table 1

Precht's model of the process of radicalization – from conversion to terrorism (Precht, 2007)

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4
Pre-radicalization	Conversion	Persuation and indoctrination	Action
Background factors	Conversion	Conviction 1. Isolation from former life	Action
1. Muslim identity crisis	1. From no faith to religious identity	2. Increased training	1. Preparation
2. Experience of discrimination, alienation and perceived injustices	2. More radical interpretation of Islam	3. Assignment of roles 4. Ready for action	2. Planning
			3. Execution
3. Living environment, neighbourhood and family	3. Conversion from one religion to another	Catalyst 1. Overseas travel (religious or camp training)	Reinforcement 1. Overseas travel
4. Personal traumas 5. Relative lack of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in the West	Identification Increased identification with and acceptance of the cause of extremism	2. Group bonding 3. Local training camp	2. Group bonding 3. Training camp 4. Videos etc. (testament)
Meeting places (opportunity)		Meeting places 1. Private homes	Key components 1. Financing
Mosque	Triggers	2. Countryside/cars 3. Places difficult to detect	2. Target selection
Internet	1. Glorification of Jihad, activism, "wanting a cause"		3. Surveillance 4. Fabrication of bomb etc.
School, youth clubs or work	2. Foreign policy towards the Muslim world		5. Pilot attack
Prison	3. Charimatic leader		Meeting places
Sport activities			Same as phase 3
Family and friends	Meeting places Same as phase 1		

The next model is developed by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008, 2010), and combines both soci-psychological and psychological approaches. Dalgaard-Nielsen identified, after a study of radicalization in Europe, six stages in the radicalization process from an individual frame of reference:

1. Interpreting a problem or situation as injustice;
2. Framing a moralistic motive to fight (religious, ideological, political);
3. Blaming the enemy ("it is their own fault");
4. Dehumanizing the enemy;
5. Displace or diffuse responsibility;
6. Downsizing the effects for the enemy.

Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) did a comprehensive study, based on a survey and interviews, on the opinion of Dutch youth about: Muslim radicalization, right wing extremism, and animal rights activism. In their research, both socio demographic characteristics of the Dutch youth as their experience of social events were included. they presented a model that assumes that a feeling of injustice has a crucial role in the radicalization process in combination with an unfavorable social situation of a young individual (e.g., when a young individual has the feeling to be disadvantaged by society). The four phases that Van den Bos et al. indicated, are:

1. Sensitive for radical ideas;
2. Sympathizers for radical ideas;
3. More active followers of radical ideas;
4. Being part of an extremist or radical organization.

Sinai (cited in Schmid 2013) presented a model that emphasizes group factors. He divides the radicalization process into three phases, with for every phase several factors that are important during that phase:

1. Radicalization
   a. Personal factors (e.g. cognitive opening);
   b. Political and socioeconomic factors (e.g. feelings of discrimination);
   c. Ideological factors
   d. Community factors – the presence of radical ideas within someone's personal environment;
   e. Group factors – the presence of a radical group within someone's personal environment;
   f. Capacitates that make it for a person possible to become a extremist;
2. Mobilization
   a. Opportunity (e.g. contacts with a radical organization)
   b. Skills (provide by for example training)
   c. Preparedness to take action on behalf of the radical group
3. Action – Actual terrorist attack

Recently, Doosje et al. (2016) presented a model that divides the radicalization (and deradicalization) process of Muslim that fight in Syria and Iraq in three phases: "sensitivity",

"group membership", and "action". Each phase includes factors at micro (individual), meso (group), and macro (society) level:

1. Sensitity
   a. Micro level – Personal factors (e.g. feelings of injustice, need for significance) and personal uncertainty;
   b. Meso level – Fraternal deprivation (radical groups give a feeling of an in- and out-group);
   c. Macro level – Worldwide dominance of the west (political, economic, and cultural);

2. Group membership
   a. Micro level – Becomes a member of the group, is very motivated to show his/her loyalty to the group and adopts the ideas, norms and values of the group;
   b. Meso level – Pysical and psychological disengagement from former life;
   c. Macro level – Forming a Islamic State (caliphate);

3. Action
   a. Micro level – Death of a relative or friend;
   b. Meso level – Form a testament, dehumanizing the enemy, and the enemy is responsible for the situation;
   c. Macro level – Displace responsibility

Appendix B: Questionnaire that is used in this study

Block 1

Beste deelnemer,

Allereerst wil ik u hartelijk bedanken voor uw medewerking aan mijn onderzoek. Dit onderzoek is onderdeel van de master Psychologie van conflict, risico en veiligheid aan de Universiteit Twente. Het doel van dit onderzoek is om meer inzicht te krijgen in het radicaliseringsproces van Nederlandse moslimjongeren. Deze jongeren hoeven in eerste instantie niet praktiserend Moslim te zijn, maar ze moeten wel een Islamitische achtergrond hebben. Ik ben mij ervan bewust dat jongeren zonder Islamitische achtergrond zich ook in dezelfde richting kunnen radicaliseren, deze jongeren vallen echter buiten de focus van dit onderzoek.

In Nederland is een groep jongeren die thuis radicaliseert en zich mogelijk bij IS wil aansluiten om te vechten in het buitenland of terroristische aanslagen in Nederland te plegen. Voordat iemand zo ver is, doorloopt hij/zij een radicaliseringsproces. Tijdens dit proces kunnen verschillende signalen worden onderscheiden. In de wetenschappelijke literatuur zijn verschillende signalen beschreven, die ik heb samengevoegd in een model. Maar ook mensen die met Nederlandse moslimjongeren werken gebruiken signalen om te herkennen of iemand aan het radicaliseren is. Ondanks de indicatoren die in de literatuur zijn beschreven of in de praktijk worden gebruikt, blijven de meeste geradicaliseerde jongeren onder de radar. Om die reden is het interessant om te onderzoeken of de literatuur en de praktijk elkaar aanvullen of tegenspreken. Om een zo goed mogelijk beeld te vormen van welke signalen in de praktijk worden gebruikt, laat ik deze enquête invullen door vier groepen participanten: wijkagenten, docenten, mensen die actief zijn binnen de moskee en jeugdwerkers.

De enquête heeft drie onderdelen. Het eerste deel bestaat uit een aantal algemene vragen met betrekking tot vanuit welke rol (wijkagent, docent, actief binnen de moskee of jeugdwerker) u deze enquête invult, wat uw geslacht, leeftijd en afkomst is. Het tweede deel bevat een clustertaak. Bij deze opdracht is het de bedoeling dat u verschillende signalen groepeert. Hiermee worden de signalen bedoeld dat een Nederlandse moslimjongere aan het radicaliseren is. Bij het laatste deel krijgt u eerst informatie over wat er in de literatuur over de verschillende signalen is beschreven en over het model wat ik aan de hand van deze literatuur heb opgesteld. Vervolgens is het de bedoeling dat u per fase aangeeft in welke mate een signaal volgens uw eigen praktijkervaringen een voorspellende waarde voor die fase heeft.

Alle antwoorden van deze enquête worden geanonimiseerd. Het invullen is volledig vrijwillig en kost ongeveer 10 tot 15 minuten. Als u de resultaten wilt lezen kunt u aan het einde van de enquête uw e-mailadres invullen. Dan stuur ik u, wanneer ik klaar ben, mijn thesis op.

Met vriendelijke groet,
Charlotte Passier

Contactgegevens:
c.e.passier@student.utwente.nl

Block 21

Ik verklaar op een voor mij duidelijke wijze te zijn ingelicht over de aard, methode, doel en belasting van het onderzoek. Ik weet dat de gegevens en resultaten van het onderzoek alleen anoniem en vertrouwelijk aan derden bekend gemaakt zullen worden. Mijn vragen zijn naar tevredenheid beantwoord.

Ik stem geheel vrijwillig in met deelname aan dit onderzoek. Ik behoud me daarbij het recht voor om op elk moment zonder opgaaf van redenen mijn deelname aan dit onderzoek te beëindigen.

○ Ja

○ Nee

Block 5

Deel 1

Vanuit welke rol vult u deze enquête in?

○ Ik ben een jeugdwerker

○ Ik ben een wijkagent

○ Ik heb een actieve rol binnen een Moskee

○ Ik ben docent

○ Anders

Block 6

Zou u dan hieronder aan willen geven vanuit welke rol u dan deze enquête invult?

[   ]

Block 18

Hoe vaak heeft u in uw werk te maken met radicaliserende moslimjongeren?

○ Nooit

○ Dagelijks

○ Wekelijks

○ Maandelijks

○ Zelden of nooit

Block 17

Hoe lang werkt u al in uw huidige functie?

*Hiermee wordt de rol bedoeld waaruit u deze enquête invult (actieve rol binnen een moskee/wijkagent/jeugdwerker/docent)

○ 1 Jaar

○ 2 Jaar

○ 3 Jaar

○ 4 Jaar

○ 5 Jaar

○ 6 Jaar

○ 7 Jaar

○ 8 Jaar

○ 9 Jaar

○ 10 Jaar

○ Langer dan 10 jaar

Block 16

Welk geslacht bent u?

○ Vrouw

○ Man

Block 15

Wat is uw leeftijd?

Vul uw leeftijd alstublieft in getallen in.
* Voorbeeld: 44

[   ]

Block 14

Hoe kijkt u tegen het radicaliseringsproces van Nederlandse moslimjongeren aan?

[   ]

Block 13

In welke plaats woont u?

[   ]

Block 12

Tot welke Nederlandse bevolkingsgroep hoort u? Hieronder is de top 25 van bevolkingsgroepen die in Nederland voorkomen weergegeven. Hoort u bij een andere bevolkingsgroep, vul dan 'anders' in.

○ Nederands

○ Turks

○ Marokkaans

○ Indonesisch

○ Duits

○ Surinaams

○ Antilliaans/Arubaans

○ Pools

○ Belgisch

○ Engels

○ Voormalig Jogoslavie

○ Voormalige Sovjet Uni

○ Chinees

○ Irakees

○ Italiaans

○ Afghanisch

○ Syrisch

○ Frans

○ Spaans

○ Somalisch

○ Amerikaans

○ Iranees

○ Indisch

○ Bulgaar

○ Portugees

○ Anders

Algemene vragen

Indien u bij de vorige vraag 'anders' heeft ingevuld, zou u dan hieronder in willen vullen tot welke bevolkingsgroep u hoort?

> [   ]

Block 11

Wat is uw hoogst voltooide opleiding?

○ Geen opleiding

○ Lagere school/basisonderwijs

○ LBO, VBO, LTS, LHNO, VMBO

○ MAVO, VMBO-t, LHNO, VMBO

○ MBO, MTS, MEAO

○ HAVO, VWO, Gymnasium

○ HBO, HEAO, PABO, HTS

○ Universiteit

○ Anders

Block 10

Wat is uw hoogst voltooide opleiding?

> [   ]

Block 9

Indien u opmerkingen heeft bij de vorige opgave wil ik u vragen dit hieronder aan te geven.

> [   ]

Block 8

Deel 2

Ik zou u willen vragen om de signalen ("items") van het radicaliseringsproces te groeperen op basis van uw eigen praktijkervaring. Elke groep stelt hierbij een fase voor uit het radicaliseringsproces en de items zijn de signalen van de verschillende fases van het radicalisatieproces. U bent volledig vrij om te bepalen welke signalen ("items") u in welke fase ("groep") wilt plaatsen, of u alle signalen in groepen wilt plaatsen en hoeveel verschillende fases u wilt onderscheiden (u hoeft dus niet 10 fases te onderscheiden, dit is het maximum). Daarbij is het belangrijk om de fases te vormen aan de hand van de meest voorkomende signalen, er zijn ten slotte altijd uitzonderingen.

U kunt de items van het radicalisatie proces in verschillende groepen plaatsen door de items naar een groep te slepen.
* Voorbeeld: Vindt u dat "het voorbereiden van een aanval", "identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus)" en "iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor de onrechtvaardigheid" samen de signalen van de eerste fase in het radicaliseringsproces zijn? Sleep deze drie items dan één voor één naar "Groep 1". De volgorde waarin u de items zet maakt niet uit.

Items	Groep 1
Het voorbereiden van een aanval	Groep 2
Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus)	Groep 3
Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor de onrechtvaardige situatie	Groep 4
Behoefte aan betekenis	Groep 5
Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam	Groep 6
Verlies van een familielid/vriend	Groep 7
Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien	Groep 8
Moslim identiteitscrisis	Groep 9
Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval	Groep 10
Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven	
Het plannen van een aanval	
Ontmenselijken van de vijand	
Persoonlijke onzekerheid	
Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden	
Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie)	

Block 2

Deel 3

Er zijn verschillende definities van 'radicalisering'. In dit onderzoek wordt de volgende definities gebruikt:

Radicalisering is het "proces van het zoeken, vinden, aannemen, voeden en ontwikkelen van een extreem geloofssysteem tot het punt waar het een katalysator is voor een terroristische daad".

Dit betekent dat radicalisering een proces is dat tot een terroristische daad leidt en dat dat geldt voor elke vorm van terrorisme. Het radicaliseringsproces doorloopt verschillende fases wat enkele maanden tot jaren kan duren. De trap is een metafoor voor het proces. Elke tree leidt tot meer radicalisering, met terrorisme op de bovenste tree. Niet iedereen zal de hele trap naar boven lopen, sommigen blijven op een bepaalde tree staan. Elke tree heeft zijn eigen gedragskenmerken en psychologische processen. Er kunnen verschillende fases worden onderscheiden, maar ze hebben ook overlap.

Uit de literatuur blijkt dat het radicaliseringsproces in **drie fases** kan worden verdeeld: **1) "Gevoelig voor radicalisatie", 2) "Groepslidmaatschap" en 3) "Actie"**. Zoals hierboven beschreven heeft elke fase zijn eigen gedragskenmerken en psychologische processen, ook wel indicatoren genoemd. Aan de hand van deze indicatoren kan worden herkend of iemand wel/niet aan het radicaliseren is en in welke fase van het radicaliseringsproces iemand zich bevindt.

 Block 3

De volgende indicatoren zijn gegeven. Geef alstublieft bij elk signaal aan in hoeverre u vindt dat dit een signaal is van de **eerste fase "Gevoelig voor radicalisatie"**. U kunt voor elk signaal aangeven of u het er "sterk mee oneens" tot "sterk mee eens" bent. Het is belangrijk dat u dit doet op basis van uw eigen praktijkervaring(en) met Nederlandse moslimjongeren en <u>niet</u> op basis van wat u verwacht dat er in de literatuur beschreven staat.

	Sterk mee oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Sterk mee eens
Het voorbereiden van een aanval	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Neutraal	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Eens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus)	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Sterk mee oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Neutraal	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Eens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Sterk mee eens

	Sterk mee oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Sterk mee eens
Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Neutraal	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Eens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee eens
Behoefte aan betekenis	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Neutraal	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Eens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee eens
Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee oneens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Oneens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Neutraal	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Eens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee eens
Verlies van een familielid/vriend	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Neutraal	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Eens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee eens
Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Neutraal	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Eens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee eens
Moslim identiteitscrisis	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Neutraal	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Eens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee eens
Ontkennen/verminderen van	○ Ontkennen/ve	○ Ontkennen/ve	○ Ontkennen/ve	○ Ontkennen/ve	○ Ontkennen/ve

de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval	rminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee oneens	rminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Oneens	rminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Neutraal	rminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Eens	rminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee eens
Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven	Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee oneens	Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Oneens	Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Neutraal	Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Eens	Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee eens
Het plannen van een aanval	Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	Het plannen van een aanval Oneens	Het plannen van een aanval Neutraal	Het plannen van een aanval Eens	Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Ontmenselijken van de vijand	Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee oneens	Ontmenselijken van de vijand Oneens	Ontmenselijken van de vijand Neutraal	Ontmenselijken van de vijand Eens	Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee eens
Persoonlijke onzekerheid	Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee oneens	Persoonlijke onzekerheid Oneens	Persoonlijke onzekerheid Neutraal	Persoonlijke onzekerheid Eens	Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee eens
Meer omgang met	Meer omgang met	Meer omgang met	Meer omgang met	Meer omgang met	Meer omgang met

gelijkdenkenden	gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee oneens	gelijkdenkenden Oneens	gelijkdenkenden Neutraal	gelijkdenkenden Eens	gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee eens
Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie)	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee oneens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Oneens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Neutraal	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Eens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee eens

Block 19

De volgende indicatoren zijn gegeven. Geef alstublieft bij elk signaal aan in hoeverre u vindt dat dit een signaal is van de **tweede fase "Groepslidmaatschap"**. U kunt voor elk signaal aangeven of u het er "sterk mee oneens" tot "sterk mee eens" bent. Het is belangrijk dat u dit doet op basis van uw eigen praktijkervaring(en) met Nederlandse moslimjongeren en <u>niet</u> op basis van wat u verwacht dat er in de literatuur beschreven staat.

	Sterk mee oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Sterk mee eens
Het voorbereiden van een aanval	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Neutraal	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Eens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus)	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Sterk mee oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Neutraal	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Eens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijk en/of religieus) Sterk mee eens
Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Neutraal	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Eens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee eens

	Sterk mee oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Sterk mee eens
Behoefte aan betekenis	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Neutraal	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Eens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee eens
Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee oneens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Oneens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Neutraal	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Eens	○ Meer radicale interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee eens
Verlies van een familielid/vriend	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Neutraal	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Eens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee eens
Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Neutraal	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Eens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee eens
Moslim identiteitscrisis	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Neutraal	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Eens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee eens
Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Oneens	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Neutraal	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Eens	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee

	oneens				eens
Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee oneens	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Oneens	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Neutraal	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Eens	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee eens
Het plannen van een aanval	○ Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Oneens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Neutraal	○ Het plannen van een aanval Eens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Ontmenselijken van de vijand	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee oneens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Oneens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Neutraal	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Eens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee eens
Persoonlijke onzekerheid	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee oneens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Oneens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Neutraal	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Eens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee eens
Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee oneens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Oneens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Neutraal	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Eens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee eens
Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardig	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardig	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardig	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardig	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardig

situatie)	heid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee oneens	heid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Oneens	heid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Neutraal	heid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Eens	heid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee eens

Block 20

De volgende indicatoren zijn gegeven. Geef alstublieft bij elk signaal aan in hoeverre u vindt dat dit een signaal is van de **derde fase "Actie"**. U kunt voor elk signaal aangeven of u het er "sterk mee oneens" tot "sterk mee eens" bent. Het is belangrijk dat u dit doet op basis van uw eigen praktijkervaring(en) met Nederlandse moslimjongeren en <u>niet</u> op basis van wat u verwacht dat er in de literatuur beschreven staat.

	Sterk mee oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Sterk mee eens
Het voorbereiden van een aanval	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Oneens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Neutraal	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Eens	○ Het voorbereiden van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus)	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus) Sterk mee oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus) Oneens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus) Neutraal	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus) Eens	○ Identiteitsverandering (persoonlijken/of religieus) Sterk mee eens
Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Oneens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Neutraal	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Eens	○ Iemand verantwoordelijk houden voor een onrechtvaardige situatie Sterk mee eens
Behoefte aan betekenis	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Oneens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Neutraal	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Eens	○ Behoefte aan betekenis Sterk mee eens
Meer radicale interpretatie	○ Meer radicale	○ Meer radicale	○ Meer radicale	○ Meer radicale	○ Meer radicale

van de Islam	interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee oneens	interpretatie van de Islam Oneens	interpretatie van de Islam Neutraal	interpretatie van de Islam Eens	interpretatie van de Islam Sterk mee eens
Verlies van een familielid/vriend	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Oneens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Neutraal	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Eens	○ Verlies van een familielid/vriend Sterk mee eens
Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Oneens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Neutraal	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Eens	○ Gemotiveerd om groepsloyaliteit te laten zien Sterk mee eens
Moslim identiteitscrisis	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Oneens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Neutraal	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Eens	○ Moslim identiteitscrisis Sterk mee eens
Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Oneens	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Neutraal	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Eens	○ Ontkennen/verminderen van de effecten voor de vijand bij het uitvoeren van een aanslag/aanval Sterk mee eens
Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een aanslag) op	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een	○ Verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde daden (bijv. het uitvoeren van een

anderen afschuiven	aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee oneens	aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Oneens	aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Neutraal	aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Eens	aanslag) op anderen afschuiven Sterk mee eens
Het plannen van een aanval	○ Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee oneens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Oneens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Neutraal	○ Het plannen van een aanval Eens	○ Het plannen van een aanval Sterk mee eens
Ontmenselijken van de vijand	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee oneens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Oneens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Neutraal	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Eens	○ Ontmenselijken van de vijand Sterk mee eens
Persoonlijke onzekerheid	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee oneens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Oneens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Neutraal	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Eens	○ Persoonlijke onzekerheid Sterk mee eens
Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee oneens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Oneens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Neutraal	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Eens	○ Meer omgang met gelijkdenkenden Sterk mee eens
Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie)	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee oneens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Oneens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Neutraal	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Eens	○ Gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid (bij een bepaalde situatie) Sterk mee eens

Block 4

Heeft u nog vragen en/of opmerkingen die u kwijt wil over dit onderzoek?

Block 7

Vul hieronder uw e-mailadres in als u na de afronding van het onderzoek de resultaten wil ontvangen:

Survey Powered By Qualtrics

Appendix C: Table with the frequency for every signal per phase

	Feelings of injustice	Personal uncertainty	Muslim identity crisis	Seek for significance	Change of identity (personal and religious)	Very motivated to show loyalty to the group	Holding someone responsible for the injustice	More radical interpretations of the Islam	Joining like-minded people	Displace responsibility	Dehumanizing the enemy	Loss of a relative/friend	Downsizing the effects for the enemy	Preparing an attack	Planning an attack
Group 1	36	53	24	39	16	13	16	7	15	7	5	35	6	8	8
Group 2	21	8	24	19	24	19	22	24	28	11	6	14	4	3	3
Group 3	9	6	15	9	20	21	22	17	16	14	16	8	17	10	12
Group 4	2	0	4	0	10	7	7	12	4	12	20	4	17	6	9
Group 5	0	1	1	0	2	6	0	9	2	8	4	1	9	19	13
Group 6	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	1	4	5	5	0	5	6	10
Group 7	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	5	3	1
Group 8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	3	4	4
Group 9	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	5	4
Group 10	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	4	1	2	4	5