Predicting network effectiveness?

An analysis of local collaborative networks to prevent and counter radicalization

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Abstract

This project offers new insights in the understanding of network effectiveness, especially with regard to the applicability and appropriateness of existing literature. Extended case method is used to the study network effectiveness as it examines theories in order to understand what to expect and thereby it seeks to build on existing theory. Policy documents and guidelines were the basis for examining the approaches that were taken by the three local collaborative networks that seek to prevent and counter radicalization. Additional semi-structured interviews provided in-depth understanding in the functioning of, and the services provided by, the collaborative networks. Besides focusing on the contextual-, structural- and functional characteristics of the collaborative networks, this thesis assesses the comprehensiveness of the services provided. This thesis observed that the theory was limited appropriate for the concerned collaborative networks, which resulted in certain side notes that have to be considered prior to assessment of network effectiveness. The key message of this thesis is that, even though a comprehensive set of services is provided and the network functions well, the desired effect is not fully achieved. This thesis argues that the capabilities in de-radicalizing an individual are limited, which ought to be considered in the approach taken; preventive supersedes repressive. Network effectiveness is a construct with a plurality of interpretations and features, which has to be explicitly alluded. Collaborative networks could be effective as in efficient, stable and encounter low levels of conflict, yet still achieve low scores on goal attainment. Indicating that effectiveness on the network-level does not guarantee effectiveness on the community-level. This thesis seeks to stimulate research in order to increase goal attainment in the field of radicalization prevention and counter-radicalization as well as additional research on the different dimensions of network effectiveness.

Key words: Collaborative networks, network effectiveness, radicalization, de-radicalization, multidimensional construct and cooperation

List of Abbreviations

AIVD	Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst
	General Intelligence and Security Service
AZC	Asielzoekerscentrum
	Asylum center
CBS	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
	Central Bureau of Statistics
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
ESS	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit
	Expertise unit Social Stability
IS	Islamic State
MDO	Multi-disciplinair overleg
	Multi-disciplinary consultation
NAO	Network Administrative Organization
NCTV	Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid
	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
RAN	Radicalization Awareness Network
VNG	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten
	Association of Dutch Municipalities

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1 Introduction

This thesis seeks to assess the collaborative networks that are established in order to prevent and counter radicalization and thereby it seeks to add to literature on collaborative network effectiveness. The assessment will be done by examination of existing literature on both radicalization and collaborative networks. There exist many different kinds of radical worldviews, which is not limited to a certain ethnicity or religion. Yet, in this thesis the aim lies on Islamic radicalization and the networks that attempt to prevent and counter radicalization in the Netherlands. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to add to theories on network effectiveness and to provide a conclusion on the assumed effectiveness of the established collaborative networks on the local level.

1.1 Background information

Modern terrorism is not new to European society. Rapoport (2004) argued that we are currently experiencing a fourth wave of modern terrorism, i.e. religious terrorism. The year 1979 is an important year with regard to the events that have led to the appearance of religious motivated international terrorism. Grand Ayatollah, and leader of the Iranian revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini declared that the Middle East should embrace, and unite in, Islam instead of opting for the western capitalists or the eastern communists. In addition, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, which led to the call for jihad by Abdullah Y. Azziz in order to fight the Soviet invaders. After the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, Bin Laden advocated that the jihad should be targeted at enemies both near and far (Graaf, 2016). Al-Qaida was the first terrorist organization that recruited individuals from multiple countries instead of merely one nation (Rapoport, 2004). However, following the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, a new terrorist organization arose i.e. the IS. This new organization excelled Al-Qaida on three crucial points as De Graaf (2016) agued, i.e. the proclamation of a Caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014; the establishment of a well-functioning and supported police state; powerful propaganda strategies (Graaf, 2016).

The considerable increase in the number of individuals that sympathize with a radical interpretation of Islam has caused challenges for governments as old methods that were used in tracking and monitoring the suspects of terrorism did not longer suffice (Olmer, 2013). Consequently, new policies have been implemented within the EU and the Netherlands. Starting in 2005 the approach of the EU was based on the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment (European Commission, 2016). Currently, the prevention and countering of radicalization and terrorism is one out of the three core priorities for European security (European Commission, 2015). According to the EC, in carrying out the European Agenda on Security opted for the period of 2015-2020, the EU can add value on seven specific areas i.e.

"countering terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online (1); addressing radicalization in prisons (2); promoting inclusive education and EU common values (3); promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people (4); strengthening the international cooperation (5); boosting research, evidence building, monitoring and networks (6); focusing on the security dimension (7) (European Commission, 2016, p. 1)". Member States, along with local, regional and national actors, are primarily responsible for the prevention and countering of radicalization. Meaning that effective cooperation and sharing of information between national and local actors is necessary (NCTV, 2014). Both the EU and the Dutch national governmental actors provide guidelines, trainings, knowledge and financial aid, as they acknowledge the key role of local actors. The European Commission has established the RAN, an umbrella network that seeks to enhance the establishment of networks, the sharing of expertize and experiences, cooperation and overall effectiveness (European Commission, 2012).

The policy and guidelines provided by both the EU and the Dutch national government enable the municipalities to structure the approach taken to their needs. Consequently, the larger Dutch municipalities have developed their own preventative projects and approaches with distinct characteristics (Vidino, 2008). There exists a strong feeling of responsibility among the larger municipalities with regard to the prevention of radicalization. However, the municipalities are not capable of resolving complex problems as radicalization on their own. Cooperation with a clear distribution of tasks and responsibilities between the national partners and the municipalities is of interest (VNG, 2014). In addition, proper information exchange and clear mutual expectations are necessary (NCTV, 2014). Municipalities are advised to prepare for radicalization related issues before the problem arises, as they feature both preventing and repressing approaches. The preventing methods for radicalization can be divided into the community targeted- and community focused approach (Jongh, 2015). The community focused approach is considered to be "cooperations and partnerships between police and the community to control crime (Spalek & McDonald, 2012, p. 20)" and the community targeted approach is considered to be "the full coercive powers of the state in obtaining information and monitoring a community (Murray, 2005, p. 354)". The municipalities have to cooperate with local and national actors, as well as the EU, in order to successfully adopt this comprehensive approach.

The success of the network form of governance has been confirmed for decades in studies on public networks (Cristofoli & Markovic, 2016), especially for so called 'wicked problems' (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Therefore, a comprehensive approach calls for well-functioning collaborative networks and cooperation on different hierarchical levels, i.e. local, regional, national and EU. Preferably, municipalities cooperate with a range of distinct actors as religious communities, imams and other key figures, civilians, youth and social workers and schools. These

actors are closest to the individuals and could detect changes in behavior (NCTV, 2014). Besides these actors in the preventive phase, the municipalities should cooperate closely with the AIVD, the national police, EUROPOL and other security services. Well-functioning collaborative networks are of utmost importance in the prevention and countering of radicalization, as the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism stated "we are as strong as our partners (NCTV, 2014, p. 16)". The question is, how strong are the partners and thus the established networks? Honing, a Dutch convert who radicalized, and later on de-radicalized, who perhaps most frequently joined the public debate on radicalization argued that the success of the collaborative networks is questionable. He argued that Islam has not a single authority, but a lot of varying religious movements. Therefore, cooperation with a few imams is unsuccessful, as these imams will lose the support of some (less secular) followers. Furthermore, Honing argued that youth-workers are applying methods developed for rebellious youth on jihadists, which tends to be ineffective (Honing & Sterkenburg, 2015). In addition, Marianne Vorthoren, a Dutch Islamic community leader, stated, "we are not the Muslim intelligence agency". She argues that she feels responsibility for the community and society, yet does not wish to inform on suspicious behavior as that is up to the authorities (Atkinson, 2016). Moreover, schools tend to be reluctant to report students as they try to protect their students of unnecessary suspicion; attempt to maintain a good relationship with their students and their parents; do not want the reputation of having radicals (Witteveen, 2016).

1.2 Research Problem

To date, there has been limited research on the effectiveness of the established networks. A study by De Jongh (2015) has examined the effects of delegating the counter-radicalization policies at the municipal level in the Netherlands. She found that counter-radicalization policies cause local actors to label individuals as deviant. Yet, local actors seem to be cautious in applying labels as 'right or wrong' to prevent stigmatization of communities (Jongh, 2015). In addition, local actors tend to prefer community-focused over community-targeted approaches. Their role of community father/mother requires mutual trust in order to be effective, which they attempt to achieve by striving for transparency and honesty concerning their intentions; continuous personal contact; displaying signs of interest in the community's needs and values (Jongh, 2015). With regard to the functioning of the established network De Jongh (2015) found that local actors perceive reluctance in information sharing by their national partners, which challenges their effectiveness.

A second research conducted by Witteveen (2016) found that actors involved in the local approach are moderately positive about the implementation and functioning of the local approach. However, he found some recurring recommendations and restrictions. Local actors recommend an interpretation expert for both the police and the municipality; emphasize that

facilitating in order to prevent provocation is different from giving in to the terrorists; more efforts into counter-narratives in order to win over the individuals susceptible for radicalization; expanding possibilities for authorization for internet searches; intensify cooperation with schools concerning the sharing of information. The findings concerning the restrictions experienced by the local actors were threefold: the paradox in efforts to counter polarization; the reluctance of schools to share information; possible backfire of successful policy, meaning that preventing an individual to go on jihad abroad could possibly lead to a terrorist attack within the Netherlands (Witteveen, 2016).

These studies have created a basis for further research, as there are some limitations to these studies with regard to network effectiveness. As De Jongh (2015) denoted, the measures taken to prevent and counter radicalization were fairly new to the tasks of local actors while she conducted her research. Meaning that most municipalities had not experienced any indicators of radicalized individuals; hence they had not yet experienced the actual effectiveness and efficiency of the policy measures and the established networks. De Jongh (2015) recommended future research on the actual policy implementation and functioning of the local approach.

Witteveen (2016) in his thesis examined whether or not the Dutch local approach is a comprehensive approach. He conducted five interviews with local actors involved with the development of the local approach or the actual execution. His findings provide insights in the perceptions of local actors regarding the effectiveness, the completeness and the efficiency of the local approach. However, five interviews are not sufficient to provide an adequate analysis of the functioning of the local approach. Therefore, further research on the actual functioning of the established local networks is of interest.

None of the studies to date have compared networks of different municipalities. De Jongh (2015) has involved four municipalities in her research. However, she does not elaborate on whether she compared the different municipalities and respectively their established networks. Consequently, she does not draw conclusions as such. Witteveen (2016) performed a comparative research on the counter-terrorism efforts of four European countries. However, he did not conduct a comparative research among Dutch municipalities concerning the local approach. To fully examine the effectiveness of local networks a comparative research is necessary. Considering that on the basis of comparative findings, conclusions could be drawn with regard to the specific needs for a network for distinct municipalities.

Among the studies currently available, none has assessed the established networks on the basis of literature concerning network effectiveness. To provide a more in-depth understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the established networks, current knowledge on networks

could offer great insights. Therefore, literature on network effectiveness should be applied as a framework in which the established local networks are examined. Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) studied the collaborative network effectiveness of crime prevention networks in the Netherlands. The results of their study indicated certain conditions that are necessary for a collaborative network to be effective. They developed a formula which could predict collaborative network effectiveness; with age, stability, resource munificence, network structure and mode of network governance set as configurations. In order to fill the gap in our existing knowledge, this thesis seeks to examine the effectiveness of the established networks to prevent and counter radicalization by applying this formula on collaborative networks effectiveness. This assessment will add to literature on collaborative network effectiveness and the policy approaches taken to prevent and counter radicalization. Therefore, the research question of this thesis reads: *How can the formula developed by Raab, Mannak and Cambré explain the effectiveness of the collaborative counter-radicalization networks A, B and C? And how does the entirety of configurations relate to other factors?*

1.3 Approach

In order to provide new insights in the effectiveness of the established collaborative networks three local collaborative networks will be examined; collaborative networks A, B and C. Theories from Provan in cooperation with distinct colleagues, and particularly the study of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), will provide a framework which will be used to assess the chosen local collaborative networks. The information on the collaborative networks will be obtained by policy documents, evaluation reports and interviews. Policy documents will provide insights in the approach taken by the specific municipality and the involved actors. Evaluation reports from both the municipality and the involved actors will provide insights in their perceptions on the functioning of the network, and what possibly needs improvement. Interviews on their turn allow me to navigate the required information and obtain information that different actors wish to express. This indicates that the interviews will be semi-structured. There have been eleven interviews distributed over three local collaborative networks. This indicates that the examination will be performed on the network-level, thus the functioning of the participating actors collectively. It is questionable whether effectiveness on the network-level causes effectiveness on the community-level. Provan and Milward (2001) argued that there are three levels analysis, i.e. the community-level; the network-level and the organization/participant-level, and that effectiveness on one level does not guarantee effectiveness on another level.

The obtained information will be tested to existing theories on network effectiveness. The results of the different networks will be compared and discussed. Meaning that besides a descriptive approach, this thesis will have an explorative approach as it seeks to explore the

different factors that influence the effectiveness with regard to the networks to prevent and counter radicalization. The comparison is necessary to acquire solid and legitimate conclusions which will add to our current understanding of network effectiveness. In addition, this thesis seeks to add to the studies performed by De Jongh (2015) and Witteveen (2016) by providing in-depth insights in the effectiveness of the Dutch local approach. Thus, by applying new theories to examine the Dutch local approach this thesis is of academic relevance. Furthermore, the society experiences a lot of fear and resentment towards religious terrorism, and thus the previous stage that is radicalization. There have been numerous terror attacks in EU countries driven by Islamic radicalism; as displayed in *Appendix A*. Moreover, the level of threat in the Netherlands since march 2013 is rated to be 'substantial' by the NCTV (NCTV, 2016). Substantial is the fourth out of five levels. Therefore, an assessment of the current policy is of interest. Governments will benefit from an evaluation of the effectiveness of current policy including possible improvements for adjusted policy approaches. New insights that lead to better policies could reduce costs while being more effective. In addition, both the governments and the society will benefit from the safer environment with lowers risks of terrorist attacks. Therefore, this thesis is of societal relevance.

This introduction will be followed up by a theoretic part in which the main theories, literature, key authors and definitions will be discussed (chapter 2). Thereafter, the methods used will be discussed, including method of data collection and method of data analysis (chapter 3). Then the case selection and the collaborative networks are described (chapter 4). Subsequently, the findings are discussed in light of the formula by Raab, Mannak and Cambré and the comprehensiveness of the collaborative networks are discussed (chapter 5). The last chapter will contain the conclusions as well as the discussion on the thesis and its findings (chapter 6).

2 Theoretic chapter

In order to adequately address and grasp the topic and to understand both radicalization and collaborative networks, the current state of theories and definitions have to be known. Therefore, this theoretic chapter elaborates on the core concepts and theories in order to be able to answer the formal research question on the effectiveness of the radicalization prevention and counter-radicalization networks. There has been a lot of research surrounding the topic of radicalization, especially in the last decade. For this thesis the work of Moghaddam, Veldhuis and Staun and Sageman are particularly interesting. Moghaddam has developed a six-level phase model that plausibly leads to radicalization. Veldhaus and Staun developed a root cause model for radicalization. Sageman, on his turn, has built on the previous models with his four pronged approach. Concerning the other topic of this thesis, i.e. collaborative networks, there has been some interesting work done by Provan, who cooperated with Milward, Sebastian and Kenis. Particularly interesting for this thesis is the recent contribution by Raab, Mannak and Cambré, who developed a theory on network effectiveness by studying crime prevention networks in the Netherlands. These reputable theories will be applied in this thesis. This chapter will start off by discussing radicalization; when is an individual considered to be radicalized? Thereafter, the determinants of radicalization will be debated; why do certain individuals radicalize where others do not? This is an important question, as the remedy for radicalization could be given as soon as the determinants are known. Subsequently, the theories on both the emergence of networks, network effectiveness and the assessment of network effectiveness will be presented.

2.1 Determinants of Radicalization

The literature on radicalization presents a quantity of definitions on the concerning concept. Yet, there is no single widely agreed upon definition that covers the phenomenon. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) defined radicalization as a "change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in-group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 416)". The in-group in this context entails the group to which the individual feels he belongs to. However, Lentini (2009) argues that this definition fails to acknowledge the desire to remodel the society, culture and political structure (Lentini, 2009). A definition that includes this desire to restructure the society, and hence covers the cultural and political aspects, is a definition on radicalism provided by the AIVD. Therefore, in this thesis radicalization must be understood as:

> "*The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).* (AIVD, 2004, p. 13)"

The determinants of radicalization are extensively researched in the last decades. However, there is no agreement on the exact determinants of radicalization. There is a quantity of suggestions of plausible causal relations, yet there are no factual conditions nor personal characteristics for the concerned process. As for each individual there might be a different motivation driving the radicalization process (Post, 2010), and therefore individuals have to be approached differently in order to be effective (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010). Although each individual needs to be approached differently, this chapter seeks to present an overview of the spectrum of services necessary to counter radicalization. The research on the understanding of the radicalization process has resulted into three predominant models; the phase models, the root cause model and the four pronged approach. However, as Witteveen (2016) argued, "it is important to keep in mind that these models are oversimplifying the real situation in society; they only serve as a structure, a way in which the process of radicalization can be looked at (Witteveen, 2016, p. 14+15)". In order to be able to answer the research question of this thesis it is of interest to understand the three prevailing models and plausible determinants of radicalization, for counter-radicalization effectiveness could be assessed once one understands the determinants.

Phase models chronologically prescribe phases which the individual goes through in the radicalization process. An example of these phase models is the staircase to terrorism model of Moghaddam (2005). In his model, in which he uses a narrowing staircase to terrorism as a metaphor, he distinguishes a ground floor with an additional five floors. The ground floor entails that an individual perceives injustice and deprivation. At the first floor, the individual seeks solutions for what he perceives. If these feelings do not perish, then an individual is likely to portray his anger on the outgroup; considered to be the second floor. If an individual perceives terrorism as legitimate, then the third floor is reached. At the fourth floor, the individual has joined a terrorist organization. At the fifth, and final, floor, the individual carries out a terrorist attack (Moghaddam, 2005). Phase models teach the different stages an individual is believed to go through and what they feel at the certain points, hence it provides insights in which services and efforts could function as a remedy for the specific point in the process.

The root cause model of radicalization is developed by Veldhuis and Staun (2009) as they had two points of critique on the phase models. The first critique they had concerns the selection on the dependent variable; radicalization. By focusing solely on the cases where the radicalization process is successful – that is the individual is radicalized to the point of violence – a biased view of reality is presented. Phase models fail to explain why certain individuals that experience a certain phase do not radicalize or radicalize in a peaceful manner, whereas others turn to violence. This results from starting the research with successful cases (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). A second point of critique is the statistical discrimination that results from the phase models, meaning that

it targets a small and sensitive group. Even though the vast majority of the group that experiences a certain phase do not radicalize in the violent form or do not radicalize at all (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The root cause model seeks to add to the phase model by offering a framework that allows to explain why certain individuals do radicalize where others do not. By doing so, the root cause model is helpful as it could provide in-depth insights in different cases, meaning why certain do and others do not radicalize.

> "The root cause model distinguishes causal factors at the macro level and the micro level, and argues that macro-level factors are preconditions for radicalization, but that in order to explain why some people do radicalize, and other people do not do so, a scrutiny of micro-level variables is essential. (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p. 22)"

The third model is the four pronged approach. Sageman (2008), who criticizes both the phase model and the root cause model, argues that the four pronged approaches offers a solution to the critiques of the other models. His critique on the root cause model is that the model does not enable to explain why most individuals under the same circumstances do not radicalize. Sageman (2008), building on the two previous models, adds two prongs to the two existing cognitive prongs (macro and micro), i.e. the cognitive prong of resonation of perceived injustice with personal experience and the situational prong of having a network (Sageman, 2008). These two middle range (meso) factors add to the macro- and micro level factors and serve to enable the explanation why some individuals radicalize and others do not. By adding two prongs to the existing prongs Sageman provides a theory that create in-depth knowledge of the determinants of the radicalization process, on which counter-radicalization strategies could be based.

As this thesis seeks to assess the effectiveness of the established networks in order to prevent and counter radicalization, the assessment and designation of the prevailing model goes beyond the scope of the thesis; nor is it possible given a lack of empirical research data (King & Taylor, 2011). Yet, the understanding of these models is necessary for assessing the effectiveness of the concerned radicalization prevention and counter-radicalization networks. In order to prevent and counter radicalization effectively, all of the determinants that could be identified based on these prevailing models have to be addressed. The determinants that result from these models combined are: personal factors; relative deprivation; macro factors; group influence; religion; altruism; demonization of the out-group; violent radicalization (Witteveen, 2016). A recent study indicated that individuals pass through three phases in the radicalization process, i.e. the sensitivity phase; the group membership phase; action phase. It is argued that during each phase the individual could be influenced by micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors that are believed to contribute to the radicalization of the individual (Doosje, et al., 2016). This study

allows for a clear overview of different factors on different levels that plausibly contribute to the radicalization process. Therefore, the determinants are further explained in similar manner.

Micro-level factors concern the personal, or individual, factors (Doosje, et al., 2016). Personal determinants that could enhance the sensitivity for a radical ideology are considered to be personal history; identity/dignity issues (Halverson & Way, 2012); personal uncertainty (Doosje, et al., 2016); mental problems; personal deprivation (Bie, Poot, & Leun, 2014); perceiving personal injustice or threat (Doosje, Loseman, & Bos, 2013); the search for meaning or significance (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010). On the contrary, supporters of the social movement theory and network theory argue that socialization is a stronger determinant in the radicalization process than inherent psychological characteristics or personal socioeconomic status (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010). This socialization is a meso-level factor, which reflects group determinants. Therefore, perceived in-group injustice and deprivation are believed to enhance a radical ideology (Doosje, et al., 2016). Macro-level factors reflect global events or trends. Globalization is believed to be a macro-level factor that enhances the radicalization process, as globalization and the spread of western culture threaten the Islamic culture (Doosje, et al., 2016). Thus, as was argued as early as 1960 by Lipset, education and training resilience is if utmost importance to withhold an individual form developing feelings and sensitivity towards radical and extreme ideologies (Lipset, 1960). Individuals with lower levels of education are more susceptible "to view politics as black and white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, they should be more likely than other strata to prefer extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems and have a rigid outlook (Lipset, 1960, p. 100)".

In the second phase, the individual has developed strong in-group feelings of belonging and has joined, or intends to join, a radical group. The individual is believed to have joined the group on the basis of the determinants of the sensitivity phase (Doosje, et al., 2016). Interesting findings suggest, however, that irregular immigrants with restricted opportunities tend to join radical networks based on pragmatic grounds rather than on ideological grounds, e.g. illegal financial gains and access to certain goods and services (Bie, Poot, & Leun, 2014). On the micro-level, the individuals presumably desire to display their loyalty by strictly following rules and publicly promoting the in-group; and in contrast, downgrading the out-group (Doosje, et al., 2016). The meso- or group level has a strong effect on the radicalization process in this phase. Radical groups tend to restrict their members, as they try to lure the individuals away from both family and former friends (Doosje, et al., 2016). This intensifies the bond with, and the dependency on, the radical group. A global event, or macro-level factor, that triggered the willingness of joining a radical group is the proclamation of the caliphate by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Doosje, et al., 2016), as this is perceived as a success and reflects great possibilities.

The third and final phase, is the phase where members turn to violence as their mean. On the personal (micro) level, a determinant to reach this stage is believed to be personal grievances, for example the loss of a close person (Doosje, et al., 2016). Again, the group, or meso-level, is a strong determinant in this phase. Group pressure restrains an individual from backing down from a planned attack or abandoning the group (Post, 2010). Macro-level determinants as violent and harsh measures conducted on the in-group by the authorities are believed to strengthen the willingness to use violence as a mean (Doosje, et al., 2016). Therefore, certain counter-terrorism activities could possibly turn out working counter-productive (Post, 2010).

Since there exists such a quantity of determinants for radicalization, without agreement on the prevailing determinants and known factual causal relations, there is an absolute need for a comprehensive approach. A broad approach serves the detection of individuals that meet the presumable determinants and enables early measures. A comprehensive approach based on the three prevailing models combined contains four themes of policy measures, i.e. "preventive, repressive, accompanying and informatory measures (Witteveen, 2016, p. 69)". Plausible indicators of a radical belief system are perceived illegitimacy of the authority; feelings of superiority of the in-group; disconnection from society; perceived distance to individuals from the out-group (Doosje, Loseman, & Bos, 2013). This section elaborated on the determinants of radicalization and provided insights in the necessary objectives for counter-radicalization. The range of determinants listed allows for assessment of the policy approaches taken by the municipalities and the other participating actors. However, as the determinants are sundry and huge in amounts, cooperation is key in addressing radicalization. Therefore, subsequently the theories on the emergence and effectiveness of collaborative networks are presented in the next section in order to be able to assess the effectiveness of the local collaborative networks of A, B and C and answer the research question of this thesis.

2.2 Networks to Prevent and counter radicalization

Literature does not fall short with regard to definitions on collaborative networks. There is a quantity of distinct definitions available. Yet, there is no single definition that is considered, and agreed upon, to be the right one. An early definition suggests that networks are "patterned relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991, p. 305)". According to Hay and Richards, networks could be understood as "strategic alliances forged around common agendas of mutual advantage through collective action (Hay & Richards, 2000, p. 13)". A widely cited study by Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti proposed the following definition of network governance:

"Network governance involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as nonprofit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit

and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997, p. 914)"

Within this definition the construct 'select' implies that involved organizations frequently contact and cooperate with certain organizations within the network, but have far less or no contact with other organizations. 'Persistent' implies frequent collaboration and 'structured' implies patterned collaboration between certain organizations. With 'implicit and open-ended' the authors indicate that the collaborations are not flowing from authority nor from legal contracts (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). However, Provan and Kenis (2008) provide a narrow, yet clear, description of networks: "groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal (p.231)". Networks are associated with certain advantages to reach collective goals. Therefore, certain conditions contribute to the development of networks.

Networks are believed to be capable of offering solutions to problems, and the provision of services, that independent organization could not achieve. As Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) said, "complex, sometimes even 'wicked' problems can only be tackled via multiple organizations with access to diverse resources and expertise (p.480)". Radicalization can be considered to be such a complex problem. In addition, "cooperation is particularly appealing when the profit motive is absent, because the potential downsides of cooperation, such as reduced autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a threat to survival (Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 415)". In contrast, joining a network is believed to increase the legitimacy of the organizations involved (Provan & Milward, 2001). A theory by Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) integrated transaction cost economics (TCE) and social network theories in order to provide a framework that describes under which conditions the network form of governance emerges. Networks are believed to emerge under conditions of demand uncertainty, asset-specific exchanges, frequent contact and task complexity. The prevention and countering of radicalization operates under demand uncertainty as there are no factual causal relations verified by empirical research (King & Taylor, 2011). The miscellaneous causes of radicalization (Post, 2010) call for an comprehensive approach (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010), which requires asset-specific exchanges. In addition, a constant flow of information, best practices and coordination is required to succeed in the complex task of addressing radicalization. In line with this theory, the emergence of collaborative networks to address radicalization is intelligible.

2.3 Network effectiveness

The actual effectuation of the assessment of a collaborative network its effectiveness is challenging. It is argued that network effectiveness should be evaluated at three distinct levels, i.e. the community level; the network level; the organization/participant level. As for each

stakeholder effectiveness could mean something different (see Table I: *Effectiveness criteria on different levels of analysis*). Community-level effectiveness entails whether the problem is being dealt with; whether the approach is received as a success. Network-level effectiveness entails factors on the functioning of the network itself; e.g. cooperation, trust, efficiency and commitment. Organization/participant-level effectiveness entails whether the actors benefit from participation in the collaborative network. The network has to be build and preserved at all the levels, as effectiveness on one level does guarantee effectiveness on the others (Provan & Milward, 2001). However, a thorough analysis on all levels is mostly not feasible as it might be too burdensome, not appropriate nor achievable at the particular time or by lack of sufficient resources (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). For example, cases of radicalization in the Netherlands are relatively scarce and hidden to the public, which results in the inability to verify the perceived influence of the collaborative networks and counter-radicalization efforts on their behavior and outlook on life. Therefore, concluding on network effectiveness on the community level is challenging and the validity is questionable.

Table I: *Effectiveness criteria on different levels of analysis*

Levels of network analysis	Key stakeholder groups	Effectiveness criteria
Community	Principals and Clients • Client advocacy groups • Funders • Politicians • Regulators • General public	• Cost to community • Building social capital • Public perceptions that problem is being solved • Changes in the incidence of the problem • Aggregate indicators of client well-being
Network	Principals and agents • Primary funders and regulators • Network administrative organization • Member organizations	• Network membership growth • Range of services provided • Absence of service duplication • Relationship strength (multiplexity) • Creation and maintenance of network administrative organization (NAO) • Integration/coordination of services • Cost of network maintenance • Member commitment to network goals
Organization/participant	Agents and clients • Member agency board and management • Agency staff • Individual clients	• Agency survival • Enhanced legitimacy • Resource acquisition • Cost of services • Service access • Client outcomes • Minimum conflict for multiprogram agencies across multiple networks

Source: *Provan and Milward (2001) p. 416*

To examine and understand the effectiveness of collaborative networks, and thus to answer the research question of this thesis, network effectiveness has to be set as the dependent

variable. Still, the challenge what network effectiveness is, and how to appropriately measure it, remains. Most studies do not clearly state what type of effectiveness they are measuring and the motives underlying the specific choice (Kenis & Provan, 2009). There are lots of varying criteria of effectiveness (Head, 2008), such as "efficiency, goal attainment, equity, quality, productivity, level of conflict, growth, survival, profit, stability, resilience, learning, and so on (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 443)". The challenge is to pick appropriate criteria of network effectiveness, clearly address them and conduct the appropriate measures. As Kenis and Provan (2009) argued, no criterion is inappropriate per se, yet there are exogenous factors that cannot be influenced by the network based on its characteristics itself, contrary to endogenous factors (Kenis & Provan, 2009). This thesis took the suggestion in consideration when the criteria of effectiveness were selected for the assessment of the concerned collaborative networks.

This thesis seeks to examine the established collaborative networks in order to prevent and counter radicalization by applying a framework acquired by an analysis of existing literature, and thus current understanding and knowledge, on networks effectiveness. One of the most widely cited studies concerning network effectiveness, and therefore functions as the basis of the developed framework, is the work of Provan and Milward (1995). This study suggests that the effectiveness of a network depends on distinct features of network structure and network context.

Network structure entails features of network integration and control. A network that contains a centralized structure, i.e. a central organization that functions as a leader, is believed to be more effective than a network that does not contain an organization as such. Provan and Milward (1995) argue that a central organization enhances integration and cooperation, as the concerning organization is capable of monitoring and controlling the actions and directions of the network. However, integration through cliques is believed to have an even stronger positive effect on network effectiveness than integration of the entire network (Provan & Sebastian, 1998). The degree centrality has to be low, as it contradicts with centralized integration (Provan & Milward, 1995; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Cooperation is enhanced by mutual trust. Mutual trust is important in developing and maintaining relations and communication (Martín-Rodríguez, Beaulieu, D'Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2009). In addition, Provan and Milward (1995) argue that direct and non-fragmented control by the state, without delegating these powers to an external organization, enhances the effectiveness of the network. Therefore, a network with a structure that contains a central organization that functions as a leader and is directly controlled by the state will have more potential to be effective than networks with a different structure. These theoretic insights with regard to the network structure will be implemented in the assessment of the effectiveness of the collaborative networks A, B and C.

Network context entails system stability and environmental resource munificence. Provan and Milward (1995) argue that changes in funding or quick attraction or department of network members could harm the efficiency and outcomes of the network. This would imply a strong decrease in effectiveness of the network. Especially if the network requires cooperation among different members of the network in order to provide adequate services to address the needs (Provan & Milward, 1995), which is the case in the prevention and countering of radicalization. In addition, Provan and Milward (1995) argue that funding, or resources, are needed for effectiveness if the goal of the services provided are long-term. In order to prevent and counter radicalization, long-term assistance and guiding is needed for radicalized individuals to help them find their way in our society. Therefore, long-term and sufficient funding will increase the chances of the network being effective. However, findings suggest that sufficient funding alone is no guarantee for effectiveness; networks that operate in a stable and well-funded context are more likely to be effective than networks that do not (Provan & Milward, 1995; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). These theoretic insights with regard to the network context will be implemented in the assessment of the effectiveness of the collaborative networks A, B and C.

A recent study measured the effectiveness of collaborative networks to prevent crime (Safety Houses) in the Netherlands. As there are lots of similarities with regard to the unit of analysis between the collaborative networks examined in that study and the collaborative networks examined in this study, this thesis will follow their example in answering the research question of this thesis. The study is based on comparable theories as discussed above and tested five configurations (set as independent variables), i.e. network age; system stability; resource munificence; network structure; mode of network governance (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). The scores on the configurations predict the level of the dependent variable, as suggested by Kenis and Provan (2009), network effectiveness. The operationalization and function of the five configurations will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter; the methods chapter. The study indicated that there are three paths for network effectiveness considering the five configurations. The path has to contain all elements in order to be effective, as the configurations are necessary, yet not sufficient, conditions (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). The following formula displays the combinations for network effectiveness:

Formula 1:

$$A \cdot S \cdot I \cdot (R + G) \rightarrow E$$

Source: *Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015)*

According to the formula, a network is assumed to experience high levels of effectiveness (E) if the network is at least three years old (A); has high levels of system stability (S); is centrally

integrated (I); has either sufficient resources (R) or is governed by a NAO (G) (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). This formula indicates that a collaborative network is assumed to be effective it contains all the criteria of the configuration or lacks either sufficient resources or is in absence of a NAO. Therefore, these configurations will be assessed at the collaborative networks A, B and C, which allows for conclusions on the assumed effectiveness and thus the answer to the research question of this thesis. Variation in the levels of these configurations allow for explanation between the differences in the predicted effectiveness of the collaborative networks of A, B and C. By implementing this formula this thesis seeks to combine two approaches for assessment of network effectiveness, as is further substantiated in the next paragraph.

2.4 Network effectiveness – approaches for assessment

Provan and Kenis (2008) argued that most of the research on collaborative networks could be divided into two groups, the network analytical approach (1) and the network as a form of governance approach (2). These theories contribute to the assessment of the concerned collaborative networks by providing insights in the distinct manners to assess effectiveness. The network analytical approach enables researchers to "describe, explain, or compare relational configurations or to use these configurations to explain certain outcomes (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 232)". This means that the network analytical approach focusses on relational ties and structures of the network. The network as a form of governance approach, focusses on the network itself. This approach sets the network itself as the unit of analysis, hence the approach acknowledges that there are different forms of network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

By conducting network analysis, it is possible to generate some in-depth insights in the structure of the network. Network analysis enables assessment of the cohesion, subgroups and the centrality of the network. Cohesion measures seek to assess to what extent actors are cooperating and information is reached. The insights generated by these measures are beneficial in an environment where cooperation, knowledge, and especially the sharing of information are key. Subgroup measures provide insights in particular cliques within a network. A clique is "a subgroup of actors who are all directly connected to one another and no additional network member exists who is also connected to all members of the subgroup (Hawe, Webster, & Shiell, 2004, p. 973)". The detection of cliques provides insights in closely cooperating network members. This structure can be examined and can result, for example, in the recommendation to let a certain member join or leave the clique to enhance effectiveness. Centrality measures enable the detection of important members of the network. These members can influence the direction of the network as well as the flow of information, knowledge and others resources. These type of approach is appropriate as it enables in-depth insights in the existing relations, network structure and the detection of key actors within the network. This approach contributes to data collection

that enables implementation of the formula provided by Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015); specifically the configuration that focuses on network structure and integration.

The network as a form of governance approach enables strategic decision making with regard to the form of the network. Three forms could be distinguished, i.e. shared governance; lead organization; NAO (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Mode of governance is suggested to be an explanatory factor that should be categorized as 'functioning characteristics' (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2010). The shared governance form entails that each member of the network is equal, and that the goals and directions are collectively decided and agreed upon. The lead organization form of governance indicates that there is a central organization that has the power to steer the network in certain directions and is able to make decisions on behalf of the network. The NAO form of governance is quite similar to the lead-organization form of governance. However, in contrast to the lead governance form, this organization is purely administrative and does not take part in the activities of the network itself (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The extent to which one of the governance forms is more likely to be effective depends on certain factors, i.e. trust; number of participants; goal consensus; need for network-level competencies (see Table II: *Factors predicting the effectiveness per form of governance*) (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Provan and Kenis (2008) acknowledge that there could be more, equally important, contingencies that can be considered while strategically deciding to opt for a specific form. However, as this thesis seeks to test the effectiveness of the established networks on the basis of existing knowledge, determining other possible contingencies goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, this approach is helpful for this thesis as it enables assessment of the choice of the type of governance and presumably results in a recommendation or approval. In addition, this approach contributes to the application of the formula by Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), as this approach provides information on the configurations that focuses on the mode of governance.

Table II: *Factors predicting the effectiveness per form of governance*

Governance Forms	Trust	Number of Participants	Goal Consensus	Need for Network-Level Competencies
Shared governance	High density	Few	High	Low
Lead organization	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
Network administrative organization	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

Source: *Provan and Kenis (2008) p. 237*

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter its purpose is to elaborate on the most important concepts and theories applicable to this study. The theoretical framework that resulted from these theories will provide a solid

basis for the chapters to come. Conclusively, there are numerous different determinants that plausibly enhance the radicalization process. Therefore, in order to address radicalization effectively, a comprehensive approach is required. The comprehensive approach has to feature preventive, accompanying, informatory, and repressive features. Each focusing on different types of guidance, trainings and other abilities. Consequently, different actors have to cooperate in order to be capable of providing the required comprehensive services. Thus the actors, out of which the collaborative networks comprise off, have a significant impact on community-level effectiveness. In addition, the effectiveness of the collaborative networks depends on structural, contextual and functioning characteristics. In order to predict the effectiveness of the collaborative networks A, B and C, the formula developed by Raab, Mannak and Cambré will be applied. Indicating that this thesis seeks to assess network effectiveness, besides the ability to collectively provide the required services, by assessing the age, stability, integration, resources and mode of governance of the concerned collaborative networks. Effectiveness has different meanings for different stakeholders in different situations. What level of collaborative network effectiveness this thesis aims to measure, and how this is assessment will be made, will be elaborated on in the next chapter; the methods chapter.

3 Methods

The previous chapter has provided a framework, a solid basis, for the remainder of this thesis. Yet, to adequately assess the effectiveness of the concerned networks, an appropriate approach is required. Therefore, this methods chapter will discuss the method of data collection and method of data analysis respectively. By doing so, the chapter provides sufficient information to replicate this study. This thesis applies qualitative research methods in order to be able to analyze the networks in greater detail. For this study, in line with suggestions of Burawoy and his colleagues, a variation of a typical case study is chosen; extended case method to be specific (Burawoy, et al., 1991). Extended case method, in contrast with grounded theory, examines theories in order to understand what to expect before collecting data on the specific cases. Thereby, the goal is not to confirm nor reject existing theories, but rather to build on existing theory (Babbie E. R., 2012).

3.1 Method of data collection

The analysis of the concerning collaborative networks required different types of data. This data is obtained in various ways. First, relevant policy documents for and of the concerned collaborative networks have been collected. Documents of the European Union and the national government contributed to the understanding of the general approach, funding, obstacles and priorities. Yet, as the municipalities are to a great extent free in the implementation of their specific policy, policy documents of the concerned municipalities were necessary. The policy documents provided insights in the approaches taken by the distinct municipalities and the budget reserved. Besides the documents of the municipalities, policy documents of involved actors have been gathered and analyzed; this enlarged the scope and perceptions as it shed multiple, distinct, lights on certain circumstances and situations. An overview of the analyzed documents is presented in *Appendix B*. Yet, more information is needed for an assessment of the effectiveness of the concerned networks. Therefore, other methods of data collection have been applied.

Initially, the intention was to approach all the participating actors of the concerning collaborative networks in order to obtain information on the composition and relations of the collaborative network. The actors would be requested to complete an, on theory based, self-administered questionnaire (Babbie E. R., 2012). The questionnaire was an online one and was intended to be distributed by e-mail, as it was less time and resources consuming and response rates tend to be higher this way (Cobanoglu, Warde, & Moreo, 2001). Yet, as an overview of the involved actors was requested from the concerned municipalities a dismissive answer followed. Due to privacy concerns and the sensitivity that surrounds the phenomenon of both radicalization and counter-radicalization they argued that the information could not be provided. As the search for all the relevant actors in the collaborative networks is too time and resources consuming, as

well as practically impossible, another solution had to found; the choice to do interviews instead was made.

In-depth interviews have been held with key actors and experts. The process for an interview is considered to have seven stages (Kvale, 1996); i.e. thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying and reporting. These stages are considered and followed in the interviews held in this study. The interviews held were qualitative interviews (Babbie E. R., 2012). As Kvale (1996) his metaphor on the interviewer as a 'miner' illustrates; the key actors and experts possess information and expertise, which is dug out by the interviewer. The purpose of the interviews is to fill remaining gaps of the previous collected data as well as verifying and correcting conflicting findings. In addition, by applying a semi-structured approach the interviewer is able to steer the conversation in certain directions, yet it allows the actors and experts to give additional information they desire to share. In order to adequately answer the formal research question two aspects of the concerned collaborative networks were researched. First, it has to be research which services the collaborative networks are able to provide collectively. The services provided, obviously, have a great impact on the effectiveness of the concerning network on the community-level. From several policy documents the assumption was made that the municipalities have a leading role within the network. Therefore, the choice was made to approach the municipalities in order to obtain information on the composition of the network; interviews were conducted on representatives of each of the municipalities. The second aspect of the collaborative networks that had to be researched in order to conclude on network-level effectiveness were the features of its structure, context and functioning. Therefore, eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted as displayed in *Appendix C*. The 100 pages of transcribed interviews have not been added to the appendix due to several requests by the respondents.

3.2 Method of data analysis

This thesis applies a qualitative approach and obtained data through several means. This indicates that there has been a process of coding during the analysis of the data, which is key in the analysis of qualitative data (Babbie E. R., 2012). This process allows for structuring and a clearer overview of the obtained data. Even more important, coding enables the detection of patterns in the data, which in turn could be linked to the theories on radicalization and network effectiveness. The approach of coding in this thesis is deductive. Deductive coding entails that the coding starts after setting a hypothesis (Bernard, 2000), as "prior empirical research and theory are employed to derive some categories (Drisko & Maschi, 2016, p. 106)". This thesis, based on the literature discussed in the previous chapter, presents the ideal approach, including the necessary services, to prevent and counter radicalization. In addition, the ideal network with regard to structure,

context and functioning characteristics is presented. Coding safeguards the demarcation of the data, as the coding schemes are shaped in order to obtain information to answer the research question of this thesis.

3.2.1 Counter-radicalization

The comprehensive approach to prevent and counter radicalization is the first theoretical concept, derived from different theories and policy documents. A comprehensive approach includes four features, i.e. preventive (1), accompanying (2), informatory (3) and repressive (4) measures (blue labels in Figure I: *Coding scheme counter-radicalization*) (Witteveen, 2016). Therefore, ideally a collaborative network applies an approach and collaborates with network actors that feature these types of measures. The features have been assigned several categories which indicate that – when the service is provided – the measures are included in the approach (white labels in the scheme). The categories for each of the different type of measures are derived from theory, either specifically mentioned or added on own initiative. All the relevant data for this theoretical concept have been coded based on the features and assigned categories. Whenever a statement, sentence or characteristic indicates that a certain type of service is being delivered, it is coded with the feature and the more specific category. The coding is done with software that facilitates the data analysis of qualitative research, i.e. ATLAS.ti. Coding the data on the basis of the named features and categories enables easy detection and order of the data. Thus, it contributes to the quality and efficiency of providing conclusions.

Figure I contains the coding scheme used to gather answers to the question whether the networks are able to provide the required services to prevent and counter radicalization. The collaborative networks will be assessed on its participating actors and their services collectively, meaning that the scope of services provided will be mirrored to the plausible determinants of radicalization. If the network contains organizations that could provide the services required, the network could be regarded as effective; that is being able to provide the necessary services in order to accomplish the collective goal. Thus, a network is considered to be effective if the features are included, which are assessed by examining if the assigned categories are implemented in the counter-radicalization approach. Findings may result in the suggestion of seeking additional actors. Perhaps the findings could suggest the release of certain actors from the network in order to enhance the effectiveness by reducing complexity. In addition, applying this scheme on the collaborative networks A, B and C allows for comparison, or more specific the differences in service delivery between the collaborative networks. For example, which municipality its collaborative network includes certain organizations and services, and which municipality does not. These difference then could be the explanation in the varying levels of effectiveness predicted for each of the collaborative networks. For each of the collaborative networks it will be assessed

how many of the different types of service they possibly could provide with the current composition of actors, and thus how effective the network could prevent and counter radicalization; in this the coding scheme functions as a checklist.

With regard to the services provided, this thesis expects the collaborative networks to be able to provide all the services listed in the measures below. The reason behind this expectation is that most of these services are already provided on other themes e.g. preventing criminal behavior. Therefore, the approaches taken on other themes facilitate the approach to counter radicalization and the prevention of radicalization. This, however, requires informatory measures in order to explain how to specifically target radicalization. How these individuals differ from, for example, criminals. Even though it is assumed that the collaborative networks are able to provide a comprehensive package of services, this thesis questions whether the services provided causes the networks to achieve the desired result. The radicalized and de-radicalized individuals are unreachable for interviews. Therefore, the effectiveness on the community-level is assessed by perceptions of actors, risks-assessment and public opinions. Additionally, the formula of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) intents to conclude on community-level effectiveness by network-level factors. The validity of the conclusions, however, are questionable and debatable.

Figure I: *Coding scheme counter-radicalization*

Source: *Own compilation*

3.2.2 Collaborative networks

The second theoretical concept is collaborative networks. Based on theories from Provan and colleagues and, in particular, the recent contribution of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), five configurations are set. To assess the predicted effectiveness of the collaborative networks, information has to be gathered on the age (1), the stability (2), the integration (3), the resources (4) and the mode of governance (5) (blue labels in Figure II: *Coding scheme network effectiveness*). In order to assess the five configurations, each is assigned several categories which together provide a detailed overview of the individual feature and hence the assumed effectiveness of the collaborative network (white labels in the scheme). The categories are derived from the same theories as the features. In accordance, all the relevant data is coded in line with these features and categories. As with the other scheme, the coding is executed with ATLAS.ti which facilitates the data analysis of qualitative research. If a certain sentence, statement or characteristic indicates that a certain category of a feature is present, it is coded with that particular feature and more specific category. Coding the data on the basis of the named features and categories enables easy detection and order of the data. Consequently, after coding the relevant data in this manner, it allows for application of the formula of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) and to predict the assumed effectiveness of the collaborative networks.

A collaborative network is assumed to be effective if the network is at least three years old; has high levels of system stability; is centrally integrated; has either sufficient resources or is governed by a NAO (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Both the interviews and the coding scheme are derived from theoretic insights of the previous chapter. The scheme itself is specifically shaped to match the formula, which is being used to predict the effectiveness of the collaborative networks. By coding the data based on the scheme, it allows for implementing the formula and thus to predicted levels of effectiveness. By implementing the formula on the collaborative networks of A, B and C, different scores on the scheme and formula and thus varying predicted levels of effectiveness could be explained. For example, one collaborative network has the perfect levels and combination of the features, whereas another has a less favored combination. Then, predicted levels of effectiveness would vary and could easily be discussed based on the formula and coding scheme.

The configuration 'age' is operationalized by determining the duration of activeness of the network, in which the age of the network is considered to be the time between the start of the cooperation and the time of data collection. 'System stability' is operationalized by examining if there have been shifts in the network, either by the joining or leaving of actors, shifts in coordination or by internal or external influences (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). 'Resource munificence' is operationalized by obtaining information on the budget of the network. However,

as there is no prior knowledge on the required budget per capita, is it not possible to set a quota. Therefore, perceptions of the participating actors on the amount of available budget will be taken into account. As there were limits to collecting data due to privacy concerns, this thesis was not able apply the helpful software UCINET and its feature NetDraw to detect key actors and create a complete overview of the 'integration' of the collaborative networks. Therefore, the structure is based on the information gathered by the interviews. Provan and Milward (1995) argued that a centrally integrated network tends to be more effective, however Provan and Sebastian (1998) argued that integration through cliques has a stronger effect on the effectiveness. Therefore, both centralized integration and clique integration will be examined in the assessment of this configuration. The 'mode of governance' of the collaborative networks will be assessed by questioning actors who is formally in control and how decisions are being made. In line with the early work of Provan and Milward (1995), three modes of governance will be distinguished, i.e. shared governance; lead-organization; NAO-governed. The scores on these five configurations allow for conclusion on the predicted effectiveness of the specific collaborative networks.

Figure II: *Coding scheme network effectiveness*

Age	Stability	Integration	Resources	Mode of governance
Network itself	Attraction or departing of actors	Centralized integration	Financial	Dicision-making
Individual actors	Internal / external influences	Integration through cliques	Time	Participation
Friction	Interuption of coordination	Density based integration	Personnel input	
			Material	

Source: *Own compilation*

During examination of the configurations certain expectations arose. Concerning network age this thesis expects that not all of the collaborative networks would have reached the 'three-year age criterion'. Therefore, it is assumed that the collaborative networks would face challenges and friction during cooperation, especially between preventive and repressive actors. This thesis expects that the collaborative networks have formed sustainable and sufficient relations, i.e. there is no instability due to attraction or departing of actors. In addition, it is assumed that the main goal of the collaborative networks remain unaltered. There are no prior expectations of internal or external influences that destabilize the collaborative networks. With regard to the structure

and integration, it is assumed that the collaborative networks are centrally integrated, with certain cliques of actors that cooperate closely. In addition, it is expected that the actors perceive the resources to be insufficient. This expectation is not substantiated by academic knowledge, yet it is formed by, perhaps a pessimistic, prospect of a man his desire to have more; "earth provides enough to satisfy every man's needs, but not every man's greed – Mahatma Gandhi". This thesis assumes that in all of the of the collaborative networks a municipality will function as a lead-organization considering that the local approach sets the municipality as a central organization who is accountable for the approach and its results. Judging from literature, this thesis expects the municipalities to face challenges with regard to the friction between preventive and repressive actors and tensions between efficiency and inclusiveness. This expectations indicate that this thesis seeks to conclude on the collaborative networks their effectiveness on the network-level; thus by assessing the efficiency, stability, level of conflict, coordination and commitment (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Milward, 2001).

3.3 Conclusion

Conclusively, in order to provide an adequate and satisfying answer to the research question two theoretical concept were developed. The first concept concerns the approach to prevent and counter radicalization. The policy documents, literature and interviews will be analyzed and ordered in line with the relevant scheme. Thereby, it enables a partial conclusion on the effectiveness of the collaborative networks; network effectiveness on the community-level. Yet, in order to be able to develop an in-depth answer to the formal research question, more has to be researched. Therefore, the second concept concerns collaborative networks and is associated with network analysis. This enables the analysis of the concerning collaborative networks and testing it to the literature on network effectiveness. More specific, the data will be tested to the formula with five configurations, which are age, stability, integration, resources and mode of governance. These configurations seem to indicate that the effectiveness is being measured at the network-level. This thesis takes a deductive approach by developing both a theory based ideal approach to prevent and counter radicalization and a theory based ideal collaborative network for that matter. Taken together, these two partial answers allow for a conclusive answer on the assumed effectiveness of the local collaborative networks of A, B and C. The findings of the data collection and data analysis will be presented in chapter 5; the results chapter.

4 Case selection

This chapter elaborates on reasons that for choosing this specific theme and these specific collaborative networks. Additionally, this chapter describes the present collaborative networks in terms of budget, risk assessment, inhabitant count, activity and form of governance. This chapter provides basic background information on the anonymous collaborative networks.

The research strategy applied in this thesis is not a new one; there have been numerous assessments of the effectiveness of collaborative networks. This study could have been conducted on any collaborative network being active on any theme. Yet, this thesis is unique in its area of subject, as to date there is no in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of the radicalization prevention and counter-radicalization networks in the Netherlands; none of the studies have tested the counter-radicalization approach to literature on network effectiveness. Hence, the main reason to select this particular case. In addition, as the threat of terrorism spreads around the globe, effective remedies are of utmost importance; which makes this assessment all the more interesting and necessary. Within the areas of research, i.e. radicalization and network effectiveness, the established collaborative networks in order to prevent and counter radicalization are the topic. To be more specific, Babbie (1998) stated that the what and whom that is being studied can be considered the units of analysis (Babbie E. R., 1998). Therefore, the local networks A, B and C are set as the unit of analysis.

The local collaborative networks A, B and C have been chosen considering that they have confirmed to have experienced cases of radicalization within their municipality, as they had individuals who went on Jihad. Data from February 28th of 2015 displays that the concerned municipalities had varying amounts of inhabitants who went on Jihad (De Telegraaf, 2015). These numbers are based on statements by the municipality's representatives. In addition, these municipalities are among the eighteen municipalities that received financial aid from the ministry of Security and Justice on account of the local approach to prevent and counter radicalization and jihadism, the municipalities received varying amounts of aid (NCTV, 2016). The varying amounts of aid allows for examination of the influence of the available budget on the effectiveness of collaborative networks. It immediately became evident that the greater the financial aid, the greater the documentation and the greater the efforts to prevent and counter radicalization.

The local collaborative networks are located in a particular region in the Netherlands. Each of the municipalities have an inhabitant count between 110.000 and 185.000. The range of the inhabitants count have been expanded a bit to enhance anonymity. As these municipalities are geographical closely located and there are no major differences in population size, these municipalities allow for comparison. Interestingly, the financial aid is not parallel to the count of

the inhabitants. A smaller municipality could receive more financial aid than a larger municipality. Which resulted in the question whether more documentation causes more financial aid or vice versa. However, the financial aid appeared to be parallel with risk assessment.

The three collaborative networks have to be understood as organizations cooperating on multiple themes. The relationships among actors were present prior to the rise of the social problem of radicalization, for example on themes as crime prevention. Nevertheless, this thesis observed that higher the risk of radicalization in a certain area, the more organizations assign and train specialists responsible for the specific theme. Each of the collaborative networks fit the description of the lead-organization mode of governance. The municipalities are considered to be the lead-organization that monitor and coordinate network activity and gather the relevant actors. In line with Whelan (2015), in security networks, like the present collaborative networks, the lead-organization is does not so much govern the networks, but rather stimulates decision making.

To summarize, the collaborative networks differ to a small extent in size and are therefore comparable. There are differences in the financial aid granted to the collaborative networks, which is caused by unequal outcomes of risk assessment. All of the collaborative networks examined have a lead-organization mode of governance with a similar organization being in the lead.

5 Results

This chapter displays an analysis of the gathered data and seeks to process in-depth information in order to answer the research question of this thesis. Sections 5.1 to 5.5, in line with the formula of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), address network age, network stability, resource munificence, network integration and mode of governance respectively. The conclusions that emanate from sections 5.1 to 5.5 enable the implementation of the previously mentioned formula. The formula enables conclusion on the effectiveness of the concerned collaborative networks. Section 5.6 features an analysis on the comprehensiveness of the collaborative networks and a discussion on plausible improvements. The section adds strength as it covers factors that are not included in the formula. This chapter functions as a solid base that enables overall conclusions.

5.1 Network age and friction

Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) stated that "at least 3 years are needed to build a sustainable collaboration, especially if inherent functional tensions exist between the participating organizations (p.497)". Within their research on Safety Houses in the Netherlands they observed tensions between law enforcement and welfare organizations. Initially this thesis was not intended to question or adapt the formula which resulted from their study, yet during the interviews it became evident that the factors surrounding the networks to prevent and counter radicalization were different. Different factors surrounding the theme made their criteria for a minimal network age of three years debatable. Merely one out three of the examined local networks had reached the age of three years at the time of the interviews. Yet, it is questionable what is ought to be determined as the 'birth' of the network. Respondents were asked for what duration of time they were involved in the efforts of preventing and tackling radicalization, which varied from two to almost five years. The personalized integral approaches, however, had been applied by local networks for many years. Therefore, the cooperation between actors from different disciplines is not new (Radic-01; Radic-06). A staff member of a Safety House perceives two developments:

> "*I think that the aspect you mention has certainly helped to quickly set up an approach and share information. Actors are already familiar with cooperation on complex issues. I also see another development, despite the same parties, it's sometimes new people too. Within organizations you have divisions on certain themes. Most organizations work with new people. ... Yes, and so you get a new dynamic. You see the willingness and the will, yet at the same time I notice that we are discussing process issues on a monthly basis at all times* (Radic-02)."

The line of argumentation in the quotation indicates the presence of trust among the different actors, yet that cooperation with new individuals of some organizations challenges efficiency. A key factor in the theory on the age of the network and its network-level effectiveness should entail that it concerns a newly emerged network without previous existing cooperation. This is not the case with the examined networks as actors previously cooperated, and still cooperate, on other themes (Radic-01; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-11). Therefore, even though two out of three examined networks have not been engaged for at least three years on the phenomenon of radicalization, they do not face challenges of trust. These findings challenge the age criterion of the formula by Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015).

Notably, respondents share the perception that the involved actors are willing to share information and cooperate in order to achieve the common goal. This willingness is important for both the preventive, curative and repressive efforts of the network. However, this does not indicate that there are no tensions whatsoever. The observed tension between law enforcement and welfare organizations by Raab, Mannak & Cambré (2015) seem to be absent in the local networks concerned with radicalization. Surprisingly, both schools (Radic-04; Radic-08) and welfare organizations (Radic-07; Radic-10) state to have good relations and cooperation with the neighborhood officer and the police. Initially, the tension between preventive and repressive actors was expected to be present the most. Apparently, organizations acknowledged that in order to achieve a safe society and environment, cooperation is necessary; a perception that is shared by an employee involved with safety of a municipality (Radic-06). My initial assumption seems to be outdated, at least on a topic of this magnitude. A manager of a welfare organization stated:

> *"I have seen the time that youth workers absolutely did not want to share information with the police, a time that fortunately has ended years ago. (Radic-10)"*

It is plausible that the involved Safety Houses, which have existed for more than three years and function to bring together the preventive and repressive actors, have influenced it. Perhaps it is because the preventive and repressive actors jointly discuss the personalized approach and explain their actions and motivations (Radic-02; Radic-05; Radic-07; Radic-11). Either way, the absence of, or minimally present, tension between preventive and repressive actors is a strength of the local networks as it enhances the integral approach to radicalization. Data obtained through the interviews implicate that clear mutual expectations, agreements and transparency are key in minimalizing the tensions between preventive and repressive actors. A staff member of a municipality instructed to report signals to the municipality, instead of the police, to lower the barrier of fear some actors have due to unnecessary storage of signals in policing systems (Radic-06); Likewise recommended in the guide on the local approach by the NCTV. A coordinator involved with radicalization prevention policies emphasized the importance of communication;

"If a repressive approach is chosen, then the welfare and care actors are explained why the approach is chosen and that it does not exclude care and help. Vice versa, if we waive the repression and see if we can achieve something through care, we motivate our choices (Radic-05)". In this thesis it is observed that cooperation, based on a foundation of trust due to clear mutual expectations, – to a certain extent – prevents unexpected events that could inflict severe damage to the trust and cooperation and hence collaborative network effectiveness on the network-level.

A topic for debate is the value conflict between the values of privacy or safety. A staff member of a Safety House argued:

> "*In these kind of cases, I really think that safety is far more important than privacy. As far as I'm concerned, much more should be allowed. On the other hand, you have to be very careful, there may be consequences for people who ever have been registered somewhere, despite that where they were registered for never really had to be true. That indicates a degree of caution* (Radic-02)."

Even though the respondent started off really certain with a strong preference of the safety value, the respondent criticizes the former statement in the latter sentences. Respondents perceive willingness and openness in sharing of information with the vast majority of the local actors. Yet, professionals in the field of psychiatric assistance and similar disciplines are educated in an environment where privacy is the key value (Radic-07); therefore, these professionals tend to be cautious in sharing information and tight cooperation (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05; Radic-07). A coordinator of a municipality argued that it will remain difficult, actors will be cautious with sharing information due to privacy concerns as they are afraid of how it could affect their position in their environment (Radic-05). Yet, the coordinator perceives that sharing information among the actors within the network has become less complicated over the years due to the established trust (Radic-05). The chief comprehensive safety of a school argued that there is a need for a clear legal framework with regard to the sharing of information concerning radicalization as weighting of values concerning privacy and safety is complex and "the network actors each have their own legal framework for sharing information (Radic-04)". The respondent believes that these are troublesome issues that complicate the prevention, the policy and the approach to radicalization. In order to smoothen the flow of information, to uphold mutual expectations and release tensions among actors a clear legal framework is required. This opinion is shared by a manager of a welfare organization (Radic-10). If actors perceive feelings of distrust it could influence the stability of the network, which is a necessary, yet not sufficient, condition for effectiveness (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Actors could cease the cooperation and impede the coordination. A clear legal

framework with regard to sharing private information will most probably enhance the effectiveness of the network and its capabilities of early signaling.

The newly introduced law, *Temporary act of administrative measures against terrorism*, can cause some friction if the measures are not reported to the local authorities. A staff member of Safety House perceived that the minister (Safety and Justice) enforced a passport measure, and the concerned municipality was simply confronted with it. The measure was announced and "the media and the family were earlier informed than the municipality (Radic-02)". Strangely however, article 7 paragraph 1 of the aforementioned law obligates the minister of Safety and Justice to consult the Mayor of the concerned municipality prior to imposing a measure granted under article 2 and 3 of that law, which covers measure of withholding of a passport. Article 7 paragraph 1 adds that if the circumstances are urgent to the extent that it obstructs the ability to consult with the concerning mayor, the minister of Safety and Justice is allowed to waive the obligation of consultation and instructs the minister to inform the mayor immediately. Meaning, even under urgent circumstances the municipality should be informed before execution. The frustrations of the respondent could have been prevented if the minister simply followed the law. Nevertheless, as merely one side of the story was heard, this should be read as an illustration. The coordinator of radicalization prevention of a municipality argues that they are yet to see the effects of this law, and that it is acceptable if the national measures are justified. However, "you do not want that the national actors undermine what you have built up locally (radic-05)". Therefore, consultation is strongly preferred to uphold the local efforts and coordination.

On the basis of the data obtained by the interviews this thesis challenges the age-criterion of the formula by Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015). The existence of previous cooperation among the involved actors should be taken into consideration preparatory to implementation of the age-criterion. This thesis argues that the previous, and ongoing, cooperation of the actors on other themes have prepared them for cooperation on preventing and combatting radicalization. The actors more and more grasp the understanding of safety through cooperation between distinct disciplines. Due to clear mutual expectations, open negotiations and cooperation on the approach taken, friction between both the preventive and repressive camps is merely minimally present. If the local networks apply the same strategies for cooperation with the national actors with regard to the newly introduced Temporary act of administrative measures against terrorism, than no or minimal friction is foreseen. The collaborative networks on preventing and combatting radicalization did not require a minimum of three years to build sustainable collaboration.

5.2 Stability
Raab, Mannak and Cambré operationalized stability as "the entrance or exit of important organizations to and from the network, the permanence of network coordination, and the impact

of internal or external changes on the network (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015, p. 497)". In this line the networks their stability was examined. Multiple respondents perceive new actors joining the network, yet that these actors are small, and often new, organizations (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-05). Therefore, these actors cannot be labeled as 'important actors' able to drastically change the dynamics and functioning of the network. Nevertheless, the same respondents acknowledge that their emergence causes difficulties in cooperation.

> *"There are new actors through the socialization of care, all kinds of providers that occur. That is a factor that creates difficulties. (...) Those companies are applying a commercial-approach. It is difficult to build the relations in a manner that these types of issues can be well-addressed (Radic-01)."*

> *"The new, small pgb-bureaus often go their own way and there is insufficient control on it. They also lack the ability to find and cooperate with the network. When it comes to regulated care, actors know where to find each other and there exists good coordination (Radic-02)."*

Whereas this thesis, in the previous section, argued and concluded that previous cooperation and established trust enabled a boost in cooperation on the underlying theme, a previous build relation with these newly emerged organizations is absent; meaning that relations have to be built from the bottom. Perhaps the age-criterion of three years is appropriate for these relations, however the data is insufficient to conclude in such a manner. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the small new actors who have joined are not influential enough to destabilize the network. In order to apply the formula/theory on collaborative effectiveness, the amount of influence a certain actor is able to generate has to be taken into account. Commitment towards the collaborative networks seems strong. A radicalization related manager of a welfare organization argues that the involved organizations possess a certain vision for society, for which they do not cease cooperation with the collaborative network (Radic-09). Nonetheless, it might occur that something not foreseeable happens. There was one example of an actor leaving the network; a key figure of an ethnic community moved to another region and therefore the main contact of that community was lost (Radic-03). The staff member of the concerned municipality stated working with multiple key figures within communities to avoid this in the future. It is debatable to what extent the loss of a key figure affects the collaborative network. Certainly, it affects a minor component of the entire collaborative network, i.e. the relations with a certain community. However, if the relations with the community were positive, this thesis argues that bonding with a new key figure is not a goal which requires a great deal of time. Therefore, this thesis argues that an unpredicted event as a key figure moving to another municipality is unable to generate an impact of a magnitude that destabilizes the collaborative network. The NCTV and ESS clearly instructed to include certain key actors. These particular actors were involved from the start.

Therefore, the regular network actors are deemed fixed and stable (Radic-05; Radic-07). In line with Provan and Milward (1995) this thesis acknowledges that quick attraction or department of networks members could harm the outcome, yet this thesis argues that it has to concern important actors to destabilize the network. As there are no new actors attracted that could drastically change the dynamics of the collaborative networks, and there are no actors refraining from cooperation, there is no instability.

If the coordination of the network is stable, i.e. there have been no major changes to the strategy and the structure of the network, then the network will be more effective (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Obviously, the goal of the network is permanent, i.e. the prevention and countering of radicalization. The gathered data indicates that there are no major, yet merely subtle, changes to the local approaches as the statement of the coordinator of a municipality illustrates:

> *"The document is 90% equivalent to the 2016 document. We continue with what we were doing, with a few small nuances in the projects. (Radic-05)"*

Similar statements have been made by representatives of the other municipalities (Radic-01; Radic-06). A staff member concerned with safety of a municipality argued to have a steady approach, they finished some projects and started some minor new ones (Radic-06). However, most respondents mentioned the changing situation in Syria and Iraq; IS is losing terrain which results in radicals returning to Europe and homegrown radicals refraining from travelling to those countries. This changing dynamic in the middle east causes a shift in the focus here in the Netherlands, i.e. returnees will require more attention in the nearby future; an expectation, and anticipated on, by the NCTV (NCTV, 2017). This shift was foreseen and the collaborative network will not require any new actors for this shift. Therefore, this minor shift within the entire approach will not destabilize the collaborative networks. The approach towards returnees will be discussed in-depth in section 5.6.

There are some internal and external changes that might be able to affect the collaborative networks. For example, the temporary act of administrative measures against terrorism, the civil conflict in Turkey and preceding policy changes within the Netherlands. To date the actual impact of the new law on the functioning and dynamics of the local collaborative networks is unknown (Radic-05). It is debatable to what extent the collaborative networks are affected as the legislation is not relevant for the vast majority of network actors (radic-02). A staff member of a municipality argued that the legislation primarily affects migrant communities, yet that it provides a topic to talk about and bond over (Radic-06). As previously argued, if intentions are announced and communicated properly than the new legislation will not damage the established trust nor will it

destabilize the collaborative networks. A manager of a welfare organization argued that even internal conflicts in Turkey could affect the effectiveness of the established local collaborative networks in the Netherlands. Key figures could lose their influence in their community as all of the sudden it matters whether you support Erdogan or Gülen (Radic-10). The effects of the coup attempt in Turkey on the local network are yet to be examined, yet it is a plausible destabilizer. However, this thesis argues that the effect on the network its effectiveness is minor, as once again this concerns a minor component of the entire collaborative networks. Every once in a while neighborhood officers switch neighborhoods, in which the transfer of contacts might be time-consuming (Radic-06; Radic-11). Whether this is favorable in challenging times as these is questionable. There would be a value conflict with the interests served with the rotation of neighborhood officers; an interest that did not become apparent during the interview.

Mosques and ethnic communities are believed to be key actors in the prevention of radicalization. These actors could enhance the early signaling and strengthen individuals their resilience to a radical mindset and behavior. Due to their key role in the local approach, it was interesting to examine their value and willingness to cooperate based on the perceptions of other actors. A recurring observation was that the abolishment of the target group policies has caused the dilution of the relational ties with mosques and ethnic communities (Radic-01; Radic-03; Radic-06; Radic-11). However, one municipality has maintained and kept investing in the relations with migrant communities, therefore the respondent believes they had an advantage due to their continuous efforts of maintaining relationships (Radic-03). Other respondents observe difficulties and possess feelings that the mosques are not as open to cooperation and sharing information as wished for (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-07). A manager of a welfare organization describes the relations with mosques as:

> *"We have contacts with mosques, but the sharing of information and requests on our expertise and competences rarely occurs. We are always welcome, but they do not show the back of their tongue. (…) It is all on the outside, we know little on the inside. (Radic-07)"*

It is favorable that the relations are perceived as benign, yet the lack in openness makes me question the quality of the cooperation; are relations strong enough to share sensitive information and is the bond strong enough to cooperate on these sensitive matters? A staff member of a Safety House observes varying levels of openness and willingness to share information among mosques (Radic-02), which is understandable as views on the Dutch society and the approach towards radicalization differ among the religious movements, the respondent argued. Respondents do not know whether mosques and migrant organizations withhold information (Radic-01; Radic-03; Radic-09). The feelings several respondents share, however, indicate that there is a possibility of them being right. It should, however, be acknowledged that findings indicate that mosques

provide a setting for socialization, yet that the actual radicalization in most cases is not being stimulated by teachings of the official hierarchy within the mosque (Silke, 2008). This plausably means that mosques, even though radicalization occurs, do not possess information. In line with findings of Martín-Rodríguez et al. (2009), this thesis argues that mutual trust is important in developing and maintaining relations and communication. This means that even policy changes that have been implemented years ago could result in a disadvantage and difficult start if new problems occur. One local collaborative network benefited due to their stronger and maintained relations with the distinct migrant groups and organizations (Radic-03; Radic-06). However, even the staff member of that municipality argued that they do not know whether their contacts perhaps possess more information. The respondent argued that they at least received some signals through them (Radic-03).

Conclusively, the main actors were involved in the local approach from the start. The actors involved do not refrain from cooperation, this indicated a stable network. There are, however, new actors joining the network. These primarily small and new care-providing organizations are not considered to be important actors able to destabilize, or change the dynamics, of the collaborative networks. The effects of the new legislation and the internal conflict in Turkey are yet to be seen. However, this thesis does not consider these to be major challenges that are able destabilize the collaborative networks. The diluted contacts with migrant communities and mosques due to preceded policy changes required extra efforts in restoring and building relations. The questions some actors share concerning these relations indicate challenges. However, this does not destabilize the functioning of the network. Nevertheless, it is questionable if it desirable – strategically – to apply an approach in which migrant communities and mosques have an important role. This thesis considers the local collaborative networks to be stable, as hitherto there are no signs of the effects of the plausible destabilizers. The factors discussed are merely minor challenges particular components of the collaborative network face separately. This thesis emphasizes the importance of assessing the actual impact that certain factors and challenges could possibly have, preparatory to deciding on the stability of a collaborative network. This thesis acknowledges that quick attraction and department of network members could influence the outcome, as argued by Provan and Milward (1995). However, this thesis confirms the condition set by Raab, Mannak and Cambré that it should entail an important actor to be able to destabilize the collaborative network.

5.3 Resource munificence

It is challenging to achieve goals without, or with limited, necessary resources (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). In line with suggestions by Provan and Milward (1995), Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) implemented resource munificence as a configuration in their formula. Contrary

to prior expectations, all of the respondents perceive the budget to be sufficient in order to perform the necessary actions. Due to its importance the theme is prioritized (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-04; Radic-05; Radic-06; Radic-11). Municipalities were able to attract financial aid from the national government (Radic-02; Radic-05; Radic-06), which the concerned municipalities did. Provan and Milward (1995) argued that resources have to be available for a longer duration of time to retain effectiveness. Fortunately, the national government stated that it will provide necessary budget till at least 2020. In addition, training and tools are primarily provided by the national government, which thus does not put a strain on local budgets (Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-04; Radic-07; Radic-08; Radic-10; Radic-11). Another major advantage in terms of resources, in line with the theory that integrated TCE and social network theories (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997), is that asset-specific requirements for specific cases can be requested at national agencies or other local collaborative networks (Radic-01; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-06), for example an individual that possesses an exceptional expertise. While discussing that the Netherlands has not yet been confronted with a terrorist attack contrary to surrounding nations, a manager of a Safety House sarcastically and smilingly stated "well, then we must have a lot of money to spend (Radic-11)". While acknowledging that the amount of money spend is not an indicator of the success in tackling radicalization, this thesis observed differences in the efforts taken in line with the available budget. The higher the available budget, the higher the amount of projects to tackle radicalization. However, the question remains if more budget equals higher levels of effectiveness.

The previous paragraph contained a core message which implied that finances are not a problem for the network, yet time is. Obviously, the amount of available time to address the underlying problem has an impact on network effectiveness as well. Where there was a strong consensus on the perceptions of the available budget, there was remarkably less consensus on the perceptions of available time. A manager of a welfare organization argued:

> *"This is part of our job. It is not an addition, it is part of. (...) It depends on how you approach it. If you would like to have someone fulltime available for it, than you require extra investments. If you think it suits the work that is already being done, than it fits in the current task description. (Radic-09)"*

A staff member of a municipality argued that in practice the amount of hours reserved for the specific function are frequently exceeded (Radic-03). The available time is perceived to be sufficient for necessary actions, yet insufficient to go in-depth in the matter (Radic-03) or for additional efforts (Radic-06). The coordinator of a municipality states:

"I am approximately fulltime available on this theme. Within the municipality and other organizations as the police, the justice department, welfare and care there are people who are able to dedicate a great amount of their time to the theme. Therefore, I believe that there is sufficient amount of time available. On the other hand, it is really labor-intensive to maintain and invest in all the concerned networks, contacts and individuals within the city. The available time could always be more. (Radic-05)"

Limited available time calls for decisions. A possible choice is focusing primarily on the necessary actions, which implies that there is no time left for other preferred efforts. Another possible choice is adapting and searching for efficiency. A manager of a welfare organization stated that "seven years ago we had double the amount of hours available, yet now we provide more services (Radic-07)". They adapted from an organizing role to an initiating, advising and guiding role. By focusing on empowering the individuals and groups and to stimulate them to achieve certain goals, they were able to achieve more in fewer hours. A coordinator of security of a school stated that there are sufficient funded training opportunities, yet that they are unable to train all of their staff due time constraints. In the light of efficiency, e-learning was proposed as a helpful alternative as the staff could access information at any given time (Radic-08). The quest for efficiency seems to be necessary in order to optimize the collaborative network its effectiveness. A staff member of a Safety House argued that the current work processes are too time consuming as there is no central (digital)point where gathered data from relevant actors could be stored and accessed before meeting to discuss possible cases of radicalization. The respondent adds that there is not always a need to gather the actors to discuss certain progress. Certain actions could be fulfilled digitally, which is believed to be more efficient (Radic-02).

Conclusively, the prevention and combatting of radicalization is secured in an environment of resource munificence. It is prioritized on both the national level and the local level. The approach is subsidized until at least 2020 by the national government. The actors feel a strong responsibility towards, and are determined to address, a socially sensitive theme as radicalization. Even though some actors preferred to have more time available, they all argued that the time is sufficient for the necessary actions. In addition, the trainings and tools are provided costless by the national agencies. The local collaborative networks possess, or could obtain, sufficient resources to address the problem.

5.4 Structure / integration

A centrally integrated network is able to provide adequate services for their clients that do not overlap (Provan & Milward, 1995; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). In a centrally integrated network, the central organization has a strong position in monitoring and governing the actions of participating actors (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Therefore, centralized integration is

believed to enhance network effectiveness, especially in service implementation networks (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). Ideally the structure of the collaborative network and its integration would be examined through an integral examination of all the actors within the network and their mutual relations, accompanied by the value they attach to the specific relation. However, this was not possible due to privacy concerns.

The interviews indicate that there are central organizations within the local collaborative networks that are assigned the monitoring and governing role; the municipality in these cases. Two quotations of an advisor of a municipality and a staff member safety of a municipality respectively illustrate this argument:

> *"Actors occasionally contact us to report a signal and request us to take the lead, since they know that then the whole network anneals. (Radic-01)"*

> *"People who report a signal prefer immediate action. Occasionally they expect us to take control of the entire signal, which is not the case. The one that has contact, that is the one we strive to keep in position. (Radic-06)"*

These quotations clearly illustrate that the actors perceive the municipality to be the central actor, the one in the position to gather and coordinate the relevant actors. This thesis observed the same structures within organizations. Throughout the entire collaborative networks organizations approach the distribution and coordination of expertise and contacts as an oil-spill (Radic-02; Radic-04; Radic-07; Radic-08; Radic-10). They seek to secure the expertise by implementing structures and distributing the expertise among their organizations through a few individuals. Neighborhoods within the cities have certain contact persons that possess some expertise on the matter (Radic-07; Radic-10), schools have appointed central figures (Radic-04; radic-08), throughout the different organizations there have been intensive trainings for specific individuals who are believed the secure the expertise and share it within their organization (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-06).

How central is the municipality in a collaborative network concerned with radicalization? A staff member of a Safety House states:

> *"As far as the subject of radicalization is concerned, I expect that they will not clinch in their own network or environment, but that they will swiftly switch to the case table, with the municipality. (Radic-02)"*

The staff member of the Safety House and the advisor of the corresponding municipality perceive that they are approached quickly by the other actors and have frequent contact. However, the chief comprehensive safety of the corresponding school and the manager of the corresponding

welfare organization seem to disagree with that (Radic-04; Radic-07). The chief comprehensive safety of the school stated in response to the question whether they cooperate with the municipality:

> *"Yes, in cases where it is passed on by the police to the municipality, we do. My experience is that we have good contacts with the municipality. We are also present at the case-table. (Radic-04)"*

This statement strongly contradicts the statement of the staff member of the concerned Safety House. In addition, the manager of the concerned welfare organization stated:

> *"The connection with the neighborhood officer is very close. We also have contact with the municipality, we do many multidisciplinary consultations on young people. At these consultation the municipality, the police and the healthcare are present. (Radic-07)"*

Both the respondent speak prominently about their cooperation with the police and the neighborhood officer, whilst acknowledging to have good relations with the municipality. However, their statements indicate that cooperation with the municipality starts at later stage; as soon as integral action is needed from the collaborate network. This on its turn confirms the central role of the municipality in gathering the relevant actors. The coordinator of a municipality has a similar view and argues that some individuals perhaps cooperate due to their own professionalism, nevertheless the respondent supposes that actors do not closely cooperate on an organizational level outside of the case-table (Radic-05). Contrary to the statements of this coordinator and the staff member of a Safety House, certain cooperation structures became apparent from the data derived from other, and even their own, interviews. Distinct municipalities cooperate and share resources (Radic-01; Radic-05), schools cooperate among each other and with the national Foundation School & Safety (Radic-04; Radic-08) and actors from distinct disciplines within neighborhoods cooperate and share expertise (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-06; Radic-10). The two respondents who rejected the thought of cooperation outside of the network, most probably aimed on cooperation on cases without informing the municipality. This thesis interprets it manner that actors independently seek to secure their knowledge and expertise on the theme both within as outside of their local collaborative network. Yet, as soon as a case requires the whole collaborative network, the municipality is approached.

Major strengths in term of effectiveness and efficiency are the regional case table and the MDO's. Signals of radicalizing individual are discussed with a selective group of relevant actors (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05; Radic-06; Radic-07; Radic-11) as signals, causes and approaches of radicalization could differ to a great extent (Radic-02; Radic-11), which was emphasized in studies by Post (2010) and Dalgaard-Nielson (2010). Agreements and approaches could most

easily be discussed with as few as possible, yet sufficient, relevant actors. Safety Houses function as a connecting actor and check for compliance (Radic-02). The coordinator of social security and integrity of a school mentioned that it bothers them that they are not invited to the regional case table. The flow of information is deemed unbalanced; with the flow from the school to the municipality being much greater than vice versa (Radic-08). The same notion was mentioned by a manager of a welfare organization aiming at the sharing of information with the police (Radic-07). The coordinator of the school argues that school is in no way concerned with the strategic and tactical decision-making (Radic-08). The value this relation would add is obscure, yet positive effects are plausible. The chief comprehensive safety of a school from another local collaborative network is represented at the regional case table (Radic-04), which sets them in a stronger position compared to the other school.

Conclusively, the local collaborative networks are centrally integrated. The municipality decides which actors are required and invited to address specific cases. Safety Houses monitor the compliance with agreements. Therefore, the collaborative networks are able to provide the necessary services without overlap. Distinct actors of the collaborative networks have local, regional and national groups where they share best-practices and secure expertise. Even within local collaborative networks there seem to be actors that cooperate closely within a certain group. These factors have a positive effect on the trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, this thesis did not collect information on all the existing relations and the attached value, which limits the view on the exact integration and structure of the collaborative networks. Therefore, conclusions on this configuration are limited.

5.5 Mode of governance

Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) argued that ideally a neutral NAO, which does not take part in the primary process but coordinates and monitors the network, should be present. This NAO is believed to be independent and better able to govern the tensions between the preventive and repressive actors, as a lead-organization will likely come from one of the camps. In addition, the NAO is believed to be better at balancing tensions of efficiency/inclusiveness and internal/external legitimacy. Moreover, judging from the scheme by Provan and Kenis (2008) (see Table II), a NAO is assumed to be most effective under these conditions as there is a moderate density of trust, the number of participants is moderate to high, there is high goal consensus and a high need for network-level competencies. However, in this study a lead-organization seems to be functioning well. In all of the examined local collaborative networks, the municipality was formally in control; all of the respondents acknowledged this. Nevertheless, there exists a complex division of roles with the local triangle (Radic-02). The local triangle exists out of the mayor, the public prosecutor and the district police chief (Radic-05). The public prosecution office, obviously,

has its own powers, which give them a strong position. However, every municipality itself decides the course that is taken (Radic-02). An advisor of a municipality stated:

"The municipality has control, the municipality gathers the actors, the municipality sets course, in case of the personal approach the municipality is chairman and selects the necessary actors. (Radic-01)"

Therefore, in the collaborative networks concerned with addressing radicalization the local municipality can be assigned the role of lead-organization.

None of the collaborative networks examined had a neutral NAO. Therefore, the ability to compare a collaborate network with a lead-organization to a collaborative network with a neutral NAO was absent. Yet, the examined collaborative networks allow me to discuss the role of a lead-organization in the light of the expectations and argumentation of Raab, Mannak, and Cambré (2015) and Provan and Kenis (2008). The interviews contradict the assumption that the lead-organization would probably come forth out of either the preventive or the repressive camp and hence is biased in the approach taken. As previously argued, the data shows that tensions between preventive and repressive actors are minimally present, nearly absent. The municipality gathers the relevant actors and jointly discusses which approach is best suited (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-04; Radic-05; Radic-06; Radic-07; Radic-11), in which the municipality is advised by professionals, and makes the decisive call (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05). In addition, a local municipality features both preventive as repressive tasks, meaning that the municipality does not fit in merely one of the camps. A coordinator of a municipality stated:

"If a repressive approach is chosen, then the welfare and care actors are explained why the approach is chosen and that it does not exclude care and help. Vice versa, if we waive the repression and see if we can achieve something through care, we motivate our choices (Radic-05)".

The municipalities negotiate with the relevant actors and appeal to the expertise the actors possess, as argued by the respondents of the concerned municipalities and Safety Houses (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-06; Radic-11). The other respondents perceive the cooperation in similar manner (Radic-04; Radic-07; Radic-08; Radic-09; Radic-10). A manager of a welfare organization stated:

"Actually we have a great degree of freedom. Obviously, the municipality wants us to be active on the various policy areas in order to generate effects there, but how we do that is up to us. (...) In general the municipality assigns upon which investments have to be made and we decide how. (Radic-07)"

This thesis observed that cooperation in this manner and the freedom granted in effectuating their particular expertise results in satisfied network actors and contributes to the absence of friction between the preventive and repressive camps.

Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) state that lead-organizations tend to favor efficiency over inclusiveness, whereas a NAO seeks to balance both. "An NAO provides the possibility to integrate both camps in the strategic decision making (inclusiveness) while performing operational activities relatively independently (efficiency) (Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015)". The interviews indicate that the lead-organizations succeed in the integration of both camps in the strategic decision making. As earlier quotations illustrated, the municipality gathers the relevant actors and discuss which approach to take in the specific case. If a decision is made, the relevant actors will provide their services and give feedback to the actors that form the regional case table. Nevertheless, there are some challenges. For example, who do you trust and who do you include? Within a specific local collaborative network is noticed contradicting statements of the advisor of the municipality and a staff member of the Safety House.

> *"We try to get involved directly and see where we can work together, but tomorrow there can be a new company with a new management team. (Radic-01)"*

> *"There are a number of healthcare providers that are a bit dubious. It is the question if working with them and sharing information is desirable. (...) but at the same time if there is a case, you must. Then you need to connect. (Radic-02)"*

The quotations illustrate the challenge of involving certain organizations in the approach. On the basis of the interviews conducted, this thesis observed that the municipalities approach organizations and present strategy and processes. In addition, they inform the organizations in the ability of participating in courses or training. Once the specific organization is deemed to be relevant and could add to a personal approach to a specific case, the organization is involved and invited to the regional case table or multidisciplinary consultation. The selective picking of relevant and necessary actors, obviously, boosts the network its efficiency. Therefore, contrary to the opening statements in the begin of this paragraph, the lead-organization is able to find a suitable balance between inclusiveness and efficiency.

Conclusively, this thesis challenges the criterion of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) that an NAO is a necessary, yet not sufficient, criteria for collaborative network effectiveness. This thesis argues that a lead organization, in these cases municipalities, is able to balance between the preventive and repressive camps and between inclusiveness and efficiency. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the lead organizations of the concerned local collaborative networks are successful in governing the networks. This thesis does not state whether or not a NAO is favorable, yet

challenges the criterion that a NAO is a necessary condition. It should be acknowledges that Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015) already found that the profit that a NAO brings could be substituted by sufficient recourses, which the present collaborative networks have. Therefore, it is unknown if the lead-organizations would be effective if they lacked sufficient resources. Besides, Provan and Milward (1995) argued that direct and not fragmented control by the state is likely to have a positive effect on the collaborative network its effectiveness. The extent to which the success of the lead-organizations is caused on the fact that it concerns the local authorities is unknown.

5.6 The comprehensiveness of the local networks and improvements

This section features an analysis on the comprehensiveness of the collaborative networks and a discussion on plausible improvements. It adds strength to the conclusions on effectiveness as it covers certain factors that are not included in the formula of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), which are deemed important factors that have to be considered in concluding on the effectiveness of these collaborative networks. This section primarily seeks to assess the effectiveness on the community-level, whereas the previous sections primarily focused on network-level effectiveness.

The data obtained by the interviews strongly implies that there are sufficient actors to provide a full range of services (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-06; Radic-10; Radic-11). A national organization, the ESS provided guidance in establishing the local collaborative networks (Radic-01; Radic-05). A coordinator of a municipality stated:

"We have sufficient actors that are able to help people with care, with financial debts, addiction, dependence, vulnerability and psychological factors with their own expertise, those are present. (Radic-05)"

However, a staff member of a Safety House stated:

"In preventative terms, I believe that there are enough actors, but I'm a little cautious because not all of them are also trained on this topic. By the NCTV and via the municipality, training has been offered for a large part for the workers in the district, for different disciplines, but not everybody followed those training sessions. (Radic-02)"

All of respondents argued that there is plenty of training and guidance available. These trainings are not obligated, but open-invitations (Radic-04; Radic-07). The training is primarily given for welfare- and care organizations, schools (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-03; Radic-05; Radic-06) and front-office employees (Radic-01). All, but one, of the respondents have positive attitudes towards the trainings available. A manager of a welfare organization argued that the basic training is informative and helpful for actors with little knowledge on the matter, yet that the deepening

training is aimed to much on different religious movements within Islam and lacks preventive theories (Radic-07). Therefore, the respondent deemed the training less practical for the services they provide as an organization; a subsequent analysis on cases of radicalization is preferred as it could result in advantageous information in order to prevent radicalization (Radic-07). A staff member of a Safety House and the coordinator of a municipality argued that even though they participated in the deepening training, they do not feel like experts (Radic-02; Radic-05). They both express the desire for more expertise and experts in interpreting the cases, which is in line with findings of Witteveen (2016). In addition, approaches and commitment seem to differ among distinct teachers and youth workers (Radic-04; Radic-09; Radic-10). This thesis questions to what extent the lack of expertise of certain actors affects the effectiveness of the approach on the community-level. Obviously, it too far-fetched to deem every actor a radicalization expert. However, that some actors did not participate in the basic training is unsettling. Besides there being plenty of trainings and actors available, there seemed be a need for better cooperation with AZC's. One local collaborative network mentioned a case which could have been detected earlier if there was closer cooperation with an AZC (Radic-01; Radic-02). The other local collaborative networks acknowledge that the cooperation with the AZC's is not tight (Radic-03; Radic-05).

There exists a significant variation in the number of radicals within different regions and municipalities. This could have some influences on the effectiveness of the local networks. A manager of a welfare organization argued:

> *"Those relations are present, but I question whether those relations are sufficiently activated. Is it sharp and clear that I could approach them with a specific case and say 'have a look with me, could we prepare an approach and which one?'. That is still an issue. (…) I believe in the willingness of the actors on the preventive side, yet if an individual does radicalize, then I question if the network is sufficiently oiled. (Radic-10)"*

The manager aims at the differences among local networks. There are some local networks that have faced radicalized individuals more frequently, hence these networks are set and ready to undertake repressive action. However, local collaborative networks that do not encounter radicalized individuals that frequent might encounter some rigidness and restraint from the local actors when it turns repressive. The respondent questions whether their local network is sufficiently active and if the mutual expectations are evident (Radic-10). A staff member safety of a municipality argued that once there is a specific case that requires cooperation, the trust is built quickly (Radic-06), also acknowledge by a manager of a Safety House (Radic-11). The concerned local network is now investing in examination of the activeness of their network and they discuss the 'what if scenario' (Radic-10).

Noteworthy, all of the respondents from schools and welfare organizations express a desire for tighter cooperation among them. A manager of social security and integrity of a school stated that the benefits of tighter cooperation between these actors entails:

> *"Signals of radicalization could be signaled early on and interventions, assistance and support could be deployed more quickly. (…) A thorough image of a student due to good cooperation among schools and welfare organizations is completed quicker. (Radic-08)"*

Cooperation between welfare organizations and schools is important as individuals could behave differently in- and outside of school (Radic-08). The school would in that case not know what goes on in a student's life, who the student is involved with, hence would not provide extra care nor attention. The manner in which youth-workers observe and approach certain situations differ from the manner in which – the majority of – teachers do (Radic-07; Radic-10). A manager of a welfare organization observed schools struggling to keep students motivated, especially those from lower social classes that already experience difficulties with studying, behavior and regulations (Radic-07). Youth-workers that operate within school then could take a preventive instead of a reactive approach to prevent the youth to even reach the first stages of radicalization. The manager believes that focusing on schools and personal development is more beneficial than the traditional aims on mosques and cultural organizations (Radic-10). This is in line with a statement by Lipset:

> *"Education presumably broadens a man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms and tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices* (Lipset, 1960, p. 56)*".*

Schools and youth-workers could jointly arrange role models to present in classes, which is believed to be prevent radicalization as it strengthens resilience (Radic-05; Radic-10).

Social media is rooted in societies today with the vast majority being active on one or more platforms every day. Therefore, the amount of information individuals obtain through social media is enormous. With regard to radicalization, an advisor of a municipality stated:

> *"social media is one of the largest unfathomed terrains in this area where the dangers lie. (Radic-01)"*

Social media is believed to be troublesome (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-04; Radic-05; Radic-10; Radic-11). However, there is software available that enables the tracking of certain discussions and posts based on keywords (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05). Whereas a staff member of a Safety House argues that the power to investigate social media activity is insufficient (Radic-02), and Witteveen (2016) observed a desire for expanding possibilities for authorization for internet

searches, the coordinator of a municipality argues that it is not due to the limited powers but rather the "limited knowledge and expertise in the field of supervision and control of social media (Radic-05)". This thesis argues that the dangers of social media lie in easy access to radical networks and the risk of biased information that enhances feelings of relative deprivation and perceived injustice. This line of argumentation is consistent with conceptions of supporters of social movement theory and network theory (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010), observations of Doosje, et al. (2016) and the cognitive prongs introduced by Sageman (2008). Fortunately, schools seem to be addressing the topics radicalization and polarization and social media (Radic-04). Both schools and welfare organizations seek to strengthen the resilience of individuals (Radic-04; Radic-07; Radic-08; Radic-09; Radic-10). In addition, companies behind the social media are more and more active in deleting and blocking radical content and users. Yet, there remain opportunities in the virtual world of social media. Even though feelings of powerlessness on social media arose during this research, the attention given to the problem is growing. The Dutch minister of Domestic Affairs and Kingdom Relations emphasized the necessity of modernizing the legislation on intelligence and security services for the protection against terrorism and other threats (AIVD, 2017). The new legislation enables to exercise powers as cable interception, phone tapping and checking computers. Due to privacy concerns the AIVD is obligated to obtain a permission from the minister and a commission, the Testing Committee for the Exercise of Powers (AIVD, 2017). Even though this law does not concern the local collaborative networks in monitoring social media activities, this will most probably strengthen their network and improve their effectiveness on the community-level. Information gathered by the Intelligence and Security Services which is of utmost importance is believed to be shared (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05). The extent to which the information gathered by the Intelligence and Security Services is actually shared is, obviously, unknown and impossible to measure.

The long-term primary focus on preventing inhabitants to join terrorist groups abroad was a concern of a manager of a welfare organization (Radic-10). The respondent argued that the primary problem no longer was the inhabitants battling abroad, but the threat of attacks within national borders and the returning of fighters from those battlefields. The shift of threat to returning fighters and attacks within national borders is acknowledges by several others (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-5; Radic-11; AIVD, 2017).

> "*People returning from a jihadist battlefield form an important part of the broader jihadist threat to the Netherlands. The threat of returnees is potentially large and can range from radicalization and recruitment of individuals to preparing and committing attacks* (AIVD, 2017)"

There is international cooperation with regard to the returnees to enhance early detection. The returnee will be prosecuted and there will be an assessment of the threat that the individual brings to the national security. Each individual will have a tailor made approach; prosecution, distinct curative tracks, limitations and monitoring (NCTV, 2017). Yet, the ability to effectively address these problems is questionable. The crimes committed are difficult to prove and reintegration is challenging. On the bright sight, the local networks seem to contain sufficient actors to provide the required services (Radic-01; Radic-02; Radic-05; Radic-10). Challenges are housing, guidance (Radic-01), jobs and education (Radic-05). A manager of a welfare organization questions the ability to arrange these necessary factors for a successful reintegration.

> *"How do the local actors or the society approach these returnees? Will they be included or rejected with all consequences that could follow? This is still a quite untouched terrain, at least for me. (Radic-10)"*

The answer to this question is yet to be seen. Especially, since there are shifts within the Netherlands; the uprising of extreme right groups and negative attitudes towards Islam. Fortunately, the local collaborative networks are applicable for this group as well (Radic-05).

Even though this thesis observed that the collaborative networks are able to provide sufficient services in order to be considered a comprehensive approach, it questions their ability to prevent radicalization and to de-radicalize individuals. This thesis questions at what moment the ability to prevent radicalization passes. A manager of a welfare organization argued that as soon as signals of radicalization are noticed, we are too late in terms of preventing; it becomes curative (Radic-09). Prevention in that sense entails preventing further radicalization; to prevent an individual from climbing the narrowing staircase referring to the theory of Moghaddam (2005). Preventing radicalization is a phase before an individual develops a radical ideology. Besides, if radical behavior or a radical mindset is detected, what are the possibilities of alternation? The coordinator of a municipality stated:

> *"I think we do the things we need and are able to do, but then you'll see that you do not always achieve the desired effect. If the person refuses to cooperate with the trajectories, then we are limited in the ability to influence that person. (Radic-05)"*

In addition, a manager of a welfare organization stated:

> *"At the moment when they want to depart, even their own family, their own relatives, are not able to influence it. Then it is questionable whether we, from well-being, can influence that. (...) If someone their own brothers, sisters and parents cannot help him out, then we should not have too many illusions about the potential of welfare workers in it. (Radic-07)"*

The statements indicate that the curative capabilities, even though there are sufficient varying actors, are limited. Returnees will follow a de-radicalization trajectory. However, the effectiveness of the de-radicalization trajectory is questionable. In a document of the NCTV the findings of a confidential research were summarized:

> *"During the investigation period, there were few or no returnees, who convincingly built a completely different life far from jihadism. A part of the returnees is guided by municipalities in finding work or education. But often they do not part from their network and find a different social environment, which makes it the questionable if it entails genuine reintegration.* (NCTV, 2016)*"*

Recently NU.nl interviewed Dick Schoof, the Dutch Coordinator Safety and Contraterrorism. Dick Schoof acknowledges that the deradicalization-trajectories are still in a trial and error phase, still in development, and that it is too early to judge whether we have proper, or the best possible, trajectories (NU.nl, 2017).

Conclusively, this thesis observed that there are sufficient actors present in the networks to provide the necessary services without overlap. There remain possibilities in the relations with AZC's and cooperation between schools and welfare organizations. Furthermore, relations with mosques and ethnic communities are perceived as ambiguous. This thesis observed the importance of structurally updating an overview of the collaborative networks. What relations are present? What value is attached? Where have been changes? What are possible improvements? More commitment to limit the vulnerability on social media is observed, yet this thesis still argues that there is work to be done. Social media requires extra attention. Unfortunately, this thesis is bound to conclude that the capabilities for de-radicalization are limited. It did not become evident that the collaborative networks are able to de-radicalize individuals, which strongly, negatively, impacts the effectiveness on the community-level.

6. Conclusion and discussion

This final chapter seeks to answer the formal research question of this thesis: *How can the formula developed by Raab, Mannak and Cambré explain the effectiveness of the collaborative counter-radicalization networks A, B and C? And how does the entirety of configurations relate to other factors?* In addition, the meaning of the answer will be discussed and new insights will be compared to other studies. Subsequently, the recommendations for strategic policy-decisions that emanate from this study will be presented. Thereafter, the academic value and limits of this thesis will be discussed as well as opportunities for further research.

According to the formula, a collaborative network is assumed to experience high levels of effectiveness if the network is at least three years old; has high levels of system stability; is centrally integrated and has either sufficient resources or is governed by a NAO. Strictly applied, the formula compels me to deem two out of three collaborative networks ineffective on the first configuration. At the time of conducting the interviews solely one collaborative network had reached the age of three years. This thesis challenges the age criterion of the formula; this will be discussed and substantiated in the next paragraph. The collaborative networks are deemed to be stable as the main (important) actors were involved from the start and do not refrain from cooperation, the network goals are persistent and hitherto there are no signs of internal- nor external factors that destabilize the collaborative network. The collaborative networks are centrally integrated with the municipality deciding on the required and invited actors and the Safety House monitoring the compliance with agreements. In addition, the collaborative networks contain cliques of closely cooperating actors. The collaborative networks are secured in an environment of resource munificence. None of the collaborative networks had a NAO form of governance; in the next paragraph it will discussed whether or not a NAO is necessary. Strictly applied the formula predicts that there is solely one collaborative network which is assumed to experience high levels of effectiveness, as the other collaborative networks fail the age-criterion. However, the age-criterion is deemed to be improper for these collaborative networks. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the three collaborative networks are likely to experience high levels of network effectiveness on the network-level.

The formula originated from a study on Safety Houses. The criteria set were limited applicable for the present collaborative networks. A minimal network age of three years is not appropriate as it is questionable what is ought to be determined as the 'birth' of the network. Perhaps the age-criterion is appropriate if it concerns collaborative networks with no prior relations nor experience. However, the main actors of the present collaborative networks cooperated, and still cooperate, on other themes. The trust was present in advance due to which the expected tensions were restricted rather quickly. Therefore, this thesis challenges the age-

criterion and recommends researchers to critically assess whether the criterion is appropriate for the particular collaborative network. With regard to the stability configuration this thesis emphasizes the assessment of the possible influence an actor or event is able to generate. It should concern important actors, a major shift in goal-orientation, and in- or external events that affects a larger part of the collaborative network. This thesis observed challenges for particular components of the collaborative networks, yet these events were considered insufficiently able to destabilize the collaborative networks. Therefore, the collaborative networks are, in accordance with prior expectations, considered to be stable. Remarkably, contradicting prior expectations, this thesis found that all the respondents were positive towards the amount of resources available. The collected data with regard to the structure and integration was limited due to privacy concerns. Therefore, it is argued that the data is insufficient to challenge or confirm the criteria set for structure and integration. Yet, the data does indicate that the collaborative networks are centrally integrated and contain certain cliques, which according to theory enhances the effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, the lead-organization selects the relevant actors per case, which prevents service duplication and enhances efficiency. Unfortunately, all the collaborative networks had a similar lead-organization, which limited the ability to compare a lead-organization governed network with a NAO governed network as well as distinct organizations that fill the lead-organization role. Therefore, even though this thesis observed the lead-organizations to be effective, it is unable to conclude whether it is because the collaborative networks operate in an environment of resource munificence, as argued by Raab, Mannak and Cambré or because it concerns municipalities who are the local authorities, as argued by Provan and Milward. Conclusively, this thesis argues that the collaborative networks are effective on the network-level The collaborative network actors are committed, are able to deliver services in absence of duplication, have high trust, are well coordinated and are able to provide a broad range of services. Yet, the collaborative networks have opportunities to enhance efficiency through e-learning and a digital data storage.

A second question of this thesis aimed to examine the comprehensiveness of local collaborative networks. Conclusively, the collaborative networks contain sufficient actors to provide distinct types of care and guidance, to prevent and detect radicalization and to effectuate repressive measures. Quite peculiar however, one respondent from a collaborative network stated that a case of radicalization could be detected earlier if the connection with the AZC was tighter. Respondents from the other collaborative networks acknowledged that the cooperation with the AZC's is not that tight. AZC's house vulnerable individuals susceptible to radicalization. Therefore, the benefits and necessity of tight cooperation and frequent sharing of information with the AZC's seem evident. In addition, all of the respondents from schools and welfare organizations expressed a desire for closer cooperation among the two organization. This thesis

wonders why this cooperation is not enhanced as restrictions did not became apparent. Even though this thesis observed more commitment to limit vulnerability on social media, it still argues that there is work to be done. Social media requires extra attention.

Unfortunately, this thesis is bound to conclude that the capabilities for de-radicalization are limited. The de-radicalization-trajectories are still in a trial and error phase according to the Dutch Coordinator Safety and Contraterrorism. It is debatable whether the de-radicalization efforts can be considered to be effective. In addition, the assessment of the level of threat by the NCTV remains undiminished, i.e. 'substantial' the fourth out of five levels (NCTV, 2017). Moreover, statistics by CBS in 2017 indicate that approximately 70 percent of the Dutch adults occasionally or often fears a terrorist attack in the Netherlands (Kloosterman & Moonen, 2017). This means that both the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the Dutch inhabitants perceive that the problem is not dealt with so far. Respondents of the concerned municipalities stated that they were able to limit the number of radicalizing individuals. However, the respondents seemed to base their statements on the number of jihadist that traveled to fight abroad. This thesis questions whether that number has halted, or decreased, due to the approach taken by the collaborative networks or due to the fact that IS is losing ground in Syria and Iraq. The latter could possibly mean that the number of radicals is rising, yet the willingness to go to Syria and Iraq is decreasing. Therefore, conclusively, this thesis argues that it is obscure whether the collaborative networks are effective in their goal attainment and the quality of the services provided. The collaborative networks operate on a theme with relatively few cases. Therefore, it is challenging to assess whether their efforts have a significant impact. Conclusively, it remains obscure whether the collaborative networks fully attain their goals and can be considered to be effective on the community-level. It is questionable whether the collaborative networks are able to de-radicalize individuals, whether radicalization is truly prevented due to the policy efforts. Additionally, the general public does not seem to notice changes in the incidence of the problem.

This thesis argues that the formula by Raab, Mannak and Cambré, with a few side notes, is able to predict network effectiveness on the network-level. Yet, that the effectiveness on the community-level depend on additional factors. This confirms earlier findings of Provan and Milward (2001), who have stated that effectiveness on one of the concerned levels does not guarantee effectiveness on another level. Perhaps the theme radicalization is inappropriate to conclude in such a manner as it remains obscure what approach is effective and if there even are successful remedies; indicating plausible unattainable ambitions and goals. However, the need for clarification on the type of network effectiveness (Kenis & Provan, 2009) and the complexity and challenges the construct brings (Head, 2008) have been emphasized earlier and is emphasized by this thesis as well.

This thesis studied local collaborative networks to prevent and counter radicalization. Findings enabled certain recommendations for both science, collaborative networks in general and the approach taken by the local collaborative networks. For future studies, this thesis recommends to assess the appropriateness of Raab, Mannak and Cambré their formula for particular collaborative networks. It is observed that the age-criterion, the stability-criterion and the mode of governance-criterion deserve additional side notes or attention prior to implementation. For collaborative networks in general, this thesis emphasizes the importance of structurally updating the status of the collaborative network. What relations are present? What value is attached? Where have been changes? What are possible improvements? Who requires more training? It is strongly recommended to assess the strength of the relations within the local collaborative networks. Especially, with regard to the concerned theme, the local collaborative networks that have not faced cases of plausible radicalization that frequent. In addition, it was observed that cooperation thrived due to the negotiations and substantiation of the approaches chosen, even though certain actors would have favored other approaches. Communication is key in establishing trust and sustainable relations. This thesis recommends collaborative networks to follow this example. For the concerned collaborative networks, this thesis encourages to strengthen their relation with the AZC's and to enhance cooperation among schools and youth-workers. The approach would benefit in terms of prevention and detection. In addition, this thesis recommends the approach to be focused on preventive measures rather than repressive measures as the effectiveness of de-radicalization is questionable. Furthermore, this thesis found that the relations with mosques and ethnic communities are perceived to be ambiguous. Therefore, this thesis recommends to emphasize the personal development and resilience of individuals via schools and welfare organizations in order to train resilience to radical ideologies and extreme doctrines. Besides, it is strongly recommended to maintain and invest in the relations with the inhabitants. The abolishment of the target-groups-approach is perceived to be the cause of the diluted contacts with mosques and ethnic communities.

Whilst analyzing the policy approach taken towards the social problem of radicalization, this thesis questioned whether this approach corresponds with the way in which the Netherlands presents itself. The government of the Netherlands argues that their core values are freedom of religion, opinion, lifestyle, association and self-determination (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2014). Likewise, the motto of the EU reads *In varietate concordia*, which translates to United in diversity. Ossewaarde (2013) argues that in rationalized societies, identities are monitored and subjected to surveillance, especially individuals or groups that are considered to be deviant (Ossewaarde, 2013). Do the networks seek to apply the tactics of soft and unobtrusive control to shape identities, as argued by Foucault (Foucault, 1991)? An individual that displays signs of deviant behavior or a deviant mindset will be monitored and discussed

within a group of experts who seek to apply the newest scientific insights of distinct disciplines to control and mold the individual. Important to note, these forms of control can be, and are, conducted prior to infringement of a law. This thesis questions whether the freedom of religion, opinion, lifestyle, association and self-determination are only granted and applicable if they are convenient, or at least not troublesome, for the government. This thesis questions if due to the risk of, for example, terror attacks the aforementioned freedoms are limited and deviants are monitored and controlled earlier.

Studies have shown that radicals tend to perceive the authorities as illegitimate (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013). To quote Charles Kurzman (1998), fundamentalists are known for their thoughts of "the illegitimacy of local political institutions (as usurpers of God's sovereignty), the authority of the revivalists as the sole qualified interpreters of Islam (Kurzman, 1998, p. 6)". Radicals possess values that conflict with the norms and values that are shared among the majority of society, therefore they are considered to be deviants (Fuller & Myers, 2011). Islamic fundamentalists live by the rules of the Quran and the Hadith and value no other rules (Fuller G. , 2003). Considering the aversion towards the Dutch government and what it represents, is a network driven by local authorities appropriate to prevent and counter radicalization? Could an united front of bureaucratic organizations perhaps trigger a paradoxical effect in which it strengthens radicalization? An united front could strengthen feelings of non-belongingness and deviance. This question cannot be answered with the collected data. Yet, this thesis hypothesizes that a network driven by the authorities is appropriate for preventive measures, but is plausibly inappropriate for curative and counter-radicalization measures. To substantiate this hypothesis, this thesis argues that the target group in the preventive phase does not possess a strong aversion towards the authorities and what it represents. The greater the aversion, the greater the inappropriateness. This subtheme deserves additional research, which is valuable for the approach taken to address radicalization.

Recently the discussion on a plausible influencer of network effectiveness, that is not covered by the formula of Raab, Mannak and Cambré (2015), arose; the choice between formalized coordination mechanisms and network management. Cristofoli and Markovic (2016) and Markovic (2017) found that a centralized network requires good managerial coordination to perform well, whereas a density based network requires formalized coordination mechanisms to perform well (Cristofoli & Markovic, 2016; Markovic, 2017). With regard to the radicalization prevention and counter-radicalization networks this thesis questioned which of the two is most appropriate. The network itself is centralized, which requires the lead-organization to have managerial skills. However, the regional case-table and other consultations have a density based set-up, which requires formalized contracts and agreements. As argued by Whelan (2015),

"security networks tend to have some form of lead-organization, but these organizations are better understood to drive network decisions and activities rather than govern networks (Whelan, 2015)". Therefore, this thesis found that it is not necessarily one over the other, but that these networks require both formalized coordination mechanisms and managerial skills dependent on the setting. This means that this thesis does not reject findings of Cristofoli and Markovic, yet adds that the choice nor the necessity works excluding. With regard to the assessed collaborative networks this means that they require 'good' managers that are able to monitor and control the relations of the network actors and proper formalized coordination mechanisms to enhance effectiveness of the density-based consultations.

The design of the research is valid as it examined the perceptions on distinct features of effectiveness of several respondents among three local networks. By conducting the research on three collaborative networks and questioning varying actors of the networks this thesis seeks to grasp the current situation of the networks with regard to the strengths, weaknesses and remaining opportunities for improvement. By questioning the actors in a semi-structured setting this thesis refrained from focusing excessively on fixed aspects and provided opportunities for personal observations by the respondents. Therefore, the conclusions drawn are based on a broad range of information. The systematical failure of focusing solely on prefixed aspects is avoided, therefore this thesis refrains from concluding on the effectiveness while crucial aspects are overlooked or left undiscussed. The findings are to a more or lesser extent applicable to other local collaborative networks. This thesis provided new insights which have to be considered while assessing network effectiveness. Therefore, this thesis adds to previous theories and is of academic value.

This study has three limitations. First, this study was unable to acquire valid longitudinal statistics on the number of radicalized individuals in the Netherlands nor was this thesis able to conduct interviews on radicalized or de-radicalized individuals. Second, this thesis discussed two out of three levels of analysis, i.e. the network-level and the community-level. The organization/participant-level has been left out of consideration. Third, this thesis had to limit its goals as it primarily intended to develop an overview of the existing relations and perceptions of three local collaborative networks. Unfortunately, due to privacy concerns, this was unrealizable. Several respondents expressed a desire and acknowledged the advantages it could generate. As an external party it was observed that the preparedness to share information on all of the involved actors and related perceptions was absent. It is plausible that the preparedness enhances when the research is commissioned by a local collaborative network collectively or the lead organization (municipality). The inability to develop a detailed overview of the collaborative networks limited the conclusions with regard to the structure of the network. This was

compensated by conducting a larger number of interviews. Surveys enable limited information from a high number of respondents, whereas the interviews enabled obtaining a lot of information from a lesser amount of respondents. Further research is required to provide an in-depth overview of the relations within the collaborative networks including the value that is attached to the relations.

This thesis wishes to encourage additional research. First, this thesis strongly recommends to assess existing relations within the concerned collaborative networks. Second, this thesis strongly recommends to assess the de-radicalization-trajectories and the capabilities to de-radicalize an individual. Third, this thesis encourage researchers to examine the effects that prior cooperation among actors on a certain theme has on new jointly pursued goals on another theme. Fourth, two respondents expressed, contrary to findings of Ministry of Safety & Security (Ministerie van Veiligheid & Justitie, 2017), to observe ambiguity with regard to the legal framework of sharing information among network actors. A follow up research could examine the current terms of sharing information in light of current judicial regulations. However, the Ministry of Safety & Security stated to provide a covenant for the actors on short-term. Finally, this thesis argues that social media is a risk as it is unfathomed terrain. The impact of social media on individuals and their vulnerability deserves more research and attention for regulation.

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Witteveen, W. (2016). *A Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy: What does it entail?*

Appendices

Appendix A: Recent terror attacks in EU countries driven by Islamic radicalism

Date	Location
May 24th 2014	Brussel, Belgium
December 20th 2014	Tours, France
December 21th 2014	Dijon, France
December 22th 2014	Nantes, France
January 7th 2015	Paris, France
February 14th 2015	Copenhagen, Denmark
June 26th 2015	Lyon, France
August 21th 2015	Arras, France
September 17th 2015	Berlin, Germany
November 13th 2015	Paris, France
December 5th 2015	London, UK
January 1st 2016	Valence, France
January 7th 2016	Paris, France
February 26th 2016	Hannover, Germany
March 22th 2016	Brussel, Belgium
April 16th 2016	Essen, Germany
June 13th 2016	Paris, France
July 14th 2016	Nice, France
July 18th 2016	Wurzburg, Germany
July 22th 2016	Munich, Germany
July 24th 2016	Ansbach, Germany
July 26th 2016	Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, France
September 7th 2016	Molenbeek, Belgium
September 27th 2016	Rimini, Italy
October 5th 2016	Schaarbeek, Belgium
October 31th 2016	Köln, Germany
December 19th 2016	Berlin, Germany
March 9th 2017	Düsseldorf, Germany
March 19th 2017	Orly, France
March 22th 2017	London, UK
April 7th 2017	Stockholm, Sweden
April 20th 2017	Paris, France
May 22th 2017	Manchester, UK
June 3th 2017	London, UK
August 17th 2017	Barcelona, Spain
September 15th 2017	London, UK

Appendix B: Overview of the analyzed documents

	Document	Pages
European		
	Draft Guidelines for the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism – Council of the European Union	14
	The European Agenda on Security – European Commission	21
	Frequently asked questions : Stronger action at EU level to better tackle violent radicalization – European Commission	6
	Charter of Principles Governing the EU Radicalization Awareness Network – Radicalization Awareness Network	5
	Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism – Council of the European Union	15
	Stronger EU action to better tackle violent radicalization leading to terrorism	2
Dutch national		
	Handreiking aanpak van radicalisering en terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau - NCTV	72
	Puberaal, lastig of radicaliserend? – Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap	45
	Handreiking Veilige Moskee – NCTV ESS	36
	The Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism – Ministry of Security and Justice, NCSC, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	20
	Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020 - NCTV	29
	Aanpak radicalisering: samenspel tussen gemeenten en Rijk essentieel – VNG	2
	De rol van gemeenten in de aanpak van radicalisering – VNG	8
	Dialoog onder druk – Stichting School & Veiligheid	21
Collaborative network A		
	Policy document approach to radicalization (municipality)	-
	Motions by local political parties	-
	Letter concerning financial aid for the approach	-
	Research document	-
Collaborative network B		
	Policy document approach to radicalization (municipality)	-
	Letters concerning financial aid for the approach	-

	Letters by local political parties	-
Collaborative network C		
	Policy document approach to radicalization (municipality)	-
	Documents concerning the budget	-
	Policy documents of an actor	-
	Document on cooperation between actors	-

Appendix C: Overview of the interviews conducted

Code interview	Profession / function	Date	Type
Radic-01	Advisor Safety & Livability at municipality	March 8th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-02	Safety house employee	March 8th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-03	Sustainability of networks with migrants	March 16th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-04	Chief comprehensive safety of a school	April 5th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-05	Advisor safety and program coordinator	April 6th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-06	Employee safety at municipality	April 7th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-07	District manager welfare	April 19th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-08	Coordinator of Social Security & Integrity of a School	17-05-2017	Semi-structured
Radic-09	Manager radicalization welfare organization	May 17th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-10	Manager welfare organization	May 23th 2017	Semi-structured
Radic-11	Manager Safety House	October 9th 2017	Semi-structured