

**GRASS-ROOTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS NETWORKS AND THEIR
STRATEGIES TO AFFECT CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES**

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INTRODUCTION

Responding to a lack of drive and action by world governments in the early 1990s Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) focussing on climate change developed. These CSOs stepped up and sprang into action in an effort to bring about change that governments were not able to produce. Regional, national and international groups, started to work together aided by the rapid development of the internet, mass communication options and the growth of news formats in print, and online media to focus more attention on the environment (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Climate change especially is a topic that is best tackled on an international plane, because it does not stop at any border, whether it is about air pollution, plastic soup or local mining activities devastating forests that are the lungs of the earth.

The approach of civil society to influencing climate change policy is mostly through a realist lens or a fundamentalist one. The longstanding main divide that social scientists have made in Civil Society Organized advocacy groups was that of insider or outsider, participation or protest (Maloney, Jordan, & McLaughlin, 1994). In the years after the millennium the differentiation in resources, power and strategies grew with the development of the neopluralist governance structures. The workings of governance became more intricate and with this the civil society groups stepping in the policy cycle with a wider variety, in set-up, strategies and cross-over-tactics (Hadden, 2014).

This work describes the background, resources and strategies that three CSO networks on climate change apply. Both ex ante and ex post involvement in the policy cycle, strategies from insider and outsider advocacy groups do complement each other in the pursuit of lowering emission standards and a safer environment. Due to the development of new governance structures realist CSOs had more opportunities to reach into the policy cycle and make their voice heard. Those who prefer to work independently of current policy have a wide array of instruments to work with from their more fundamentalist stance and mobilise both their members and the public in general. The balance of perceived influence shifted from insiders to outsiders with the growth of the internet and especially social and mass media (Kapstein & Busby, 2016a). The links that have developed between these organizations strengthen both their processes and results in working outside and within the policy process. This results in an added analysis of the current state of CSO strategies, in the changing field of governance, policy development and CSO resources.

Three case studies focussing on most dissimilar international CSOs working on climate change give an overview of what is happening in climate change civil society. Because all three CSOs have developed to the international level, an important part of their functioning is embedded in their networked structure, hence CSO networks. The analysis of the strategies applied by CSOs will be mapped over the structure, strategies and possible results of the three case study organizations, Citizens Climate Lobby, 350.org and Climate Action Network, making use of the available data from all three organizations (350.org, 2017; CAN, 2016; CCL, 2017a)

The analysis of literature and the data from the three selected CSO networks leads to the conclusion that it is difficult to actually quantify the effects of CSO networks input on climate change policy. But the fact is that many lobby activities, the resources deployed by the CSOs, demonstrations and participation at conferences do reach policy makers. The accumulation of all of this work navigates forward towards lasting climate change results. Especially if we look at the differentiation in

strategies and tactics, the cross pollination, linkages and the added pressure of these groups the effects on climate change policy are clearly visible.

Research question

Which leads to my main research question, how do CSO networks, influence climate change policy? First sub question is, which types of CSO networks can we distinguish, and second what kind of strategies do they currently use to influence climate change policy.

The structure of this work is as follows; the first step will be starting with the theory of CSOs and CSO networks operations, their place in modern governance. The next step is description of the field they work in, the existing policy cycles and where CSO can and do enter the policy cycle, or try to influence from outside. Followed by a description of the three selected CSO for this thesis, and the reason for choosing three most different cases. Next an overview of the types of organizations, their strategies tools, real results and expected results in general will give the basis for the comparison to the CSO theory. Showing the results of these seemingly very difference CSOs will give the overview of their field of influence and the complementary nature of their strategies.

Who is at the centre of this work?

Civil Society Organization networks are the main focus of this study, or advocacy groups, or power groups, protest groups, these are all manifestations of people coming together on a voluntary basis for a cause they care about. Over the years the different labels have developed, depending on the area of their work, the relations with people or organizations and the arena in which they participate or purposefully not-participate.

To better understand how current CSO networks function and make steps toward different climate change policy, a short overview in very general terms will help to set out the analysis of the situation in more detail. Knowing what is already at work, and aiming to see where there may be room for improvement and perhaps new approaches to climate change policy alternatives in the case studies is the ambition of this paper. The growth of their resources, development of different strategies, perhaps crossing the realist – fundamentalist divide may help different CSOs to achieve more. Several authors acknowledge that more research is needed to fully understand the options available to civil society, but research of a rapidly changing societal phenomenon at the same time is a complicated task. The Danish case study by Binderkrantz (2005) needs comparative studies in other countries to give a more comprehensive picture and the statistical approach by Böhmelt (2013) gives a very general picture of results at UNFCCC meetings that does not represent specific strategy outcomes enough.

To define the realist view in these CSOs, the power politics view from the international relations theory is the closest fit. Working for social influence or control and aware of the need for resources, both used in pursuit of their networks goals (Wohlforth & Donnelly, 2008).

For the definition of the fundamentalist stance of a number of these CSOs the most general definition of fundamentalists applies, from Boer (2005) if we not include the religious connotation “feminism, environmentalism, anarchism and gay and lesbian movements could be characterized as fundamentalist. In each case, the use of the term marks recognition of opposition to the dominant form of capitalism and liberal culture, whether patriarchies, environmental degradation, capitalism itself or a dominant heterosexual culture”

Already in the early days of growing global civil society, the next level of advocacy, Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin (1994) took it upon themselves to revisit and add to the existing model of civil society organizations. The main division has been determined as insider and outsider groups, always from a grass-roots background. The insiders are the organizations that do want to be consulted by policy makers. The outsiders are the CSO that do not want to be at the table in preparing policy, they do not want in any way to be held accountable for the outcome of the policy process. Their perspective is literally from the outside in, protesting a situation (Browne, 1990; Maloney et al., 1994). The original model dates back to Wynn Grant (1978) already claiming that both groups can temporarily combine insider and outsider strategies but in the end to stay a believable partner must choose one strategy to work from.

A general representation of CSOs that work with government being realists and using the resources available to them, or mainly working outside the policy making process and being fundamentalist, as shown in Table 1, is a start to building the CSOs' profile.

Table 1. CSO profile

	Approach to the policy process		
CSOs	Insider strategies	Outsider strategies	Expected outcomes
Realist	<p>Format agenda setting and insert policy outcome preferences.</p> <p>Work with policy makers. Bring resources to the process, epistemic and financial.</p> <p>Ex ante influence on CC policy making.</p> <p>Lend credibility to government policy.</p> <p>Rely on consultation status.</p> <p>Collaborative approach.</p>	<p>Sparingly use media offensives.</p> <p>Occasionally point to outsiders working on this topic to apply pressure.</p> <p>Use (mass) media to frame their solution as the best for a current problem.</p> <p>Ex post influence on CC policy and legislation.</p>	<p>Input on agenda setting and policy development.</p> <p>Monitoring government for windows of opportunity.</p> <p>Creating awareness in policy makers.</p> <p>Creating awareness in general public.</p> <p>Incremental change.</p>
Fundamentalist	<p>Collaborate in larger groups.</p> <p>Agenda setting.</p> <p>Policy formulation.</p>	<p>Evaluation of current policy or situation by way of protesting.</p> <p>Use (mass) media to frame their solution as the best for a current problem.</p> <p>Ex post influence on CC policy and legislation.</p> <p>Ex temporo influence by mobilize members and outsiders at protests.</p> <p>High visibility (social) media offensives.</p> <p>Antagonizing approach.</p>	<p>Influence agenda setting. Impact one problem, one organization, one plan at the time.</p> <p>Creating awareness in general public.</p> <p>Short term, bold results. Long term lingering effectiveness of campaigns.</p> <p>Disruptive change.</p>

This is a basic concept of CSO groups as discussed in literature throughout, and is helpful to get a view of the arena of organizations in the climate change debate. A more fine-tuned and more complex web is of course the reality especially after the millennium and through globalization, which shows the world of governance interaction with Civil Society and its organizations and networks.

THIS WORLD WE LIVE IN

While for many the basic distinction of insider and outsider to the policy process still works as a useful categorization, others do find that this divide is too black and white. The development of civil society's role in climate change policy has led to a diversity of groups within the insider and or outsider groups. Also the growth of a number of cross-over tactics is very clear, insiders using the protest of the outsiders to their advantage at the negotiation table and vice versa.

This theory section starts at the basics, globalization and the description of a civil society organization in its environment, or social context. For the case study analysis we need to know in which arena the climate change civil society organizations operate, the networks in which they work to bring about change. Both the policy networks and their organizational networks are instrumental.

Global civil society

Globalization as we now know it, the international and transnational interactions on trade and economics, agreements on human rights and climate, cooperation in solving 'world' problems has a profound influence on politics and governance. While national economies get bigger, the extent of their power is limited by the international web of states, business and civil society working together. The whole process of globalization that started with trade and economics (see the EU) has become a complex and certainly not evenly distributed phenomenon. States no longer look just inside, providing public goods, they also set up relations with other countries and build economic bridges to further their economy (Cerny, 2009). One of the new actors in this globalization process are civil society organizations, the third dimension or third force, depending on which author you consult. The concept of civil society stepping up in itself is not so new, but on the international plane it has a bigger role. Civil society at the governance table widens the old power distribution of states, individuals and groups have input in governance and decision making at moments in time where it actually counts. This addition of an extra actor in the government balance can be the cause of a punctuated equilibrium, it can be one trigger that upsets but also adds to the balance of governance (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2006). In civil society people take part in organizations, in policy making, in fact in governance. Thanks to the internet, social media, air traffic and growing economy in the 1990 and later the global interconnectedness was added, because some problems can only be addressed on an international level. Archibugi, (1998) responds to this by giving Global Civil Society organizations the label of 'agency' in a growing world with overlapping authorities, but limited advisory and non-executive functions.

Global civil society and governance

The contribution of civil society to governance is growing, new structures for policy development emerge both nationally and globally, and the way in which these structures are regulated are also developing. So who is talking to whom and what are the results of this?

The format in which all global actors now concerned with climate change policy work has its roots in neo-pluralism. Approaching the climate change global actors from the process side of their interaction, neo-pluralism registers the interaction between interest groups and international organizations. The resulting shifting power balance, objectives from actors, different strategies and available resources in the process make for a very dynamic policy development process (Kütting & Cerny, 2015). This focus on interchange between actors, who work in a quite regularized relation, makes that transnational neopluralism view, shows which structures work, which do not and to quote Dahl (1961) “who governs” in the end. This growing group of actors, contains both civil society and business, value groups and governmental actors, in a composition that is aiming to get a really targeted result from their deliberations (Kütting & Cerny, 2015). This is a step up from what governments usually have at the end of big deliberations, where all compromises needed to get any agreement signed usually results in a pareto-optimal political outcome, the most optimal outcome under the given circumstances. Transnational neopluralism is going hand in hand with globalization, which creates complex transnational linkages, across nation and state lines. (Kütting & Cerny, 2015)

To get a hold of this transnational neo-pluralist society now working in climate change, governments have tried to unify the regulation on climate change under an integrated comprehensive system. Instead a regime complex has emerged due to the number of state and non-state actors involved in climate change policy making, lobbying and action (Keohane & Victor, 2011). Where government is the national entity to enforce compliance with the law, on the global level this formal structure is missing (Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond, 2004). On the global plane the definition that works well to describe the emerged global governance comes from Nye and Donahue (2000) “by governance we mean the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” additional by Armstrong et al., (2004) “the group in this case is any interlinked network in some specific issue area”. In this case the group is a civil society network advocating on the topic of climate change, and the governance, both formal and informal processes and institutions, is the regime complex.

Civil society participation in governance also has the property of bringing soft powers to the table, according to Kathryn Sikkink, (2002) “Transnational advocacy groups contribute to restructuring world politics by altering the norm structure of global governance”. She is not the first to bring this argument across, Wendt in (1999) already mentions a structure of common rules and norms parallel to anarchy as we know it or the power of hegemony in our state driven democracies, he calls it “international distribution of ideas” and (Ruggie, 1982) already noted that the structure of international society that work from a common set of rules and norms, next to government and international organizations, helps us understand the form of international order, not yet its content.

Due to the international focus of climate change, networking is key, both for insider and outsider groups. One reason for civil society organizations to form a network is the power of the shared or accumulative resources now available to the network. It also cuts down on the cost of taking action on a specific topic all care about and would have the same strategy of approach. Last a larger power block entering policy agenda setting, preparation or formulation makes for a participant that usually cannot be ignored. The effects of being part of a network for a CSO are noticeable, according to Walter Powell, (1990) “Networks are lighter on their feet and are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information and for the exchange of commodities whose

value is not easily measured”. But it also applies to networked governance, in our current networked model of decentralized governance that emerged next to the traditional hierarchical governance, multiple actors inside and outside traditional governments come together and share responsibility for networked climate governance (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017).

Böhmelt, (2013) concludes in a large statistical study that Business is the most successful in lobbying at for example UNFCCC, and perhaps surprisingly in an environmental friendly fashion, on the other side environmental CSO could improve their performance by first selecting the more perceptive ‘policy making organizations’ to lobby.

There are roughly two roads to travel in this field of climate change. Work within ‘the system’ be part of the legitimate section or find a way around it and have an approach outside the policy or governance cycle. This next section will describe both main groups of CSOs, with their strategies, interaction points in the policy cycle and the build of the organization communication on our super internet highway included.

The insiders

From a policy development view there are a number of arguments to consult with civil society organizations at an early stage (Browne, 1990; Maloney et al., 1994). One of the important ones is the input these civil society organizations can bring to the table, first of all in representing at least a small part of the public that values environmentally correct policy. The size of the membership of this group does not influence the weight of the voice a group has in the policy negotiations (Steffek et al., 2009). Second many of these organizations have ties to science, sometimes even their own scientific bureau, so the access to the epistemic community of a CSO is a good thing to have in policy development. Third the status of a CSO, both insider and outsider groups have several layers of engagement, and attractiveness to the policy makers which demonstrates the many grey scales in the whole spectrum of insider and outsider CSOs (Steffek et al., 2009).

Over the years several subdivisions have been formulated. From Maloney et al., (1994) come the peripheral insiders and the core insiders, the peripherals are consulted to keep them quiet, the core insiders however are valued as members with input in policy development. Not so much later (Grant, 1995) extended the insider definitions to, Prisoner groups, who due to dependence on subsidies had a very low impact, next low profile groups, mostly specialists organizations and last the high-profile groups with already a more sophisticated mix of insider and outsider strategies that brings them some insider autonomy.

A third characterization from Lune and Oberstein, (2001) looks at the relationship between advocacy organizations and the state, they also define three different relations. First the directly embedded groups, work within their policy field and are dependent on the state, but their integrated form also makes them relatively effective. Second the outsiders also here, are those challenging the decision making process and power, naming themselves ‘extra-institutional’ to assert their independence. Third the mediating organizations, who on a regular basis work with government and civil society. This division in three parts also allows to distinguish politically accepted civil society groups and other social movements on the outside of the policy and decision making process.

Why then do policy makers, governments or international policy makers consult these CSOs? From these categories of CSOs, the core insiders that do have influence, resources to bring to the table and

in the end get results, are the ones at the top of the consultation list of policy makers. These are an asset to the process, positive attitude but at the same time willing to stand their ground when it comes to the cause they represent (Browne, 1990; Fraussen, Beyers, & Donas, 2015). This exchange of value ‘goods’ such as information and validity in policy circles drives an almost market like economy in the policy business according to Browne (1990). The next arguments come from the section ‘politically correct’, policy makers do want to be seen and known to have consulted outside expert in their process to gain legitimacy for the policy they are developing. For this they consult the insiders with the valued consultation status that has been awarded to them, but also a number of groups just to make them feel heard in the system, but at the same time ignore their input in the process, all of this just to keep them as insiders in the process (Maloney et al., 1994).

Insider strategies

The strategies set out and implemented by insider civil society organizations are usually deliberate, diplomatic, and fitting an official brief, but once in a while when they feel the need to take a stand an insider CSO will resort to some outsider, read ‘bold’, strategies to make policy partners take notice. Strategies by insider groups are also called direct strategies, because they do have a direct access route to policy makers (Binderkrantz, 2005).

The insider strategies as defined by Maloney et al. (1994) work with government and policy connections, be asked, have the option for input, and have the ear of prominent policy makers. They support the process by input of the scientific community to strengthen their argument and support the actual policy makers this way to speed up the process if needed. Next to that there are more fields where CSOs feel they need to be on the ‘inside’.

Influence on governance and society asserted by the market is called private politics according to the citation of Baron (2013) by (Kapstein & Busby, 2016b). Social movements, civil society organizations are also targeting big business to get them to work on sound social principles, the best known example being the price negotiation for HIV/AIDS in third world countries. Where within a market strategy approach advocacy groups have been able to get affordable medication available for a large market, the climate change organizations still struggle to make industry and business reduce emission and work more environmental friendly. The industry opportunity structure as refined by Schurman (2004 p. 251) of “a set of economic, organizational, cultural and commodity related factors” would be the door into the realm of market controlled business and could if navigated properly give advocacy groups the possibility to influence market outcomes. For the climate change movement the more pragmatic approach of talking to the auto industry, to make them change fuel systems could work better than making an entire fossil fuel industry give up their business .

Also taking the next step by lending scientific support to the innovations in the industry would make this a value added approach that could go a long way for the CSOs (Kapstein & Busby, 2016b). Within the market strategy approach, Kapstein and Busby (2016) also argue for an insider approach in agreement with the definition by Maloney et al. (1994). This strategy builds up working with business to provide environmental friendly labels and certification of their products. On some topics transnational action groups already have built a normative framework for big business on how to behave socially acceptable in a way that governments had not yet achieved according to Schurman (2004), so there are options for climate change CSOs to set out a sound strategy to make work in a market environment.

In one very significant case, the 2015 Paris climate agreement, this was already visible. Where the Kyoto protocol in 1989 (UNFCCC, 2016c) was built upon nations making legally binding agreements, and sometimes plainly ignoring them, the Paris accord was based on bottom-up agreements from a national level to influence market conditions in regions and countries (Kapstein & Busby, 2016b). The relation of CSOs and CSO network to state and business is something that needs one further element of thought. Some authors claim that due to networks, relations and financial ties there are no purely independent CSOs, the dependency on cooperation and finances to keep on going makes them vulnerable and will impact their power to get things done. Price in his (2003) review article concludes that a majority of researcher does not agree with this.

It may seem a big step to move from conferences to values. Amy Luers (2013) advocates to take a page from the US conservative playbook, make climate change, and all that comes with it, part of your values. To make climate change really happen, bottom-up style, she proposes four areas of rethinking, first: focus more on the medium to long term. Second, start with people, not emissions. Third, focus more on values, less on science. Fourth, evaluate and share what you have learned (Luers, 2013).

The interpretation of the effect, influence or even impact of these civil society strategies is being weight differently by authors, many see potential, but the main agreement lies in the fact that it is difficult to quantify, more research is needed to map the real effects of civil society climate change strategies. (Böhmelt, 2013; Kapstein & Busby, 2016b; Maloney et al., 1994; Schurman, 2004; Tarrow, 2011).

Insider CSOs in the policy cycle

The overall goal of CSOs as defined by, Keck and Sikkink, in 1998; “trying to get an issue on the international agenda, to make international actors change their discursive position and institutional procedures and to influence policy change and actor behaviour”, is a very large ask. Most available strategies to get an issue, on the agenda, usually give results in incremental change, that has to build up into visible results over the years. Small steps forward, one step back (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). What is even smaller than incremental change? Sowing the seeds of change. The strategy to get the issue that needs attention ‘discussed’ at an event with impact is not always very visible but it works. At that moment of the conference people may disagree, but it has been written down, the subject has been discussed, so it has become a topic of international discourse. This very small first step is the one foot in the door anyone can need, it is a steppingstone to build upon (Florini, 2000). Having this foothold in government or governance policy cycles is a base to work from, these connections could also be part of the leverage a CSO can bring to their interaction with market actors.

Lending support to policy development through scientific support of the process via the CSOs network is also a way into the policy process. Where there is also the growing trend of mandating specific NGOs for the policy implementation, in these circles there is also the option for CSOs to be asked by NGOs to have input in the implementation stage of climate change policy.

Insider connections to members and the world

The way CSOs communicate is crucial for the survival of their organization. Based on a volunteer workforce all involved need to feel an integral part of the organization, this is why meetings between

CSOs and decision-makers, workshops, newsletters and most of all, still, personal contact is what keeps groups up and running. This same strategy goes for growing the organization, people respond best to peers, a group that is familiar and speaks their language. Internet is important, social media work well for basic information, but the backbone and the best growth strategy is still the human touch.

The way in which an insider group presents its work to the outside world also has to take into account the vast differences in online skills levels of possible members, but also needs to keep making contact on a personal level. Growing membership and keeping people working with and for a CSO network requires personal contact, in settings that are familiar to those you want to commit to the organization (van Dijk, 2012).

In the next section the portrait of the outsider groups is painted in different colours, even though they do have the same end result in mind as the insider groups, they are perceived as being totally different. Yet their tactics and the way they approach the subject are different, but there are apparent commonalities with the insiders on the outcome of the work and structure of the organizations.

The outsiders

The outsiders literature of the civil society organization is immediately three steps removed from the civil society organizations policy literature, when researching their position in the field the word civil almost completely disappears and is replaced by activists, interest group, or in general ‘movement’. Tarrow in his book on Power in Movement departs from the more realist view of international relations, people come together because they feel a common in justice, they come together “to mount common claims against opponents, authorities or elites” (Tarrow 2011 p. 11). The projected image of a tough, creative and sometimes un-civil bunch of some outsider civil society organizations is easily debunked by Tarrow (2011), just a handful of organizations have a more aggressive stance in protest, and if other outside events get out of hand it is usually because people who come there to cause havoc do derail the situation.

When describing the outsider civil society organizations both Browne (1990) and Maloney et al., (1994) are again dividing them into two groups. First of all there are the outsiders who would like to be on the inside, the potential insider or outsiders by necessity, second the ideological outsiders who are purposefully standing outside and keep their distance from policy input. From the potential insiders Browne (1990) remarks that the most likely cause of their outsider status is the lack of sophistication in the policy process to get inside, the lack of scientific and financial resources to make things happen. Grant in (1995) also defined three types of outsiders, the potential insiders, who work for this and have resources and credibility to get there. Second the outsiders who try for insider status but fail, and third the ideological outsiders whose purpose is to stay and work from the outside Maloney et al. (1994) are of the opinion that outsiders choose their own place in the relation with policy makers, they do not want to be part of the policy cycle. Realising that the option of being an insider is purely based on the fact that this status is granted to an organisation by ‘the bureaucracy’, there are many who do not want this position. In (2014) Hadden concludes that to the outsider activism as seen at the COP meeting has received relatively little study, to understand the interaction and workings at such an event more work is needed.

For this part on outsider strategy the focus will be on the real outsiders, those who demonstrate, march, stage sit-ins and performance art to attract attention.

Outsider strategies

Strategies of outsider groups to get their message across are diverse and often times creative. They can be divided into three main streams of action. Contained behaviour, disruption and violence are the main headlines, but their use is (happily) not evenly distributed. First the contained behaviour manifesting itself as demonstrations and protest marches “ritualized public performance” as Tarrow, (2011 p. 113) describes them, are now common place and accepted by the elites they target and the public that encounters them. Disruption is the second protest form commonly used by interest groups that want to make their point, if carefully planned and executed a creative form of attention seeking does work, gets into the newspapers and brings the point across, although disruption is vulnerable to become unstable, because of their new approach. Even with this instability attached, disruption is one of the more powerful tools in the box, because it spreads uncertainty in the public, and this uncertainty is leverage over the actor they oppose. Sometimes there are groups that feel that only violence will bring their view across to those who are in charge, this part of contentious politics is usually the least successful, but it does create headlines. Part of the charm and effect of fundamental groups is their way of framing their issues in an innovative and attractive way and seeking venues that lend themselves for a dramatic performance (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). However the point of protest performances is to add excitement and amusement to public politics, to grow the movement but foremost to disarm the opponents in order to get traction for the cause (Tarrow, 2011). These outsider strategies are also called indirect strategies because they all have a medium or action in-between to reach the policy makers (Binderkrantz, 2005).

As one of the instruments to instigate and organize the performances, get an audience to the happening and attract media attention, the use of social media and the internet is indispensable. A good communication strategy can make or break these happenings today, also avoid collision with other events that could drain attention from the plan (Hestres, 2015). There is another important incentive for lively actions to be added to CSO strategy, the sustainability of the movement also depends on the type of work they undertake, the outsider membership expects out-of-the-box actions and hopefully results.

The effect of this kind of contentious actions can be two fold, sometimes a protest, a march or exhibition results in the immediate closing of a factory or coalmine, which is a win, but seems to do little for the root of the problem. But Tarrow (2011) also sees the opportunity of planting a seed, the topic has been raised, more people are aware and those in power have been confronted, which may lead to benefits at a later stage, perhaps on a related topic, but there is opportunity for one demonstration to lead to progress in the future. This effect was already noted by Maloney et al. (1994) but is being reinforced by modern news media and the internet. We can compare this to effect that insider CSOs can have when getting a topic discussed at an important, let's say climate conference, that was not on the formal agenda, their then has been part of a discussion, notes have been taken, and all parties involved have some inkling of a problem that is out there, another seed sown (Florini, 2000). States, or as referred to by the movements ‘the elite’ are very much aware of this principle and have been seen to steer the process by allowing specific manifestations to go

forward and hindering, relocating or outright banning the protest at hand (Tarrow, 2011) hence the need for spontaneous, and civil disobedient action every now and then.

Outsider CSOs and the policy cycle?

There is the matter of perspective, if an outsider organizations stages a protest march at a nuclear power plant, is this an evaluation of the policy? It surely is an avid statement that there should be a nuclear power policy change, hence a matter of agenda setting? If the same organizations gets its solar power plant on the government agenda, they may want to have input, or will give input on technology, location and size, they even may contribute to the development and implementation by delivering expert opinions, and scientific information. The fact that some well know outsider organizations are a member of the Climate Action Networks makes them look like outsiders with insider tactics or is CAN to them a policy broker (Sabatier, 1988) to make it possible for outsider groups to also have their argument heard on the UNFCCC meetings?

Connecting to the outsiders, inside and out

For the outsider groups communication with their members but also to the general public, and informing Business, governments, insiders and decision makers of their viewpoints is very important. Their strategies of getting people together depend on communicating their intentions, explaining the event at hand and mobilizing people all around the world to join.

To do this effectively a number of circumstances have to be taken into account. The current western countries takes internet access and social media for granted, but it is still not readily available to all. The qualities of internet as it was seen as an option for transforming democracy and even having a revolutionary implications as listed by Van Dijk (2012) are the fact that it is an interactive medium, active and creative, direct interaction, a platform where everyone is equal and a network medium for collective work. This opposing the previous mass media such as television, radio and newspapers that where more of a broadcast only nature, the internet should work great for democracy. One the positive side of online participation research for the European Union in (2010) by van Dijk showed that online participation for the cause of civil society topics are more successful than government initiated programs.

The downside of this upside is that there is still the digital divide (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2009) showed that for a representative sample of the Dutch citizens the divide on digital skills is with level of education, but also with information skills. Looking at this from the civil society participation side, those who engage via online media, must be aware of this is a digital door into their community and must try to be aware of the complexity of the information structure they offer. This digital divide, especially over socioeconomic lines is confirmed by Banaji (2013) who found that internet access without sufficient skills, but also without the inclination to become socially active does not change the group of people who CSOs may want to engage.

Strategy results

The way to quantify or clearly qualify a result of CSO strategies is still a topic of discussion, descriptions of events and steps taken seem to give better overview results, where statistics marginalize the contribution of civil society to a given event or action. That is why in this section a few long-term and short-term results of civil society action from insider and outsider origin are mentioned, not forgetting the effects of combining resources. Use of outsider instruments by insider organizations can be effective to give a final push, or even get a start in some processes. On the other hand some outsider CSOs do feel the need to participate in the policy cycle as one extra tactic to even get their more fundamental stance on climate matters on the table at governance level. Early 2000 a shift from the 'success' of insider to a more successful outsider strategy level was seen by Binderkrantz (2005). The growing options to reach more people, make better use of the growing communication and media landscape, via conventional media and online options was one of the things that tipped the scale.

This first example from a climate change study outcome is one with mixed results. From a comprehensive study using a matching approach of the attending Advocacy groups, NGO's Business and International NGOs and other interest groups at delegations of nations the Conference Of the Parties (COP) at UNFCCC's conferences, the conclusion by Böhmelt (2013) is that the impact of Environmental NGOs is hardly measurable. There may be incremental influences, but they cannot measurable be translated into the policy output. Perhaps surprisingly the influence of the BINGOs on the attained outcome of the UNFCCC conferences was measurable. Where state or national delegations had included the business lobby, outcome to their preferences was found, and while the motivation for business to attend such conferences is mostly to benefit from the business opportunities that come with for example renewable energy, the end result being a positive outcome on climate change policy is the same (Böhmelt, 2013). To support this, there is one result from the research by Baumgartner and Leech (2001) that shows the effect that Grass-roots, non-profit, or in general more open Interest groups sort is less than expected, while the more secretive negotiations of Business, Trade unions or other professional groups do bring results on the topic they are lobbying for. The lack of results by CSOs at UNFCCC COP conferences may be explained by Bernauer, Böhmelt and Koubi (2013) who claim that the marginal effects that may occur when CSOs participate do fade away due to collective action problems that these groups stemming from democratic origin face. This means that if it is not possible to actually measure impact, because the input of CSOs has already been put into the governments point of view because they want to portrait it as environmental friendly, is this a win? One of the participants in the British research by Craig Taylor and Parkes (2004) found that until there is any measure of equality between policy makers and the CSO in the process there cannot be a partnership to build upon and the policy formulation an development will remain a long struggle with just very incremental change as a result.

From another civil society hot topic comes one of the best examples of CSO strategies. This must surely be the result of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear arms negotiations, just a side step away from the climate lobby (Johnson, 2000). The 1970 non-proliferation treaty, required a renewal after 25 years, so 1995 a heavily divided world on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy faced each other. France's take on nuclear arms was met with economic boycotts and civilians not buying French goods, in the USA next to demonstrations in the streets the epistemic community played an important insider role. In Germany the government could not miss

the opinion of both spontaneous civil demonstrations and organized action. All of this leads (Johnson, 2000) to the bold but clear conclusion that both the insider, behind the door negotiations, and the outsider organised protest and the spontaneous civil actions are a winning and reinforcing combination.

This last example of civil society action outcome does show unexpected results. We know from projects in developing countries, the best intentions do not always have the expected and required results, due to our inability to cross the cultural divide. In his (2001) paper on The Corporate Ethics Crusade, Ethan Kapstein raises the question of the results of the best intentions that NGOs have in promoting to uphold environmental standards, work in a healthy and safe working place, and human rights standards for business. While the coercion strategies of targeting big business with Internet and media storms do have effect on business ethics, there is a downside to many actions that has not been taken into account. Clothing factories that have been closed in poor countries both because of poor work ethics and horrifying environmental practices, this has left entire villages without work and economic livelihood. Companies that have been forced into adjusting their practices have done so without looking at the people they leave behind, creating another problem in its wake. At a first glance their public face is saved, but both the Advocacy group that instigated the change and the business that responded with drastic measures did not see or feel the social responsibility to find a middle way in doing business in a sound fashion for the environment (Kapstein, 2001).

METHODOLOGY

The empirical descriptive case study design has been set up to see what strategies Climate Change CSOs have to influence any of the steps in a policy cycle for climate change. To get a current and wide angle view of available strategies and tactics, three most different climate change CSOs have been selected.

Most of the scientific literature of the last ten years has its focus on a specific CSO type or group, specific country, finding interaction with policy for insider CSOs or describing the un-civil side of the climate advocacy groups when talking about outsider action groups. In the theory sections both are mentioned but most literature has a narrow focus.

With this wider-angle lens, the aim of this work is to show that the current Climate Change CSO networks all in their own profile and with strategies and instruments, taking a fundamental or a realistic view and approach, do have a great complementary output. Strategies and instruments used by both insider and outsider groups have evolved by opportunities available to different groups and the network they participate in. Also the adaptation of known strategies by advocacy groups on other subjects such as human right, that are now applied by climate change CSOs has broadened the scope of climate change action. This spill-over effect of strategies has had its largest impact with the outsider groups in climate change action according to Hadden (2014).

The dependent variables in this work are the climate change policies that have been developed on the international stage. The independent variables are the strategies that the CSOs use to influence the policy development.

To set the strategies developed and used by CSOs next to the theoretical models as described by Maloney et al. (1994); Tarrow (2011) their group structure, strategies, tactics, communication modes and membership have been set out in Table 3 (p23). This guides the comparison of the CCL, 350.org, and CAN to the theory on tactics and interaction with the policy cycle. Since the actual influence of these strategies and tactics on policy on climate change is difficult to quantify, the observation of strategies and interaction with policy makers is of a descriptive nature. Where some actions of the targeted actions of outsider groups can visibly result in halting specific practices or stopping procedures, the actual translation into policy is not always directly relatable to the organized action.

The policy cycle

A brief introduction into the policy cycle followed by the points of interaction of CSOs and the way governance and CSOs interact start out this paragraph.

The theory of policy cycles is usually represented as a circular system, in its most basic form consisting of the elements according to the Rational model of the policy process; 1. Agenda Setting, 2. Policy formulation, 3. Decision-making, 4. Policy Implementation, 5. Policy Evaluation. The policy cycle as we experience it is not a real and complete cycle, it's a cyclical process that almost never completes the full cycle. Actors involved in each of the 5 stages and the external factors such as politics, economic situation, current law and society shape and influence the policy cycle in each stage. Within the whole policy cycle development power issues also play a role, who gets what and why and how. In the power division visible in policy making we find two types, Elitism, where the distribution of power is mostly un-equal and where the elite can keep themselves in a leading role using economic and institutional resources. On the other side of the spectrum, the Pluralism model is working from an even distribution of power stance. Multiple groups have a finite amount of power, and compete for influence depending on the issue, with changing success rates.

Relations between groups in the policy process can be formed by the desire to stay in a position of power by forging stable bond, and not create possibilities for more participants to have a share of the take. Other policy communities come together on topic, they defend a common interest in a specific field, for example climate change. In a more open structure networks of issue groups come together to build a stronger force on topics, the composition of the network may change over the issue at hand. In general, the more pluralist groups do represent a more equal voice of all participants.

CSOs interact with policy makers or governments at several stages of the policy cycle; at the stage of policy evaluation the outsiders are the groups that start their interaction with the policy cycle most frequently. They protest the manifestation of a policy and demand change or a complete halt of the current policy. The Agenda setting of the problem they perceive is the next step in their process, demanding again change, a complete stop or even more constructive the CSOs propose an alternative policy.

The operationalization

The three Civil Society Organizations are of a dissimilar construction although they work in the same arena. The common characteristics are their international organizations, working on climate change. All three are volunteer not-for profit organizations and have a grass-roots membership base. But their strategies and the actors they target to influence the climate change policy are distinctly different.

This conceptual table of climate change CSOs will be the basis for the analysis of the individual case studies and their place in the field of CSOs. The scale of each individual case CSO and their field of operation will determine if, and in which form each of the concepts applies to that specific organization. The attributes of each concept are generic in this general CSO conceptualization and will not apply to each CSO.

Table 2. CSO conceptualization

CSO conceptualization	Insiders	Outsiders
Organizational structure	Formal organization, head office leadership, volunteer grass-roots base.	More informal organization, with leadership, volunteer grass-roots base.
Programs	Policy learning. Working with policy makers. Education in general and for members	Information campaigns for public and members on climate change.
• communication channels	Internet, social media, traditional media, letter writing, personal contact	Internet, social media in all formats, text, video, picture. mainstream media,
• membership	Advocacy groups, lobby organizations, scientific organizations, small business.	Activist groups, ad-hoc coalitions, national coalitions,
Strategies	Framing the topic to get it on the policy agenda. Lobbying government representatives. Work with policy makers to formulate or influence policy. Offer Scientific input. Be flexible in strategies and tactics if needed.	Media offences on topic. Mass mobilization for actions and demonstrations Naming and shaming investors /business Big campaigns on single issues. Participation in CAN.
• tactics	Consultation with policy makers. Use specific outsider tactics if needed . Make use of outsider protests in own consultation sessions.	Targeting specific organizations, persons. Social media activation. Strategize with insiders if combined efforts are needed.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> instruments 	<p>Negotiations.</p> <p>Epistemic community</p> <p>Communication with news media.</p> <p>Education programmes for members.</p>	<p>All out use of internet, news-media and social media.</p> <p>Education programmes for members.</p> <p>Offer support materials for protests.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Point of interaction with policy cycle 	<p>Agenda setting, policy formulation or development, Policy implementation</p>	<p>Policy evaluation, Agenda setting, Policy formulation (within CAN)</p>
<p>Place of CSO in Global Governance structures</p>	<p>Represented at Global climate conferences.</p> <p>Working in preparation for global network meetings.</p> <p>Input in policy preparation of International organizations.</p> <p>Making (scientific) resources available for international policy development.</p>	<p>Supporting national and international, policy coalitions by providing outside pressure.</p> <p>Taking part in CAN that facilitates members meeting COP representatives on global climate issues.</p>
<p>Costs</p>	<p>Reduced results due to insider position.</p> <p>Somewhat limited in actions due to consultation status.</p> <p>Acceptance of bargaining position for incremental change.</p> <p>Conform to required consultant behaviour</p>	<p>Effectiveness usually one topic at a time.</p> <p>No direct input into policy making.</p> <p>Distance from policy processes.</p> <p>Ex post involvement.</p>
<p>Benefits</p>	<p>Input, influence, marketing.</p> <p>Ex ante influence</p> <p>Social capital</p> <p>Insight in government, windows of opportunity</p>	<p>No compromises to fundamentals.</p> <p>Not limited in presenting opinion.</p> <p>Broad range of action options.</p>
<p>Expected hypothetical outcomes</p>	<p>Getting matters on policy Agenda.</p> <p>Giving input on Policy matter.</p> <p>Actual input on policy implementation.</p> <p>Opportunity to insert opinion or information on pertinent moments.</p> <p>Opportunity to steer government agenda through lobbying.</p> <p>All incremental change due to collaborative stance insider CSOs.</p>	<p>Fast single issue results; Closing of e.g. mines, Adaption of energy facility regulation.</p> <p>Shaming business into halting specific practices.</p> <p>Public awareness.</p> <p>Behaviour change in government and public.</p>

Case study selection

The criteria for the selection of the case studies is the result of the research question, focussing on strategies of internationally operating climate change CSO networks. To have an overview of strategies and tactics available to CSOs working in the field of climate change mitigation, three most dis-similar organizations have been selected. This will greatly impact the option to compare strategies and results, but also will give the option to see where gaps in specific strategies or tactics may be recognized. For data gathering a broad online presence is a requirement, the working window of this research does not allow for extensive surveys and information gathering on these international networks, all information is secondary.

The selection process of three organizations started with a broad web search, for a first orientation on climate change organizations. The first criterion—an organization functioning on an international level—already resulted in a much smaller selection. The second criterion—having a most different approach to policy in their working strategies—resulted in a manageable list of organizations, from which CCL, 350.org and The Women’s Earth & Climate Action Network (WECAN) were selected. On further study of the needed data, the WECAN website was found to be not up to date, while the fact that this was again a USA based organization did not meet the criterion of most dissimilar organization, although it would have been nice to have an all Women-led, and active in Africa organization in the case study group. Further research on climate change action “groups” led to the Climate Action Network, specifically working on providing access of advocacy groups to the COP at UNFCCC conferences, and thus a worldwide advocacy enabler, on one specific but important event.

The three Civil Society Organization networks selected for this case are:

Citizens Climate Lobby (CCL), started in California, USA, grew national and is now an internationally present organization with international chapters, however does operate mostly on a national level. It is a genuine insider organization, mainly politically active, which seeks interaction with national or state government officials. Next to that information for members to expand network and create awareness are their first priorities (CCL, 2017a).

350.org is an organization that was established to bring together and empower existing climate change organizations worldwide. They present themselves as an online community, with a relatively small formal headquarters, but with a number of dedicated staff guiding the organization and supporting initiatives of member organizations. Their profile is truly outsider, the formats of citizens engagement to the climate cause are very distinctive and creative next to the more standard protest marches which due to their sheer volume sometimes are again very remarkable (Campaigns 350.org, 2016).

Climate Action Network (CAN) is the umbrella organization to all who want to work at the UNFCCC conferences. Also CCL and 350.org are members of CAN. The focus of CAN is facilitating the participation of members at UNFCCC conference, mostly the pre-conference events and the Conference Of the Parties (COP) meetings. CAN has a full-fledged insider profile, supporting the participation of CSOs that want their voice heard at the global climate meetings which started with the Kyoto protocol (CAN, 2016).

Case study data

Most data used in this study was available online. The individual organizations, CCL, 350 and CAN have extensive websites. All gathered data is available in Appendices 1, 2, and 3 for each individual organization. Because the setup of the website is such as to make it most attractive for visitors and not for data gathering for research, the information has been saved, combined, put in lists and excel tables to make it a manageable entity. Annual reports from some organizations, mostly on finance are available. All sources have been cited in the appendices.

Case study data is available not completely consistent from all sources between 2007 and 2017.

For insight into Climate Change numbers the work from (Burck, Marten, & Bals, 2017; Germanwatch, 2017; Germanwatch & CAN international, 2016; Sönke, Eckstein, Dorsch, & Fischer, 2015) has been helpful. To see which data support the decision mechanisms of countries and CSOs on climate change on where work needs to be done. The availability of this Climate Change Performance Index, which data is supplied by scientists from all over the globe, also informs the media and the general public of the current status of climate change action by countries worldwide.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

For the analysis of Citizens Climate Lobby, 350.org and the Climate Action Network the table from the operationalization will be applied in order to determine their field of operations in the climate change CSO field.

Citizens Climate Lobby (CCL)

CCL is a worldwide network founded in 2007 in California, USA, that primarily targets national governments. CCL members talk to their representatives in congress or government to influence in climate change policies. The US national headquarters are in California, but local chapters of the CCL focus on state and regional climate policy (CCL, 2017a). Worldwide chapters have emerged since 2007, in Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Kenya, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

CCL strategy is based on a participatory democracy, making the best of the democratic systems of representation by enabling citizens to call upon their representatives in governments to make their voice heard on the subject of climate change, and by bringing together members in rallies throughout the country to build support, engage more citizens and work on getting specific legislation passed. The Citizens Climate Lobby really stresses the point that everyone has a voice and every contribution matters for climate change efforts (CCL, 2017a).

The work of the CCL has shown how they apply their strategies by the next two examples. First of all the establishment of a bi-partisan climate caucus in the US House of Representatives (CCL caucus, 2016b). Four years of lobby work started by a Pennsylvania based CCL member, connected to Florida where a new CCL chapter was established just to support this strategy. The connection to Washington was needed to connect the Democratic climate representatives and the Republicans. To

gain enough republican support, a republican representative even contacted the CCL to shore up support in specific districts, this to get a motion in congress for republicans to acknowledge the dangers of climate change (Friend Committee on National Legislation, 2017). Next step with a more informed and better prepared republican section in the house was the establishment of the bi-partisan caucus in 2016. This could only happen through the mutual strategy of republican and democratic representatives and the CCL chapters that joint in the efforts to support representatives in their own district to grow support for their climate change efforts. (CCL caucus, 2016a).

As a direct result of the newly established bi-partisan climate caucus, in 2017 the National defense Authorization Act has been accepted by congress (CCL caucus, 2017). This act forces the US military to take rising sea levels and climate change events into account in future threat assessments, daily operations and their general readiness (CCL caucus, 2017).


CCL work at the COP meetings consists of participation of side meetings and conference workshops to bring to the forefront their point of view in representation of their members (CCL, 2017b). the other aspect of this work is communication with the membership and at the same time creating awareness for the cause in the general public, via the CCL newsletter, blog and letters from the conference (CCL COP23, 2017)

350.ORG

350.org has built a global movement but still claims to do this bottom-up, grassroots involvement and action (350.org, 2017). Working in over 188 countries, 350.org relies on a massive online community and communication to reach targets. The name 350.org is derived from the goal of 350 CO₂ parts per million --instead of the current 400 parts per million—for the air to become safe. 350.org is also a well-established network, whose founder is Bill McKibben. The organization has a limited formal office in Washington D.C., but they do pride themselves on the core staff team, working and located in more than twenty-five countries worldwide. 350.org offers supports all who want to start a climate campaign anywhere. The website is the starting point for all engagement, and e-mail is how they communicate according to the slogan on their website. While there is a division in roles, people work according to their skills. 350.org works as a campaign oriented network, offering support for local, national or international groups to pursue a climate change goal (350.org, 2017). Their slogan when on the action section of the US website is “we are changing the climate politics of the United States” .

Visibility of their work is one of the first goals of 350.org strategies. The March 2017 climate march that resulted in an event that took place in 370 cities worldwide, bringing together over 200.000 people to voice their opposition on current climate policy (350.org, 2017b). Being even more to the point in the US where the current president promised to withdraw from the Paris climate accords. Their own coverage on the 350.org website with prominent politicians commenting (350.org, 2017c) and television and movie celebrities supporting and marching reached millions of viewers. This implementation of their mass media communication strategy, used to frame the topic of climate change and the way it affects everyday life found its way to a large audience on and offline. A LexisNexis search on the event revealed over 822 mentioned in English printed media, and 100 mentions in major news resources, print, televised and online (Figure 7. Annex 2).

One of the long running projects is the Divestment cause. 350.org strategy here is that all their members are pushing, enticing and shaming companies into divesting in fossil fuel and this way the access to fossil fuel for industry and market will be reduced and hopefully completely halted. Worldwide action, also and even more in developing nations will target fossil fuel divestment by foreign investors (350 Divest, 2017). May 5-13, 2017 350 called for global demonstrations on divestment as the best strategy according to 350 to help stop devastating effects of climate change. The staging of street art at the van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam is there to make the museum end their connection to Shell as an investor in the museum (Volkskrant, 2017) (Het Parool, 2017), did get national press attention (MuseumActueel, 2017)



Protest van Fossil Free Culture in het Van Gogh Museum / Foto: Laura Ponchel

Figure 1. Protesting Shell at the Van Gogh museum (MuseumActueel,2017)

Direct discussions and framing the 350 view of the investors behaviour is part of the toolset used to grow the list of divestment pledges. 350's current list of divestment promises is long, over 750 churches, universities, pension funds, NGOs all over the world have pledged to fully or partially stop their investments in fossil fuel linked investment opportunities (350 divest, 2017). The 350.org website mentions 5.53 Trillion dollars of promised divestment by the listed organizations, one big step for mankind (350 divest, 2017). The Divestment campaign page lists as part of this strategy: availability of educational and information materials. Keeping pressure at business, the Vatican and Gates foundation, but also sharing a page on options for personal divestment (Campaigns 350.org, 2017). The divestment campaign uses a broad spectrum of strategies and instruments to spread this issue around the globe.

350.org participation at the COP by UNFCCC is the moment were they use a more insider strategy, they also take part in the conference side meeting to bring about their point of view. Next to this they also take the opportunity to hold information meetings 'town hall meeting' to inform other participating groups of their climate change mitigation solutions. At the COP23 in Bonn this year they did assemble a U.S. Peoples delegation, which consisted of climate change advocacy groups to show the determination of the US people in opposition of their governments environmental position (350 COP23, 2017)

Climate Action Network (CAN)

The Climate Action Network (CAN), with headquarters based in Beirut, unites non-governmental, non-profit, community-based climate action groups. Founded in the late 1980s by a coalition of environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, it works primarily from a scientific basis with a clear insider profile (Hadden, 2014). Within CAN, national, regional and transnational networks communicate with governments, partake in site or pre-conference meetings at the COP or UNFCCC meetings. The membership roster already mentions 905 members of CAN worldwide. In 2014 CAN celebrated their 25th anniversary of coordinating environmental action and policy impact. Their vision for the future is *“a world striving actively towards and achieving the protection of the global climate in a manner, which promotes equity and social justice between peoples, sustainable development of all communities, and protection of the global environment.”* (CAN, 2016) The mission is to *“support and empower civil society organization to influence the design and development of and effective global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ensure its implementation at international, national and local levels in the promotion of equity and sustainable development.”* (CAN, 2016)

Membership of CAN is worldwide, also across the North-South divide. While some action collectives are mostly originating from the northern hemisphere, CAN incorporates advocacy groups from all over the world. The website of CAN is their main information hub, providing news, newsletter portal, all official communication and regional and national webpages. CAN also makes use of available social media channels, contact with press outlets and discussion fora online, to promote their position. Their newsletter ECO has transitioned from a printed newsletter at conferences to a digital format and now of course has its own app.

The strategies that CAN employs to get things done are mainly targeted at big climate meetings or the G20 / G7/8 meetings where climate is part of the agenda. Their connection to the organization of the COP allows them as registered participant to submit a report for discussion at the pre- or side conferences, which results will be reported in the tracking (UNFCCC- Tracking, 2017) of the conference and thus remain on the agenda of talks and will come up again in meetings for follow up. The Agenda setting powers of CAN as an established entity in the COP meetings is visible and registered at the extensive UNFCCC websites (UNFCCC, 2016a) From the 2016 Morocco meeting the promise to more closely incorporate civil society input in the future climate conferences is clearly registered, opportunity created, what will result in actual policy input of course is not guaranteed.

From the G20 website for Hamburg 2017 it is clear that discussion with civil society is part of the agenda. The schedule of meetings pre G20 conference is full. A lot of it may be perceived as symbolic, but CSOs and other interested parties do line up to work at the G20 table. From the press release by the “Civil20” after the pre-conference meeting we can see the engagement and commitment asked from the G20 partners to commit to the Paris agreement and uphold climate agreements in all national policies (C20, 2017b). In preparation for G20 meetings and other global events C20 often engages other groups (C20, 2017a) to strengthen their message and resolve towards world leaders, big business and big finance, who also gather at the G20 or G8 meetings

Next Table 3. Showing the strategies developed and used by CSO networks next to the theoretical models as described by (Maloney et al., 1994; Tarrow, 2011) their group structure, strategies, tactics, communication modes and membership.

Table 3. CSO network analyses

CSO conceptualization	Citizens Climate Lobby	350.org	Climate Action Network
<i>Organizational structure</i>	<p>National chapters, international contacts.</p> <p>All working via the same format, direct national government contact and lobbying.</p> <p>Formal organization, head office leadership, grass-roots base.</p>	<p>International organization, supporting and bringing together a multitude of different environmental organizations.</p> <p>Informal organization, headquarter office in NY.</p> <p>Core staff works coordination through online contact.</p>	<p>Internationally operating network organization to support Environmental and Climate action organizations into conferencing and working at the UNFCCC COP meetings.</p> <p>Formal organization, head office in Beirut.</p> <p>Formal staff and support, contact with epistemic community.</p>
<i>Programs</i>	<p>Working with policy makers.</p> <p>Education in general and for members.</p> <p>Policy learning.</p> <p>Bridging political divides to make policy change possible.</p> <p>National and regional membership meetings to create public awareness.</p>	<p>International campaigns on divestment, lobbying all large (international) organizations.</p> <p>Organizing demonstrations on Climate Change topics, and support of these by member organizations.</p> <p>Educational sessions and materials, made available and support in the organization.</p>	<p>UNFCCC COP meeting support and policy preparation for member organizations.</p> <p>Intersessional meetings for COP.</p> <p>G20 meetings participation on climate.</p> <p>High level events, representatives from business, NGOs, institutions meet next to COP.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>communication channels</i> 	Internet, social media, traditional media, letter writing, personal contact	Internet, social media, mainstream media.	Internet, social media, New app., mainstream media.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>membership</i> 	Private persons, Scientific organizations, small business	Environmental organizations worldwide.	Environmental Advocacy groups, NGOs, CSOs with insider and outsider affiliations.
<i>Strategies</i>	<p>Work with policy makers to influence policy.</p> <p>Be flexible in strategies and tactics if needed.</p>	Through large scale media attention bring climate change topics and solutions to the attention of governance, business and the public.	<p>Bring together Climate action groups to form a strong unified front on climate policy</p> <p>Develop polity position papers.</p> <p>Coordinate strategic climate advocacy</p>

<i>CSO conceptualization</i>	<i>Citizens Climate Lobby</i>	<i>350.org</i>	<i>Climate Action Network</i>
	<i>Regional information meetings for the public</i>	<i>Framing of the CC problem in a dramatic fashion. Lobbying (international) organizations, groups, universities, business and governments.</i>	
• <i>tactics</i>	<i>Consultation with policy makers. Use specific outsider tactics if needed to push items into Agenda Setting. Make use of outsider protests in own consultation sessions.</i>	<i>Naming and shaming organizations. Staging demonstrations, protests, boycotts. Creating public awareness via big, bold, informative campaigns. Civic disobedience. Entertainment of public. Membership from a broad social spectrum, allows for big differentiation in Climate action.</i>	<i>Coordination and communication via online channels and in-person meetings mostly in conjunction with international or regional climate meetings. Issuing of position papers, interventions, discussion papers and recommendations to COP</i>
• <i>instruments</i>	<i>Letter writing, meetings with government representatives. Epistemic community availability. Communication with news media. Readymade motivational presentations for members to present at schools or community meetings,</i>	<i>Internet, social media. Getting attention via mainstream news by creating big, shocking or positive events. Making protest and educational materials available to members. Organizing events to support members. Organizing events to grow membership.</i>	<i>Communicate via mainstream media. Epistemic community and members-network. Reports prepared for all members. Media engagement.</i>
<i>Point of interaction with policy cycle</i>	<i>Agenda setting. Policy development. Policy implementation. Policy instrument choice Policy evaluation.</i>	<i>Policy evaluation, most protest voice the problem 350 sees in a current situation. Agenda setting. Policy formulation, via CAN membership.</i>	<i>Agenda setting. Input via epistemic community in UNFCCC meetings. Policy development. Policy evaluation.</i>

<i>CSO conceptualization</i>	<i>Citizens Climate Lobby</i>	<i>350.org</i>	<i>Climate Action Network</i>
<i>Place of the CSO in Global Governance structures</i>	<i>Direct inside contact with local government.</i>	<i>Voice of 350 is heard in our pluralist society, but formal interaction is mostly from an outsider stance. 350 is a member of CAN, via this route has input at the UNFCCC meetings.</i>	<i>Access through lobbying to Climate governance on the international level. Access to COP members in COP pre and side conference meetings.</i>
<i>Costs</i>	<i>Reduced results due to position. Somewhat limited in actions due to consultation status. Accept bargaining position for incremental change. Conform to required behaviour due to consultation status.</i>	<i>Negative image or impact on some groups in society. Resulting in less impact in some areas or groups 350 wants to reach. Membership limits type of action (only outsider).</i>	<i>Limited to general remarks to represent the greater groups. Heavy work load on CAN staff.</i>
<i>Benefits</i>	<i>Input, influence, marketing. Social capital Insight in government, windows of opportunity Opportunity to insert opinion or information on pertinent moments. Opportunity to steer government agenda through lobbying.</i>	<i>High visibility of action, allows for sympathy vote of the larger public. Framing CC message and position of offenders is an efficient tool in current (social) media landscapes. Great freedom to voice opinion</i>	<i>Permanent position in COP set-up. Support in finance and science from all participating CC networks. Broad policy access position in many countries. General acceptance of CAN work and reports</i>
<i>Expected hypothetical outcomes</i>	<i>Bringing together different political groups to work together on CC issues. Getting CC initiatives and laws pushed through to becoming law. Incremental change in (national/international) CC policy. Long lasting connections to policy makers, with implied results.</i>	<i>Short term results in ending or changing of high profile environmental 'violations'. Growing media and political attention to specific climate problems. Very visible results in CC behaviour. Influence insiders. Demonstrations support insider CSOs.</i>	<i>Input on UNFCCC agenda setting. Delivering scientific background at COP meetings. Contribution and influencing UNFCCC policy outcome. Input on individual Countries Climate Change policy stance at UNFCCC meetings. Follow-up, on COP meetings policy and implementation into national law.</i>

RESULTS & DISCUSSION FINDINGS

Relating the status of the three case study organizations to the theoretical subdivisions and concepts that have evolved over years is not as straight forward as it seemed at the start of this research. Insider or Outsider, yes but which type? Or using other strategies? Definitions have developed over a relative short time span of 20 years. With the development of governance, modern communication and globalization the organizations and the world they function in have been flexible to suit a purpose and meet the demands of growing climate change problems. Analysis of the work of these three networks will be set against the theory available on the following concepts; type of organization, strategies and instruments, interaction with policy, and the expected results of their strategies.

Organization type

The Citizens Climate Lobby (CCL) is in its basic concept an insider organization, local, regional and national representatives work with government officials on each level. All of this in the format of lobbying, discussions and information panels (CCL-what, 2017) Related to that groups of the CCL work on specific policy projects, or laws they think should be implemented. While most politics comes with a specific political affiliation, the CCL is strictly bi-partisan, in US terms, or non-political for the other organizations and chapter worldwide. Australia being the largest in the group (CCL-chap, 2017).

350.org is fundamentally an outsider group, its core strategy is high visibility demonstrations, actions, performance art and sometimes a more un-civil demonstration when the topic is urgent and needs this level of input. 350 has been founded as an umbrella organisation to support smaller, national, regional and also international organizations to have an impact. Most member organizations also have an outsider profile and this fundamentalist approach to climate change action has been gaining more traction in the last 15 years (350.org, 2017).

CAN the Climate Action Network also has an insider profile, established by environmental NGOs it is built upon the strengths of its founding organizations, members are still larger climate change and environmental organizations (Hadden, 2014). Their work is now mostly limited to working within the cycles of the UNFCCC–COP meetings, but also branching out in G7 and G20 meeting support for climate change CSO networks (Hadden, 2014). The support of CAN enables CSOs and climate action groups to participate in the pre-conference or next-to-conference meetings with the country representatives that take part in the actual Conference Of the Parties (the parties being the countries that are members of the UN).

The type of CSO is mostly also responsible for the boundaries in which they operate, a strict insider CSO such as CCL works with policy makers, puts initiatives on the table and brings scientific input if needed. This is the type of organization people have affiliated themselves with and what makes the organization grow (Maloney et al., 1994). Even without the distinction into insider or outsider groups, the addition of CSOs to the policy discussions, on climate change already changes the governance structure of the topic (Sikkink, 2002). The soft powers mentioned by Sikkink added to the international distribution of ideas by (Wendt, 1999) help national governments step outside normal structures and content of intergovernmental negotiations. According to Kütting and Cerny (2015) the more neo-pluralistic setting of the negotiation landscape has options to attain a more targeted result from the deliberations. It improves upon the government negotiations as we know them, and so helps to make more progress in formal and informal steps that help mitigating climate change problems.

It becomes clear that both insiders and outsiders do well in the neopluralist governance landscape that has developed, and that on both levels interaction with policy makers has made different approaches to policy development possible. All three case study organizations do show their results in their individual approaches to governments and international organizations.

Strategies and instruments

It is the most straight forward conclusion to see CCL as a core insider in the description set by Maloney et al., (1994). Their attitude, methodology and crisp and clear presentation of their position makes them a valued part of policy making in government circles as is still the case and also formulated by (Fraussen et al., 2015). With patience and understanding of the political process they already have succeeded in setting up a bi-partisan CC commission, that even under de Obama administration would not have been established via government initiatives. Also harnessing some business support as defined in the marked strategy approach by Kapstein and Busby (2016) they add to their resources and work on promoting industry alternatives for carbon based energy. Both 350.org and the CCL network of chapters worldwide, also contribute to the spread of climate change awareness and values, (Luers, 2013). Where news headlines and demonstrations create awareness, the change of people's values is mostly done via peer contact (van Dijk, 2012).

Lobbying government representatives is the main and almost only strategy of CCL. Individual letter writing campaigns, organised meetings at government or CCL events with policy makers are part of the tool-set. Strategies of letter writing, pre-fab letters online, the best way to connect to your representatives is a nice example of the spill over of tactics from the humanitarian front in this case the classic letter writing campaigns of Amnesty international. Working quietly in preparation with representatives in the US congress, one of the striking accomplishments is the establishment of a bi-partisan climate commission in congress, a big step forward in the US governments role to step up its work. The annual membership meetings, educational materials, videos and online support are the most important instruments in the strategy to grow the membership and grow public awareness for their cause. Part of this is the personal communication, social media aside, still the information on a cause that comes to a person via a peer, someone from the same social circles that has a similar place in life is the most trusted source. Part of their strategy to contact congress representatives could be considered outsider, because not all individual members already have this connection, but the interaction between local groups and local government, and the national representatives at meetings is truly a sign of an accepted insider status strategy that is working for CCL.

For CCL membership there is ample opportunity to join in education groups, discussion groups, work on papers that apply to regional topics. Especially the Australian branch of CCL (CCL-AU, 2017) is very active in social media connection, website information and growing its membership this way. The German CCL chapter (CCL-DE, 2017), of course under its German name, profiles as an European organization

350.org's strategy could be considered more antagonising, or the un-civil side of civil society, but the array of options 350 uses to make their point of view known has its softer and hard sides. 350 is capable of organizing big national campaigns for specific topics, but also global attendance at very special moments to get so much publicity that no one inside or next to government can ignore this. Business is enticed to join an pledge to do their best to improve, universities, banks and pension funds are asked to divest from the fossil fuel industry. Working with manufacturers of timber materials or

food, members of 350.org are willing to “certify” their products as environmental safe when standards are being met. The wide range of outsider strategies that 350.org employs also entails the membership of CAN, and this step into an insider strategy helps 350.org to bring their more fundamental attitude to the negotiation tables of the global climate change conferences COP by UNFCCC. The big media initiatives that 350.org employs to get their message across and organise events are frequently supported by film or television celebrities that lend their name and most often their opinion to support 350.org's causes. Price (2003) already sees that purist activists get more traction, get the discussion going, followed by practical work and proposals of insiders to write policy, especially when political conditions are unfavourable. The more un-civil society approach of outsiders (Tarrow, 2011) like 350.org is visible in their blockage of a day-mining operation in Australia and the repeated staging of protest of Shell as museum sponsor, one more example of their “ritualized public performances” (Tarrow, 2011). Staging such events only can influence the public and or policy if there is enough media attention (Yanovitzky, 2002), this will allow for the naming and shaming of business or governments into changing their ways (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

CAN is a pure insider, while they do use media attention, have their own long standing newsletter, the majority of their strategy lies with the facilitating the input of CSOs worldwide at the COP of UNFCCC. Making it possible to meet with their countries representatives before the actual COP gives many organizations the option to have input, this does not in any way guarantees anything, but the option to pitch and lobby is there. In support of organizations they help by writing position papers on environmental topics, preparation of policy briefs all with help of the epistemic community. Also the coordination of strategies for approach of COP members is part of their work. CAN's regional nodes all over the world, on all continents prepares regional topics and holds regional meetings in anticipation of national or the global climate conferences.

CAN's main strategy of getting climate change discussed and supported is in its role of policy broker, as formulated by Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible and Sabatier (2014) with the added specification that CANs work at the UNFCCC meetings is on behalf of CSO groups. The support of members by reports preparing for summits that have been formulated through their contacts with the epistemic community is part of their core insider profile as defined by (Maloney et al., 1994). Where member of CAN do display both their outsider profile and their insider views at the COP, the focus of CAN is at the negotiation and side events of the big climate conferences.

Interaction on the policy cycle

CCL is active on almost all phases of the policy agenda. Taking initiatives for new laws to be formulated, agenda setting comes first, since it's their initiative also the policy formulation sometimes is a part of their process. CCL does not have agency powers so the implementation is not in their reach. Evaluation of existing and also new climate change policy is their freedom to voice their opinion in public and contact their government ‘representatives’. Especially their interaction with policy makers to aid the establishment of a US bi-partisan commission on climate change in congress is a great entry point to the policy cycle. Connections to science and business do give them the cloud to contribute to policy formulation.

The core insider status of CCL allows for both the option to work on policy development, but also provides them with the opportunities formulated by (Kingdon, 1995) to see ahead in the current local or national policy landscape and spot a window of opportunity for their cause to contact and work

with specific policy makers. Because they work mostly close to national or regional governance, their options are both limited, but also closer relations allow for better targeted policy initiatives (Maloney et al. 1994).

The contact of 350 with the policy cycle is first and foremost at the evaluation stage, the protest against current environmentally unsafe practices, and the supporters or investors of these climate change problems are evaluated loud and clear via all media available to them. Next they do make it clear which solutions should be implemented to mitigate climate change, so agenda setting is also on their action list. Not always directed at the policy cycle, also direct communication towards business, governments or the public to change their ways, no policy needed, stop what you are doing suffices. So also from an outsider perspective. The only insider action on the policy front comes from 350.orgs membership of CAN, here their input into the pre-COP meetings is going to be part of the policy input given to COP members.

Looking in from the outside gives 350.org the freedom to try and insert themselves at most levels of the policy cycle, but first and foremost their protest can be read as an evaluation and suggestion for new agenda setting to governance involved in their target of protest (Tarrow, 2011) the option to formulate policy is not used often, but suggestions for the way a problem should be addressed and the preferred outcome will be communicated in many ways to all involved (Yanovitzky, 2002).

CAN connection to the policy cycle is that of the policy broker, (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) the intermediary function to make access public for all its members, support their policy formulation with help of the epistemic community. This applies to agenda setting, policy formulation, policy evaluation on the policy cycle. From the figure of participation at the COP by (Böhmelt, 2013) we can see that this is a much needed support seeing the steady rise in the number of participants of CSOs.




Figure 2. CSO membership in states' national delegations at 1995-2001 COPs (Böhmelt (2013))

Because of its broad support for the CAN members at climate conferences, and the preparation of policy briefs, that in their turn requires a detailed analysis of the problem, the conclusion that CAN works on all levels of policy making is inevitable (King, 1985). Working at agenda setting in preparation, but also by inserting their prepared statement on behalf of the members, warrants discussion and so via the UNFCCC tracking system their work becomes a part of the COP system for the follow-up of agenda items (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This may be one of the moments where the incremental change of the insider actions is apparent, but it is at the same time a tried and tested way of agenda setting (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Case study CSO linkages

The comparison of organization types, added to that the strategies and instruments available to CCL, 350 and CAN, and their opportunities to interact with policy, shows a very broad pallet of climate change action options for CSOs. Where CCL works with and on the turf of governments, 350 works expressly outside government and with the general public, CAN brings together the outcome of all their work at for example the UNFCCC meetings. This is one case where in fact the whole world comes together, and where the mix of strategies has been seen to the fullest, to all get their message across (Hadden, 2014).

The best example of the common ground for all three organizations are the UNFCCC meetings. Here one of CANs main functions is to bring together the Climate action groups to form a strong and unified front on climate policy. The support CAN provides to twofold, it arranges the meetings of the CSOs with de country delegates to the Conference Of the Parties, and it prepares and submits to the conference a Report representing the member of CAN. The 2016 CAN report to the UNFCCC meeting called “Road map for climate action” was submitted to section of the (CAN International, 2016b) COP23 meeting in Bonn, November 2017. The UNFCCC tracking systems, registers this report and keep notes on the progress of the discussion and representation of this contribution in this and other COP meetings, to make sure that civil societies voice is being heard and recognized. First result of this 2016 report asking for a more formal recognition of CSOs contribution to UNFCCC COP meetings has resulted in the appointment of two special High Level Champions to the COP on civil society matters at the COP meetings (UNFCCC, 2016b) These Global Climate Action coordinators will be coordinating the consultation and cooperation with CSO at the forefront of CC action innovation and solutions. The Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2017 is the first in a long line of supporting documents . CAN represents over 1000 organizations in more than 110 countries in this case (CAN COP, 2016).

Due to the meeting opportunities coordinated by CAN, members of CCL and 350 will have the option to present their point of view to their country representatives preceding the COP meeting and will have the opportunity to share their views with other conference participants and delegates from other countries in a number of side events with the UNFCCC conference.

In this COP framework, 350, CCL and most definitely CAN use their insider strategies to bring across their climate change concerns. All of this while a number of 350 members will not miss this opportunity to gain media attention for their goals and their more fundamental roads to mitigation of climate change effects by staging protests, sit-ins or remarkable pieces of performance art. Making good use of their colleague’s work, also insiders such as CCL will use the 350 demonstrations to highlight their point of view (Maloney et al., 1994) and show a united front to world leaders. This is where strategies of both realists and fundamentalist work from the same point of departure, naming CO2 reduction and by adapting strategies and tools to the moment, the cumulative effect of both insider and outsider strategies work well. Adding to this the fact that the overlap in effort, tools, and the acknowledged need of all CSOs to make bigger steps create a larger momentum. All of this shows that individual CSO strategies and the combined effect and overlap of used strategies do cover a broad climate change action field. All civil society organizations under the CAN umbrella have a vast array of their own strategies and combined resources available to make an impact on the COP proceedings.

The diagram below shows the one very clear example of where their interests overlap and combine pressure. It is not the combination of strategies and teamwork on lobbying but applying pressure on the same topic at the same time from different angles that also works in making steps forward. At the Bon COP23 of 2017, 350.org on behalf of the US send a U.S. Peoples delegation to fill the void that the Trump administration has left open (350 COP23, 2017). But the CCL is not on the participants list of this delegation.

In the example of participating in the UNFCCC COP meetings, CAN as an organization also works at the G20 and G7 meetings to represent CSOs on the topic of climate change. Growing recognition by countries and COP delegates seem to have a positive effect on the impact CSO efforts have at the policy prepared and agreements made at the UNFCCC COP meetings.




Figure 3. CCL, 350 and CAN linkages

From this same figure 3. The overlap in work on the topic of CO2 reduction can be inferred. Where CCL works on “Carbon free and divide” a revenue neutral carbon tax as an instrument to reduce CO2 emissions (CCL-acc, 2017). Also 350.org calls for CO2 divestment from governments, universities, pension-funds and private citizens (350.org, 2016a), the relation in work is there, but both groups do not give information on cooperation in any way on the topic. CCL uses their tried and tested strategy of lobbying members of congress, where 350 demonstrates, also talks but many uses the naming and shaming methodology for this cause. All comes back to the COP agenda where CAN arranges for participation of both groups and the representation of all CSO members of CAN.

So while all groups work on a topic, and do confirm to work as partners and allies (350, 2017) they do not work a combined strategy. It is exactly this differentiation in strategies that allows these CSOs, to reach their demographic and beyond, and make progress in affecting policy change. Their growth in membership numbers, donations and participation in meetings and events also shows the growth in climate change awareness.

What has been and can be achieved?

From the work and networking activities of the individual case study groups, CCL, 350.org and CAN, there are a number climate change policies that are the result of their work, and a few outcomes that could be expected. The realist and fundamentalist perspective are of course awaiting different outcomes due to different tactics and tools. And even within this divide the insider and outsider positions may give room for nuances in results from their work on specific topics.

CCL

A clear result of CCL lobbying was the 2016 establishment of the bi-partisan climate caucus in the US House of Representatives. This caucus that is set up after four years of lobbying and consists of an equal number and a still growing number of democratic and republican members in the US House of Representatives (CCL caucus, 2016b). The first part of environmental legislation that has passed with the help of this caucus was the 2017 National defense Authorization act, that holds the US military to standards in which they do their daily operations, but also make climate change related disasters part of their readiness program (CCL caucus, 2017). These are remarkable results in a country where states do work on climate change action and the national government is the last one to act on climate change disaster mitigation.

The close connections CCL groups and individual member strive to have with regional and national governments should build a connection that gives access in future cases (CAN international, 2015). Also the support for climate and environmental actions by government representatives would result in a mutual recognition of work and actions. Actual proposals for reduction of emissions on specific grounds or via specified technology have a better chance of reaching potential via this route. In the US case where the individual state governance also has many options next to the national government this strategy of close contact to government representatives has more potential of bearing fruit than if all of it had to be done nationwide.

The number of meetings with congress (US situation) has been ten-fold in six years (CCL-acc, 2017), if we assume that at each meeting at least an idea, notion or plan has lingered the steady build-up of momentum should result in (incremental) change in policy development and environmental thinking due to these CCL members.

The growth of the CCL organisation in the number of members, number of actions taken, the budget are all indicators that CCL media strategy and member outreach are having a real impact on society (CCL-acc, 2017). Information is passed on digitally, but one of the communication pillars in this case would be the personal contact with a peer. Personal information by someone in a group that people are familiar with does transfer best and this method is one of CCLs strategies that has shown to work well. Working with this premise also the information to the general public is flowing well, the growth in finances can be attributed to this. Although the majority of CCL revenues comes via philanthropy, also the number of members and individual donations to add significantly to the resources of CCL and this again to the possibilities of CCL to act on behalf of climate change policy change (CCL-acc, 2017).

350.org

One of the bold actions that 350 is known for are their climate marches, the may 2017 climate march in Washington, D.C. show US politicians supporting the cause, commenting on the viability of climate change action (Gerritsen, 2017) .

In 2017 their main strategy is the divest from fossil fuel campaign. Talking to big portfolio holders, banks investors and even universities has led to pledges that lead into the trillions in promises to no longer invest in any kind of fossil fuel industry or operation(350.org, 2016a). A recent report from Oxford University on the economic impact of divestment on companies shows that due to the lack of actual fulfilment of promises to divest, the economic impact for companies at the moment is not devastatingly high (Ansar, Caldecott, & Tilbury, 2013). More promising is the conclusion that the stigmatisation of companies as an in-direct effect is a far greater threat to companies than the economic ramifications. The report labels this as an in-direct effect, question is if 350.org does agree. According to 350 founder Bill McGibben in the Guardian (The Guardian, 2017) not using fossil fuel or divesting will not bankrupt business, but it will limit their political game and their influence on the world economy very clearly, yet another not so in-direct effect.

On the other front, a good campaign in Australia to close a day mining operation to reduce fossil fuel was very successful. A few hundred protesters shut down the operation for a day, creating a huge media outcry and again making awareness with the general public grow on this topic (350.org Australia, 2016). One other item that received global, or perhaps just “western” attention was the KXL pipeline, running through a nature reserve. The building of this pipeline was halted during the Obama presidency, construction opened again in 2017, but the 350.org plan to build a solar park right on the route of this tar-sand pipeline did make headlines. All of this in the campaign stop fossil fuel, make all renewables (350.org, 2017a). For the 2017 action in Nairobi, Kenya, Brazil and Malawi, divestment in Cape Town South Africa, are also on the coordination list 2017 (350 Annual16, 2017). The fact that these do get less media attention in the Northern hemisphere is something that can be improved by targeted media strategies in countries and aimed at specific public. Usually media only pick up such news if it is preceded by a disaster, as Hurricane Harvey in Texas and floods in India, and Nigeria show in August 2017 .

Teaching how to protest, with the blog “the importance of sitting down” is one of the support mechanisms 350 has for all who work under their umbrella, also spreading the word and making the outsider format of climate change CSO more successful than ever (350.org, 2017d). 350 is known for their effective media outreach, using their own web channel to broadcast the 2017 Washington, D.C. and worldwide Climate March where millions of participant where counted. Enlisting celebrity actors to support their message has the option to attract a wider public, fans that maybe had not been climate aware could listen in, other celebrities may feel the need to voice their support (350.org, 2017b). All part of a rather successful media strategy by 350.

Finances, and membership numbers for 350.org are also growing, both via individual donation and sometimes even corporate sponsorship, signifying that their message is being heard (350.org, 2016b). More people are aware of the problems that climate change causes, indiscriminating of location or race. Both heat and flooding are now causing catastrophes in Africa and the USA, which tragically builds support for CSOs like 350, but still a number of policy makers do not see the cause of flooding in climate change.

CAN

Three distinctive results from the work that CAN does with and for its membership can already be seen. First of all the establishment of two special representatives for the contact with Civil Society organizations at the UNFCCC 2015 meeting (UNFCCC, 2016b). This is a positive step into next conferences with even more opportunities for CSOs to directly interact with the COP, help develop policy initiatives and work at the COP. Second, making good use of the UNFCCC COP conference tracker several issues have already been placed on the next COP agenda for further discussion, even when only in commission, this keeps the policy door open for another cycle (UNFCCC- Tracking, 2017). Third the growth of CAN participation had a small dip in 2011, but it did grow right back to 2016 when budget and participation numbers of the COP side conferences almost doubled to 2011. This signified at least the interest member CSOs have in participating at the COP pre-conference and side meetings (CAN International, 2017).

The membership growth and growing number of opportunities that have been created to interact with policy makers do show the progress that CAN is making in their work. Also adding to this the fact that UNFCCC is not the only platform that CAN uses to represent their members and facilitate their participation the opportunities for incremental change in policy engagement grow considerably with the number of lobbying opportunities.

To highlight these opportunities; prior to the G20 meeting of July 2017 CAN is part of one of the G20 engagement groups, the Business20, Civil20, Labour20, Science20, Think20, Vulnerable20, Women20 and Youth20 part of dialogue forums. The B20, C20 and T20 all have set up climate and energy taskforces and have climate inclusive paragraphs in their recommendation to the G20 (Business20, 2017)

When looking at what has been achieved and how this has been achieved the different strategies of the selected CSOs stand out, each gaining momentum and getting results in different ways. And while they all work on the COP of the UNFCCC conferences, their independent work is just that. While it's a positive that the unwillingness of the Trump administration to address this issue has resulted in a 450 led "U.S. Peoples delegation, there are no cooperation strategies on working at the UNFCCC between CCL and 350. There is at the moment only one common ground and strategy, membership of CAN and supporting their work, making it possible with financial support of their members. For the indirect effect of the participation of these CSOs the description of their effect by (Maloney et al., 1994) and (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) are relevant. Insiders with consultation status have access and the opportunity to insert their input, while this effect is weakened by the built in positive environmental actions by governments due to their knowledge of their countries general stance on the environment. Outsiders pressure governments into action, shame them into doing the right thing, and if not government, then the participating business will do.

The membership growth of these CSOs can be partly contributed to their media strategy, which contributes to a greater awareness with the general public. Even the 350 climate marches, and the their mass media coverage could contribute to CCL's membership growth for people with a more insider approach to advocacy. But also here this media influence is not measurable, and theory states that most influence on topics is gained from peers, so people in the group influencing peers (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2009)

CONCLUSION

Climate change CSOs agree on one thing, their theory of change is the fact that bottom-up, grassroots participated social movements are needed to achieve comprehensive steps in climate change mitigation. Gathering the arm-chair activists, the internet and social media activists, mix in the performance art exhibitions and these combined networking efforts will work because they transform the terms and the nature of the debate. Their non-traditional methods will allow them to mobilize information and people vast and strategically and to focus this on governments and larger organizations using a new kind of pressure, to gain leverage and persuade actors to (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Even without the distinction of realist and fundamentalist principles of CSO networks, these elements that civil society brings to the climate change discussion are visible with Citizens Climate Lobby, 350.org and the Climate Action Network. Where the formulation in the description of CSO network methods may differ now, they are still faster and more flexible in comparison to the formal governance systems.

The analysis of these three case study helps to answer the question how do CSOs networks influence climate change policy, which types can we distinguish and what strategies do they use to influence climate change policy?

The main division of realist and fundamentalist CSOs starts to frame the groups, all grass-roots but opposing approaches to the problem of climate change and the lack of policy progress. Within the realist CSOs the insiders have a broad spectrum of participants from the core to the peripheral (Maloney et al., 1994). This is where we find CCL, a true core insider, working on levels of governance in direct contact and negotiations. Also CAN works as core insider, even when representing also some of the outsider groups. This worldwide representing organization is outside the scope of the groups considered in Maloney's (1994) definition, but (Fraussen et al., 2015) also defines this kind of umbrella groups as core insiders to the process. The more un-civil society participation of the fundamental outsiders such as 350.org also have members and participant from left to right in the outsiders spectrum, but most members who call themselves advocacy groups stay within reach of the civil definition of activism (Tarrow, 2011). This is partly why 350 is also a member of CAN, making use of insider strategies to also cover this avenue to reach their target of a maximum of 350 parts per million of CO₂ in the atmosphere.

In the CSO conceptualization, working with the description of the individual case study CSOs, the differences in organization and membership, but also the overlap in communication methods and tools shows that our pluralistic society offers options to all, just the use of these differ (Florini, 2000). Where the insider tactics of CCL and CAN, work with governments and where the protests and staged exhibits of 350 work against the grain (Fraussen et al., 2015)(Florini, 2000) the insider outsider division becomes clear. The benefit of being on the inside, providing scientific information to policy makers, having insight to governance (Kingdon, 1995) comes with the restrictions of the granted insider status (Maloney et al., 1994). This range of policy input options is complimented by the unrestricted option of outsider 350 to comment on and evaluate policy, all while making abundantly clear what should be the route to a positive change (Tarrow, 2011). Together and overlapping with their work in CAN shows that each approach does show on the multi-strategy map of climate change activism.

This all adds up to the fact that there is no one perfect CSO to act on behalf of us all to mitigate climate change problems. Because we live in a world that is so diverse in governance, politics, cultures, norms, values and religions there is no one size fits all answer. The third force examples by Florini (2000) show the different approaches, and even shaping of agreements and monitoring of their effect. Some of which would not have come into effect without civil society. The CCLs role in setting up a bi-partisan US House commission on climate change is one of the strong example, very specific and locally but would not have happened without outside lobby work. One thing that works for all types of CSOs to grow and spread the word is that communication science confirms that we accept information and are more open to information if it comes from our 'peers' this pluralist CSO society also works as a source of climate change information in all layers of society (van Dijk, 2012). All climate change CSOs have their own communication strategies, using sometimes the same channels, but in their own fashion to communicate with their target audience and their policy targets.

The overall conclusion of this thesis is that our plural society has created very diverse climate advocacy CSO networks, with realist and fundamental approach to the problem, who due to their background and membership work different strategies that support, compliment and overlap each other. Maloney et al. (1994) already mentioned that in order to keep their membership a certain type of action and communication is required from each type of CSO, outsiders insist on firm language and crisp messaging, insiders work from a collaborative view and community or policy stance. This is what we recognize in the fundamental stance of 350, one goal at the top, bold actions to reach it, and clear cut messaging and video on their websites that demonstrate their work. While CCL and CAN show a more policy and debate oriented side, using graphics and bold numbers to show their work, but with more added information and messaging. Where globalization on many fronts is a factor of concern, the climate change effects have to be addressed globally and the UNFCCC COP meetings have shown that CSOs working with adaptive strategies can have their say in policy development and climate change mitigation agreements (CAN, 2016). The developing governance diversification also gives more opportunities for CSO networks to interact and engage policy makers on more levels (Hadden, 2014). And just because the large COP meetings attract more media attention, different CSOs will highlight their cause by bringing a more diverse strategy pallet to get their part of the media coverage and push their message to COP mediators and also the public (Hadden, 2014)

This landscape of bold and also more diplomatic CSO strategies from both a fundamental and more realistic stance, has a strengthening effect on the whole CSO network. It supports and instigates nations and policy makers, to take their responsibilities in climate change negotiations (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). This is visible today in the results of CCL, 350 and CAN strategies and actions, starting at the grassroots and resulting in fundamental changes of climate change policy.

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Annex 1. The Citizens Climate Lobby - Data

The Citizens Climate Lobby is a USA network founded in 2007 in California, that primarily targets the national government, specifically CCL members talk to their representatives in congress to make a dent in climate change policies. The national headquarter is based in California, but local chapters of the Citizens Climate Lobby focus on state and regional climate policy (CCL, 2017). Their vision is a livable world for every citizen on this planet.

Organization

Professional office with clear structure: governing board, advisory board, staff and regional coordinators.

Financials support is coming from member donations and sponsors, for example donations from MacArthur Foundation, David Rockefeller Fund, Clif Bar Family Foundation, The Educational Foundation of America, The Mayer & Morris Kaplan Family Foundation, Mertz Gilmore Foundation and Cool Planet.

Global presence

Citizens Climate Lobby began in the United States on October 7, 2007, and now has over 63,000 supporters worldwide in 31 countries. Worldwide there are now 415 chapters (CCL-chap, 2017)

Online presence

CCL is using online and social media on all fronts. Member engagement, Information of the general public, connecting with Politics, offering a platform for members of congress and the House of Representatives to show their interaction and support for CCL. Donations from members, supporters and business are being displayed and endorsed. Weekly information session to recruit more members, active support in participation and use of web, e-mail and communication media to make this happen.

Table 4. CCL social media numbers (CCL-what, 2017)

	Twitter	Facebook	YouTube	Instagram	Google+
Followers / members	16085	23104	1106	1350	249
Likes	1470	23112			
Tweets, videos, messages	23494		139	133	
Following	23292			406	
Views			94952		

National websites

CCL – Australia (CCL-AU, 2017)

CCL – Germany (CCL-DE, 2017)

CCL – Netherlands (CCL-NL, 2017)

General strategies and engagement

The CCL tries to include a wide range of citizens, specific sections of the website bring business and climate together, showing relations from five major faith groups worldwide and climate together, literature references included. Also their latest climate change initiative “Carbon free and dividend”

which taxes business (to reduce carbon emissions) and lets the tax revenues flow back to the people to be able to make climate change friendly decisions, is being presented as economy friendly.

Their five stepping stones are called : The levers of Political Will, 1 Lobbying, training citizens in building relationships with elected representatives. 2. Media relations, train citizens to engage and influence media, Write letters and op editorials and place stories in all forms of media. 3. Grassroots outreach, recruit and education the public on climate advocacy and how to interact with the government. 4. Grass-tops outreach, Build partnerships and educate and gain support of community leader, NGOs nationally and internationally. 5. Chapter development, Grow and manage local CCL groups, this makes it possible to push all four levers for building political will

Strategy

Their strategy is based on a participatory democracy, making the best of the US system of the representative democracy by enabling citizens to call upon their representatives in congress to make their voice heard on the subject of climate change. Bringing together members on rally's throughout the country to build support, engage more citizens and work on getting specific legislation passed. The Citizens Climate Lobby really stresses the point that everyone has a voice and every contribution matters, and in this building a large coalition for climate change efforts (CCL, 2017).

The Citizen Climate Lobby is a not-for-profit organization, working as they proclaim, always respectful and non-partisan, with elected officials, the media and the public, to build the political will for action (CCL-what, 2017).

Strategies at work

- Establishing the bi-partisan House Climate Caucus

One major feat of the CCL is being part of the establishing of the Bi-partisan House Climate Caucus. This caucus was the result of extensive talks of Pennsylvania based CCL member Jay Butera (CCL caucus, 2016b) in 2013 with congressman Ted Deutch from Florida. In just three years the bi-partisan commission was formed, by Democrat Ted Deutch and Republican Carlos Culbero in a government that has never been great on environmental topics. Convincing representatives in Miami that also faced rising tide problems was difficult. Starting soft with a proposed Costal Resilience Caucus did not pan out. The combination of efforts with Jose Auguto from the Friends Committee on National legislation who started by getting republicans (the Grand Old Party) to at least agree to acknowledge that climate change is a cause for concern speeded up the process. He contacted the CCL to get backing of constituents in Gibson's district. Also not yet enough support to get a resolution passed. Butero started a Florida CCL chapter at that time to gain more traction, a senator, NASA scientist and the major of Miami Beach joined the effort. Taking the strength gained in Florida to New York, Butera found 550 mayors, commissioners, scientists, state representatives and university presidents to endorse his endeavor to get climate change and sea level rising acknowledged by Congress as a risk. To support representative Curbelo in his effort one CCL member got 50 school children to write thank you letters for his work, this worked a treat to further motivate him in his efforts. Other Republicans joined, more Democrats engaged and through hard work, personal lobbying and letter writing to get the vote through congress, the bi-partisan House Climate Caucus was established (CCL caucus, 2016b).

- Climate focus amendment to the National Defense Authorization act.

June of 2017 a defense policy was introduced in the US House of Representatives that required the Secretary of defense to provide assessments and recommendation on mitigation of vulnerabilities of Military installations to climate change risks. Also the protection of the installations against these threats needed to be formulated. This National Defense Authorization act, would have been blocked by a republican majority on this topic if the House Climate Caucus lobby would not have been successful (CCL & BHC, 2017).

Engaging members

The CCL works with a very structured and accessible format of engaging members. Monthly meetings, climate advocacy trainings, regional conferences keep up the engagement of all members. For specific events or actions extra meetings are organized and the annual conference and lobby day. On most pages of the website a link to what people can take home from this section is provided. So called laser presentation, which give a short view of a topic are available to use in regional or chapter events.

Engaging Politics, Science, Business and Institutions

The main strategy of the CCL is to empower citizens to engage their representatives in government. This can be done through individual contact, starting a letter writing campaign and organized meetings with members of congress on special occasions on special topics. The establishment of the bi-partisan Climate Solution Caucus in the US House of representatives in 2016..

The CCL actively petitions Universities to support their specific initiatives, in May 2017 30 college and University president endorsed the system or carbon pricing as an instrument to reduce carbon emissions. A number of their initiatives have a gone through an Impact study carried out by a researcher at a related university. The results of the study are being published online together with a list of questions to explain specific points, and also a good question, who is this researcher and why should we believe him.

Republican representation in the House: “Resolved, That the House of Representatives commits to working constructively, using our tradition of American ingenuity, innovation, and exceptionalism, to create and support economically viable, and broadly supported private and public solutions to study and address the causes and effects of measured changes to our global and regional climates, including mitigation efforts and efforts to balance human activities that have been found to have an impact” (Republican House Representatives & CCL, 2017)

Citizens Climate Education (CCE)

Next to the main organization CCL, the educational department CCE was founded in the same year as the CCL, 2007. The CCE empowers ordinary citizens by educating them about the scientific, economic, policy and environmental implications of climate change and climate change solutions (CCE-CCL, 2017).

Results

From their website the recent accomplishments are listed, mainly for specific events, such as the sponsoring of a resolution, partnering with a state to get a resolution passed, but more aimed at the future the establishment of the House Climate Solutions Caucus, a bipartisan group, founded in 2016, in the US House of Representatives. Members will be even between Democrats and Republicans. (Feb. 2017: expanded to 24 members) (CCL-Caucus, 2017)

A listing of city and state resolutions calling on the US Congress to address climate change, because this is something that cannot be solved on a local level alone.

A good result for the CCL is also the number of more than 18.000 new supporters since the election of the new president, they list their new supporters from all over the nation and all political persuasions.

Accomplishments

Table 5. CCL Accomplishment (CCL-acc, 2017)

	Growth in Activities and Actions	Letters to Congress	Published media	Outreach events
2010	106		65	
2011	255		232	
2012	534		646	412
2013	711		1670	695
2014	1086	6991	2593	1041
2015	1241	16064	3574	1952
2016	1391	40438	2928	2383

Finances

Table 6. CCL Finances (ProPublica, 2017)

Tax year (ended on March 31)	Total expenses (USD)	Total revenue (USD)
2014	41.294,00	77.411,00
2013	360.631,00	375.964,00
2012	320.446,00	302.327,00
2011	310.485,00	305.832,00
2010	98.028,00	104.500,00

Annex 2. 350.ORG - Data

350.org has built a global movement but still claims to do this bottom-up, grassroots involvement and action (350.org, 2017) Working in over 188 countries 350.org relies on a massive online community and communication to reach targets. The name 350.org is derived from the standards of CO₂ parts in the air, it has to reach 350 parts per million instead of the 400 parts per million now to become save. Their three main principles, Climate justice for all in equal measure, Collaboration makes stronger and diverse coalitions to pressure governments and fossil fuel industry and third, Mass mobilizations shows governments that the voice of the people needs to be heard and pressure decision making.

Organization

350.org is also a well-established network, founder is Bill McKibben. The organization has a limited formal head office, they do pride themselves on the core staff team, working and located in more than twenty-five countries worldwide. While there is a division in roles, people working according their skills

350.org offers support to all who want to start a climate campaign anywhere. The website is the starting point for all engagement, and e-mail is how they communicate according to the slogan on their website.

Global presence

350.org works as a campaign oriented network, offering support for local, national or international groups to pursue a climate change goal.

Online presence

350.org invites all who want to start a climate action to register at their website, offer guidance and (social) media support to get the proposed campaign underway.

Table 7. 350 social media numbers Retrieved: June 5, 2017

	Twitter	Facebook	YouTube	Instagram
Followers / members	330764	534931	8837	22600
Likes	2964	562797		
Tweets, videos, messages	34669		368	522
Following	19448			191
Views			2787453	

General strategies and engagement

Through the networked structure of 350.org they do try to get a specific strategy or campaign across the world by running local and national campaigns targeting leaders. They capitalize on big regional and international events like climate negotiations and economic summits. Currently their Divestment initiative is the main running strategy. Make banks, businesses, even homeowners aware of where there money is being invested, and ask them to divest (stop investing) all things that generate larger amounts of CO₂, so no more investments in coal and other environmental unfriendly energy systems.

The latest example from the Netherlands is the march to the Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam to ask their director to divest from their partnership with Shell .

Strategy

- Organize high media impact campaigns targeting CO2 emitting industries
- Support community building on a low carbon economy
- Pressure government into limiting emissions via campaigns at large climate summits and negotiations

Instruments:

- Mass media, news media, social media
- Mass mobilization, worldwide actions, simultaneous.
- Epistemic community support
- Power by personal invested actions
- Creative actions, using the power of creativity to raise awareness and drive change
- Peaceful action by people, dignified action.



Figure 4. 350 Mass media mobilization 2017 (Campaigns 350.org, 2016)

Strategies at work

- **Global divestment**

May 5-13, 2017 Worldwide actions on Divestment, people too action to get the institutions such as Bank, pension funds, Churches, Universities and especially governments in their country, where they work to divest from fossil fuels. Demonstrations, sit-ins, marches all over Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia. At Universities, at prayer meetings in temples, at hospitals for a healthier living environment. Big investors such as pension funds pledged to divest. Politicians see that they need to respect their voters voice who demand divestment from their government.

This global action week made headlines in : Germany: the Deutsche welle, USA: The Guardian, Worldwide: La Croix, a catholic daily (La Croix, 2017). Brazil: the Fulha de Sao Paulo. South Africa: The South African.

Other steps on the calendar to keep pushing for divestment (350 Divest, 2017) are the mobilization towards WesPac bank in Australia to defund the Adani mine. In New Zealand this same WesPac will

be the target of actions. East Asian action groups will target and spotlight investors in fossil fuel projects that harm communities in India, Vietnam and the Philippines. In Europe pressure will be upped to make churches, pension funds museums divest actively. In Latin America especially the mining and destruction of forests will be the target of new actions (350 Divest, 2017).

This one event is the latest out of a series, the longer running Divestment campaign by among others 350.org has resulted in a long list of divestment promises from 750 companies, universities, pension funds worldwide. The full list is available from the 350.org site (CCL caucus, 2016b)




Figure 5. 350 Divestment illustration (350.org, 2016a)

451	Town of Saint Herblain	Government	France	Full	→
452	Town of Saint Maur des Fosse	Government	France	Full	→
453	Tubmanburg City Cooperation	Government	Liberia	Full	
454	Urban community of Cherbourg	Government	France	Full	→
455	Urban community of Hénin-Carvin	Government	France	Full	→
456	Waltham Forest Pension Fund	Government	UK	Full	→
457	Östergötland Region	Government	Sweden	Full	→
458	British Medical Association	Healthcare	UK	Full	→
459	Canadian Medical Association	Healthcare	Canada	Full	→
460	Chicago Medical Society	Healthcare	USA	Full	→
461	Gunderson Lutheran Health System	Healthcare	USA	Partial	
462	Health Care Without Harm	Healthcare	USA	Full	→
463	Practice Greenhealth	Healthcare	USA	Full	→
464	Royal Australasian College of Physicians	Healthcare	Australia	Full	→
465	Society for the Psychological Study of	Healthcare	USA	Fossil Free	
466	UK Health Alliance on Climate Change	Healthcare	UK		→
467	UNISON Cambridge Hospitals	Healthcare	UK		→
468	World Medical Association	Healthcare	France	Full	→
469	350.org	NGO	USA	Fossil Free	
470	350.org Australia	NGO	Australia	Fossil Free	
471	Australian Guild of Screen Composers	NGO	Australia	Full	
472	CCFD - Terre Solidaire	NGO	France	Fossil Free	→
473	Center for Humans & Nature, The	NGO	USA	Full	→
474	Center for International Environmental	NGO	USA	Full	→
475	Citizens for Public Justice	NGO	Canada	Full	→
476	Clean Water Action	NGO	USA	Full	→
477	Climate Action Network Australia	NGO	Australia	Full	
478	Conservation Breeding Specialist Group	NGO	USA	Full	→
479	Council of Canadians, The	NGO	Canada	Full	
480	Diakonia	NGO	Sweden	Full	
481	Doctors for the Environment Australia	NGO	Australia	Full	→
482	Earthjustice	NGO	USA	Full	
483	Eastside Audobon Society	NGO	USA	Full	→
484	Ecotrust	NGO	USA	Full	

Figure 6. 350 Divestment list 750 pledges excerpt (350.org, 2016a)

- **Climate March**

April 29th, 100th day of the Trump presidency 350.org organized a march with around 200.000 participants, in Washington, D.C. To instigate a global awareness that climate change has to be met with action, time is running out. From the US angle also against the Trump administration climate policy, more accurately the lack of that and the withdrawal of the US from the Paris 2015 agreement. Next to this around 370 sister marches in Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Germany, United Kingdom, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica and more, saw tens of thousands people taking part. (350.org, 2017b). In the USA in almost 50 states similar protests took place.

- Opening press conference: speakers from several more affected groups and regions
- Start of the march at 12.30:
 - at 14.00 the goal of completely surrounding the White House with marches was reached.

Newspaper coverage: The new York times, Washington post

Television coverage: NBC news, CNN,

Radio and online: NPR (NPR, 2017)

Online Media: Huffington Post

Social media: 350, CNN, #ClimateMarch. Via Facebook 12.000 people confirmed participation. Several celebrities joined in. Tweets from Hillary Clinton and Leonardo di Caprio work as great boost in social media attention, reaching also those maybe not so much aware of climate change problems.



Figure 7. Climate Marche images world wide (350.org, 2017c)

A major part of the drive to gain attention is the art carried or performed during the march. Signs and banners, Parachutes with dancing puppets beneath, referrals to Trump in paper-mache heads.

A poll by CNN after the climate march revealed that, 70% people recognize that climate change is a threat. 69% of people think that the US should stand by the Paris climate accord. 80% favour a tax on CO2 emissions to make progress.

The resulting press coverage from this event that took place in many capitals around the world can be confirmed by a LexisNexis search for the number of press mentions of the Climate March in April of 2017.

Search for all English news media on the April 2017 climate march worldwide resulted in 822 news media mentions

Table 8. Lexis Nexis results March 2017 Climate March

Climate March 2017 in Lexis Nexis /	· All English news / 822 mentions.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Newswires & Press Releases(439) · Newspapers(223) · Industry Trade Press(144) · Web-based Publications(97) · Newsletters(47) · Tenders Opportunities(41) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Scientific Materials(15) · Aggregate News Sources(13) · Patent Filings(13) · Country & Region Reports(12) · Magazines & Journals(12) · Statistics(12) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Blogs(8) · News Transcripts(6) · News(2) · Company Filings(1) · Guidelines & Notices(1) · Market Research Reports(1) · Unclassified(6)

Table 9. Examples of the News Media and their coverage on the Climate March

LIMIT TO MAJOR NEWS RESOURCES / LAST YEAR /	100 RESULTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Newspapers(91) · Web-based Publications(8) · Magazines & Journals(2) · Newsletters(2) · Scientific Materials(2) · Industry Trade Press(1) 	

2.	For a 3.5-mile-long pipeline, a steady stream of protests The Washington Post METRO; Pg. B01, Patricia Sullivan	1330 words 1 hit	07 August 2017 Preview
3.	Al Gore urges activists to push climate issues The Washington Post A-SECTION; Pg. A19, Dino Grandoni	904 words 2 hits	26 July 2017 Preview
4.	N.R.A. Ad Condemning Protests Against Trump Raises Partisan Anger The New York Times Section ; Column 0; Express; Pg. , By JONAH ENGEL BROMWICH. Follow Jonah Engel Bromwich on Twitter @Jonesieman	969 words 1 hit	30 June 2017 Preview
5.	Is fighting climate change a Jewish duty? Jerusalem Post NEWS; Pg. 3, DANIELLE ZIRI/Jerusalem Post correspondent	911 words 3 hits	11 June 2017 Preview
6.	Eco concerns have fallen by the wayside but now it's time to act The Western Mail NEWS; Pg. 32, ALED BLAKE	448 words 1 hit	09 June 2017 Preview
7.	Crowds rally at March for Truth in D.C., major cities The Washington Post METRO; Pg. C01, Perry Stein;Lori Aratani	872 words 2 hits	04 June 2017 Preview
8.	Leaders warn Trump against Paris deal withdrawal Al Jazeera - English AMERICAS,	1227 words 2 hits	01 June 2017 Preview
9.	The Paris climate accord is old-fashioned and naive telegraph.co.uk OPINION; Version:1, By Telegraph View	443 words 2 hits	01 June 2017 Preview
10.	Energy: The Transition to 100% Clean Energy for All Is Unstoppable Africa News Thomson Reuters Foundation (London)	874 words 2 hits	30 May 2017 Preview
11.	Protests make Washington's port-a-potty industry flush The Washington Post	895 words	21 May 2017
13.	Many peoples at the Climate March The Washington Post EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A15,	111 words 1 hit	13 May 2017 Preview
14.	Trump era inspires iconic gay activist to continue fighting The Washington Post METRO; Pg. B01, Perry Stein	1109 words 1 hit	13 May 2017 Preview
15.	Trump Administration Delays Decision on Leaving Paris Climate Pact The New York Times Section A; Column 0; National Desk; Pg. 16, By CORAL DAVENPORT and MAGGIE HABERMAN	1180 words 1 hit	10 May 2017 Preview
16.	Scientist who studies protests says 'resistance' against Donald Trump is not slowing down; Protesters are mobilising in new ways - many of them for the first time The Independent (United Kingdom) AMERICAS; Version:1, Sarah Kaplan	1472 words 22 hits	08 May 2017 Preview
17.	A scientist who studies protest says 'the resistance' isn't slowing down The Washington Post A-SECTION; Pg. A04, Sarah Kaplan	929 words 16 hits	08 May 2017 Preview
18.	Climate march New Scientist NEWS;,,	194 words 6 hits	06 May 2017 Preview
19.	Climate march New Scientist NEWS;,,	194 words 6 hits	06 May 2017 Preview
20.	Ivanka Trump quotes renowned environmentalist and critic of her father in new book; First Daughter cites British primatologist Jane Goodall in Women Who Work- who responds with hope she will defy President and 'cherish our natural world' The Independent (United Kingdom) AMERICAS; Version:1, Samantha Schmidt	856 words 4 hits	03 May 2017 Preview
21.	Debate on Pulling Back From Paris Climate Deal Could Turn on a Single Phrase The New York Times Section A; Column 0; National Desk; Pg. 17,	1019 words 1 hit	03 May 2017 Preview

Figure 8. News coverage 2017 Climate March

Shutting down a German coalmining operation

In 2015 about 1500 people in a staging of peaceful civic disobedience shut-down operation in a Rhineland open-pit lignine mine. Moving through fields to circumvent police and via diverse routes about 800 people managed to enter the mine. Although press was removed from the site, the 350 media machine managed to generate sufficient coverage to get widespread attention to this protest (350 Germany, 2015)

Engaging members

350.org is a coalition of groups, they do not use the term members, but do receive about 6.4 M\$ in individual donations and support of over 7.3 M\$ from foundations to do their work.

Engaging Politics, Science and Institutions

Mostly with outsider strategies, highly visible actions, online, outside and in the press media.

Results

Their most recent success is the delivery of 2,5 Million signatures to the U.N. Secretary General support the Paris Agreement on June 6, 2017.

- From the action pages:

June 2017: Fossil Free National strategy survey Australia. Strategize for a plan to further stigmatise the fossil fuel industry

2017: NoTAP: peaceful community resistance against construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

- In the online annual reports a limited number of results can be found:

Annual report of 2016 (350 Annual16, 2017)

- Divestment Commitments up to 5 trillion so up 1,6 trillion from 2015
- Campaign to investigate Exxon was successful, US Securities and Exchange Commission opened an investigation into Exxon, on their climate change risk assessment in their business model.
- 350.org reports the 400% increase in banning fracking in Brazil, A second year of Open pit coal mining action in Germany. 28 fossil fuel project were cancelled, delayed or rejected.
- 1000 people were trained in civil disobedience practices and 99 were arrested in Ottawa during a protest.
- During the Global Climate March over 200.000 people marched on April 29th, 2016. in Washington D.C. and in over 370 sisters marches in the US and across the world.

Annual report 2015 (350 Annual15, 2016)

- Fossil Fuel Divestment and Reinvestment campaign started at Swarthmore College.
- A 3,4 trillion US Dollar Divestment of assets under management have Committed. To a level of divestment at the end of 2015. 6800% increase in divestment commitments from 2014.
- Global Divestment day, February 2015. 450 events in 60 countries. A newspaper campaign resulted in 300.000 signatures for the Gates Foundation and Welcome Trust to divest. Support to the Reinvestment Network US to support divesting funds in other directions.

- Leading up to the U.N. Climate Conference in Paris, 785.000 people participated in the Global Climate March in Paris in November 2015. 2300 location worldwide hosted a climate march, and in Paris 10.000 people in the streets for climate support (despite the state of emergency due to terror)
 - Other projects on the move are: on Tar Sands (the Keystone XL pipeline) Fracking in Brazil and the US, Coal mines in Philippines, Germany and Australia.
 - A new Global training program was developed to facilitate workshops and training globally as a capacity building tool for activists, for more powerful activism. The program is funded by the Global Greengrants Fund.
 - Main Projects: Tar sands/pipelines (Keystone XL), Fracking, Coal.
- Note: President Obama rejected the Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline on November 7, 2015.

2014

- Divestment commitment USD 50 billion.
- Main projects: Fracking, KXL pipeline.

2013

- Main projects: Tar sands/KXL pipeline
- Forward on Climate rally, events.

2012

Main projects:

- KXL pipeline, proactive project
- Connect the Dots' to help tell a unified narrative about the many disparate events taking place worldwide. Global day of action, may 5th
- Global Power Shift project to re-ignite the energy and power in the global network and the
- Do the Math Tour' with the central them to make the fossil fuel industry a public villain.
- India beyond Coal: inform people that coal is not needed to develop the country's infrastructure
- Pacific Warrior Day of Action: work with Pacific Islanders to defend their islands from rising sea levels
- Training new leaders

Annual reports online

2016	(350 Annual16, 2017)
2015	(350 Annual15, 2016)
2014	-
2013	(350 Annual13, 2014)
2012	(350 Annual12, 2013)

Finances

Table 10. 350 Finances (350.org, 2009) (350.org, 2010) (350.org, 2011) (350.org, 2012) (350.org, 2013) (350.org, 2014) (350.org, 2015) (350.org, 2016b)

:	Total expenses	Total revenue
2016	10.655.813,00	13.771.791,00
2015	8.906.848,00	11.279.955,00
2014	8.314.606,00	5.757.336,00
2013	5.196.923,00	6.538.626,00
2012	2.867.671,00	3.627.463,00
2011	2.149.251,00	3.013.995,00
2010	2.194.984,00	1.398.850,00
2009	2.654.121,00	1.934.142,00
2008	69.862,00	1.635.303,00

990 **Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax** **2010**
 Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service
 ** PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COPY **
 Under section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except black lung benefit trust or private foundation)
 The organization may have to use a copy of this return to satisfy state reporting requirements.

A For the 2010 calendar year, or tax year beginning **OCT 1, 2010** and ending **SEP 30, 2011**

B Check if applicable:
☒ Address change
☒ Name change
☐ Initial return
☐ Termination
☐ Amended return
☐ Application pending

C Name of organization: **350.ORG**
 Doing Business As
 Number and street (or P.O. box if mail is not delivered to street address) Room/suite
1850 M STREET, NW 1100
 City or town, state or country, and ZIP + 4
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
F Name and address of principal officer: **MAY BOEVE**
SAME AS C ABOVE

D Employer identification number: **26-1150699**
E Telephone number: **(802) 552-4067**
G Gross receipts: **3,013,995.**
H(a) Is this a group return for affiliates? ☐ Yes ☒ No
H(b) Are all affiliates included? ☐ Yes ☒ No
 If "No," attach a list. (see instructions)
H(c) Group exemption number: **2007**
I Tax-exempt status: ☒ 501(c)(3) ☐ 501(c) () (insert no.) ☐ 4947(a)(1) or ☐ 527
J Website: **WWW.350.ORG**
K Form of organization: ☒ Corporation ☐ Trust ☐ Association ☐ Other **L** Year of formation: **2007** **M** State of legal domicile: **DC**

Part I Summary

1 Briefly describe the organization's mission or most significant activities: **350.ORG IS BUILDING A GLOBAL GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT TO SOLVE THE CLIMATE CRISIS.**

2 Check this box ☐ if the organization discontinued its operations or disposed of more than 25% of its net assets.

3 Number of voting members of the governing body (Part VI, line 1a) **3** **5**

4 Number of independent voting members of the governing body (Part VI, line 1b) **4** **5**

5 Total number of individuals employed in calendar year 2010 (Part V, line 2a) **5** **20**

6 Total number of volunteers (estimate if necessary) **6** **9714**

7a Total unrelated business revenue from Part VIII, column (C), line 12 **7a** **0.**

7b Net unrelated business taxable income from Form 990-T, line 34 **7b** **0.**

8 Contributions and grants (Part VIII, line 1h) **1,397,614.** **3,008,741.**

Figure 9. Financial disclosure form 350.org proof of funding growth

Annex 3. Climate Action Network CAN International - Data

CAN International, the Climate Action Network, established in 1989, with headquarters based in Beirut, CAN International unites Non-governmental, non-profit, community-based climate action groups. Within CAN, national, regional and transnational networks communicate with governments, partake in for example site or pre-conference meetings at the COP or UNFCCC meetings. In 2016, 950 non-governmental organizations in more than 110 countries worked together in CAN (CAN International, 2015). The Conference of the Parties is the ultimate decision making body of the conference. All members of the conference have their input at this body in which they review all aspects, legal and implementation wise of the agreements on the table. The COP meets every year.

In 2014 CAN celebrate their 25th anniversary of coordination environmental action and policy impact. Their vision for the future is “a world striving actively towards and achieving the protection of the global climate in a manner, which promotes equity and social justice between peoples, sustainable development of all communities, and protection of the global environment.” The mission states that they want to “support and empower civil society organization to influence the design and development of an effective global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and ensure its implementation at international, national and local levels in the promotion of equity and sustainable development.” (CAN international, 2015) The CAN way of achieving this is in bringing organizations together in a Network, acknowledging differences, but establishing mutual trust, so that in a time of need groups would and could work together towards a common goal, through networking at International and Global Climate conferences.

COP22 Marrakesh Morocco 2016

Strategy

- Bring together Climate action groups to form a strong unified front on climate policy
- Develop policy positions
- Coordinate strategic climate advocacy

Instruments:

- Coordination and communication via online channels and in-person meetings mostly in conjunction with international or regional climate meetings.
- Issuing of position papers, interventions, discussion papers and recommendations to COP

Strategies at work

At the COP meetings a number of side events create the platform where CSOs and other organizations have the opportunity to discuss their concerns and ideas with COP delegates or join forces with colleagues to set up a combined strategy or just issue discussion.

From the list of admitted NGO at the UNFCCC meetings this section of information “This webpage provides information for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that **have observer status**, i.e. that have been admitted by the Conference of the Parties as observers to the UNFCCC. “ (UNFCCC, 2016a)

Climate Action Network - Europe (CAN - Europe) Mr. Eddy De Neef	Brussels	Belgium	Constituency - (32-2) 894-4670 Environmental CAN	(32-2) 894-4680	info@climnet.org
Climate Action Network - Latin America (CAN-LA) Mr. Enrique Gabriel Maurtua Konstantinidis	La Plata	Argentina	Constituency - (54 221) 457-3477 Environmental CAN	(54 221) 457-0481	enriquemk@fam.org.ar
Climate Action Network Australia (CANA) Mr. Alex Rafalowicz	Ultimo	Australia	Constituency - (61-2) 8202-1215 Environmental CAN	(61-2) 9281-1060	alex@cana.net.au
Climate Action Network Canada (CAN-Rac) Mr. Christian Holz	Ottawa	Canada	Constituency - (1-613) 241-4413 Environmental CAN		general@climateactionnetwork.ca
Climate Action Network International (CAN International) Ms. Lina Christiane Helga Dabbagh	Beirut	Lebanon	Constituency - (961) 350 6313 Environmental CAN		mburgess@climatenetwork.org
Climate Action Network South-East Asia (CANSEA) Mr. Nithiyananthan Nesadurai	Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	Constituency - (60 17) 3079313 Environmental CAN	(60 3) 78754039	cansearegcoordinator@gmail.com

Figure 10. CAN worldwide participation at COP

- **High level meetings**

High level meeting is when “senior representatives from cities, businesses, national governments, climate vulnerable communities, development organisations and civil society are gathering to showcase actions that are taking place around the world to get us on track to go 100% renewable. Speakers will present actions and demonstrate the benefits, moral imperative, technical and financial feasibility of the just transition to a world powered solely by renewable energy” (CAN International, 2016a) available via YouTube (CAN 100%, 2016)

For this event the following partner signed up: COP22 Presidency, Climate Vulnerable Forum, UNDP, SE4ALL, Climate Action Network, World Future Council, The Stanley Foundation, Hivos, Sierra Club, Christian Aid, Renewable Cities, RE 100, Climate Group, Climate Reality Project, Solutions Project, ICLEI, Climate Reality, Greenpeace, Purpose, ICLEI, Avaaz, 350.org, WWF, CARE, IndyAct, Beyond Zero Emissions, Track 0

- **Meeting with COP parties**

To have the opportunity to discuss proposals and issues with parties to the COP you have to submit a formal request with report through the UNFCCC website. (UNFCCC, 2017a)



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Roadmap for Global Climate Action

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COP	CMP	SBSTA	SBI	APA
Constituted bodies			Roadmap for Global Climate Action	

To view submissions received by **Parties to the UNFCCC**, please click [here](#).

Submissions received by **admitted organizations and other Non Party Stakeholders**:

Organizations	Date	Document
Hivos*	13 September 2016	Response by the Hivos to the Champions' Roadmap for the Global Climate Action Agenda (330 kB)
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions	16 August 2016	Response to the Champions' Roadmap for the Global Climate Action Agenda (782 kB)
Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)*	11 August 2016	Submission on the Road Map for Global Climate Action (358 kB)
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre and Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)*	10 August 2016	Submission on Road Map for Global Climate Action (206 kB)
SUEZ	5 August 2016	Responses by SUEZ (318 kB)

World Resources Institute (WRI)*	2 August 2016	Submission from World Resources Institute on the Roadmap for Global Climate Action (245 kB)
BusinessEurope*	1 August 2016	BusinessEurope response (134 kB)
CDP Worldwide (CDP)*	1 August 2016	CDP response (632 kB)
Climate Action Network International (CAN International)*	1 August 2016	CAN International response (614 kB)
Climate Alliance (Klima-Bündnis)*	1 August 2016	Climate Alliance views on the Roadmap for the Global Climate Action Agenda (418 kB)

Figure 11. CAN submission of report by membership to COP

In this case CAN submitted their report in the COP section “Road map for climate action” (CAN International, 2016b) to promote their 6 point plan to make climate change action a top priority with many High level operatives and organizations, to keep the bottom-up pressure going. Hence the High level meeting they participated in organizing (strategy 1.)

This report was part of the 17 November Bon meeting (UNFCCC, 2017b), High level event on global action

07 Nov - 18 Nov 2016	Marrakech Climate Change Conference - November 2016 <i>The twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) and the twelfth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 12) will be held in Bab Ighli, Marrakech, Morocco from 7-18 Novem</i>	Bab Ighli, Marrakech, Morocco	UNFCCC
08 Nov 2016	In-session workshop on the modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement more >>	Marrakech, Morocco	
09 Nov 2016	Nairobi work programme 10th Focal Point Forum on health and adaptation <i>SBSTA 45 Mandated Event</i> more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	UNFCCC
10 Nov - 11 Nov 2016	Second workshop of the facilitative sharing of views under the ICA process more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
11 Nov 2016	Facilitative dialogue on enhancing ambition and support more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
12 Nov 2016	Second round of the multilateral assessment process under the IAR more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
14 Nov 2016	Second round of the multilateral assessment process under the IAR, continued more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
16 Nov 2016	High Level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
16 Nov 2016	Facilitative dialogue on enhancing ambition and support more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	
17 Nov 2016	High-level event on global climate action more >>	During Marrakech Climate Change Conference	

Figure 12. Program side conference meetings, 17 Nov CAN High level event

Advancing implementation of the Paris 2015 agreements is the shared goal of all participants and in this event the support of all non-state actor partners was recognized to be a needed addition to the climate change effort, states the after event Press report (UNFCCC news, 2017)

From the Progress Tracking (UNFCCC- Tracking, 2017) of all efforts and agreements of the Marrakech and other meeting rounds, we can see that the building of High level meetings and strengthening of volunteer efforts will be on the November 2017 COP23 agenda for further development

§120: Convene, pursuant to decision 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and in conjunction with each session of the Conference of the Parties during the period 2016–2020, a high-level event (see para 120 (a–d) for further details).	COP	COP sessions from 2016–2020.	A high-level event was held at COP22.	A high-level event to be held at COP23 (November 2017).
§121: Act on behalf of the President of the COP to facilitate through strengthened high-level engagement in the period 2016–2020 the successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalition (see para 121 (a–c) for further details).	Two high-level champions	Ongoing from 2016–2020.	Ongoing.	Ongoing.

Figure 13. Tracking of meetings and agreements at COP events (UNFCCC- Tracking, 2017, p. 11)

One of the results of the Marrakesh round was the appointment of two High Level Champions, who will be frontrunners on establishing and growing the Global climate action as is stated in their declaration titled “Further, Faster, Now Accelerating Global Climate Action together through the Marrakech Partnership” (El Haite & Seruiratu, 2017) the input of NGOs and CSOs is highly valued in the pursuit of climate change policy and the two high level champions will work on maintaining constructive dialogues to drive climate action.

The UNFCCC has a special page for the MAS Observers Mandate Search for Observer Engagement “Over the past decades, Parties to the UNFCCC have continuously enhanced engagement of observer organizations in the UN climate change intergovernmental process. Information on past decisions and conclusions pertaining to observer engagement is available in this online search tool. It allows easy access to relevant official documents searchable by body and/or theme. “ (UNFCCC - MAS, 2017)

Rules Of the UNFCCC state : “Anybody or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object” (UNFCCC - SBI, 2010) Section III promotes the participation of observer organizations from Civil society for transparency and the fact that has been recognized that the accountability of nations is so guaranteed and the issue of climate change will stay high on the public agenda. Also the input of observer organizations is recognized.

Examples of SBI conclusions on observer organizations participation, image below, confirms the input and value of information exchange and support in assessment of policy choice effects.(UNFCCC - MAS, 2017, p. items/9558.php (values of participation)

Document Ref.	Theme	Paragraph
FCCC/SBI/2016/2	Values of participation	40. In this context, the SBI has repeatedly reaffirmed the fundamental value of effective participation by observers and the value of contributions from observer organizations to deliberations on substantive issues
FCCC/SBI/2012/15	Values of participation	240. The SBI recalled the conclusions from its thirty-fourth session reaffirming the fundamental value of effective participation by observers and the value of contributions from observer organizations to deliberations on substantive issues, while recognizing the recent exponential increase of participants from observer organizations
FCCC/SBI/2011/6	Values of participation	33. A number of submissions from Parties and observer organizations emphasized the value of participation by and dialogue with observer organizations, and called for improved measures to enhance information exchange between observer organizations and the Parties.
FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.7	Values of participation	17. ...She stressed the importance of the participation of observers with a science or social science background who can assist with the interpretation of scientific issues and help assess the likely effects of different policy choices.

Figure 14. SBI report on COP side meetings and press report

Global presence

Membership of CAN is worldwide, also over the North South divide, where some action collectives are mostly originating from the northern hemisphere, CAN incorporates advocacy groups from all over the world.

CAN Regional Networks: CAN-Eastern Africa CAN Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (CANEECCA) CAN-Europe CAN Latin American (CANLA) CAN-Arab World CAN-Pacific (PICAN) CAN-South Asia (CANSAs) Southern Africa Region CAN (SARCAN) CAN-South East Asia (CAN-SEA) CAN-Western and Central Africa

CAN National Networks CAN-Australia (CANA) CAN-Rac Canada CAN-China Rac-France CAN-Indonesia CAN-Japan CAN-South Africa (SACAN) CAN-Tanzania CAN-Uganda US Climate Action Network (USCAN) New Zealand CAN (CAN International, 2015)

From the 2015 annual report, the growth of the number of national and regional networks, also known as ‘nodes’ is a most important feat into shifting the public discourse into the renewable energy direction. The strengthening of the CAN network through the networks via member participation and in the preparation of the CAN 2016-2020 strategy have been proven to work in 2015.

Online presence

The website of CAN is their main information hub, providing news, newsletter portal, all official communication and regional and national webpages. CAN also makes use of available social media channels, contact with press outlets and discussion fora online, to promote their position.

Table 11. CAN Online presence

	Twitter	Facebook	YouTube
Followers / members	14728	14861	136
Likes	207	14887	
Tweets, videos, messages	7071		92
Following	1096		
Views			36525

Retrieved: June 5, 2017

General strategies and engagement

Most CAN strategies are cooperation at policy level, support in policy development and taking part in UNFCCC COP meetings. Also information exchange is mentioned as one of their strategies alongside with coordinated development of NGO strategy on international, regional and national level through network hubs. (CAN international, 2015)

CANs main communication strategy is focused on gaining maximum media attention by preparing spokespersons, members in committees, partners and their own press media. Prepared documentation is being set-up media friendly for optimal coverage, and connecting with nodes and members to get the 100% renewable message out, consistently, in all countries not omitting developing nations. (CAN Policy, 2016)

A coherent advocacy strategy was developed by CANs in its function as a coordinator and facilitator for its membership, working towards COP 21 in Paris. This strategy tool called “Bare essentials” guided all members and COP participants toward and through the conference. Also in the months leading up to the conference strategy sessions organized by CAN supported the delegates in delivering a coherent, strong and united message from CAN members to the COP.

Information sessions during the UNFCCC conference by the CAN secretariat kept all participating member informed of all development in other platform discussions during the conference so they could if needed bring information to their discussion round.

Civil Society’s message on the need to a 1,5 degree temperature rise maximum goal was presented at the Paris 2015 climate meeting in plenary and negotiation sessions by CAN members, and available for distribution to a wider audience to again create a greater awareness in the general public in countries worldwide.

Bringing together more and different groups to stand together in these climate goals was also a successful strategy at the COP 21 meeting. Several inter-faith meetings resulted in stronger ties with faith based organizations, and a new Global Muslim Climate Network was formed. Relations with the Sustainable Development Movement were strengthened.

Since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, the connection to CAN work could not be more clear, putting climate change work in a broader development setting can only enhance both efforts, starting out with affordable low carbon energy in developing nations would be double win for all.

CAN claims their influence on governments on sustainable energy development throughout 2014 and 2015 via a series of position papers and submissions, delivered by strategically targeted advocacy and communication. Combining energy efficiency, climate change, resilience and adaptation of solutions.

The framing of the climate message by CAN, delivering a targeted and strong message to emphasize the political momentum, at the exact moment it gets most traction in the media has helped to present a clear and united message to governments and the public, and received good media coverage.

Engaging members

The basis of CAN is a network of subgroups, engagement of members’ lies with each sub-group. At large events coordination of members takes over.

At for example UNFCCC meetings they make full use of all possible contacts available at such events by organizing High-media profile activities, post position papers, provide support to all organizations with discussion papers, position papers, scientific support. Also the communication with state and national capitals, full use of social media and when possible support capacity building are in the array of tools used by CAN to support all network members in their quest to bring about change (CAN COP, 2016).

To present a united and this way stronger voice at a UNFCCC meeting CAN requests members and delegates who take part in UNFCCC sessions to coordinate their contact with the media, first to get the message out as clear as possible, second to have a coordinated content.

Engaging Politics, Science and Institutions

CAN engagement strategies at UNFCCC- COP meetings are listed as: interventions, taking part in side events, workshops, press conferences, bi-lateral meetings, briefings, submissions, announcements and elements of the daily programs and having a booth at the event.

Prior to the G20 meeting of July 2017 CAN is part of one of the G20 engagement groups, the Business20, Civil20, Labour20, Science20, Think20, Vulnerable20, Women20 and Youth20 part of dialogue forums. The B20, C20 and T20 all have set up climate and energy taskforces and have climate inclusive paragraphs in their recommendation to the G20 (Business20, 2017)

Finances

Table 12. CAN Finances (CAN International, 2015)

Year	Total expenses (USD)	Total revenue (USD)
2015	1.533.617,00	1.571.917,00
2014	1.630.155,00	1.416.290,00
2013	899.294,00	945.189,00
2012	617.490,00	606.166,00
2011	811.066,00	786.123,00
2010	1.144.920,00	1.210.524,00