

The People Know Best

*An empirical research on why lower educated people are more likely to vote
for left- and right-wing populist parties in The Netherlands*

by

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Preface

The basis for this thesis originally stemmed from my personal interest for populism in politics. Because of the fact that, throughout the past couple of years, populist political parties have become predominantly present in West-European countries, I wanted to research whether these parties attract certain educational groups more than others and if so, why this would be the case. I would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Giedo Jansen and Prof. Dr. Ariana Need for their constructive feedback throughout my graduation period. I would also like to thank my friend and classmate Kevin Ceven for his help and support with my thesis when I needed it.

Abstract

This thesis addresses the relationship between educational attainment and populist voting in The Netherlands. It further aims to examine this relation in depth in order to find out which attitudinal factors possibly mediate this relationship for left- and right-wing populist voting. Using data derived from the Religion in Dutch Society (SOCON, 2011/2012) survey, this thesis empirically tested a set of hypotheses concerning attitudinal factors (e.g.: political trust, Euroscepticism, perceived ethnic threat and anti-Muslim attitudes) which could serve as mediators for this relationship. The results indicate that lower educated people are indeed more likely to vote for a populist party than their higher educated counterparts. However, the results also show that, despite the fact that several variables are significantly correlated with voting for a certain party, these factors do not mediate this relationship. The attitudinal factors that turned out to have a significant (but not mediating) effect for left-wing populist voting are political trust and Euroscepticism. For right-wing populism, only perceived ethnic threat turned out to have a significant effect as attitudinal factor. These findings show that there is a considerable difference between the attitudinal factors as to which left- and right-wing populist parties appeal. Although these factors cannot strictly be regarded as mediators, their significant effect on voting behavior shows that they do influence the relationship between educational attainment and populist voting to a certain degree.

1. Introduction

Relationships between the level of education, political attitudes and voting behavior have been the subject of academic and societal debate for years. In the past, many academics like Lubbers et al., (2002); Kessler and Freeman, (2005); Ford and Goodwin, (2010); Werts et al, (2012) and Ivarsflaten and Stubager, (2013) aimed to find relations between the level of education of an individual and right-wing populist voting. In general, their results indicated that lower educated individuals are persistently overrepresented among the electorate of right-wing populist parties in Europe.

The proposition that education plays a significant role in the shaping of political preferences and voting behavior of an individual, was already introduced by Lipset in 1960. In his book, he emphasized this significance by stating that: *“Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices”* (Lipset, 1960, p. 56). Moreover, he states that the situation of people in the lower social strata with low levels of education, *“predisposes them to view politics as black and white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, they should be more likely than other strata to prefer extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems and have a rigid outlook”* (Lipset, 1960, p. 100). Based on these hypotheses given by Lipset, one of the main expectations in this thesis is that lower educated people are more susceptible for these extreme political doctrines than their higher educated counterparts.

A recent article by Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) addresses the relationship between educational attainment of an individual and radical right (populists) voting in the Netherlands. They found that lower educated people are indeed more likely to vote for the Party for Freedom (PVV) than their higher educated counterparts. Consequently, they investigated the explanatory reasons for this phenomenon. In their research, they tested a wide array of explanatory mechanisms simultaneously in order to gain more insight on the ‘why-question’ for this relation. When testing these mechanisms separately, they found that lower educated people turned out to be more Eurosceptic, which was positively related with voting for the PVV. Moreover, lower educated people were less involved in voluntary organizations and held lower levels of social trust, which, in turn, was negatively related with radical right voting. However, when they tested these same mechanics simultaneously, Savelkoul and Scheepers found that these influences could no longer be considered significant. Ultimately, only three mechanisms turned out to be significant in their research to explain the relationship between the level of education and voting for the PVV: authoritarian attitudes, perceptions of ethnic threat and anti-Muslim attitudes. These findings will be further elaborated on in the theory section.

In general, academic research about predictors of populist voting in The Netherlands has focused predominantly on the right-wing political spectrum (Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016) & (Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2015), giving left-wing politics a somewhat lower priority. An exception to this is an article by Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove, (2014) which aimed to measure populist attitudes among Dutch citizens and investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with certain party preferences. They found that voters who score high on the populist attitude scale have a significantly higher preference for the Dutch populist parties, the Party for Freedom (PVV) and the Socialist Party (SP). At the same time, they found that there is a clear distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism. Right-wing populism displays a strong exclusionistic character by ruling out certain ethnic groups from society. In contrast, left-wing populism has a more inclusive nature, refraining from such ethnocentric policy. Similarities between these two forms of populism were found in the form of shared high levels of anti-elitism among their electorates.

On the right side of the political spectrum, populist parties have experienced a significant growth in voters and followers in Western-Europe. In the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen and her far-right 'Front National' managed to come out as second in the results. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders and his far-right 'Partij voor de Vrijheid' (PVV) have also risen to become the second largest party in the Dutch national elections of 2017 (Chappell, 2017). In October of 2017, the Austrian people chose the right-wing populist politician Sebastian Kurz as their new chancellor. He presumably won his campaign by making two promises to the Austrian people: he will combat the current socio-economic establishment and implement a strict immigration policy towards asylum seekers (Wansink, 2017). Needless to say, right-wing populism has, throughout the past couple of years, grown out to play a significant role in modern West-European politics.

Throughout the past couple of years, left-wing populist parties have also become more present in European politics. In the Greek parliamentary elections of 2012, the left-wing populist formation SYRIZA achieved 26.9% of the votes, accumulating to 71 seats within the national parliament (Metapolls, 2012). In the parliamentary elections of 2015, their seats even increased to 149 of the 300. This increase in votes was mainly the consequence of a large degree of dissatisfaction among Greek citizens because of many financial cuts and reforms that had been carried out by former governments, commissioned by the European Union (The Guardian, 2015). In Spain, the left-wing populist party Podemos received 8% of the national vote in the 2014 European Parliament election. Because Podemos avoided using nationalistic language, which is typically present in right-wing populism, they were able to attract leftist voters who were disappointed with the current political establishment, without them taking sides in the regional

political conflicts. In the 2015 national parliamentary elections, Podemos achieved 20.7% of the votes, becoming the third largest party in Spain. Currently, Podemos holds 69 out of 350 seats in the national parliament, bringing an end to the traditional two-party system of Spain (Spiegel, 2015). Within the Netherlands, the Socialist Party (SP) of Lilian Marijnissen, which has been in parliament since 1994, could also be regarded as a populist party.¹ Now that also left-wing populist parties are so abundantly present in modern day Western politics, it begs the question whether the same mechanisms that could mediate the relationship between lower education and right-wing populist voting are the same for left-wing populist parties.

At the left end of the political spectrum, the (possible) relationship between level of education and left-wing populist voting lacks extensive research. What remains to be seen is whether, and to what extent, the relationship exists between having a lower education and left-wing populist voting. And if so, how to explain this relationship by testing theoretically derived mediating factors. Also, it begs the question whether the three mechanisms presented by Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) that turned out to be significant for right-wing populist voting (authoritarian attitudes, perceptions of ethnic threat and anti-Muslim attitudes), are the same factors explaining the (potential) link between lower education and left-wing populist voting. Moreover, some of the attitudinal factors tested by Savelkoul and Scheepers (2016), which did not turn out to be significant mediators, could be significant in mediating the relation between lower education and left-wing populist voting. The possibility also exists that the relation between level of education and populist voting on the left-wing political spectrum is determined by other intermediate factors than its right-wing political counterpart. This is because of the fact that left- and right-winged populism theoretically possess very different ideologies. This research therefore aims to test some of the same mediating mechanisms of Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) for left-wing populist voting and consequently fill this academic gap by testing other possible mediating variables.

For this thesis, The Netherlands forms an interesting case for research as its political landscape contains populist right-wing as well as populist left-wing parties. On the right side of the political spectrum, there is the previously mentioned PVV of Geert Wilders. In contrast on the far left, you have the Socialist Party (SP) of Lilian Marijnissen. The PVV and SP are the only left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Western Europe to be in a national parliament at the same time for more than one parliamentary term (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007). According to Mudde, (2004, p. 543) the main feature that left- and right-wing populist parties share is that they distinguish society into two combative groups: 'the pure people' against 'the corrupt elite'. Both the PVV and the SP share this populist feature significantly. They do, however, differ from one

¹ Why this is the case will be further elaborated on in theory section 2.4.

another in a certain populist area. The radical right PVV claims that there exists a group of 'others' in the Dutch society who do not belong to the people. In this case, they mainly refer to Muslim migrants, who are supposedly foreign to the virtuous culture of the people. In contrast, the SP has a much more welcoming attitude towards foreign migrants. They argue that The Netherlands has an international responsibility to take refugees into the country, stating that asylum seekers are always entitled to humanitarian help and shelter (SP, 2017). In the theory chapter, the differences between left- and right-wing populism will be further elaborated on. Consequently, several attitudinal factors will be conceptualized, operationalized and tested for their mediating strength in the data and results chapters. The implications of the results will be discussed in the conclusions chapter.

To address the lack of academic literature addressing the relation between level of education and left-wing populist voting, the following research questions will be answered: *(Q1) Which attitudinal factors mediate the relationship between educational attainment and left-wing populist voting? (Q2) And to what extent do the effects of these factors differ from those mediating the relationship between educational attainment and right-wing populist voting?*

2. Theory

2.1 Introduction to theory

To properly conduct this research, the theoretical concept of populism has to be clearly defined and consistently used throughout the thesis. In this chapter, the concept of populism will be explained in general and on the left-right political spectra. Consequently, mediating factors that could explain the possible relationship between lower education and populist voting will be derived from academic literature and discussed.

2.2 Populism

In their book, Albertazzi and McDonnell, (2008, p. 3) define populism as: *"an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice."* Albertazzi and McDonnell, (2008) deliberately refrain from mentioning terms like 'right-winged' or 'conservative' in their definition because they believe that the equivalence of populism with the political right can be misleading. The populist claim that the people are the only legitimate sovereign and have been deprived of power can also easily be in line with leftist ideologies. Moreover, they consciously avoid conceiving populism in terms of specific social bases, economic programmes, issues and electorates. In short, they state that populism should not only be seen against such backgrounds, but beyond them.

In his research, Zaslove, (2008) found that radical-right populism, the center-right populism of Forza Italia, and the left populism of the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) all possess populist characteristics, according to the populist ideal type. However, these three populist political parties also exhibit substantial differences. They have distinct party platforms and garner support from diverse segments of the population, highlighting that populism manifests itself in different forms, depending upon given opportunity structures and, most importantly, upon the actions of the parties themselves. The findings of Zaslove, (2008) further emphasize that populism is not just restricted to far-right politics but can manifest itself in political parties across the entire left-right political spectrum.

In one of the articles he wrote for Al Jazeera, Zabala (2017) further emphasizes the differences between left- and right-wing populism. He states that although both sides of populism apply the same principle, namely bringing together a crowd around a political idea in order to shape an 'us' against a 'them', the concepts used to define these groups are radically different. This is especially evident in the emotions each side uses to mobilize voters: fear of the foreigner on the right and hope for a better future on the left. The former is entrenched in hatred and indifference, and the latter in justice and equality. The right-wing populism of Donald Trump and Nigel Farage, expressed in their "*Make America Great Again*" and "*Leave*" campaigns, restricts the national identity of 'the people', excluding immigrants, refugees and any other definable as 'foreign' to a sentimental ideal. Although exclusion is also present in the left-wing populism of Bernie Sanders and Pablo Iglesias, they do not exclude categories of people, but rather those sectors of the establishment in the service of neo-liberal global corporations. For Sanders, this meant "*breaking up the big banks*" and, for Iglesias, defeating the Spanish "*caste*" which includes the two major political parties, the right-wing People's Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. Based on the abovementioned definition, it can be stated that in general, left-wing populism has a more inclusive nature towards people and targets different emotions in voters than its right-wing counterpart.

2.3 Education and right-wing populism

According to Rydgren, (2007 p. 242) radical right (populist) parties generally "*share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism*" and focus on "*strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous*". As mentioned in the introduction, Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) addressed the relationship between educational attainment and voting for a radical right populist party, namely the PVV, in the Netherlands. They found that three mechanisms turned out to be relevant in explaining the relationship between the level of education of an individual and voting for the PVV: authoritarian attitudes, perceptions of ethnic threat and anti-Muslim attitudes. The first explanation referring to authoritarian attitudes is based on the idea that the socio-economic

position of the lower strata is characterized by poverty and deprivation, which causes frustration and anxiety among this group. Consequently, lower educated people are likely to submit themselves to strong authorities and conventional norms and values. These psychological needs are served by radical right parties which emphasize traditional norms and have a strong leader. Secondly, they found that lower educated people perceive more ethnic threat, compelling them to vote for the PVV. This is in line with Rydgren's (2007) abovementioned statement that radical right parties like the PVV put a strong emphasis on ethno-nationalism. Lastly, lower educated people turned out to hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims, driving them to vote for the PVV, which has an ethnocentric agenda and resorts to a racist and xenophobic discourse, targeting particularly Muslim communities (ECRI, 2008).

2.4 Education and left-wing populism

Zaslove, (2008, p. 329) describes left-wing populism as political parties which *"fuse populism with a political platform and political themes that are usually associated with socialist or social democratic parties"*. Left-wing populist parties generally put important emphasis on themes like anti-capitalism, social justice, pacifism and anti-globalization, whereas class society ideology or socialist theory is not as important as it is to traditional left-wing parties. Notably, left-wing populism distinguishes itself from traditional socialist or social democratic parties by putting a lower emphasis on class, socialism and socialist ideology in favor of a political platform that appeals to the 'people'. The abovementioned 'class struggle' is still present in left-wing populism, but to a somewhat lesser extent in comparison to traditional left-wing parties.

While previous research like Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) already shed light on multiple factors which determine the relation between education and right-wing populist voting, these findings do not cover populism in its entirety. Their findings particularly focus on the PVV, which only partly represents populism in The Netherlands. As left- and right-wing politics have entire opposite ideologies on a wide arrange of subjects, one could expect that the factors determining the possible relation between the level of education of an individual and voting for a certain political party would greatly vary across the left-right political landscape. Therefore, the same three mechanisms identified by Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) that turned out to be significant in explaining the relationship between educational attainment and right-wing populist voting (PVV), will be tested on their mediating strength for education and left-wing populist voting (SP). Furthermore, attitudinal factors which did not turn out to be relevant in their article but could theoretically be significant on the left-wing populist spectrum, will be tested on their mediating strength. Consequently, these results will be compared with their mediating strength on the right-wing populist political spectrum. Moreover, the aim of this research is to find and assess additional attitudinal factors which are expected to exclusively mediate the relationship

between educational attainment and left-wing populist voting, in contrast to their right-wing counterpart.

Within the political landscape of the Netherlands, it can be argued that the left-wing SP of Lilian Marijnissen matches the definition of a populist party given Albertazzi and McDonnell, (2008). In general, the SP also represents a virtuous and homogeneous group of people known as the 'common working class' against the so-called elite 'ruling class' in the Netherlands. Being the most left-winged party in Dutch parliament, the SP has, since its foundation in 1972, mainly practiced a socialist-oriented ideology with their current political slogan being in favor of: "*human dignity, equality and solidarity*" (SP, 2017). Throughout the years, the SP has distinguished itself from other leftist parties in The Netherlands by displaying populist characteristics like Euroscepticism. Moreover, the SP frequently displays a strong aversion and dissatisfaction against the existing status quo (being the parties that are currently in government) and tries to mobilize the people (being the working class in The Netherlands), against the current political establishment (Rooduijn, 2014). In defining populism, the "*virtuous and homogeneous people*" are generally considered to be inferior to the "*elites and dangerous 'others'*" (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). In their article, which discusses the diversity of radical left parties and voters in Western Europe, Gomez, Morales and Ramiro (2016) also regard the SP as a left-wing populist party within the political landscape of The Netherlands. Level of education has been regarded by academics as an important factor in determining an individual's voting behavior. As mentioned in the introduction, Lipset, (1960) considers education as one of the (if not the) most important determinants for the shaping of an individual's voting behavior. The main implication of this research therefore is that this feeling of inferiority by the public originates and is a consequence of being low educated. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: *(H1) Lower educated people are more likely to vote for the SP in the Netherlands than higher educated people.*

The level of education of an individual however, does not necessarily have to influence one's choice of voting for a left-wing populist party directly. It could also indirectly influence this choice by shaping the political attitudes of a person. Therefore, several political attitudes related to populism will be analyzed as intermediate factors for this possible relation. As mentioned before, the first three possible intermediate factors that will be tested are the ones that turned out to be relevant in explaining the relationship between educational attainment and right-wing populist voting (PVV): (I) authoritarian attitudes, (II) perceptions of ethnic threat and (III) anti-Muslim attitudes. Because of the fact that the SP, as a far-left populist party, practices a substantially different political agenda than the far-right PVV, having a much less exclusionist nature and tapping into different voter emotions, the mediating strength of these three mechanisms could differ greatly on the left-wing political spectrum.

2.5 Authoritarian attitudes

In their book on the 'Authoritarian Personality', Adorno et al, (1950) theorized that the socio-economic position of the lower strata is characterized by poverty and deprivation, which causes frustration and anxiety among this group. Consequently, lower educated people are more likely to submit themselves to strong authorities and conventional norms and values than their higher educated counterparts. Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) found that, because radical right parties emphasize the role of the strong leader as well as traditional norms, they therefore are able to serve the psychological needs of these people. For left-wing populism, it is expected that this same feeling of deprivation, which leads to frustration and anxiety, gives lower educated people the psychological need for a strong political leader. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: *(H2a) Lower educated people are more likely to have authoritarian attitudes than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H2b) is explained by the positive effect of authoritarian attitudes on the likelihood to vote for the PVV and (H2c) the likelihood to vote for the SP.*

2.6 Perceptions of ethnic threat & Anti-Muslim attitudes

In their articles, Coser, (1957), Blalock, (1968), Bobo, (1999), Scheepers et al, (2002) and Coenders et al, (2004) elaborate on the realistic group conflict theory and the ethnic competition theory. These theories address the alleged competition between ethnic out-groups and one's ethnic in-group. They state that natives compete with ethnic minorities with regard to scarce resources (e.g., jobs or affordable housing) and conflicting values. The presence of ethnic minorities is expected to trigger perceptions of ethnic threat among natives, particularly among deprived people among the ethnic majority group in similar social positions as ethnic minorities, which, in turn, increases levels of out-group derogation (Scheepers et al, 2002; Coenders et al, 2004). As radical right parties generally practice a strong anti-immigrant policy (in particular with regard to immigrants from Muslim countries) (e.g., Zaslove, 2004; Rydgren, 2007), they can effectively mobilize these deprived voters who perceive ethnic competition and/or hold negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and Muslims in particular. In contrast to their right-wing counterparts, left-wing populist parties do not practice an ethnocentric political agenda, but rather focus on socio-economic equality. Because of this difference, it is expected that these two attitudinal factors will not be significant mediators in the relation between lower education and left-wing populist voting. Therefore, the following hypotheses have been constructed: *(H3a) Lower educated people are more likely to perceive ethnic threat than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H3b) is explained by the positive effect of perceived ethnic threat on the likelihood to vote for the PVV (H3c) but cannot be explained by the effect of perceived ethnic threat on the likelihood to vote for the SP. Also: (H4a)*

Lower educated people are more likely to have anti-Muslim attitudes than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H4b) is explained by the positive effect of anti-Muslim attitudes on the likelihood to vote for the PVV (H4c) but cannot be explained by the effect of anti-Muslim attitudes on the likelihood to vote for the SP.

2.7 Political trust

Previous research by Schoon et al, (2010) has shown that that lower educated people generally display lower levels of trust in politics and consequently tend to use their vote for a political party as a so-called 'protest vote'. Schoon et al, (2010) found that people with high scores on cognitive ability at age 11 were significantly associated with high levels of political trust at the age of 33. On the contrary, people in the lower strata of the social status hierarchy, showed less political trust. Similar to the PVV, the SP displays a degree of political cynicism by being strongly in favor of less governmental power in exchange for more control by the public in the form of direct referendums (SP, 2017). Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: *(H5a) Lower educated people are more likely to have lower levels of political trust than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H5b) is explained by the negative effect of political trust on the likelihood to vote for the PVV and (H5c) the likelihood to vote for the SP.*

2.8 Relative deprivation

Another explanation for the possible relationship between educational attainment and populist voting can be found in in the theoretical notions of relative deprivation together with the losers of modernization thesis (e.g., Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007). According to this assertion, lower educated people are considered to lack the necessary skills like cultural capital, individual entrepreneurship and flexibility to be able to cope with the rapidly changing socio-economic and socio-cultural structure of advanced Western European democracies. As a consequence, this group of people has increased chances to get stuck in full or partial unemployment. This results in lower educated people running the risk of forming a new underclass of 'losers of modernization' and becoming 'superfluous and useless for society' (Betz, 1994, p. 32), which might result in uncertain present economic situations as well as uncertainty about future economic prospects. This is in line with the relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Meyer, 2004), which focuses on feelings of relative deprivation and frustration arising from uncertain present and future economic prospects. According to Runciman, (1966) and Gurr, (1970), disappointing comparisons with one's own past or with social reference groups can induce such feelings of relative deprivation. Rydgren (2007, p. 248) states that *"the ethnonationalistically defined, homogeneous community and the virtue of traditional roles stressed*

by the new radical right constitute appealing counterweights for people who do not feel at home in a modernizing society". Because of the fact that populism in general puts an emphasis on a homogeneous community, which is supposedly being deprived by 'the elite' of its rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice, the same relationship that Rydgren, (2007) describes could be applicable to left-wing populist parties. Based on these theoretical notions, it is expected that particularly lower educated people are more likely to face relative economic deprivation, which could explain why they are more likely to vote for populist parties. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: (H6a) Lower educated people are more likely to face relative deprivation than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H6b) is explained by the positive effect of relative deprivation on the likelihood to vote for the PVV and (H6c) the likelihood to vote for the SP.

2.9 Euroscepticism

In search for other mediating factors, the definition of left-wing populism given by Zaslove, (2008), could give some insight in this matter. According to Zaslove, (2008), one of the themes that left-wing populist parties put an emphasis on is anti-globalization. In West-European politics, Euroscepticism could be regarded as a part of this theme. In their researches, Lubbers and Scheepers, (2007) and Hakhverdian et al, (2013) found that lower educated people tend to be more Eurosceptic than their higher educated counterparts. Lubbers and Scheepers, (2007) argue that Euroscepticism is more predominantly present among lower educated people because they attach more value to national traditions, are more strongly opposed to immigrants from European countries and perceive these immigrants as a stronger threat than their higher educated counterparts. Moreover, Hakhverdian et al, (2013) found that this negative relation between education and Euroscepticism has become stronger throughout the years as the process of European unification has progressed. Just like the PVV, which is a proponent of The Netherlands stepping out of the EU, the SP also exhibits a certain degree of Euroscepticism, pleading for less power for the European Commission in order to give more legislative capacity back to the Dutch national government (SP, 2017). Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: (H7a) Lower educated people are more likely to be Eurosceptic than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H7b) is explained by the positive effect of Euroscepticism on the likelihood to vote for the PVV and (H7c) the likelihood to vote for the SP.

2.10 Income equality

Another important theme that left-wing populism puts its emphasis on, according to Zaslove, (2008) is anti-capitalism. In short, anti-capitalism encompasses those who wish to replace

capitalism with a moneyless society or with another type of economic system. One of these alternative systems is socialism, which advocates *“public or direct worker ownership and administration of the means of production and allocation of resources, and a society characterized by equal access to resources for all individuals, with an egalitarian method of compensation”* (Newman, 2005). Thus, in general, socialism advocates the equal distribution of wealth among the citizens of a country and is a strong proponent of the social welfare state. On the contrary, the PVV pleads for “lower income taxes” in The Netherlands, which would, in all probability, increase the differences in income throughout the country. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been constructed: *(H8a) Lower educated people are more likely to want income equality than higher educated people. And the relationship between having a lower education and voting PVV and SP, (H8b) cannot be explained by the effect of income equality on the likelihood to vote for the PVV but is explained by the positive effect of income equality on the likelihood to vote for the SP.*

Based on the theory mentioned above, two schematic representations have been constructed. These schemes depict the (expected) relations between the independent, mediating and dependent variables for both the PVV and SP. A + indicates a positive mediating relation, a - indicates a negative mediating relation and a O indicates no mediating relation. The independent variable ‘Lower education’ will be compared to its counterpart ‘Higher education’.

Figure 1: Schematic representation with voting for the PVV as the dependent variable.





Figure 2: Schematic representation with voting for the SP as the dependent variable.



3. Data and Operationalization

3.1 Introduction to Data and Operationalization

This research uses empirical evidence in the form of quantitative data to analyze possible relations between multiple factors. Therefore, this study takes on the form of an empirical research design with an explanatory sub-design. Quantitative data is drawn from the Religion in Dutch Society 2011-2012 (SOCON) survey. SOCON 2011-2012 consists of 368 variables across 994 (N) Dutch citizens. The analyzed respondents for a possible relation consist of adult individuals (18+) who have the right to vote in the Netherlands. This includes immigrants who are eligible to vote. It can be argued that the inclusion of immigrants could lead to spurious results when testing the relationship between educational attainment and the PVV, but because of the fact that anti-Muslim attitudes and perceptions of ethnic threat are included as mediating variables, this threat is accounted for. For a consistent interpretation of the results, the

independent, dependent and mediating variables are operationalized similar to Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016). Missing values are removed by listwise deletion. Missing values for the variables are: educational attainment: 4, voting behavior: 157, authoritarian attitudes: 24, perceptions of ethnic threat: 148, anti-Muslim attitudes: 153, political trust: 107, relative deprivation: 6, Euroscepticism: 147 and income equality: 35. After listwise deletion, the new sample size is 587 (N).

3.2 Dependent variable: Voting behavior

To measure voting behavior, respondents are asked which party they would vote for if the Dutch parliamentary elections were held today. In this survey item, the answer categories consist of the ten largest political parties represented in the Dutch parliament as well as the option for 'another party'. For this research, their responses are categorized into two separate variables, each having two nominal values with 0 meaning voting for another party, 1 meaning voting for either the PVV or SP. Because of the fact that only people who actually casted out a vote are relevant in this thesis, non-voters are excluded from this variable. The total amount of respondents who actually casted out a vote for a party is 837. The non-voters consist of 58 respondents. Out of the 587 respondents (after listwise deletion), 49 people have indicated that they would vote for the PVV and 84 people would vote for the SP. Cases with 'do not vote', 'I don't know' and 'no answer' are treated as cases with missing values (157 cases).

3.3 Independent variable: Educational attainment

To measure educational attainment, respondents are asked about the highest level of education they have completed after elementary school. These educational levels range from 'no completed school' to 'phd or doctorate', consisting of thirteen levels in total. Consequently, these thirteen levels, based on their descriptions, have been categorized into three dummified levels of educational attainment: primary or lower secondary education are coded as 'Lower education', upper or post-secondary and non-tertiary education are coded as 'Middle education' and first or second stage of tertiary education are coded as 'Higher education'. Because the hypotheses give predictions about the odds of lower educated people relative to higher educated people, the latter group is used as reference category. Cases with 'other', 'no answer' and 'system missing' are treated as cases with missing values (4 cases).

3.3 Mediating variables:

Authoritarian attitudes

Authoritarian attitudes of the respondents are measured by using the following Likert-scale item: *"What we need are less laws and less institutions, and more courageous, indefatigable, and devoted*

leaders, in whom the people can put their faith". Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that a respondent completely agrees with the statement and 5 meaning that a respondent completely disagrees with the statement. For the sake of a straightforward interpretation, this item is recoded the other way around. Therefore, the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less authoritarian this person is considered to be. Cases with 'never thought about' are treated as cases with missing values (24 cases).

Perceived ethnic threat

Perceived ethnic threat among the respondents is measured by a set of seven Likert-scale items including: *"Regarding the distribution of houses, people from ethnic minorities get their turn before Dutch people do"*, *"Education for children from ethnic minorities is at the expense of Dutch children"*, *"The day will come that Dutch people will be forced to give jobs to people from ethnic minorities"*, *"I sometimes worry that my neighbourhood will decline due to the arrival of ethnic minorities"*, *"Due to the presence of ethnic minorities criminality in the Netherlands has increased"* and *"The coming of ethnic minorities to the Netherlands is a threat to our own culture"*. Together, these items form one dimension. Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that a respondent completely agrees with a statement and 5 meaning that a respondent completely disagrees with a statement. For the sake of a straightforward interpretation, these seven items are recoded the other way around. Therefore, the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less ethnic threat this person is considered to perceive. The mean score is calculated for respondents with valid answers on at least four items. The Cronbach's alpha, which measures the internal consistency of items, for these items is .84. Cases with 'never thought about' and 'system missing' are treated as cases with missing values (148 cases).

Anti-Muslim attitudes

To measure anti-Muslim attitudes among the respondents, a set of five Likert-scale items is used. This set includes the following items: *"Muslims easily resort to violence to solve their problems"*, *"Muslim husbands dominate their wives"*, *"Muslims raise their children in an authoritarian way"*, *"Muslims lock themselves out of Dutch society"* and *"Most Muslims have no respect for homosexuals"*. Together, these items form one dimension. Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that a respondent completely agrees with a statement and 5 meaning that a respondent completely disagrees with a statement. For the sake of a straightforward interpretation, these five items are recoded the other way around. Therefore, the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less this person is considered to have anti-Muslim attitudes. The mean score is calculated for respondents with valid answers on at least

three items giving a Cronbach's alpha of .79. Cases with 'never thought about' and 'system missing' are treated as cases with missing values (153 cases).

Political trust

Political trust is measured by asking respondents to which extent they generally trust the political parties in The Netherlands. This is asked in the following survey item: *"Please tell me on a score from 0-10 how much you trust the Dutch parliament."* Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10 with 0 meaning that a person has no trust in the Dutch parliament at all and 10 meaning that a person has complete trust in the Dutch parliament. In other words: the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less trust this person has in Dutch parliament. Cases with 'No answer' are treated as cases with missing values (107 cases).

Relative deprivation

Relative deprivation can be split up in two different dimensions: 'present relative deprivation' and 'future economic decline'. To measure present relative deprivation, three items are measured: *"I am very unsatisfied with my present income"*, *"I am very unsatisfied with my present social standing"* and *"I am having difficulties buying necessary things from my salary"*. Future economic decline is measured by the following three items: *"I sometimes am afraid that my financial prospects will decline the next years"*, *"I think I will be able to afford less coming years"* and *"I think I will have to adjust my present lifestyle in coming years"*. Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that a respondent completely agrees with a statement and 5 meaning that a respondent completely disagrees with a statement. For the sake of a straightforward interpretation, these items are recoded the other way around. Therefore, the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less feelings of relative deprivation this person has. For each dimension, the mean score is calculated for respondents with valid answers on at least two items, giving a Cronbach's alpha of .64 for present relative deprivation and a Cronbach's alpha of .82 for future relative deprivation. Consequently, the indicator for this variable consists of the mean score of both dimensions. Cases with 'Not applicable' are treated as cases with missing values (6 cases).

Euroscepticism

In SOCON 2011-2012, respondents are asked what their stance is on several statements concerning the European Union. To measure Euroscepticism, three Likert scale items were used: *"The European Union is a threat to Dutch culture"*, *"The Netherlands should resign its membership from the European Union"* and *"The Netherlands benefits strongly from its membership from the European Union"*. Together, these items form one dimension. Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 meaning that a respondent completely

agrees with a statement and 5 meaning that a respondent completely disagrees with a statement. For the sake of a straightforward interpretation, the first two mentioned items are recoded the other way around. Therefore, the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the less Eurosceptic this person is considered to be. The mean score is calculated for respondents with valid answers on at least two items giving a Cronbach's alpha of .77. Cases with 'never thought about' and 'no answer' are treated as cases with missing values (147 cases).

Income equality

Attitudes towards income equality are measured by asking respondents what, in their opinion should happen to the income differences in The Netherlands. This is measured by using the following Likert-scale item: *"Would you like the differences between the high and low incomes to become greater or smaller? Or would you like them to remain the same?"* Respondents are asked to put themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 3 with 1 meaning that income differences in The Netherlands should become bigger and 3 meaning that income differences in The Netherlands should become smaller. In other words: the lower the position of a respondent in this item, the smaller this person wants the income differences in The Netherlands to be. Cases with 'no answer' and 'do not know' are treated as cases with missing values (35 cases).

3.9 Control variables

To exclude other mediating factors, several known predictors of voting behavior are controlled. The gender variable is included with females as reference category. Age measured in years will also be included as control variable. To measure church attendance, the frequency of respondents' church attendance is assessed, distinguishing low attendance: 'Never or hardly ever' (reference category), medium attendance: 'Less than once a month' and high attendance: 'Once a month or more'. Marital status is included with the categories 'not married', 'married' and 'divorced/widowed' (reference category).

Table 1: Frequencies for the categorical variables.

(N=587)	Frequencies
Educational attainment	587
Lower education	144
Middle education	226
Higher education	217
Voting behavior	587
Voting for the PVV	50
Voting for the SP	85

Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the mediating variables.

(N=587)	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum range	Maximum range
Authoritarian attitudes	3.45	1.14	1	5
Perceived ethnic threat	2.78	.74	1	5
Anti-Muslim attitudes	3.43	.68	1	5
Political trust	5.69	1.69	0	10
Relative deprivation	2.66	.75	1	5
Euroscepticism	2.50	.79	1	5
Income equality	2.70	.48	1	3

Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

4. Results

4.1 Introduction to Results

To measure the correlations between lower education and the (possible) mediating variables, a linear regression analysis has been conducted in Table 4. To measure the mediating strength of the intermediate variables on voting behavior, a logistic regression analysis has been conducted (Tables 5 & 6). Logistic regression is created to adequately measure mediating strengths on dependent variables which have a dichotomous nature, meaning that they only contain two categories (in this case either 'yes' or 'no' for voting for a specific party). The interpretation of a logistic regression analysis differs from the interpretation of a linear regression analysis. When composing a logistic regression analysis in SPSS, the output gives several statistics which depict the (mediating) strength of the chosen variables. The first column shows the B-coefficient, which depicts the expected effects on the log odds (the natural logarithm of the odds ratio to either vote or not on a certain party). The larger the number of the B-coefficient, the larger the effect on the log odds. Like linear regression, a positive effect is depicted by a positive number and a negative effect is depicted by a negative number. If, for example a certain variable has a B-coefficient of .044, that would mean that the chance of voting for a certain party would increase by .044 for every unit that variable increases. Because scientific researchers usually prefer to talk in terms of probability ratio's than in terms of log odds, a closer look is given to another column which depicts the oddsratio ($\text{Exp}(B)$). The oddsratio consists of e to the power of the corresponding B-coefficient. For a B-coefficient of .044, an oddsratio of ($e^{.044} =$) 1.045 would be given. In other words: with every unit that this variable would increase, the odds to vote for a certain party would increase by $((1.045 - 1) \times 100\% =)$ 4,5% (Sieben & Linssen, 2009). In the second column of a model, the standard error is shown. The standard error depicts the degree of spread in the sample data. When you add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, you obtain the 95% confidence interval range. When the B-coefficient of lower education in the first model of an analysis falls outside this interval range, the corresponding variable can be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. Before composing the multivariate regression analyses, a

bivariate analysis will be conducted in Table 3 to measure the correlations between the mediating variables. This is done to exclude the possibility of multicollinearity and to analyze the relations between the mediators.

Table 3: Bivariate correlation analysis for the mediators.

(N=587)	Income Equality	Authoritarian Attitudes	Political Trust	Euroscepticism	Perceived Ethnic Threat	Anti-Muslim Attitudes	Relative Deprivation
Income Equality	1						
Authoritarian Attitudes	.07	1					
Political Trust	-.15**	-.12**	1				
Euroscepticism	.03	.22**	-.36**	1			
Perceived Ethnic Threat	-.02	.33**	-.11**	.41**	1		
Anti-Muslim Attitudes	-.00	.31**	-.12**	.31**	.62**	1	
Relative Deprivation	.21**	-.17**	.29**	-.22**	-.26**	-.24**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). - Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

4.2 Bivariate correlation analysis

Table 3 depicts the correlations between the mediators. These correlations are measured with the Pearson correlation coefficient, also known as Pearson's *r*. The Pearson's *r* gives a value between -1 and 1, where 1 means a total positive linear correlation, 0 means no linear correlation and -1 means a total negative linear correlation. The two variables with the highest bivariate correlation are anti-Muslim attitudes and perceived ethnic threat with a Pearson's *r* of .62. This comes as no surprise since both variables are theoretically strongly associated with one another. Moreover, the survey items of which they consist show many similarities. Because of the fact that the highest correlation in this test is .62, it can be concluded that multicollinearity does not form a threat for the results.

Table 4: Linear regression analysis of the influence of educational attainment on the mediators.²

(N=587)	Authoritarian Attitudes		Perceived Ethnic Threat		Anti-Muslim Attitudes		Political Trust		Relative Deprivation		Euroscepticism		Income Equality	
	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.
Lower Education	.74***	.12	.56***	.08	.55***	.07	-1.18***	.18	.39***	.08	.75***	.08	.10	.05
Middle Education	.50***	.10	.36***	.07	.27***	.06	-.53***	.15	.23***	.07	.37***	.07	.04*	.05
Higher Education (Ref)														
Constant	2.60***	.24	2.77***	.15	3.25***	.14	6.47***	.35	2.01***	.16	2.38***	.16	2.38***	.10

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 - Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

² All models are controlled for gender, age, church attendance and marital status.

Table 5: Multivariate logistic regression analysis for voting for the PVV.

(N=587)	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model D		Model E		Model F		Model G		Model H		Model I		
	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	
Lower Education	2.29***	.52	2.01***	.53	1.64***	.55	1.72***	.55	2.13***	.54	2.10***	.53	1.91***	.54	2.36***	.53	1.49**	.59	
Middle Education	1.50***	.51	1.32**	.52	1.06**	.54	1.18**	.53	1.41***	.52	1.38***	.52	1.32**	.52	1.53***	.51	.98*	.55	
Higher Education (Ref)																			
Authoritarian Attitudes			.51***	.18														.27	.19
Perceived Ethnic Threat					1.47***	.26												1.09***	.31
Anti-Muslim Attitudes							1.26***	.28										.42	.34
Political Trust									-.11	.09								-.03	.10
Relative Deprivation											.53**	.22						.26	.25
Euroscpticism													.51**	.20				.02	.25
Income Equality															-.30	.33	-.47	.36	
Male	.31	.32	.33	.32	.29	.34	.18	.33	.37	.32	.37	.32	.37	.32	.26	.32	.23	.36	
Age	-.05***	.02	-.05***	.02	-.04**	.02	-.04***	.016	-.05***	.02	-.05***	.02	-.04***	.02	-.05***	.02	-.05***	.02	
Church Att. High	-2.51**	1.03	-2.54	1.03	-2.90***	1.09	-2.59**	1.05	-2.46**	1.03	-2.59**	1.04	-2.51	1.03	-2.49**	1.03	-2.92**	1.13	
Church Att. Medium	-.18	.36	-.22	.36	-.22	.38	-.21	.37	-.16	.36	-.21	.36	-.18	.36	-.20	.36	-.25	.39	
Not Married	.02	.69	-.01	.70	.51	.74	.17	.71	.00	.69	.04	.69	.11	.70	.09	.69	.47	.75	
Married	.18	.57	.08	.58	.29	.60	.13	.59	.20	.57	.30	.58	.2	.58	.22	.58	.26	.62	
Constant	-1.72	1.08	-3.14**	1.22	-6.29***	1.43	-6.08***	1.49	-1.10	1.19	-3.01**	1.22	-3.12**	1.23	-.98	1.34	-6.63***	2.12	
Nagelkerke pseudo R2	.19		.23		.33		.28		.20		.21		.22		.21		.33		

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 - Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

Table 6: Multivariate logistic regression analysis for voting for the SP.

(N=587)	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model D		Model E		Model F		Model G		Model H		Model I		
	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	B-coefficient	s.e.	
Lower Education	.71**	.32	.71**	.33	.71**	.33	.67**	.33	.28	.34	.53	.33	.35	.34	.67**	.32	.15	.36	
Middle Education	.40	.30	.40	.31	.40	.31	.38	.31	.22	.31	.31	.31	.23	.31	.39	.31	.20	.33	
Higher Education (Ref)																			
Authoritarian Attitudes			.00	.11														-.07	.12
Perceived Ethnic Threat					.00	.17												-.19	.23
Anti-Muslim Attitudes							.07	.19										.00	.25
Political Trust									-.36***	.07								-.28***	.08
Relative Deprivation											.51***	.17						.25	.19
Euroscpticism													.50***	.16				.38**	.18
Income Equality															.92***	.33	.80**	.34	
Male	-.51**	.26	-.51**	.26	-.51**	.26	-.52**	.26	-.38	.26	-.50*	.26	-.43*	.26	-.39	.26	-.24	.27	
Age	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.04***	.01	.03***	.01	.04***	.01	
Church Att. High	-.52	.34	-.52	.34	-.52	.34	-.52	.34	-.32	.35	-.55	.35	-.48	.35	-.56	.34	-.35	.36	
Church Att. Medium	-.40	.30	-.40	.30	-.40	.30	-.41	.30	-.34	.31	-.47	.30	-.39	.30	-.40	.30	-.34	.31	
Not Married	.23	.44	.23	.44	.23	.44	.23	.44	.16	.46	.21	.45	.28	.45	.13	.45	.11	.47	
Married	-.20	.35	-.20	.35	-.20	.35	-.20	.35	-.17	.36	-.11	.35	-.18	.35	-.30	.35	-.17	.37	
Constant	-3.47***	.75	-3.47***	.80	-3.47***	.88	-3.68***	.96	-1.60*	.85	-4.79***	.89	-4.85***	.89	-5.88***	1.18	-5.26***	1.56	
Nagelkerke pseudo R2	.08		.08		.08		.08		.14		.10		.10		.10		.18		

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 - Source: SOCON 2011-2012; Own calculations

4.3 Analysis

This thesis started with a general hypothesis about the possible relationship between educational attainment and voting for a left-wing populist party, i.e. the SP. The results in Model A of the corresponding logistic regression analysis (Table 6) show that there is a significant positive relationship between the lower educated group of respondents and voting for the SP, giving a B-coefficient of .71. This translates to an oddsratio ($\text{Exp}(B)$) of 2.03. When we convert this oddsratio into percentages, we can see that lower educated people, within this sample, are 103% more likely to vote for the SP than their higher educated counterparts. This is in line with the expectation depicted in H1 and therefore confirms this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis discusses the possible mediating influence of authoritarian attitudes on this relationship. The results in the first model of the linear regression analysis (Table 4) show a significant positive relation between lower education and authoritarian attitudes ($B = .74$), which means that lower educated people are indeed more in favor of authoritarian attitudes than their higher educated counterparts, confirming H2a. When we analyze Models B of both logistic regression analyses, we can see that having authoritarian attitudes is significantly and positively related to voting for the PVV with a B-coefficient of .51, but unrelated with voting for the SP, giving a B-coefficient of .00 with no significance. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between .95 and 3.07 for the PVV and .05 - 1.37 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, authoritarian attitudes cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectations made in H2b and H2c.

The third hypothesis discusses perceived ethnic threat as a possible mediator in this relationship. The results in the second model of the linear regression analysis show a significant positive relation between lower education and perceived ethnic threat ($B = .56$), which means that lower educated people indeed perceive more ethnic threat than higher educated people, confirming H3a. When we analyze Models C of both logistic regression analyses, it becomes clear that perceived ethnic threat is significant and positively related to voting for the PVV with a B-coefficient of 1.47, but unrelated with voting for the SP, giving a B-coefficient of .00 with no significance. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between .54 - 2.74 for the PVV and .05 - 1.37 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, perceived ethnic threat cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectation made in H3b but confirms the one made in H3c.

The fourth hypothesis discusses the attitudinal factor anti-Muslim attitudes. The results in the third model of the linear regression analysis show a significant positive relation between lower education and anti-Muslim attitudes ($B = .55$), which means that lower educated people indeed hold more anti-Muslim attitudes than their higher educated counterparts, confirming H4a. When we analyze Models D of both logistic regression analyses, it becomes clear that perceived ethnic threat is significant and positively related to voting for the PVV with a B-coefficient of 1.26, but unrelated with voting for the SP, giving a B-coefficient of .07 with no significance. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between .62 - 2.82 for the PVV and .01 - 1.33 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, anti-Muslim attitudes cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectation made in H4b but confirms the one made in H4c.

Hypothesis 5 discusses political trust as a possible mediator in this relationship. The results in the fourth model of the linear regression analysis show a significant negative relation between lower education and political trust ($B = -1.18$), which means that lower educated people indeed hold less political trust than higher educated people, confirming H5a. When we analyze Models E of both logistic regression analyses, we can see that political trust is unrelated with voting for the PVV with a B-coefficient of -.11 with no significance, but significant and negatively related with voting for the SP, giving a B-coefficient of -.36. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between 1.05 - 3.21 for the PVV and -.40 - .96 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, political trust cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectations made in H5b and H5c.

The sixth hypothesis discusses relative deprivation as a mediator in this relationship. The results in the fifth model of the linear regression analysis show a significant positive relation between lower education and relative deprivation ($B = .39$), which means that lower educated people are indeed more likely to hold feelings of relative deprivation than higher educated people, confirming H6a. When we analyze Models F of both logistic regression analyses, we can see that relative deprivation is significant and positively related to voting for the PVV and the SP giving B-coefficients of respectively .53 and .51. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between 1.04 - 3.16 for the PVV and -.13 - 1.19 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, relative deprivation cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectations made in H6b and H6c.

Hypothesis 7 discusses the possible mediating influence of Euroscepticism on this relationship. The results in the sixth model of the linear regression analysis show a significant positive relation between lower education and authoritarian attitudes ($B = .75$), which means that lower educated people are indeed more likely to be Eurosceptic than higher educated people, confirming H7a. When we analyze Models G of both logistic regression analyses, it becomes clear that Euroscepticism is significant and positively related to voting for the PVV and the SP giving B-coefficients of respectively .51 and .50. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between 0.83 - 2.99 for the PVV and -0.33 - 1.03 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, Euroscepticism cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding rejects the expectations made in H7b and H7c.

The eighth and last hypothesis discusses income equality as an attitudinal factor. The results in the seventh model of the linear regression analysis show no significant relation between lower education and income equality ($B = .10$), which means that lower educated people are not more likely to want income equality than higher educated people, rejecting H8a. When we analyze Models H of both logistic regression analyses, we can see that income equality is negatively related to voting for the PVV, giving a B-coefficient of -.30 with no significance, but is significant and positively related to voting for the SP giving B-coefficient of .92. When we add and subtract the standard error twice from its corresponding B-coefficient, we get a 95% confidence interval range between 1.30 - 3.42 for the PVV and .03 - 1.31 for the SP. Because both B-coefficients of lower education in Models A fall within these ranges, Euroscepticism cannot be regarded as a mediator for this relationship. This finding confirms the expectation made in H8b but rejects the one made in H8c.

When we look at Models I in both logistic regression analyses, we can see which variables maintain their significance when all variables are included in the model. For the PVV, only perceived ethnic threat maintains its significance with a B-coefficient of 1.09. It is also worth mentioning that lower education still has a significant correlation with voting for the PVV in this model ($B = 1.49$). For the SP, the variables that maintain their significance are political trust, Euroscepticism and income equality with B-coefficients of respectively -.28, .38 and .80. Lower education loses its significant relationship with voting for the SP in this model ($B = .15$).

5. Conclusions and Discussion

One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that lower educated people are more susceptible for populist political doctrines than their higher educated counterparts. One of the main claims that populist parties make is that the 'virtuous and homogeneous people' are considered to be inferior to the 'elites and dangerous 'others'' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). This thesis theorizes that this feeling of inferiority by the public originates and is a consequence of being low educated. The results of this research show that lower educated people are indeed more likely to vote for left- and right-wing populist parties compared to their higher educated counterparts. This finding could support Lipset's (1960) hypotheses that lower educated people are (among other things) more susceptible for extremist political doctrines (suggesting easy and quick solutions to complex problems) compared to their higher educated counterparts. This thesis further aims to examine this relation in depth in order to find out which attitudinal factors mediate this relationship across the left-right political spectrum.

The results of the logistic regression analyses indicate that the three mechanisms in the research of Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016), that turned out to have a significant effect on the relationship between educational attainment and right-wing populist voting (PVV), show no significance for left-wing populist voting (SP). The fact that anti-Muslim attitudes and perceived ethnic threat show no mediating significance for voting for the SP, comes as no huge surprise since these attitudinal factors are more predominantly targeted by right-wing populist parties compared to their left-wing counterparts. However, in contrast to the expectations made in this research, authoritarian attitudes also show no mediating significance on the left-wing political spectrum. This finding shows that authoritarian leaders are of less importance for lower educated left-wing populist voters in comparison to their right-wing counterparts. Moreover, despite the fact that these three mechanisms are significant for voting for the PVV, their influence on the B-coefficient of lower education is not strong enough to be regarded as a mediator for this relationship in this sample. This phenomenon is present with all tested intermediate variables across all models.

This is an interesting finding because in the research of Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016), perceived ethnic threat is regarded as a mediator for this relationship. Using bootstrapping, they found that: *"only the indirect effect of educational attainment via perceptions of ethnic threat on radical right voting turned out to be significant"* (Savelkoul and Scheepers, 2016, p. 561). These results differ from mine as I did not use bootstrapping to multiply the sample size as a representation for the entire population. It is however worth mentioning that, in their research, the standard error for educational attainment (.72), given in the corresponding model for

perceived ethnic threat (Model 6, Table 2), is approximately ten times higher than the standard error for educational attainment in all other models of the regression analysis. It could be the case that this is due to a typing error of the authors. Nonetheless, it is to this date unclear for me how and why perceived ethnic threat is regarded by Savelkoul and Scheepers, (2016) as a mediator for this relationship as, according to my calculations, the maximum standard error for educational attainment in this model cannot exceed (-).042 for perceived ethnic threat to be considered as a mediator. Bootstrapping in their research could have possibly produced a B-coefficient and standard error which did meet the statistical standards for regarding this variable as a mediator.³

4

The results further indicate that political trust, despite not being a mediator, is only significant on the left-wing populist political spectrum (SP). This is in contradiction with the expectations made in the theory, which proposed that this variable would have a negative mediating effect for both populist political parties. This finding could suggest that SP voters possibly have higher expectations of Dutch parliament than PVV voters and therefore possess lower levels of political trust than their right-wing counterparts. Relative deprivation is found to be significant for left- as well as right-wing populist voting. Its significant relationship with the lower educated group of respondents shows that this feeling of deprivation could indeed originate and be a consequence of being low educated. This comes as no surprise since lower educated people generally have a lower socio-economic status than their higher educated counterparts. They can however, just like all other variables, not be regarded as a mediator for this relationship.

Euroscepticism has also turned out to be significant for left- and right-wing populist voting. The results show that lower educated people are more likely to be Eurosceptical than their higher educated counterparts and that Euroscepticism, despite not being a mediator, is significantly related with voting for the PVV and SP. This finding could support the argument of Lubbers and Scheepers, (2007) that lower educated people attach more value to national traditions, are more strongly opposed to immigrants from European countries and perceive these immigrants as a stronger threat than their higher educated counterparts, therefore leading to higher levels of Euroscepticism. The results lastly indicate that income equality has no significant relation with the lower educated group of respondents and can therefore (among other things) not be regarded as a mediating variable in the relationship between lower education and left-wing populist voting, despite the fact that it is individually significantly related to left-wing populist voting. This finding comes somewhat as a surprise as one could reasonably assume that lower

³ In section 4.1, I give an elaboration on which conditions I used to measure whether or not a variable can be considered a mediator.

⁴ I contacted dr. Savelkoul and prof. dr. Scheepers about my findings and they notified me that they would look into their data and give me clarification on this matter in the near future.

educated people, generally having a lower socio-economic status than their higher educated counterparts, would be in favor of more wealth distribution in their country. The finding does show that wanting more income equality is more present among SP voters in comparison to their right-wing counterparts. This is also in line with the expectations of this thesis as the distribution of wealth is much more present in the socialistic approach of the SP compared to its right-wing counterpart, the PVV.

Coming back to the main research question, it can be concluded that, for this sample, there are no attitudinal factors which mediate the relationship between educational attainment and populist voting in The Netherlands. The factors that maintain their significance in the final model of the logistic regression analysis for left-wing populist voting are political trust and Euroscepticism. These factors differ vastly from right-wing populism, as the only variable which maintains its significance on this side of the political spectrum is perceived ethnic threat. These results show that there is a considerable difference between the attitudinal factors as to which left- and right-wing populist parties appeal. Although these factors cannot strictly be regarded as mediators, their significance shows that they do influence the relationship between educational attainment and populist voting to a certain degree. This finding underlines the importance for future researchers to break down populism across the left-right political spectrum when researching possible mediators for populist voting behavior.

It is worth mentioning that occupational status has been excluded as a control variable as this variable is entwined with educational attainment, therefore depriving educational attainment of its statistical significance. It is also noteworthy that in all models of the logistic regression analyses, the control variable 'age' has a significant negative correlation with voting for the PVV and a significant positive correlation with voting for the SP. This finding could serve as a recommendation for further research. Exploring and analyzing which factors could cause younger people to be more likely to vote for the PVV and older people to be more likely to vote for the SP, could form an interesting research in this context. Lastly, the fact that this survey is only conducted in The Netherlands among Dutch citizens could pose a threat to the external validity of the conclusions. Because of the uniqueness of the political landscape of The Netherlands, containing both left- and right-wing populist parties in parliament, generalization of the conclusions to other countries could pose to be difficult. To broaden the stretch of these results, further research should be conducted with additional attitudinal factors which could possibly serve as mediators for the relationship between lower education and left-right populist voting.

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7. Appendix

Appendix 1: Table 7

Table 7: Overview of which items the variables consist of.

Educational attainment
V0040 Highest education completed after elementary school
Voting behavior
V0080 Political vote today
Authoritarian attitudes
V0627 Country needs strong leaders
Perceived ethnic threat
V0639 Minorities get turn before Dutch people (Recoded)
V0640 Education minorities at expense Dutch children (Recoded)
V0642 Dutch people fired because of minorities (Recoded)
V2152 Minorities are threat to our own culture (Recoded)
V3089 Worries: Decline of neighbourhood due to ethnic minorities (Recoded)
V6031 Presence minorities increases criminality Netherlands (Recoded)
V6032 Presence minorities increases criminality neighbourhood (Recoded)
Anti-Muslim attitudes
V2140 Muslims easily resort to violence (Recoded)
V5104 Muslim husbands dominate their wives (Recoded)
V5105 Muslims raise their children in authoritarian way (Recoded)
V5106 Muslims lock themselves out of Dutch society (Recoded)
V5108 Most Muslims have no respect for homosexuals (Recoded)
Political trust
V5151 Please tell me on a score from 0-10 how much you trust the Dutch parliament
Relative deprivation
<u>Present relative deprivation</u>
V3219 I am very unsatisfied with my present income (Recoded)
V3220 I am very unsatisfied with my present social standing (Recoded)
V3222 I am having difficulties buying necessary things from my salary (Recoded)
<u>Future relative deprivation</u>
V3093 I sometimes am afraid that my financial prospects will decline the next years (Recoded)
V3214 I think I will be able to afford less coming years (Recoded)
V3216 I think I will have to adjust my present lifestyle in coming years (Recoded)
Eurocepticism
V5141 Netherlands should cancel EU membership (Recoded)
V5143 Netherlands have much to gain from EU membership
V5144 EU posts a threat against the Dutch culture (Recoded)
Income equality
V0220 Income differences should change

Source: DANS Data Guide 11

Appendix 2: SPSS Syntax

* Encoding: UTF-8.

*** Creating dummies for Voting Behavior ***

```
RECODE V0080 (3=1) (12=SYSMIS) (13=SYSMIS) (14=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO VoteForPVV.  
EXECUTE.
```

```
VALUE LABELS VoteForPvv 1 "PVV" 0 "Another Party".
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
RECODE V0080 (5=1) (12=SYSMIS) (13=SYSMIS) (14=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO VoteForSP.
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
VALUE LABELS VoteForssp 1 "SP" 0 "Another Party".
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

*** Creating dummies for Educational Attainment ***

```
RECODE V0040 (1 thru 3=1) (4 thru 12=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO LowerEducation.
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
RECODE V0040 (4 thru 8=1) (1 thru 3=0) (9 thru 12=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO MiddleEducation.
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
RECODE V0040 (9 thru 12=1) (1 thru 8=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO HigherEducation.
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

*** Recoding the other way around for Authoritarian Attitudes ***

```
RECODE V0627 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (6=SYSMIS).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
RENAME VARIABLES (V0627=AuthoritarianAttitudes).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

*** Recoding the other way around for Euroscepticism ***

```
RECODE V5141 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
RECODE V5144 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

*** Computing mean for at least 2 items for Euroscepticism ***

```
COMPUTE MeanEuroscepticism = MEAN.2(V5141,V5143,V5144).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

*** Recoding the other way around for Perceived Ethnic Threat ***

RECODE V0639 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V0640 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V0642 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V2152 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V3089 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V6031 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V6032 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

*** Computing mean for at least 4 items for Perceived Ethnic Threat ***

COMPUTE MeanPerceivedEthnicThreat =
MEAN.4(V6031,V0639,V0640,V0642,V6032,V2152,V3089).

EXECUTE.

*** Recoding the other way around for Anti-Muslim Attitudes ***

RECODE V2140 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V5104 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V5105 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V5106 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

RECODE V5108 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

*** Computing mean for at least 3 items for Anti-Muslim Attitudes ***

COMPUTE MeanAntiMuslimAttitudes = MEAN.3(V2140,V5104,V5105,V5106,V5108).

EXECUTE.

*** Recoding for Income Equality ***

```

RECODE V0220 (8=SYSMIS) (9=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
*** Renaming to Income Equality ***
RENAME VARIABLES (V0220=IncomeEquality).
EXECUTE.
*** Renaming to Political Trust ***
RENAME VARIABLES (V5151=PoliticalTrust).
EXECUTE.
*** Recoding the other way around for Relative Deprivation ***
RECODE V3219 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE V3220 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE V3222 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE V3093 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE V3214 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
RECODE V3216 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.
*** Computing Relative Deprivation ***
COMPUTE MeanPresentRelativeDeprivation = MEAN.2(V3219,V3220,V3222).
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE MeanFutureRelativeDeprivation = MEAN.2(V3093,V3214,V3216).
EXECUTE.
COMPUTE RelativeDeprivation =
MEAN.(MeanPresentRelativeDeprivation,MeanFutureRelativeDeprivation).
*** Creating dummies for control variable Gender ***
RECODE V0013 (1=1) (2=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Male.
EXECUTE.
VALUE LABELS Male 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
RECODE V0013 (2=1) (1=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Female.

```

```

EXECUTE.
VALUE LABELS Female 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
*** Creating control variable age ***
COMPUTE Age=2012 - V0014.
EXECUTE.
*** Creating dummies for control variable Religiosity ***
RECODE V0143 (1=1) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO ReligiosityHigh.
EXECUTE.
VARIABLE LABELS ReligiosityHigh "Once a month or more".
VALUE LABELS ReligiosityHigh 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
RECODE V0143 (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO ReligiosityMedium.
EXECUTE.
VARIABLE LABELS ReligiosityMedium "Less than once a month".
VALUE LABELS ReligiosityMedium 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
RECODE V0143 (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO ReligiosityLow.
EXECUTE.
VARIABLE LABELS ReligiosityLow "Never or hardly ever".
VALUE LABELS ReligiosityLow 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
*** Creating dummies for control variable Marital Status ***
RECODE V0037 (1=1) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO NotMarried.
EXECUTE.
VALUE LABELS NotMarried 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
RECODE V0037 (1=0) (2=1) (3=0) (4=1) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Married.
EXECUTE.
VALUE LABELS Married 1 "Yes" 0 "No".
EXECUTE.
RECODE V0037 (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO DivorcedWidowed.
EXECUTE.

```

VALUE LABELS DivorcedWidowed 1 "Yes" 0 "No".

EXECUTE.

*** Creating dummies for control variable Occupational Status ***

RECODE V6090 (0 thru 34=1) (35 thru 99=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO OccupationalStatusLow.

EXECUTE.

VALUE LABELS OccupationalStatusLow 1 "Yes" 0 "No".

EXECUTE.

RECODE V6090 (35 thru 59=1) (0 thru 34=0) (60 thru 99=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO OccupationalStatusMedium.

EXECUTE.

VALUE LABELS OccupationalStatusMedium 1 "Yes" 0 "No".

EXECUTE.

RECODE V6090 (60 thru 99=1) (0 thru 59=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO OccupationalStatusHigh.

EXECUTE.

VALUE LABELS OccupationalStatusHigh 1 "Yes" 0 "No".

EXECUTE.

*** Listwise deletion of missing values ***

SELECT IF not (sysmis(VoteForPVV)) & not (sysmis(VoteForSP)) & not (sysmis(LowerEducation))

& not (sysmis(MiddleEducation)) & not (sysmis(HigherEducation)) & not (sysmis(AuthoritarianAttitudes))

& not (sysmis(MeanEurocepticism)) & not (sysmis(MeanPerceivedEthnicThreat)) & not (sysmis(MeanAntiMuslimAttitudes))

& not (sysmis(IncomeEquality)) & not (sysmis(PoliticalTrust)) & not (sysmis(RelativeDeprivation))

& not (sysmis(Male)) & not (sysmis(Female)) & not (sysmis(ReligiosityHigh)) & not (sysmis(ReligiosityMedium))

& not (sysmis(ReligiosityLow)) & not (sysmis(NotMarried)) & not (sysmis(Married))

& not (sysmis(DivorcedWidowed)) & not (sysmis(Age)) & not (sysmis(OccupationalStatusLow))

& not (sysmis(OccupationalStatusMedium)) & not (sysmis(OccupationalStatusHigh)).

EXECUTE.

*** Calculating frequencies for Educational Attainment ***

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=V0040 LowerEducation MiddleEducation HigherEducation

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

*** Calculating frequencies for Voting Behavior ***

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=V0080 VoteForPVV VoteForSP
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
*** Calculating frequencies for Euroscepticism ***
FREQUENCIES MeanEuroscepticism.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Authoritarian Attitudes ***
FREQUENCIES AuthoritarianAttitudes.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Perceived Ethnic Threat ***
FREQUENCIES MeanPerceivedEthnicThreat.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Anti-Muslim Attitudes ***
FREQUENCIES MeanAntiMuslimAttitudes.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Income Equality ***
FREQUENCIES IncomeEquality.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Political Trust ***
FREQUENCIES PoliticalTrust.
EXECUTE.
*** Calculating frequencies for Relative Deprivation ***
FREQUENCIES RelativeDeprivation.
EXECUTE.
*** Reliability analysis for Euroscepticism ***
RELIABILITY
/VARIABLES=V5141 V5143 V5144
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE
/SUMMARY=TOTAL CORR.
*** Reliability analysis for Perceived Ethnic Threat ***
RELIABILITY
/VARIABLES=V0639 V0640 V0642 V2152 V3089 V6031 V6032

```



```
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE
/SUMMARY=TOTAL CORR.
```

*** Reliability analysis for Anti-Muslim Attitudes ***

RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=V2140 V5104 V5105 V5106 V5108
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE
/SUMMARY=TOTAL CORR.
```

*** Reliability analysis for Present relative deprivation ***

RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=V3219 V3220 V3222
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE
/SUMMARY=TOTAL CORR.
```

*** Reliability analysis for Future relative deprivation ***

RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=V3093 V3214 V3216
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE
/SUMMARY=TOTAL CORR.
```

*** Calculating descriptives for mediating variables ***

```
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=AuthoritarianAttitudes MeanPerceivedEthnicThreat
MeanAntiMuslimAttitudes
```

```
PoliticalTrust RelativeDeprivation MeanEurocepticism IncomeEquality
```

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

*** Checking for bivariate correlations for the mediating variables***

CORRELATIONS

```
/VARIABLES=IncomeEquality AuthoritarianAttitudes PoliticalTrust MeanEurocepticism
MeanPerceivedEthnicThreat MeanAntiMuslimAttitudes RelativeDeprivation
```

/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG

/MISSING=PAIRWISE.