The dualistic system on the Caribbean public entities that are part of the Netherlands in the Dutch Caribbean.

This study examines to what extent the administrative culture and administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba conforms to the situation as intended with the policy theory after the implementation of a dualistic administrative system for local government.

Mark Paalman
Master thesis
Public Administration
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Master thesis Public Administration
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June 2018 University of Twente
Preface

By finishing and defending this thesis I will finally end my time at the University of Twente.

For me, the University of Twente has been a great place to work, learn and be inspired. In general it provided me with a better understanding of deeper and abstracter public administrative concepts, I met lots of interesting people and I will be looking back on this time of my life with fond memories.

The subject of this thesis was the institutional developments of the former Netherlands Antilles Island Territories of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba after their joining of the Netherlands as special public entities and the adoption of the Dutch administrative system.

It is a unique situation, three islands with their own administrative culture becoming part of another country. This makes it interesting for research, is there such a thing as dualism Caribbean style, or is each Caribbean public entity unique in its own right. This research attempts to provide a modest contribution to answer those questions. I would however caution to compare the situation there, too much to the Netherlands. The three islands are unique in their situation, as well as in their policy issues. Judging their institutional situation is strongly dependent on their special context.

My interest in the subject matter came from my own term as a municipal councilmember in Hellendoorn and while this research was ongoing, I served another year as municipal councilmember.

Regardless whether administrative culture and/or practice is happening according to certain policy goals or not, I have great respect to all who are willing to run and serve in public office. It is both a burden and great opportunity to serve the public and I am convinced that all who perform this have the best public interest at heart even though they might disagree on what the public interest actually is. This is what both municipal councilmembers in the Netherlands and the Island councilmembers on the Caribbean Islands have in common.

This thesis was made possible by several people at several key moments, family, friends, too many to name them all. But I would specifically like to extent thanks to mr. Pim Knopper former council clerk in the municipality of Hellendoorn who donated me a comprehensive amount of publications on the implementation of dualism in the Netherlands; Mrs Janny Elhorst and Mr John Morber, who advised me on both content and editing of this thesis; Mrs Olga Boers from BOZ who made me promise to finish it; Mr Carl Buncamper from Saba, who was crucial in establishing the first contact with the Island council members; Mrs Anneke van der Wal who lent me the necessary equipment to conduct the interviews; and drs. Keklik Yücel whom I served as campaign manager and whose campaign message was that one has to finish school to succeed and thus inspired me in the last crucial phase of this thesis.

I would extent special thanks to dr. Pieter Jan Klok and prof. dr. Bas Denters for their incredible patience and sound advice during the development of this thesis.

June 2018

Mark Paalman
Summary

With the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles on 10-10-2010, the three Island Territories of Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius (BES) became part of the Netherlands as ‘special public entities’ and later ‘Caribbean public entities’. This transition also included the adoption of the Dutch dualistic governmental system to replace the Netherlands Antilles system of monism.

The system of monism was also present in the Netherlands before 2001 and was replaced because the system designed by Prime Minister Thorbecke in the 19th century was no longer fitting to the changed circumstances of local government. So as in the Netherlands the dualistic system was intended to adapt local government, strengthen the Island council in its controlling and framework setting role and make the roles between administrative bodies more clear and distinct.

These developments meant an intended change in administrative culture and administrative practice. This study aims to assess if similar changes were made on the Caribbean public entities.

The first chapter of the thesis is to introduce background of the institutional change by going over the original system of Monism and the governmental developments that changed local government and caused four main problems that led to the introduction of the dualistic system in the Netherlands. This chapter is written for readers who are not familiar with the developments leading up to the dualistic system in the Netherlands.

The second chapter is about the administrative developments within the Netherlands Antilles, its administrative features and what led to the BES Island territories becoming Caribbean public entities within the Netherlands. This chapter is written for readers who are familiar with the dualistic system in the Netherlands, but are unfamiliar with the developments on the Netherlands Antilles and the BES Island territories transitioning into Dutch Caribbean Public Entities.

Chapter three describes the theoretical framework, here we look further into the concepts and definitions and theory relating to administrative culture and administrative practice. We look into the policy outcomes of the dualistic system found in the Netherlands. Based on this we introduce our main research question in chapter four: “What are the attitudes and behaviour of Island council members regarding dualism after the implementation of the WolBES and to what extent are they conforming to the intention of the dualistic system?” And subsequent sub questions, which will be answered in chapters seven through twelve.

With chapter five we go over methodology to answer the research questions. We established four factors to focus on: The separation of two administrative bodies, the distinction of roles, the acquisition of new tools and powers and making local island government more transparent to the public.

It was decided to perform a cross-sectional study using a survey. Given the research population was relatively small, we opted to use interview methods to achieve as high a response rate as possible.

We decided to perform T-tests to have a guideline to assess the data. A T-test is a statistical test to see and compare if averages deviate significantly from a certain value. We used this test to compare the found survey values to data from the Netherlands and internally to theoretical averages to see if results lean a certain way. In this chapter we also go over the indicators.

Chapter six is a short chapter about the general response outcome. We had a potential of 34 Island council members in our research population. Of those, 26 (72.2%) were able to partake in the survey, 14 (66.7%) from Bonaire, 7 (66.7%) from Sint Eustatius and 5 (83.3%) from Saba.

73% of the respondents were at least in office for more than 1 year and 42% were more than 5 years in office. In this response group 6 former Island commissioners were included. 4 from Bonaire and 2 from Sint Eustatius.
In chapter seven we will review the mandatory measures of the WolBES to answer the question to what extent they were implemented. Here we find that all mandatory measures were implemented and all appointments were made such as the Island council Clerk and the official to the shared court of audit. It was found that many measures had been delayed, but that perhaps the ambitions were too optimistic with regards to time.

With chapter eight we wanted to answer to what extent Island councilmembers were supportive of the positional separation and other measures that sought to improve the position of the Island council. Here we see that on measures relating to formal positional separation, the Island council Members were strongly supportive, they were more evenly divided on informal positional separation such as Island commissioners no longer attending faction meetings. Measures regarding the strengthening of the Island council were also strongly supported. The Island councilmembers are divided on the measure that the Lt. Governor can overrule the council and make closed door sessions public.

In chapter nine we sought to answer the question to what extent Island councilmember’s views align to their dualistic role of being more controlling and less administrative. Here we find that when presented as a dichotomous choice, the Island council members overall view that the Executive Council should administrate which is as the dualistic policy theory intended. When asked to rate several tasks in importance, it was found that the budget right and the representative role were seen as most important for the Island Council. When comparing the assigned importance between controlling and administrating, we see that the respondents from Bonaire lean more towards controlling and that respondents from Saba and Sint Eustatius do not significantly lean either way.

We also find that on Bonaire the Island councilmembers significantly lean towards dualism fitting well into their administrative culture, while this could not be established on Saba and Sint Eustatius.

Chapter ten answers the question on how Island councilmembers spent their time on council work and how they view the possibilities for control and accountability. Here we saw that respondents on BES overall and Bonaire specifically the Island councilmembers spent more time on their work than in the Netherlands. On Saba and Sint Eustatius this also looks to be the case even though our t-test did not show significance. Of this time spent, the respondents spend most time on their representative role and on BES overall, Bonaire and Saba this was significantly more than found in the Netherlands.

Regarding the controlling role of the Island Council, we found that most Island councilmembers used their right to question extensively and that the number of questions asked had increased, this was found with respondents on BES overall, Bonaire and Sint Eustatius. We also found that the Island councilmembers rated their possibility for control as moderately positive while only the respondents on Bonaire rated the Utilization as being positive, while respondents on Saba and Sint Eustatius viewed this more negatively. On Bonaire the rating found was significantly higher than values found in the Netherlands.

Island councilmembers indicated that Executive Councilmembers were frequently held accountable in Island council sessions but were more divided on them being held accountable in faction meetings. It was in all Caribbean public entities found that the Island councilmembers viewed accountability as having increased.

The eleventh chapter looks into various factors of executive monism to answer the question to what extent there are executive monistic tendencies present. We found that despite the perception that the Island council sets the agenda. The Island councilmembers also view strong binds to coalition agreements, but were divided on how much room to manoeuvre that still leaves.
Overall on BES and Saba we see decision making being done along party lines. But with the Island council members being divided if the Island Council is compliant or critical. Influence of the opposition party is seen as low and the Island council members did not see this changing. Debates were seen as taking place between coalition and opposition with clear political division on the BES entities as a whole. It was also seen that the influence of the Executive Council decreased after the implementation of the WolBES.

In chapter twelve we will review the current administrative practice regarding closed door sessions. The WolBES included some special measures not present in the Dutch Local Government Act to make Island council sessions more transparent. When assessing the data we find that the indicated number of closed door sessions on Saba and Sint Eustatius did not seem to be very different average in the Netherlands, while views on Bonaire were divided. The Island council members on all Caribbean public entities were divided on if the number of closed door sessions increased, stayed the same or declined. On Bonaire and Sint Eustatius the respondents indicated the overall situation had improved after the implementation of the WolBES, while on Saba the Island council members were divided.

In the last chapter we will answer the main research question to what extent are they conforming to the intention of the dualistic system and draw conclusions based on the data presented in the preceding chapters.

We established four factors that determine the extent of dualism. Regarding the separation found that the mandatory dualistic measures were implemented and we conclude that the formal positional separation is generally supported as intended, but that this does not necessarily translate in the intended dualistic practice as there are still indications of executive monism present and there was less support for informal separation.

The dualistic measures intended a redefinition of roles, the representative role was seen as most important and this attitude and practice seems grounded in tradition from before the WolBES. The intended priority of the controlling role was not as commonplace as hoped.

Regarding the acquisition of new tools and powers. We found that the new instruments, tools and powers were welcomed but with room for improvement in their utilization. This might be consistent with what we found with the role of control not yet being fully embraced on all three public entities.

Regarding the local island government becoming more transparent to the public, it was found that the measures of the WolBES seem to have had the intended effect on closed door sessions with the current situation not being out of the ordinary and the respondents viewing the situation as improved. However in the course of this research when performing literature research we found that the publication of documents was not up to the expected standards and should be improved.

Overall we can say that in a formal sense the dualistic system was implemented and supported with regard to formal positions, but that executive monism was still strongly part of the administrative culture and practice and the controlling role should be improved.
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<tr>
<td>Administrating</td>
<td>The term describing a broad spectrum of acts of government, in Dutch: ‘besturen’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Body</td>
<td>Specific administrative body within a Public Entity, such as the Island Council, Executive Council and Lt. Governor (administrative bodies) within the Island Territory (Public Entity) in Dutch: ‘Bestuursorgaan’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Culture</td>
<td>The views and attitudes of actors in an administrative setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Practice</td>
<td>The behaviours and acts of actors in an administrative setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BES Islands/Caribbean Netherlands</td>
<td>The three Caribbean public entities of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba that are part of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>A former Netherlands Antilles Leeward Island Territory in the Caribbean, with about 16,000+ inhabitants. Now as a 'Caribbean public entity' part of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Public Entity</td>
<td>The specific designation of the public entities of the Caribbean Netherlands after the implementation of article 132a of the constitution in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dualism/The dualistic system</td>
<td>The new administrative system introduced with the WolBES to separate Executive and Island council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Caribbean</td>
<td>The Islands of Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten in the Caribbean region that are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Council</td>
<td>Administrative body and BES equivalent of the Dutch Board of Mayor &amp; Aldermen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Monism</td>
<td>The consolidation of power around executive branch of local government with decision making being mostly done within the boundaries of a coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Thorbecke</td>
<td>The informal term for the administrative structure of the Netherlands established by the Constitution, Provincial Governments Act and Local Governments Act introduced by the Dutch statesman Thorbecke between 1848 and 1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Commissioner</td>
<td>BES equivalent of a Dutch Alderman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Council</td>
<td>Administrative body and BES equivalent of the Dutch Municipal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Administration</strong></td>
<td>Joint Administration is when laws and regulations are set by the national 'higher' government but are executed by provincial or municipal 'lower' governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kingdom representative</strong></td>
<td>The Kingdom representative (Rijksvertegenwoordiger) for the public entities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba who acts as a liaison between the Dutch government and the Caribbean Netherlands, has a somewhat similar as a King's Commissioner in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LGA</strong></td>
<td>The Local Governments Act in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lt. Governor</strong></td>
<td>Administrative body and BES equivalent of a Dutch Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M&amp;A</strong></td>
<td>(Board of) Mayor &amp; Aldermen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monism/monistic system</strong></td>
<td>The former local government system where Island commissioners were both part of the Executive Council and the Island council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands Antilles</strong></td>
<td>A former nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands consisting of Aruba (until 1983), Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten until it was dissolved in 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Entity</strong></td>
<td>General label of administrative units in the Netherlands, such as: Rijksoverheid (National Government), Provinces and Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saba</strong></td>
<td>A former Netherlands Antilles Windward Island Territory in the Caribbean, with about 2,000 inhabitants. Now as a 'Caribbean public entity' part of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sint Eustatius</strong></td>
<td>A former Netherlands Antilles Windward Island Territory in the Caribbean, with about 3,500+ inhabitants. Now as a 'Caribbean public entity' part of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Public Entity</strong></td>
<td>The administrative entities in the Caribbean Netherlands created under the provisions of article 134 of the Constitution of the Netherlands until the implementation of article 132a in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WolBES</strong></td>
<td>Law public entities Bonaire Sint Eustatius and Saba, comparable to the Local Government Act in the Netherlands</td>
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1. Introduction

On the 10th of October 2010 the kingdom of the Netherlands changed with the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles into two new nations and three Islands, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, having been part of the Netherlands Antilles and now becoming part of the Netherlands. As one can imagine this was a huge undertaking which required great effort and work to align on multiple levels as a society and in particular its polity into the new situation within the Netherlands. While the Netherlands Antilles did have a shared Dutch origin as a former colony and being part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it has as a polity developed a distinct identity. Part of the realignment was the adoption of the Dutch administrative system for local government, the ‘dualistic system’ and the implementation of this system was intended to change both the culture and practice of local government.

This unique situation is interesting to study from a public administration point of view. As such this study was designed to look into the attitudes and behaviour of Island councilmembers regarding dualism after the implementation of the WolBES and to what extent are they conforming to the intention of the dualistic system.

Before looking into the situation of the Caribbean public entities of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (BES) we will look into the historical developments that led to the implementation of the dualistic system in the Netherlands.

The implementation of dualism in the Netherlands was an institutional reform and a structural change to primarily improve the roles of municipal administrative bodies. Naturally this means that if an institution has changed, there was also a state of being before that change. The state of local government before the implementation of dualism was called ‘monism’ but what was monism and why was it deemed necessary to change? In 1.1 the structure of monism will be described and will go into explaining the issues this system developed over time in 1.2 and the four main problems that were identified are covered in 1.3. This is what we call a policy theory. A state commission, headed by prof. mr. dr. D.J. Elzinga, developed this policy theory, which was then expanded by the explanatory memorandum of the new local government act of 2002 that would implement dualism (de Groot, 2009).

Both monism and dualism are designations for structures that are about the relationships between administrative bodies within for example a municipality. Since 1931 the three administrative bodies of municipalities are the municipal council who are elected by the citizens, the Board of Mayor & Aldermen (M&A) and the position of mayor itself who is formally appointed by the crown. The relationships between these administrative bodies both formal and informal have changed over time, but before the institutional change it was still formally a monistic structure. (Engels, 2008) (Elzinga, 2004) (Elzinga, Rapport Dualisme en lokale democratie, 1999). We will go into the dualistic system in 1.4 and what this broadly meant for the Municipal Council, Aldermen and Mayor in 1.5. Followed by a short overview of the goals of the implementation.
1.1. Monism

Etymologically speaking ‘monism’ comes from the ancient Greek word ‘monos’, meaning ‘single’, ‘alone’ or ‘one’. In philosophy ‘monism’ has to do with the idea that everything in existence is of the same substance (Bächli, 2003). If we would apply that to the structure of government, it could imply a singular administrative body, multiple administrative bodies working as one or very close connections between different administrative bodies (Korringa & Molen, 2005).

Monism in government has a couple of distinctive characteristics as stated by the State Commission (Elzinga, 1999):

1. Primacy of the municipal council as the representative administrative body;
2. The primacy of the representative administrative body in legislative and executive responsibilities;
3. Membership of aldermen to both the executive and representative administrative bodies;
4. The absence of a right of dissolution. The Board of Mayor & Aldermen cannot dissolve the municipal council;
5. The absence or limited control options of the municipal council to control the Board of Mayor & Aldermen.

In practice this meant that the municipal council had both formal administrative and control tasks, the Board of M&A would handle the execution of policies set by the municipal council while at the same time an Alderman was chosen as a municipal councilmember, stays part of the party caucus and takes part in the council voting and decision making (Korringa & Molen, 2005).

The primacy of the municipal council finds formal support in both the constitution of the Netherlands and in the legitimacy it receives by being an elected representative body. Municipal councilmembers are elected by the public and this sets the municipal council as the democratic core of local government. In turn the Board of M&A also finds democratic legitimacy because the aldermen are also chosen representatives (Elzinga, 1999).

Both of these aspects of primacy speak of the hierarchical way local government was structured, even today after the implementation of dualism, the Dutch constitution still states in article 125 that the municipal council is ‘the head’ of the municipality. In the monistic system this was even more emphasized, because the Board of M&A derived most of its functions from the municipal council by mandate and delegation. This means that there was a formal subordination of the Board of M&A under the municipal council (Raad voor het openbaar bestuur, 1997) (Derksen & Schaap, 2007).

The third point by Elzinga was that monism is also defined by the phenomenon that members of one administrative body are chosen from within the members of the other administrative body and that subsequently they also continue being members of both administrative bodies (Brederveld, 2005) (Elzinga, 1999).

In the monistic system we can see a couple of examples: the position of mayor while being an administrative body itself was also part of the Board of M&A and chairman although not part of the municipal council. Aldermen were part of the Board of M&A, while also members of the municipal council. (Korsten & Tops, 1998) The idea of aldermen also being part of the municipal council was an elaborate one, their role in executing policies was seen as secondary to their primary functioning as municipal councilmembers, when the structure was designed and implemented in 1851 (Elzinga, 1999).
The fourth characteristic marks a distinctive difference between Dutch national and local government structure, the right of dissolution. If due to a vote of no confidence or otherwise a lack of trust in the national government, the position of the national cabinet becomes unsustainable, then parliament can be disbanded and new elections organized to attain new legitimacy from the public (Bovend’Eert & Kummeling, 2010). This is not possible in Dutch local government, there is one Election Day for all Dutch municipalities every four years. After these elections there is an electoral result from which a coalition is formed that fills the positions of aldermen on the Board of M&A. When trust in this board and/or coalition falls apart, a new coalition must be found in the original election results without new snap elections. This was seen as a monistic characteristic, due to the established primacy of the municipal council (Elzinga, 1999).

The last aspect seen as defining of monism were the limited options to exercise control by the municipal council both in formal powers as well as practice, while for example instruments to control joint administrative tasks were not included at all. This came in part due to deliberations of the third point, due to aldermen being municipal councilmembers, it was not deemed important to give the municipal council extensive instruments of control. The Board of M&A was by law accountable and obliged to provide all information deemed necessary to the municipal council as a whole. (Elzinga, 1999).

In practice for example the situation was that aldermen were part of the municipal council, the municipal council had to control the Board of M&A, so aldermen had to exercise control over themselves. Aldermen could also not be dismissed until 1948 (de Groot, 2009) (Brederveld, 2005)(Korringa & Molen, 2005).
1.2. Monism in historical perspective

We looked into how the State Commission defined the monistic system. It is however also important to know that this structure was instituted in a certain context. In this section we will look into how local government developed over time and how this affected the structure of local administration and relations between the municipal council and the Board of M&A.

1.2.1. The local government as designed by Thorbecke

The fundamental principles of the original Local Government Act were the direct election and the governmental primacy of the municipal council in legislation and execution of local government. The Local Government Act was drafted by Prime Minister J.R. Thorbecke in 1851, Europe was in a state of revolutionary unrest. This proved to be a great time for reforms both constitutional and institutional. In those years the right to vote was attained by paying amount of taxes (this was known as Census suffrage), so politics was the business of a small elite, mainly consisting of aristocrats, high officials and wealthy traders. The number of people that were able to pay those taxes were nevertheless growing and with them also grew a desire to reform. Nevertheless, due to the fact that universal suffrage would not be implemented until 1919 politics in the local setting would often remain the business of a small elite (Vries, 1971) (Elzinga, 1999) (de Groot, 2009).

In those days, municipal policy was not very extensive compared to recent times, the State Commission considered the Dutch local political life of the 19th century was “Negligible” (Elzinga, 1999, p. 32). The affairs of government were that of a ‘Night-watchman state’, the local governmental functions were low, as were the joint administrative tasks with higher governments. The ‘welfare state’ that would later increase government policy did not exist yet and the people who were able to vote actually preferred a more passive government and did also not always actively partake in voting (Elzinga, 1999). The constitution of 1848 laid down the governmental structure of municipalities and with article 139 recognized only the municipal council as ‘head of the municipality’, though article 138 of the Constitution of 1848 determined that the actual structure and responsibilities were determined by national law. The Local Government Act of 1851 did determine the role of aldermen. It was established that the municipal council would have a primacy on autonomous matters and the mayor assisted by aldermen was tasked with executing autonomous policies were held accountable to the council. This would not be the case with so called joint government tasks, which would be the responsibility of the Board of M&A without accountability on a local level (Brederveld, 2005) (Dikken & Schipper, 2005).

It was initially not deemed necessary to formalize joint government tasks in the Local Government Act nor to provide the municipal council with ways to exercise control over the execution of those tasks by the Board of M&A. Joint government tasks were ultimately the responsibility of ‘higher’ government with the Board of M&A simply tasked with its execution. Joint government tasks were also not as prevalent in those days, as compared to how they would grow to be in the 20th century. Also of note is that the Board of M&A was not yet mentioned in law as an administrative body (Brederveld, 2005) (Elzinga, 1999).

The first foundations of this change could already be seen in the later years of the 19th century, new political movement rose and began a more active political role on the municipal level. Especially on matters relating to infrastructure and public health, which already became a responsibility of the municipality due to the Local Governments Act (LGA) of 1851, though without any prescription what policies municipalities should implement in practice. This led to several initiatives that put public utilities under the umbrella of local government (Elzinga, 1999) (‘t Hart, 2005).
In the years that followed, more and more social developments would take place, government socially intervened increasingly in public life by improving public education and by new social laws such as the ‘child-law’ by parliamentarian Van Houten in 1874, which combined with the law of compulsory education introduced by the Cabinet Pierson prohibited child labour. Both laws are considered to be the first building blocks of many more of what in contemporary times is known as the welfare state. This led to certain consequences at the municipal level. Municipal responsibilities increased as did joint administrative tasks. Many laws of the welfare state were legislated on the national level, but executed at the local level. This meant increased executive responsibilities for aldermen, while the municipal council slowly lost more and more of its primacy as it did not receive additional means to control the joint administrative tasks. At the same time, the needed professionalism to perform as a municipal councilmember grew. The responsibilities and complexity of municipal policies increased, while municipalities grew due to both natural increases in population and as a result of municipal redistricting. These trends would continue well into the late 20th century (Schenkeveld, 2003) (Elzinga, 1999) (de Groot, 2009).

1.2.2. Joint administrative tasks

The term ‘Joint administration’ has come up a few times, in the context of the developments that led to the implementation of a dualistic system. The term relates to the relations between public entities on ‘multiple levels’, in this case both the national and local levels of government. The constitutional reforms of 1848 in the Netherlands solidified its public entities in geographical divisions. There are the national government, provinces and municipalities and together they form what is known in the Netherlands as the ‘house of Thorbecke’ (Linker, 2006). These different levels of government have set tasks and responsibilities that they either perform autonomous or in joint administration. This is currently laid down in the Dutch constitution article 124:

1. “The powers of provinces and municipalities to regulate and administer their own internal affairs shall be delegated to their administrative organs.”

2. “Provincial and municipal administrative bodies may be required by or pursuant to Act of Parliament to provide regulation and administration.”

The first subsection relates to autonomy, this is in essence freedom for an administrative body to take initiative and determine its own policies in its administrative unit, when to make decision or not to have certain policies at all. The second subsection relates to joint administration, in joint administration policies and responsibilities are set by the ‘higher’ national government for ‘lower’ local public entities to execute. These are also binding, administrative bodies might have some freedom in its execution methods, but the higher government determines the framework (Pot, Elzinga, Hoogers, & Lange, 2006).

Both autonomous policy and joint administration have their own place. Autonomous policy enables a municipality to tailor its policies to its specific characteristics. While joint administrations is useful to prevent legal inequalities and ensure that people receive similar treatments no matter which municipality they reside in. The Local Government Act of 1851 considered autonomous tasks a responsibility of the municipal council and joint administrative tasks a responsibility of the Board of M&A (Dikken & Schipper, 2005).

What did this mean for the relation between the municipal council and the Board of M&A? While at first this relation was, as established, a hierarchical one. The municipal council was formally the highest local administrative body.
In practice the Board of M&A became more dominant over the years in collusion with increasing municipal responsibilities. In theory the municipal council still held most of the primary municipal responsibilities and powers, in practice most were delegated to the Board of M&A. Especially the joint administrative tasks that were the responsibility of aldermen, directly undercut the primacy of the municipal council. This development was incremental and took decades into the 20th century before, as a response to this development, the Local Government Act of 1994 would finally put the municipal council more in charge of joint administrative tasks. This was done by giving the municipal council decision-making powers on whether or not to delegate Joint Administrative Tasks to the Board of M&A (Elzinga, 1999).

1.2.3. The changing role of aldermen

The role that aldermen initially fulfilled was already part of local government before the Local government act by Thorbecke. Back before this act was implemented there were the appointed positions of ‘adjuncts’, the responsibilities of this office consisted included an advisory role and the possibility of delegated executive tasks by the office of mayor. It was an assisting and subordinate role to the office of mayor.

At the time of the Local Government Act (LGA) of 1851 the office of mayor was at still a very honorary position that was often held by local dignitaries of high standing. With the LGA of 1851, the office of alderman was also implemented in all municipalities and became an appointed position from within the elected municipal council and would remain a combined position with the municipal council membership until 2002. A main change in the position of Alderman as identified by the State commission was that at first the position of Alderman included by law a responsibility to assist the mayor. In that regard it was a continuation of the former position of adjunct. The Board of M&A did not yet exist as an administrating body with decision making powers.

Some situational aspects heavily attributed to this initial situation and these were often the main responsibilities of the Mayor. In these early years after the LGA of 1851, local politics resembled that of a Night-watchman state. Municipal administration heavily emphasized on safety and public order and this was primarily the role of mayor as the responsible official for administrating the local police force. It was also with some regularity the case that mayors were directly in charge of the civil servants, especially in smaller municipalities this was practical due to the equally small number of civil servants. For reference, apart from law keeping officials, a city like Assen would employ only 4 municipal civil servants, a municipal secretary, a tax collector, a clerk and a concierge. In this setting it is not strange that the mayor was the dominant factor in municipal administration as other policy fields were very limited (Gras, et al., 2000) (Elzinga, 1999).

Before we discussed the gradual evolving of the welfare state, these developments significantly changed the role and position of the alderman within the Board of M&A. Several factors seem likely to have contributed to this such as the responsibilities of the mayor being more codified in law, aldermen being elected people’s representatives with a political agendas and the experimental nature of the first welfare policies. These factors gave opportunity for ambitious aldermen who were less restricted in their roles and responsibilities to, with support from the municipal council, develop welfare policies and especially when combined with a finance portfolio strengthened the position of the alderman within the municipal administration (Elzinga, 1999).
In some municipalities this changed the role of alderman from assistant to pioneer and overall the development paved the way for the both the growing political discourse and responsibilities on the municipal level and the welfare state developments that would be legislated at the national level and executed municipally due to joint administrative tasks.

This changed role became formal in 1931, when a legislative change in the LGA abolished the assistant role of the alderman and instituted the Board of M&A as an administrative body capable of formal decision making. In the same time period there was a rise of political parties, paving the way for the establishment of party factions within the municipal council. This development put the alderman often in a leading position in his faction. And another development was the rise of joint administrative tasks coming to municipal administrations. These developments further put the Alderman in a central position within municipal administration and would define roles within the municipality until the LGA of 2002 (Elzinga, 1999).

1.2.4. Problems emerged in local government practices

What can be told about the relations between the Municipal Council and the Board of M&A? As we have seen, the structure of monism formally put the municipal council as the ‘head’ of a municipality. We have also seen that this primacy was in practice undercut by the changing position of the Board of M&A. This in fact had been a problem from the start and only increased when the responsibilities of the Board of M&A grew with joint administrative tasks as a consequence of for example the developing welfare state which put the Alderman more and more in a leading position within the municipality. It was also, perhaps unsurprisingly, seen that the council factions with an Alderman where more influential than opposition factions.

It was thus seen that the council was in practice not able to adequately influence municipal policy making which was strongly dominated by the Board of M&A. The Board of M&A had a huge policy advantage because of its professional support provided by the civil servants. Civil servants fall under the administrative responsibility of the Board of M&A and the number of civil servants would grow with the developments leading to more responsibilities for municipalities. The State Commission citing Denters et al 2000, stated that in administrative practice the Board of M&A does not so much deal with the Municipal Council. But more so with so called standing Council committees. These Council Committees were generally formed by Municipal councilmembers who were party specialists based on the portfolio of aldermen, who often chaired these committees. The function of these committees were to inform Council members and advise the Board of M&A.

This worked as follows: civil servants from within the administration would prepare a policy paper, this would discussed within the Board of M&A and if deemed ready, would be send to the committee where the Committee members would be further informed and the committee would subsequently advise its contents and whether or not the paper was ready for decision making in the Municipal Council. The policy paper would go for another round to the Board of M&A, possibly adapted based on the advice of the committee and then be send to the Municipal Council for decision making. The committees had no formal decision making powers, though it was often seen that the opinions of the political factions within the committee would not change significantly and thus making the council decision making a formality to the de facto decision making in the committee (Elzinga, 1999) (Denters, et al., 2000) (Brederveld, 2005) (de Groot, 2009).
1.3. The four main problems of the monistic system

We have seen how local government changed and worked in practice while responsibilities developed over time. Some of these developments were seen as problematic and there were some measures and minor changes implemented over the years while maintaining the same basic model as drafted in the LGA of 1851. Then in 1998 a State Commission was assembled to look into the developments, define the problems within local government at that time and propose an alternative to the original model of local government. We will now go into the problems that came to be as a result of those developments. The state commission identified 4 main problems of the local government:

1. The position of local political parties, voter turn-out and decreasing relations between voters and parties;
2. The formal monistic structure evolved over time and resulted into a dualistic administrative practice;
3. The political recognisability is low due to the intertwining roles of the local administrative bodies;
4. The collegiality of the Board of M&A.

These four problems were central in the decision to change the local government structure and in the next paragraphs we will go into more detail of what made these four situations problematic. In a later chapter it will also be assessed to what extent these problems were also present on the BES Islands.

1.3.1. The position of political parties

After the implementation of universal suffrage that would lead to the establishment of (national) political parties as an important factor in representative politics, the political landscape would continue to develop. In the early years of the 20th century, society in the Netherlands was still strongly ‘pillarized’ along several ideologies and belief systems. But over the years the pillarization of the Dutch political landscape would decrease. Voting became no longer a matter of loyalty to a pillar and custom. But of deliberations and considerations and voting habits would change more with each subsequent election. With this development the bonds between voters and political parties naturally became looser.

A similar trend was also noticed in the memberships of political parties as people lacked clarity of what political parties stood for. This can be seen in the ideological development of the main political parties that represented the liberal, Christian conservative and social democratic movements. The leader of the Dutch labour party for example proclaimed in 1995 the shedding of ideological feathers because of the ongoing liberalization of society, the Christian parties saw increasing secularization. Both developments were indicators of a transformation within the political parties from the pillarized specific ideologies to a general ‘catch-all’ principle.

Political parties would put fewer effort in representing specific groups, but cater to the general public. Which meant also that ‘traditional issues’ faded more to the background and parties would align more on policy issues. At the same time national political parties became more professional in their organization, while at the same time the role of ordinary members to influence party policy and recruitment decreased. As a consequence while all citizens can become members of a political party, motivation to do so decreased. This resulted in a decreasing role for citizens to participate in politics despite increasing possibilities to participate in the development of general government policy (Krouwel, 1996) (Elzinga, 1999) (Kanne, 2011).
Additionally voter turn-out decreased after the abolishing of mandatory voting in 1970, the latest municipal elections in the Netherlands saw a voter turn-out of 53.8%. Of special interest to this research is the finding that voter turn-out is often higher in smaller municipalities, a municipality that is twice as big as another would see a 2 to 10% decrease in voter turn-out and it is generally established that small municipalities of 20,000 citizens and smaller have a higher turn-out than larger municipalities (Van Ostaaijen, Epskamp, Dols, & Van Zuydam, 2016). Adding to this could be the phenomena of municipalities fusing over time and getting bigger as a result, this in combination with the general decreasing interest and involvement can be seen as reasons for the ever decreasing voter turn-out (Elzinga, 1999) (Koster, 2014).

1.3.2. The formal monistic structure evolved into dualistic administrative practice.

Very few governmental structures are pure monistic or pure dualistic, they are most often on a scale between those two polar opposites. In structure the municipal government before the LGA of 2002 was dominantly monistic, the municipal council was the head of the municipality and the Board of M&A received its responsibilities primarily by delegation and providing a mandate from the municipal council.

It was however seen that over there were strong dualistic tendencies that were not originally part of the formal structure. It was for example seen that in practice the Board of M&A held a primacy in policy initiatives and decision making. This could be explained by local government responsibilities growing since the days of Thorbecke. As a result the daily administration became more and more complicated, requiring more policy creation under the responsibility of aldermen who in turn became to dominate local politics. This was seen as problematic because with the formal decision making process being the authority of the municipal council, there were too few mechanics in place to hold the Board of M&A accountable. In short while the responsibilities, influence and professional support of the Board of M&A grew, the controlling powers of the municipal council did not grow accordingly. The municipal council was in that sense truly considered a form of ‘lay administration’ while the Board of M&A became more and more professional.

According to the state commission, this situation causes a lack of transparency both for insiders as well as outsiders. Increases in local responsibilities could in that sense diffuse the responsibility and accountability. For insiders there was the risk of underwhelming effectiveness of municipal decision making. For outsiders it was difficult to grasp how local politics works and to whom to turn. Additionally the low recognisability of local government could also hinder the recruitment of potential Councilmembers (Elzinga, 1999) (de Groot, 2009).

1.3.3. The political recognisability is low due to the intertwining roles

As a citizen it was also difficult to grasp the actual workings of local government, on the one hand there was the formal hierarchic relation between the municipal council and the Board of M&A where the municipal council was formally in charge and on the other hand there was the practical primacy of the Board of M&A that was, due to its daily and executive tasks, a more visible contact for ordinary citizens. Combined with that aldermen were also municipal councilmembers and at the same time had a strong party connection and often being seen as party leaders. This made it difficult for relative political outsiders to understand.
Is an alderman primarily an executive function or is it a people’s representative? Is the municipal council a controller on municipal policy or do they administrate themselves? And if aldermen are both in the municipal council and doing executive tasks, do they control themselves? Is the mayor a leader of the municipality? In addition to the developments leading to local policies becoming more complex, it is difficult to keep it all apart and to understand which administrative body is responsible for what task. This makes it difficult for outsiders to understand the decision making process and also makes it difficult for outsiders to participate themselves.

For example: despite the formal primacy of the municipal council, policies were almost never initiated nor designed by the municipal council. In practice policies were often drafted by the Board of M&A or more precisely by the professional apparatus of civil servants under the administrative responsibility of the Board of M&A. It was then presented to the council, who more often than not lacked the expertise to successfully formulate policy alternatives of their own.

In practice the municipal council factions of the coalition were heavily influenced by the alderman that was part of their faction and more often than not followed the Board of M&A. The state commission thus concluded that the municipal administration was very inclusive and in combination with the actual decision making being done in the Board of M&A and the coalition factions this also is a problem with regard to transparency (Elzinga, 1999).

1.3.4. The internal relation within the Board of M&A

This main problem relates to the relations between both the participating aldermen themselves and between the aldermen and the mayor. It was seen as a result of the position of Alderman becoming more substantive and changed from being an assistant to the mayor to being on equal footing and actually becoming the more dominant factor within the Board of M&A.

In this regard it might also be interesting to additionally look at the administrative bodies of a municipality. According to the general administrative law of the Netherlands (Awb article 1:3), only administrative bodies are capable of formal public administrative decision making. A municipal public entity has three administrative bodies: the municipal council, the Board of M&A and the mayor itself. So while the office of alderman increased over years to more policy responsibilities, the office of alderman itself does not have decision making powers outside the Board of M&A as a whole and as part of the municipal council. This can lead to tensions, as an alderman is caught between his own portfolio and the Board of M&A as a whole (Zijlstra, 2009) (Elzinga, 1999).

Additionally as over time the duties of the board, especially those of the aldermen increased by both delegations and joint administrative tasks. The role of mayor was not as much increased by these developments and as a consequence the internal balance shifted. The mayor was still seen by the public as a figurehead but was often internally politically dominated by the more politically influential aldermen. This was especially seen in larger municipalities, as shown in the report by the state commission, the amount of portfolio’s for a mayor was often inversely proportional to the population size of a municipality. The larger the size of a municipality, the more unclear was the role of the mayor (Elzinga, 1999).
1.4. The dualistic system

We have covered what monism was and how the local governmental situation changed over time. A state commission was assembled to analyse the situation and come up with an alternative model to the original monistic model that had been standard for local government since the LGA of 1851. Based on the recommendations of this state commission a new dualistic model for local government was eventually implemented by the Dutch national government in 2002. In the next pages we will go into what dualism is and in short what the new LGA entailed for the administrative bodies within the local public entity.

As covered before, Monism and Dualism are about the institutional and working relation between two administrative bodies. In Monism this relation is a relation of subordination, the powers and responsibilities of the executive administrative body were in principle derived from the primary representative administrative body, in the context of this research: the municipal council. In dualism both administrative bodies are more or less in an equal relation (Elzinga, 2004, p. 86). Dualism as an institutional change aimed at separating administrative bodies where their tasks, responsibilities and powers are interwoven. In this regard the State Commission defined dualism as a state between a representative and executive administrative body, when both have been granted their own exclusive tasks and responsibilities by law and members from the executive body are not also members of the representative body (Elzinga, 1999, p. 63)

The implementation of dualism as a policy instrument entailed 1. The institutional separation of the position of aldermen and Municipal Councilmembers; 2. The formal allocation of execution powers to the board of A&M and the allocation of setting policy frameworks and control to the Municipal Council; 3. Improving the position of the mayor in local government (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004). This changed the relations between the board and municipal council as administrative bodies, which could also influence how they interacted with each other in the context of a coalition or within the standing commissions (de Groot, 2009).

So dualism in the Dutch local setting is a structure where both representative and executive administrative bodies are separated from each other, have their own responsibilities and exclusive memberships while maintaining certain relations with each other. Additionally Elzinga further refined the concept of dualism by distinguishing ‘pure’ and ‘moderate’ measures of the structure. In a ‘pure’ dualistic state the administrative bodies are completely separate in their legitimacy. For example it was stated that in a ‘pure’ state of dualism there would be few instruments of control. This may seem counterintuitive as dualism was a response to the situation existing in monism where there was limited control. The idea was that in ‘pure’ dualism, both administrative bodies operate based on their own mandate given by the public (Elzinga, 1999). However monism and dualism are two polar opposites on a scale with plenty of variation, hence ‘moderate’ variations of monism and dualism. After all the monistic structure also wasn’t an example of ‘pure’ monism and neither are most other government structures around the world (Elzinga, 1999) (Raad voor het openbaar bestuur, 1997).
1.5. Dualism Local Government Act 2002

We can see elements of moderate dualism in the actual implementation of the Local Government act of 2002. The Municipal Council is still the head of the municipality and while the Board of M&A now has its own responsibilities by law, it is still accountable to the municipal council. The municipal council also installs the aldermen and the controlling function of the council includes options, such as article 49 of the Local Government Act, to dismiss aldermen as well (Elzinga, 2004) (Derksen & Schaap, 2007).

1.5.1. Municipal Council

The role of the municipal council changed with the Local Government Act of 2002 and the implementation of dualism. The council lost its responsibilities of co-administration and execution became the responsibility of the Board of M&A. The council would focus on the representation of the electorate, determining the frameworks of policy, setting the municipal budget and controlling the Board of M&A. The municipal council gained several rights to control the Board of M&A, such as the rights of amendment, initiative and information. (de Groot, 2009) (Projectbureau Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2004).

The Municipal council still directly appoints the aldermen and has the right to dismiss them as well. New, though not as a result of the implementation of dualism, was also the right of recommendation. With this the municipal council can recommend a candidate for mayor. In practice this means that while the mayor is formally still appointed by ‘the crown’ in the form of a cabinet decision by the national ministers, de facto the appointment of a mayor is decided by the municipal council as the recommendation is very rarely not followed by the national cabinet. Only under grave substantial grounds and with an obligation by the minister to motivate such a decision can a recommendation be ignored (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2008) (Lont, 2011).

1.5.2. Aldermen

With the LGA and the separation between aldermen and municipal council new ways of recruiting aldermen became available. The Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) distinguished four types of aldermen recruitment: From elected municipal councilmembers, this is similar to the original situation in monism with the only difference that the alderman would subsequently leave the municipal council. Fundamentally new ways of recruitment are the options to recruit aldermen from non-elected candidates from the ballot or from the larger electorate within the municipality. The last option is to recruit an alderman ‘from outside’ meaning outside the municipality, this opens up the position of Alderman for people all over the Netherlands and thus enables a municipal council to broaden the search for professional administrators. This last option is limited though as aldermen are also held to article 10 of the LGA, which means that they have to reside in the municipality. Though article 36a of the LGA states that the municipal council can provide dispensation for a year (Projectbureau Vernieuwingsimpuls dualisme en lokale democratie, 2005, p. 13).
1.5.3. Mayor

The role of Mayor in the dualistic structure of the Local Government Act also changes. What remained the same was the role of chairman on both the municipal council and the Board of M&A. Though after the changes in the constitution of 2008, the Mayor is no longer by the constitution held to be chairman of the municipal council, the Mayor still holds this position due to article 9 of the Local Government. This constitutional change was due to deliberations on what is- and what is not a constitutional issue, not primarily to immediately or in the future change the status of the chairmanship. On the contrary the position was re-established in the deliberations because of the bridge the Mayor provides between the council and the Board of M&A (Vernieuwingsimpuls dualisme en lokale democratie, 2002) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008).

The role of Chairman of the municipal council became a more ‘technical’ chairmanship due to the separation between council and Board of M&A, on the other hand the role of the Mayor on the Board of M&A increased. With article 53a of the LGA, the Mayor received the ability to put forth topics on the agenda and the ability to put forth proposals in the board meetings (Vernieuwingsimpuls dualisme en lokale democratie, 2002).

At the same time the Mayor became more susceptible to the control of the Council, as we have seen the municipal council gained a right of recommendation when appointing a new mayor. This meant that the mayor gained an expressed support and a derivative democratic legitimacy from the municipal council. Though formally limited in comparison to the accountability of the aldermen, the Mayor is also held accountable on her portfolio, but can for example not be formally dismissed by the municipal council. though in practice a Council can decide to put forth a motion of no confidence and the Mayor will step down by his own accord or on recommendation by the Minister of internal affairs invoking article 61b of the LGA due to strained relations with the Municipal Council (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2008) (Weijs, 2013) (Nijs & Boerefijn, 2013) (Rijksoverheid, 2014)
1.6. Goals of dualism

The implementation of the dualistic model of government had several goals. Generally it was about the improvement of local government by changing the structure and culture of local government. When implementing a change in culture it is important that this change is seen as relevant and legitimate (Anderson & Ackerman, 2010) so in that sense it is important how municipal councilmembers see the implementation of dualism themselves. In assessing support for the implementation of dualism, a study was performed by Denters et al, which showed that the questioned Councilmembers distinguished broadly 4 different measures that came with the implementation of dualism:

- Positional separation;
- Separation of tasks and responsibilities;
- Improving the position and rights of individual Councilmembers;
- Facilitating the control abilities of the municipal council.

These 4 measures have both formal structural and informal cultural and practical dimensions. Formal in this sense is again to what extent a measure is laid down in formal laws, this is the structural change. Informal relates to the freedom people have in administrative bodies to develop their own ways to get things done, these changes are cultural in that they are dependent on specific views that might have influenced administrative practice (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).

Positional separation relates to the extent of separation between council and alderman. This has formal and informal aspects in that for example aldermen not being integral part of council commissions and municipal council decision making due to no longer being part of the municipal council itself was a very formal separation that needed the LGA to change. Aldermen being part or not being part of council faction meetings is an example of a possible informal change, it was perhaps intended to lessen the dominant role of the Alderman in a party faction. But as such, relations beyond the formal structure were not laid down in the LGA (perhaps impossible so) and depended on factions themselves in how and to what extent they wanted to establish relations with aldermen outside the formal lines (de Groot, 2009).

Separation of tasks and responsibilities relates mostly to formal rules, either tasks are attributed to an administrative body by law or by delegation. This measure is mostly a formal one, the extent to which a municipal council themselves delegates to the Board of M&A can differ a bit with some municipalities delegating certain administrative tasks were others were more reluctant (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004).

Improving the individual rights for Councilmembers, such as the right of interpellation. The formal change of this are that these new rights have been implemented in the first place. The question is to what extent these new rights are actually used is again a matter of cultural views and actual administrative practice.

Facilitating the control abilities of the municipal council is another change that has strong formal aspects. The municipal council clerk for example is a function that is determined by law and instituted to provide administrative support and act as a liaison between the municipal council and the civil servants of the municipality (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2011).

These four measures can perhaps also be used as a template to establish the extent of the cultural and practice changes on the BES Islands. But in the next part we will first go into the developments on the BES Islands.
2. The situation of the Caribbean public entities

In the first section we went over the developments that led to the implementation of the dualistic system for local government in the Netherlands. These developments drove the administrative practice to its institutional limits and prompted a dedicated effort to improve local democracy and administration as a result. However the circumstances that led to the implementation of a dualistic system on the Dutch islands of the Caribbean Netherlands were different. To understand an institution it might be important to understand its history. Perhaps in this case especially because of the unique judicial circumstances. Institutions and structures sometimes change. In some occasions because of changing circumstances within the institution, sometime because of the changing world. In the case of the BES islands and the implementation of dualism, we can speak of a change to an institutional structure as a consequence of even greater constitutional changes.

On October 10, 2010 Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba (BES) became part of the Netherlands when the Netherlands Antilles ceased to be an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Conferentie van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 2010). On March 2, 2011 there were elections to vote for new Island councils and from this day dualism was implemented as an institutional structure for the local special public entities.

Two changes, one constitutional and territorial, the second institutional. We will go into the historical context of how in general this situation came to be and what prompted these resent territorial and institutional changes. Starting with the broad history of the territories in 2.1. Then we will go into the administrative bodies on the BES islands in 2.2 followed by a short section on the political structure and culture in 2.3. Following that we will look into the four problems of monism and how this applied to the BES islands in 2.4. The dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles and the development of the WolBES is covered in 2.5, followed by a short overview of the changes in 2.6.

2.1. History

The Dutch Caribbean territories were an inheritance from the Dutch colonial past. And as such the Netherlands Antilles have a shorter governmental history and democratic tradition than the Netherlands. First being under private ownership and ran like a company and then after 1791 as a colony. The Islands remained under colonial rule until 1951 (Bakker & Veer, 1999).

While the Islands were governed as a colony in those 160 years, significant constitutional and institutional changes occurred within the Netherlands. When under Thorbecke the Local Government Act of 1851 was implemented, the Kingdom of the Netherlands still included Luxembourg, the territories that are currently Indonesia, Curaçao & the subordinate Islands in the Caribbean, Surinam and of course the Netherlands itself. All these territories were formally ruled from the Netherlands (Blom & Lamberts, 2003).

While these territories were at the time part of the Netherlands, these constitutional and institutional changes were not implemented in the area that would become the Netherlands Antilles. While the Netherlands reformed their form of government, these colonies remained basically under the same form of colonial rule as they had been from 1791.

In that time period from 1791, the Dutch Caribbean islands were as a whole ruled by the governor of Curaçao assisted by a Colonial Council. All of these positions were filled by people coming from the Netherlands and appointed by the crown, furthermore the colonial council had only a limited advisory role.
On Aruba, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten the office of the governor was represented by a lieutenant governor. These five lt. governors were assisted by two ‘landraden’ and these two administrative bodies were in fact the only two at that time to feature positions that could be elected by those qualified to vote.

It wasn’t until 1862 that a call for limited suffrage was made and subsequently denied by the Netherlands. However there was still some development in local government as steps were taken to change the Colonial Council, its members were increased and it gained the right to ask questions. Around this time, slavery was also abolished (Slave population was 20 to 50% on some islands). Over the years there were several more calls for limited suffrage, but it wasn’t until 1936 that it would be granted (Departement van Uniezaken en Overzeese Rijksdelen, 1940) (Bakker & Veer, 1999).

The first political parties on Curaçao formed during those years after the mid 30’s. These political parties were fundamentally based on ethnically and religious foundations. Historically the western European elite on the Islands has largely been protestant, while the African slave population was for the most part catholic. While that seems like an interesting correlation on its own, the simplest truth derived from literature seems to be that catholic missionaries got to the slave populations first and the protestant institutions didn’t much care for them to convert again. Subsequently the first two main political parties were a Roman Catholic party backed by the wealthier ‘coloured’ and a protestant party backed by the ‘white’ elite (Bakker & Veer, 1999).

This limited suffrage was soon to be discovered to be inadequate and the call for more autonomy only grew stronger. It would take until 1948 before universal suffrage was implemented (twenty-nine years after it had been implemented in the Netherlands) and until 1954 for the Netherlands Antilles to become autonomous.

And this in turn became an issue on its own. While the colonial situation seemed somewhat like a dictatorship under the governors rule. In truth his authority was rather limited because in comparison to the Netherlands, politics and government had less influence in the daily life of people in the Caribbean and even less so on the islands outside of Curaçao. The people on the islands ‘took care of their own’, being small and isolated communities that were in some cases very far apart.

It is therefore interesting that as soon as talks began about autonomy in the 1940’s, the first political party of Aruba wished a secession not from the Netherlands, but from the authorities on Curaçao. This sentiment would continue to overshadow the political development of the Netherlands Antilles (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2001).

Autonomy?
It would still take until 1951 before the local government of these islands would change. While the Netherlands were cautious to grant full autonomy to the Caribbean territories, the people on the Islands continued to organize politically and so steps were taken for more self-government. This finally happened on march the 14th 1951 with the implementation of the Islands Regulation of the Netherlands Antilles (Eilandregeling Nederlandse Antillen ERNA) which acted as the constitution of the Netherlands Antilles (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2001) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).

This legislation brought to the Netherlands Antilles a more autonomous internal structure that together with the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954 would established the Dutch Caribbean territories as an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) and implemented on the local Island level a structure similar as the Local Government Act.
A key difference with the Netherlands was that the Island territories making up the Netherlands Antilles, also enjoyed a high level of autonomy, the responsibilities of the Netherlands Antilles as a state were delimited in the ERNA, every responsibility not listed fell under the autonomy of the local administration of the separate Islands. This is different from the Netherlands, where municipalities also have autonomous responsibilities but are not as such constitutionally ensured (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

At first the ERNA act established the four so called Island territories of Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao (ABC Islands) and the combined Windward Islands (Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba).

Each Island territory of the ABC Islands was similarly governed like a Dutch municipality, with an Island council (similar to a municipal council), an Executive Council (similar to a Board of M&A) and a Lieutenant Governor (similar to a Mayor). Also modelled after the Dutch Local Government Act of that time, Island commissioners (similar to aldermen) were part of both the Island council and Executive Council (Bor, 1979).

The Windward Island territories were jointly governed, up until 1983 the three Windward Islands participated in a shared Island council consisting of 15 members divided over 3 chapters with 5 seats for each Island. And two Island commissioners per Island for a total of six Island commissioners in the shared Executive Council. There was still one Lt. Governor seated on Sint Maarten, with an administrative representative seated on Saba and Sint Eustatius.

This administrative body was somewhat unique at the time in that, unlike what was then mandatory in the Dutch municipalities and the other Island territories, the Island commissioners of the Windward Territory did not had to have a seat in the Island council as well.

This arrangement was revised when, due to Aruba seceding from the Netherlands Antilles and gaining the ‘status aparte’ becoming an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the constitutional relations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands were again changed in 1983. This change abolished amongst other things the shared administrative bodies of the Windward Islands and effectively broke chapters that made up the shared council into separate administrative bodies per Island territory (Bakker & Veer, 1999) and subsequently became also the same structure as the other Island territories (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

The political unrest about the Netherlands Antilles would not end with Aruba’s status aparte. It was subsequently questioned if the five remaining islands should continue under the Netherlands Antilles. While formally forming a nation together, in practice every Island was run like its own republic and the usefulness of the National authority from Curaçao continued to be challenged. We will further go into the constitutional developments that would dissolve the Netherlands Antilles, but first the administrative bodies of the Island territories will be reviewed (Paalman, 2011) (Bakker & Veer, 1999).
2.2. Administrative bodies on the BES Islands

We have seen how the Dutch administrative bodies were structured in the monistic system before the LGA of 2002 and how the new structure was after implementation of the dualistic system. But was this development similar on the BES Islands?

The institutional development of the Netherlands Antilles in general and specifically the BES Islands shared similarities and differences with the developments within the Netherlands. For the most part the governmental structure was not developed locally by the Netherlands Antilles, but ‘imported’ from the Netherlands.

It could be said that the original institutional structure shared similarities with ‘the house of Thorbecke’ albeit with one less floor, as the Netherlands Antilles had only a local government layer of the separate Island territories and the national whole of all included Islands. Government tasks that were not explicitly attributed to the national government were the responsibility of the Island territories that in practice enjoyed a de facto state of high autonomy, in this sense the Netherlands Antilles had elements of both a decentralized unitary state and a federalized state (Bentvelsen, et al., 2003) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).

One of the similarities is that the implementation of ERNA in 1951, gave the Island territories a similar monistic local government structure of the LGA in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands there are three administrative bodies, the municipal council, the Board of M&A and the mayor. The ERNA implemented a similar structure of administrative bodies on the Island territories, though they are named differently they are basically the same in design and structure: Island council, Executive Council and the Lieutenant Governor (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).

Being a similar monistic structure, an Island territory was under daily administration by executive members coming from within the Island council, functioning also as Island council members. Though section 2 of article 47 of ERNA stated that half the Island commissioners could be from outside the Island council. Those commissioners would become advisory members of the Island council but without having the right to vote on decisions, as section 3 of article 47 ERNA stated that these commissioners have an advisory vote instead. In the next parts we will go further into some of the key differences and noteworthy characteristics in the structure of the local administrative bodies of the Netherlands Antilles.

2.2.1. Island council

The Island council is the representative administrative body on the Dutch Caribbean Islands. Its roles are to decide on ordinances, determining the budget and controlling the Executive Council.

The first obvious difference with the Netherlands was the number of seats on the Island councils. When looking at specifically the BES Islands when each Island got their own Island council in 1983, then Bonaire had 9 seats, 4 of those belonged to Island commissioners. Saba and Sint Eustatius had 5 seats of which 2 were held by the Island commissioners. This is fundamentally different with the Dutch LGA which determines in article 8, a minimum of 9 seats for each municipality and increases with the size of the population. If the BES islands were Dutch municipalities under the LGA it would translate to 9 seats for Saba, 11 seats Sint Eustatius and 17 seats for Bonaire.
Why is this noteworthy? It has been recognized in political history that fewer councilmen, potentially mean more power and control for each individual councilman. In a monistic system, this could give aldermen/Island commissioners an even stronger position. It also shows that Island commissioners had a potentially more influential position on the Council. After all if the commissioners were in agreement, they would just need one more vote to achieve a majority on the Island council (Spinoza, 1670) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Paalman, 2011).

It could also be observed that the Island councils often had meetings behind closed doors. Article 35 of the ERNA determined that the Island Council deliberated in public (Rijksoverheid, 2017). Nevertheless in practice closed door sessions happened regularly and this was seen as an example of a specific administrative practice (and probably administrative culture as well) on the Islands. And would be seen from the viewpoint of the Netherlands as undesirable behaviour that required institutional reform. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

2.2.2. Executive Council

Similar to the Dutch Board of M&A, the Executive Council was (as its name implies) tasked with the daily government of the Island territories. The Executive Council consists of the Lt. Governor and four (Bonaire) or two (Saba and Sint Eustatius) Island commissioners. The Lt. Governor is chairman of the Executive Council and the Executive Council operates in the same collegial way as a Board of M&A in the Netherlands. Key difference with the Netherlands was that half of the Island commissioners did not need to have a seat in the Island council, it was however also not that all of them had a seat on the council.

The Executive Council operates in a similar way as the Board of M&A in the Netherlands. By article 57 ERNA the Executive Council prepared the decision making process in the Island council and were tasked with the execution of those decisions and is held accountable by the Island council. The Executive Council also managed and maintained all island territory assets, possessions and finances. In all this the Executive Council is held accountable by the Island council. (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Paalman, 2011)

2.2.3. Lieutenant Governor

The Lt. Governor is similarly as a Mayor in the Netherlands appointed by the crown and acts as both chairman of the Executive Council and the Island council. The portfolio of the Lt. Governor includes public order and police similar as in the Netherlands. The Lt. Governor is also a representative of the Governor of the Netherlands and as such has a supervisory role to oversee that local ordinances were not in conflict with the ERNA.

The function of Governor is in some ways a remainder of the colonial era in that the governor directly represents the crown and acts as a head of state of the Netherlands Antilles in a similar way as the King does in the Netherlands. The function is to be seen in the context of the Netherlands Antilles being an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Governor was in that regard a responsibility for the Netherlands Antilles cabinet in the same way that the Netherlands national government is responsible for the King.

In comparison to a Mayor in the Netherlands, the Lt. Governor is less expected to be involved in policy (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).
2.3. Political structure and culture

The former Netherlands Antilles after the secession of Aruba in 1986, were a collection of 5 remaining Island territories that varied greatly in both size of population and square meters. The smallest Island of Saba had a population of around 2000 on 13 km² while Curaçao had more than 120,000 people on 444 km².

Geographical not a unity, the Islands could be divided in two basic clusters the Windward Islands of Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius and the Leeward Islands of Bonaire and Curaçao. The distance between these two clusters was nearly a thousand kilometres and they literally speak a different language. On the Leeward Islands, the people speak predominantly Papiamentu while English is the primary language of the Windward Islands (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Bentvelsen, et al., 2003).

The BES Island territories were the smallest island territories both in population and surface which is why instead of attaining a more autonomous status apart they chose to become part of the Netherlands. The small scale and isolation of these Islands also plays a role in the political structure and culture, relations between populous and government are close and being isolated communities there are many public-private relations between government and inhabitants. The so called gap between government and community is smaller. The other side of this medal is that forms of clientelism sometimes also called ‘patronage’ are also part of the political culture.

Political parties

The way politics was organized on the BES islands was a bit different than in the Netherland. The changing role of political parties was also a factor in the deliberations to change the Local Government Act. The state commission noted that after the introduction of universal suffrage, ideology based national parties were at the core of political power. Society was still very much ‘pillarized’ and political parties representing those pillars were at a time the bridge between the people and government. This changed with the continuing emancipation (Elzinga, 1999).

This was different on the Netherlands Antilles, in fact one can say that there were no national parties at all that compare to the situation in the Netherlands. In municipalities in the Netherlands there are often both national parties with local chapters and local parties active on the council. In the 2014 municipal elections between 27, 8 of the votes went to local parties (Kiesraad, 2017). Not so on the Netherlands Antilles, due to the geographical distance between the Islands, the inhabitants identified themselves more based on their Islands than the Netherlands Antilles as a whole. This was politically also apparent in the way people voted for the national parliament. Similar as for example the parliament of the European Union, every Island had a number of designated seats, with every Island territory voting to fill their own designated seats. This meant that there were different parties for the local Island level and the National Netherlands Antilles level and on the National level the parties were not active on more than one Island (Bentvelsen, et al., 2003).
2.4. Four problems on the BES Islands?

We have seen that the state commission headed by Elzinga analysed the local government in the Netherlands and formulated four main problems that developed within its monistic system. These four problems justified an institutional change that was laid out in the new Local Government Act in the Netherlands. For the governmental transition from the ERNA to the WolBES, these four problems were not specifically analysed on the former Netherlands Antilles territories. This is perhaps justifiable because the administrative structure of the Netherlands Antilles was very similar as it was in the Netherlands before the new Local Government Act. Nevertheless the political structure on the Netherlands Antilles developed parallel but separately, so the four problems found within the Netherlands might have been similar but also could have been distinctly differently on the Netherlands Antilles.

In the next part we will briefly go over the 4 problems and to what extent these problems might have been present on the BES islands based on the available information. For this we use sources that looked into the situation on Saba and Bonaire specifically, because a similar source reviewing the prior governmental situation on Sint Eustatius, did not seem to be available.

2.4.1. The position of political parties on the BES Islands

In the Netherlands, the State Commission recognized the local political situation as problematic. To what extent this problem is/was also present on the BES Islands is difficult to say. Voter turn-out of the last Island council elections were above average. This can also be found in literature where voter turn-out is often found to be higher in smaller, isolated communities and is observable in smaller isolated municipalities in the Netherlands such as for example the Wadden Islands (Swanson & Swanson, 1977) (Anzia, 2013).

On the BES Island, local parties have always dominated local politics, to the point that there actually were no supralocal political parties present that represented multiple Islands at the Netherlands Antilles level. With regards to membership, it was seen on Bonaire that already few people were actually members of the parties. However political parties enjoy the support of loyal followers that sometimes become ‘sleeping members’, these members do support the party financially, but often do not engage in party politics. Not much is known about if these numbers were in decline on Bonaire (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).

On Saba several people involved within the political parties did see that membership did decline drastically. It also became difficult to look for candidates among the members. Being the smallest of the Islands in terms of population it was noted that many people either working for the government or working for companies with ties to the government, this in turn severely limits eligible people to be able to be on the ballot (Paalman, 2011).

On the Islands it was viewed that there are close ties between political parties and the electorate they represented. This is partly explained by the scale and isolation of the Islands and the often intertwined public and private life. There are differences in opinion to the question if there is a gap between government and citizens in general. By some, the gap in this context is seen as non-existent because of the close ties between the political parties and their followers. On the other hand there is also a recognition by others of an information gap, this is mostly mentioned by opposition members politically and in general about government information both by government channels and free news media. While every Island citizen can pick up the phone and call the Island commissioner directly, there is often not an active information approach towards citizens (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Paalman, 2011).
2.4.2. The monistic structure in practice on the BES Islands

The State Commission described that in the Netherlands the formal structure was monism, but that the administrative practice showed dualistic tendencies. The main issue was that while formally the municipal council was the ‘head’ of the municipality, over time the position of aldermen grew in influence and the strong influence in decision making and taking initiative. This problem was also noted for its lack of transparency outwards for those who expect the formal monistic situation, but do not grasp the de facto situation.

In practice there were some dualistic tendencies present on the Islands, similar as seen in the Netherlands. The Executive Council dominated the political proceedings on the Island territory. This was seen as very democratic, because of the local political customs and local views on democratic mandate. On Saba for example it is a voting tradition that the two candidates with the most votes were by default expected to become an Island Commissioner and claim political leadership. This means in practice that the two Island commissioners sometimes represented the majority of the electorate and from this it was by some deemed logical that they would be dominant over the political process.

A lack of transparency on the BES Islands could be similarly a product of these practices that divert from the formal structure of government. But apart from questions of dominance, initiative or who influences decision making the most. The lack of transparency that is presupposed to be the result of unclear relationships between administrative bodies might in practice have been overshadowed by the local practice of having council meetings behind closed doors (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

The small setup of the Island council with potentially two out of the five seats on Saba and Sint Eustatius and four out of nine seats on Bonaire being taken by an Island commissioner also puts the Executive Council 1 seat away from dominance in the Island council. A distinct difference from smaller municipalities in the Netherlands is the political position of the Lt. Governor. In the Netherlands it was seen that in smaller municipalities, mayors would often have more policy influence. This was not so evident on the BES Islands. The Lt. Governor was often in practice limited to strictly the powers and responsibilities as laid down in the law with little or no influence on other policies. On Bonaire this was seen as undesirable by several, on Saba this was mostly seen as a logical result of not having a democratic mandate (Elzinga, 1999) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Paalman, 2011).

2.4.3. Political recognisability on the BES Islands

The third problem put forth by the state commission was the confusion of the public regarding the roles actors held within the administrative bodies. The multiple roles of for example Alderman in both the Board of M&A and the municipal council could be hard to distinguish. And important decisions that in theory are made in council sessions, seem de facto already been made in meetings between coalition parties and their aldermen.

This problem when applied to the BES Islands should indeed be distinguished into two separate categories: First we have recognition of the administrative bodies and which politician is part of which administrative body. Second is the recognisability of how decisions are made. When it is about recognisability of the actors and their roles, then there seemingly was not much of an issue. Due to the small scale and approachability of all politicians, practically everyone knows who they are and what role each fulfils in administrating the Island and the politicians themselves retain close ties with the community (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).
One can question if this clear recognition is of both the formal roles and/or just the de facto administrative proceedings and relations in practice. For example: Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, the Island council has a formal primacy, but in practice the Executive Council was far more influential. So if as an Island Citizen you wanted to get something done, you went to an Island Commissioner. Due to the small scale of the community, this was well known. So the de facto ways who got things done, was therefore very recognizable to the general population (Paalman, 2011).

The political and administrative practice of the actual decision making process was another matter. In some cases clientelism and nepotism, in other cases the somewhat frequent occurrence of closed council sessions would also lead to what the State Commission describes as “inclusive and non-public administration” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009, p. 119). Both these factors did limit general public scrutiny of the political process and also limited the accessibility of the political process to supporters of the ruling party (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008).

2.4.4. Internal relation within the Executive Council

The fourth problem found by the State commission was that of tensions within the Board of M&A that put the collegiality within the Board of M&A under pressure. On both Islands the Lt. Governor was a figurehead towards the general population in his function as ‘bridge’ between politics and the people, despite the lack of actual political leadership. This seemed most apparent on Bonaire where certain tensions between Island commissioners, Island council and the Lt Governor were indeed noted. It was already described before that the Lt. Governor was not expected to get involved in general policies outside his appointed tasks and responsibilities, the reason being that he was a crown appointed official, while the Island commissioners had a democratic mandate from the Island council with the political leader having received the most votes.

The ability of the Lt. Governor to control and correct the legality of the government proceedings was not strong and the Lt. Governor was sometimes even seen as blatantly subservient to the Island commissioners and thus seen as ‘politically coloured’, not standing above the political parties. (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008). The circumstances on Saba were similar though this seemed not to have created actual tensions. Tasks and responsibilities here were also clearly delimited, the Lt. Governor was expected not to interfere with other policy fields than defined by law or tradition. The position to stand above the parties and safeguard that political decision making went according to law seemed to have been far more respected in practice (Paalman, 2011).

2.4.5. Concluding

The pre-WolBES situation on the Netherlands Antilles was based on a similar system as the local government in the Netherlands where four main problems were the justification of an institutional change. Some of the problems identified by the State Commission were indeed present on the Island territories prior to the implementation of dualism. The Executive Council was found to be dominant in political proceedings and decision making in itself not being very transparent. There were also some clear differences probably due to different practices and culture, the political recognisability was not seen as problematic and neither was the general political affiliation of the electorate in question due to the strong local ties of Island politics. It is unclear to what extent these circumstances were actually considered for the implementation of dualism on the BES Islands. In the next few paragraphs that detail the changes the WolBES would implement, we will also see how this would relate to some of the issues found on the BES Islands.
2.5. Dissolution and transition

We reviewed some of the developments of the Netherlands as a nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the colonial era. In this part we will go into the developments that led to its dissolution and the inclusion of the BES Islands into the Netherlands.

It was originally intended that Aruba would become truly independent by 1996. This intent was even formally included in the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The state of status aparte that set up Aruba as an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands was originally a temporary measure, however by the early 90’s the goal of independence was abandoned by Aruba and scrapped from the charter. This meant that the status aparte of Aruba became an indefinite situation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This would also pave the way for future relations of the Islands that were still part of the Netherlands Antilles.

In response of the ongoing debate about the position of the Netherlands Antilles, referenda were held on the five remaining Islands between 2000 and 2005. The people of both Curacao and Sint Maarten spoke out in favour of becoming an autonomous nation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a similar status as Aruba. The people of Bonaire and Saba favoured direct ties with the Netherlands and only on Sint Eustatius there was a majority in favour of renewing the structure of the Netherlands Antilles.

Seeing the results on the other Islands, Sint Eustatius relented and followed the wishes of the other Islands (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009). The results were clear, on the one hand a majority on the Islands chose to stay part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and on the other hand also in majority spoke out against the continuation of the Netherlands Antilles as a nation. This led to talks about the future of the Islands within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The consensus was reached that the Netherlands Antilles had not developed into a unified nation and people. As a consequence steps would be taken to change the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and dissolve the Netherlands Antilles.

Thus the Kingdom of the Netherlands would encompasses four nations: The nations of Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten as part of the Dutch Caribbean region which are considered ‘overseas countries and territories’ (OCT) by the EU. And the Netherlands which is part of the European Union and thus is considered ‘European Netherlands’. The Caribbean public entities of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba are geographically part of the Dutch Caribbean, institutionally part of the Netherlands, but not part of the EU and are also considered to be OCT.

![Euler Diagram Kingdom of the Netherlands](image-url)
This new status of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba would be in the form of ‘special public entities’ and later the specifically created ‘Caribbean public entities’. Initially conceived under article 134 of the Dutch constitution, this article made it possible to institute such public entities, in the past this has for example been done to administrate the new area of Flevoland in its initial development phase before installing the new municipalities and province of Flevoland as conventional public entities. This was done with a special act called Law Public Entity Southern IJsselmeer - Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Wet Openbaar Lichaam Zuidelijke IJsselmeer - Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba). Eventually a specific article was implemented in the Dutch constitution in the form of article 132a. This new article specifically arranges the creation of Caribbean public entities in the Caribbean Netherlands territories and allows these entities specific legislation different from the European Netherlands.

While Flevoland was ‘simply’ the creation of new land, the BES Islands were part of a whole other nation that, while heavily influenced by Dutch laws and ways of public administration, had developed its own ways to get things done. There were different laws, different practices and a different administrative culture. This is not simply changed and it was decided that it required a transitional period, the creation of the ‘Regional Service Centre’ that served as a gateway for the Dutch ministries (which would turn into the ‘Rijksposten Caribbean Netherlands’) and the establishment of the ‘Kingdom representative’ who would serve as a liaison to the Dutch Government and has a somewhat similar role as a King’s Commissioner. A transitional law for the BES Island was also drafted. This transitional law would arrange for the BES Islands to be Dutch territory without the Dutch law being applicable unless explicitly stated. This would allow for the alignment of the BES islands with the rest of the Netherlands in phases, original Netherlands Antilles law would be kept in place until it was gradually phased out (Verhey, 2009).

For the BES Islands there was also a need for new acts to be put in place to change its administrative bodies. This would ultimately be the Act Public entities Bonaire Sint Eustatius, Saba (Wet Openbare Lichamen Bonaire Sint Eustatius Saba/WolBES), that would set up the formal foundation for the Islands as public entities. A key difference with the governmental development of the province of Flevoland was that instead of being a temporary measure, thus the WolBES could be permanent as it was agreed that the BES Islands would not become ‘normal’ Dutch municipalities under the LGA. The WolBES would be for the most part based on the Dutch LGA, but with room for specific deviations. This situation does lead to a problem with the constitution, as the measure of extraordinary public entities is constitutionally seen as temporary and thus the constitution would have to be changed to allow a more permanent existence of the BES public entities deviating from the currently constitutionally recognized municipalities. These talks also determined that the monistic structure that defined the relation between Island councils and Executive Councils under the ERNA would change in a dualistic structure similar to what was implemented in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009) (Zijlstra, 2009).

The initial structure of ‘special public entity’ that would later be formalized into ‘Caribbean public entity’ after the implementation of article 132a in the Dutch constitution, was chosen for several reasons. While the size of the population, makes a municipality the most suitable default structure of administrative bodies for these territories, there were several reasons to adapt this structure to suit the special position of the BES Islands. Especially “the size, great distance from the Netherlands and isolated nature” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009, p. 5) were stated by the Council of State of the Netherlands as reasons to support an Extraordinary structure. While the Netherlands knows municipalities that are both smaller in size and populations such as for example the Dutch Frisian or Wadden Islands that are also municipalities, those Islands and while isolated due to the Wadden Sea. The biggest difference is that these Islands are close to the mainland of the Netherlands are therefore still to some extent able to share in mainland facilities, while the BES Islands are surrounded by foreign nations which also adds to further administrative complications and workload (Spies, Soons, Thodé, Verhey, & Weekers, 2015).
The BES Islands are so far from the Netherlands that they have to be fully sustained on the local level while at the same time the economic output is rather limited. The isolation and distance also means that some costs that are out of proportion in comparison to Dutch municipalities and that does also relate to the personal lives of the inhabitants. Due to both isolation and too small to provide basic necessities of life, a lot has to be imported. This means in practice that prices of those necessities are on average 65% higher than in the Netherlands, while on average the wages are 60% lower.

The isolation of the Islands also mean that they have to maintain for example air- and seaports. Other considerations were for example to allow the administration of Bonaire to be able to use Papiamentu for communication and similarly English for Saba and Sint Eustatius and to have the American dollar as a currency. These deviations were made possible with several special laws such as the WolBES and the BES monetary act which put the BES Islands in a position that allowed for differences with the European parts of the Netherlands. The relations between the BES Islands and the Netherlands would be a direct one without a province in between as the scale was seen as to small to justify the creation of a new province. This meant that provincial oversight would fall to the national government while provincial executive responsibilities would fall to the Islands. A formal position of ‘State Representative’ would be created to function as an administrative link between the National government of the Netherlands and the local Island administrations (Bakker & Veer, 1999) (Alspeer-Belfor & Hulman, 2008) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009) (Paalman, 2011) (College voor de rechten van de mens, 2014). These differences were later formalized with article 132a of the constitution, which established the ‘Caribbean public entity’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2015).

2.6. Differences between the WolBES and the LGA

The differences between the WolBES and the LGA are in some cases pertaining to the relation between administrative bodies and in some cases relate to either the specific circumstances or responsibilities. Most notable differences introduced in the WolBES not found in the LGA, are articles 9, 11, 24, 41, 49, 57, 73, 76, 95, 107, 168, 209 and 221 of the WolBES, the lack of financial articles (these are part of a separate financial act BES) and the general administrative law of the Netherlands not being applicable with the exception of chapter 9 (instead the Law administrative jurisdiction BES was adopted (WarBES)). Below we will go over how this relates to the different administrative bodies.

2.6.1. Island council changes

For the Island council, the number of seats on the council was allowed to remain being less than the number prescribed in the LGA. It would also not be allowed for non-Dutch Citizens to be elected on the council (in the Netherlands anyone who legally resides for 5 years in a municipality can be elected). The Island council is limited in establishing an auditing office or ombudsman and is only able to do so in a shared fashion with all three of the Island councils of the BES Islands.

Also different was that the Island council can be corrected by the Lt. Governor on two distinct occasions. 1. If the Island Council calls for a closed door session when in conflict with the public interest (article 24 section 4) and 2. If the Island Council wrongfully fails to dismiss an Executive Councilmember (article 57 section 4 WolBES). And with the implementation of dualism, Island commissioners could no longer be part of the Island council. Similarly the controlling powers of the Island council are increased (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).
2.6.2. Executive Council changes

The Executive Council gained an additional limitation in that it was now prohibited for people who shared second grade family relations or marriage to serve together on the Executive Council. They also are now obliged by law to declare business interests as well as private capital of their own and their spouses when they are appointed and dismissed.

The Executive Council is also limited in their ability to manage personnel, needing approval from the State Representative to appoint, promote or dismiss civil servants working for the Island public entities. Every formal decision also has to be send to this State Representative.

The Executive Council also gained the right to judge proposed policies by the national government of the Netherlands, that pertain specifically the BES Islands or when nationally proposed policies deviate significantly from the legislation in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands municipalities can also influence policy making, but do so seldom directly. In the case of the BES Islands this form of participation for each individual public entity is uniquely granted by law (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

2.6.3. Lt. Governor Changes

A new power that is unprecedented in the Dutch administrative legal system is the power of the Lt. Governor to veto a decision of the Island council to meet behind closed doors. In the Netherlands, council meetings are usually public by default and only behind closed when the situation demands it, such as the procedure to propose a mayor or when there are for example strategic financial considerations. On the BES Islands it was far more customary that Council meetings were not public and in the transition this was seen from the Netherlands as a threat to transparency to and public scrutiny.

Parties gaining absolute majorities were not uncommon and in such a situation could therefore in theory always decide to keep meetings behind closed doors, the power of the Lt. Governor to veto such decisions was put in place to encourage more transparency and can be seen as a measure to change the existing administrative culture and practice. This also relates to dualism, as the position of Lt. Governor as independent, impartial and as chairman of the council would make the position suitable to monitor and enact transparency.

Another unprecedented power the Lt. Governor gained was the power to dismiss an Island Commissioner if that commissioner held on to conflicting functions as laid out in article 40 of the WolfBES and the Island council failed to dismiss the commissioner themselves (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

2.6.4. Concluding

On the one hand some of these measures seem to be in place to establish control and oversight from the Netherlands over these Islands. Of note is the lack of autonomy over personnel management and the specific powers that set up the Lt. Governor in a more controlling role to be able to correct the Island council. On the other hand it also establish an unprecedented form of participation for each BES Island to be able to participate in the specific legislation of their Islands so that their position is under consideration and taken into account.
What is interesting is that it for example in a controlling role implicitly recognizes a different cultural attitude and potential undesirable practice. The Lt. Governor got two additional powers to correct the Island council in case the Island council would not take action. In other words the Lt. Governor got powers to potentially enforce the change in behaviour to make council sessions more open to the public and control the Island commissioners.
3. Theoretical framework

We called the implementation of dualism an institutional reform and structural change. When a structural change for an institution is considered, several factors are important: 1. the administrative practice or behaviour that is intended to change; 2. the administrative culture or attitudes of people might need to be changed to identify the original institutional setting as problematic and a new one as a solution and 3. Institutional reforms needs to take place to actually change the institution. While the specific circumstances are perhaps contextual and different between the implementation of the LGA in the Netherlands and the WolBES on the BES Islands. The goal is in essence the same as are the overall principles. The administrative culture and practice might have been (subtly) different on the BES islands, the institutional change and the implementation of dualism has similar goals as in the Netherlands. As such we feel confident to apply similar policy theories to this specific case.

Administrative culture was deemed important by the State Commission, as one of the variables that would have to change to improve and renew local governance. It is therefore an important variable to study when looking at the effects of the implementation of administrative dualism and we will go over this in 3.1. At the same time, the implementation was a so called institutional reform. It was primarily a new law, by which local government would change its workings. The context and content of this structural change was discussed in the chapter before, in this chapter we will also go into several rule aspects of structure and institutional reform in 3.2. Furthermore it will be reviewed how structure and culture relate to each other in the context if a formal legislative change of local government that would also have to lead to changes of administrative culture and practice (van Hulst M., 2009) (Elzinga, 1999).

This does not necessary mean that the implementation of dualism would causally lead to changes in administrative culture. It was however the original policy intent that after the formal implementation of dualism, administrative culture should have to be changed by the people involved. And the aim of this research will be to determine to what extent attitudes reflect support for the dualistic measures of the WolBES. To that end we will also go into the definitions of administrative culture in 3.3 and administrative practice in 3.4 as used in this research. We also consider the role of administrative tradition in 3.5 and view the relations between administrative culture, administrative practice & administrative tradition in 3.6. As the basis for this change is the implementation of the dualistic system in the Netherlands, we will go over some of the results in 3.7.

3.1. Administration

We have used the term ‘administration’ already a lot in this thesis. In Dutch we would use the word: ‘bestuur’, which is a broad term used in Dutch for both public and private organisations denote a board that leads the organisation. It is also used broadly to denote the official bodies of state and lastly it refers to government functioning. As such it does not seem to have a clear direct English translation. Describing it in English, ‘bestuur’ would boil down to a sort of ‘authoritative body’ that acts by ‘steering’ or ‘supervising’ a group or process. It also is used to label broadly the whole and parts of (local) government. For example: ‘gemeentebestuur’ (municipal administration) refers to all three ‘bestuurslichamen’ (the three administrative bodies: Municipal Council, Board of M&A and Mayor) combined. The term administration in relation to government is in the English language most often used to refer to executive branches. However as we have seen, in the Dutch system of monism the distinction between municipal council and board of M&A was much less clear to distinguish them into legislative and executive branches. In the situation of the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles before implementation of dualism, executive power was formally a responsibility of the municipal council and was mandated to the Board of M&A. In that sense, the Anglosphere’s idea of ‘administration’ referring to executive branches, would therefore formally also have referred to the municipal council.
This further complicates the matter but also justifies using the term ‘administration’ to denote the broader Dutch meaning of ‘bestuur’. With the dualistic system the roles of these two administrative bodies became more distinct but the traditional jargon, legislative language and labels are hard to discard and still apply. Adding to that, the Dutch meaning of the word ‘bestuur’ is also linked to concepts as setting frameworks or control. As such the term ‘bestuur’ still tends to be broader in the Netherlands than the word ‘administration’ implies in the Anglosphere. As it is seemingly the closest fitting terminology for the purpose of this thesis, we will thus use the term ‘administration’ to refer to the broader meaning, practices and institutions that we would describe in Dutch with the word ‘bestuur’.

When we refer specifically to executive roles, we will specifically denote this as ‘executive’. Helping us in this matter is that the administrative body tasked with the executive role, is actually literally called the ‘Executive Council’, keeping the terminology consistent.

### 3.2. Structure

It was stated that the implementation of the dualistic system was intended as an institutional reform and structural change. An institution can be defined as ‘structure’ and in this setting it is defined by formal laws and regulations which establish ‘the rules of the game’. This institutional structure provides a framework what actors are in the administrative context are either prohibited to do or contrary what they are allowed to do in certain instruments in situations (de Groot, 2009) (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006).

#### 3.2.1. Rules

One way to view such rules within institutions is by using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework by Ostrom et al. People operating within an institution are most often not able to do so in absolute freedom, but do so while considering several limiting factors, such as the ‘laws’ of nature, conventions or norms of the community and more specific rules and regulations. These three factors give structure to behaviour and formal interactions (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2012). Given that dualism relates in large part on the implementation of formal rules it is in the interest of this research to look a bit more into the theory behind such rules.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position rules</td>
<td>These rules establish the positions of the actors involved, what they are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>responsible for, which powers they have, how many positions there are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary rules</td>
<td>When are actors eligible for a position? How are actors subsequently able to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attain a position? And how is succession arranged when they leave it? Boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rules determine those conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority rules</td>
<td>Actors need to act, authority rules establish the means, rights and obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for actors in positions to perform tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope rules</td>
<td>Acts have consequences, scope rules determine what outcomes may be affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting frameworks is an example of setting up scope rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information rules</td>
<td>To make decisions and act, information is needed, information rules determine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to what extent information is made available and under what circumstances for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the people in the established positions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Rules in institutional settings*
Ostrom distinguished several different types of rules, five of which were recognized by de Groot as applicable to the implementation of dualism, in table 1 above these five types of rules are briefly described and we will briefly go over how they relate to this specific institutional setting (de Groot, 2009) (Ostrom, 2005) (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2012).

**Positional & Boundary rules**

We can relate those types of rules to some of the formal changes made by implementing the WolBES and the dualistic system. The change that aldermen could no longer also be part of the municipal council is an example of a change in position and boundary rules. The position rules establish the positions of aldermen and Councilmembers and the boundary rules determine that Councilmembers are no longer eligible for being aldermen unless they leave the position on the council or when they are ‘demissionary’ in the transition period after an election. Subsequently the new rule that people from outside the municipal council and even the municipality (provided that they moved into the municipality or receive dispensation) could become aldermen was also an example of a changed boundary rule.

**Authority rules**

The new measures to control and hold the Board of M&A accountable and loss of executive tasks for the municipal council are examples of authority rules.

**Scope rules**

The shift in focus from the municipal council being involved in the finer points and specifics of policy making, to determining the more general framework is a shift of scope rules as is the execution of policies becoming the primary responsibility of the Board of M&A.

**Information rules**

The obligation of the Board of M&A to inform the council is an example of an information rule. An important reason for this change was in fact the change in positional and authority rules. Due to not anymore being responsible for the execution of municipal policy, the municipal council needed additional tools to perform its controlling role (de Groot, 2009).

These rules can shape how actors in the institution act, after all these rules are formal, often written down in law and therefore often not non-committal especially if there are also other institutions in place that can enforce those rules. By that mechanism it can be reasonably expected that institutions in general can shape how actors behave (Grietens, 1999) (Ostrom, 2005) (de Groot, 2009).

3.2.2. Institutional reform

Structure was defined as the ‘rules of the game’ and we have covered five types of rules that can be found in the administrative setting. These rules that make up an institution might not be there for all eternity. They may change over time either by evolving circumstances, reinterpretation and natural adaptation to changing circumstances. Alternatively rules can change by deliberately implementing a new law such as the WolBES.

Such a reform might be considered by lawmakers to be needed due to the old rules no longer fit to the daily workings of government. For example it was seen in the Netherlands that, because of the responsibilities of municipalities growing beyond what was anticipated at the time of Thorbecke, the institution of municipalities and the monistic system needed reform. And as an answer for that
development, the LGA of 2002 was implemented to encourage the actors of the municipality to behave in a new way that would hopefully answer to the current democratic and administrative demands. That last part is important, because obviously such a structural change in a municipality is not done lightly and requires changes in administrative culture as well. For the structural change to be successful, the actors that are to work with those changes need to be convinced that the old situation is undesirable (Tichy, 1983) and then subsequently an actual institutional reform changing the rules with a new law can take place.

If such a change is seen as needed, then there are still multiple ways to achieve that without necessarily having to do an institutional reform by making a new law. The structural change to implement dualism was for example seen as a somewhat intense and intrusive intervention. So alternatively it was considered by lawmakers that the desired effect of improving and strengthening local democracy could also be reached by measures aimed at administrative cultural changes that did not involve imposing a new law. In other words should this be a measure that would fall under the autonomy of municipalities to implement as they saw fit or would this be top-down implemented without any permissiveness. It was weighted that without a structural change, changes could not be guaranteed and the fact that some proposals made by the State commission were deemed impossible to implement without structural changes, the choice was made to change the Local Government Act (Rijksoverheid, 2001).

The considerations of the Dutch national government show different thoughts on how to achieve change, such as the autonomous freedom to achieve cultural changes versus an imposed institutional reform by instituting new rules. This is sometimes viewed as a contrast of informal culture versus formal structure (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006), which can indeed be seen in the autonomy that municipalities would have in the considered cultural approach and the formality of laws that the chosen structural approach implies. While municipal autonomy would of course not have excluded the possibility of municipalities to implement local regulations to formalize an autonomous form of dualism and therefore create a structural change on the local level. It was in that scenario also possible for a municipality to state an intention to change, without actually changing the formal rules.

The idea that structure is defined as the formal framework of rules and regulations and administrative culture as an informal way ‘things are done’ (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006), seems a somewhat classical take on the agency versus structure debate. Culturalism in this is the creation of meaningful practices, such as life experience, by human agents and structuralism as meaningful practices based on structures that go beyond the individual agent. There have been many views on this and the question over what has primacy, structure or agency? Where do the values, beliefs and attitudes of the individual as an agent end and those variables being shared in a structure begin? While views that are shared and constitute a status quo as to how things are done and could be viewed as facto ‘structures’ we will not refer to this as structure unless they are also formalized in rules or regulations (Barker, 2000).

It is tempting to see these aspects as a polar opposites, both culture and structure can be interwoven. The need to change structures comes often from cultural motives and subsequently the Dutch government and State Commission both recognized that the for the successful structural change to strengthen the municipal administration, both implementation of dualism as an institutional reform of rules and administrative culture would have to change. To that end a joint project between the National government and the joint municipalities was carried out between 2000 and 2006 called the “renewal impulse dualism” which specifically stimulated cultural changes (Elzinga, 1999) (Rijksoverheid, 2001) (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006) (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004).
3.3. Administrative Culture

Culture in the administrative setting is important for this research. We have seen that culture is considered an important factor in realizing structural changes. We then need to define what culture actually is. In literature it is recognized as important to people to want to keep their identity and culture in the administrative domain. It also means that it might not be so easily changed, culture is sometimes also seen as traditional and set way to get things done either within or outside official ways. It was also identified by the state commission as an important factor for the successful implementation of dualism (Caidan, 1998) (Dwivedi, 2005) (Elzinga, 1999).

But what then is culture? Culture is more difficult to grasp as a concept, when reviewing literature there are multiple interpretations and viewpoints. Finding its origin as a social concept in an agricultural metaphor for the ‘cultivation’ of the soul by ancient roman statesman and philosopher Cicero (Cicero, Bouhier, & d’Olivet, 1812) the concept evolved over time to its more anthropological meaning as “a whole and distinctive way of life” (Barker, 2000, p. 35), learned behaviour or in other words: habits, views and feelings we derive from our social environment by learning from others and opposed to ‘nature’ and ‘instinct’ (Wilterdink & van Heerikhuizen, 2007) or in an organisational context “the way we do things” (Van Dam & Marcus, 2005, p. 491). Those views on culture are still very broad, but they do give a basic framework while at the same time providing us with a problem. These definitions have both a passive component in views and an active component in behaviour, while we have established earlier that behaviour is something separate from culture.

There are also other considerations such as: Is culture for example stable and shared or is it contentious, ambiguous and always in motion (van Hulst, 2009). Is culture more than learned behaviour apart from nature (Wilterdink & van Heerikhuizen, 2007). Is culture actually measurable as a variable, set apart from behaviour and structure (van Hulst, 2009)? Perhaps it is not really possible to really define culture at all because it is such a broad concept (Willis, 2002). So to work with culture as a potential variable, its meaning has to be narrowed down and more specifically defined in a public administrative context. While views on administrative culture in literature may also be diverse and similar to views about culture in general, it could however provide an established framework.

To do this we can look specifically to sources relating to public administration that are about culture in an administrative context (or simply put: administrative culture). And also literature on the subject of the dualistic system published by the VNG (Institution for Dutch municipalities). By doing this, one can narrow down the multiple interpretations of culture a bit by the definitions used in the field of public administration on the subject of institutional dualism. These might still vary, but should provide more focus.

One such source defines administrative culture as the “modal pattern of values, beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions that characterize and identify any given administrative system.” (Dwivedi, 2005, p. 20) Though the same source also mentions an active component in the sense of ‘the way things are done’. Another source views administrative culture as an independent phenomenon having an impact on behaviour, we will for the purpose of this research use most of the definition by Dwivedi (Singh, 1997) (Dwivedi, 2005).

Dissecting the definition we can identify the key factors that define culture. The first keyword is ‘pattern’. We can view pattern in several different ways but for the purpose of defining culture, we view it in the context of establishing a common culture. Culture as seen as a system is made up by the sum of its people or beings sharing all the same or similar characteristics of that culture. With that we mean that one person alone does not define a culture, it is shared in such a way that a pattern emerges between the actors involved that is repeated such as a shared norm (Johnson, 2013).
Another key factor is the grouping of ‘values, beliefs, attitudes and predispositions’. These four terms have in common that they are about what goes on inside people’s minds. The term ‘attitude’ might actually be a good overall summarization of these four terms as an attitude is perhaps best described as a ‘stance’ or a ‘view’ that a person has on something else. As such an attitude can be seen as the evaluation of an object, such as a belief, person, policy or entity. This implies a certain predisposition to be able to value these objects as what they ought to be. We thus might also view this as a dominantly normative factor (Cushman & McPhee, 2013).

The third key factor is that administrative culture characterizes and identifies an administrative system. It is part of what makes such a system distinct. So if we are looking at administrative culture in the context of this research, we are looking for: patterns of attitudes that characterize a public entity. Now that we have this definition of administrative culture, we also need to define administrative practice.

### 3.4. Administrative practice

When we looked at ‘culture’ in its broadest sense we saw that in incorporated both passive components such as shared views which are more normative in nature and active components ‘the way things are done’ which is more descriptive in nature. We have defined the passive component encompassing attitudes and views as administrative culture. That leaves us with an active component ‘practice’ and this is important for our research as we are not only interested what people think of an institutional change, but also how they subsequently operate and practice after that change. In short we are interested in how people actually behave when the rules change.

We can define behaviour as acts and/or habits performed by individuals in conjunction with themselves or the larger environment such as other systems, individuals or physical environment. Behaviour as such can be seen as a response of an individual to both internal and external stimuli and this can be both conscious and subconscious (Minton & Khale, 2014). Behaviour can thus be influenced by many things including formal rules, group dynamics and their own attitudes.

It is therefore justified that we treat it as a separate variable, because while rules have the intention to channel or change behaviour. It is not a given that when the rules change, behaviour automatically follows (de Groot, 2009).

Rules determine human behaviour in every stage of life and function. Culture is in this context often a rule giver from where desirable behaviour evolves (Baum, 1995). The difficulty in this specific situation is that the institutional reform with its new (formal) rules are not directly derived from and tailored to the already established local cultural normative attitudes, but basically copied from the Netherlands. It is however also not necessarily the case that formal rules always come from locally established normative attitudes, and people having certain attitudes against new rules does not necessarily mean that they will not (eventually) work along those new rules if they respect the framework from which these formal rules are established (Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, & Southwood, 2013).

Depending on attitude some rules can be seen as bendable, some as ignorable, others as unbreakable and that is ultimately dependable on cultural, social and historical factors. But even so people can deal with rules in their own individual way (Grietens, 1999). Nevertheless, rules probably influence actual behaviour more effective if they codify the normative views of the people (Skoog, 2005) (Grzymala-Busse, 2010) hence why in the Netherlands it was stimulated to adapt normative views and change the administrative culture after the implementation of the new Local Government Act.
In other words: It was the intention with the WolBES to make a structural change that required behaviour to also change to be successful. After all different rules do not mean a thing if the actors do not follow them. However it is unlikely that nothing at all was changed, the question will be probably be more to what extent behaviour will have changed.

Behaviour as a variable is possibly dependent on many variables in some sort of synergy of tradition, formal rules and attitudes. We may not always know what specifically influence behaviour on an individual level in this study, but we can look for shared attitudes and if this reflects in common practice.

3.5. Relation between attitude and behaviour in administration

Now that we have defined administrative culture and administrative practice we will look at their relations. We used terms such as ‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviour’. And have set them apart as very different terms. There were also definitions of ‘culture’ with a more active element such as ‘the way getting things done’ which seems like behaviour. The reason why in culture terms like attitude and behaviour might be grouped together is perhaps because these are at times also seen as complimentary to each other. While there are certainly relationships between attitudes and behaviour it is not the case that attitude automatically leads to a certain behaviour. Literature as such makes a distinction between attitude-relevant behaviour and attitude-irrelevant behaviour (Cushman & McPhee, 2013)

So should we pair attitudes and behaviour in the context of the implementation of the dualistic system? Literature on dualism does not give a clear answer, most view these as separate variables. Denters et al in several publications about the implementation of dualism, define administrative culture essentially as role views separate from how people actually behave which is defined as administrative practice (Denters, et al., 2002) (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).

A separation between ‘views’ and ‘behaviour’ can also be found in the publication titled ‘Culturen rond besturen’ (Cultures amongst administrating), this publication by the Association of Dutch Municipalities was part of the efforts to change the administrative culture after the implementation of the LGA. In it, the authors view administrative culture as “shared ways of thinking and practice by administrators and government officials” (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006, p. 18) This might seem at first that they in fact view that both attitudes and behaviour as being part of culture, but on closer inspection they further separate culture in three layers: 1. administrative tradition as the underlying foundation of administrative culture. Every municipality has its own environment, its own people and its own history that while in constant state of change, are also what makes a municipality distinctive and overall as a sum contribute to its administrative culture; 2. Administrative style which is about what the conventional ways to do things are in a municipality in a normative sense of attitudes, viewpoints and opinions how to handle situations; 3. Administrative practice as the actual methods and instruments used in practice to get things done.

These definitions share strong similarities with what we already established as administrative culture as attitudes and administrative practice as behaviour and introduces a new one called ‘administrative tradition’.
3.6. Tradition

A third dimension to consider beside culture and practice is ‘tradition’. It is tempting to assume that administrative systems are generally the same within a nation if they have the same legal foundation and common history. However it is also observed that in very different settings, distinct administrative traditions form. With tradition we mean the legacy of the rules, practices, values and beliefs that have been passed down by those that came before us, the ‘weight of the past’ that shapes an identity today. We are not people who simply have random rules, behaviours and attitudes nor does tradition necessarily mean a static state of affairs with every actor conforming when such matters are established. Values, beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions do not appear out of nowhere, they often develop incrementally over time influenced by various factors which can be highly regional in nature (Painter & Peters, 2010).

The administrative tradition in the cultural sense of the history of an institution is sometimes also seen as a more structural component. Patterns in attitudes can become normative in nature and turn into so called ‘social institutions’, in the sense that informal unwritten ways of ‘how things were done’ in the past can be as strict as formal written rules (Johnson, 2013). So in essence administrative tradition is a product of the historical development of culture, structure and how things have actually been done in practice (de Groot, 2009) (Begeleidingscommissie Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale democratie, 2006). Administrative tradition as a variable could be important and remain influential to the process of change. Administrative tradition remains the foundation on which an institutional change such as introducing the dualistic system as part of the WolBES intervenes in. And if this foundation is not taken sufficiently into account this might result in the institutional change not being as successfully implemented as can possibly be (Tichy, 1983) (Papadakis, 1996).

In an institutional setting, these incremental changes and rules are not random, but can be fairly arbitrary. Specific structures and rules may have formed because structures and rules in itself were needed, instead of the system needing those specific rules and structures (Keller, Poortinga, Scholmerich, Butterworth, & Scholmerich, 2012). It can be observed that cultures often change due to the human capacity of applying trial and error and this might develop differently in different polities. In a political institution working together is often based on distinct social rules, while at the same time policy problems ask for constant learning and experimentation and sticking with what rules and practices work or selecting new rules and ways when there is a need improve performance (Lewis & Steinmo, 2012) or the occasional mandatory legislative change from ‘higher’ government. However at the same time those changes are also determined and shaped by distinctive heritage and such influences are often found to be incredibly persistent, with characteristic features persevering through many reforms and structures changing while the original values endure (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) (Painter & Peters, 2010).

Regardless of shared tradition, there remains a human factor, in cultural studies sometimes referred to as ‘agency’. The actors involved are individual human beings, not robots who are programmed to just follow rules and traditions blindly. Individual people have views, opinions, ‘quirks’ and can make their own free choices. These can be highly influenced by existing culture, traditions, groupthink, and other (in)formal rules but still retain their own agency. Structures influence, steer, and/or limit that agency with rules, but people can still make choices how to act and possibly help or obstruct such changes (Barker, 2000).

An administrative tradition is thus most likely the outcome of a many iterations and ongoing evolution of individual attitudes and practices resulting in a shared entity what in the public administrative setting is called a ‘polity’, or in other words: ‘the collective political identity’. Though to what extent individual actors conform to this, is in constant flux as is the tradition itself.
3.7. Administrative Cultural Domain

So multiple sources define different aspects that relate to something called ‘culture’, some of it reflects on history, some specify culture as views and attitudes apart from behaviour, some view the combination as both as ‘culture’. To prevent confusion, we will combine the definitions of Denters et al with the three layer system of cultural aspects by the Association of Dutch Municipalities. The whole of the three layers we call the ‘Administrative Cultural domain’, which contains the layers Administrative tradition, culture and practice.

In this definition, the administrative cultural domain is what we mean by culture in its broadest meaning within the administrative setting. Defining this as a cultural domain recognizes the many views that there are of ‘culture’.

Administrative tradition is more specifically the combined history, setting and people and encompasses the traditional aspect of ‘the way things were done’ and historical views that make the specific administration unique. Administrative culture is specifically about attitudes as in the current attitudes, views and opinions and Administrative practice is about behaviour and how people currently behave in practice. We will go a bit further into how these relate to each other and model how the variables would change following the policy theory of the structural change that the implementation of dualism would bring.

Earlier we covered relations between rules, attitude and behaviour. And so it might be the case in the context of this research. We assume that past rules, attitudes and behaviours in tradition influences both cultural attitudes and practice in the form of continuation of how things have been done and should have been, while contemporary cultural attitudes influences practice from contemporary views reflecting on how things should be done in the current circumstances.

![Figure 2: The Administrative Cultural Domain](image)

The whole cultural domain is thus a complex concept and to go specifically into local tradition would probably require significant anthropological study on three separate Island territories with little literature on the matter.
In this research we therefore focus on administrative culture, which we define as patterns of attitudes that characterize a public entity. We also focus on administrative practice which we define as patterns in acts and/or habits performed by individuals. Administrative tradition as the collective history of the administrative setting, we do not focus specifically on, but assume this might be an influence and perhaps reason if respondents do not fully adopt the attitudes or practices that define dualistic culture and practice.

The implementation of the WolBES and the dualistic system dualism is an institutional reform that was expected to set in motion (though not necessarily in causal effect) changes in attitudes and behaviour. It is however unlikely to state that a structural change leads to immediate changes in the cultural layer of tradition, though in time it will probably become part of it in some form.

3.8. Expected results based on practice within the Netherlands

With the implementation of dualism it was intended to restore and reinforce the position of the municipal council as a representative and controlling administrative body and improve the recognisability of local government to the public (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004). Having definitions of dualism and the aspects of administrative culture, it is then the question in what way the implementation of dualism would change administrative culture and practice.

As stated before the local government has seen developments over the years since the Local Government Act of 1851. Local government grew due to for example the ideas and policies of the growing welfare state and the increasing joint administrative tasks. This development led to changing relations and shifted the primacy in governing and execution of policy more and more towards the Board of M&A.

Roles that already were intertwined became more unclear over time and from this development four main problems were defined. An answer to this situation was the implementation of dualism. Dualism in this context is about the separation of two bodies of government. This separation also includes a separation of roles. The policy theory behind this was that when the municipal council focuses less on administrative tasks, would give municipal councilmembers more time to act in their roles as the representative of the people within the municipality and also focus more on its controlling task to keep the administration by the Executive Council accountable (de Groot, 2009).

In the Netherlands there is no ‘pure’ form of dualism, as the State Commission stated a ‘pure’ form of dualism has in theory no strong instruments of control as both administrative bodies have their own mandate. The form of dualism implemented with the Local Government Act explicitly involved instruments of control to reinforce the position of the Municipal Council. The current constitutional status of the municipal council also remains unchanged leaving the Council as ‘head’ of the municipality, in that sense the new institutional situation retains some characteristics of a hierarchy (Elzinga, 1999).

But is this also how the participants actually view their new roles? It is of no use to instigate institutional changes if they do not result in actual improvements and this means changes in how municipal councilmembers and members of the Board of M&A view their roles and how they perform them in practice.
3.8.1. Culture & Practice

Of interest is earlier research on the matter in the Netherlands which for example reviewed how participants viewed that their roles after dualism was implemented. Primarily if the municipal council should be more about control and less about administrating? In this they took the idea of the State Commission that a successful implementation of dualism would need a change in culture. The change in culture should then also lead contribute to changing administrative practices and thus an improved functioning of local government. For example the idea that administrative bodies commit to their own tasks and do not interfere to much with the tasks of the other administrative bodies (Oort, 2011) (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).

Denters et al, showed this idea schematically an adaptation of which can be seen below:

![Implementation of Dualism Adapted from (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001, p. 2)](image)

The study by Denters et al was performed on participating municipalities that experimented with dualism before the Local Government Act of 2002 and focused most on the role of municipal councilmembers. Amongst the participating municipalities some differences were found between municipal council members, administrators and other ‘opinion leaders’ (such as representatives of local press and entrepreneurs) on their judgement of the importance of control and administration as part of the tasks of the municipal council (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).

3.8.2. Initial Evaluative findings

Evaluations of the implementation of dualism in the Netherlands showed varying results. Initial research and evaluations in 2004 revealed a lack of clear vision on how the development of dualism should proceed; a lack of direction in the sense of who should be primarily responsible for the implementation (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004) by 2008 the national government assessed the implementation of dualism a success (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2008).

Earlier we established 4 measures of dualism, a study was performed to what extent these measures were supported. This study showed mainly support for the improved position and rights for Councilmembers and improved facilities for the control abilities of the council and to a lesser degree support for the separation of tasks and the separation of functions and positions (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).

With the changing structure of local government came a change in roles, the municipal council was structured to have more abilities to maintain control, while administration became the responsibility of the Board of M&A. However the structural change did not necessarily change attitudes. In the study council members, board members and relevant ‘opinion leaders’ were also asked about what the priorities of the council should be given the choice of control and administration. The views of municipal councilmembers proved to be more strongly attached to their original more administrative duties, while board members and opinion leaders expect more priority on the control function of the municipal council. (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2008) (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001).
3.8.3. Relation between Council and Board of M&A

The relation between the Board of M&A and the municipal council did not always improve after they were separated by both the new structure of the Local Government Act and how it was implemented and became administrative practice. Most actors seemed to agree that the independence of the municipal council improved, this sometimes meant that aldermen were not invited to attend council meetings and were sometimes even excluded from attending the standing Council Committee’s to which they were no longer member of by law.

These developments were not viewed positively by aldermen, who together with mayors and municipal secretaries indicated increasing conflicts and decreasing stability. Interestingly these developments were not observed by the municipal council members, aldermen after all had held a very dominant position and Elzinga basically called it a necessary counterbalancing act that the separation between administrative bodies decreased the dominance of the position (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004) (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2012).

Aldermen thus recognized both a cultural and practice change. Culturally in the sense that they saw a municipal council who became much more aware of its position and the power of their control now that aldermen are no longer part of the council. In a way, dualism brought a sense of ‘being in charge’ to the municipal council and a boost of self-esteem. This meant that aldermen became not only separated but also somewhat opposed, the system went from a consensus model to more of a conflict model (Korringa & Molen, 2005). It is also interesting to note that beyond the formal separation, the actual arrangement and extent of that separation in practice were under the autonomy of the municipalities themselves. Municipalities did not have to separate the council and aldermen so strictly as in the example above. There were for example also municipalities where aldermen were actually more often invited to attend Council and Committee sessions and the separation was achieved by aldermen simply not being part of the municipal council anymore and fewer involvement between aldermen and party meetings outside the official council and committee sessions (Dikken & Schipper, 2005). So the implementation of dualism did create a separation but there have been differences to which extent aldermen remained involved with the council, to streamline the relationship more it was for example advice to further structure the relation by laying down procedures how and when administrative bodies communicate (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2008).

It was also noted that despite the formal positional separation in a dualistic system, there still could be a de facto administrative practice of ‘executive monism’. This was typically defined by there being a strong bind between coalition factions and an executive or coalition agreement. This then bound a majority of a municipal council on a certain policy course with little opportunity to deviate, dominating the policy discourse. Party discipline and compliant coalition factions were also factors that defined executive monism, as was decision making on the basis of coalition parties with little room for opposition factions and decision making being predetermined in consultation between coalition factions. (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001, p. 9). Executive monism is therefore mostly the consolidation of power around the executive branch, which potentially hampers the functioning of the municipal council.

In a retrospective 10 years after the implementation of dualism Elzinga mused that the new position of Council clerk as a professional with staff members working for the municipal council proved important in the separation and empowerment of the Council with relative to the Board of M&A. The council clerk after all has the ability to level the playing field a bit by its professional support of the municipal council where before there was only a civil servant apparatus supporting the Board of M&A (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2012). Also of note is that while as a consequence of dualism and the council and board becoming somewhat more to stand opposite to each other. The relation within the Board of M&A seemed to become more collegial (Korringa & Molen, 2005).
3.9. Intended implementation on the BES Islands

It was assessed that for the implementation of the dualistic system in the Netherlands to succeed, both the administrative culture and practice needed to change. This was thus given great priority, being explicitly noted as such in the explanatory memorandum of the local government act, subject to in-depth research and in practice the subsequent executed by several programmes, training opportunities and supporting publications organized by the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Rijksoverheid, 2001).

This kind of effort was seemingly less notable in the process to implement the dualistic system on the BES islands. The issue of the local administrative culture was noted as different, necessary to change and that it would take time (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009). The issue of administrative culture in the new dual system was briefly mentioned as being prioritized for Lt. Governors in 2011 to receive training (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2012), it was onwards not explicitly mentioned as a priority for the rest of the administrative bodies in the subsequent progress reports of the transition (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2014) (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2015) (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2016) (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2017).

That is not to say that there have been no efforts made, however these might have been overshadowed by for example the efforts of the relevant Dutch ministries investing heavily in the workings of local government departments in their respective fields such as the transitioning of the education system or the healthcare system. In the Netherlands the implementation of the dualistic system was an operation in itself, in the context of BES it was one subject of many.

The Association of Dutch Municipalities did offer training to Island Councilmembers and Island Commissioners on how to work within the new system and how this new system affects the working relationship between administrative bodies (VNG, 2012) and in the course of this research the Island Council clerks also indicated having spent some efforts on the matter.

So the main efforts seem to have been made to set up the overall administrative practice in the broadest sense of the word covering the executive working of all departments and the workings of administrative functioning such as the workings of the WolBES and the dualistic system. After the initial implementation of the WolBES, there seems little evidence of attempts to change the administrative culture. With regards of adapting to the Dutch governmental system an evaluative report noted that the mind-set seemed to be that the administrative model of the Local Government Act of 2002 was a proven concept and that the three Caribbean public entities now included would sort themselves out over time (Spies, Soons, Thodé, Verhey, & Weekers, 2015, p. 104).
4. Research questions

In this study we want to find out what the attitudes and behaviours relating to the workings of local government are after the implementation of dualism. Even though it might be difficult to establish actual causal relations, it is known that the implementation of the LGA had intended certain (democratic) effects to improve local government. The WolBES being similar to the LGA might achieve similar effects and it is the aim of this research to see to what extent the situation is as intended after the implementation of the WolBES.

The main question therefore is as follows:

What are the attitudes and behaviour of Island councilmembers regarding dualism after the implementation of the WolBES and to what extent are they conforming to the intention of the dualistic system?

This main question has several components. First there is the fact that the WolBES is in effect, specifically the measures relating to the improvement of democracy such as dualism have to be implemented. The second component relates to the administrative culture (attitudes), we want to know what the respondent’s attitudes are on the measures of the WolBES relating to the dualistic system and we want to know their attitudes on their changed roles and if that attitude is dualistic in nature itself.

The third component is about administrative practice (behaviour) that might have been affected by the implementation of the WolBES. We want to know how Island councilmembers are spending their time and instruments used in their roles to control and hold the executive council accountable. With this component we also intend to look into if the administrative practice is dualistic in nature or if there are still Executive monistic tendencies present. And lastly we want to know if the BES specific issue of closed door sessions preventing outward transparency is still present after the implementation of the WolBES.

This leads us to formulate six research questions:

1. To what extent have the mandatory dualistic measures of the WolBES been implemented on the Caribbean public entities? Chapter 7
2. To what extent are Island councilmembers supportive of positional separation and Island council improving measures from the WolBES? Chapter 8
3. How do Island councilmembers view the role of the Island Council after the implementation of the WolBES and to what extent do these views align with the dualistic intentions of the WolBES? Chapter 9
4. How do BES Island councilmembers perform their council work in terms of time spent and instruments used and how do they view the possibilities for control and accountability? Chapter 10
5. To what extent are there tendencies of executive monism present in the administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES? Chapter 11
6. To what extent have Island council sessions become more transparent on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES? Chapter 12

In the next part we will go into the indicators and research methods to answer the research questions.
5. Methodology

To answer the research questions, a research design was needed. To this end we explain what the units of analysis are, and what data was necessary. Finally it must be explained how the gathered data will be analysed and we will briefly go over how to present it.

5.1. Research design

With this research we want to find out what the attitudes and behaviour of Island councilmembers were after the implementation of the WoLBES and more specifically attitudes and behaviour on the articles and measures relating to the introduction of the dualistic system for local government. For this we established four variables and six research questions.

Additionally we shall explain what the considerations were for the kind of design we used to answer those questions. For example: what were the considerations between doing a longitudinal or Cross-sectional study? In the following pages we will review several methods. The different variables are perhaps not all suited for study with the same method. Some were better researched with quantitative methods, while others were better researched with qualitative methods. In the following pages we will detail the choices made for the methods chosen.

5.1.1. Qualitative: Implementation dualistic measures of the WoLBES

The implementation of dualistic system itself is a process that mostly consists of changing formal rules in the form of regulations and ordinances. It can be studied by doing literature research on the law and explanatory memorandum, general publications on dualism and the subsequent policy papers of the Caribbean public entities themselves. However this proved to be difficult as we found that such documents were not always being properly publicized. Nevertheless a list of measures could be derived from multiple sources and a checklist created to establish to what extent dualism was implemented.

Interviews

Initially it was somewhat hard to find the documentation on the implementation of these mandatory measures. Not all documents were readily available on official publication pages of the Caribbean public entities and neither does it seem that all documentation is available in the legislative database in the Netherlands. To this end we also considered performing interviews with stakeholders such as the Island secretaries and (if present) Island council clerks as experts on to what extent measures have been implemented. However by the time this thesis was nearing completion there were enough indicators to assess the situation. For future studies, interviews are recommended.

5.1.2. Quantitative: Attitudes and behaviour

It would probably have been more interesting to study behaviour by direct observation, however as we lack the budget for such methods and seeing that we also want to study attitudes we are considered using a more cost efficient way by doing a survey. Attitudes are probably best measured by asking respondents to voice them as we cannot measure nor observe them directly. Furthermore we have a population based on three different Islands with different languages.
To avoid possible coding issues it was considered to use quantitative methods. All these considerations led to the choice of a quantitative survey as being the most suitable in terms of both capabilities and resources available.

Longitudinal
As we want to see if attitudes and practices had changed, a longitudinal study would have been the preferable option. Such a research method entails a series of observations of the same research subject(s) spanning a certain amount of time. It is however an intensive way of studying a subject that can take years of study and as such can show developments in its research subjects and therefore potentially able to find effects in a contiguous timeframe that might be indicative of possible causal relations. In that sense a longitudinal design provides a good method for studying a specific event such as the implementation of the WolBES and the dualistic system. For a master thesis, this would be achievable and feasible if there was already a foundation.

And it is perhaps therefore not a surprise that when studying dualism in the Netherlands, a longitudinal design was used to review the developments over time. In the context of the BES islands we unfortunately cannot use longitudinal methods. While indeed this approach has been used in studies in the Netherlands, there have been few studies on the BES Islands that can serve as a proper pre-test. Given that the BES islands were formally situated in a different nation than the Netherlands with its own governmental structure and culture, it can be questioned if it is wise to equate Dutch behaviour and attitudes found before the implementation of dualism in the Netherlands to behaviour and attitudes on the BES islands before implementation of the WolBES and a dualistic system.

What can also be done is lay the foundation to repeat this research and perhaps in the future observe developments over time. It is also possible to some extent to compare the intended outcome of the WolBES with the actual outcome found in practice after the implementation of the WolBES by asking if the respondents view the administrative practice as having changed. This approach is perhaps less reliable, but given the lack of a possibility of a longitudinal design, it is feasible and workable. So given the unique situation on the BES islands and differences found in the initial position before the implementation of dualism and thus the lack of a proper pre-test on the BES islands, it is almost inevitable to perform a cross sectional study.

Cross-sectional
A cross sectional study is a kind of study one performs at a specific time without interfering with the research population. It is often used to measure a single or several aspects of different populations at a singular moment in time and can be used to compare a variable among different groups at the same time. Given that we are looking into a development on three separate Islands, this seems suitable.

The downside of a cross sectional study is that it does not readily show development over time within the dataset, while we are in this research interested in how something developed after an intervention. We can however perform some measure of analysis by assessing if a current situation conforms to what was intended in the policy theory. While we can of course ask respondents if they view a situation as having changed, a recollection of a change in attitude or practice is less desirable than being able to view a change over time.

This makes it difficult to assess causal relations. One of the characteristics of a causal relation is that it is an effect which happens contiguous in a timeframe. A cross sectional study, which is by definition a snapshot of any given moment without gathering comparable data on the population about what happens before or after the study does not take such a timeframe in account and as such does not establish a contiguous event.
Thus it was chosen to do a cross-sectional study for practical reasons.
5.2. Collecting data

In this part we will explain how we collected the necessary data. We will go over the choice of performing a survey, its execution and the units of analysis.

Survey
This research entails the views of Island councilmembers and administrators regarding the dualistic structure of government and the subsequent practice within that new structure. In earlier research it was chosen to perform a survey to gather data on both views and practices related to the implementation of dualism in the Netherlands and this method would also be applicable in the BES situation. The reasoning to perform a survey in earlier cases was that some aspects were not directly observable such as attitudes, views and how people perceive behaviour in this new structure.

Behaviour would actually be perfectly observable, especially given the sample size. The choice not to observe behaviour is a practical one, it would take too much time and money to set up observations on the BES Islands. Where it just three municipalities within the Netherlands it would be advisable and more practical to perform observations. Given that earlier research also gathered data on behaviour using a survey it is defensible to do so as well (de Groot, 2009) (Denters, et al., 2002).

Execution
There are several ways a survey can be performed. There are more intensive ways such as performing surveys face to face or by phone, there are also less intensive ways such as sending questionnaires by mail or e-mail.

Both methods have advantages and disadvantages: Written questionnaires are less time consuming than performing them face to face or by phone. A form must be created and then either be copied or send by mail or put in an online survey program and send out as opposed to having to contact each respondent individually and take time to go through the questionnaire. It is therefore understandable that earlier research that tried to reach a relatively large number of respondents opted for a written questionnaire.

Another advantage of a written questionnaire is that potentially respondents give less socially desirable answers than any of the methods that require human interaction. In terms of validity and reliability it might be more prudent to perform a written survey.

There was a valid consideration to deviate from this method in this case. The research population is relatively small so in that sense it is perhaps not a substantial problem to use phone or face to face methods in terms of available time. But perhaps even more important is that due to the small research population, we should aim for a very high response rate which is more probable with contacting respondents more directly.

With the response rate in mind and out of practicality it was ultimately chosen to perform both a face to face option when the opportunity arose and perform subsequent surveys by telephone. Thus a group of Island Councilmembers were surveyed in The Hague and an additional group was contacted by phone and other digital means.

Units of analysis/Research population
Administrative culture and administrative practice relate to patterns in attitudes and behaviour of the actors operating in the administrative setting. These actors involved are primarily the Island councilmembers and possible (former) Island commissioners and Lt. Governors.
As seen before, the WolBES establishes the number of Island councilmembers and the established number of Councilmembers is lower than in the Netherlands.

Where similar research in the Netherlands needed sampling processes to select municipalities and draw samples as employed by Elzinga and later research such as Denters et al or De Groot simply due to the size of the population in the Netherlands. The significantly smaller scale of just the three BES Islands and subsequently smaller number of Councilmembers and commissioners provides us with the opportunity to try and study it as a whole. Given this small scale of the total research population it would be prudent and practical to try and aim for the whole population with a questionnaire.

The current amount of Island council seats and maximum administrators on the BES Islands is shown in table 2 below.

**Table 2: Officials on the Caribbean public Entities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Bonaire</th>
<th>St Eustatius</th>
<th>Saba</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Island Councilmembers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Commissioners</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Practical considerations in this research (mainly which actors were willing/available) determined that we focused on current and former Island Councilmembers after the implementation of the WolBES. We only surveyed Island Commissioners if they also served as Island Councilmembers during that period.

One of our research questions relates to executive monism. And to study this, a focus on subgroups like coalition- and opposition roles would have been interesting as well. However due to the political circumstances on the Caribbean public entities the distinction between coalition and opposition is rather diffuse. So while we focused on getting respondents from as many political parties as possible, we do not make sharp distinctions if respondents served in a coalition or opposition role.

**Response**

Because of this small population it is also important to try to ensure a high response rate. In this case it is even preferred to receive a 100% response rate. To actually try and attain such a high rate (or as high as possible), several strategies could be followed.

But before any such strategies could be considered, we had to anticipate reasons for refusing participation. Some general reasons that are often identified are respondents having no time, the subject is not fitting for the respondent in the sense that people either are not interested or having not (or believing so) enough knowledge on the subject, it may not be seen as useful by respondents and a general distrust or dislike of surveys (Stoop, Billiet, Koch, & Fitzgerald, 2010). A possible language barrier was also of consideration, as some within the population might speak only Spanish or Papiamentu.

Some of these reasons were easier to anticipate than others. ‘Having no time’ is an external factor in optima forma, however it can be addressed. Common tactics to counter this were stating that the number of questions and the time it takes to fill in the survey and also making the survey not too long. The small research population also makes it easily feasible to approach each respondent personally. It was perfectly possible to upfront contact potential respondents by phone and ask if they were
interested in participation and apart from gauging interest this can also be used to assess if potential respondents have the time for it. Given the distance between the BES Islands and the Netherlands it would be most practical to send a questionnaire by e-mail. This also makes it possible to send reminder e-mails. Addressing the language barrier proved to be more of a challenge that seemed unsolvable despite offerings family or party members to assist and translate.

Given that this research is about the implementation of a governmental structure in which Island councilmembers and executives operate. The subject proved to be naturally fitting for the respondents, to further ensure this, we made it clear in our messaging and the description of the survey that we used to approach the respondents that the survey was about their views on institutional dualism. The fact that it is explicitly about views that the Councilmembers held over their own roles made it unquestionable part of their expertise.

It was prudent to ask general questions about dualism and not for example ask Councilmembers specific questions that are more suited towards executives and vice versa.

Anticipating how useful this survey would be for potential respondents could also be tricky. Depending on how useful potential respondents viewed dualism itself, we would assume that Island councilmembers would have some professional or political interest in the subject, however a politician does not necessarily have an in-depth interest in the political structure in which the political discourse takes place.

Making the survey more trustworthy would be achieved in several ways. First was simply by employing courtesy in respecting the respondents. Respondents will be addressed formally and in high esteem. Furthermore as this research was done under the auspices of the University of Twente. The name of the university was used. It was also outright stated and guaranteed that every respondent will remain anonymous.

5.3. Statistical tests

Given the small population we did not take a random sample but tried to study the whole population or rather as whole as possible. This would ordinarily mean that statistical testing is not an obvious thing to. But we nevertheless chose to perform several statistical tests for a couple of reasons that might benefit the data analysis.

In this thesis we looked into many variables to see if a result leans a certain way. For example if the number of questions asked has increased or if a situation leans towards a more dualistic practice or leans toward a more executive monistic practice. Assessing a certain leaning can be rather arbitrary especially with small populations, a statistical test then serves as a guideline to help indicate and interpret apparent leanings. Of course a statistical test only shows significance, strictly speaking it does not really show how much- or how important something is, only how likely it is to have occurred by chance (Crano, Brewer, & Lac, 2014).

We nevertheless chose this approach because our research population is small and has essentially three subpopulations with varying numbers of respondents, the smallest being five, the largest being sixteen. We thus have a subpopulation where one respondent can mean a 20% shift, where the total respondents for example lean 80%/20%, the subpopulation can lean easier lean 60%/40% by chance. Therefore we can use a robust statistical test to assess if such a leaning is statistically significant or not and thereby helping us in assessing conclusions.
However this approach is not without its potential flaws. Findings on the larger Caribbean public entity could be found to be leaning significantly towards a certain result. However similar findings on a smaller public entity might not test significantly, because of the smaller sample size making the test stricter. We therefore use statistical testing not in a strict way, but as a ‘rule of thumb’ and a guideline.

For this purpose we can use a one sample two tailed t-test that can be used to test whether or not a sample mean is significantly different from a hypothesized value and perform the t-tests with an alpha level of 10% that is still relatively strict but not overly so.

We specifically used two tailed tests in data where theoretically the findings can lean both ways from a mean. The additional benefit of this test is that it is applicable to small sample sizes and thus makes it possible to test the smaller samples we will find in this research. We generally also use the t-test to ascertain if survey results of interval questions lean significantly towards the outer values of a scale. We do this by testing the found interval values against the median.

It is also possible to test the found data against averages from other comparable populations. While it is not the aim of this research to compare the BES Islands to the rest of the Netherlands, we nevertheless can also use this test to also selectively test and compare data from this research with the average values found from similar research in the Netherlands when it is beneficial to do so. Such as for example if the average time spent on council work on the BES Caribbean public entities is comparable to the average time spent in the Netherlands.

In the design of this research it was originally also considered to compare the results found between opposition and coalition respondents using the independent samples t-test. Due to the political situation on two of the Caribbean public entities, the reality was that many council members who performed in an opposition role, also served in a coalition role. This made it difficult to view coalition parties and opposition parties clear distinctive groups. In future studies this methods might be more applicable if such positions are more clearly distinct.

Another case of comparing groups are the respondents who have been on the Executive Council and respondents who only have served on the Island Council. With some variables we saw distinctly different views from those two groups. For example in assessing with a percentage how much influence certain administrative bodies exert in shaping policy. In such instances it was found to be appropriate to apply the statistical test of comparing means to see if these views would indeed differ statistically.

Additionally we have, incidentally, attempted to look into the possibility of correlations between variables. While we did not aim to do this structurally, it was in a couple of instances found to be helpful in the course of this research. Notably with the assessment of the openness of debates and with assessment of the number of closed door sessions increasing or decreasing it seemed that looking into possible correlations benefitted the understanding and interpretation of certain findings.

### 5.4. Operationalisation: Determining the variables

We have described both dualism in the context of implementing an institutional change (both in the setting of the Netherlands and specifically the BES Islands) and the different dimensions of an administrative cultural domain. This leads to 2 independent variables and 2 dependent variables. The structural implementation of Institutional dualism is the variable that is an intervention in the administrative tradition and provides institutional changes that in turn should also lead to the changes of both administrative culture and administrative practice. We now have to determine on which variables we should focus.
The policy theory is that with the implementation of the WolBES behaviour would change while at the same time attitudes would also need to change to support the new workings of local government. It was thus intended that the institutional change would be accompanied by initiative to promote an administrative cultural change, though this happening is not an automatic certainty (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004). It is thus important to study current administrative culture and then reflect if present attitudes seem to reflect what the policy theory intended. And specifically look for attitudes that reflect on the institutional changes themselves and on specific intentions of the changes that the dualistic system brings such as the positional separation and the new measures to support and improve the new roles.

It is also very probable that an institutional change made by the implementation of legislation, has some influence on Administrative practice as intended. Local government is after all supposed to be bound by law. So it is likely that at least to some degree, institutional changes have been made that subsequently changed administrative practice. For example with the dualistic system it becomes mandatory by law that executive administrators are no longer part of the representative assembly, so subsequently the institutional practice becomes that island commissioners are no longer part of the formal Island council decision making. The Executive Council could still be dominant in such a setting, but with the positional and authority rules having changed, it still creates a new dynamic in the workings of local government to which actors have to adapt. So with the rules having changed the institution and its workings, we want to look for indicators that reflect on the primary changes of the dualistic system such as indicators for control, setting frameworks or openness of council deliberations.

However that is not to say to what extent those changes also resulted in different attitudes or behaviours regarding situations that were not formalized in rules or within the discretionary space those new rules provide. It thus makes sense to also to some extent look for indicators that relate to informal practices outside mandatory measures.

The variable of Administrative tradition is to be seen as setting the historical and traditional context of the administrative bodies, as such it reflects the actor’s attitudes and behaviours developed in the past and form the identity part of the polity. There is an old idiom ‘old habits die hard’ and this is also what makes a culture and practice distinctive. However it is also an abstract factor, rather than empirical, it might at times be seen as manifesting, but is also dependent on many spurious other factors (Painter & Peters, 2010) that go beyond the scope of this research. Subsequently we might expect that past attitudes and behaviours developed within the former institutional structure possibly still play a role in contemporary attitudes and behaviour. Either because the implementation of the WolBES does not address the specific tradition, or continuing informally despite the formal structural change, as behaviour does not necessarily change after changing the rules (de Groot, 2009) (Painter & Peters, 2010).

Both the institutional reform changing rules and administrative cultural attitudes can influence administrative practice. The complication is that we suspect that administrative culture is also influenced by the existing administrative cultural tradition (Elzinga, 1999) but we do not know to what extent. For the purpose of this research it is more feasible to get data on current practice and behaviour as well as determining the actual implementation of the institutional changes. While the variable of tradition might need a more anthropological study to adequately understand. As such we might suspect lingering traditional factors, but will not look into it specifically.
5.5. Operationalisation: Indicators

We have determined the variables, but now we have to further operationalize them. In this part we will go over the indicators that answer the research questions. We will go over the indicators for the implementation of the WolBES first. Followed by the indicators for culture and behaviour with regard to four relevant categories that were affected by the implementation of the WolBES.

5.5.1. Indicators Implementation of the WolBES

The WolBES is a law that came in effect at 10-10-2010. The implementation of this came in the form of different measures. There are the formal rules that were either supposed to be implemented with the law coming into effect or mandatory to be implemented at a later date. There were also measures that were optional and envisioned cultural changes that were voluntary. In this part we will go over the indicators for the formal part of the implementation. These were similarly defined with research on the implementation of the local government act of 2002 in the Netherlands and can be assessed by a simple dichotomous checklist. A measure is either implemented or not implemented (de Groot, 2009). Below we will list formal measures of the WolBES relating to dualism that would need to have been implemented at a certain time after the law came in effect.

**Formal rules to be implemented**

As stated there were several formal rules that were implemented immediately, such as the rule that in the function of island commissioner, one could no longer be on the Island Council at the same time. There were also a number of measures in the WolBES that would be implemented within a set timeframe, these are listed below:

- Every Caribbean public entity needed to have an Island council clerk introduced within a year of the enactment of the WolBES (articles 124 & 237 WolBES);

- Implementation of a shared court of audit. The WolBES article 95 stipulated that 1 court of audit could be founded jointly by all three BES islands. This had to be implemented within two years;

- The Island council establishes an ordinance about the assistance of civil servants for groups represented in the Island council. This ordinance is to be adopted within one year after the enactment of the WolBES (articles 35 & 238 WolBES);

- Introduction of a code of conduct for Island councilmembers, Island commissioners, Lt. Governor (Articles 16 sub 3, 53 sub 2 and 82 sub 2) within a year of the enactment of the WolBES (article 238);

- The Island council establishes an ordinance stipulating how residents and stakeholders will be involved in the development of policy on the public entities. This ordinance is to be adopted within one year after the enactment of the WolBES (article 154 & Article 238 WolBES).

As stated before, the indicators of these formal rules are dichotomous and as such can be measured by simply asking a yes/no question. For example - is an Island council Clerk appointed yes or no?
5.5.2. General indicators of administrative culture and administrative practice

Above we covered formal rules, in the following we will go over possible attitudinal and behavioural results after the implementation of the WolBES. This part is about the measures that were optional and envisioned cultural changes that were voluntary and relate to the administrative culture and actual practice in how actors on the island fill in their way of working under the new legislation.

With the variable: ‘administrative culture’ we want to study the attitudes of Island council members and see if those attitudes are in line with the intended changes after the implementation of the WolBES. As we established an attitude is an evaluative stance on an object such as a policy. Specifically we are interested in the attitude towards the consequences of the implementation of the WolBES and the new ways to perform the responsibilities of the Island council. With the variable ‘administrative practice’ we look into what the actor’s behaviours are in dealing with these consequences and responsibilities. We have covered before that there might be possible relations between the administrative cultural and practice variables. If people have views and attitudes on something in an administrative setting they might also realize those views in practice. This is known as attitude-relevant behaviour (Cushman & McPhee, 2013). It goes too far to accurately describe the relations between attitudes and behaviour in this research, so while we will acknowledge that there might be a relation we will look at these variables as separate.

We have covered the formal rules and changes that were implemented with the introduction of the WolBES. This part is about the possible developments after this implementation. With the introduction of these new formal rules it was intended to achieve a change in administrative culture and a different administrative practice. In this we will determine a number of categories that might have been changed or influenced by the implementation of the WolBES and review those on both administrative culture and administrative practice. However administrative culture and practice being two separate variables, will have separate indicators.

The difference in approach between indicators for administrative culture versus administrative practice is normative information versus a descriptive information. When we want to know about administrative culture then we generally want indicators of attitudes and views that are more normative in nature. In other words when we want to know about administrative culture the main indicator is a form or variant of asking what should be? As we established that an attitude is an evaluative stance on a certain subject. As this is about how people place values in other words what sorts of practices do people think should (have) be(en) in use or how should their institutional situation be with or without the change in formal rules.

We can use indicators for attitudes like: Are you in favour or against certain measures? Which statement (on for example a monistic measure vs a dualistic measure) suits your personal views best? How important do you think certain tasks are? These indicators should show attitudes on for example relations between the Island council and the Executive Council. It also should provide us with information on if Island council members support certain measures or not, are for or against a certain rule or policies.

Contrary, indicators of behaviour and practice would be more descriptive in nature to state what is actually happening. So on administrative practice the main indicator would be a form of asking what is? More specifically this leads to indicators like: how much time does the Island council member spends on...? How often is a policy instrument used? To what extent do different actors influence decision making?
These will serve to illustrate what the situation is after the implementation of the WolBES. How are for example the current relations between the Island council and Executive Council in terms of separation? In the next part we will establish categories in which we can apply such indicators. In general we will apply these to the more optional situations and not for example the formal separation.

**Framework/Categories**

Knowing the variables and general indicators we still need to further define the framework within we are to ask the survey questions. After all public administration is about a broad range of issues and even when just focussing on the WolBES, which has 241 articles, would take too much time and resources to completely cover.

Therefore to further specify this, it was chosen to divide administrative culture and practice into four factors that relate to the Island council and its new relation with the Executive Council. We distinguish the following terms for these: Separation, roles, acquisition and openness. And with that we mean:

1. The *separation* of two administrative bodies
2. The distinction of *roles*
3. The *acquisition* of new tools and powers
4. Making local island government more *transparent* to the public

The first factor relates to both direct dualistic measures that caused to the changed relationship between the Island council and the Executive Council. The category is not only about the formal separation, but also about the extent of this separation beyond formal rules such as possible executive monistic tendencies.

The second factor is about how the actors interpret and view the (new) roles of the Island council and Executive Council after the implementation of the WolBES and how they act on them in practice.

The third factor is about the views and use in practice of the policy tools and institutional measures to fulfil the new roles.

And finally the fourth factor relates to the specific measures within the WolBES relating to the openness of local government. This last factor relates to specific measures which were more extensively laid out and implemented than with the LGA in the Netherlands.

In the following part we will cover in greater detail these different factors and their indicators.

**Extent of Separation between Island Council and Executive Council**

With the introduction of the WolBES the relation between the Island- and Executive Council has changed, where the Executive Council was once part of the Island council, both administrative bodies are now institutionally separated as is the purpose of the dualistic system. But how far did that separation go?

**This category is therefore about the extent of separation between two administrative bodies.**

How was this separation viewed? What were the views of the Island councillors on the extent of which the municipal council and Executive Council should operate separately? There is the formal rule that Island commissioners cannot serve on the Island council anymore, but beyond that the Island council and Executive Council can and do communicate and work together in- and outside of formal settings. For example an Island commissioner answering question during an Island council session is communication in a formal setting.
But communication outside the council sessions could also take place in lobby, party- or faction meetings. Especially party lines could be an important factor in this, the coalition or ruling parties on the council with an Island commissioner could potentially communicate and mutually influence each other easier than opposition council members could. Or perhaps alternatively coalition council factions could opt to have their faction meetings always without their Island commissioner(s).

Views/Attitudes: Indicators for this needed to show how important Island council members view the separation has been, do they view the dualistic changes as desirable (positive) or undesirable (negative) and do they view it as something fitting or not to their ideas on how local Island politics should work.

For this asked a general question: Is a councilmember for or against a certain measure? We asked this for the following hypothetical situations: Island commissioners no longer taking part in faction meetings; no longer chairing commission meetings; no longer taking part in commission meetings.

Practice: Indicators for this were to what extent the Executive Council influences or dominates the decision making process of the Island council. For this we determined the relevant variables to assess the presence of ‘executive monism’. We looked at of there is a strong bind between coalition factions and an executive or coalition agreement which provides little room to manoeuvre for the Island council; if there was party discipline and compliant coalition factions; if there was decision making on the basis of coalition parties with little room for opposition factions and if Decision making was predetermined in consultation between coalition factions.

Roles

One of the goals of the introduction of the dualistic system was the realignment of roles of the municipal council and Board of M&A, in practice this could for example mean that the municipal council would be more focused on control and framework setting while the Board of M&A would focus more on executive tasks.

In short this category is about the Island council’s current responsibilities

When it is the intent of the implementation of dualism to change administrative culture. It is interesting to find out how actors view and act out their own roles. So we will also look at the changes in roles found on the BES islands as a possible result of the implementation of the WolBES.

We defined administrative culture as attitudes that actors have in the administrative setting. If in this setting roles change, the question then for example becomes how actors in the administrative setting come to view their roles. Do they view that their roles should indeed be more to set a framework and establish control or do they view their role to still be more in line with the old monistic situation where the council had more emphasis on being responsible for the execution of policies? How do they view their role in representing the population after the WolBES?

Another important aspect in reviewing views on roles would be for example how important they view certain roles in comparison and if their view is that with the introduction of the WolBES the importance of certain roles have changed. Do Island councilmembers rate the execution of policy as more important than controlling the Executive Council or vice versa? Do they view that executive powers should be delegated to the Executive Council or not?

Indicators of administrative practice on roles are then how much time they spend on setting frameworks, controlling the Executive Council and keeping in contact with the electorate. But also to what extent the Executive Council is held accountable and who takes initiative for this.
**New methods, governmental procedures and support options**

This category differs from the separation and roles categories in that this category is about the tools, methods, rights and civil servant support the Island council has at its disposal to execute its tasks and responsibilities in controlling the Executive Council and acting as the representative administrative body.

*In short this category is about what the Island council can do under the WolBES.*

The WolBES provided Island councilmembers with new methods and procedures to perform their duties in their new roles. Such as new rights to take initiative or amend policies, tools and support by civil servants and the council clerk. These were measures to support their new roles and enable the council with ways to perform its controlling role by for example having a court of audit to audit certain policies. Similarly the introduction of support by civil servants and the council clerk was meant to further support the Island council in its tasks.

Indicators for views and attitudes, would be for example an assessment showing if Island councilmembers are in support of the implemented measures or not. This can be done by similarly as with the other categories above by asking them if they are in favour or against certain measures. Indicators on behaviour and practice can be found in the question if these new tools, support and options are actually used. How often does the Island council take initiative, submit motions or ask questions.

**Open democracy**

One of the distinct facets of the administrative tradition on the BES islands was the relatively many of the council meetings behind closed doors. This was recognized in the drafting of the WolBES by including specific measures to reduce and prevent this from happening. These measures are not always present in the Dutch Local Government Act. Examples of this are article 24 sub 4 WolBES that states that the Lt. Governor can declare a closed council meeting open for public if the Lt. Governor finds it is in the public interest and article 25 sub 2 WolBES which states conditions under which an Island council session cannot be behind closed doors and which is far more comprehensive than its similar counterpart article 24 of the LGA (which shares an identical sub 1, but lacks sub 2 entirely).

What were the Island council member’s views and attitudes be on these changes? Indicators for would be for example if Island council members were in favour or against the implemented measures in the first place. Did they perceive the meetings being behind closed doors as a problem or not? And was the subsequent situation viewed as an improvement.

Indicators of administrative practice would be for example the number of council meetings behind closed doors; Asking if meetings behind closed doors happen more, less or at the same frequency as before the WolBES. Also of interest would be if the Lt Governor has had to declare a closed Island council session open to the public. Though at the time of this research this had not happened.

**5.6. Data format**

We will generally show the data in tables and bar charts, this will generally include: sample size (N), percentages (%). If we present mean values in bar charts we will use error bars to show standard deviations. With T-tests we will provide: means, standard deviations (σ), degrees of freedom (df), t-value (t) and p-value (P). If the consistent among all groups we will present the null-hypothesis (H0), alternative hypothesis (H1) and alpha (α) in a footnote or alternatively they will be shown within the table if they vary.
Given the small population it was prudent to try to achieve a high response rate. Table 3 shows the response rates per Island and per council term.

In total there were 26 respondents out of 36 possible actors. Of these 14 were from Bonaire, 7 from Sint Eustatius and 5 from Saba. These respondents were either active as Island council members in the council period of 2011–2015, 2015–2019 or both. The total response rate from the 2011–2015 period was 76.67% and 78.52% for the 2015–2019 period.

Table 3 shows the characteristics of the population. Of these respondents 38.5% were woman and 61.5% were men. On average the time served on the Island council was 5.85 years, with 34.6% having served fewer than 2 years, 23.1% having served between 2 and 5 years and 42.3% who served more than 5 years. This last group is guaranteed to have experienced both the old system of monism and the new dualistic system as an Island council member.

Of these Island council members 11 members have exclusively been part of the coalition and 2 have exclusively been part of the opposition. 13 respondent have been part of both. In that regard it is worth noting that in the 2011–2015 period the coalition on Bonaire changed once and the coalition on Sint Eustatius changed twice.

Table 3: Response rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Bonaire</th>
<th>Sint Eustatius</th>
<th>Saba</th>
<th>Total BES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total council seats</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>10 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response women</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>94.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>9 (15)</td>
<td>4 (6)</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>16 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response men</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>66.70%</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>67.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (21)</td>
<td>7 (9)</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>26 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total response</td>
<td>66.70%</td>
<td>77.80%</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
<td>72.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in council period 2011-2015</td>
<td>11 (14)</td>
<td>5 (7)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>20 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>78.60%</td>
<td>71.40%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
<td>76.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in council period 2015-2019</td>
<td>5 (9)</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>14 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>55.60%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
<td>78.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in both council periods</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>8 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When we look at years served in table 4, we see that 73% served more than 1 year, with 42% serving more than 5 years. This last group is certain to have served during the monistic system.

Table 4: Years served as an Island Councilmember

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years served</th>
<th>Bonaire</th>
<th>Sint Eustatius</th>
<th>Saba</th>
<th>Total BES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 years</td>
<td>5 (36%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>7 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5 years</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>8 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5 years</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>11 (42%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 5, we look at specific functions amongst the respondents. Namely Faction Leader and Island Commissioner. The number of faction leaders on Sint Eustatius seem especially high, though this is logically explained by there by the political developments Sint Eustatius leading towards there five one-person factions, making every councilmember their own faction leader.

We set out to interview former Island commissioners as well and were able to get response from six of them, four from Bonaire and two from Sint Eustatius. These were respondents who both served as Island Commissioner and Island councilmember after the implementation of the WolBES. While we have no respondents from Saba who served as Island commissioners.

Table 5: Other possible Political Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Bonaire</th>
<th>Sint Eustatius</th>
<th>Saba</th>
<th>Total BES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faction Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5 (36%)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>12 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9 (64%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>14 (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4 (29%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10 (71%)</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>20 (77%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-response varies over the Caribbean public entities. On Saba a member of the opposition was not available for an interview, which does skew the data even more towards the governing party. On Sint Eustatius the then sitting (former Island Councilmembers) Island Commissioners refused an interview. On Bonaire the non-response was more varied, a then sitting (former Island Councilmember) Island Commissioner was unavailable, an independent councilmember was not represented due to a language barrier and scheduling problem, the other non-respondents were spread evenly amongst the main parties.
7. Implementation of mandatory measures

The first research question that we will answer is: **To what extent have the mandatory dualistic measures of the WolBES been implemented on the Caribbean public entities?**

As we have seen, the WolBES is similar to the Local Government Act of 2002 in the Netherlands. As happened in the Netherlands, the implementation of the WolBES meant several institutional changes. After the elections on the BES special public entities on March 2011, the positional measures, such as Island commissioners no longer being seated on the Island council after instalment, were immediately put in effect.

With regards to the more facilitating measures that are intended to improve the position of the Island council, the WolBES dictated that certain measures, such as appointments, and ordinances had to be taken and/or implemented within a set period of time. These measures and deadlines were included within the WolBES.

These appointments and measures to be implemented were:

- The council Clerk
- The shared court of audit
- Civil servant assistance
- A code of conduct
- A participation ordinance

According to a report by the Kingdom representative in 2014 most of these measures were in effect (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2014). We will go over each measure if they were implemented, at what time they were implemented and if applicable to what extent they have been implemented. We will look into the appointment of the Council Clerk in 7.1, review the status of the Shared court of audit in 7.2. Finally we look into the implementation of: civil servant assistance in 7.3; the code of conduct in 7.4 and the participation ordinance in 7.5.

7.1. Council Clerk

To support the Island council in their controlling and framework setting tasks, the WolBES stipulated that the special public entities should appoint an Island council Clerk (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009) According to the WolBES, every public entity is obliged to appoint an Island council clerk introduced within a year of the enactment of the WolBES (articles 124 & 237 WolBES).

At the moment of this writing there was an appointed Island council clerk on all three Caribbean public entities. On Saba the Council Clerk was appointed on 1-10-2011, on Bonaire the Island council Clerk was appointed on 12-1-2012, and by February 2012 the appointment of an Island council Clerk on Sint Eustatius. The Kingdom representative noted that problems with the appointment of an Island council Clerk on Bonaire indicated that a clear procedure is something that needed more attention at the time (Rijksvertegenwoordiger voor de openbare lichamen Bonaire, 2012) (Rijksdienst Caribisch Nederland, 2014).

We will look more into attitudes regarding the Island council clerk when we look into the second research question.
7.2. Shared court of audit

Like the Island council Clerk, the implementation of a shared court of audit is meant to improve the controlling- and framework setting role of the Island council. This measure was to be implemented differently than in the Netherlands. While municipalities in the Netherlands had a choice between establishing a court of audit or an audit function for their own municipality, the Caribbean public entities were given no choice but to establish a shared court of audit. This was done for several reasons: It was meant to improve the sharing of knowledge between the Caribbean public entities; to not stress the civil servant capacity on a singular Caribbean public entity and to better guarantee the independency of the court of audit (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009). To that end the WolBES article 95 stipulated that 1 court of audit was to be jointly established by all three Caribbean public entities within two years after the implementation of the WolBES. All three public entities would have to appoint a member to the shared court for it to function.

There currently is an ordinance shared court of audit Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, Saba and the three Caribbean public entities have taken steps to institutionally establish a shared court of audit and have taken necessary steps for its foundation (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2014). However the shared court of audit was not yet active as of 2016, it was repeatedly reported that the public entity of Saba had not appointed a member to the shared court of audit leaving it in institutional limbo (Griffie Eilandsraad Bonaire, 2015) (Griffie Eilandsraad Bonaire, 2017) (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017).

7.3. Assistance

The third mandatory implementation is that the Island council is obliged to establish an ordinance about the assistance of civil servants for Island council factions. This ordinance is to be adopted within one year after the enactment of the WolBES (articles 35 & 238 WolBES).

Bonaire implemented this on 16-10-2012, Saba implemented this on 22-08-2013 (Openbaar lichaam Saba, 2015) (Eilandsraad van het openbaar lichaam Bonaire, 2016) At the time of this writing there seemed no ordinance ready on Sint Eustatius, within the instruction for the Island council Clerk 2016 but there is a reference towards such an ordinance needing to be developed (ST. Eustatius Caribisch Nederland, 2016)

7.4. Code of conduct

To further improve the practice of good governance and public perception on the Caribbean public entities, and provide a tool for the Island council to control the Executive Council, the Caribbean public entities were obliged to introduce a code of conduct for Island councilmembers, Island commissioners and Lt. Governor (Articles 16 sub 3, 53 sub 2 and 82 sub 2) within a year of the enactment of the WolBES (article 238). Such a code of conduct is not enforceable by law, but can be used as guideline on which public servants can be held politically accountable. As such, the public entities are free to determine the specific contents of such a code of conduct for themselves (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2009).

All the Caribbean entities were reported to have a code of conduct that was implemented by December 2014 (Rijksvertegenwoordiger Caribisch Nederland, 2015) Bonaire its code of conduct publicized on its webpage (Openbaar Lichaam Bonaire, 2015) Sint Eustatius implemented the code of conduct in 2012 (Rijksvertegenwoordiger voor de openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba, 2015). The code of conduct on Saba reportedly exists, but was not findable in the publication channels.
7.5. Participation

As one of the ways to improve local democracy by involving the electorate, increasing citizen participation were recommended by the state commission. Measures to increase this were part of the local government act and were also stipulated in the WolBES. To that end the Island council was obligated to establish an ordinance stipulating how residents and stakeholders will be involved in the development- and execution of policy on the public entities. This ordinance was to be adopted within one year after the enactment of the WolBES (article 154 & Article 238 WolBES). Bonaire adopted this ordinance at 28-02-2012, Sint Eustatius at 16-08-2012 and Saba on 14-08-2013.

7.6. Concluding

Regarding the question to what extent the measures of the WolBES had been implemented we can answer that formally all measures were implemented in the sense that institutionally all necessary work was done. While measures were often delayed, the representative of the Kingdom at the time assessed that perhaps the timeframe to implement the WolBES had been too ambitious (Rijksvertegenwoordiger voor de openbare lichamen Bonaire, 2012). Most measures were eventually implemented fully or to some extent. The Island council clerks were appointed by 2012 and all the mandatory measures were put into formal ordinances by all the Caribbean public entities by 2014.

The shared court of audit was, at the time of this research, in practice not yet active. While formal arrangements were made, the Caribbean public entity of Saba had not yet appointed a member to the court of audit, which needed appointments from all three Caribbean public entities to become operational. This put the shared court of audit in institutional limbo.

With the next research question, we will look more closely into support for some of these measures.
8. Attitudes on Dualistic measures

With the last question we saw the state of the implementation of the WolBES. The separation of Island commissioners and Island council was already completed and established as the formal administrative practice since the elections in 2011 on all three Caribbean public entities. And facilitation measures and appointments were made and in place. In this part we will focus on attitudes and answer research question 2:

*To what extent are Island councilmembers supportive of positional separation and Island council improving measures from the WolBES?*

The main purpose of this question is to assess to what extent Island councilmembers support dualistic measures and ultimately to what extent they see it as fitting to their administrative culture.

To answer this research question we will look at attitudes on the separation of Island commissioners and the Island council. We will in 8.1 look into several optional and non-optional measures to further separate the two administrative bodies which we categorize as positional separation and separation of powers. These are divided into both formal and informal positional separation. The respondents rated these measures and we will try to put some context to their ratings.

After that we will look into the attitudes on measures that further strengthen and facilitate the Island council members individually or facilitate the Island council as a whole in 8.2. Concluding we will look into a unique WolBES measure to increase political transparency in 8.3, followed by the conclusions in 8.4.

8.1. Positional separation

The positional separation is the most visible core tenet of the dualistic system. In this part we will look into several aspects of this separation, both positional separation and separation of powers.

8.1.1. Formal positional separation

While the separation of Island council and Island commissioners has been a fact since 2011 and practiced on all three Caribbean public entities, we asked the respondents if they were actually in favour of this measure or against this separation and to what extent roles should be separated on Island Commissions and faction meetings.

The 26 respondents on all three Caribbean public entities were unanimous their favour of Island commissioners no longer being on the Island council, providing a clear and present supporting attitude on the primary positional separation.

Also largely in favour were the respondents regarding the new role of Island commissioners not being the chair of council commissions. 92,3% of the respondents were in favour of Island commissioners not chairing Island council commissions and 84,6% were in favour of Island commissioners not being part of central council commissions. These three measures relate to very basic and formal aspect of how the two public entities relate to each other.
With the positional separation, there was also a realignment of executive powers. When we take a closer look in figure 5, we can see that support for the delegation of executive powers from the Island council to the Executive Council is less in favour on Bonaire respondents (64%) in comparison to Saba (80%) and Sint Eustatius (86%).

Figure 4: Attitudes on formal positional separations

Figure 5: Delegating executive powers
8.1.2. Informal positional separation

While there is strong support for the formal separation, it is a different matter how Island councilmembers view the two public entities should relate to each other outside of their instituted roles and formal interaction. The way members of both public entities interact outside of the formal setting of council sessions is not laid down in the WolBES (nor in the 2002 LGA), so every public entity and every party on the council is free in how party members on different public entities interact and deliberate.

Looking at the views of the respondents, then they are more divided when it comes to deliberations and separation outside of formal settings. When asked if Island commissioners should no longer take part in regular party faction meetings the results are split with 50% in favour and 50% against. Looking at this further revealed small differences between the Caribbean public entities with Bonaire being slightly more on favour than Saba and Sint Eustatius. When we look at the different council terms after the implementation of the WolBES it seems that the overall favourability is slightly decreasing with the respondents of the 2015-2019 council period being slightly more against Island commissioners not taking part in council faction meetings.

![Figure 6: Favourability of Island Commissioners being part of faction meetings](image)

Figure 6: Favourability of Island Commissioners being part of faction meetings
8.2. Measures for more (individual) rights and support of Island council

In this part we will look into support for measures that are meant to support individual Island council members and measures that better facilitate the Island council.

8.2.1. Measures to improve individual councilmember rights

Respondent were again asked if they were in favour or against a number of measures improving the position of the Island council and/or individual Island council members. In figure 7 we see that the respondents showed great support for these measures improving the position of or giving new tools to Island council members with 96% in favour of Island council members individually receiving the right of initiative, amendment and motion.

100% of the respondents were in favour of Island council members individually receiving the right to request an interpellation. 100% of the respondents were also in favour of Island council members receiving training.

Of some note is that the least support respondents gave for a specific measure, was for each individual Island council member having a right to receive administrative assistance (88, 5% favour). Some felt that this was better served on a faction level instead of the individual level.

8.2.2. Facilitating measures

The respondents from all three Caribbean public entities very much in favour of measures to facilitate the Island council. The measures to actively provide information for control and more comprehensible financial information could count on 100% favourable views. Likewise the introduction of the council clerk and the establishment of an external institution complaints and the initiation of benchmarks and quality charters was met with 100% favourable views.

96,2% viewed the Island council creating a budget to conduct research as favourable, as did 96,2% of the respondents view the Island council being able to organizing hearings as favourable.
Least favourable viewed was the establishment of a shared court of audit with 92% of the respondents viewing it as favourable.

Looking a bit further into the shared court of audit, we can see that specifically respondents from Saba were divided. Further questioning revealed that some Island council members from Saba indicated that while they were in favour of a court of audit, they did not favour a shared court of audit with the other Caribbean public entities.

### Figure 8: Favourability of facilitating measures

Looking a bit further into the shared court of audit, we can see that specifically respondents from Saba were divided. Further questioning revealed that some Island council members from Saba indicated that while they were in favour of a court of audit, they did not favour a shared court of audit with the other Caribbean public entities.

### Figure 9: Favourability of the shared court of Audit

**8.3. Additional WolBES transparency measure**

The WolBES introduced an extra measures to the Caribbean public entities. The measures to make the Island council sessions more public have a dualistic component in the sense that relates to the position of the Lt. Governor to the Island council. The measure also serves to further the transparency of council sessions to strengthen the democratic function of the Island council. More openness could serve as a way to make the new intended administrative practice implemented more transparent to the electorate. However the new measures for openness give the Lt. Governor the possibility to go against the Island council.
Of the general BES 53.8% of the respondents were against the Lt. Governor being able to make closed door sessions public. On Bonaire this was viewed 50% in Favour and 50% against. On Sint Eustatius 42.86% of the respondents favoured the measure with 57.14% against and on Saba there were 40% in favour and 60% against.

**Figure 10: Favourability of transparency measure**

8.4. Conclusions

Overall Island council members showed attitudes in favour of the positional dualistic measures. The separation of the Island commissioners from the Island council and Island commissions was dominantly seen as favourable indicating that the formally implemented core positional changes of dualism seems well supported. Island council members were divided on whether Island commissioners should no longer take part in regular party faction meetings. This was observable on all three Caribbean public entities and despite the found attitudes in favour of the positional dualistic measures, the attitude on Island commissioners could be an indicator for Executive-monism that we will further explore in the next chapters. Measures to strengthen the position of individual Island council members as well as facilitating the Island council to better perform its controlling role were also generally seen as favourable. Delegating executive powers was also mostly viewed with favour.

Measures to increase individual rights and facilitating measures were also overwhelmingly viewed in favour. Only the specific measure in the WoBES relating to openness of council sessions giving the Lt. Governor the ability to make closed door sessions open to public if he views it to be in the public interest was slightly disfavoured. On Bonaire respondents were split on the issue, on the smaller Caribbean public entities they were seemingly stronger against it.

Overall the data shows great support to the core dualistic measures. But we will look further how the Caribbean public entities view the dualistic system. For that we will look next at how the respondents view their new roles.
9. Views on roles

Before we looked at support for dualistic measures relating to positions, rights and facilitating the Island council. In this part we will look into roles and role views to answer the question:

**How do Island councilmembers view the role of the Island Council after the implementation of the WolBES and to what extent do these views align with the dualistic intentions of the WolBES?**

From the policy theory behind the dualistic system we saw that it was intended for the Island council to adopt a more controlling role and leave administrating to the responsibility of the Executive Council. In this part we will go over how the respondents view which administrative body should administrate in the sense of being primarily responsible for the executive tasks in 9.1. We will go over how the respondents rate several tasks in terms of importance in 9.2. And we will specifically compare how important respondents view the controlling role compared to the executive administrating role. We will then look to what extent the respondents view dualism as fitting to their administrative culture in 9.3, followed by the conclusions in 9.4.

9.1. Views on which administrative body should executively administrate

With the dualistic system and the separation of Island council and Executive Council also came a realignment of administrative roles. The Island council would be more focused on setting frameworks and controlling the Executive Council, while the Executive Council would focus more on the administrative and executive tasks. To assess to what extent this is now part of administrative culture on the Caribbean public entities, we asked the Island council councilmembers which administrative body in their views should administrate the Caribbean public entity, the Island council or the Executive Council.

Overall on the BES level, 88.46% of the respondents viewed that it is the Executive Council that should administrate, as seen in figure 11. The Island council councilmembers of Bonaire had the strongest view that the Executive Council should administrate the Island (100%). But also on Saba (80%) and Sint Eustatius (71.43%) a large majority had this view. Overall on BES this was a significant leaning towards the view that the Executive Council should administrate (25) = 6.019, p = .00. On Saba and Sint Eustatius this could not be established but based on the overall findings we suspect this to be the result of the small population and the strictness of the test as opposed to a real profound difference in views.

![Figure 11: normative view on which administrative body should executively administrate](image-url)
9.2. Views on tasks

To assess views on tasks we asked the respondents to indicate the importance of six council tasks (determination of ordinance content, determination of budget contents, redirecting/steering policy, controlling the Executive Council, representing the people, executively administrating the Caribbean public entity) on a four-point scale of importance (very important, important, unimportant, very unimportant).

Representing the people on the Island was together with determining the budget seen as the most important tasks of Island council 84.60% of the respondents viewed this as very important. Determining the content of ordinances was next seen as most important, with 61.50% of the respondents seeing it as very important and 38.50% as important.

Controlling the Executive Council was relatively seen as ‘less’ important, with 46.20% viewing it as very important, 50% as important and 3.80% as unimportant. The respondents viewed administrating the Caribbean public entity as the least important task, though many still viewed it as important (57.70%), 26.90% as important and 15.40% as unimportant.

\[\text{Figure 12 Priorities of council tasks}\]

For the purpose of assessing if the Caribbean public entities adopted a more dualistic culture, it is of interest to compare how important the respondents view their controlling task in comparison to the administrating task. We already applied a four point scale when we looked at the importance of tasks. If we assign values, with 1 being very important; 2 being important, 3, being unimportant and 4 very unimportant, we can rate the separate Caribbean public entities based on the average scores.

If we take the average score of each Caribbean public entity on this 4 point scale, then Bonaire rates controlling as 1.3 and administrating as 2.1. Sint Eustatius views controlling and administrating as both as 1.7 and Saba views controlling as 2.2 and Administrating as 1.6.

If we take a closer look at these tasks and compare the task ‘controlling’ and executively ‘administrating’ and see if respondents viewed controlling either as more-, equally- or less important than administrating as a responsibility of the Island council. Then respondents from Bonaire dominantly view the controlling role of the Island council as more important (79%), respondents from
Sint Eustatius dominantly view that controlling and administrating are equally important (57%) with administrating as the second most important task (29%) and on Saba 60% of the respondents viewed controlling and administrating as equally important with 40% viewing administrating as more important.

So on average, respondents on Bonaire view control as more important than administrating, on Sint Eustatius respondents view them as equally important and on Saba they view administrating as more important than controlling the Executive Council.

We tested these findings for significance and indeed found a significant leaning towards control on Bonaire, but no significant leanings on the overall BES level or on Sint Eustatius and Saba.

**Table 6: T-Test Control vs Administrating**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
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<td>0.7646</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-1.539</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.6333</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-3.798</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.6901</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5477</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.633</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 2, H1: μ ≠ 2, α: 0.10*
9.3. Do the respondents view dualism as fitting in the administrative culture

Finally, the respondents were asked if according to their views, the dualistic measures were fitting for the administrative culture on the Caribbean public entities. This was done on a five point scale ranging from fitting perfectly (1) to not fitting at all (5).

While overall on the BES the respondents seemingly are leaning to dualism moderately fitting in the administrative culture and slightly to it fitting well, there are notable differences per Caribbean public entity. On Bonaire 50% of the respondents viewed the dualistic measures as fitting to the administrative culture. While on Saba and Sint Eustatius views were dominantly moderate on dualism fitting. With Saba leaning slightly to fitting well and Sint Eustatius leaning to not fitting well.

Overall we did not find significant leanings $t(25) = -0.941, p = .356$. When looking only at Bonaire, we find a significant leaning towards dualism fitting well $t(13) = -2.482, p = .028$.

![Figure 14: Dualism fitting or not fitting on the Caribbean public entities](image)

Table 7: Averages and St Deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.8339</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.6462</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7868</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.0955</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.4. Concluding

The attitude of Island council members on the Caribbean public entities on the question if the Island council should executive administer or set frameworks initially showed a dualistic tendency. The respondents dominantly viewed that the Island council should set frameworks and control the Executive Council instead of the Island council administrating the Caribbean public entity. This view was most strongly present on Bonaire and least on Sint Eustatius. Overall this could be an indicator for an adoption of a more dualistic administrative culture when it relates to both positional and supportive measures.

Looking further into how Island council members prioritize tasks of the Island council in terms of importance, the respondents viewed representing the people as the most important task together with determining the budget followed by determining the content of ordinances and correcting policy from the Executive Council. This might indicate an attitude that places a larger focus on the representative task of the Island council which is in line with the administrative tradition on the Caribbean public entity and more priority for setting frameworks.

Administrating the Caribbean public entity was overall seen as least important, followed by controlling the Executive Council. When controlling the Executive Council as a task is compared to administrating at the level of each separate Caribbean public entity, it revealed that respondents from Bonaire dominantly viewed Controlling as more important than administrating but that on Saba and Sint Eustatius the attitudes were that controlling was of equal or more importance, so on the matter of controlling vs administrating, this data hints at a more dualistic attitude on Bonaire than Saba and Sint Eustatius.

While we saw earlier that there was overwhelming support for the positional separation and the respondents indicated that they at least support the new practice of the Executive Council primarily administrating the Caribbean public entities. The respondents were more moderate in their assessment when asked if the dualistic system fitted as a whole into their administrative culture. With respondents on Bonaire indicating it fitting moderate to well, but on Sint Eustatius indicating it fitting moderate to not well.
10. Administrative practice: Island council membership

We saw before that the Caribbean public entities on average were smaller in population and more isolated, this could make a difference in how politicians operate and influence administrative culture and practice. In this part we will look at average time spent as an Island council member and what that time is being used for. After that we will look at instruments used and utilities and utilization for control.

*How do BES Island council members perform their council work in terms of time spent and instruments used and how do they view the possibilities for control and accountability?*

In 10.1 we will go over the time spent on council work, to have a point of reference to assess the data we will compare the time spent on the BES Islands with time spent on council work in the Netherlands. In 10.2 we focus more on time spent on more specific tasks and in 10.3 we will go into Instruments used. The possibilities and utilization of both control and framework setting instruments are covered in 10.4, followed by measuring accountability in 10.5. We will subsequently draw conclusions in 10.6.

10.1. Time spent on overall council work

To ascertain how much time the Island council membership on the Caribbean public entities on average takes, we asked the respondents to estimate how much time their council membership took from their time in hours per week. On the whole, the respondents indicated that on average they spend 33.8 hours per week as an Island council member. On Bonaire the average time spend on council work was estimated by the respondents at 25,9 hours, on Sint Eustatius 33,3 hours and on Saba 56,7 hours. As hinted by the Standard deviations, the differences between individual estimates of time spent was sometimes extreme, with some indicating that time spent was more than a full time job in itself and others seeing it as something doing next to their regular job. We did not find a clear indication where these extreme findings come from, though in a small community it might not be strange to experience a political office as a 24 hour function.

![Figure 15 Time spent on Island Council work (averages and standard deviation).](image)

These findings had a very diverse and seemed extreme in some cases. To have a point of reference, we compared this to data on time spent on municipal council work in the Netherlands from research done by raadslid.nu in 2012. We can see in graph 10B how the BES situation compares to the average in the Netherlands. When compared to data from the Netherlands we can see that the average time spend on council work for the whole Netherlands was 16.8 hours a week.
For municipalities with <14,000 people, this was 12.1 hours per week and for municipalities where the population lay between 14,001 and 30,000 the average was 15.1 hours per week spend on council work (Raadslid.nu, 2012).

![Chart: Average time spent compared to the Netherlands](image)

That would make the average found on the Caribbean public entities to be more than double the average found in the Netherlands. Also of interest is that in the Netherlands on average the number of hours seems to correlate with the size of the municipality, with the larger the municipality the more hours are spent (Raadslid.nu, 2012). On the Caribbean public entities the data at first glance shows signs of the opposite, the smaller the Island population, the more time on average an Island councilmember spends on council work according to the respondents. Seeing the spread of the results found, it is not surprising that there are rather extreme differences between council members regarding time spent with two Island councilmembers on Saba indicating they are spending over 90 hours a week on their council work.

Upon testing, using a one-sample t test, to see whether the Caribbean public entities score differently than comparable Dutch municipal averages. We see that on Bonaire there was a significant difference with the Dutch municipal average. We did not find such a significance on Saba and Sint Eustatius but seeing the data it seems to be an obvious difference. The hours spent did differ greatly between Island Councilmembers as seen by the standard deviation and thus the extreme finding could be a result of statistical outliers. Though literature on the matter also suggests that the workload is fundamentally bigger than in the Netherlands (Spies, Soons, Thodé, Verhey, & Weekers, 2015).

Table 8: T-Test Time spent on Council work compared to the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>H₀</th>
<th>H₁</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>µ = 16.8</td>
<td>µ ≠ 16.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.519</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>µ = 15.1</td>
<td>µ ≠ 15.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.514</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>µ = 12.1</td>
<td>µ ≠ 12.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.392</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>µ = 12.1</td>
<td>µ ≠ 12.1</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.442</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: α: 0.10
10.2. Time spend on tasks

To further ascertain the administrative daily practice, the respondents were asked about how much time they estimate to spend on different tasks in a week in hours. We put forward the following tasks: Decision making, exercising executive powers, control, maintaining contacts with citizens, organizations, party members and negotiations with other politicians, reading of documents and other activities. We subsequently converted these hours into percentages.

Before we noted that on the Netherlands Antilles politicians and electorate had an administrative tradition close relations with each other. One councilmember noted that the difference she saw between the Netherlands and her Island was that voting day in the Netherlands is a regular working day, while voting day on the Islands is an event where people go out in party colours and celebrate.

This is also visible in how Island councilmembers estimate their time spend with maintaining contacts with citizens, of all the activities listed.

![Figure 17: Time spend on tasks and contacts](image)

Maintaining contact with the electorate is the most time consuming activity according to the respondents. While in the Netherlands the personal contact with citizens was indicated to be on average 5.9% of the time spend as a municipal councilmember in 2014 (Daadkracht B.V., 2016) versus the average of 20.7% estimated time spend on contact with individual citizens on the Caribbean public entities. If maintaining contacts with local organizations and party members is also included was on average estimated at 42.9%. Of note is also that decision making (9.6%) and control (7.7%) were overall estimated to take more work than exercising executive powers (6%).

Only on Sint Eustatius Exercising executive powers was estimated slightly taking more time (4.3%) than control (4%), but less than decision making (7.7%) and lower than the BES average. Reading of documents is often estimated as high (16.4%) and on Bonaire (17.2%) and Saba (16.9%) on average estimated to take more time than maintaining contact with individual citizens.

If we take the average of 5.9% contact with citizens from the Netherlands and apply that to the average hours spent. We can test if the values found on the Caribbean public entities are significant. We found
that respondents from the BES as a whole and Bonaire and Saba specific showed significant leanings toward more contact between Island council members and citizens.

Table 9: T-Test Time spent on contacts with citizens compared to the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>$H_0$</th>
<th>$H_1$</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>$\mu = 0.99$</td>
<td>$\mu \neq 0.99$</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.863</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>$\mu = 0.89$</td>
<td>$\mu \neq 0.89$</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.354</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>$\mu = 0.71$</td>
<td>$\mu \neq 0.71$</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.287</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>$\mu = 0.71$</td>
<td>$\mu \neq 0.71$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.874</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: $\alpha: 0.10$

We saw in figure 17 that maintaining contacts with party members, voters and party officials was also relatively high (16% BES Average) we wanted to know if this meant that Island council members had informal deliberations with Island council members. As shown in figure 18, over 92% on all Caribbean public entities indicated that they had at least incidental deliberations with executive Council members and about half the respondents indicated that they frequent informal deliberations.

Figure 18: Frequency of informal deliberations
10.3. Instruments used

We asked the respondents to what extent they made use of several instruments available to them. We can distinguish two categories. 1. Instruments that set or adjust frameworks such as the right of initiative, the right to put forth motions and the right of amendment; 2. Instruments for control such as the right of interpellation and the right to ask questions. The court of audit is also an instrument for the controlling role, but at the time of the Survey, the court of audit was not yet active. In 10.3.1. We will go over the instruments used in plenary Island council sessions and in 10.3.2. We will go over the instrument of questions separately.

10.3.1. Plenary Instruments

It was asked the number of times they submitted initiative proposals, amendments, and motions or requested an interpellation in the past council period. We can see in figure 19 the overall numbers on the Caribbean public entities, the numbers on the specific entities how often on average certain instruments were used in a year.

Overall motions (6.8 pp / $\sigma = 7.0$) are the most used instrument followed by amendments (4 pp / $\sigma = 4.5$), initiative proposals (3.1 pp / $\sigma = 4$) and interpellations (2.5 pp / $\sigma = 4.6$). Though looking in closer detail we can see that motions are only the most used instrument on Bonaire. On Sint Eustatius and Saba, amendments are viewed by the respondents as about equally- or more often used than motions.

As can been derived from the Standard deviations, there is quite a spread in these findings, with some Island council members using these instruments sporadically and other Councilmembers indicating they use it very often.

Faction leaders often indicated that they use these instruments more often, notable exception are the interpellations. In speaking with the respondents it was found that there were quite different views of what constituted an interpellation, ranging from informally asking if an executive member would answer questions to the more formal summoning for a debate.
10.3.2. Questions

The Dutch Local government act of 2001 sought to strengthen the municipal council’s role on control. With article 155 of the LGA, the municipal council explicitly gained the right to ask questions that was formerly implied. The lawmakers emphasized the importance of the right to question to be implemented in a form that made it easily applicable with low thresholds (Rijksoverheid, 2001). Likewise the WoLBES provides Island council members with the right to ask questions (Article 159 WoLBES). So questions were deemed important in gathering information for the control role of the Island council, we want to know how this is applied in practice. We looked at both written and oral questions. And the frequency that they were used during a council period.

When looking at questions we see that written questions are used by most council members. There is some notable spread in frequency, the majority has submitted at least 1 or more written questions, over 60% of the respondents fell within either the category of 5 questions or less down to zero.

![Figure 20: Frequency of written questions asked](image)

Oral questions are much more used than written questions. 76.9% asked more than 10 questions. This is on the whole not surprising as oral questions are much more easily asked during any sort of council session if they relate to the subject already on the agenda (non-scheduled matters are a different matter depending on local council rules), written questions have a bit more formal tone, having set terms for when they should be answered and are sometimes required to specifically not be about affairs that are on a current agenda.

![Figure 21: Frequency of oral questions asked](image)
We subsequently asked the respondents if the number of questions asked was changed after the WolBES. With the separation between Island council and Executive Council we would expect the number of questions to increase. This seems to have been the case according to the respondents, with over sixty-five percent of them indicating that the number of questions was increased. This was especially prevalent on Sint Eustatius (71%) and Bonaire (71%). On Saba the respondents were evenly split between the number of questions increasing or remaining the same.

While the values we found seem to overwhelmingly indicate that the number of questions asked increased. We nevertheless tested these outcomes to see if the increases were significant. On the BES as a whole and Bonaire and Sint Eustatius specifically we found significant leanings towards the questions having been increased, while on Saba we did not.

![Figure 22: Changing frequency of questions asked](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.53896</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-6.478</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.62158</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-4.18</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.57735</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.732</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 2, H1: μ ≠ 2, α: 0.10
10.4. Possibility and utilization

Before we looked at the administrative practice of time spent and instruments used. We will now look how the respondents view the possibilities and utilization of the Island council’s framework setting and controlling role.

We asked the Island council members to rate their possibilities and utilization for setting frameworks and control on a scale from 0 to 10.

The possibility to set frameworks was not very positively rated, ranging between 5 and 6 on average, rating 5.7 on BES overall, 6 on Bonaire, 5.8 on Saba and 5.1 on Sint Eustatius. Utilization was similarly rated on all Islands with the overall rating of utilization being a 5.6 average.

Overall the possibilities of controlling the Executive Council were moderately positive rated around 7 (6.9 BES), with respondents from Bonaire being the most critical (6.7), Sint Eustatius (7.0) and Saba (7.2) rating it more positive. The utilization of controlling the Executive Council was overall slightly less positively rated as a 6+ (6.2). Bonaire rated the utilization at the same level as the possibility (6.7). Saba rated the utilization more than a point lower (6) and Sint Eustatius rated it almost 2 full points less (5.1).
10.5. Accountability

We subsequently asked to what extent the respondents view the Executive Council is held accountable. We asked this for both the plenary council sessions and party faction meeting settings. We also asked who takes the initiative for accountability. Overall 81% of the respondents indicated that the Executive Council is frequently being held accountable in plenary sessions of the Island council. With an additional 15% indicating that the Executive Council is incidentally held accountable.

With 92% of the respondents indicating that the Island council takes the initiative for accountability.

For faction meetings 50% of the respondents indicated it happening frequently that a member of the Executive Council was being held accountable and 23% indicating incidentally holding the Executive Council members accountable.

90% of the respondents indicated that the party faction initiates the Executive Council members giving an account.

When asked about general accountability, we can see in figure 29 that the respondents were even more in agreement with ninety percent viewing the Executive Council’s accountability to have been increased after the implementation of the WolBES and a few respondents indicating that the situation remained the same.
These results seem very clear that the councilmembers view accountability as having improved after the implementation of the WolBES and testing these results only adds further weight to the assessment that the respondents lean strongly towards accountability having been increased.

Table 11: T-Test Increased accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.30079</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-13.784</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.31623</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.40825</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: $H_0: \mu = 2, H_1: \mu \neq 2, \alpha: 0.10$

10.6. Concluding

Politicians on the Caribbean public entities indicate a high amount of time spent on council work. When compared for context, we found the time spent on council work to be higher than in the Netherlands. There was a high spread found between respondents, and some outliers seem extraordinary and are perhaps a result of a perception that one is always ‘in office’ as a representative. There is however some theoretical justification to assume a higher workload and the difference was found to be significant on the BES as a whole and on Bonaire.

This difference in time spent might be partially explainable with the time spent on contact with members of the constituency. This was found to be significant on the BES as a whole, on Bonaire and on Saba. The formal duties of Island council membership could be more similar to those of a municipal council member in the Netherlands but this requires further in depth study.

The WolBES gave Island councilmembers a wide range of instruments, the Island councilmembers generally use both framework setting and controlling instruments with motions being the most popular. The Island councilmembers also indicate that oral- and written questions are regularly used. We also saw that the respondents view that the number of questions has increased. And this was
significant on the BES as a whole, Bonaire and Sint Eustatius. In this sense the dualistic changes of the Island council seem to have increased the controlling role.

The possibilities and utilization to set frameworks were rated barely positive. With the possibilities to control being rated moderately, scoring a seven minus on a scale of one to ten. Which, while in no way great, does indicate that the dualistic system allows for a moderate control in practice. The utilization of control was rated less positive with a six plus score and the differences between Caribbean public entities was more pronounced. Overall it indicates an administrative understanding and modest appreciation of the new potential of the controlling role and possibilities of the Island council, but an administrative practice that does not always fully utilizes that potential.

According to the respondents, the Executive Council is frequently held accountable with the Island council seen as taking the initiative. The respondents significantly indicated that according to them accountability has increased after the implementation of the WoLBES, possibly indicating a growing dualistic practice.

In the next chapter we will go further into indicators that could signify dualism or lingering executive based monism.
11. Administrative practice: Executive monistic tendencies?

Before we looked at attitudes on administrative culture. In this part we will look into the administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities and answer the research question:

To what extent are there tendencies of executive monism present in the administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES?

In 11.1 we go into overall views of the administrative practice on the BES islands and the categories of executive monism. 11.2 covers the first category to what extent coalition agreements leave room for Island Council influence. 11.3 is about party discipline and compliance. Influence on decision making is assessed in 11.4 and whether or not debates are open or predetermined is reviewed in 11.5 followed by conclusions in 11.6.

When considering the Executive monistic tendencies, it can seem prudent to take several perspectives into consideration. Two specific dichotomous perspectives seem obvious as we can identify from theory: the coalition perspective versus the opposition perspective and the Island Council perspective versus the Executive Council perspective.

In this study, the respondents were Island Council members who have been active after the implementation of the WolBES, as we saw before that due to coalitions shifting there were few distinct coalition and opposition party members and this makes it difficult to isolate clear coalition or opposition perspectives to take into consideration as few respondents have served in a clear opposition role.

We also saw that some respondents have also served for a period of time as Island Commissioners after the implementation of the WolBES, as we saw before that due to coalitions shifting there were few distinct coalition and opposition party members and this makes it difficult to isolate clear coalition or opposition perspectives to take into consideration as few respondents have served in a clear opposition role.

With some variables it was thus considered to additionally isolate and view their responses as a separate subgroup when assessing specific variables where it made logical sense and would clearly benefit to assess a situation from such a dual perspective.

11.1. Executive monism

As seen in the chapters before, one of the goals of the dualistic measures of the WolBES is a change in administrative practice. The Island council in the dualistic system is responsible for setting the frameworks of policy. This means that the Island council makes the formal decisions that determine the boundaries within the Executive Council has to operate.

Before we asked the respondents who should normatively/executively administer the Caribbean public entity in their view (see also figure 11), we will now look at Table 12 which shows how the respondents view who executively administrates the Caribbean public entity in practice. Here we found that 92% of the respondents viewed the Executive Council executively administrating the Caribbean public entity and the Island council controlling and setting the frameworks.
Table 12: Administrative practice of administrating the Caribbean public entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is most in accordance to administrative practice?</th>
<th>Councilmembers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Island Council executively administrates the Island, the Executive Council handles daily affairs</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Executive Council executively administrates the Island, the Island Council sets frameworks and controls the Executive Council</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (n= 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data could be indicative of a dualistic administrative practice, however we also saw before that respondents were for example divided on if Commissioners should attend party faction meetings or not. This could be indicative of some lingering influence by the Executive Council on decision making and some continuation of the executive dominance which ended up being prevalent in monism. Or it could be just two administrative bodies informing each other.

To explore this further we can look into several factors that could reveal if the WolBES resulted in an actual dualistic administrative practice or a continuation of executive dominated monism. Earlier research in the Netherlands determined executive dominated monism as a situation in which:

1. there is a strong bind between coalition factions and an executive or coalition agreement which provides little room to manoeuvre for the Island council;
2. Party discipline and compliant coalition factions;
3. Decision making on the basis of coalition parties with little room for opposition factions;
4. Decision making is predetermined in consultation between coalition factions.
   (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2001, p. 9)

We asked the respondents about how they assessed administrative practices in these 4 categories, which we will go over on the next pages and conclude to what extent there is a dualistic- or an executive dominated monism administrative practice.
11.2. The coalition agreement that leaves little room for council influence

The political and governmental practice on the BES public entities is one where in practice the Executive Council is usually appointed and politically derived from a majority within the Island Council who together form a coalition (unless for example when one party has a majority by itself). The basis of such a coalition is usually a written down agreement that is known as a coalition agreement that outlines policy directions. The matter at hand is if this agreement provides a broad framework with the Island Council as a whole being able to provide input in further elaborations (which would be more indicative of a dualistic practice), or if it is ‘nailed down’ to details with only the coalition parties having general influence (Which is more indicative of an executive monistic tendency). A Coalition agreement is often negotiated between party leaders who then function as Island Commissioners.

11.2.1. Coalition Agreement

We first asked the respondents to what extent decision making took place according to a coalition agreement on a scale of almost always (1) – to great extent (2) – somewhat (3) – little or never (4). 32% of the respondents indicated that almost always decision making took place according to a coalition agreement with 48% saying that this happened to great extent. 12% indicated that it happened somewhat and 8% responded that little or never decision making took place according to a coalition agreement.

Decision making viewed as being mostly done along coalition agreements was most strongly viewed as being administrative practice on Saba, where 60% of the respondents view it as almost always and 40% as to great extent happening. Saba did not have coalitions in recent history with one party always having won the majority on the Island council in the elections.

On Sint Eustatius 43% viewed decision making almost always happening according to a coalition agreement and 29% to great extent, but also 29% indicating little or never happening according to a coalition agreement. On Bonaire 15% viewed decision making almost always happening according to a coalition agreement and 48% to great extent, but also 12% stating it happened somewhat and 8% indicating little or never happening according to a coalition agreement.

![Figure 30: Decision making based on coalition agreement](image-url)
When testing the overall respondent’s answers against a theoretical average (2.5), we found a significance leaning towards the coalition agreement being the basis for decisions. We also found separate significant leanings on Bonaire and Saba. With respondents from Sint Eustatius we did not find significant leanings.

Table 13: T-test decision making based on coalition agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>0.8882</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-3.038</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.64051</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-2.382</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.34519</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0.702</td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.54772</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-4.491</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: µ = 2.5, H1: µ ≠ 2.5, α: 0.10

11.2.2. Room for manoeuvrability within the coalition agreement

Does a coalition agreement generally leave room for the whole of the council to give input? We put forth a contraposition. We asked the respondents to rate on a 5 point scale if the administrative practice leaned to either there being no room to manoeuvre on policy due to an coalition agreement (1) or there being much room to manoeuvre on policy (5).

Looking at the data in figure 31, we can see that the data on the Caribbean public entities as a whole seems to show a moderate position on the coalition agreement leaving room (3.1). Indicating a moderate position on if the Island council is limited due to an executive agreement or has room for its own policy considerations. When looking at the data of individual Caribbean public entities then Saba and Sint Eustatius scored the situation as moderate (3) and Bonaire slightly more toward room for the Island council’s own considerations (3.25). Overall there is a fairly large spread in the data and the respondents did not lean significantly either way, t (23) = .592, p = .560.

Figure 31: Coalition Agreement leaving room for legislative manoeuvrability
11.2.3. Determining the political agenda

We subsequently looked at the views on which administrative body determines the political agenda shown in figure 33, with 1 leaning most to the Executive Council and 5 leaning most towards the Island council. On the whole BES this leaned strongly towards the Island council (4), this was strongest on Bonaire (4.3) and weakest on Sint Eustatius (3.3). Here the respondents overall did lean significantly towards the council setting the agenda, $t(25) = 4.406, p = .000$. This could not be determined separately on Saba and Sint Eustatius. On Sint Eustatius this seems to be because of the more diverse responses, on Saba this might be due to statistical test being too strict for the smaller population.
With this variable it would be again interesting to include the view of the Island commissioners. We found them to be leaning a bit less towards the Island Council determining the agenda than BES average with a score of 3.5, this did not seem to be outside the scope of the results so we did not test this separately.

11.2.4. Concluding

We found that, according to the views of the respondents, decision making overall took place along coalition agreements. But with the respondents being divided on how much room the coalition agreement actually leaves for further input on policy. We also found that the respondents view that the political agenda is often determined by the Island council.
11.3. Party discipline and compliant coalition factions

One of the other variables that could indicate executive monism, is to what extent political parties on the Island Council are critical or compliant to proposals and acts of the executive council. To assess this, we will look to what extent decision making was being done according to party lines and to what extent coalition factions were seen to be critical or compliant.

11.3.1. Decision making along party lines

We asked the respondents to what extent decision making took place along party lines on a scale of almost always (1) – to great extent (2) – somewhat (3) – little or never (4). Of the respondents 27% viewed that decision making almost always went along party lines and 50% to great extent along party lines. Decision making being mostly done along party lines was most strongly viewed as being administrative practice on Saba, where 80% of the respondents view it as almost always and 20% to great extent happening. Saba has an electoral history of one party always having won the majority on the Island council in the elections. This situation might explain a stronger tendency to party lines and is consistent with data found earlier where 60% of the respondents on Saba favoured party lines over the personal mandate from the electorate.

On Sint Eustatius 29% viewed decision making almost always happening along party lines 57% to great extent and 14% little or never. On Bonaire 7% viewed decision making almost always happening along party lines and 57% to great extent but also 29% stating it happened somewhat and 7% indicating little or never happening according to party lines.

Overall we saw a significant leaning towards decision making, often being done along party lines and specifically on Saba this was clear. Further examination showed that this was not significant when viewing just the Caribbean public entity of Bonaire or Sint Eustatius. Although especially on Sint Eustatius the numbers are similar as seen on BES overall. As such this could be a matter of Sint Eustatius having a small N and therefore not testing as significantly leaning, while in reality it is similar as BES overall.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
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<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>BES</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>-2.702</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bonaire</td>
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<td>0.74495</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-0.718</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1.323</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.44721</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 2.5, H1: μ ≠ 2.5, α: 0.10
11.3.2. Coalition party following or critical

For this category we also gave respondents the choice in a contraposition to rate if the Coalition party follows (1) or is critical (5) about the Executive Council on a 5 point scale shown in figure 36.

On the whole respondents from the Caribbean public entities indicated a position moderately in between following and critical with leaning slightly towards being critical (3.1). Sint Eustatius leaned slightly towards following (2.9) and Bonaire slightly towards being critical (3.1) and Saba leaning most to being critical (3.4). Overall the respondents did not lean significantly either way, t (25) = .515, p = .611.

With this variable being about the stance of the Island Council versus the Executive Council we again considered looking specifically at the views of respondents who had also been Island Commissioners, as their specific view could have added value to the research.

When separately looking at this group, we saw that (former) Island commissioners on average leaned most towards the Island council following the Executive Council (2.3). It the difference between the former Island commissioners and the rest of the respondents fell just slightly short of being a significant difference in the scores for Island commissioners (M=2.33, SD=1.37) and non-Island commissioners (M=2.00, SD=3.35) conditions; t(24)= -2.026, p = .054.
11.3.3. Concluding

With regards to decision making, the results seem to lean to great extent to making decisions along party lines. This was strongest seen on Saba and moderately on Bonaire. The reason why on Saba this view is strongest might be explainable by one party having had the majority on the Island council for many council periods.

When asked if coalition parties were critical or following, the views overall leaned slightly towards critical while specifically the former commissioners leaned more to following. So while the overall view would indicate a moderate administrative practice, the views of the former Island commissioners could still indicate a practice with a tendency towards executive monism.
11.4. Influence on decision making

One of the main functions of the Island Council within the dualistic system is to make decisions, such as to set frameworks or establishing the budget. But is the Island Council truly influential on decision making or does the Executive Council exert the most influence in practice?

11.4.1. Influence of the Executive Council vs the Island Council

We asked the respondents to indicate in percentages who would have the most influence on decision making. We put forth the options to rate the difference of influence between Island council and Executive Council; and the difference between Coalition and opposition within the Island council.

Figure 38 shows the data on who the respondents view as influential on the BES level, while the graphs show the distinctions between the different Caribbean public entities. As a whole the respondents view the Island Council as more influential (54.5%) than the Executive Council on decision making. On Bonaire they rated the council influence as 61.2% on Saba 60%, while on Sint Eustatius the respondents viewed the Executive Council as more influential with 62.9%.

Figure 38: Influence of the administrative bodies

With this variable we also looked at the specific difference between the respondents who have also been Island commissioners and the respondents who have only been on the Island council. When attributing influence to an administrative body it might help to have experience in both administrative bodies, which the former Island Commissioners have. Island councilmembers without that experience might view things differently.

When the groups are split, there is a very notable is the difference between how the Island Councilmembers who have been commissioners estimate the influence of the Executive Council versus the rest of the respondents. The commissioners estimated the influence of the Executive Council on decision making to be of 67.5% while the other respondents viewed this as 32.5%. We looked to see if the differences found would be significant by comparing means.

Table 15: Comparing means influence of the Executive Council and Island Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Executive council</th>
<th>Island council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ex)Commissioners</td>
<td>67.50%</td>
<td>32.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilmembers</td>
<td>39.92%</td>
<td>60.08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: * = 0.05
11.4.2. Influence of the coalition party versus the opposition party

The difference of influence between coalition- and opposition parties was viewed by the respondents as leaning heavily to the coalition parties 79.96% versus an estimated 20.04% influence to the opposition parties. On Bonaire respondents viewed opposition influence at 28.21%, Saba at 17% and Sint Eustatius at 5.86%.

Figure 39: Influence of the coalition- and opposition party

Assuming that the influence of both the coalition parties and opposition parties would be equal in a theoretical optimal dualistic situation where debate is 100% open, we tested the results against such an assumption and unsurprisingly found that the influence of the opposition party was on all Caribbean public entities, significantly lower than what we would expect in such an optimal dualistic situation.

Table 16: T-Test influence of the opposition party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.445</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-9.29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15.1413</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-5.384</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.9281</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-19.701</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17.1756</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-4.296</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 50, H1: μ ≠ 50, α: 0.10
11.4.3. Perceived influence changes

Given that the positional separation of Island council and Executive Council was a core intent of the WolBES, it is important to see if the respondents view the influence of Executive Council, Coalition party and/or Opposition party having changed or not after the implementation of the WolBES. Optimistically the separation would also mean a more open debate on the Island council and thus more influence for the opposition party. Overall the respondents indicate that they view the influence of the Executive Council remained the same (35%) or decreased (55%). This was strongest on Bonaire and Sint Eustatius and less strong on Saba.

![Figure 40: Administrative influence changes](image)

When testing these results we can see that overall we see the $p$-value leaning towards the influence of the island council significantly decreasing, we also found this on Bonaire and Sint Eustatius, but this could not be established on Saba which in the graph does seem to show distinctly different views.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
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<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.68633</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.932</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.6742</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.569</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: $H_0: \mu = 2$, $H_1: \mu \neq 2$, $\alpha: 0.10$

Being specifically about the influence of the executive council, it was again interesting to also specifically isolate the views of the (former) Island Commissioners. These respondents leaned 66.7% to the influence remaining the same and 33.3% towards the influence decreasing. When testing this we found no significance for the view of the commissioners ($M=2.00, SD=0.55$) conditions; $t (5) =1.581$, $p =.175$. 
On the question if the coalition party’s influence changed the respondents viewed this mostly (52.38%) as remaining the same and overall leaning slightly more to increasing (28.57%). On Bonaire the views were more evenly divided amongst the respondents, while on Sint Eustatius (80%), Saba (60%) the respondents leaned most to the situation remaining the same.

When testing the results using a two-tailed t-test we found the leanings not to be statistically significant.

Table 18: T-Test Changing influence Coalition party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES (N=21)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.70034</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-0.623</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire (N=11)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.83121</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.363</td>
<td>0.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.44721</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba (N=5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.70711</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 2, H1: μ ≠ 2, α: 0.10

Regarding the opposition party’s influence the respondents overall viewed this also as mostly remaining the same (47.37%) as remaining the same and split over increases or decreases (26.32%). On Bonaire forty percent viewed the opposition influence as decreasing and Sint Eustatius the views were more strongly that influence remained the same (80%) and leaned slightly towards influence decreasing (20%). On Saba the respondents were evenly split between the influence of the opposition increasing and remaining the same. Due to the unique circumstance on Saba, where one party dominated the Island Council for decades with four of the five seats, the one seat increase to two seats on the five seat council could indeed have increased influence.
When testing the results we found no significant leanings. The issue could be very spurious though, influence is not necessarily dependent on only an institutional change or administrative culture. It sometimes might heavily dependent on sheer personalities.

Table 19: T-Test Changing influence Opposition Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.70034</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8756</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.44721</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.57735</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.732</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: µ = 2, H1: µ ≠ 2, α: 0.10

To ascertain if there are possible executive monistic tendencies present in the council debates, the respondents were asked to indicate if their council sessions lean most to debate between Coalition and opposition (1) or debate between Island council and Executive Council (5). The idea being that in an executive monistic situation the parties on the executive council would form a block on the Island council as well and thus debates would be mostly between the coalition point of view and an opposition point of view, while in dualism the Island council holds the executive council accountable and debates are more between Island Council and Executive Council.

Overall the Caribbean public entities leaned moderately to debate between coalition and opposition (2.3). Bonaire rated an average of (2.3), while Sint Eustatius leaned most towards debate between coalition and opposition (1,7) and Saba leaned most to debate between Island council and Executive Council (3,4). Of note is that the spread is lower with this variable, which would suggest more agreement, which was tested showing the respondents indeed leaning significantly towards coalition vs opposition, t(25) = 3.942, p = .001. This was also found on Bonaire t (13) = 4.372, p = .001 and Sint Eustatius t (6) = 6.971, p = .000. But not on Saba.
11.4.4. Political division

Given the results on the Island council debating on the premise of coalition vs opposition or Executive Council vs Island council, we subsequently wanted to know if the respondents view the political division as clear (1) or unclear (5). Overall the respondents scored this at 2.1 with Bonaire (2.3), Saba (2.2) and Sint Eustatius (1.6) scoring this more strongly as a clear political division with the smallest spread. Testing these respondents showed the respondents lean significantly towards clear political division, t (25) = -4.308, p = .000. This was also found separately on Bonaire t (13) = -2.500, p = .027. Sint Eustatius t (6) = -7.071, p = .000. But not with Saba t (4) = -1.089, p = .338.

Figure 43: Debate between administrative bodies or coalition vs opposition

Figure 44: Political division
11.4.5. Concluding

When looking at the views on decision making we have seen that overall the respondents view the Island council as more influential, but we have also seen that the former Island commissioners have very opposing view and see the Executive Council as more influential. Given that the former Island commissioners all have served in the past- or serve in the present on the Island council and perhaps have the most complete perspective, it is tempting to view the perspective of this group as most in line with the actual practice and this would indicate an executive monistic tendency.

The influence of opposition parties is overall low among the respondents, With Bonaire indicating the most influence for opposition parties and Sint Eustatius the least. In combination with the respondents indicating that council sessions leaning towards opposition versus coalition in debates while leaning towards clear political division, these indicators point to the monistic practice of decision making on the basis of coalition parties with little room for opposition factions.

11.5. Predetermined or open debate

The last of the stated indicators of executive monism is the openness or predetermination of debate. When we consider a debate being predetermined from an executive monistic consideration, we would assume it is likely to happen among the (coalition) parties that make up the Executive Council. However predetermined debates are also possible with any other majority on the Island council.

11.5.1. Openness of debate

We asked to what extent the respondents would rate their administrative practice on a 5 point scale as being an open debate (5) or predetermined between coalition parties (1).

As seen in figure 45, overall the respondents overall view the Caribbean public entities leaning average in between predetermined and open debate. Bonaire leans most to the administrative practice being a slightly open in debates (3.5), while on Saba the views were diverse, with respondents resulting in an overall moderate score (2.8). Sint Eustatius leans most towards decision making being predetermined (2). Looking closer we found that on the whole the respondents showed no significant leanings $t (25) = -.143, p = .887$. Because Sint Eustatius seemed to lean more strongly towards predetermination, we tested it and indeed found a significant leaning towards predetermination $t (6) = -2.646, p = .038$. 
In 11.4.3. We indicated a possible link between the openness of debate and the influence of the opposition. The idea being that the more open a debate on the Island Council, the more influence you’d expect the opposition to have. Given that we have data on both variables we can further assess this to see if the findings were consistent. We looked if the two variables were correlated and indeed found a strong correlation (\( -0.582^{**} \)) with the amount of influence the respondents attribute to the opposition factions and the openness of the debate. The more a respondent leaned to stating the administrative practice is that of open debate, the more likely they are to attribute influence to the opposition party. This shows a logical consistency in the views of the respondents on these variables.

### 11.5.2. Singular or multiple proposals

Another factor of a debate being predetermined or open is if in policy deliberations there is just one proposal presented to the Island council or several alternatives. We can see in figure 46, that the respondents overall scored this as very average (3.1), but with a spread of 1 on a 5 point scale. Bonaire scoring similarly (3.1) and Sint Eustatius scoring lowest (2.9) with also the lowest spread and Saba Highest (3.4) with the highest spread. No significant leanings were found \( t (25) = .371, p = .714. \)
11.5.3. Concluding

On asserting if debates were open or predetermined debate almost all groups of respondents seem divided. Clearest view comes from Sint Eustatius where the respondents significantly viewed the situation as predetermined, while Bonaire overall leaned more towards open debate. There is a broad moderate view on the question if the council is presented with one proposal or multiple alternatives, overall leaning slightly towards multiple alternatives.
11.6. Conclusions

We looked at 4 factors that could indicate the administrative leanings toward either dualistic practice or executive monism:

1. Is there a strong bind between coalition factions and an executive or coalition agreement which provides little room to manoeuvre for the Island council?

Given the significant results we can state that there is a strong bind between the coalition factions and the coalition agreement with the respondents viewing that decision making tends to go along the coalition agreement. At the same time the respondents were divided on how much room this still leaves, but with stronger views that the Island council determines the agenda. This seemingly would imply a strong bind to coalition agreements, but with some perceived room to manoeuvre. Overall this does seem to indicate executive monistic tendencies, but with the Island council.

2. Is there party discipline and are coalition factions compliant?

We saw an overall significant leaning on the Caribbean public entities towards decision making being done based on party lines, this could not be established on the singular public entities of Bonaire and Sint Eustatius, but could find it on Saba. Given that on Saba, one party has had an absolute majority for many years, these findings are not unexpected. With no significance found on the other two Caribbean public entities it is hard to state that party discipline is strongly involved with administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities as a whole.

With the respondents being diverse but overall indicating a moderate balance between coalition parties being compliant or critical. Of note is that on Saba the respondents see themselves as most critical, while not significant, the outcome is interesting in the light of them leaning significantly towards party discipline.

Saba showing the strongest tendency to decision making along party lines could perhaps be a case of ‘horizontal party discipline’ in which the party keeps it ranks closed on the Island council but still be critical towards the Executive Council. And not of ‘vertical party discipline’ implied in executive monism where party discipline is maintained and transcending the positional separation. Further study is needed to ascertain this.

Regarding this factor we cannot in good conscience state either way if the administrative practice is strongly dualistic or executive monistic.
3. Are decision being made on the basis of coalition parties with little room for opposition factions?

Overall the influence of the opposition was seen as low by the respondents. In combination with the also significant leaning towards debates between opposition and coalition in the significantly clear political division. In combination with that we cannot establish the influence of the opposition having been significantly increased at all, this seems a strong indication of executive monism.

One might expect Saba to show this the most, based on their one party having a sole majority for several decades, the respondents on Saba viewed (while not significantly) the opposition as having increased the most and leaned most (while not significantly) towards council debates being between Island council and Executive Council. This might be in part due to the recent development of the opposition gaining another seat on the council which might increase their influence. While the tradition of always having had a majority on the council could result in more discussion between Island council and Executive Council, this difference requires more study.

4. Decision making is predetermined in consultation between coalition factions.

It is difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding the predetermination or openness of debates. Only on Sint Eustatius did the respondents significantly lean towards predetermined debate. We found a correlation between the influence that was attributed to the opposition and the extent of predetermination of the debate. As this seems to be a logical correlation and we found the influence of the opposition to be low, it could be that the outcome of debates are often predetermined within the coalition parties.

While we did not find significant leanings on proposals being singular or multiple proposals being presented. Overall this factor does not show strong executive monistic tendencies overall, with the exception of Sint Eustatius.
12. Transparency

The lack of transparency was one of the stated problems of the monistic system in the Netherlands. While this did not explicitly refer to closed door sessions in the Netherlands, the perceived frequency of closed door sessions of the Island council was one of the issues that were specifically addressed by the WolBES. This resulted in measures that are not in effect in the Netherlands. To gain insight into this situation on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES, we will take a look at how the Island council members perceive the situation after the implemented measures and answer the question:

**To what extent have Island council sessions become more transparent on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES?**

To answer this question we will reflect on if the respondents perceived this as a problem in 12.1. In 12.2 we go over how often closed door sessions were held after the implementation of the WolBES. Then in 12.3 we go over the number of closed door sessions change after the implementation. And finally in 12.4 we go over the respondents’ perception on if the measures of the WolBES were an improvement or not followed by the conclusions in 12.5.

12.1. Problem Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Nominal</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>BES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 20: Problem perception closed door sessions*

Recognisability and transparency were key aims of the Elzinga report (Elzinga, 1999). While that rapport focused more on the relations between administrative bodies, closed door policies of the local government are obviously also of importance to the recognisability and transparency of public office and therefore not necessarily out of place as part of dualistic measures. As seen in the earlier chapters, there were extra regulations included in the WolBES with regard to closed door sessions with the aim of reducing them.

We looked for data on closed door sessions in the Netherlands and found that the overall average was 3.7 closed door sessions a year. It was also found that the average number of closed door sessions seemed to increase with the size of the municipality. Smaller municipalities of <20,000 citizens would see on average 2.4 closed door council sessions, while the large municipalities of >100,000 would see on average 8.4 closed door sessions a year (Warbroek, 2010).

In the next pages we will go over the frequency on the BES islands but we first asked the respondents if they viewed the frequency of closed door sessions as problematic or not problematic. In table 20 we can see that most respondents (56%) did not view closed door sessions as problematic with the second largest group having no opinion on the matter (28%).
12.2. Regularity of closed door sessions

To assess the regularity of closed door sessions we gave the respondents three broad averages of closed door frequencies. Once a month or more, every quarter of a year or twice a year or less.

Overall it was the view of 60% of Island council members that closed door sessions took place twice a year or less, 16% stated that closed door session would take place approximately every quarter of a year and 24% stated that closed door sessions took place every month. As seen in figure 47, the observation that closed door sessions took place once a month or more came predominantly from Bonaire, where the assessments seem more diverse than on the other Caribbean public entities.

It was seen in the Netherlands, that smaller municipalities, with less than 20.000 constituents, had on average 2.4 closed door sessions council sessions a year. Given that the Caribbean public entities are of similar smaller size in terms of constituents, it is interesting that according to the respondents on Saba and Sint Eustatius, the perceived number of closed door sessions seem similar to the findings in the Netherlands.

![Figure 47: Frequency of closed door sessions](image)

We subsequently tested these findings to see if the respondents viewed the regularity of closed door sessions was two or less (3) or more than that (1, 2), as displayed in table 21. We found that that Sint Eustatius and Saba did not show significantly more closed door sessions than 2 per year. While on Bonaire there were significantly more closed door sessions reported which skewed the total BES results as well.

**Table 21: T-Test regularity closed door sessions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.86023</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-3.72</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.95407</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-3.488</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.37796</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.89443</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 3, H1: μ < 3, α: 0.10*
12.3. Changing Regularity

We subsequently asked if the regularity of closed door sessions increased, declined or remaining the same. We found that the Island council members were rather diverse in their views over the answer possibilities. Though between Caribbean public entities we can see interesting differences.

As can be seen in the graph on the whole of BES the views seem diverse, 32% indicated that according to them the regularity of closed door sessions declined versus 27% who indicated it stayed the same and 41% who stated that the number of closed door sessions increased. The view that the number of closed door sessions increased was most dominant on Bonaire where 67% of the respondents held this view. Saba and Sint Eustatius leaned more to a declining number of closed door council sessions.

We found these findings remarkable as it was intended for the closed door sessions to decrease, yet the respondents on Bonaire viewed the number as increasing. We decided on performing an additional correlation test and found a strong correlation (< 0.01) between the time the respondents served on the Island council and if they viewed the number of closed door sessions increasing or declining. The more time spent, the more respondents were likely to state the number of closed door sessions declining. Which could indicate that

![Figure 48: Changing regularity of closed door sessions](image)

We also tested these findings to see if the respondents viewed the regularity of closed door stayed the same (2) or if it had changed by increasing (1) or decreasing (3), as displayed in table 22. We found that none of the Caribbean public entities showed significant leanings towards the number of closed door sessions having been increased nor declined.

Table 22: T-Test Changing Regularity of Closed door sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
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<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>21</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaire</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.90034</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.603</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sint Eustatius</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.83666</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.535</td>
<td>0.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saba</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.54772</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1.633</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: H0: μ = 2, H1: μ ≠ 2, α: 0.10
12.4. Improving or worsening?

Next we wanted to know if the Island council members viewed the situation pertaining to closed door sessions as improving or worsening after the implementation of the WolBES. Because while the regularity might have changed, that does not in itself mean that a situation has improved or worsened. It could be for example that closed door sessions increased in numbers, but for legitimate reasons. Looking at the data, we found that the Island council members overall leaned to viewing the situation as improving (58%). With respondents from Bonaire providing the strongest views of improvement (69%) and Saba being more mixed around neither being an improvement nor a worsening (50%). Of note is that the situation on Saba is not attributable to difference in views from governmental parties or opposition.

Figure 49: Assessment of improvements

We also tested these findings to see if the respondents viewed the regularity of closed door stayed the same (2) or if it had improved (1) or worsened (3), which is displayed in table 23. We found that Bonaire and Sint Eustatius showed significant leanings towards the situation having been improved.

Table 23: T-Test Assessment of improvements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>t</th>
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<td>Bonaire</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
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<td>Saba</td>
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<td>0.8165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Tailed T-Test: $H_0: \mu = 2$, $H_1: \mu \neq 2$, $\alpha: 0.10$
12.5. Concluding

We wanted to see if the measures were an improvement and increased the transparency of local island politics. We found results that might seem contradictory. Accumulatively there were 76% of the respondents who indicated the closed door sessions to be once every quarter (16%) or only twice or less closed door sessions in a year (60%). Saba and Sint Eustatius were not significantly higher than Dutch average, while Bonaire did lean significantly higher than 2 closed door sessions a year. However given that the average in the Netherlands was 3.7 overall and 2.4 closed door sessions for smaller municipalities, the views of the respondents would not seem to show dissimilar practice on the Caribbean public entities.

When asked if the regularity of closed door sessions had changed, we saw that overall the results were diverse and we did not find significant leanings either way. From just the raw data it would appear that Bonaire viewed the regularity of closed door sessions to have been increased. This subsequently seems in contrast with the significant leaning on Bonaire to the situation having been improved after the implementation of the WolBES. There could be a number of reasons for this that are incidental in nature such as temporarily increasing the number of closed door sessions for appointments, while overall the undesirable closed door sessions are decreasing.

It is notable that a correlation could be found between the time served on the Island council and the views on if the number of closed door council sessions changed. Island council members who served less than 5 years were more inclined to view that closed door council sessions had increased. While longer serving Island council members were more inclined to state that the number of closed door sessions either stayed the same or decreased. This could be an indicator for closed door sessions overall having decreased since the WolBES.

With further regards to transparency, this research focused on closed door sessions and the data gathered from respondents solely applied to that subject. However during the course of the research it became clear that there may also be issues with regard to the availability of documents and decisions made by the administrative bodies. We noted in chapter 5 that we found that decisions and policy documents were not always properly publicized and this was subsequently confirmed by other literature where it was found that proper publication was not systematically happening according to the prescribed procedures (Spies, Soons, Thodé, Verhey, & Weekers, 2015).
13. Summary of Conclusions

In chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 we went over data from both literature and empirical findings and sought data to provide (partial) answers for the research questions established in chapter 4. Here we will go over the conclusions from each chapter and the research questions to ultimately answer the main research question and draw main conclusions.

13.1. Conclusions Chapter 7

In chapter 7 we reviewed to what extent measures were implemented after asking the question: *To what extent have the mandatory dualistic measures of the WolBES been implemented on the Caribbean public entities?*

We found the following results:

- All mandatory ordinances were formally implemented.
- All Caribbean public entities appointed an Island council clerk.
- The shared court of Audit was not yet active due to a refusal to appoint a member from Saba.

The implementation of these measures was often delayed, with the Dutch government indicating that the timetable was perhaps too ambitious. However the refusal to appoint a member to the shared court of audit is obstructing the final implementation of that measure.

13.2. Conclusions Chapter 8

In chapter 8 we went over the dualistic measures and positional separation based on the research question: *To what extent are Island council members supportive of positional separation and Island council improving measures from the WolBES?*

We found the following results:

- There is strong support for formal positional separations between the Island council and the Executive Council. There is also strong support for the additional measures that increase the rights, support, facilitating measures and instruments for the Island council;
- Support for the separation of positions to extent to Executive Council members faction meetings is diffuse with the respondents being split on the matter;
- Support for the additional WolBES measures of the Lt. Governor being able to overrule the Island council on closed door sessions is likewise diffuse.

This leads us to conclude that there is strong support for the formal positional dualistic measures, but differences of opinions on how Executive Council members and Island council members interact outside of the formal setting. The additional measure to give the Lt. Governor the power to overrule the Island council is not strongly supported.
13.3. Conclusions Chapter 9

The introduction of the dualistic system saw a realignment of roles, we went over how Island Councilmembers viewed this realignment in chapter 9 with the third research question: *To what extent do Island councilmember’s views align to their new dualistic roles of being more controlling and less administrative and to what extent they see dualism as fitting to their administrative culture?*

We found the following results:

- When directly asked which administrative body should executively administrate, 88% of the overall respondents indicated that the Executive Council should administrate and the Island council should set frameworks and control;
- When further asked about their roles, the representation of the electorate and the content of policies and budget is seen as most important to the respondents;
- When controlling and administrating are independently scored and compared in terms of importance, the Caribbean public entities differ on the assigned importance to controlling and administrating roles. On Bonaire controlling is seen as more important, while on Saba administrating is still seen as more important and Sint Eustatius leans in between;
- It seems that Island council members feel that dualism fits moderately in their administrative culture. Of the three Caribbean public entities, on Bonaire respondents significantly lean to dualism fitting into the administrative culture on Sint Eustatius and Saba leaned to a more moderate view.

The representative role of the Island council has the greatest priority of the Island councilmembers, this is in line with the goals of the dualistic system. Though this is more likely an outcome of already existing administrative culture than a consequence of the WoIBES. Of the three Caribbean public entities, Island council members on Bonaire seems to have adopted dualism as administrative culture the most in comparison of the Island council members of the other two Caribbean public entities. Island council members on Bonaire view dualism as moderately fitting in their administrative culture and view the controlling role as more important than executive administrative roles. On the other two Caribbean public entities, this is less clear.

13.4. Conclusions Chapter 10

We went over the daily practice of the Island council, control & accountability, the degree of executive monism and the openness of Island council sessions after the implementation of the WoIBES with the fourth question in chapter 10: *How do BES Island councilmembers perform their council work in terms of time spent and instruments used and how do they view the possibilities for control and accountability?*

On daily practice, control & accountability we draw the following conclusions:

- Island councilmembers on the Bonaire spent more time in their role as Island councilmembers than municipal councilmembers in the Netherlands;
- Of that time spent, BES Island councilmembers allocate significantly more time to communication with individual citizens than is reported in the Netherlands;
- Overall the view of the respondents is that the number of questions has been increased after the implementation of the WoIBES;
• Island councilmembers rate their possibilities to set and utilize frameworks as barely positive;
• Island councilmembers rate their possibilities for control as moderately positive;
• Utilization of control possibilities varies from moderately insufficient on Sint Eustatius, Barely sufficient on Saba and moderately sufficient on Bonaire.
• Accountability seems to have been increased after the implementation of the WolBES.

The administrative cultural view that the representative role of the Island council is most important is also shown to be the case in practice in terms of interaction. In comparison to the Netherlands the Island councilmembers have more interaction with the electorate. The possibilities and utilization to set frameworks is perhaps in need of improvement. In terms of control the Island councilmembers are positive about their possibilities but often view that the utilization as less positive indicating that they could improve their practice. Nevertheless the Island councilmembers view accountability as having improved.

13.5. Conclusions Chapter 11

To assess the presence of executive monism in chapter 11, we asked the fifth question: To what extent are there tendencies of executive monism present in the administrative practice on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES?

We draw the following conclusions:

• Island councilmembers on the BES as a whole lean towards decision making usually happening based on coalition agreements, they are divided on how much room this leaves for the Island council, overall viewing the room for the Island council to manoeuvre as less than moderate. This seems to indicate executive monism;
• The Island councilmembers strongly feel that the Island council sets the agenda;
• The Island councilmembers strongly feel that decision making is based on party lines and moderately view the coalition party between following and being critical. The Island councilmembers who also served as Island commissioners view the coalition party as leaning more to following. Overall this does seem to indicate lingering executive monism;
• The Island councilmembers do view the influence of the Executive Council on decision making as having been decreased;
• The Island council members indicate that the influence of opposition parties is weak, this is further underlined by the view that debates lean most towards coalition versus opposition and clear political division, strongly indicating executive monism;
• There is no clear view among Island council members on if Island council sessions are predetermined or an open debate, only on Sint Eustatius was there a significant leaning towards predetermination, though the lack of opposition influence might also indicate predetermination. Island councilmembers are likewise divided on if there is often just one proposal or multiple proposals.

On the whole it seems that there are executive monistic tendencies in the administrative practice on the BES public entities, these are strongest seen in the amount of influence there is for the opposition and decision making being done based on the coalition agreement.
13.6. Conclusions Chapter 12

This chapter related to the specific intentions of the WolBES to reduce closed door sessions. This was as such not part of the dualistic considerations the Netherlands, the nature of the solution to the perceived problem does seem in line with the stated goal of Elzinga et al, to create more outward transparency.

To that end we asked the sixth question in chapter 12: *To what extent have Island council sessions become more transparent on the Caribbean public entities after the implementation of the WolBES.*

- Overall most Island councilmembers indicate closed door sessions as happening twice a year or less, which is comparable to similar sized municipalities in the Netherlands. On Bonaire the view was notable more diverse.
- The Island councilmembers were overall divided on if the number of closed door sessions increased or decreased, with Island councilmembers on Bonaire mostly viewing closed door sessions as having been increased. Of note is that the longer Island councilmembers have served, the more they seem to indicate the number of closed door sessions as having been decreased.
- Overall most Island councilmembers view the situation as having been improved, of note is that this was most strongly viewed on Bonaire.

At first glance these findings seem contradictory, especially on Bonaire where people view the number of closed door sessions as having been increased, while at the same time viewing the situation as having been improved. We did not closely look into the nature of the closed door sessions, we just asked about the quantity. It is for example possible that the intention of the law was met in regard to general closed door sessions, but that Bonaire experienced extraordinary closed door sessions for justifiable reasons. It might also be possible that respondents gave socially acceptable answers, however that would seemingly contradict with the findings. Why would respondents give a socially acceptable answer that the situation has been improved, but not to the question regarding if the number of closed door sessions has changed? Given that we also found that longer term Island councilmembers were more likely to state that closed door sessions overall had decreased, then it seems to be the more likely conclusion that Island council sessions have been more transparent as intended with the WolBES but that perhaps there was an incidental increase.

A more immediate problem pertaining to transparency, seems to be the publication of decisions and documents. This fell out of the scope of this research but was becoming more and more apparent during literature research.
13.7. Main Conclusions

The data and conclusions in the previous sections and chapters lead us to answer the main research question: Which attitudes and behaviours of Island council members regarding dualism are present on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (BES) after the implementation of the Law for public entities Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius (WoIBES) and to what extent are they conforming to the intention of the dualistic system?

We established four factors in chapter five regarding the separation of two administrative bodies, the distinction of roles, the acquisition of new tools and powers and making local island government more transparent to the public. We have subsequently gone over the descriptive data of our research and answered the sub questions in the previous chapters seven through twelve. We will now answer the main research question.

Separation of public entities

From the data gathered we can conclude that overall the attitudes on the formal positional separation of Island council and Executive council are as strong as intended on all Caribbean public entities. There are however executive monistic tendencies present and we can perhaps see this in the attitudes on informal positional separation, such as the divided views if Island commissioners should still attend Island council faction meetings or not. Regardless of formal separation, actors from the Executive Council and actors from the Island council can still deliberate outside of their formal settings. We saw for example that 50% of the respondents indicated that Executive Councilmembers were held accountable in faction meetings and likewise 50% of the respondents indicated that they frequently had deliberations with Executive Councilmembers outside formal settings. This does suggest a degree of predetermination even though we could not establish significant leanings towards predetermination from the views of the Island Councilmembers, except on Sint Eustatius.

What we could establish was that overall on BES decisions were mostly seen as being based on a coalition agreement (or single party agreement in the case of Saba). We also saw that this was seen as being done based on political party lines.

On Saba this was significantly found, which perhaps conforms to the situation of a 1-party majority on the Island council. We did not find similar significant findings on Bonaire and Sint Eustatius even though on both Caribbean public entities a strong majority seemed to indicate decision making at least to great extent being done along party lines.

This was further enforced by the strong view that debates were defined by being often coalition versus the opposition with clear political division. Though the respondents on Saba seemed to indicate leaning more towards the Island council versus the Executive Council.

It was also strongly seen by the Island council members that the opposition has little influence. This influence seems not to have been increased, nor decreased after the implementation of the WoIBES according to the Island council members. With the respondents overall being divided regarding the coalition party following or being critical and the respondents did indicate strongly that the Island council sets the agenda.

So while the positions are formally separated, the administrative practice strongly suggests executive monistic tendencies in the administrative practice.
**New Roles**

Regarding their roles, the Island councilmembers place the most importance to their representative role and their budget right. Given that the dualistic system intended to strengthen both the representative and controlling role of the Council. It seems that the attitude on the Island council’s representative role on the Caribbean public municipalities was already well established and probably did not need much strengthening. We also saw this in administrative practice with time spent on contact with individual citizens which was on the BES as a whole significantly more than found in the Netherlands.

With the changes in roles that came from implementing the WolBES, we saw that on the BES overall, the attitude was that the Executive Council should executively administrate. When asked to rate tasks on importance we could compare to what extent the Island councilmembers view controlling as more important than administrating. On Bonaire the attitude leaned significantly towards control, making the views there more in accordance to the dualistic intention, but that this was less clear on Saba and Sint Eustatius.

**Acquisition of new Instruments**

The Island councilmembers showed overall favourable attitudes on dualistic measures to improve the position of the Island council. The measures to improve and strengthen the Island council were also greatly supported. While there were some long delays in the actual implementation of these measures such as the necessary ordinances and the appointment of officials to the shared court of audit (and thus delayed its activation indefinitely), it was recognized that the deadlines were perhaps too ambitious to begin with.

We found that the possibilities and utilization to set frameworks were rated barely positive, while possibilities for control was averagely positively rated on the Caribbean public entities. Utilization of administrative practice on control was highest rated on Bonaire, which is what we would expect based on the found attitudes. Utilization of control was on Bonaire significantly higher rated as values found in the Netherlands as well. Saba and Sint Eustatius seemed to rate the possibilities of control higher than Bonaire, but rated their utilization lower.

**Transparency**

On the issue of there being too many (unnecessary) closed door Island council sessions and thereby preventing the openness and transparency of local government, the situation seems to mostly be in accordance to the intention of the WolBES. While it is hard to state that attitudes on this matter have changed. The Island councilmembers were divided on if the situation with closed door sessions was problematic, with just a small group of four respondents indicating that there was a problem at all. Regardless if it was problematic according to Island councilmembers, there was a correlation found with the longer an Island councilmember having served, the more likely the councilmember states that the closed door sessions have decreased.

Overall on BES and on each Caribbean public entity specific, we could not establish if the number of closed door sessions had significantly increased or decreased. However seeing as we found that on Saba and Sint Eustatius there were more than 2 closed door sessions a year, which is in line with the Dutch average for municipalities with <20.000 citizens, it is perhaps probable that the administrative practice regarding closed door sessions is as intended on these Caribbean public entities, though not necessary caused by a cultural change as a result of the WolBES.
13.8. Discussion:

From the conclusions it seems clear that there is some room for improvements. In this short section we will go over some priorities for improvement that could be considered:

- While the representative role of the Island council seems fine from the point of view of the Island council members, a priority should be made to improve the framework setting and controlling role of the Island council. As the respondents rate the possibilities of control higher than utilization, this suggests that the administrative culture would need to change to further encourage a different administrative practice regarding the controlling role. Though the problem probably also lies with the power dynamics of local politics, perhaps some improvements can be achieved with more training for the Island council members to fully utilize their control possibilities. The final establishment of the prescribed shared court of audit would be highly recommendable.

- Regarding the executive monistic tendencies. While it is perhaps not feasible to fully change the administrative culture and practice regarding the underlying power structures and communication within political parties themselves, perhaps more effort could be made to have more open discussions on the Island council and perhaps see if in the Netherlands there are municipalities with a more consensus culture within their municipal council and see if best practices can be adopted.

- Regarding transparency, it seems that the measures are mostly working as intended regarding closed door sessions. And the respondents view the situation as improved. However, while it fell outside the scope of this research, it was found that the publication of decision making should undergo systematic improvement to bring it in line with the intended transparency of the public administrative practice. This can perhaps be achieved by additional facilitation and training.

- One of the deviations the WolBES provides in article 9 is the number of Island council members on each Island. 9 for Bonaire and 5 for Sint Eustatius and Saba. In the Netherlands Bonaire would have 15 council seats, Sint Eustatius would have 11 and Saba would receive 9. While the articles of the WolBES state a fixed number of council seats, the explanatory memo of the WolBES states that this might be increased. While this research did not directly go into the number of Island council seats, it was mentioned a number of times in the conversations and given that the average estimated time spent on the Island council duties is significantly more than the average amount found in the Netherlands. Increasing the number of council seats to the same standard as the Netherlands, might lessen the work of individual Council members. Though more research into this issue is advisable.
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Appendix A. Euler Diagram the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2018)
Appendix B. Questionnaire

Survey WolBES – Island councilmembers

In general

1. On which public entity are you active as an Island councilmember?
   
   O Bonaire
   
   O Sint Eustatius (Statia)
   
   O Saba

2. How many years have you served as an Island councilmember?
   
   ___ ___ Year

3. Is your party part of the executive council?
   
   O No
   
   O Yes

4. How many members did/does your faction have? (if you served before 2015 please fill in that number)
   
   ___ ___ Factionmembers

5. Are you the faction leader/chairman?
   
   O No
   
   O Yes
Dualistic measures

6. In the discussion about dualism in local government, there were a number of measures that were proposed and are also possible- or implemented with the WolBES. Please indicate for each of the following measures whether you are in favour or against it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Island commissioners are no longer part of the Island council</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Island commissioners no longer take part in regular party faction</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Island commissioners no longer chair Island council commissions</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Island commissioners are no longer part of the Island council</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commissions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Largely delegate executive powers of the Island council to executive</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Each Island council member receives individually the right of</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initiative, amendment and motion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Each Island council member individually gets the right to request an</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpellation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Island council organizes hearings</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The executive council actively provides the information necessary for</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Island council creates a budget to conduct research</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Island council members receive opportunities to receive schooling and</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Island receives administrative assistance by the council clerk</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Each Island council member has an individual right to administrative</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Island council shall be provided with more comprehensible financial</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The establishment of a shared court of audit</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The establishment of an external institute for complaints</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Island council initiates benchmarks and establish quality charters</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Kingdom Representative is responsible for approving decisions</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concerning the appointment, promotion, suspension and dismissal of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>island officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Lt Governor receives the power to overrule the Island council to</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make closed door council sessions open for public if he finds it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary in the public interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Which of the following statements is most in accordance to your personal viewpoints?

The Island council ought to govern the Island, the executive council ought to handle daily affairs
O

The executive council ought to govern the Island, the Island council ought to create frameworks from which the executive council operates and the Island council controls the executive council
O

8. Which of the following statements is most in accordance to your personal viewpoints?

Strict party discipline is incompatible with the mandate given to the Island council by the voters
O

Island council members are elected as representatives of a political party, therefore they should vote according to the views of their party
O

9. Do the dualistic measures of the WolBES fit to the administrative culture on your public entity/Island?

The dualistic measures of the WolBES:

O Fits perfectly or almost perfectly
O Fits well
O Fits moderately
O Fits not well
O Does not fit at all

In the administrative culture of my Island
Island council membership

10. How many hours do you spend on average on your work as an Island council member?

___ ___ Average hours a week

11. Can you, by approximation, indicate how much time you spend as an Island council member on the activities listed below?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decide on regulations, budget and frameworks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercising executive powers of administration (including notes and plans)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of the Executive Council and Officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining contacts with individual citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining contacts with local organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining contacts with party members, voters and party officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining contacts and negotiations with other politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading of documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Could you of each of the following tasks determine how important you find them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Very unimportant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The determination of the content of ordinances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining the content of the budget</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redirecting or steering the policies of the Executive Council (eg through motions)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling the Executive Council and the civil servants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing the people on your island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing the island (the exercise of administrative powers)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. How often did you as the first representative or initiator use the following instruments after the implementation of the WolBES?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Number of times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making an initiative council proposal</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submitting an amendment on a proposal</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requesting an interpellation</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submitting a motion</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How often did you as the first representative or initiator use the following instruments after the implementation of the WolBES?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 times</th>
<th>1-5 times</th>
<th>6-10 times</th>
<th>More than 10 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written questions</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral questions</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. If you compare the number of questions asked from before the WolBES and after the WolBES. Are there more questions being asked, less or did the extent of questions asked remain the same?

After the implementation of the WolBES the number of questions submitted to the executive council...

- O Increased
- O remained the same
- O decreased
- O No opinion/Not applicable
Control/giving account

16. Members of the executive council have an obligation to be accountable. Does this happen in the plenary sessions of the Island council and if yes how often?

- No in plenary sessions of the Island council the members of the executive council does not give an account
- Yes the executive council incidentally gives an account
- Yes the executive council often gives an account

17. When members of the executive council give an account over their actions on the Island council, who is most often the initiator?

- The Island council
- The executive council

18. Besides formal contacts between executive council and Island council in plenary sessions of the Island council, it is possible for informal contact between members outside of formal channels. Do you have deliberations with executive council members outside formal channels?

- No, there are no deliberations with Island commissioners outside formal channels
- Yes, incidentally
- Yes, frequent

19. Members of the executive council have an obligation to be accountable. Does this happen in party faction meetings and if so how often?

- No, in faction meetings the members of the executive council never give an account
- Yes the executive council incidentally gives an account
- Yes the executive council often gives an account
20. When members of the executive council give account over their actions, who is most often the initiator?
O The Island council party faction
O The executive council member(s)

21. If you compare the accountability of the executive council from before the WolBES and after the WolBES. Are they being held more, less or did the extent of accountability remain the same?

The executive council is held....
O less
O Equally
O More
O No opinion/Not applicable

Accountable than before the WolBES

22. There will follow a series of situations, would you review these situations with a grade on the scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 = very unsatisfactory and 10 = excellent)?

To what extent are you of the opinion that...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Island council currently has sufficient possibilities to formulate frameworks within the Executive Council should govern?</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island council, adequately uses and exploits the current possibilities to formulate frameworks within which the Executive Council should govern?</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island council currently has sufficient possibilities to control the Executive Council?</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island council adequately uses the current possibilities to control the executive council sufficiently uses and exploits?</td>
<td>___ ___</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Decision making

23. If you would put it in percentages, to what extent are the preferences of executive council members and Island council members influential on the contents of council decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The executive council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island council</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. If you would put it in percentages, to what extent would you estimate the Lt. Governor, the commissioner with the portfolio and other Island commissioner(s) are of influence on council decisions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Lt. Governor</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The portfolio holder (specific Island commissioner)</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The other Island commissioner(s)</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Has the influence of the executive council changed after the implementation of the WolBES in your opinion?

The influence of the executive council on council decisions has ....

O Decreased
O Remained the same
O Increased
O No opinion/Not applicable
26. If you would put it in percentages, to what extent are the preferences of parties that make up the executive council and non-executive council party members influential on the contents of council decisions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Councilmembers of executive council factions (coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilmembers of non-executive council factions (Opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Which of the following statements would you consider to be most in accordance to the factual situation?

For the acceptance of a proposal on the Island council...

- The deliberations between the executive council and members of the same party are more important than discussion and debate on the Island council
- Discussion and debate on the Island council more important than deliberations between the executive council and members of the same party

28. After the implementation of the WolBES and the dualistic system, the Island commissioners were no longer part of the Island council. As a result the influence of an GOVERNING/COALITION party on policy making....

- Increased,
- Did not increase or decrease
- Decreased
- No opinion/not applicable
29. After the implementation of the WolBES and the dualistic system, the Island commissioners were no longer part of the Island council. As a result the influence of an OPPOSITION party on policy making....

O Increased,
O Did not increase or decrease
O Decreased
O No opinion/not applicable

30. Which of the following statements best characterizes the administrative practice on your public body?

O The Island council governs the Island, the executive council focuses on the daily affairs
O The executive council governs the Island; the Island council sets the framework and controls the executive council

31. If you review the last period of the Island council, to what extent did decision making take place according to the party discipline of Island council parties?

O Almost always
O Often
O Somewhat
O Little or never
32. If you review your last period on the Island council, to what extent did decision making take place according to a coalition agreement by governing parties on the Island council and the executive council?

O  Almost always
O  Often
O  Somewhat
O  Little or never

33. If you review the plenary Island council sessions how would you characterize these sessions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everything was predetermined in consultation between governing parties</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizable political divisions</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing parties are not critical</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The executive council determines the agenda of the Island council</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shows mostly contrasts between Island council and Executive Council</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program of the executive council does not provide room for influence of the Island council</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island council only responds to finished proposals by the executive council</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion on the basis of multiple alternative proposals</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Open debate on issues with consultation of the entire Island council
- Political divisions unclear
- Governing parties are very critical
- The Island council determines its own agenda
- Shows mostly contrasts between governing parties and opposition parties
- The program of the executive council leaves very much room for influence of the Island council
- The Island council establishes early in the policy making, demands on content in policy and the policy process
- Discussion on the basis of just one proposal from the executive council
34. The controlling role of the Island council is characterized by....:

O  Safeguarding the democratic purity of the followed procedures

O  Comparing policy proposals to party program and coalition Agreement

O  Neither
35. There are a couple of specific measures in the WolBES with regard to under what circumstances meetings take place behind closed doors. How often were formal council meetings behind closed doors after the implementation of the WolBES?

O Approximately every month or more often
O Approximately once every quarter of a year
O Approximately twice every year or less

36. If you compare the Island council meetings from before the WolBES and after the WolBES. Then the number of formal Island council meetings behind closed doors have...:

O Declined
O Neither declined nor increased
O Increased

37. Which of the following statements conforms the most to your views?
The measures to decrease the number of meetings held behind closed doors...:

O Have improved the functioning of the Island council
O Have neither improved nor worsened the functioning of the Island council
O Have worsened the functioning of the Island council

38. Which of the following statements conforms the most to your views?
Meetings behind closed doors were problematic for the functioning of the Island council

O Meetings behind closed doors were NO problem for the functioning of the Island council
O No opinion/N.a.
Concluding

39. Now that your Island is part of the Netherlands as a public body, which of the following statements conforms the most to your views?

In general, the transition from the Netherlands Antilles to the Netherlands was…:

- O An improvement
- O Nor an improvement, nor a deterioration
- O A deterioration

For the public administration on the Island

40. Do you have any further comments on this questionnaire? Then you can state them here: