The European Union with PESCO – A Security Community?

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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Common Commercial Policy</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capabilities Development Plan</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Committee of European Economic</td>
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<td>CEJ</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
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<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>European Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic States (in Iraq and Syria)</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political Security Committee</td>
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<td>PJCCM</td>
<td>Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters</td>
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<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
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<td>WU</td>
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Abstract

This study aims at understanding the way the European Union developed towards a security community with focus on the role of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the latest achievement under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Applying the theory of a security community inspired by a framework proposed by Adler and Barnett (1998a), two periods of security are analysed: First, the building of the European Coal and Steel Community up to the Treaty of Lisbon and second, PESCO under the CSDP of the Lisbon Treaty. PESCO is reviewed in reflection to the EU security community, taking into account its strategical, narrative and practical dimension. Under the notion of constructivism, the special interplay between institutions and identity is focused on. In summary, the EU is concluded as mature security community with PESCO signing for trust and a common identity. Unlike often proposed, however, PESCO is not seen as the ‘dream’ coming true in defence matters and questions of external security. Its launch is in line with the European strategical vision today and the general EU security community development, dominated by institutions mutually reinforcing a common European virtue.
1. Background: The European Union and Security Community Theory

The European Union (EU) has often been case to studies since its origin in the foundation of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) in 1951. In addition to the increasing economic integration, over the years the Union also gained a new understanding as a general political unit and even a common idea on foreign affairs and external security developed. On its way, the EU became a system *sui generis* which today cannot be found anywhere else in the world. Hence international relations theorist from any direction have tried to explain its set up and modus of peaceful cohabitation or the EU’s place in the wider world (e.g. Warleigh, 2002; Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015; Jørgensen, et al., 2015).¹ Among this, under consideration of the Euro-Transatlantic relationship, the idea about a security community evolved in the 1950s: Trying to theorize supranational community-building and regional peace, security community theorists focus on trust and a collective identity embedded in an institutionalized structure (Deutsch et al., 1957). Peace, the most basic (security community) condition, is evident as a lack of violent inter-state crisis and conflict for Western Europe since the second World War (WWII) (Lewis, 1994). Instead, any bi- or multilateral disagreements or conflicts, e.g. in the course of the Cold War, were settled on a non-violent basis with diplomatic means (Bicchi & Bremeberg, 2016). At the same time, a strong sense of a common destiny developed. With increasing institutionalization this was reflected in a stronger common-appearance towards non-members and other powers worldwide, also in terms of security policies. Although the attempts to build a common defence union failed ever and ever again, the present Treaty of Lisbon on European Union (and its Functioning; TEU and TFEU) offered new possibilities. The latest development, the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), may signal a new try towards deeper cooperation. PESCO’s launch in 2017 was agreed upon by nearly all of the EU Member States and created an international media response foreseeing a new era for European defence. Words like “milestone” and “European Defence Union” were proposed by German politicians (Bundesregierung, 2017) and even the traditionally eurosceptic UK welcomed PESCO - despite withdrawing from the Union altogether (Friede & Lazarou, 2018). The French president Macron not only welcomed the step but advertised even further reaching plans, in his idea of a bilateral, operational European Intervention Initiative (Koenig, 2018). Likewise, the reactions from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, (NATO) were generally positive (NATO, 2017). However, NATO’s largest contributor and informal leader, the USA did not tire to strongly emphasize that “robust involvement” of PESCO capabilities in NATO is expected (Euractiv, 2018).

¹ Until at one point, the EU had built a new theory line in IR, the European Studies (see e.g. Rumford, 2009).
1.1 The Research Question(s)

This thesis aims to assess the question ‘How did the EU evolve into a security community and to what extent does PESCO affect its presumed status?’ To this basis, the study is divided into two parts. In the first part the development of post-war Europe towards a security community is analysed. Along a three-dimensional analysis framework derived from several approaches on security community theory, attention is drawing to the interplay between identity and institutions in direction to security and external affairs. Likewise, the wider world’s historical context is taken into account. In the second part, PESCO is given a closer look: Although the final effects of PESCO in a practical view remain open and can only be fully scrutinized at a later stage, in view of the results of part one, a practical outlook and a theoretical analysis are possible. Along a similar framework as above, first the judicial and institutional circumstances under the Lisbon Treaty are introduced with view on the EU’s level of security community. Second, the way towards PESCO’s launch under consideration of narrative and strategical lines is considered to lastly look at the practical implementation as planned so far – the legal commitments and projects.

Furthermore, the in-depth analysis of PESCO allows to open a new perspective within security community theory: The theory’s usually rather inward turned view expecting national states’ peaceful relations does not provide much on military security and defence towards the outside of the community. Specific case studies on the EU look at this dimension from rather different theoretical perspectives. In this work, however, exactly the security community theory and its lack of external considerations is of interest, i.e. first, the European development towards a community of internal peaceful relations in the first step, and second, the achievement of a military security system to the in- and outside (by PESCO).

Hence, the following sub-questions framing the study are to be answered:

- How did external influence, institutionalisation and identity influence the EU development towards a security community?
- How are these factors, especially the second and third, intertwined?
- At what stage of security community development is the EU today under the Lisbon Treaty?
- How may a security community be linked to (military) security and defence?
- How did PESCO develop along the narrative and strategical community?
1.2 Aim and Relevance

The goal of this work is twofold: First, it aims to understand how the EU turned into a security community – whether it works as such is hardly under scrutiny since the region follows a non-war postulate since 1945 (Biscop, 2005), and second, how PESCO may contribute in defining and affecting it. Thus, it offers not only a descriptive analysis of the EU itself but also gives an insight in PESCO embedded in the theoretical context of the security community. The importance of this topic is given in academic as well as social sense: Security community theory within political, social studies, especially International Relation Theory (IR), may not be a very common approach like e.g. Waltzian Realism, but it offers great explanatory potential and new insights by combining security and community which each already on its own constitute important and broad research topics.

Since security today is rarely governed within national borders but rather across regional systems in order to enhance peace and security within and across the region’s members (e.g. NATO, ASEAN, EU, North America, etc.), its understanding and theoretical examination has become highly important and built an own IR string (often called Peace and Conflict Research; Security Studies, etc.). Scholars interested in community and statehood building or those theorizing security (e.g. Baldwin 1997), peace and war scientist, studies on stability and instability, have contributed to this theory complex. How the security community is built and persists has been analysed and defined by scholars from all over the world, for example Adler and Barnett (1998a), Väyrynen (2000), Acharya (1991, 2001), Möller (2003) or Tusicisny (2007), often by applying to a specific case, e.g. the NATO. What practical implications this offers is highly visible as well: by understanding how security is achieved and maintained in general, implications can be drawn for how to reach and maintain peace, how to peacefully settle or even hinder war, conflict and violence, or how to establish (human) security. In practice, military and civilian missions may be developed, reviewed, evaluated and improved along the idea of a security community.

2. Methodological Reflection: Research Design

‘How did the EU evolve into a security community and to what extent does PESCO affect its presumed status?’ – especially the second part of this research question may appear like an empirical, explanatory question proposing a causal relation of PESCO as independent variable affecting the EU security community. However, this causal appearance is a fallacy since the analysis is theoretical along an interpretative, historical method (see Mylonas, 2015; Thies, 2002). As a single case study with a cross sectional focus and mini time series, two history blocks are to be considered: In the first part, the underlying premise that the EU represents a security community is
analysed in terms of its development into such community starting with the beginning of a European idea after the WWII. Due to its very rich history, some limitation is necessary: I will focus on external influence factors and global occurrences triggering the EU becoming a security community, and institutional and identity development in terms of EU political and external relations. PESCO as part of EU foreign affairs justifies this focus – the internal relations under view of security community theory, however, can be of interest as well but are not considered here (see e.g. Wivel & Wæver, 2018). The second part concentrates on PESCO: First mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty provisions are taken into account up to the latest Council Decision establishing the first set of PESCO projects (in March 2018).

Overall, the analysis is based on a broad theoretical part – since the idea of a security community is already more than 60 years old, a number of authors and scholars are looked at to derive hypotheses and construct an own multidimensional framework (Blatter, Haverland & van Hulst, 2016). For the first part, mainly secondary literature and a few primary sources, like EU Treaties or Statements, are taken into account in a contextual, historical analytical method to a) capture the global context in which the EU developed into a security community to find possible trigger, and b) understand the internal juridical and institutional developments. Since the theory proposes some degree of path dependency, a chronological presentation of selected historical events is necessary to fully understand the EU security community of today. In the second part, the PESCO itself is under scrutiny with the aim to understand how the EU security community moved towards its launch and what the outcome might be in the theoretical as well as practical sense. Here next to academic literature, primarily the Lisbon Treaty providing the provisions on PESCO, the notification and Council decision launching PESCO and a few statements of the EU institutions – official press releases and speeches, as well as resolutions and strategy papers on PESCO which are no covered by academic literature yet, are considered.

It remains important to note, that the EU as collective poses the unit of analysis. Nonetheless, it might become necessary to refer to single Member States due to the high degree of interconnectedness of the EU and its members in general – in the end, the EU remains a system sui generis which can only theoretically be treated as independent entity. Hence, the unit of observations (see Toshkov, 2016; Howard, 2017) may range from individual, societal to institutional and global level to understand the EU collective. As mentioned above, I do not argue along causal inference like several other case study designs, for example such designed as structured, focused comparison. Rather, the within-case study design is built upon to allow for an in-depth view to understand the case at hand, the EU as security community under PESCO (George & Bennett, 2005).
2.1 Philosophy of Social Science: Understanding versus Explaining

The idea of understanding in social science might demand some further discussion: In this work, it is aimed at a fruitful understanding by context and history emphasizing method of qualitative theoretical review.2 Such aim is valid although when tracing back methodological lines in social sciences, today more often an opposing direction is being used: Since the 1970th, the raise of a positivist, empiricist (or objectivist) epistemology in social science is visible, based and aiming at the general natural sciences’ metaphysical logics (see e.g. Yanow, 2009; Pedersen 2008; Hollis & Smith, 1990).3 Among the most popular representatives of this approach, King Keohane and Verba (1994) theorize about qualitative and quantitative research.4 The authors assume, that both kinds of research follow the natural science logic of inference along the idea of causality (also see Blatter & Blume, 2008; Gerring, 2007).

Although this is clearly a qualitative work, analysing PESCO and the EU security community under view of a cause-effect relation would never stand out and is not aimed at here. Rather I apply an interpretive logic (in retro-perspective manner) in order to give a valid possibility to understand the relation. Thereby inference is drawn along my own self: “the interpretive researcher uses her own person as the primary sense-making device” (Yanow, 2009, p.433; also see Flick, 2009). In general, this idea is based on a different thought line than those proposed above, sometimes called “subjectivist paradigm” (Pedersen, 2008, p.457), or hermeneutic approach. In this “the researcher assumes a participant’s perspective and […] the central issue is the meaning the actors attach to their actions” (Pedersen, 2008, p.457). Hollis and Smith (1990) argue on this presumption evolving from a historicist background; Miller (1972) explicitly decides for naming it ‘historicism’ and traces it back to Kant- and Hegelian ideas.5 Other scholars simply refer to it as qualitative paradigm of social constructivist theory (is further specified below; Döring & Bortz, 2016). For this work, two assumptions are important to keep in mind: Truth is relative (epistemology) and subjective, as an

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2 This is a legit aim in social science according to Pickel (2009): “Aim of qualitative analysis is usually “understanding” of meaning and action, not an explanation or generalization” (translated after Pickel, 2009, p.520), or Marsh and Smith who simply state: “Emphasis is upon understanding, rather than explanation” (2001, p.529).
3 For an overview see Hollis and Smith (1990) who show how social sciences (explicitly International Relation Research) metaphysics root in two lines: natural versus historical science. This implicates a division of inquiry logics between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ in a Weberian sense; showing the value of ‘understanding’ a la Peter Winch, Hollis and Smith summarize this as “rational reconstruction” (p.204) and give it a role in the IR debate.
4 One must acknowledge that several scholars criticize the strict differentiation into qualitative and quantitative research, since “many phenomena are amenable to both types” (Thies, 2002, p.353).
5 Please note, that the term ‘historicism’ is given various meanings and referred to in complete different disciplines, e.g. theology, as well as in other philosophical contexts, for example by Popper, who contrasts historicism with determinism and holism, giving it a different meaning than that proposed by Miller.
interpretation of sense perception” (ontology; Miller, 1972, p.800).  

2.2 Possible Limitations, Methodological Shortfalls and First Expectations

With a case study design, methodological critique comes from various angles which is especially true for small-n or single case research missing possible comparative advantages given in large-n studies (see above; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Internal and external validity are questioned, sometimes even denied and selection bias is assumed (Howard, 2017). This bias can refer to selecting sufficient literature (and other data sources) but to take the right focus in reviewing historical events and actors. Hence, a valid conceptualization and operationalization of security community theory is necessary (Lustick, 1996). All this, however, is usually vocabulary of empiricist, of positivists. Since the decision for a different underlying philosophy is already explained above, this critique does fall short here. The possibility to look in-depth on the case at hand without having any pressure to find or confirm a generally valid theory but understand case and theory rather offers a great advantage. Furthermore, understanding the case is reason and aim of this study at the same time: This means, different from research analysing theory X in the context of case Y to confirm or reject the theory, here understanding the case itself lies at heart and security community theory is merely a means to the end.

Furthermore, when reading this work one must be aware that the idea of a security community is a pure theoretical concept. Hence, also the analysis and conclusion remain at this theoretical level. Since the first part is mainly based on secondary literature of EU and global history, this is relatively easy. For the second part concentrating on PESCO itself, a similar manner is applied but a practical view and especially outlook are needed as well since PESCO is newly launched and might not yet have unfolded its full potential. What is clear, is how PESCO is incorporated in the EU institutional and judicial/legal structure and what projects are planned in the EU security and defence area. This is taken into account to comprehensively consider how it may affect the theory of an EU security community.

In sum, this research provides one possible interpretation, acknowledging the possibility of different understandings Hence, the first part offers an understanding of how the EU developed towards a security community and the second, an understanding of PESCO in a (security community)

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6 Next to this, further approaches were theorised (see Wendt, 1991 on ‘scientific realist conception; or Guba & Lincoln, 1994, arguing of in total four paradigms). Among them, also constructivism is named and described as taking the middle ground between positivist and radical views, combining how “the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction [which] depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material worlds” (Adler, 1997, p.322). In this line, constructivism also poses a specific IR theory, further considered below.
theoretical but also practical sense. In terms of the EU, the main expectation is that it poses a security community with common authority to the outside. PESCO’s added value is less clear, one may expect that it provides for:

a) An increased EU identity and more trust of the Member States in each other (and differentiation towards the US)

b) A first institutional basis for deepening defence integration

3. The ‘Security Community’ in International Relations

In 1957 Karl Deutsch et al. introduced the concept of ‘security community’ into IR theory as a new idea of international order. The basic definition is: A security community is “a group of people which has become ‘integrated’ [...] within a territory” attaining “a sense of community and [...] institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 5). This integration is fostered by mutual dependencies; however, the most basic assumption of stable, long-lasting peace is simply based on the pure unwillingness and unattractiveness to use force. Instead, the practice of peaceful change – the “resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale, physical force” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 5), supersedes force until war within the community becomes unthinkable (Deutsch et al., 1957).\(^7\)

This idea of a peaceful community may be seen as a shift in IR which at that point in time were highly dominated by realist thinking (Lijphart, 1981).\(^8\) Nevertheless, it did not gain as much attention as the big IR theory strings evolving over the course nor may be classified along these lines – “the security community concept [rather] takes the middle ground between various strands of IR theory” (Koschut, 2014b, p. 528).\(^9\) In the following years, however, a great reference towards constructivist ideas and methods developed: The second most known anthology ‘Security Communities’ edited by Adler and Barnett (1998a), for example, was classified as “perhaps the best known scholarly work among others that combine the concept of security community with

\(^7\) Nevertheless, the security community is not characterized by pure harmony but at heart lies peaceful change as means to settle conflict peacefully (also see Pouliot, 2006).

\(^8\) Morgenthau’s ‘Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace’ introducing the realistic approach in IR theory was published not even a decade before in 1948.

\(^9\) Overall, IR theorist usually deal with inter-state relations and how they are ordered in the global, anarchic system. The best-known theory-lines are: Realism (arguing of survival a self-help system), Neorealism (balance of power), Liberalism (states strive for absolute gains and cooperation is possible), Neoliberalism (zero—sum-game, cost-benefit analysis) and Constructivism (social construction of interest and identity), for an overview see Daddow, 2013; or Jackson and Sørensen, 2016.
mainstream Constructivist approaches” (Koschut, 2014b, p.520). These and other authors’ work adding up to Deutsch’s concept shall be taken into account along the theory of constructivism in IR.

As already visible in the Deutschian approach, not only national interests but rather a ‘sense of community’, ‘unwillingness’ and institutions are highlighted as driving factors in security community theory. This can be related to mainstream Constructivism as proposed by Alexander Wendt (1992): He first of all breaks with the anarchy picture long time typical in IR, the ‘war of all against all’. In his view, the global anarchy is not a pre-given structure states act within but is adjustable, formed by national identities and interests which are again mutually constitutive to each other. This may be summarized well in his famous statement and eponymous article (1992): “Anarchy is what states make of it” (p.39f). Buzan (2007) adds, that “anarchy does not constitute a single form with relatively fixed features but rather a single condition within which many variations can be arranged” (p.148). On this basis, states’ relations are not limited to self-help and power politics but allow cooperation which when institutionalized unites “a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992 p.399). In sum, either a security dilemma or a security community, Wendt argues referring to Deutsch, are possible forms of states’ relations with each other (Wendt, 1995). Ultimately, any actors act and behave according to how they perceive themselves, others and their social environment – their identity, achieving meaning via interaction. The role of identity and institutional capability and their interplay are guiding notions in the following. With this in mind, we turn back to security community theory beginning with Adler and Barnett.

3.1 The Second Most Cited Work on Security Communities: Adler and Barnett

Next to giving the definition, Deutsch et. al concluded that two forms of security community are possible, the amalgamated or the pluralistic one. For the case under study, the EU collective, the second, pluralistic type applies, defining legally independent bodies (EU Member States) becoming a security community. Further theorizing about this type, Adler and Barnett published a collection of essays (1998a), including their own proposal for an analysis framework catching the development of a security community (1998b): They define three tiers along which states may develop dependable expectations of peaceful change. The first tier is characterized by an (exogenous or endogenous) environmental factor, for example, any kind of event or change in the areas of technology, economy, as social movements or security itself (Adler & Barnett, 1998b,

10 Also see chapter 2.1 – next to being an IR theory, constructivism is considered to pose a specific metaphysical paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
p.37f.) providing a ‘trigger’. Second, new processes and structures evolve: Orientation towards powerful states due to their “positive image of security and material progress” (p.40) begins and shared meanings and understandings about how a state acts practical and legitimated evolve. On the process side, social learning via communicational transaction leads to the creation of new, common social facts which happens within institutions and organizations. Hereby, first ideas of mutual expectations amongst each other evolve, based on, e.g. a common understanding of “norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanism, and sanctions to enforce those norms” (p.42.). As last tier, mutual trust and a collective identity have built upon the dialectic of processes and structures which as a result lead to the “dependable expectation of peaceful change” (p.48) emerging at national levels.

In order to overcome the underlying path dependency, Adler and Barnett furthermore define three stages of maturity, the nascent, ascendant and mature security community, which overlap with the three tiers but are not congruent: The nascent security community seems “virtually indistinguishable form a security alliance” (p.50) with only a low level of mutual trust. Instead, the recognition of common interests which are best achieved by common action, drives positive interstate transaction. Possible triggers, like the establishment of economic associations, “cultural, political, social, and ideological homogeneity” (Adler & Barnett, 1998b, p.51) across borders, or basically the will to lower transaction costs, can deepen existing interactions and promote the establishment of social and international institutions and organizations. The ascendant security community shows deeper mutual trust and less national expectations of the other being a threat. Trans- and interaction takes place in an “increasingly dense network [and] new institutions and organizations” (Adler & Barnett, 1998b, p.53). A cognitive structure is growing, which increases common perceptions (for examples of norms) and promotes collective action – a collective identity might evolve and dependable expectations establish (ibid). The mature security community finally, has bound these expectations to a very high degree to domestic and international institutions. A collective identity has evolved and mutual trust exists.

Turning to the EU collective, the path drawn by Adler and Barnett provides much room for expectations: In view of the high degree of institutionalization and long history of European integration, one may expect the EU to be a mature security community (hypothesis one, h1). The mature security community, Adler and Barnett state, may be further sub-divided along the degree of interconnection: It may either remain as loosely coupled, mature security community or developed towards a tightly coupled one. For both cases Adler and Barnett provide a set of

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11 Important to note is, that often trigger and outcome have material and normative forms and can retrospectively not be divided easily, for example a common threat (Adler & Barnett, 1998b).
indicators, which are defined as necessary (loose) and sufficient (tight) characteristics of the mature security community (see appendix 1). For this study on the EU and PESCO, military security and defence characteristics are of particular interest: According to Adler and Barnett the mature, loose knit security community is characterized by a change in national military planning due to the exclusion of allies as potential (national) threat and instead common definition of the “‘other’ that represent a threat to the community” (Adler & Barnett, 1998b, p.56). For the tightly coupled security community, the authors even consider cooperative security to the inside and “collective security, with regard to threats arising outside the community” (ibid) among high military integration, especially regarding resources and its pooling.

For the EU mature security community, the degree of tightness in the terms of military and security characteristic as stated above is expected to become tightened by PESCO (h2).

In sum, the constructivist notion as explained above, is clearly visible in Adler and Barnett’s ideas which provide a first basis of indicators to analyse the EU and PESCO. Clearly, ‘environmental factors’, e.g. as threat perceptions and the role of norms and values and institutions, creating a common identity should be taken into account. To better understand what may lay behind this, some further approaches are considered below.

3.2 A Sense of Community: Identity and Norms in the Security Community

Beginning with what Adler and Barnett named as social learning processes and common knowledge and norm structure, the process of identity building under consideration of the role of norms and rules is introduced: First of all, identity matters in terms of peaceful change – as Mattern (2005) argues, a sense of “we-ness constitutes a normative prohibition on threats or use of physical violence” (p.13) within the community. This can be achieved through ‘representational force’ – defined as representation (to the outside and inside) on three levels, by leaders, by (mass-) media and by the respective institutions, explicitly “the states’ security bureaucracy” (p.51).\(^\text{12}\)

Drawing on the same idea of self-other differentiation, Koschut (2014a) theorizes about emotions, introducing the emotional community: Emphasizing the constitutive role of emotional knowledge in security governance mechanisms, Koschut uses the antonyms of amity and enmity to conclude

\(^\text{12}\) In case of the EU a collective with PESCO, not the (member) states’ security bureaucracy but the EU own institutional structure is to be considered in shaping the EU security identity and PESCO (also see above).
their importance as guiding notion in self-other perceptions – of which the enmity other is usually perceived as threat while the amity other becomes part of the self, the community.\textsuperscript{13}

Furthermore, Cronin (1999) argues of direct communication and interaction as main identity building mechanisms. He theorizes that the hereby evolving in- and out-group comparison leads to the development of a common identity. This however, is not enough for community building but some minimum requirements must be fulfilled, which he defines as: shared characteristics, exclusivity and positive interdependence all tied together by the “consciousness of commonality” (p.17). Furthermore, common action and intersubjective recognition of the shared identity are important factors as well – best achieved by common, intense experiences.

Developing the theory on transnational cognitive regions, Adler (1997) confirms the importance of identity, even as border-mechanism: Via the convergence of “causal and normative understanding across national boundaries, high levels of communication, economic interdependence, and cooperative practices” (p.252) the security community builds a diffuse common identity. Such cognitive mechanisms may even build a region border independent from material (and national) ones.

Finally, the dialectic of commonness versus compatibility is worth to be looked at: The above described ideas and theories presume either a basis of common or compatible norms and values. For example, Cronin (1999) explicitly defines commonality (and its consciousness) as minimum requirement for community building while Adler’s cognitive region can build on a ‘diffuse identity’ which indicates for a lower level of commonness (i.e. compatible norms).\textsuperscript{14} In 2003, Möller explicitly argued about this dialectic recommending compatibility: He summarizes that security communities may “acknowledge, but do not reify, difference” (p.318), with peaceful change at heart as the only non-discussable term.\textsuperscript{15}

In view of the naturally given diversity in the normative landscape of the European Union (consisting of 28 Member States with distinctive historical experiences etc.), the latter approach of compatible norms seems most helpful when considering the national level as unit of analysis. Since, the EU as collective developing a common identity is under scrutiny here, it may have its base in compatible rather than common national norms. However, the EU collective is overall more likely

\textsuperscript{13} Already in 1932 Carl Schmitt referred to self-other differentiation as the distinctive indicator of the political: “The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation” (Schmitt, 1963, p.27). It even lays at heart of politics: “The specifically political distinction [...] is the distinction between friend and enemy” (p.26).

\textsuperscript{14} Koschut’s emotional knowledge (2013) can be rather modelled along commonness in (amity-)feeling, while Mattern’s representational force (2005) may also function on compatibility level.

\textsuperscript{15} Norms and values must “be tolerant of one another and capable of coexisting, [...] not mutually exclusive” (Möller, 2003, p.318).
to represent commonness in vision and normative idea to the in- and outside. Furthermore, the repeated idea on representation, self-other and other enmity in identity building is valuable when considering the outside of the security community. This is not only important in terms of exogenous triggers, as Adler and Barnett, have outlined, but also with regard to how the security community behaves towards non-members in terms of foreign affairs and defence. Overall, common identity and trust are the distinctive factors of security community theory in relation to other peace-bringing mechanism considered in IR, e.g. formal agreements (Nathan, 2006).

In total, for the EU security community under PESCO a common vision and identity presented to the in- and outside is expectable (h3).

3.3 Outside the Security Community: The Role of Threat and Defence

Along the process of identification, the other, the outside of the security community is often emphasized and especially when taking a negative enmity form defined as constitutive factor. However, when it comes to the security community’s reaction to threats and its general (external) relations to the outside, scholars are less precise. Considering the analysis’ view on foreign affairs and military security conditioned by the second focus on PESCO, some possible concepts are collected here.

Overall, external factors are often considered rather briefly in security community theory due to an underlying assumption of encompassing endogeneity, Väyrynen (2000) explains.16 However, to only focus on endogenous ‘cognitive regions’ is not enough in his view, external territorial indicators have also to be taken into account. Like Adler and Barnett (1998a), Väyrynen generally considers an external military threat as taking a constitutive role for security community building (p.182). This in turn, does not necessarily guarantee for defending its members; “the community of identity is not the same things as the community of protection” (p.184).

Therefore, Acharya (1991) distinguishes between a security and defence community: the former is characterized in the typical Deutschian sense, while the latter focuses on military defence to the outside. For the case under study, ASEAN, it was defined as going “beyond existing bilateral cooperation and [the possibility to] involve cooperation on arms manufacturing” (p.159).

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16 This is explainable when considering the Deutschian origin and its context: Until first neo-liberal ideas were developed in the 1980s (e.g. Keohane, 1984), the main actors within IR theory remained states. Deutsch et al. (1957) naturally followed the common perceptions and focused on inter-state relations, developing a theory already revolutionary in terms of its presumption of a possible peaceful order and community on the international scene (Lijphart, 1981). At that time, considering the (institutionalized) community as actor towards its outside was just no possibility to think of – but with changing IR theory giving international institutions and organizations actor quality, this becomes more and more important.
Although Adler and Barnett (1998b) rather emphasize a security community’s transnational and institutional binding power than a common threat, they as well recognize the possibility of collective defence already on the lowest level of maturity, in the nascent security community. Defence capabilities, as “power balances, nuclear deterrence, and threats of retaliation” (p.56) become essential instruments in case of external threat or attacks – the “security community may respond as a collective security system or even as an integrated military defence organization” (p.56).

In terms of behavioural rules, Bjola and Kornprobst (2007) theorize about national habitus delineating along self and other practices (which are shaped by the authoritative history). In detail, the ‘habitus of restraint’ defined as internal “self-restraint against the use of force” accompanied by negative experiences with it, is the specific war-hindering mechanism inside the security community (also see Poliout, 2008; Adler, 2008 on communities of practice). But not enough, they argue, that this “restraint becomes a second nature” (p.291) providing orientation towards interaction with the other. “Security communities do not use force on a random basis regardless of any predispositions about what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of force” (p.291). How and whether such restraint functions for the EU security community action to the outside is unclear. What is expectable, are the outside influence on the EU security community and identity building as well as the launch of PESCO:

Since the EU roots in economic cooperation, one may expect external influence in that sector giving an incentive for integration rather than a common threat perception (h4). The launch of PESCO, however, may be a reaction to such common threat from the outside (h5).

A closer look at the inside (ideas, norms and identity) and the outside (threat and defence) of the security community has been taken, still leaving the question on practical actors (defending the security community). To be more precise, the role of institutions remains open and will be discussed in the following.

3.4 Institutions in the Security Community

Already Deutsch argues of identity and institutions ensuring dependable expectations of peaceful change. Similarly, Adler and Barnett emphasize identity (see above) and argue for the degree of institutionalization as indicator to categorize the security community (1998b). First of all, the two-dimensionality of institutions – on one hand as social practices, roles and rules, on the other as material entities is important. In both cases, institutions and identity are reciprocally shaping each

17 The core notion of (internal) peaceful change, however, at any time excludes expectation or preparation for violence of the Members against each other (Adler and Barnett, 1998b).
other and deepening mutual trust. In terms of material security institutions, Adler and Barnett (1998b), argue they “facilitate transaction and trust” (p.42) but may also “‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are” (p.43), or even create common, homogenic norms and visions. The most important notion, however, seems that institutionalization is necessary for binding expectations and ensuring peace in the development towards the security community (see above e.g. tier two).

Furthermore, depending on its configuration along “shared and coordinated practices, and public policies” (Adler and Barnett, 1998b, p.57), authority may become institutionalized – international institutions can achieve (judicial) power and capabilities, even in terms of security and defence.\(^{18}\)

Deutsch et al. (1957) define a common threat as necessary precondition for collective defence; Adler and Barnett, however, suggest, that states foster collective defence mechanism not purely for this sake but to “deepen the institutional and transnational linkages that bind these states together” (p.50). Hence, security institutions may evolve for common defence or vice versa, common defence is fostered to deepen institutionalization.

However, some other approaches speak for variation, e.g. taking society and individuals into account.\(^ {19}\) The special position of (regional) institutions and organization, such as the EU bureaucracy, as this is “‘where something happens’ (for instance, practicing co-operative security)” (Neuman cited by Bremberg, 2015), nevertheless, remains uncontested. Hence, in this work, the EU institutionalization in terms of foreign affairs and (military) security is under scrutiny:

It is expected, that the EU institutional landscape ensures not only peaceful change to the inside but a common authority to the outside (in interrelation with identity) evolves over time (h6). Furthermore, PESCO is under scrutiny of giving the EU a defence authority in practical terms; and hence, tightens the security community (h7).

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\(^{18}\) “[A]n institutional form that is intended to give muscle to already existing expressions of mutual obligation” (Adler and Barnett, 1998b, p.51) may developed.

\(^{19}\) Already Deutsch took an “individual-societal focus and bottom-up approach” (Koschut, 2014b, p.522) while Adler and Barnett rather emphasize the role of international organizations and institutions (governed by political elites) and their identity and value building power (see above). Tusicsny (2007) criticizes exactly this (material) institutional focus and accuses security community theorists in general of having an elitist focus, referring back to the original Deutschian idea of a ‘group of people’ becoming integrated in a security community (p.429) to argue on the importance of masses – any “politically relevant strata of all participating units” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p.47) should be taken into account. Likewise, Krahmann (2003) suggests a broad view on security considering “the level of the state to society and individuals, and from military to non-military issues” (p.9).
4. Analysis Framework: Hypotheses and Operationalization

To make transparent how the concept of a security community is applied in analysing the EU and PESCO, further hypothesizing and operationalisation is necessary. First, the hypotheses as formulated above will be specified and assigned to a framework of triggers, institutions and identities (in accordance with Adler and Barnett’s three tiers and levels of maturity idea).\(^\text{20}\) Second, the hypotheses are operationalized in view of the EU and PESCO.

The main expectation (h0) is indicated by the research question: The EU is a security community to which PESCO adds up. Along the above outlined theoretical approaches, the following hypotheses are made: The EU security community developed along environmental triggers, which for the EU are of economic nature (H4) while PESCO’s launch is expected to be connected with an – at least alleged – external threat (h5). Furthermore, the EU security community is expected to develop a common identity and strategical vision presented to the outside (h3). At the same time, an institutional landscape ensuring peaceful change for the inside and a common authority to the outside evolves (h6) which PESCO may represent in terms of security and defence (h7). As outcome, the EU is expected to be at the stage of a mature security community, may be even a tightly coupled one (h1). If not yet, PESCO is expected to tighten the degree of interconnectedness making it tightly coupled (h2).

Table 1: Analysis Framework with Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>EU Hypotheses</th>
<th>PESCO Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Triggers or Incentives</td>
<td>Economic association influenced from the outside</td>
<td>(alleged) Common threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Common identity</td>
<td>Common strategical vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Institutionalized landscape, common authority</td>
<td>Common defence authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Mature security community</td>
<td>Tightly coupled, mature security community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To conduct the analysis, a multidimensional framework with specific indicators for the two history blocs is derived from the hypotheses as formulated above (see appendix 2): First of all, the

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\(^\text{20}\) Given the similarities between each tier of development and the stages of maturity, they are treated as equivalents. Although some authors proposed different views (e.g. Chang, 2016), I have decided to define them as correlated.
development graduates along the levels of maturity proposed by Adler and Barnett, the nascent, ascendant, or mature security community, divided into a loosely or tightly coupled community.

The first history bloc is analysed as the beginning multinational, inter-governmental institution building in Europe. Since it is widely accepted that the European Union roots in economic integration, this lies at heart, specifically the foundation of the ECSC (incentive). Emphasize lays on the ideational way towards the ECSC with focus on possible external influence, the incentive for economic integration. Since world war two had just ended when the European integration process started, naturally a link to security and peace was given not to be missed in the analysis. In the end, the nascent security community level may be achieved.

After the economic association triggered the (security) community building, the institutional development in terms of political coordination and cooperation is under scrutiny (in specific the European Political Cooperation, EPC). It is analysed whether the Member States within EU institutions on basis of the existing cooperation in economy, commonly foster political integration; also taking into account the global context. At the same time, norm- and identity building processes appeared within Europe emphasizing a common role in the wider world, formally revealing for the first time in the Copenhagen Declaration of 1973. Along the idea of self-other differentiation, again global events are under consideration. As outcome either an ascendant or mature security community are possible, depending on the degree of identity and institutionalization.

The second analysis bloc builds upon the results of part one and is sub-divided again: First, the judicial and institutional landscape introduced with the Lisbon Treaty, in which PESCO is already mentioned, is under scrutiny. The respective policy areas, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP and CSDP) are described and analysed in terms of their weight within the EU and to the outside. They either confirm or reject the outcome of the parts before.

With a first view on the underlying strategy of the EU introducing its priorities in the wider world, PESCO’s narrative is presented to understand the internal and external dynamics of threat perception. In this line, also a study on national expectations towards PESCO is introduced, to summarize how PESCO was triggered from the outside and inside (accordingly to the strategical identity). It follows a discussion on the implementation of PESCO as planned in the Lisbon Treaty provisions and elaborated by Council Decisions. Hereby, two viewpoints on PESCO as framework or process are taken into account two viewpoints on PESCO- Furthermore, respective review and financing mechanisms are considered to conclude how PESCO may be related to the EU security community and give an outlook.
5. Introducing the EU as Security Community

Since the end of the Second World War, the European region is among the most peaceful areas of the world (Tardy, 2009). Either in itself but especially in alliance with Northern America building the NATO, it has often been subject to security community studies (see e.g. Deutsch et al., 1957, Tsakaloyannis, 1996; Wæver, 1998, Cronin, 1999; Koschut, 2014a, Adler, 2008; Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Nearly almost as often, today’s EU has been analysed in terms of its security community capability, referring to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as sort of becoming a special “instrument of security policy” (Rieker, 2016, p.3, also see Bengtsson, 2011; Laporte, 2012; Bremberg, 2015). This repeatedly came along the wider discussion of the EU as a normative power (see e.g. Manners, 2002; Bicchi, 2006; Pace, 2007; Koops, 2011). Other studies considering the European Union collective and its role in international relations deal with the idea of actoriness, asking whether and how far the EU represents a global actor (see e.g. Sjösted, 1977; Bretherton & Vogler, 2005; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013).

Security community theory generally follows a different logic: Its inward view does not naturally implicate patterns or logics of behaviour to the outside – but such are possible and even valuable, as already shown by the respective ENP studies. How the security community is connected to military defence will be shown by the example of PESCO. First the status of the EU as security community and how it developed towards such follows. As proposed above, it starts after WWII considering external incentives and triggers, followed by political institutionalization and identity and norm-building along the way to the Treaty of Lisbon.

5.1 The Beginning: Incentives and Triggers

With the end of WWII, the world was shocked and in a never-again entitlement, the United Nations (UN) were found by the former WWII Allies in October 1945 to pave the way towards a universal system of collective security – at least that was the intention (Hauser, 2014). Although the US and USSR were permanently seated together in the UN security council, soon the Cold War divided the world into Western versus Eastern influence and satellite zones, confirmed by the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. In this the US declared themselves as global supporter for any resistance against Eastern communistic influence starting their support in civil-war Greece and Turkey (Merill, 2006; Kuniholm, 1994).

One year later in 1948 in Europe, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and UK signed the Brussels Pact founding the Western Union (WU), a military alliance against possible Eastern aggression. Interestingly enough, the official reason for its establishment was German re-
empowerment, hence, the often theorized ‘threat’ came from within the later community and not from the outside (Gehler, 2006). In this period, a first idea of Western togetherness may have evolved, which topped by Eastern aggression (Berlin Blockade) brought the US and Western Union close and led to the creation of NATO (1949). In 1954, also West Germany was included in both alliances when the WU turned to the Western European Union (WEU). This underscored the alliance real raison d’être which was not to keep Germany down but the administration and organization of European commitments to NATO against possible (external) Soviet threat (Schwarz, 2005). Since (external) security and defence were now guaranteed and tied to Northern American, the WU and its successor remained surprisingly insignificant in terms of European (security) community building (Rohan, 2014). Rather the economic developments pushed integration and institutionalization, and became a successful model.

Economically, liberal ideas under US lead evolved: The establishment of the Bretton Woods System for common monetary management in Australia, North America, Europe and Japan (together with the foundation of Worldbank, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, later World Trade Organization) guaranteed the rise of a Keynesian system and liberal, democratic values (Bordo & Eichengreen, 1993). Next to this, explicitly the Marshall Plan (officially European Recovery Programme, ERP, signed in April 1947) under the Truman administration offering economic aid contributed to the reconstruction of Western Europe from 1948 to 1951.22 Today, its influence in terms of grants, loans and materials on the economic success in post-war Europe is highly debated (see e.g. Eichengreen & Uzan, 1992; Milward, 1989; Brusse & Griffith, 1997) – if at all, the argument about ERP filling the “crucial margin” (Schuker & Kindleberger, 1981, p.357) to European recovery might have found consensus. In non-economic terms, however, its influence on the political, strategical and institutional landscape, is emphasized more and more:23 Already in Marshall’s speech revealing the plan one year before its closure, European political and strategical autonomy was intended (see Geremek, 2008) – “the initiative, I think, must come from Europe” (Marshall, 1947, par 7).24 The response was the evolvement of the

21 Before an attempt to build a European Defence Community (EDC) had failed (Hill & Smith, 2011).
22 Background: Holding a speech at Harvard University, foreign minister C. G. Marshall introduced the ideas behind the ERP which as “milestone” ultimately sent off US American isolation policy (which began with Roosevelt’s New Deal; see Lukacs, 1997). Based on Keynesian liberal ideas, now a global world economy was foreseen under American lead, to which the ERP was the means to first) free Europe from is economic misery making it inaccessible for Eastern communism, especially Germany, and second) introduce Bretton Woods and its components (see Bossuat, 2008; Geremek, 2008; Milward, 1989; Judt, 2007).
23 A fourth level of impact is generally not to be missed although thematically rather irrelevant here: The emergence of a new middle class, “the birth of a Euro-America model of modern society with different nuances” (Bossuat, 2008, p.21) is observable, stimulated through transaction via ERP.
24 In detail, Marshall even demanded cooperation: “Here must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take” (Marshall, 1947, par.7).
Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) for the period of July to September 1947 in which the American offer was deliberated between its Members and with the US. As result, Marshall aid started in April 1948 administered and operated by the new Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC; successor of CEEC in April 1948). The Europeans (namely their foreign ministers) had created their first own inter-governmental institution of a much broader scope than WU and NATO at the time (Members: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK; see Griffiths, 1997).  

In general, some scholars argue that this was the first step towards the Treaty of Paris (e.g. Barbezat, 1997), which to some extent might be right. However, considering some of the main intellectual forces driving integration, the US American influence shall be clarified: Jean Monnet, a French economist living in Washington during war, sympathised with the American, Keynesian vision of Europe and early recognized, that ‘French greatness’ can only to be (re-)achieved in the wider European frame. Writing to the French prime minister (R. Schuman), Monnet recaps a discussion in Washington, concluding that the actual situation and dangers are to overcome by meeting the US endeavours and turning “national efforts into a truly European effort, [which] will be possible only through a federation of the West” (Monnet, 1978, p.272f). Although the OEEC turned out a disappointment in these terms – it finally became today’s Organisation on Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961, a global intergovernmental economic forum; Monnet’s vision and Marshall’s intention were becoming reality by different means:  

Six Western countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and West Germany) began negotiations about a common market and customs union focusing on two of their key industries, Coal and Steel. French prime minister Schuman appeared as driving force at the negotiation tables, and assisted by Monnet and others, he introduced a proposal on the European Coal and Steel Community, which in April 1951 was signed as the Treaty of Paris.  

How and whether this would have happened without the American impetus via the Marshall Plan is in some argumentation completely denied and European dystopias are drawn (see e.g. Hogan, 1987). Other scholars, i.e. Geremek takes a transatlantic view not giving Marshall and his plan such a big role: He rather places the ERP within usual Cold War-Truman-philosophy and together with NATO he defines it as an “integral part of the development of the Euro-Atlantic alliance” (2008, p.46). In any case, the American vision and influence were a viable part not just in OEEC but also ECSC foundation: The ERP offered psychological benefits making “co-ordinated economic policy-

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25 Here is not to be missed naming W. Churchill and his famous call for a United States of Europe in 1946.  
26 Some other attempts were made before: The European Congress Meeting in The Hague in 1948 and 1950; Monnet judged as neither ambitious nor pragmatic enough.
making seem normal rather than unusual” (Judt, 2007, p.97) which provided for great opportunities for American influence on intellectual and institutional integration, for example proven evident in case of US accession pressure (by US High Commissioner John J. McCloy) on German Coal managers (Berghahn, 2008). And although the ECSC may first have been intended to become the economic teammate of the WU and WEU in the war-hindering game, soon economic success prevailed over any war-thinking which only underlies what Schuman had in mind from beginning on: “solidarity in production […] will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (italics added, Schuman, 1950, par.6). Considering the hypothesized internal economic association, this is indeed evident in increasing European community building. The economic connection itself, however, is influenced by external factors – the general American influence through ERP and specific contributions in ECSC negotiations and execution. Just unlike theory expected, the external influence was not perceived as threat (although bilateral tensions and first sceptics were given; Griffith, 1997) but appeared as friend helping with economic aid.27 In sum, the common economic interest within a general (Western) never-again ideology promoting peace created a regional construction of institutions which can be considered as nascent security community.

5.2 The EU Security Community Institutional (and Territorial) Development

After the ECSC was founded, only seven years later further economic cooperation was fostered via the establishment of the European Economic Cooperation (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) by the Treaties of Rome. While the former aimed at a general common economic policy, the latter was mainly focused on nuclear energy production. In its negotiations, the dangerous dual use of nuclear material as weapons was considered and a common waive debated.28 In total, however, the EC’s remained “throughout the Cold War first and foremost as an economic actor, with its role in foreign and security issues being very much both secondary and circumscribed” (Marsh & Mackenstein, 2005, p.51). The institutionalization of this dimension is crucial for the finalization of the security community: the outcome of dependable expectations of peaceful change is ensured and guaranteed when bound in institutions, Adler and Barnett state. Although the respective Member States of the ECs were not committed to any inter-state nor intra-state conflict in that time period (see Gleditsch, et al., 2002) the security community further

27 The US American intention behind ERP, although in the Marshall speech introduced as selfless and friendly, was however clearly of economic and anti-communistic interest serving the US national interests (Barbezat, 1997).
28 In the end, the Members agreed on national freedom of action in military terms except for those countries which were forbidden to use and development nuclear armament in the aftermath of WWII, e.g. Western Germany (CVCE, 2016).
developed along two ways: increasing normative and ideational basis (processes) and increasing territorial and institutional structure.

The latter, the main organizational, and territorial developments, can be summarized from 1951 to 2007 in a few highlights: After the Rome Treaties established EEC and EURATOM next to ECSC, ten years later, (1967) the ‘Merger Treaty’ came into force merging several institutions of the three independent organizations to create an institutional landscape quite similar to that of the EU today (in detail see European Parliament, 2018). Between 1973 to 1986, three big enlargement waves occurred: The economic success from 1960s to 1980s attracted Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Portugal and Spain to join the Community (European Commission, 2015). The Single European Act of 1986, established a political unit, the European Political Committee and in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the three-pillar system unifying the economic organizations (now European Community) with a dimension of internal security and the pillar on political matters (EPC).\(^{29}\) For the first time, the term European Union, which was long striven for, was given a shot. Two year later, in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden and in 2004 the whole east bloc followed into the Union which was reformed by several amending, the Amsterdam Treaty 1997/1999, the Nice Treaty 2001/2003 and the current Treaty of Lisbon 2007/2009.\(^{30}\)

In this short overview of proceeding European institutionalization and integration, the EPC stands out in the institutional development of the EU security community: Already introduced as voluntarily mechanism in 1970, more than a decade followed until the European Council (consisting of the Heads of States) contemplate its formalizing. They signed the Solemn Declaration (1983) recognizing that “the dangers of the world situation” and the European “virtue of its political role” call for a “coherent common political approach” (p.24). The underlying idea of a common political virtue, more specific the “will to transform the complex of relations between [the] States into a European Union” (p.25), can be considered as shift in the Community’s knowledge structure not only allowing but asking for cooperation and integration. Suddenly, after more than 30 years of economic cooperation, the EPC were to fulfil the economic community’s political role (Murphy, 1989). Next to internal normative changes, also external explaining the evolvement of the EPC: The ongoing Arab-Israel conflicts starting in 1948 were not just leading to the first common European foreign statements but one after another created a common vision (Elhami, 2010). Due to typical self-other identification processes along the conflict lines, Europe developed a self-perception

\(^{29}\) The economic pillar of EC consisting of ESCS, EEC and EURATOM, was connected to the internal Political and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (before Justice and Home Affairs) and an external (political) pillar emerging form the EPC.

\(^{30}\) If not stated otherwise, the first year refers to the signature of the respective treaty and the second date is the year of it entering into force. If only one date is stated, it refers to the latter.
contrasted to the Middle East which may considered as basis for the developing identity and security community.

In any case, external dangers or internal virtue, a common vision of a united Europe was created by the heads of states and accelerated by Parliament with a Draft Treaty on the European Union (1984). Although never ratified by the single Member States, the Draft Treaty was not completely refused by the European Council: A reviewing ad hoc committee recognized its ambitious idea and proposed that further negotiations shall be “guided by [its] spirit and method” (Dooge et al., 1985, p.32). Referring to institutional stagnation and economic crisis, the Dooge committee concludes that action and reform were necessary. After further negotiation between Council of the ECs (states’ ministerial level) and the European Council, finally, a year later (1986) the Single European Act (SEA) was declared, amending the Treaty of Rome and formally establishing the EPC as first official commitment to common foreign policies – this can be seen as a step forward towards a political union (Murphy, 1989).

This difficult process towards the first official political entity and the constitutional try by the (first elected) Parliament shows how complex the unification question was for the different parties involved. Although the Draft Treaty went beyond what the Member States were to give, the shift in thinking and need for formalization of a common political addressee for the inside and outside was widely accepted and implemented via the SEA, based on former positive experiences with the voluntarily EPC and the stable and well-functioning ECs together with increasing awareness of a common destiny (Bretherton and Vogler, 2005). Interestingly enough, already the Treaties of Paris and Rome had proposed political unification but the foreign occurrences and internal economic crisis mentioned seemed necessary to take this step (European Parliament, 2018).

Coming back to enlargement: Although not in detail specified here, the territorial enlargement of the security community may be attributed to what Adler and Barnett name power structure – due to EC’s success and increasing common voice other countries became attracted to it, which may be fostered by institutional connectedness in other super-regional organizations, e.g. WEU and NATO. The ECSC having started with six Member States, today has 28 Members (27 to be – British withdrawal planned for March 2019).

The increasing institutionalization though, is not just based on a developing normative structure but is shaped by material factors undermining identification processes and demanding a common approach. In sum, the EU security community covers with the new EPC the full range of policy

31 “The common coal and steel market was to be an experiment which could gradually be extended to other economic spheres, culminating in a political Europe” (European Parliament, 2018, p.1).
areas interesting for security community in institutions – mainly foreign affairs (EPC) and a bit economy (ECs). In terms of military security and defence, however, “the EPC did not go as far as some member states wished” (Smith & Timmins, 2001, p.81). Although such issues could have been governed through the extra-community organization of WEU, the main military defence organization for European security remained NATO (Smith & Timmins, 2001). This changes with the end of the Cold War: Since the dissolving of the USSR changed world security pattern, NATO’s raison d’être was questioned and European attempts for autonomy strengthened (Rees, 1998; Smith & Timmins, 2001). In the framework of the European (but non-Community) Organization WEU, European security was re-negotiated and the “role of WEU as the defence component of the European Union” emphasized. Through the already negotiated Maastricht ideas, ratified in 1993, the EPC was turned into the Common Foreign and Security Policy, officially giving foreign affairs the same weight as the economic dimension (also see Smith & Timmins, 2001). In accordance to that, slowly the WEU was merged into the EU: Its tasks were taken over by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997/1999 and its operative structures incorporated in 2003 by the Nice Treaty. Accomplished by the creation of the CSDP EU own crisis reaction forces were to be build (mentioned in the Helsinki Headline Goal) until 2003 and the necessary institutional structure rebuilt along the WEU’s example. Furthermore, the position of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) was built to give Europe an official single voice to the outside. With the introduction of the European Defence Agency (EDA), any left WEU responsibilities were vanished – the EU had swallowed the other institution and recreated in itself (Bretherton and Vogler, 2005).

In conclusion, the incorporation of the EPC to the Community marks a start of the EU as political and security actor, to the outside. To the inside, Masstricht ensured by a third pillar on the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), that police and juridical cooperation inside the community would take care of civil security and intra-community peace. Hence, the idea of dependable expectations of domestic peaceful change were now internally bound in institutions (Lavenex & Wagner, 2007). Before, international peaceful change between the EC/EU Members so far did not experienced such a pure security institution overviewing the internal peaceful conflict resolution within the EU framework, but rather the economic connectedness had ensured this habit. By giving themselves the internal as well as external common political and security role, the security community process was finished: When representing oneself commonly and acting together to the outside, internal inter-state peaceful change is conditional.
5.3 Identity, Norms and Values in the EU Security Community

Next to the institutional and territorial developments, change in norms, values and practices becomes visible. Through transaction and communication, new common facts were created and a new common vision developed, which in the end may lead to common action. Both, the development of a normative basis and common action (as a political Union) were already laid down in the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC: Although merely the “fusion of their essential interests […] by establishing an economic community” (1951) was the main goal, already a notion of “common destiny” (p.3) and safeguarding world peace was expressed in the preface.

These ideas were repeated in the following Treaties fostering integration and elven and half month after Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the European Communities, the Heads of States put them to record in the Copenhagen Declaration on European identity (14th of December 1973):32 “The Nine […] are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity” (Copenhagen Declaration, 1973). Furthermore, they stated that former enmities were overcome because “unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they [we] have in common” (Copenhagen Declaration, 1973). Under light of the economic success and the Davignon report (1970) introducing means of political coordination (the EPC), the nine Member States had managed to identify their mutual normative basis to build a new European vision indicating a greater future.

The global events deepened this new vision and upcoming political role: As if it the world had wanted to give its approval, the UN recognized the EC by granting it the observers status in 1974. More specific, self-other orientation processes occurred – but although being in the middle of the Cold War, the Soviet role may not to be overestimated here. This is because the EC was rather bound to a general idea of the West under the lead of the United States than taking an autonomous place in the Cold War bipolar power play (Ekengren, 2008). In addition, both power poles roughly followed a détente ideology during the 1960s and 70s (which did not ask for European military action or a single voice) until the last big showdown started a decade later under the Reagan administration (Marsh & Mackenstein, 2005). Instead quite early tensions between France, the UK and the US due to the latter states’ leading role in NATO, led to the French withdrawal from the

32 Interestingly, the Copenhagen Declaration was one of the first results of the at that time voluntarily in-formal EPC, indicated in the French Fouchet Plan and introduced via The Hague declaration in 1969 (of the European Council) and the Davignon Report in 1970 (of the today Foreign Affairs Council Configuration; Tonra, & Christiansen, 2004).
alliance in 1956. And although only a few years before the Treaty on a European Defence Community failed ratification in the French parliament (and was directly refused by UK; 1952), in 1961 the country proposed an EC own system for common defence (Fouchet Plan). Since explicit anti-US notions were noticeable and the UK was completely excluded, it was never seriously considered by the remaining four ECSC Members (Western Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands). However, in view of the US strategy of détente and sudden change under Reagan, general transatlantic differences became more and more obvious, so that the need to stress European autonomy against the US seemed given when the Copenhagen Declaration was formulated (Koops, 2011; Marsh & Mackenstein, 2005).

In total, the vision drawn, however, was rather based on civilian, diplomatic and economic means than hard power politics (e.g. military action): “the underlying logic of the EU as security community is that the process of mutual democratization and economic integration, rather than using direct force and threat of military action, provides peace” (Öni, 2003, p.23) – the theorized habitus of restrain seemed alive; administered in the at that time voluntarily EPC. Emphasizing consensual decision making and ignoring the field of security in other terms than politics and economy, the EPC “was largely reactive than proactive, […] reflect[ing] the lowest common denominator” (Marsh & Mackenstein, 2005, p.11). Hence, talking prevailed over action, which slowly changed the in the 1980s when the EC more and more differentiated itself from the US, for example by taking a different course in the Arab-Israel conflict recognising the role of Palestine (Venice Declaration, June 1980; Selim, 2010).

A decade later, the end of the Cold War influenced the whole world’s security patterns, shook the EC civilian nature and questioned the role of NATO, which up to then still functioned as main security and defence provider in Europe. “The EU moved from a role of interlocutor to a more proactive role of policy advocate with the dissolution of the Soviet Union” (Rhodes, 1998, p.10). The Second Gulf War followed right after (1991), and driven by France, Spain “and less wholehearted Germany” (Smith & Timmins, 2001, p.82), an end of military dependency on the US and own powerlessness was foreseen (also see Fröhlich, 2014). European Commission president Delors stated (1991) that in the last consequence, security also contains military defence, an ability which the EC has to build up to if it wants “to contribute to the new world order” (p.99). The UK

Furthermore, French and British relations were already relatively tense due to the Suez Crisis in 1956 (see Mattern, 2005).

It is stated that the EC-US “ties do not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity” (Copenhagen Declaration, 1973, par.14).

Marsh and Mackenstein (2005) note, that the “EPC’s setting outside Community structures and its restriction to political and economic dimensions of security rather demonstrated the continued unwillingness of member States to move beyond intergovernmentalism” (p.11).
and Netherlands, however, proclaimed the transatlantic ideal under NATO for European security governance. As compromise, the extra-community organization WEU “would be reconfigured as a kind of ‘bridge’ between the new EU and NATO” (Smith & Timmins, 2001, p.82). In June 1992 the ministerial summit of the council of the WEU formulated the Petersberg Tasks giving the WEU a military role in terms of humanitarian, peacekeeping- and making operations. Becoming ratified in 1993, the Maastricht pillar of CFSP became active and received access to WEU operational capacities (Hauser, 2014).

The urge for an EU own security and defence identity (ESDI) became louder until it was acknowledged and allowed within NATO in the EU-NATO Brussels summit in 1994, with the aim to strengthen the European component within NATO (definite endorsement reached in 1996). The first amending Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/1999) even included the WEU Petersberg Tasks (Art. 17) and the signature of the Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 was the final go for a common defence policy signalling British willingness (Howorth, 2004), so that the European Council adopted the European Policy on Security and Defence in 1999. In the same year, the European Council in Helsinki already proposed ambitious goals on building military capabilities until 2003 (called the Helsinki Headline Goal). To avoid tensions between the EU and US, this new role had always to be backed up within NATO. As mentioned above, the ESDI was confirmed in 1994/1996 and further developments were made in 2002, approved in 2003, via the Berlin Plus Agreements regulating the EU-NATO relationship in terms of mutual consolation and access to capabilities. The following first EU own ESDP mission started on 01st of January in 2003 (European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) – adding to an existing mission of the UN. With this the EU had developed towards an active military and security actor although still tightly coupled to the US but now recognized as equal member in NATO. Also in terms of identity and norms, the EU can be considered a mature security community.

5.4 Outcome: Political Institutionalization and Collective Identity

After institutionalization and enlargement brought the Community and later Union to life, the EC developed its new role based on a common normative idea and vision (liberalism and democracy) and the security community ultimately achieved maturity. Dependable expectations of peaceful change were bound into institutions and underlined by a common identity and mutual trust. The predecessor, an ascendant security community, may have been reached around the 1970s, 1980s, when the Copenhagen Declaration on Identity and the EPC were formalized. With the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties providing for the CFSP and CSDP institutional balance, taking over WEU tasks and organizational structures, and giving the EU a single voice in form of the HR, the institutional set up became ‘mature’. At the same time the mutual recognition of commonness and
the political virtue (e.g. in the Copenhagen Declaration), common statement on external, outside occurrences under differentiation to the US and national attempts striving for strategical autonomy came up and confirmed a common identity. Both factors can be considered sufficiently intense to conclude the mature EU security community.

Reflecting on this, one must acknowledge that not only security community theory may help understanding the European institutional and normative development, but also other theories, for example specific integration theories like Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (1993), or Neofunctionalism (Haas, 1964). Within security community theory, the path proposed by Adler and Barnett which was mainly followed here, is only one way to understand security community development. Since several other scholars have built up to the theory, other views and opinion are legit and acknowledged, for example Wæver (1998) arguing of a Europe with different security phases. The main result, however, remains that the EU poses in one or another way a security community to the inside including a certain degree of security and defence action to the outside. Second matter of interest is now the newly launched military cooperation framework PESCO and how this might tighten the interconnectedness within the mature EU security community. First of all, however, the current legal status under the latest amending Treaty of Lisbon is under scrutiny.

6. The Lisbon Treaty: Jurisdiction and Institutions of CFSP and CSDP

Since already the European Convention drafting the Lisbon Treaty had laid out provisions on PESCO among the CSDP, the respective judicial and institutional structure evolving from the Treaty’s entry into force in 2009 to PESCO’s launch in 2017 is introduced here. Both parts may either reject or confirm the above finding of a mature security community allowing for a discussion of the status quo. However, rather the consolidation of the findings above is expected.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007/2009 strengthened the EU identity to the outside but also to the inside, by giving the EU a new quality confirming its role in IR (Wessel, 2001). In terms of legislative and practical action, the EU is now divided into a set of exclusive and shared competences – the Treaty provides for an exact division of tasks and responsibilities the EU collective and the single Member States have to and can fulfil. Only the CFSP including CSDP remain within a specific status, which some define closest to a sort ‘parallel competence’ (see e.g. Schütze, 2015). Although this might limit the EU practical ability in terms of security and defence, this does not mean its level of security community is reduced. Ultimately, the above delineated developments prove the Union’s development towards a security community by building a collective identity rather than building upon common action or capabilities. Such followed after the EC Members made clear the role each of them were foreseeing for the common European dimension and the externalities asked for it. The
respective institutional landscape under which CSDP is governed and implemented today developed under the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty up to 2010, when a Council Decision established EDA.

6.1 The Specific Role of CFSP and CSDP in the EU Jurisdiction

Coming into force in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty – inspired by the signed but unratified constitutional treaty proposed in 2004 –, *inter alia* diminished the former pillar structure of Maastricht, provided the EU a legal personality and re-named ESDP to CSDP (Wessels & Bopp, 2008). Although this was just a name change, one should not underestimate its significance – it “further underscore[ed] the objective of commonality in the EU’s approach to international relations” (Howorth, 2011, p.198). However, some further changes in CSDP provided far more significant impact: Adjustments in the institutional set up and judicial power came along. As mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty exactly defines the policy areas in which the EU collective and its Member States have exclusive or shared legislative power (art.3-6, TFEU). The CSDP as part of CFSP (art.42(1), TEU) however, is not mentioned in this list and not easily put into one of the categories offered. Instead a vague mixture of powers and commitments is proposed, guided by a general notion on external affairs:36 “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, [etc.]” (art.3(5), TEU).

Specifying how the EU may uphold to this notion, the CFSP is introduced and detailed in title five of the TEU, including the notion on common defence: “The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions related to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence” (art.24(1), TEU). Hence, any policy area linked to foreign affairs and security may now fall under the CFSP governance, which the Maastricht pillar structure did not allow for in this extent (van Vooren & Wessel, 2014).

As concrete competence, however, the EU can “in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, define and implement” the CFSP (art.2(4), TFEU), although it is hereby “subject to specific rules and procedures” (*lex specialis*, art.24(1), TEU) differing to the standard legislative procedure. Considering the broad scope covered by the CFSP, military security and defence are

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36 Already before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the linkage between different policy areas and foreign affairs became more and more obvious: “Challenges the Union faces within the international system are ever growing and requiring an ever-increasing scope of action across different policy fields, geographical regions and arenas of policy-making.” (Wessels & Bopp, 2008, p.1; also see Tonra & Christiansen, 2004).
connected to the more specific CSDP. This “shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets” (art. 42(1), TEU) – giving it a security role to the outside and inside (van Vooren & Wessel, 2014). In realizing its role, the Union may “use civilian and military means, [including] joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (art. 43(1), TEU).

The necessary capabilities shall be provided by the Member States (art. 42(1), TEU) and any “commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (art. 42(7), TEU). Among the most important changes, however, are the solidarity and mutual assistance clause: After the EDC and other previous attempts failed to build a basis for common defence, Maastricht provided for a first hint which was explicitly set out in the Lisbon Treaty in article 42(2): “The [CSDP] shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council acting unanimously, so decides”. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty offers a parallel to NATO’s famous Article 5 on collective defence adopted in a weakened version, stating that “if a Member States is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States hall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power” (italics added, art. 42(7), TEU).

In the solidarity clause, the scope of the solidarity case is widened and requires that “[t]he Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.” (italics added, art. 222(1), TFEU). However, the strong link to NATO is not to be missed: In any case above, NATO remains “for those States which are members of it, [...] the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation” (art. 42(7), TEU).

Also PESCO is listed among the important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, referred to in article 42(6) TEU: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework” (italics added). How these higher criteria, binding commitments and most demanding missions were further

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37 This differentiation is based on the two different Council configurations dealing with the CFSP and CSDP, the provisions laid down under CSDP are however, “far from clear” about that (van Vooren and Wessels, 2014, p.402).
38 This was for the first time invoked by France in 2016 after it became victim of terrorist attacks (Anghel, & Cirlig, 2016).
39 Howorth concludes in 2011, that “[i]f permanent structured cooperation works as intended, it could have significant effect on the generation of EU military capacity” (p.216).
elaborated in 2017 to be referred to later. Next, the ‘Union framework’ PESCO is born into, is given a closer look.

6.2 The Institutional Balance and Set Up

The overall EU institutional structure for foreign affairs has changed from the informal EPC to highly institutionalized CFSP over the years.\footnote{Note: Since the CSDP is part of CFSP any references to the latter automatically applies to the former if not stated otherwise.} And still, not just the judicial competence is less clear than for any other policy area, it is also exceptional in term of institutional balance (art.24(1), TEU). First of all, the role of the European Parliament, the only EU legislator democratically elected remains comparingly weak in the CFSP: The Parliament does not have any legislative but remains with budgetary and some inter-institutional consultation power (Legrand, 2018). Second, the Commission as the EU form of an executive, which is usually strongly involved in common matters, remains formally inexistent in implementation the CFSP provisions (and CSDP; van Vooren & Wessel, 2014). Instead, the Member States’ Foreign and Defence Ministers monthly meeting in the Foreign Affairs configuration of the Council of the European Union (FAC) dominate the legislation and Member States, HR and lower level bureaucratic structures implement it. The Council can adopt the main and only legislative instruments of CFSP, the Council decision (Art.16(6), 25, 29, 42(4), TEU):

However, even these decisions are different from the usual legislative acts (as proposed in art.288 TFEU; regulation and directive) possible within the EU: They follow the European Council’s strategic guidelines to be decided unanimously, are themselves taken unanimously (with a few exceptions allowing QMV for CFSP, not CSDP matters) and have a distinct binding nature, mainly due to the limited role of the CJEU. In detail, the Member States are committed to consult and comply with each other and the FAC on their positions and actions in terms of general interest (art.32, TEU) and “shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions” (art.28(2), TEU), i.e. they are not allowed to act or decide opposing (Wessel, 2015). However, this duty is not legally enforceable by any Member Stater or the EU (via the CEJ) and the Member States still remain with distinct power to interpret the ‘general interest’ against national interest allowing for individual positions and action (art.32, TEU; Klamert, 2014; van Vooren & Wessel, 2014; Wessel, 2016).

In total, the strong Council involvement becomes (only) limited in terms of the other policy areas linked to foreign affairs, for example the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) which is strongly
linked to the Commission, allowing for it to participate in shaping the CFSP (Marsh & Rees, 2012). Due to its general limited role, the main executive part is, however, taken over by the High Representative and the Member States themselves: The CFSP “shall be out into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [HR] and the Member States” (art.24(1), TEU) – HR and further sub-ordinated bodies as main EU executive part are again considered below (Cherubini, 2012). Summing up, the overall exceptional institutional balance undermines the CFSP speciality and its intergovernmental non-communitarian character, even after Lisbon destroyed the pillar structure (Devuyst, 2012).

Taking a closer look at CSDP, the more specific security and defence policy is ruled by the same institutional structure as CFSP. Nevertheless, along its way, from Fouchet Plan to ESDI and ESDP and now CSDP, important organizational achievements on a lower institutional and bureaucratic level have been made, mainly sub-ordered to the Council: In 2001 the Political and Security Committee was established by council decision, consisting of Member States’ ambassadors to assist in contact with the HR the FAC as main preparatory player in the decision-making process. Its main function is to overview and track the international situation and relations. Thereby, the PSC itself receives help and advice from the Committee for Civilian Aspect of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The latter is the highest military body within the Council and composed of the Member States’ Chiefs of Defence and their representatives. The EUMC also oversees the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) providing Military expertise, together with the High Representative.41 (EEAS, 2016a; Rehrl, 2017). This position was already established in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997/1999 as an integral EU institution posing a first commitment to an EU foreign minister. By the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) gained new functions, for example the permanent chair of the FAC and the vice-presidency of Commission (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2017).42 Furthermore, the HR heads the in 2010 formally established European External Actions Service (EEAS), which might be described as the EU foreign and defence ministry, uniting Commission and Council powers, including the 139 EU diplomatic delegations all over the world (former Commission delegations). Some further specific agencies with various tasks exist, e.g. the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) providing analysis and results from Earth observation satellites, the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) analysing general foreign, security and defence

41 Please note that a deeper specification of tasks and further sub-sub-ordered organizations, for example the Civilian and respective Military Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC and MPCC) is possible but within the scope of this work not feasible.

42 Especially the new position as vice-president of the Commission influenced the institutional balance of CFSP/CSDP. Now the Commission was allowed for joint proposal on CFSP (but not CSDP) together with the HR; and in practice (although nor formally) gained implementation weight (van Vooren and Wessel, 2014).
issues, Fontext responsible for Coast and Boarder control, or the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in which Member States’ civilian and military staff, like diplomats, may receive training to better understand CSDP and to promote the European security culture (EEAS, 2018a). The far most important agency, however, is the in 2004 formed European Defence Agency: Responsible for capability coherence of the EU and its Member States, EDA together with the EEAS forms the Secretariat for PESCO (EEAS, 2018a).

6.3 Discussion: The EU Security Community under Lisbon

Taking the juridical and institutional structure of CFSP and CSDP into consideration, the balance between EU and Member States is unambiguous. This might be best summarized by citing van Vooren and Wessel’s (2014) conclusion: “The non-executive nature of CFSP is paramount. The competences of the institutions, the obligations of the Member States and the decision-making procedures all reflect the intention of the states to create a common policy that would not unconditionally replace the national policies of the individual state, but that would only emerge where and when possible” (p.398).

Reflecting the history of the EU security community outlined above, these developments are not quite surprising: Despite the early attempts on a defence and political community in the 1950s, the transition from a pure economic community to a political one (EPC) took more than 30 years (SEA in 1986) and needed some incentives from outside. Although the first stimulus for European economic cooperation did not stem from the often-theorized common enemy but rather from a real common friend, the inspiring and supporting US. However, underlying tensions increased more and more in the course. Further external concurrences and differentiation, own economic downfall and the idea of a common virtue, provided the basis for the EPC and later the ESDP, after a great number of failed predecessors, topped by the 2004 unratified European Constitution. The actual institutional balance and juridical power on CFSP, CSDP provided by the Lisbon Treaty and follow-up decisions (e.g. on the EEAS), can be put in a line of small, if not tiny steps, allowing for more and more cooperation up to a single, common approach. This is at least one way to understand the Lisbon Treaty and CFS and CSDP provisions, which fits to the notion of path-dependency indicated in security community theory (also see Wessels and Bopp, 2008, Figure 1).

In total, it becomes appearing, that even though the judicial circumstances might be categorized as blurry in terms of commonness and direct effect, the CSDP became a highly institutionalized policy area over the course providing a deep and broad structure. One may even interpret, that the institutional structure may supersede the CSDP judicial intention – but when reconsidering the ‘sleeping beauty’ PESCO, the exact opposite reveals. In terms of Adler and Barnett’s categorization
of security community maturity, the mature security community as recognized above can be confirmed taking into account the developments under the Lisbon Treaty. Regarding the degree of interconnectedness, even some indicators for the higher, tightly coupled stage may be confirmed: ‘High military integration’ and ‘collective defence to the outside’ are given. The internal security governance is not considered in this work, however, in accordance to other academic work might be assumed (e.g. Bossong & Rhinard, 2016). Whether the EU strategical line, PESCO narrative and practical dimension fits in this, is to be looked at in the following.


Within the above described structure, PESCO – the “sleeping beauty” (Fiott et al., 2017, p.1), was awakened in 2017: Although the specific provisions (art.42(6), art.46, Protocol 10) and necessary institutions (EDA and EEAS) were already established with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007/2009, the military cooperation framework had never been seriously considered before let alone been close to being launched (Kempin & Scheler, 2015).43

Although a shift in general European Strategy began earlier, it took until the 13th of November 2017, when 23 of the 28 EU Member States followed the legal procedure described in article 46(1) (TEU) and officially sent a notification to the HR stating their intention to participate in PESCO (Notification, 2017). In addition, recalling the FAC agreement from March 2017 “on the need to continue work on an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation based on a modular approach, which should be open to all Member States who are willing to make the necessary binding commitments” (Notification, 2017, p.2), and emphasizing the European Council’s wish for an “inclusive and ambitious PESCO” (Notification, 2017, p.2), the 23 interested Member States not only notified their intention, but at the same time offered a proposal on possible binding commitments PESCO demands (art.42(6), TEU). And although the Council was granted three months to vote on the proposal (QMV needed, art.42(6), 46(2), TEU), the decision was taken unanimously not even one month afterwards at the 11th of December 2017, signed by Frederica Mogherini, the actual HR (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315). It includes a list of the participating Member States, which due to short-term reconsideration by the in the beginning hesitant Italy and Portugal, increased to a total number of 25 (Council of the European Union, 2018).44 Furthermore, provisions on PESCO’s governance, projects, supervision, financing and third country participation are included and the binding commitments as proposed in the

43 Although the description of PESCO’s nature as military cooperation framework is criticized later, it shall be sufficient until further discussed below.

44 Only Denmark which generally opt-outs for CSDP, Great Britain being in process to generally leave the European Union and Malta, who referred to constitutional neutrality, did not join (Friede & Lazarou, 2018).
Notification are taken over word for word in an annex. Apart from what this might imply for the EU security community, the question remains for what reasons PESCO was established at this point in time. Giving a closer look to the strategical position the EU took under HR Frederica Mogherini and possible external influences, reactions and statement from the EU institutions and national Member States are analysed below.

7.1 The awakening of PESCO: Strategical Framework and the Role of Threat

In understanding what incentives and triggers may have influenced PESCO’s awakening, the broader EU internal strategical position and external occurrences and threats are taken into consideration. The first is clearly related to HR Frederica Mogherini, who takes an active role since 2014 and *inter alia* published in June 2016 the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). Based on review of former strategy papers, the EUGS identifies the EU’s geographic priorities and respective objectives (EEAS, 2016b; also see Howorth, 2017). Giving it more formal weight, the Council adopted conclusion along the EUGS and a follow-up document in late 2016 and by in doing so set new strategic priorities, named level of ambitions:

1) RESPONDING to external conflicts and crises when they arise,
2) BUILDING the capacities of partners,
3) PROTECTING the European Union and its citizens through external action.

(EEAS, 2017a).

The respective follow-up document is the by EDA and HR proposed CSDP specific ‘Implementation Plan on Security and Defence’. It does not only include the strategic priorities but also suggests specific actions, including the launch of PESCO (November 2016). Soon after, the Commission followed up with the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) suggesting respective financial mechanisms, e.g. the European Defence Fund (EDF) and industrial strengthening. Together with the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration from July 2016, identifying seven areas for deeper cooperation, the three plans have also been called 2016’s ‘winter package’ on European security and defence (Blockmanns, 2016). The package cannot be defined as a “game changer but [at least] part of a longer trend” (p.25) towards strategical autonomy (e.g. by own permanent operational headquarters, specific funding and harmonisation; also see Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012).

In this culture, not only the EDF but also PESCO and earlier in 2017, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), a new capability review and assessment mechanism, are born – at first sight in line with the trend.

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45 Named ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ the EEAS under authority of the HR published the EUGS (2016).
7.1.1 The Common Narrative on PESCO

The external dimension of PESCO’s launch is easily relatable to the big (IR) news’ headlines of the last years: The EU relevant changes in global security patterns can be roughly summarized as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, several terrorist attacks in Europe, the European migration crisis and latest “shifts in US foreign and defence policy” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2015, p.1; Barnier, 2015). The common threat seems to be re-established and triggering PESCO – although the hope on the US as a strong ally is not lost yet – terroristic attacks and the Russian behaviour in the Ukraine were and are perceived threatful (see e.g. Chivvis, 2017).

Taking into account official EU statements on PESCO’s launch, a picture emphasizing the importance of PESCO as an answer to these developments can be drawn: For example, in October 2017 the actual President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, held a speech about the European Council’s meetings and agenda in front of the European Parliament beginning with an emphasize on his personal ‘obsession’ with unity. Tusk continued arguing about three dimension of European Union community – the cultural, political but also territorial one. The latter refers to a defined, common territory and respective borders which have to be protected against possible threat, for example the ongoing migration crisis. Furthermore, “the aggressive behaviour of certain third countries, and the destabilisation around Europe” (par. 2) even demands defence. Hence, Tusks concludes, the commission is willing and prepared for PESCO. Two days after its launch, Tusks emphasizes his and the Commission’s delight: Presenting PESCO as “practical expression of [the] will to build European defence” (par.3), it would make the dream of a Defence Union as it failed several times before become reality. Against the fears on PESCO weakening NATO, Tusk opposes it would rather strengthen the alliance: “PESCO is not only good news for us, but it is also good news for our allies. And bad news for our enemies” (Tusk, 2017, par.3).

The Council of the European Union even published a short video as reaction to the establishment of PESCO undermining its importance in line with Tusk’s message. In a sequence of pictures of refugees, places of public grief, soldiers in front of EU Member States’ flags and military capabilities, such as drones and helicopters, all accompanied by dramatic music, the following sentences are stated:

“In a troubled world[,] citizens want the EU to offer them more protection[,] EU member States reinforce their defence cooperation making it more ambitious and more flexible[,] Group of countries will join forces to develop capabilities and be ready for operations where

46 At least after the next presidency elections the weight of the US is assumed to become clear, de- or increasing with President Trump as key figure. In total, the explicit global security patterns and its changes of the 21st century relatable to PESCO and its development may be considered as separate topic in a foreign policy analysis.
needed[.] Together EU countries are stronger to face global threats and make Europe and the world a safer place” (Council of the European Union, 2017).

Next to the two main PESCO institutions, also Parliament and Commission support the picture: Already in the end of 2016 the Parliament adopted two resolutions encouraging steps towards a European Defence Union (2016/2052(INI)) and the full implementation of the CSDP (2016/2036(INI)). In both non-binding motions, the Parliament emphasizes instability in the Middle East and North Africa, in particular the dangers proposed by the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups; Russia as “increasingly autocratic and more aggressive towards its neighbours” (point E.) and other indefinite hybrid, cyber and energy insecurities as reasons to draw on the Lisbon Treaty’s full potential, including PESCO. As for the Commission, President Juncker highlighted even before his presidency (in his election campaign) the “need to take more seriously the provisions of the existing treaty” (European Commission, 2017) to allow for defence cooperation under the roof of the EU – this would especially in terms of capabilities and the European defence industry make “perfect economic sense” (European Commission, 2017). He welcomes PESCO as a step on laying the foundation for a European Defence Union. In sum, a narrative of a global threat coming in several forms (even as refugee) from outside to the EU endangering security and peace of the EU citizens is drawn. Against this backdrop PESCO is highlighted as a more than appropriate remedy in difficult times proposing ‘ambitious and flexible cooperation’.

7.1.2 Overview on National Prospects

Another aspect regarding PESCO’s launch are the single EU Member States’ positions towards it. Fortunately, right before the launch, an analysis based on survey results was published categorizing the single Member States along their willingness and likeliness to join PESCO (Mauro & Santopinto, 2017). The outcome shall be briefly represented here: Graduating along leading, willing, reluctant, undecided and non-participating Member States, Mauro and Santopinto gave a prediction of who will and who will not be in, making a total of 18 to 24 participators. Interestingly enough, among the clear non-participants expected were not just the UK due to Brexit, or Denmark which generally opts-out for any CSDP matters, but also Ireland and Austria naming reasons of constitutional neutrality. In fact, Ireland was together with Portugal (which was defined as reluctant) hesitant in first place, but both countries immediately followed the first 23 signatories (among them Austria) when the decision was about to be taken. Hence, the national opinions seem to underline the European narrative: Any reasons against a participation in PESCO named in the first place must have been overthrown in the second, when PESCO was about to become reality. The repeated idea
of PESCO’s attractiveness by the communitarian institutions and general sense of community are possible influencing factors in this process.

Furthermore, one Member State demands a closer look, the UK: Although the EU may lose its biggest defence contributor in terms of money and troops and second nuclear power through the Brexit, it likewise gets rid of its most loyal transatlantic fan and strong opponent against any CSDP integration – specifically on “increasing the EDA’s budget, military integration under PESCO and setting-up a European military headquarters” (Csornai, 2017, p.8). Both sides will reveal their impact on future CSDP integration. Nevertheless, its geopolitical strength, including its defence industry, and troops may be missing in future – a partnership as provided for in the Council Decision (art.4(g), 9, Council Decision 2017/23315) could become possible. In any case, UK’s withdrawal from the EU in combination with the evolving Trump administration made room for French leadership, aided by Germany.47

In total, support for PESCO especially in the light of external occurrences is visible along the communitarian dimension but also on national level, especially evident in the shift of Ireland and Austria. The early developed common vision and identity and the structure provided under the Lisbon Treaty offer a fertile ground for PESCO’s launch. This may strengthen along further external developments, e.g. the latest establishment of tactical ballistic missiles (SS-26 Iskander) by Russia in Kaliningrad able to reach to Berlin, Warsaw or Copenhagen (Spiegel, 2018), the missing progress in defeating IS and pacifying Syria (Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 2018) or the newly initiated US-American economic tariffs (Higott, 2018).

7.2 PESCO: Implementation and Interpretation

Although the Member States were “clearly lagging behind the European institutions in this general trend” (Mauro & Santopinto, 2017, p. 12), PESCO’s launch signals a shared understanding and agreement on ‘doing more’. In line with previous CSDP operations and missions which started in 2003 (in Bosnia) and today add up to more than 30 in total (Rehrl, 2017), PESCO’s processual and operational dimension is mirrored in the ‘higher criteria’ and ‘binding commitments’. First, there are specific (higher) entry criteria the Member States are expected to fulfil when participating in PESCO. These are laid out in the Lisbon Treaty in Protocol 10, article one: On the one hand, PESCO is open to any Member State which is willing and able to develop its defence capabilities “more intensively […] where appropriate, in multinational forces” (art.1, Protocol 10), and on the other

47 Although both Member States’ underlying strategical interest was long time rather opposing than congruent (German military reluctance and French increasing armament), the German course had shifted since Afghanistan and both countries generally strive for unity, especially in light of Brexit and Trump (Csornai, 2017; Mauro & Santopinto, 2017).
can provide targeted combat troops “structured at a tactical level as a battle group” (art.1b, Protocol 10), supportive units and logistics for planned missions (as set out in art.43, see above) within five to 30 days for a period of 30 to 120 days.

Based on these provisions, Mauro and Santopinto argue of PESCO as process rather than framework which in line with the general European strategy (and new level of ambitions) aims at creating “a capacity for autonomous action in order to handle crisis” (Mauro & Santopinto, 2017, p.14). They underline this interpretation referring to article 2 which provides more specific actions to be taken by PESCO participating Member States, e.g. aligning the national defence apparatuses. Comparing the CSDP and PESCO’s with NATO’s ambitions, the authors even ascertain that PESCO’s goals in line with the EU level of ambition (EU strategy) in some point level NATO’s provision on collective defence. Furthermore, in a comparison of the Eurozone architecture (along which CSDP architecture would have been inspired) and PESCO’s governance, Mauro and Santopinto draw a line to how the process may lead to integration instead of simple ‘cooperation’, ending in a European Defence Union (p.27ff.).

As PESCO is launched by now, the respective notification and decision further specify article two in terms of ‘more binding commitments’: The Member States committed/commit themselves to increase their defence budget, investments and capabilities in line with the NATO and oriented toward the EDA collective benchmark demanding for a minimum defence budget of 2%/GDP of which respectively 20% shall be put in joint defence capabilities, and 2% in research and development (art.2(a), Protocol 10; No1-5, Annex I, Decision 2017/2315). Furthermore, common capability development, including the use of review via CARD, involvement of EDF and joint use of exiting capabilities (art.2(b), Protocol 10; No6–11) and capability cooperation to strengthen overcome shortcomings via a collaborative approach, by participation in at least one project under PESCO (art.2(c); No15-17) is laid down. Next to that, a few operational and economic objectives, like support to CSDP missions and operations and contribution to EU battle groups, and a commitment to EDA were made (art.2(b,e); No 12-14, 18-20). Fiott et al. (2017) conclude over this, that PESCO provides for an operational capacity: It “is an instrument or process by which the member states will develop capabilities and improve the deployability of their forces and so strengthen the security and defence of the Union” (p.33). These may even be possible outside the CSDP frame, for example under UN or NATO lead. However, in any case when considering article 46(2) (TEU) which introduces PESCO as possibility among Member States “with a view for the most demanding missions”, it becomes clear, that PESCO operates on the “upper level of the military spectrum” (p.36).
In this light, the participating Member States have proposed 17 projects which in March 2018 were adopted by Council Decision 2018/340. Like former EU missions and operations, the projects are of civilian and military nature: For example, medical aid and energy provision are planned, an increase and development of new military and cyber capabilities is anticipated as well as new logistic hubs and a military mobility project to improve infrastructure. Moreover, a training centre shall be established and another unit shall standardize military training within the Member States. Likewise, the command and control system of EU missions and operations is to be improved, a disaster relief package planned and the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core in planning, a mechanism for more rapid troop building (Goeller, 2017).

Reviewing the adopted projects, Fiott et al.’s idea on the PESCO operational dimension ‘in view of the most demanding missions’ is mitigated. And also, Mauro and Santopinto’s picture of PESCO leading to strategic autonomy fulfilling the EU ideal on the way to a European Defence Union is not evident in the above binding commitments or proposed projects. Rather “business as usual” (Mauro & Santopinto, 2017, p.17) in form of voluntary projects and financial contributions is manifested – at least this is what is seems for now. Considering PESCO’s governance in the next chapter, one automatically refers to EDF and CARD, two other new instruments of CSDP. It might as well be that in this broader perspective, PESCO shows other added value to the practical dimension of the security community.

### 7.3 PESCO’s Financing, Governance, and Review

Generally, PESCO (either as framework, process or instrument) is a form of inter-governmental cooperation under lead of the EU Member States participating. However, as part of the EU CSDP it was not only launched by the Council but is guided under its management in terms of directing policies (previously defined by the European Council) and specific decisions, e.g. on allowing a new member or excluding one breaking the commitments (by QMV, although usually unanimity is demanded, art.46(6), TEU). The overall super- and re-vision is taken over by the HR in first place and on second level by EDA and EEAS (in specific EUMS). Together both entities form the PESCO secretariat as “a single point of contact for the participating Member States” (EEAS, 2018b) to support the individual projects’ governances on capability (EDA) and on operational (EEAS)

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48 In particular, underwater mine countermeasures, common technology for European military radios, maritime capability for surveillance and protection (sensors, software, platforms), a general upgrade of maritime surveillance (integration of maritime, land and air surveillance platforms), new vehicles and indirect fire support are planned projects on military side. Regarding cyber security, on the one hand general defence measures, like firewall techniques, and on the other hand stronger resilience and common action are planned to be developed.
Furthermore, the secretariat supports HR and Council in reviewing and assessing implementation and compliance of and within PESCO. This process happens along two lines – first, the common binding commitments are under scrutiny by EEAS (with help of PSC and EUMS) and second, single national commitments are under supervision within two mechanisms, the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and CARD. The latter was established in spring 2017 as voluntarily review instrument to “help foster capability development addressing shortfalls, deepen defence cooperation and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans” (EDA, 2017). The similarity to the above named PESCO commitments is evident, hence, CARD ran by EDA will help to fulfil the PESCO review based on National Implementation Plans (NIP). Both reviewing entities, EEAS and EDA, shall receive the NIPs in which the Member States set out “how they will meet the more binding commitments” (art. 3(2) Council Decision 2017/2315). Although the CARD review process including mutual consultations is voluntarily, the NIP and general review under PESCO is not, which may foster coherence under CARD. Furthermore, CARD reviews whether the EU Member States (not just PESCO participants) fulfil the recommended defence capability priorities and needs as EDA (and EUMS, EUMC) identify within the CDP. In total, the CDP, CARD and PESCO commitments shall ensure a capability driven approach leading to a set of “usable, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable capabilities and forces” (EDA, 2018), as possible to develop in course of a PESCO project.

Another new mechanism, the EDF, shall add up to these goals in terms of financing: The usual defence finance mechanism ATHENA foresees funding of common costs of CSDP exercises by contributing Member States; not EU budget (Council Decision 2015/528). The EDF offers a new, different approach that aims “to help Member States spend taxpayer money more efficiently, reduce duplications in spending, and get better value for money” (EEAS, 2017b, para. 11). In particular, the fund shall offer research grants for collaborative projects, with an estimated annual investment in defence research and capability development of 5,5 billion € after 2020, financed by Member States’ (80%) and EU budget (20%, partially up to 30%). Since through this the defence industry and EU security capabilities’ quality may be stimulated in “a structured process to gradually deepen defence cooperation” (EEAS, 2018b, p.3). Some of the PESCO projects fall under this financing scheme, in general, however, article 8 (Council Decision 2017/2315) defines that EDA and EEAS administrative tasks are under EU budget while operational expenses are financed by the participating Member States, in particular, “beyond what will be defined as common costs according to the Athena” (no.14, Annex 1, Council Decision 2017/2315). In total, the will for

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49 The EEAS is in charge of operational aspects and projects “in the areas of availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces” (Art. 782b) Council Decision 2017/2315) and EDA in specific “shall support Member States in ensuring that there is no unnecessary duplication with existing initiatives also in other institutional contexts” (Art. 7(3b) Decision 2017/2315).
increasing financial commitments on defence and security is evident – the EDF as foreseen will even “place the EU among the top 4 defence research and technology investors in Europe” (European Commission, 2018).

7.4 Discussion: The EU Security Community with PESCO

When considering the EU security community, PESCO although not delivering own forces, strengthens the collective security approach to the outside of the community. An operational dimension is clearly possible under the provision of the Lisbon Treaty, proposing PESCO as a process or instrument. The present elaborations of criteria and commitments, however, present PESCO as cooperation framework, mainly in terms of capability development. Defence capabilities (i.e. logistics, weapons, etc.) are an important factor in practical operations and missions, however, an approach on a common operational authority to the outside is missing – the operational, practical potential does not seem fully reached. The projects adopted in March this year underlie the same thinking: The Member States seem willing to foster coherence in capability terms but less regarding strategical autonomy and general CSPD coherence.

For the security community nevertheless, this offers enough to fulfil Adler and Barnett’s military security criteria of the mature security community: The unanimity decision taken on launching PESCO although QMV would have been sufficient; among the positive reactions on PESCO’s launch, are a sign for higher trust between the participating Member States. Since it does not fall on empty ground but is backed up by a common European identity and vision, for which a strategy change toward autonomy is visible, PESCO is not a simple formal agreement but part of the EU security community identity. Despite its capability-view and probable un-used potential (in processual, operational dimension), this does confirm the stage of at least the loosely coupled security community.

Furthermore, multi-national operations and campaigns as collective security to the outside are possible under general CSDP. They can be directed against the outside enemy, the common threat. Although perceptions of what this might vary, the willingness to foster a common answer is given. PESCO might not be this answer (the ‘dream coming true’) despite of the narrative taken in EU institutions, but this does not necessarily have to do with missing national willingness, lacking common leadership qualities or capability deficits, in sum missing common identification. Instead EU diplomatic means may just dominate accordingly to the theory on a reflected habitus of restraint (see above; Bjola & Kornporbst, 2007). However, the institutional practice proofs this wrong, as since 2003 also military missions and operations are deployed under the CSDP frame. Considering, this and the (perceived) intensification of security challenges which occurred in the 21st century,
and the decline in trust in the US as NATO’s leader, the latest strategical positions tending toward autonomy are explainable. Bearing this in mind, one might indeed wonder why PESCO does not include a common security authority but remains inter-governmental.

Despite this, the criteria on military integration and collective security are fulfilled. Considering the relatively low level of integration the indicators demand (since Adler and Barnett argue on pluralistic not amalgamated security communities), the ‘international authority’ factor may be sufficiently although not comprehensively satisfied in the given frame of PESCO. Hence, the tightly coupled security community is concludable for the EU under PESCO. Furthermore, when considering the EU security community development and strategical trend as proposed in the winter-package, an optimistic answer to integration and unity is possible: PESCO along CARD and EDF may seem to stand for the beginning of a new development in CSDP.

8. Conclusion and Outlook

It is time to get back to the questions and expectations which built the starting point for this analysis: First of all, the EU is a security community, in a specific way a mature one. Interestingly, its coming into fruition is not connected to a common threat tying together national states. Rather, the community building started along economic association *inter alia* pushed by the US and its ideals and visions, who needed a new, strong trading partner to push their own economy after WWII. Furthermore, external occurrences as the Arab-Israel wars offered a possibility for common positioning to the outside. A role which the EC Member States took on willingly to foster a single political voice to the outside. With the formalization of the former voluntary EPC, this single voice was made official.

Based on an increasing visible idea what norms and values the Community grounds on and should promote to the outside (Copenhagen Declaration), the EC began to politically differentiate from the US (and their Cold War doctrine). In terms of military security and defence, which general security community theory although not placing it at heart recognises at early stage of maturity, a pure European (but not EC) organization, the WEU, existed next to NATO. However, in comparison to the transatlantic alliance it was rather insignificant and mainly functioned as its secretariat coordinating the European contribution and capabilities. With the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EPC turned into the CFSP under which one by one WEU institutions and tasks were taken over. Along this increasing institutionalization and intensifying identity, the EU grew up to a mature security community. This latest EU amending Treaty, setting out the CSDP judicial and institutional structure, confirms the stage of maturity. It equips the EU with highly integrated security institutions and strengthens its common identity by giving it legal personality to be voiced to the outside.
In sum, a lack of security community theory in terms of foreign affairs is visible. Internal institutionalization based on trust and identity with the possibility seemed a sufficient form of internal order when the theory had its origin in the 1950s. Today, however, any regional community must be asked and theorized about its greater role in the globalized world. For the EU, whose economic role became increasingly overarching and apparent along its course, security and defence to the outside seemed like a taboo topic which did not fail the agenda but never became reality. The taboo was first broken in 1994 when the ESDI was formulated under NATO giving the EU own strategy. The ESDP evolved and became as CSDP integral part of EU foreign affairs (CFSP) under the Lisbon Treaty. With this, the provision on PESCO came into existence: External occurrences perceived as threatful and the demise of the strongly opposing UK, lead to its launch 7 years after proposed. This goes along with a general strategical change of course under HR Mogherini and further mechanism like CARD and EDF to strengthen European defence.

In theory, the willingness of the Member States to finally launch PESCO marks a big step in terms of security community development. It signals higher trust in each other and maybe even readiness for a further move. In a practical sense, the design and plan of PESCO’s commitments and projects refer back to its origin – they show a rather economical sight. The focus is on capabilities in terms of armaments and infrastructure (military Schengen) and (operations’) financing, which are a prerequisite for common defence, but the major step of common operational authority and leadership is left out. Thus, the overall ability in terms of defence on European Union level has only increased to a very limited extent.

On this basis, one must be aware, that PESCO was and is planned as inter-governmental progress or instrument supported by EU intuitions and mechanisms but not under its lead. Ultimately, it depends on the single, individual Member States’ willingness and readiness. Although the Lisbon provision seemed open for wider interpretation offering greater (operational) possibilities PESCO, the voluntariness of participation remains at heart. Furthermore, like the general CFSP and CSDP, its commitment’s enforceability is limited: The CEJ is almost powerless and the Council’s only possibility of punishment is exclusion. Since the general movement within the EU is pro-PESCO – which had not been expected – however, it may prove to be a stronger weapon than concluded. Rethinking the interplay of institutions and identity in the overall security community development, a pattern proofing this right may be assumable: Once a common idea and vision is institutionalized in any form, the European Union is unlikely to step back from it – to segregate rather than integrate. This is for example evident in the development from ESDI, to ESDP and to CSDP: Common security and defence was not a new idea among the European Member States but already proposed in the 1950s. The supra-national vision, however, failed institutionalization (by ratification).
Triggered by external occurrences and an increasing identity, the will for an ESDI came up again years later and this time was institutionalized. In this row, PESCO would not be another instrument or mechanism of CSDP but may mark a new level, depending on its further course.

Summing up, PESCO does so far not pose the answer some European actors were talking it into. However, it can become a first step towards strategical autonomy and deeper defence integration, e.g. in form of a European Defence Union. In security community terms, the PESCO elevates the EU towards a tightly coupled mature security community.

Regarding the academic outlook, some further practical as well as theoretical problems become evident: Not only in this work but also other ones on PESCO, the NATO presidency in European defence is emphasized repeatedly. In view of current US behaviour, the strive for autonomy may outweigh European commitments to NATO and end up in a clash. This will give new room to theorize the alleged security community under NATO. Likewise, Mauro and Santopinto’s study (2017) offers room for review to explain the launch of PESCO under consideration of national perspectives, especially for the cases turning out different than predicted. Furthermore, in future, the extent of national participation and compliance to PESCO may be related to general willing- and likeliness to deepen cooperation and integration in CSDP. Accordingly, time will show what impact PESCO might have in practical sense and whether it is a beginning on the road to autonomy or just ‘business as usual’. In any case, from this point of view, I try the daring guess that the EU will remain an interesting case for Security Study theorists in general, for the next decade at least.


Speeches, Press Statements and EU Fact Sheets


**Legal Texts: EU Treaties, EU Secondary Law and Declarations**

1951/1952 Paris Treaty:


1957/1958 Rome Treaties:


1965/1967 Merger Treaty:

1986/1987 Single European Act:

1992/1993 Maastricht Treaty:

1997/1993 Amsterdam Treaty:
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AC%3A1997%3A340%3ATOC.

2001/2003 Nice Treaty:

2004 Draft Treaty:

2007/2009 Lisbon Treaty:


Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of December 1 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States. retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2315.


Copenhagen Declaration:


Solemn Declaration:


Venice Declaration:

Table 2: The Loosely and Tightly Coupled Mature Security Communities’ Characteristics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Loosely Coupled</th>
<th>Tightly Coupled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateralism</strong></td>
<td><strong>A high level of military integration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making procedures, conflict resolution, and processes of conflict adjudication are likely to be more consensual than in other types of interstate relations. This type of architecture reflects the high degree of trust present in the relationship and that common interests are handled through common and consensual mechanisms that automatically incorporate the interests of all members.</td>
<td>Although a security community does not require that there be military integration, it is quite likely that shared identities and a high degree of trust will produce a desire for the pooling of military resources; this will be particularly true if there was military cooperation in earlier phases of the emerging security community. We expect that if there was no military cooperation in earlier phases, then the emergence of a common threat at this stage would produce the desire for it. This indicator reflects not only high trust but also that security is viewed as interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unfortified borders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cooperative and collective security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although still present, border checks and patrols are undertaken to secure the state against threats other than an organized military invasion.</td>
<td>Movement from reciprocal arms control and confidence building to &quot;cooperative security,&quot; with regard to security problems arising within the community, and to collective security, with regard to threats arising outside the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in military planning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy coordination against &quot;internal&quot; threat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Worst-case&quot; scenarios assumptions do not include those within the community. Although there might be some concern about the degree of cooperation and contribution to a joint military campaign, those within the community are not counted as potential enemies during any military engagement.</td>
<td>There is greater policy coordination among those within the security community to &quot;patrol&quot; and stand vigilant against common definitions of the internal threat. (Although most working within the security community tradition point to the existence of external threats, many (territorially-based) communities also derive their identity from internal threats to the community.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common definition of the threat</strong></td>
<td><strong>Free movements of populations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This depends on the identification of core &quot;personality&quot; features of those within the security community. Self-identification frequently has a corresponding &quot;other&quot; that represents the threat to the community.</td>
<td>Allowing the citizens of other states free movement into and out of the state reflects that there is less differentiation between &quot;us&quot; and &quot;them.&quot; For instance, visas are no longer required and routine movements are no longer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discourse and the language of community
The state's normative discourse and actions reflect community standards. Thus, the discourse is likely to reflect the norms of the specific community, and refers to how its norms differ from those outside the community.

Internationalization of authority
Shared and coordinated practices, and public policies, can further the creation of an informal system of rule. However, authority may also become internationalized, or, alternatively, states may attempt to coordinate and harmonize their domestic laws; as law becomes internationalized, so too will enforcement mechanisms.

"Multiperspectival" Polity
Rule is shared at the national, transnational, and supranational levels.

### Table 3: Overview on Analysis Framework and Data

#### 1. Part one: EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Identity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Internal economic associations, influenced by the outside</td>
<td>political institutions and common authority</td>
<td>identity building via self-other differentiation;</td>
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</table>

**Outcome:** Nascent/Ascendant/Mature Security Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Literature on End of WWII</th>
<th>IR of EU Armed Conflict Data</th>
<th>Academic Literature on EPC, CFSP</th>
<th>Academic Literature on Cold War bipolarity, anti-US</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuniholm, 1994</td>
<td>Murphy 1989</td>
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<td>Koops, 2011</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Academic Literature on Cold War, WU, WEU and NATO</th>
<th>Academic Literature on Armed Conflict Data</th>
<th>Academic Literature on End of Cold War, EU role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bordo &amp; Eichengreen, 1993</td>
<td>SEA EPC, 1992</td>
<td>Cold War, EU role</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Eichengreen &amp; Uzan, 1992</td>
<td>Arab-Israel Conflicts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Milward, 1989</td>
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<td>Brusse &amp; Griffith, 1997</td>
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<td>Schuker &amp; Kindleberger, 1981</td>
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<td>Hill &amp; Smith, 2011</td>
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<td>Griffiths, 1997</td>
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<td>Barbezat, 1997</td>
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<td>Judt, 2007</td>
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<td>Hogan, 1987</td>
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<td>Berghahn, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<th>Role of ERP, OECD</th>
<th>Academic Literature on Review on Draft Treaty EU</th>
<th>Academic Literature on Security and Defence EPC NATO</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>solemn declaration</td>
<td>EPC Davignon report, 1970</td>
<td>Copenhagen Declaration, 1973</td>
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<td>Dooge report</td>
<td>NATO Berlin plus agreement</td>
<td>Venice Declaration, 1980</td>
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- Copenhagen Declaration, 1973
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<th>EU Factsheets</th>
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<tr>
<td>ERP Marshal, 1974</td>
<td>Overview on Treaties European Parliament, 2018</td>
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</table>

### 2. Part Two: PESCO

#### 2.1 Lisbon Treaty

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>CFSP and CSDP Treaty Provisions</td>
<td>CSDP governance</td>
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**Outcome** Confirmation/Rejection of Nascent/Ascendant/Mature Security Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Academic Literature on</strong> EU external relation law</th>
<th><strong>Academic Literature on</strong> EU Strategy</th>
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<tr>
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<th><strong>Academic Literature on</strong></th>
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### 2.2 Launch and Implementation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Trigger and Identity</th>
<th>Institutional Implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Common threat, Strategical vision and common narrative</td>
<td>Elaborations of PESCO’s commitments, projects and governance, review, and financing</td>
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**Outcome:** Loosely/Tightly Coupled Mature Security Community

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<th>Academic Literature on</th>
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<td>Winter Package</td>
<td>Howorth, 2017</td>
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<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Blockmanns, 2016</td>
<td>Rehrl, 2017</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ginsberg &amp; Penksa, 2012</td>
<td>Goeller, 2017</td>
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<td>National Prospects</td>
<td>Chivvis, 2017</td>
<td>Fiott et al. 2017</td>
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<tr>
<th>TEU</th>
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<tr>
<td>Art.3-6</td>
<td>EU Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.3(5)</td>
<td>relation with wider world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.24(1)</td>
<td><em>lex specialis</em> how to frame CSDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.42(1)</td>
<td>CSDP; operational capacity provided by MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.42(2)</td>
<td>Solidarity Clause</td>
</tr>
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<td>Art.42(6)</td>
<td>PESCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art.42(7)</td>
<td>NATO, mutual assistance (common defence)</td>
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<td>Art.43(1)</td>
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<td>CFSP Council Decision</td>
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<td>Art.24(1)</td>
<td>HR and MS Executive</td>
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<td>Art.28(2), 32</td>
<td>MS alignment to EU CSDP</td>
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<td>Art.288</td>
<td>regular secondary law</td>
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**PESCO**  
Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2015, Barnier, 2015

### EU Strategy Paper and Information

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<tr>
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<td>EDAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation Plan; EEAS, 2017a</td>
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### Speeches and Press Releases

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<tr>
<td>Tusk, 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of the European Union, 2017 (VIDEO)</td>
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**EU Defence**

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<td>EU Parliament Resolution (2016/2052(INI))</td>
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<td>EU Parliament Resolution (2016/2036(INI))</td>
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<td>Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 2018</td>
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### News

**Legal Text**

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<td>Art.1</td>
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<td>Art.46(2)</td>
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<td>Council Decision 2017/2315</td>
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| Council Decision 2017/2315, Annex 1 |  
| No.1-5 | Defence Spending |  
| No.6-11 | Common Development, EDF and CARD |  
| No.15-17 | Participation in Projects |  
| No.12-14 | Economic Objective and Support for EDA |  

### EU Factsheets

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