

**Social control in problem areas: A research about social control in problem areas and the role of the municipality.**

by

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## **Preface.**

Before you lies the Master thesis: 'Social control in problem areas: A research about social control in problem areas and the role of the municipality'. A research conducted in the city of Enschede, and to be more precise, in the areas Velve-Lindenhof and Acacia (Stadsveld). This thesis was written in the context of my graduation at the University of Twente.

First of all I would like to thank Bennie Beuvink, who help me set the basis for this thesis. He helped me find a suitable topic and areas that are relevant for my research questions. Furthermore Bennie helped me find several people that were willing, and able, to answer questions relevant for my thesis. Furthermore Hans Koning ter Hege was also of help in guiding me in the beginning. He gave me the opportunity to find my own topic and gave me different frameworks, and problems, the municipality of Enschede had, or has, to deal with. This set the stage for this master thesis.

Following this I would like to thank all the people that were kind enough to take a little bit of their time to help me set the basis for the results and conclusions drawn. These people had no problem with me recording the conversations and were a big help in this thesis. I chose to thank them because the people that were able to answer the questions was very limited and they choose to share their findings and opinions with me.

In closing I would wish to thank both my supervisors that took the time to help me finish this thesis! Dr. A.J.J. Meershoek and Dr. M.R.R. Ossewaarde thanks for the help offered in the pre-work, middle and finishing of my thesis.

I wish all the people a lot of pleasure reading this Master Thesis!

Coen Eidhof,  
Albergen.

## Abstract.

Velve-linden-hof used to be a well-known problem area, with possibly the biggest low during the MIRO-riots. However, in the years during and after the renovation this the area totally changed. Not only did the neighborhood got an huge upgrade, the social control and quality of life was improved. Now the framework is set for informal social control within this neighborhood without a lot of government involvement. On the contrary, in Stadsveld Enschede, a neighborhood in the east of the city, people are worried about the developments in the area. In a small area within Stadsveld, Acacia, problems are no longer acceptable and intervention is needed in order to alter the situation. Both areas are located near and around play gardens. Which is an ideal (small) setting to work out several theories about 'crime hotspots' and the 'New-parochialism'. This led to the following research question: *'To what extent contributes (new-)parochialism to social control in playgrounds in Acacia and Velve-Linden-hof?'*

This research question cannot be answered straight away, so several sub questions were constructed in order to effectively answer the main research question. The first sub question is; *'What kind of public unsafety can be found on both playground-areas?'* Using data available for both areas an answer can be given to this answer. Three definitions are central in the answering of this question. The main findings are that Velve-Linden-hof has no real unsafety in the area any longer, opposed to before the renovation. The safe feeling has improved, Velve-Linden-hof is not a crime hotspot and can no longer be seen as an problem area. On the other hand, Acacia does have public unsafety in the area. The safe feeling of citizens is not guaranteed, it can be stated as a problem area and a crime hotspot.

The second sub question is; *'To what kind of extend motivated offenders, suitable targets and other (than parochial social controllers) kind of guardians of violations can be found on both hotspots?'* This question is answered using the theory of Cohen and Felson. The main findings in Velve-Linden-hof are that there are not a lot of motivated offenders, but this can change in the future. There are few suitable targets, perhaps only the play garden. And lastly, there are several capable guardians in the neighborhood available. Acacia, however is a different case. There are several motivated offenders present in the neighborhood. There are several suitable targets for motivated offenders, such as illegal jobs in order to take care of their children and because control from the police and the municipality is inadequate. And finally there are no capable guardians. Possible skilled guardians, such as leader (s) of the neighborhood, are not known to any of the actors. Possible capable guardians, such as leader(s) of the neighborhood, are not know by any of the actors.

The last sub question is; *'To what extend can features of new-parochialism, according to the concept of Carr, be found in both playground-areas?'* The basis for this question is the theory of Carr, applied in Beltway, Chicago. The most important results are shown in the models in chapter 7. We saw that all the criteria from Carr are met in Velve-Linden-hof, before the renovation, with different actors. Together with professionals, the municipality and citizens, the stage was set for (informal) social control. Professionals and district coaches had an important role in facilitating and organising initiatives. After the renovation, this factor was taken over by citizens who prefer to remain anonymous or who do not want to make themselves known to the researcher. The leading role of professionals and the municipality could change into a more facilitating role, thanks to the strong network that had arisen at that time. Acacia differs from Velve-Linden-hof in various ways. Figure 7.6 shows that there are a lot of red lines and red factors, meaning that they lack certain factors. Therefore it is very hard to expect that (informal) social control can arise. The most important factors are threats of denial and accountability, no public interference, no responsibility of the community, no clear leader (s) in the district, no main activists, no common value and no integral policy.

The main research question can be divided into the two areas; Velve-Linden-hof and Acacia. Velve-Linden-hof has shown that before and after the renovation New parochialism arisen, which led to a decrease in crimes, motivated offenders, suitable targets and a rise in capable guardians. In Acacia it

did not come about. The analysis shows that Acacia lacks many stimulating factors. This leads to an unsafe feeling under citizens, there are motivated offenders, there are suitable targets and there is an absence in capable guardians.

## Samenvatting.

Velve-lindenahof was vroeger een bekend probleemgebied, met mogelijk het grootste dieptepunt de MIRO-rellen. In de jaren tijdens en na de renovatie is het gebied echter totaal veranderd. Niet alleen kreeg de buurt een enorme upgrade, de sociale controle en kwaliteit van leven werden verbeterd. Nu is er een kader ontstaan voor informele sociale controle binnen deze wijk zonder veel overheid bemoeienis. Echter, in Stadsveld Enschede, een wijk in het oosten van de stad, maken mensen zich zorgen over de ontwikkelingen in het gebied. In een klein gebied binnen Stadsveld, Acacia, zijn problemen niet langer acceptabel en is interventie nodig om de situatie te veranderen. Beide gebieden (Velve-Lindenahof en Acacia) bevinden zich in de buurt van speeltuinen. Dit is een ideale (kleine) setting om verschillende theorieën over 'crime hotspots' en het 'Nieuw-parochialisme' uit te werken. Dit leidde tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: *'In welke mate draagt (nieuwe) parochialisme bij aan sociale controle op speelplaatsen in Acacia en Velve-Lindenahof?'*

Deze onderzoeksvraag kan niet meteen worden beantwoord, dus zijn er verschillende deelvragen opgesteld om de centrale onderzoeksvraag effectief te beantwoorden. De eerste deelvraag is; *'Welke openbare onveiligheid is er op beide speelterreinen?'*. Met behulp van beschikbare gegevens voor beide gebieden kan een antwoord op deze deelvraag gegeven worden. Drie definities staan centraal in het beantwoorden van deze vraag. De belangrijkste bevindingen zijn dat Velve-Lindenahof in het gebied niet langer echt onveilig is, in tegenstelling tot vóór de renovatie. Het veilige gevoel is verbeterd, Velve-Lindenahof is geen hotspots voor misdrijven en kan niet langer als een probleemgebied worden gezien. Aan de andere kant kent Acacia publieke onveiligheid in het gebied, het veiligheidsgevoel van burgers is niet gegarandeerd, het kan worden vermeld als een probleemgebied en het kan gezien worden als een hotspot voor misdrijven.

De tweede deelvraag is; *'Op welke soort gemotiveerde overtreiders, geschikte doelen en andere (dan parochiale sociale controleurs) soort hoeders van schendingen zijn te vinden op beide hotspots?'* Deze vraag wordt beantwoord met behulp van de theorie van Cohen en Felson. De belangrijkste bevindingen in Velve-Lindenahof zijn dat er niet veel gemotiveerde overtreiders zijn, maar dit kan in de toekomst veranderen. Er zijn weinig geschikte doelen, wellicht ooit de speeltuin. En ten slotte zijn er verschillende capabele bewakers in de buurt beschikbaar. Acacia is echter een ander geval. Er zijn verschillende gemotiveerde overtreiders aanwezig in de buurt. Er zijn verschillende geschikte doelen voor gemotiveerde overtreiders, zoals illegale banen om voor het kind te zorgen en omdat de controle vanuit de politie en gemeente tekort schiet. En tot slot er zijn geen capabele voogden. Mogelijke bekwame verzorgers, zoals leider(s) van de buurt, zijn niet bekend bij een van de actoren.

De laatste deelvraag is; *'In hoeverre kunnen kenmerken van nieuw-parochialisme, volgens het concept Carr, worden gevonden in beide speelterreinen?'*. De basis voor deze vraag is de theorie van Carr, toegepast in Beltway, Chicago. De belangrijkste resultaten worden getoond in de modellen in hoofdstuk 7. We hebben gezien dat alle criteria van Carr worden gehaald in Velve-Lindenahof, vóór de renovatie, met verschillende actoren. Samen met professionals, de gemeente en burgers was het kader voor (informele) sociale controle beschikbaar. Professionals en wijkcoaches hadden een belangrijke rol bij het faciliteren en organiseren van initiatieven. Na de renovatie werd deze factor overgenomen door burgers, die liever anoniem blijven, of zich niet bekend willen maken aan de onderzoeker. De leidende rol van professionals en de gemeente kon veranderen in een meer faciliterende rol, dankzij het sterke netwerk dat op dat moment was ontstaan. Uiteindelijk werd Acacia onderzocht. Acacia verschilt in diverse opzichten van Velve-Lindenahof. Figuur 7.6 laat zien dat er veel rode lijnen en rode factoren zijn, wat betekent dat ze bepaalde factoren missen. Daarom is het erg moeilijk om te verwachten dat er (informele) sociale controle kan ontstaan. De belangrijkste factoren zijn ontkenning van bedreigingen en verantwoording, geen publieke inmenging, geen verantwoordelijkheid van de gemeenschap, geen duidelijke leider(s) in de wijk, geen hoofdactivisten, geen gemeenschappelijke waarde en geen integraal beleid.

De belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag kan worden onderverdeeld in de twee gebieden; Velve-Lindenhof en Acacia. Velve-Lindenhof heeft aangetoond dat vóór en na de renovatie nieuwe parochialisme is ontstaan, wat heeft geleid tot een afname van misdaden, gemotiveerde overtreeders, geschikte doelen en een toename van capabele bewakers. In Acacia is het niet tot stand gekomen. Uit de analyse blijkt dat Acacia veel stimulerende factoren mist. Dit leidt tot een onveilig gevoel onder de burgers, er zijn gemotiveerde overtreeders, er zijn geschikte doelen en er is een afwezigheid in bekwame voogden.

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# 1. Introduction

'Buurtbewoners kapper uit Enschede voelen zich al langer onveilig' is the title of the newspaper Tubantia, in the beginning of February (Smook, 2017). Saying that citizens don't feel safe anymore in their own neighbourhood. This shows that there are several neighbourhoods in Enschede that are either 'problem areas' or that have 'safety issues'. Since the beginning of the 'Vogelaarwijken' of minister Vogelaar there has been a lot of attention for problem neighbourhoods. Velve-Lindenhof is one of the neighbourhoods that was labelled as a problem area and received a lot of grants from the nationwide government. From then on Velve-Lindenhof got an upgrade and was no longer seen as a problem neighborhood. However, even before the 'Vogelaarsgeld' the municipality of Enschede had the intention to do something about the neighborhood and the social control. At this moment in time, the same is happening in Acacia and the municipality of Enschede, stadsdeelmanagement West, wants to do something about the problems in that Neighborhood.

One of the main social meeting places in such neighbourhoods are the playgrounds. Key for these playgrounds, why they are so important, is because they form a low threshold for citizens to join activities and they are organised for and by the neighborhood residents (Verduin, et al., 2017). How these playgrounds are used to boost social interaction and control varies between playgrounds. Playgrounds form the basis of all social control in these areas, a shared value between actors: children.

Ever since the article of Cohen and Felson (1979) came out, researchers looked at the potential theoretical and practical benefits of focussing research on crime places (Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). This research will investigate to what extent these crime places are relevant and that crime areas are mostly limited to streets or even housing blocks, 'crime hotspots'.

So this shows that playgrounds do in fact have a large role for social interaction and control within a neighborhood. Together with the study of Weisburd, et al., (2012) that shows crime is mostly limited to streets, I have chosen to look at the areas around the playground 'Velve-Lindenhof', in Velve-Lindenhof, and 'Robinia', located in Acacia (Stadsveld). These areas were chosen because they once were problem areas or they have the potential to become one. Therefore, results can be compared.

## 1.1. Outline Thesis

*The first chapter* of this thesis introduces the research questions that will be guiding in this thesis, the relevance of this thesis and in concluding the added value of this thesis. *The second chapter* deals with the theoretical framework that describes the basis of this thesis. First of all the definitions will be explained that are important for the research. Afterwards, several theories about (informal) social control will be discussed, and in the end a (Chicago) concept will be introduced that will be guiding for this thesis. Thereafter, *chapter three* will describe the research methodology. Within this chapter I will discuss the research design, the units of analysis, I will discuss the case selection and in the end the operationalization. *Chapter four* will briefly explain the selected cases Velve-Lindehof and Acacia and why they are chosen for this thesis. In *chapter five* the both cases will be examined even further and public unsafety will be examined. Based on these findings *chapter six* will look at the theory of Cohen and Felson (1979), looking at motivated offenders, suitable targets and absence of capable guardians. The third and last sub question will be answered in *chapter 7*, the concept of Carr, applied to Velve-Lindenhof (before and after) and Acacia. Finally a conclusion will be given, in which I will answer the sub questions. Furthermore I will discuss the results of the research, mention any limitations and in the end I will come up with recommendations for both neighbourhoods.

## 1.2. Research Questions

Municipalities have to deal with a lot of safety issues. It is important to deal with these correctly and as effective as possible, therefore the Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten makes an integral safety plan to help municipalities coordinate this. Thereafter it is up to the municipalities to come up with a policy to deal with safety issues in their municipality. On aspect of this safety issue that got a

lot of attention in recent years is that of (informal) social control. Recent years have led to a decline in citizen involvement in their neighborhood and less (informal) social control (Carr, 2005). This asks for new methods and/or concepts to regain or create a new kind of social control to deal with crimes and create a safe feeling for citizens in their neighborhood. Following these findings I have chosen for the following main research question:

**“To what extent contributes (new-)parochialism to social control in playgrounds in Acacia and Velve-Lindenahof?”**

This question is supported by the following research questions:

- Q1: What kind of public unsafety can be found on both playground-areas?
- Q2: To what extent can motivated offenders, suitable targets and other (than parochial social controllers) kind of guardians of violations be found on both hotspots?
- Q3: To what extent can features of new-parochialism, according to the concept of Carr, be found in both playground-areas?

The first sub-question will give an insight in the factors that are important for public interference or abstinence in the two hotspot areas within Enschede. First of all, in Velve-Lindenahof the research will show what kind of public unsafety is present and what were relevant unsafe situations in the past. In Acacia this will be done in the current time, because in doing so the concept of Carr can be applied to both situations and it possible to compare them. In order to answer the question different results will be used. Those who are available from the CBS, and the results of the interviews.

The second sub-question will look at current results in these areas to examine current motives for crimes to occur. This will give an insight in what the motives are from possible offenders. By doing so, I will not only look at ‘crime-hotspots’, but also at the persons that have an important role in their neighborhood and the situation of the neighborhood. this question will be the starting point for the last sub question, because it can show what the relevance of the neighborhood is.

The last sub-question will use the concept, explained in chapter 2, to explain social control in both areas. The concept of new-parochialism will be guiding in this chapter. In Velve-Lindenahof two moments in time will be chosen, one use of the concept of Carr before the renovation and one after the renovation. In Acacia the current situation will be described and points of improvement will be made visible. In the end, the conclusion will describe the main conclusions that came forth in this thesis. Furthermore the differences between Acacia and Velve-Lindenahof will be mentioned and made visible, using figures of the model. Finally the discussion chapter, will discuss the recommendations and conclusion and further research about (informal) social control.

### **1.3. Context of study.**

The city of Enschede and her four ‘stadsdelen’ (north, east, south & west) have to deal with a certain amount of problem areas. Studies conducted across the world showed that crimes and problem areas are in fact limited to segments, or even streets (Weisburd, et al. 2012). This adds, and explains, why there are several neighbourhoods and streets that have a ‘bad’ name in Enschede. Instead of crime spreading throughout the entire city. Furthermore, there are several studies and sites available that describe the amount of crimes committed, income, housing offer, etc., in a neighborhood such as, Stadsveld (e.g. CBS, Jijmaaktdebuurt & Allecijfers). However these only show the number of an entire neighborhood, which can consist out of 12.000 citizens, and not a specific area. That is why there needs to be a specific research based on these small areas, using the correct sources and results.

Moreover, these numbers are all based on facts and perceived crimes, burglary, etc. In order to fully grasp the impact of these crimes and the ‘safe feeling’, it is important to look at the subjective safety and neighborhood satisfaction of citizens (Wallage, 2014). Cheng and Smyth (2015) take it even further; *‘Previous studies have suggested that (subjective) fear of crime is more relevant to individual behavior than (objective) regional crime rates, and thus, should be preferred (p. 424).* Subsequently did they found out that an unsafe feeling, opposed to a safe feeling, can be as high as

1500% of an annual household income (Cheng & Smyth, 2015). This shows even more that subjective side of 'safe-feeling' is important and should be taken into consideration. Chosen in this thesis is for a qualitative design in order to take into account these 'feelings' of citizens and really pin down where the pain points are and what place they have in the model of Carr.

In the specific case of Enschede there are two neighbourhoods that can be used to examine (former) problem areas and how this has been dealt with. The two problem areas lay within Velve-Lindehof and Stadsveld and can be specified to certain streets that are, or were, problem areas. Chapter three and four will further specify these neighbourhoods. By choosing these two areas, this research lends itself for a qualitative design in order to aim for problem areas and investigating the subjective safety. This is further specified in chapter 3, research design.

Since 1979, when Cohen and Felson conducted their research, the way of thinking shifted from researching the supply of offenders, to investigating also the circumstances. In their view the circumstances are more important to explain crimes from occurring in an area. From this on more researches looked at the circumstances in problem areas. One of these researchers is Carr, Carr did a research in Beltway, Chicago. Beltway was a specially chosen neighborhood with problem areas. Carr found out that (informal) social control is key for a safe neighborhood (Carr, 2005). One of his new findings was a model that put the parochial level of control central in creating social control within a neighborhood. This was a different way of thinking because previous researchers only looked at the private and public level of control, or saw the parochial sphere as not important. Quantitative studies, such as Hipp and Wickes, found out that people are willing to engage in social control in their neighborhood when the problems are located in the parochial sphere (Hipp & Wickes. 2018). However, they only discuss the reasons why people want to engage in informal social control or why not, not on how to establish it and how to maintain it in streets/neighbourhoods (e.g. Waner. 2014). In his research, Carr took five years in order to examine and record informal social control in Beltway, Chicago. In this period he came up with an concept in order to achieve social control, create and maintain groups. All this in order to achieve and sustain informal social control in an area.

Therefore, this thesis will try to explain this concept set up by Carr in Velve-Lindehof and Acacia. This concept will use the 'New parochialism' as starting point (Carr, 2005). The New parochialism makes a connection between the parochial level of control and the public level of control. By doing so, this research reproduces that from Carr, and uses it in Enschede. This thesis can give an insight in the workings of informal social control in a (problem)neighborhood in a Dutch city.

#### **1.4. Added value thesis**

In this introduction the gaps in current studies and literature are briefly introduced. With the help of this thesis it is possible to use a(n) (effective) concept for Enschede and give an insight in how this works. It is not yet clear why some systems work in some areas and why in others not. Because it is hard to compare these two areas with Beltway in America. This thesis therefore can explain existing relationships and how some 'groups' are founded and are still effective today. Moreover, this thesis will discuss an concept to hopefully give new insights for both citizens, the municipality of Enschede and all other actors involved. All in order to improve social control.

From a scientific point of view, the contribution of this thesis is the application and addition to the research of Carr. The research of a new way of looking at (informal) social control was only limited to the United States and did not had a lot of examples in other countries. Studies conducted about social control merely limit themselves by doing quantitative research (e.g. Hipp & Wickes. 2018). This type of study limits itself because they only look at numbers of crime, disturbance and surveys and look past the subjective 'safe-feeling' of citizens.

In the more practical sense the thesis will give an insight into a Dutch city and how to improve informal social control in problem areas. In the research of Carr, he only looks at Beltway, a neighborhood in Chicago. This research will add to that research by looking at a city in the Netherlands. First of all, this thesis will investigate the different factors and variables observed by Carr, and apply them in Velve-Lindehof. A neighborhood which has already grown from a 'sick'

neighborhood to a 'healing' or 'healthy' neighborhood. With this insights and findings this concept can be applied to Stadsveld and more specific Acacia. Acacia is a problem area within Stadsveld and can be stated as an 'unhealthy' neighborhood. Summarizing, an already known model will be applied, examined and advise shall be given about the concept and the neighbourhoods. By doing so, this thesis will give an insight for the different actors that are involved within the neighbourhoods. Such knowledge and insights is new in the Netherlands and especially in Enschede. The results can therefore be used in cities across the Netherlands.

Moreover this thesis cannot only be used by different cities across the Netherlands, this thesis will also show the different roles and tasks of the actors. This gives an overview for the municipality of Enschede which specific persons are relevant and important to boost (informal) social control. By naming specific people and other institutions, Enschede will have a framework for implementing successful policies to improve social control and battle problem areas.

Finally this thesis will be of use for 'stadsdeel west' because the problem of Acacia was already known and they had the desire to battle this problem area. This research can contribute to existing work to deal with problem areas and can work as a basis for further research in the Netherlands.

### **1.5. Motivation**

Social control is not a new understanding. Previous research has already shown that social control is an important element to battle problems in problem areas and help ensure a safe feeling for citizens. This will be further discussed in chapter 2. However, it is important to look at all the actors that are important to achieve this. In Enschede it is not yet researched how social control can be (successfully) achieved.

The research of Carr is relatively new and is not yet been applied in the Netherlands. Enschede has a few examples that have certain frameworks that makes it ideal to test this new concept in two locations in Enschede: 'Velve-Lindenhof' and 'Acacia'. A limitation however is that the government does not always have all the information at hand to investigate the social control. In order to get a full picture of all the elements and variables needed, it is important to investigate all actors that are important to use following the concept of Carr. Therefore the theory of Carr will be explained and summarized in the theoretical framework.

This research is focused on all actors and does not put the government central. This thesis is an independent research that examines different actors that are involved and what role they play. In doing so, certain important roles or actors can be mentioned and be discussed. The goal of this research is to identify social control and find the frameworks that are important to reach, and sustain, social control in a neighborhood using the theory of Carr.

## 2. Literature review

This chapter will review the main subjects and definitions that will be used in this thesis. It will help understand all definitions and concepts that will be used. There will be a chronological explanations of the definitions and concept in order to get a full image of the theories available. These theories are analysed and discussed. In the end there will be a conclusion about the literature. The main subject in this thesis is safety in certain situations or areas. Carr (2005) for example found reasons for looking, and evaluating (informal) social control: *'(...) while traditional forms of civic engagement may indeed be declining, other alternative avenues of volunteerism and civic participation may be opening up. Certainly, the new parochialism in Beltway seems to mirror that particular finding'* (p. 142). These alternative avenues will be discussed in this chapter. Several researchers have done research in order to determine why certain areas are more or less prone for criminality (e.g. Weisburd, Bushway, Lum & Yang, 2004; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Weisburd, et al., 2012).

One of the first, and controversial, articles written about crime and the circumstances in which they occur, is that from Cohen and Felson (1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) were one of the first to look at the circumstances of an offender rather than the supply of an offender. They found that certain elements can lead to an offender committing crime: *'(1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians of violation'* (p. 589). Cohen and Felson were one of the first researchers to link these factors to crime. From there on, more and more research has been conducted in order to find factors that can lead to criminality. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Following this article from Cohen and Felson many researchers have tried to find results that crime is in fact, concentrated in a few street segments rather than spread throughout a city. Weisburd, et al., (2012) did a research in the city of Seattle and found some interesting results: *'When looking at the distribution of crime incidents year to year in Seattle, we find that crime is strongly concentrated at street segments'* (p. 50). This result shows us that crime is indeed concentrated in very small 'micro places'. Together with the results from Cohen and Felson we can conclude that there are several motivated offenders, suitable targets and absence of capable guardians of violation concentrated in street segments. Which makes it possible to narrow this research to specific place(s).

As stated above it is also important to recognize the subjective safety in a neighbourhood. In order to determine certain safety issues in a neighbourhood we have to look at what factors include this subjective safety. This subjective safety is important because this can have a negative effect on the safe feeling of citizens. Moreover this can have a negative effect on happiness, self-reported health and neighbourhood satisfaction (Cheng & Smyth, 2015). This can therefore have a negative effect on the costs for a municipality or the government. Cheng and Smyth (2015) found that these costs can be very high: *'(...) the amount needed to compensate someone for living in an unsafe or neutral neighborhood, as opposed to safe neighborhood, is 1500% of annual household income'* (p. 433). This shows even more that it is necessary to look at the subjective character of safety in neighbourhoods.

Chapter 1 and 2 showed that social control is an important factor to deal with crime hotspots and an unsafe feeling. Moreover, many interviewees confirmed that the neighborhood is key in finding an solution to deal with problem areas (interview 3, 5, 6 & 7). In order to explain why certain neighbourhoods are troublesome or why people feel unsafe in an area, chapter 5 will give examples in both areas. First, this chapter will describe and explain the concept used by Carr in Belfast, Chicago. This concept is not a guarantee for social control to exist and hold on, but it does give some important insights that can be of help for actors or for other neighbourhoods. This concept will then be applied in Velve-Lindenahof and Acacia in the subsequent chapters, in order to evaluate social control. In the end, these findings will be compared and conclusions can be drawn.

## 2.1. Definitions

In order to get a complete image of the problem, and perhaps come to certain policy recommendations, it is relevant to follow certain definitions to describe the limitations and frame the concepts. From here on the concept of Carr can be explained and in chapter 3, the operationalization of the factors is given. The definitions of these terms will be the basis for the answering of the sub questions. In order to answer the first sub-question it is important to specify how public unsafety can be seen or noticed. Public unsafety can be brought down to three terms that both capture the objective and the subjective safety in both neighbourhoods; *problem areas, safe feeling and crime Hotspots*.

The term “problem areas” first needs to be specified. In the research from Drs. A.A.M. Blok, (2017) chairman of the Dutch alliance of mayors, he tries to come to a definition for this term. Blok (2017) says the following about this term (translated from Dutch): *‘a disturbance of any meaning in the normal course of events or to the relevant public space’* (p. 13). In order to put this in perspective Blok, (2017) also comes to an definition for normal areas, so without problems: *‘normal cause of social life on a given place and under given circumstances’* (p.13). This distinction gives a picture of what is meant with problem areas and will be used in this research. A Dutch definition is used because this research will be conducted in Enschede, a Dutch city. The reason this definition is chosen is because this definition leaves room for opinion, it is not based on an objective definition. Reason for this is that the disturbance is not always based on breaking the law (Weisburd, et al., 2012). As Roeser (2016) states, *‘purely rational decision procedure overlook important ethical considerations about risks’* (p. 11). So it is important that people’s motivation is also taking into account, to a certain limit.


Another term frequently used in literature and in this thesis is the term ‘safe feeling’. The term “safe feeling” has a lot in common with the term explained above. However, the term above aims on a specific place or moment, the term ‘safe feeling’ will be broader. The term is explained in an advice written for the public governments about local safety (which is also the case in this research). Wallage (2014), comes to the following conclusion about local safety: *‘(...) the perspective of safety on the scale of the citizens. By that we mean both the safety in the direct living environment, but also the experienced safety: ‘safe feeling’*” (p. 8). In the view of Wallage everything that can be explained, and/or falls within this definition is a safety issue. Important to note, Wallage stresses the importance of the citizens opinion about safety. As do Cheng and Smyth (2015) also confirm in their research: *‘Previous studies have suggested that (subjective) fear of crime is more relevant to individual behavior than (objective) regional crime rates, and thus, should be preferred’* (p. 424). Different theories stress the importance of this subjective aspect, besides the objective aspect, in looking at crime and unsafe situations.

One of the key terms used in this thesis and relevant literature is ‘(crime)hotspots’. It is important to come to an central definition in order to get the same information, data and to draw the right conclusions. As Weisburd, et al., (2012) already noticed in their book: *‘There is no single accepted definition of a hot spot’*(p.4). So it will be hard to come a central definition that will include all aspects as discussed in literature. For clarification, this thesis will not identify certain statistical techniques but rather look for a theoretical explanation of hotspots. The U.S. Department of Justice (Eck, Chainey, Cameron, Leitner, & Wilson. 2005) did a research about hotspots and came to the following explanation of (crime)hotspots: *‘(...) a hot spot is an area that has a greater than average number of criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than average risk of victimization’* (p. 2). A lot of researchers narrow (or widen) their research by using different sizes of places, from addresses to bigger areas. This will not be used in the definition in this thesis, in order to be able to compare studies and results with each other.

## 2.2. Chicago concept

*'In fact, close social ties are not a prerequisite for successful informal social control'* (Carr, 2005. P.140). One of the main conclusions from Carr is a rather different one than what most researchers found out. For this thesis a concept will be described, used in Chicago, in order to test certain events that have happened in both Chicago and in Enschede. Using this concept it will give insights in safety issues and unsafe areas and in what way that this can help Enschede. In this way this thesis will look further than only social ties that can ensure (informal) social control.

On the basis of this concept lies the willingness of citizens to help, for example, either the police or government, or organize a neighborhood watch to deal with problems in their neighborhood (Carr, 2005). In the book of Carr he comes to certain conclusions about citizens involvement in current times. First, he notices that there is a decline in involvement of citizens. Secondly new sorts of involvement arise in society. And thirdly, the rise of informal social control outside the private level of control (Carr, 2005). This informal social control takes a central role in the study of Carr (2005), therefore he comes to the following conclusion about this term: *'Put simply, informal social control requires that we, as a group, monitor and regulate one another's behavior in order to preserve order and promote the common good'* (p. 10). This definition stresses not only the subjective nature of 'what is normal', but also what a society (or neighborhood) finds normal and what agreed upon rules are. This informal social control can be examined by visualizing engagement in self-regulation in three distinct levels of control: *'The private, the parochial, and the public'* (Carr, 2005, p. 12). In which the private sphere are friends and family, parochial are relationships between neighbors (even in networks and institutions such as schools), and public refers to ability of the neighborhood to secure goods and services outside the neighborhood. In order for effective social control to exist in a neighborhood, it is important that all three levels articulate and communicate with one another (Carr, 2005). During his research, Carr comes to a new understanding: 'New parochialism'. This new understanding no longer sees the private level of control as important, but a combination between parochial and public as the leading form for social control (see model 2.1).




Model 2.1. Old and new forms of (informal) control

This new model no longer looks at the private level, but only parochial and public, trapped in the yellow. An example of the New-parochialism is, for example, an budget for the neighborhood that citizens can use without asking the government. In which there is a neighborhood council that decides if requests are worth it and they can award money (Carr, 2005). This shows that involvement of citizens has changed to a different kind of (social) control.

The short description of this Chicago concept will be described in more detail in the following chapter, but this is the basis from which this thesis is written. Beltway is an area located within Chicago. This concept and the factors that are important will be described. Following this description of the concept, this can be used in the areas within Enschede and can be applied to describe their problems and describe factors that are important for social control.

In the research of Patrick Carr he looks at a neighborhood called Beltway. He examined this neighborhood for five years and made a concept for this neighborhood. One of the first things he does is describing the context of the area(s) and what the history of the area looks like. One detail of the history that stands out, is that almost half of all the houses in Beltway today, were built between 1950 and 1960 (Carr, 2005). Throughout the years Beltway changed quite a bit. A rise in new houses being build, a rise in Latinos (population group), most workers became white collar workers, etc. About one in every fourteen people live below the poverty line in Beltway.

Carr tries to come up with an explanation for informal social control within the area of Beltway. One of the main criteria for informal social control to exist, according to Carr (2005), is *'Informal social control cannot take place without community engagement (...)'* (p. 31). This is one of the main criteria for citizens to engage in informal social control. However, it is not the only criteria for informal social control to work according to Carr (2005), *'Successful grassroots activism is rare without assistance from established institutions and individuals who can parlay people power into a positive outcome'* (p. 32). Here we already see the new understanding from Carr, described above, New parochialism. The collaboration between the parochial and public level of control is essential in order for informal social control to exist and work. Therefore it is important to look at the connections people have with certain factors, institutions and politicians. Within Beltway they have several politicians that are closely connected to the citizens of Beltway, which results in a good collaboration between the parochial and public level of control (see model 2.1). When looking at the parochial level of control it is important to look at leader(s) of the neighborhood, someone to follow (Carr, 2005). However, it is also important to look at who the main activist are and what do they do to maintain their communities (Carr, 2005). All in the parochial level of control. So the emphasis is not per se on the politicians, civic groups and institutions but on the 'parochial level of control' as seen in model 2.2.




Model 2.2 factors 'New parochialism'

The model above shows criteria that are important for (informal) social control to exist in a neighborhood or area. The model builds upon the new parochialism explained by Carr in the sections above. The parochial and public level need to interact in order to achieve social control, but the model does show nicely which criteria are needed within these levels on a neighborhood-scale. Leader(s) of the neighborhood and main activist are separate criteria because sometimes people only stand up for causes in their own neighborhood or area. Thus, main activist are mostly limited to their own area or time they wish to invest in any given action. However, it is important to both actors that resources are at hand and not too hard to utilize (Carr, 2005). In the book of Carr he speaks of two examples where citizens try to deal with decisions been made, and successfully alter them. With the help of politicians (aldermen) and institutions (Board of Education in this case) people can come up for their own believes and be successful. Carr (2005) comes to the following conclusion; *'Securing support and resources from the public sphere is an important underpinning of the new parochialism*



(...)' (p. 46). This all seems very positive and logical, however, Carr (2005) places an important footnote on this 'participation'; '*Overall, voluntary participation is episodic for many Beltway residents*' (p. 46). This shows that citizens are willing to come up for their rights and ideas if it hits them directly, (e.g. school problems on a school with their children on it) and will find ways (parochial and public) to deal with the problem. However, when this problem is solved, they no longer want to participate in local problems within the neighborhood. Applying this to the example from the book, model 2.2 shows why Jane Pratt (main activist of this plan) was successful (model 2.3). Moreover, the use of the concept makes all factors insightful.



Model 2.3 Jane Pratt example.

In the example above we see that all criteria have been met and the parochial and public level (can) lead to a successful result.

However, not all people and/or citizens are willing to participate in local problems or are able to deal with troublesome youth. This can lead to social disorganization within a neighborhood, which leads to a consequent diminution of social control (Carr, 2005). Carr (2005) comes to the following conclusion about a lack of social control: '*Put simply, when a neighborhood lacks the capacity to do things for itself, it will not be able to control the behavior of its residents*' (p. 50). Without this social control, local youth or others are free to commit crime. Possible explanations according to Carr are a low socioeconomic status, the rate of residential mobility and the level of heterogeneity are high (2005). All in all, in the examples noted in the book, problems are mostly solved by citizens and their (public) possibilities/capabilities to act. However, as in this case, strong ties between public institutions/politicians and citizens do not always lead to strong (informal) social control. Carr found out in his study that social control/action can also be the result of a lack of police service, bad public schools and/or lax persons. The second element that he found that worked as a catalyst was that there was panic about the problem that was at stake (gang shooting in this case). At first citizens took initiative, which lead to crime-fighting-groups in Beltway, without any public interference or meddling. Although this plan was adopted with a lot of enthusiasm, interest only lasted for about seven to nine months because there was no real plan-of-action and leader within these groups (Carr, 2005). In the end 2 out of the 3 original plans, initiated by citizens, did not last long. However, there was also a boxing program that was in fact successful and lasted for more than three years. This was also reactive and self-regulated. This program was set up in order to do something about gangs in their neighborhood. However this was different because it was more preventive instead of reactive. This program worked better because two main activist stepped up who were in it for the long haul and not afraid to take leadership. Moreover, after sometime they were able to get public funding and had a clear goal; providing an alternative to gangs (Carr, 2005). This shows even more that only a parochial level of control (model 2.2), is not sufficient. In the literature there are mainly two strands of theory that can explain why the groups (in reaction to the gang-shooting) did not endure. Namely, Resource mobilization and the study of moral panics (Carr, 2005). These will be described in the chapters 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.

A response to (violent) crimes can lead to two negative discourses; namely denial and accountability (Carr, 2005). When one of these two is present as a reaction to crime, social control is not exerted successfully. Denial leads to a lack of action to prevent or deal with the problem, whereas accountability leads to finding a scapegoat and blaming them instead of collective action. However crimes can also lead to 'community responsibility' which has a positive effect on formal social control (Carr, 2005). This can lead to initiatives that do not necessarily have to have a plan of action, but can be facilitated by a government, which Carr describes as a new phenomenon 'New-parochialism'. These discourses are important for 'leaders' and 'main activist' of the neighborhood because, in the example of Beltway, their efforts become futile. Denial and accountability can both be competitive as complementary (Carr, 2005). This also means that denial can lead to accountability in some cases. They can also be competing because some residents, in the Beltway example, were in denial while others sought to make people accountable (e.g. the principal)(Carr, 2005). This has a direct influence on the model stated above, model 2.2. This new (negative) model is displayed in appendix 2, model 1.

So how can problems be solved even though citizens are in denial or hold others accountable? Well according to Carr, an important aspect is that people no longer start blaming others and look at what they can do themselves to alter the situation. In many cases it is not possible for citizens, in an area, to do that themselves, so there is need for public intervention. The government (on whatever scale is relevant) can set up, for instance, neighborhood watches and take the lead (in the beginning). In order to shift away from denial and accountability towards community responsibility, which is positive for a neighborhood (Carr, 2005). This new factor, community responsibility, can have a positive effect for the social control within an area or neighborhood. From then on, main activist can pick up the leadership and use (informal) social control in their neighborhood to improve the safe feeling. Appendix 2 model 2, gives a schematic overview on how this works. In the example of Beltway, Carr sees a very clear reason why informal social control didn't work: *'Put simply, the lack of effective supervision occasioned the lapses in informal control'* (p. 104). One of the reasons found by Carr in his Beltway research was that society has changed and there is less supervision and intervention in a neighborhood. Another explanation is that the collective responsibility in a neighborhood is lower than 'back in the days' (Carr, 2005). As we saw earlier, and is displayed in the models in appendix 2, is that denial and accountability are two main causes for this. And public interference can battle these threats and turn them into community responsibility.

### 2.3. Resource mobilization

The first explanation for failure in groups is that of how they mobilize resources for their group. These can be defined into three features that can explain how group efforts to mobilize resources can be categorized (Carr, 2005).

- Agency, which is defined as; *'(...) the "sheer amount of effort activist invest in collective action'* (p. 72). So not only at the beginning of an action, but from beginning to end.
- Strategy, is a crucial role for a local organization. According to Carr (2005): *'Typically, organizations pursue a mix of three general types of strategy: public education, direct service to people affected by the condition the group wishes to change, and structural change'* (p. 72). So strategy is divided into three subgroups.
- Organization of group activities. Organization can be measured simply by measuring the amount of meetings and the number of committees they have to solve certain problems or organize an action.

These three elements are key elements according to the resource mobilization theory. Another important factor for mobilizing resources is the age of the group. The longer the group exists, the easier it is for them to mobilize resource for their cause. This model can help decide or judge how 'good' or 'bad' certain groups score on this list. In the model below (model 2.4) we see an example of three groups and how they score according to the resource mobilization theory.

<i>Resource Mobilization in Beltway after the Thompson Shooting</i>			
	<i>Rendell Park Patrol</i>	<i>SON</i>	<i>Boxing Program</i>
Agency	Low	Mixed	High
Collective Action	No	Yes	Yes
Strategy	Low/mixed	Mixed	Mixed
Public education	No	Yes	Yes
Structural change	No	No	No
Direct service	Yes	No	Yes
Organization	Low	Mixed	Low
#/Type meetings	No	Yes	No
Task committees	No	No	No

Adapted from John D. McCarthy and Mark Wolfson, "Resource Mobilization by Local Social Movement Organizations: Agency, Strategy, and Organization in the Movement against Drinking and Driving," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 1070–1088.

*Model 2.4 Resource Mobilization in Beltway after the Thompson Shooting. (Carr, 2005).*

As said before, the boxing program was the only program that lasted longer than seven to nine months. As we look at the resource mobilization we see that they score relatively high on Agency and on strategy. They score a little bit low on strategy because, as the person admitted themselves, they could have done better themselves. Moreover, they didn't have any meetings or committees so the score is lowest by organization. So even the boxing program had difficulties to maintain the group, as did Carr (2005) found out: *'However, the main point to note from this is that none of the groups could mobilize sufficient resources to overcome the liability of newness and to sustain its efforts'* (p. 20). So the groups didn't worked out as planned, perhaps if they could tap into public resources they would have lasted longer. However Carr does acknowledge that the very basis of these groups were moral panic, and that was the reason why they failed (Carr, 2005). The next paragraph will discuss the study of moral panic.

## 2.4. Study of moral panic

There are many definitions used to describe moral panic in the book. I choose for the one connecting moral panic and social control: *'The moral panic, then, is characterized by the feeling, held by a substantial number of the members of a given society, that evildoers pose a threat to the society and moral order as a consequence of their behavior and, therefore "something should be done" about them and their behavior. A major focus of that "something" typically entails strengthening the social control apparatus of the society'* (p. 76). To fully understand and explain moral panic there are five indicators of moral panic (Carr, 2005).

1. Level of concern. In this case that would be gang members and the threat they oppose.
2. Increased level of hostility towards the group.
3. Widespread consensus that the threat is serious.
4. Criteria of disproportionality should be met; which means people must think that there are a lot more people afraid than there actually are.
5. The last one is volatility. Panic can erupt al of a sudden and as quick as that, disappear.

If we use this list, we can apply that to the sample of Beltway after the gang shooting in the neighborhood (see model 2.5).

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Presence</i>	<i>Level</i>
Concern	Yes	High
Hostility	Yes	High
Consensus	Somewhat	Low
Disproportionality	Yes	High
Volatility	Yes	High

*Model 2.5 Presence of goode and Ben-Yehuda Indicators of Moral Panic In Beltway after the Thompson Shooting (Carr, 2005, P. 77).*

In this case Carr speaks about volatile moral panic. This was also the cause for a quick rise of groups, but also the fall of these groups because they were based on moral panic. However after some time they had not enough resources and the moral panic died down. In conclusion we can say that the reason why these groups failed was the lack of resources, and these groups were based on (short) moral panic.

### **Conclusion.**

The new concept from Carr, described above, is a new way to map (not in all cases), (informal) social control within a neighbourhood. However, it is important to put some side notes with this new approach. This will be discussed in this paragraph.

First of all it is important to note that this 'New parochialism' approach is not an model that can be used to all situations or areas to reflect social control (Carr, 2005). Different situations may ask for different approaches. As we saw already in the models, sometimes there is no need for public interferences because people have strong leader(s) within their group and/or main activist that arrange everything. In which case they only need the public level of control to gain resources or use politicians/ institutions to enforce the law (facilitative role). In this case there is no need for public interference in the beginning stage (see model 2.3). All in all it is important to note that the three levels of control are now reduced to only two levels of control (that are important for (informal) social control): Parochial level of control and the public level of control. This new way of thinking is called 'New-Parochialism'. This New parochialism can be used to measure social control in an area. In the models shown above, certain factors can be found in order to evaluate social control. For the parochial level of control the important factors are Leader(s) of the neighborhood, Main activities to maintain communities, and main activist. For the public level of control these factors are Politicians and Institutions. In the examples given above in Beltway, these factors were present when social control was effectively used in order to deal with problems. However, this does not always lead to social control, as does model 2, appendix 2 show. In closing, denial and accountability can have a negative effect on social control.

However, there is a way to battle these two negative effects on social control, public interference. This is shown in the example explained in appendix 2, model 3 & 4. In this case it was helpful that citizens got a little help from the public level of control. This does not exterminate denial and accountability, public interference can convert these two factors in community responsibility. This has a positive effect on social control and the New parochialism. Carr admits that this model can not be used in all neighbourhoods and areas to evaluate social control, because they all differ in size and sort of citizens. However, this model can contribute in making (insightfull) long-lasting or meaningful community-police partnerships (Carr, 2005). All in all this model can help evaluate relationships between citizens, public entities, politicians, institutions, etc. The outlines of this model can be used for governments in order to get an insight in the social control within a neighborhood. However, it is important to note that factors within this concept can be changed and altered to respond to different situations and/or people.

### 3. Methodology

In this section the operationalisation of certain concepts will be explained, as well as the variables that will be used. In the previous chapters the problem was addressed and theoretical background was given to help set a framework for this research. The goal of this chapter is to give an insight in the data and case selection for this research. In the end the way of data processing will be described and discussed. The conclusion in the end will sum up the important criteria in this chapter.

#### 3.1. Case selection & units of analysis.

This research is done in the city of Enschede, with the help and contribution of the municipality of Enschede. In order to choose a case selection the factors of Carr should be taken into account, because they are the basis and criteria for social control to exist and work (to improve the safe feeling). The ideal picture is that all actors involved in the neighbourhoods should be selected and interviewed. The table below (table 3.1) will give an insight in the people selected and their involvement in the area(s). This table is the ideal picture of people selected.

Number	Actor	Role actor	Area	Before/after
N1	Neighborhood Council	Secretary	Velve-Lindenhof	Both
N2	Neighborhood Council	Secretary	Acacia, Stadsveld	D.n.a.
N3	Municipality	District director	Acacia, Stadsveld	D.n.a.
N4	Municipality	District director	Velve-Lindenhof	After
N5	Professional	Youth worker	Velve-Lindenhof	Before
N6	Stichting Enschedese Speeltuinen	Chairman	Both	Both
N7	Municipality	Registrar	Velve-Lindenhof	Before
N8	Main activist	Involved in the area	Velve-Lindenhof	Before
N9	Main activist	Involved in the area	Acacia, Stadsveld	D.n.a.

Table 3.1. Distribution case selection.

This way all factors involved are selected in both areas. Chosen is for these people, in cooperation with Bennie Beuvink, in order to choose the people that have, or had, leading roles within the neighborhood. This table is the basis for the selection of these people. In Velve-Lindenhof is chosen for two moments, before and after the renovation, in which the social control and all factors and actors are analysed. That is why the table shows the criteria before or after in Velve-Lindenhof. In Acacia I have to deal with limited data and persons available, therefore people are chosen that have knowledge about the current situation (resulting in the criteria; does not apply). Moreover, the situation in Acacia has not changed during the last 20 years, and in Velve-Lindenhof it has, so in Velve it can be compared.

Furthermore the units of analysis need to be specified. Two areas were chosen on the basis of three definitions specified in the second chapter (theoretical framework); *problem areas*, *safe feeling and crime hotspots*. These were previously explained and are used as a basis for choosing two areas. The two areas that matched these criteria were located in the city of Enschede: Velve-Lindenhof and Stadsveld. These neighbourhoods jumped out because one neighborhood used to be a problem area; Velve-Lindenhof, and one area was still labelled as a problem area; Stadsveld. But it was not the entire neighborhood but rather a small area, which we already saw is frequent. (that crime is centred in a few streets within a town) (Weisburd, et al., 2012). The areas are centred in two streets around playgrounds; Velve-lindenhof: Stephensonstraat & Van Leeuwenhoekstraat, Stadsveld: Acaciaplantsoen & Berkstraat (also known as Acacia).

Acacia is a neighborhood located in the city Enschede. The neighbourhood is situated in the west-side of the city and falls under district west. In this neighborhood, Acacia, there are two main streets located, these are: Berkstraat & Acaciaplantsoen. In the picture below we see the

The second neighborhood this thesis will examine is the neighborhood Velve-Lindenhof, in the east part of Enschede. Again, the neighborhood around a playground (het Lindenhof) will be investigated. In this neighborhood there are more streets involved, however they are all located around the playground. The playground and houses are more modern than in Acacia and saw some successful private initiatives. The streets in this neighborhood are Stephensonstraat, Van Leeuwenhoekstraat and (a part of) the Wattstraat. This area is located in the east side of Enschede. In the pictures below we can see the location of the neighborhood (pictures 3.3 & 3.4).



A map of a residential area in Amsterdam, showing streets like Lipperkerkstraat, Ommenstraat, Stephensonstraat, Van Leeuwenhoekstraat, and Marconistraat. A red rectangle highlights a specific block of houses. The map also shows 'Bomkampfietsen.nl' and 'Leuwerink Auto's'.

Picture 3.4. Stephensonstraat, van Leeuwenhoekstraat & Wattstraat.

To answer the research question of this thesis it was relevant to look at the literature about social control, in order to improve the safe feeling of citizens, within specific areas. The theory showed that crime can be centred in very specific areas, even streets/housing blocks. Furthermore we saw that safety can not only be measured in numbers and figures, the subjective 'safe feeling' is even important. These findings led to the research of Carr (2005), in Beltway. In this research it is important to look at the development of a neighborhood at certain points and with certain (f)actors. Knowing this has led to the choice of a cross-sectional study. This means that the investigator only observes and does no interventions (Mann, 2003). By choosing for a qualitative research it is possible to look at certain points in time and compare them. The data collected will be recorded and will be



worked out on paper. By recording and working it out the reliability and availability of data will be improved (Mann, 2003).

In this thesis the literature study has been done first, afterwards the interviews will be conducted. With these findings the research questions shall be answered. The literature study set the framework for social control within specific areas. The people chosen gave a nice representation of the actors that are, or were at some point, involved. By doing so model described in the previous chapter can be filled in and can be discussed.

The interviews were held in a neutral environment and focused on a pre-set question list. This list was used for all interviewees and the goal was to leave a little room for explanation from the persons. This question list is included in appendix 9. The questions are stated in Dutch because the interviews were also conducted in Dutch. The questions are already stated in different sections that follow the factors of Carr. However, the interviews themselves may follow an alternative route, but always answering as much questions as possible. The interview protocol starts with the interviewee that states his name and his or hers role within the neighborhood(s). Thereafter the interview tries to follow the design of the interview protocol, but the main goal is that the people answer all the criteria points stated in the protocol (appendix 5).

The interviews were recorded with a telephone and lasted between 45 and 76 minutes. These recordings were used to type them out in order to analyse them. In the tables used in the appendixes the information is organised per section (factor/actor). These tables will give an overview of the main points that emerged in the interview. Table 3.2 gives an example how this can look.

Person	Denial?	Accountability?	Public interference	Community Responsibility	Leader(s) of the neighborhood
N1	Yes	Yes	No	No	Person A
N2	Yes	Yes	No	No	Person B
N3	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Person A & B
N4	No	Yes	No	No	Person A & C
N5	No	No	No	No	Person A
N6	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Person A
N7	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Person A, B & C
N8	Don't Know	Yes	Yes	Yes	Person B
N9	Not mentioned	Yes	No	No	Person B & C

Table 3.2 example information table Factors.

Therefore it is easier to analyse the information and process it in order to answer the sub questions and fill in the model of Carr (2005). In practice the answers will be more elaborated and cannot all be answered with 'yes' or 'no'. With this information the sub questions can be answered in each chapter. With the data conclusions organised per sub question, the final conclusions can be drawn and recommendations will be given. In the end the discussion part will be included in order to discuss results and limitations.

### 3.3. Operationalisation.

In order to evaluate the variables and criteria stated in the concept from Carr, it is required to operationalise these in measurable, observable, conditions. In this paragraph the variables and criteria of the concept will be explained in order to apply them in the field. In appendix 2, model 2, the entire model that is used in the research of Carr is explained. This concept will be used in order to determine if the Chicago concept can be applied in Enschede, in 'De speeltuinen; Robinia & het Lindenhof'. Examples of these criteria are listed in Appendix 2, model 3.

**Denial:** The first criteria, that has a negative effect on the 'New Parochialism', has to do with the opinion of citizens and actors. First of all, in order to exert social control there needs to be a agreement among citizens that there is a problem. Denial means that there is a difference between

citizens in the situation, where one group thinks no action is needed, and the other no action is needed. This will result in a negative impact on the formation of informal social control strategies (Carr, 2005). Denial is not limited to citizens. All actors can experience denial. Denial can also be observed between different actors, which can lead to no conformity.

**Accountability.** Like denial, accountability has a negative impact on New-Parochialism. This means that certain citizens, or actors, hold certain figures or institutions accountable for a problem in the neighborhood. Thereby informal social control (strategies) will not be formed. The main feature of this discourse is finding scapegoats to blame (e.g. parents, schools, government) (Carr, 2005).

**Public interference.** This is not a cause or a consequence of behaviour or any other thing, this is an interference by public institutions. Most of the time this interference is done in order to help form and sustain certain groups that exert social control (for an example see appendix 2, model 3). Examples, in Beltway, are also given in chapter 2, theoretical framework.

**Community responsibility.** Like public interference, this is not a consequence of denial and responsibility, but rather a third factor (next to denial and accountability). However, this one works positively on the New-Parochialism. One of the most important criteria, and difference from the other two negative factors, is that in this stage actors realise it is a problem, and 'our' problem (Carr, 2005).

#### **Parochial (level of control)**

**Leader(s) of the neighborhood.** As discussed above, leader(s) within a neighborhood are crucial for initiating groups and/or social control. These people distinguish themselves by participating and involving in a broader area outside their own interest and (direct) living area and also not limited by time.

**Main activist.** This criteria looks a lot like the criteria of leader(s) of the neighborhood, but differs. First of all, these people only participate until their (direct) problem is solved or only participate in social control if problems are directly in their neighborhood. Their activism characterizes itself by being either short lived or it is area bound (Carr, 2005).

**Main activities to maintain communities.** In order to promote, and actually effectively use, informal social control it is necessary that the community carries out certain activities (over a longer period). These are the actual activities a community pursues and use to enforce (informal) social control and safety. Appendix 2, model 3, shows an example. From here on these activities can be accommodated in certain groups that, for example, form a neighborhood watch group that walks the streets during night time (models 2.4 and 2.5 can then examine and judge these groups). This factor is mostly based on a transcending value between actors/citizens.

#### **Public (level of control)**

**Politicians.** When looking at social control, the public sphere of control needs to be seen as facilitating for the parochial sphere of control. However, it is important that citizens have possibilities to reach politicians and institutions to pursue their goals. Therefore it is important to look at which politicians are used and are important to reach goals of the community. A good understanding between both public and parochial control is critical for successful (informal) social control (Carr, 2005).

**Institutions.** Like the 'politicians' criteria, institutions should be supportive for the parochial sphere. Institutions, for example, can be seen as an important boards that has the power to enforce the law. Examples can be, college of Mayor and Aldermen, board of education, etc. Not only is it important to look at the institutions that are involved, but it is important for the parochial sphere that they know where to go to with their problems.

### **3.4. Reliability and validity.**

These two elements are important criteria for an academic research. In this paragraph I will discuss these two criteria in the context of this research.

Reliability is the first criteria discussed. Reliability has something to say about the way outcomes are free from mistakes and if the results can be reproduced (Golofshani, 2013). According



to Golofshani (2013), to ensure reliability in qualitative research is; *To ensure reliability in qualitative research, examination of trustworthiness is crucial*' (p. 601). In this research this will be hard to achieve because answers are based on the experience of the interviewees. The way they tell it and the way they interpret questions and situations. Therefore all interviews are recorded and decoded in order to examine the exact words people say in the interview. In order to improve reliability only people are chosen who have experience in their area (Acacia and/or Velve-Lindhof). Furthermore the definitions will be used in the interviews in order to prevent a different interpretation of these words. In the end, results will be collected as described in model 3.2. By doing so, results can be examined easily and compared to each other. By comparing results between interviewees, the reliability of results and conclusions is improved.

Validity has something to do with the measures used in a research. Do these measure truly measure what you want to measure (Golofshani, 2013)? Therefore it is important that the data collection is done accurate and correct. I therefore used a pre-set question list that I followed in all the interviews. This way the change of bias is reduced. These recordings of interviews are put together and can all be investigated in order to increase validity. However, there is a drawback in using qualitative research. The selected cases are not very big in numbers and are relatively sensitive for generalizing. It is hard to conclude or generalize the results to all groups and all cities (Golofshani, 2013). Because I only chose two locations in the same city, it can be hard to generalize the results to all problem areas, crime hotspots in the Netherlands.

### **Conclusion.**

This chapter gave an insight in the way the research will be conducted. Several criteria are explained and therefore can (hopefully) be reproduced by other researchers. This will also help set the framework for the researcher to conduct the research.

First of all the case selection is mentioned and discussed. In first instance, 9 people are selected by using several criteria. By selecting these people beforehand the framework is set to effectively and correctly choose the case. Then the units of analysis are selected. Based on pre-set definitions that are central in this research, I have chosen for two areas within Enschede; Acacia and Velve-Lindhof. Both are located near playgrounds, respectively named Robinia and het Lindenhof.

Data is selected based on three central definitions in this research; *Problem areas, safe feeling and crime hot spots*. The theory then showed a research of Carr in which he investigates the safety and social control within a neighborhood in Chicago, United States of America. Based on this literature, the further research shall be conducted. The theory is the basis for the questions, sub questions and their answering in this thesis. The questions are based on the factors that are included within the concept of Carr. Table 3.2 in this chapter gives clarity on how the information from the interviews will be processed. By doing so, the answers can be compared.

The operationalisation is done in order to examine if the answering can be compared to these definitions of key factors in this research. By doing so, this chapter gives other researches the change to reproduce this research or results.

Finally the reliability and validity is discussed. Although there is a lot of discussion in current research about the use of reliability and validity in qualitative research, I choose to include them in my methodology. I did so because in the end of this thesis the limitations are mentioned and this explanation can be used as argumentation.

## 4. Acacia & Velve-Lindenhof

Enschede is a city with roughly 157.000 citizens. Of these citizens 71.4% is autochthonous, 12.4% is a western-immigrant and 16.2% is a non-western-immigrant (Allecijfers.nl, 2018). For this thesis two neighbourhoods are chosen that lie in different districts within Enschede. In this chapter I will discuss these neighbourhoods/playgrounds and I will describe my findings when walking through the area.

The first neighborhood is Acacia. Acacia is an area located in between the neighbourhoods Pathmos and Stadsveld. These neighbourhoods have a citizen total of 2.045 (pathmos) and roughly 22.000 (Stadsveld) (Allecijfers.nl, 2018). Within these areas the housing price is almost equal: €119.000 over €112.000 and average income is €16.700,- and €16.500,-, which is below average (Allecijfers, 2018). I have chosen to include Pathmos because the housing looks more like Pathmos, as well as their income. These data are available to this point and will be used in this thesis during this research. When looking at the streets that are centred around the playground Robinia, Berkstraat and Acaciaplantsoen, the first thing that shows is the amount of linked houses (see appendix 3, figure 2). In the middle of the Acaciaplantsoen lies a big open field with a lot of grass and a few playground facility (see appendix 3, figure 1). The neighborhood has a diversity in gardens, where one garden is very tidy and well maintained, others are haggard and not at all maintained. Here and there are some old cars and not all are parked in the designated parking spots. Together with some gardens (which are just rocks and concrete slabs) makes it that the area feels cold and bleak. When taking a quick peak through Google Maps, which is shot during the World Championship of Football, there is in fact a lot of social interaction noticeable between citizens.

Acacia is a typical working class neighborhood, predominantly built in the post war period. Between two houses and between a big gate lies the playground 'Robinia'. Robinia is located in between the backs of several linked houses. The playground consist out of about 10 play facilities and a community centre. In the community centre is a large room where people can organize different activities, which they to organize themselves.

The second neighborhood, Velve-Lindenhof, is located in the east side of Enschede. The streets and playground that will be examined in this research, are located in the neighborhood Velve-Lindenhof. In Velve-Lindenhof there are approximately 4.500 citizens with an average income of €17.800,-. The average housing price is €144.000 in this neighborhood. Velve-Lindenhof is a neighborhood where a lot of houses are renovated or newly build. In the centre of the streets Stephensonstraat, Van Leeuwenhoekstraat and the Wattstraat lies the playground; 'Het Lindenhof'. This playground is tidy and has, among other things, a soccer court, cable car, a sandbox, and many more facilities. The streets around the playground look relatively new and are properly maintained. There is no litter around the playground and the green areas in the neighborhood look properly maintained.

Velve-Lindenhof is a renovated neighborhood and looks like a(n) (almost) new neighborhood. The neat and tidy playground certainly adds to this. In the neighborhood Velve-Lindenhof they have a council that have a budget (€30.000,-) to facilitate certain ideas from citizens. The neighborhood council consist out of a few people who want to make the neighborhood better and reduce the distance between citizens and government. They even have an own website which includes everything the neighborhood council does, who they are, what their goals, mission, etc. ,is.

## 5. Public unsafety

This chapter will describe the factors that are relevant to the first sub-question: *'What kind of public unsafety can be found on both playgrounds?'*. The answer will be given in the final chapter, called conclusion. This chapter will describe the factors that are relevant to this question. First of all in chapter 2.1 the different terms and theories are described. The terms used in the beginning of this thesis are vital in describing the 'unsafety' in certain neighbourhoods. In order to describe the factors that play in the neighbourhoods 'Acacia' and 'Velve-Lindenhof', this thesis will not describe every definition but rather focus on a few (described in chapter 2) and describe the situation for every neighborhood separate. Furthermore it is important to include the opinions of citizens in order to fully understand the feeling of 'safe' in a neighborhood (Roeser, 2016). This chapter will discuss per neighborhood, the different criteria on the basis of observations and interviews.

### 5.1. Acacia

At first glance Acacia looks like a typical working class neighborhood. There are a lot of linked houses with a lot of grey front gardens with here and there junk in the gardens (pictures are given in appendix 3). In the middle of the neighborhood we find a large open grass field with few play facilities and a dog outlet area. Between two houses there is a playground called 'Robinia'. To answer the question of public unsafety we first have to look at the definition of a 'problem area'; *'a disturbance of any meaning in the normal cause of events or to the relevant public space.'* (Blok, 2017). At first the neighborhood looks like a normal neighborhood. Several people walk and drive through the neighborhood and they don't look threatening in any way. The playground that lies directly in the neighborhood, and is surrounded by the backs of the linked houses, looks like a decent and tidy playground with a community centre. All in all it doesn't seem like a problem area. However, Weisburd, et al., (2012) found out that any disturbance are not always based on breaking the law. So, in order to answer this question properly the opinion of citizens and other factors need to be included. Possible overly positive or negative outcomes here can be the effect of denial or accountability, but this will be discussed in chapter 6.

When I was walking through the playground and in the community centre, I stumbled upon a person, who wished to be anonymous. He was some sort of care taker of the playground and the centre. The moment he knew that I was conducting a research he no longer wished to talk to me, and he said I needed to be careful with taking pictures of houses and people. From this encounter I got a little bit of a hostile feeling because people in that neighborhood would not participate in any research in whatsoever. However, it might have been possible for him that I was an unsafe person or threat to him or the neighborhood (Interview 5). Later on, several people told me that I was lucky that I wasn't threatened and that people didn't hit me or something (Interview 2 & 7). Which may sound hostile but it can also be a sign of a high amount of social control within the neighborhood.

In the small time the person was willing to speak to me he did explain that it was critical for the playground that it remained tidy, one of his tasks. Furthermore they did organise a fair amount of events in the community centre (Interview 6). Moreover what caught my eye was the strong gate at the entrance of the playground (see appendix 3, figure 5). It is important to look at the opinions of citizens. But even more important is an objective view of the neighborhood, as did wallage (2014) encounter: *'Local safety is safety on the scale of the citizens. Local safety is more than social safety, it is also about involvement from citizens who need to be organized on the relevant scale'* (p. 8). The opinion of citizens is even more relevant than objective regional crime rates because they control and steer individual behaviour in a neighborhood, including social control (Cheng & Smyth, 2015). In chapter six the involvement of citizens will be discussed and explained.

When typing in 'Acacia' and 'Acaciaplantsoen' on Google, the search engine finds a fair share of accidents that took place in that neighborhood. From shootings and classifications as a problem area, to people living in their car. Looking at these facts one can say that there is a fair share of public

unsafety. Even people in Stadsveld, which Acacia is a part of, think Acacia has a rough history (interview 2). They don't feel connected to Stadsveld, because there are a lot of differences between housing and incomes.

Looking at the first definition of a problem area, we can decide if Acacia can be called a problem area. Blok (2017), came to the following definition; '*a disturbance of any meaning in the normal course of events or to the relevant public space*' (p. 13). Looking at the findings produced by Google, we see that there are some events (shootings & the car incident), that are a disturbance in the normal course of events. This all took place in a small area surrounding Robinia. These are just a few examples because this research is limited by the time span. Furthermore the hostile attitude of citizens is also not positive for the area (interviews 2, 3 & 6).

Secondly, the safe feeling of people is looked at in Acacia. The definition and literature has shown us that both crime statistics and the opinion of citizens is important. CBS has calculated that in Stadsveld; in 2010, 1281 crimes occurred, and in 2015, 1223 crimes. A small drop of 58 (4,7%) (CBS, 2016). In overall, in Enschede the numbers dropped from 12.159 crimes to 9.767. A reduction of 2392, 19,6%. Which shows that the crime numbers in Acacia (Stadsveld) have dropped less rapidly. Furthermore the findings in Acacia have shown that the general 'safe feeling' in Acacia is not particularly high. Even the results, worked out in the attachments, showed that people (involved in Acacia or Stadsveld) recognize that the neighbourhood is not safe (Interviews 2 & 6).

Thirdly, the last criteria mentioned in the theoretical framework is crime hotspots. Findings above show us that Acacia is a problem area and the people living in, and visiting, Acacia do not feel particularly safe (Interview 2). However, people in the neighborhood may think otherwise, because they mostly are able to solve their own problems (Appendix 8). There are two definitions that can classify an area as a problem area: (1) a greater than average number of criminal disorder events, or (2) an area where people have a higher than average risk of victimization (Eck, et al., 2005). We saw in the crime statistics that the drop in crime was lower in Stadsveld and Acacia. However it is almost impossible to gather specific numbers on Acacia as a separate and secluded area. However, in combination with the unsafe feeling (interviews 2, 3 & 7), in the area this can be considered as a crime hotspot in general.

## **5.2. Velve-Lindenlof**

Velve-Lindenlof is a neighborhood located in the east side of Enschede. When driving through this area the first thing that stands out is that the neighborhood had a huge upgrade in the last years. Local government invested almost 200 million euro in the neighborhood (Lensink, 2018). Houses are renovated or newly build and playgrounds look modern and tidy (pictures are added in appendix 4). As shown in the pictures, the playground is located in the middle of the neighborhood and the houses are located around the playground (all facing the playground). In the centre of this all, a community centre is located, just besides the playground. In first instance this looks like the ideal setting because there are a lot of opportunities to initiate (informal) social control.

It looks like the neighborhood had a very friendly and interactive sphere. From looking at the neighborhood, one cannot imagine that this is a problem area in any way. However, when I walked through this neighborhood and took some pictures, a guy immediately came in my direction. He said he was involved in the playground association of Enschede. He then asked what I was doing and warned me not to take pictures of people because that could cause trouble. So the first appearance wasn't fully justified and showed that there still were some 'troubles' in the neighborhood. Later on the guy, who wished to be anonymous as well, explained that the social control was very great and the people addressed other people who didn't belong there or showed divergent behavior.

In the following moments the person was in fact kind enough to share some more information about the neighborhood and the playground. In fact, they were just busy with some new play facilities for the playground. Volunteers from the neighborhood and some rejected workers,

helped with placing the new play facilities. At the end of my visit some neighbors were screaming at each other, not knowing if it was serious or not I decided to end my visit. Velde-Lindenhof has not always been a neighborhood with new houses and fancy playing facilities. In the previous century, Velde-Lindenhof was well known for the MIRO-riots, many coffee shops, prostitutes located in the neighborhood, and many more disturbances (Lensink, 2018). Many citizens did not feel safe within Velde-Lindenhof (Interview 5). In this whole period the neighborhood got many (negative) titles: problem area, deprived area, attention district and 'Vogelaarswijk'. These stigmas of Velde-Lindenhof were the starting point of hundreds of millions euros, of investments in the neighborhood. The coffee shops disappeared, houses were destroyed and newly build or renovated, playing grounds were renewed and the neighborhood was no longer a problem area (interview 5). So the main, and most important, attention points were addressed. But it did not end there.

Following these investments and changes in the neighborhood, the social control and community responsibility grew (interview 7). Which does not mean that the renovation was the main reason for the improvement in social control. Out of several housing commissions located in Velde-Lindenhof, started the neighborhood council. In the years to come Marinus Gouma and Gerrit Ansink took the lead in building the neighborhood council and improve social control (interview 5). As stated in chapter 2, living in a safe neighborhood can save up to 1500% of an annual household income opposed to an unsafe living environment (Chang & Smyth, 2015). So it is logical to take a closer look at social control. Looking at the present time we see that many problems have been solved but there are still some little things that can lead to unsafe feelings in the neighborhood. Still there are some (small) problems that plague the neighborhood. Such as gatherings of youth with mopeds, wastelands that invite to littering, and skirmishes around a coffee shops that will be renovated (interview 1).

Looking at the definition of a problem area, '*A disturbance of any meaning in the normal course of events or to the relevant public space*' (Blok, 2017, p. 13), shows us that the problems in Velde-Lindenhof can still be specified as problem area. Because the situations, described above, cause a disturbance under citizens and neighborhood council members, and interfere with the normal course of events. For example the renovation of the coffee shop leads to an interference within the normal course of events because vans are parked outside with offensive stickers, and people fear for what's to come in the premises (Interview 1 & 4). These findings are based on subjective opinions of people in the direct environment.

Secondly the safe feeling of people can be questioned in this neighborhood, or in certain areas within the neighborhood. It can be stated that Velde-Lindenhof still has some situations in which people do feel unsafe, but in comparison with before the renovation, are much less (Interview 1). This can also be noticed in the interviews from before and after the renovation. Before the renovation the whole system within Velde-Lindenhof was disturbed (interview 5), and after the renovation the biggest problems are trash cans and junk on the streets (interview 1). The definition leaves room for subjective safety. Not only looking at numbers of crime, but also include the opinions (subjective) of the citizens. Looking at the statistics produced by the CBS, Velde-Lindenhof had a reported number of 212 crimes in 2016, against 344 crimes in 2010 (Cbs, 2016). A drop of 132 crimes, 38,4%! This is higher than the average in Enschede (19,6%). Several examples are mentioned that can threaten the safe feeling of citizens. A clear description of what a problem really is, and when interference, from a public or parochial sphere, is wanted is crucial in countering the effects of denial and accountability (Carr, 2005). This will be discussed and explained in the next chapter (6).

Thirdly, the term crime hotspots is frequently used in this thesis (and explained in the theory section). The results show us that both terms above mentioned, were present in the Velde-Lindenhof area. The definition used in this thesis split up in two criteria: (1) a greater than average number of criminal disorder events, or (2) an area where people have a higher than average risk of victimization (Eck, et al., 2005). Although Velde-Lindenhof used to be a problem area with crime hotspots, due to

recent changes, it can no longer be classified as a crime hotspot and problem area. The neighborhood shifted from an problem area to a safe neighborhood.

### **Conclusion.**

Acacia and Velve-Lindenhof are examined in this chapter, in order to answer the following sub-question: *'What kind of public unsafety can be found on both playgrounds?'*. The two areas were chosen because they are both nearby playgrounds and faced or face the same problems. Both areas are located within bigger neighbourhoods, Stadsveld and Velve-Lindenhof (the entire neighborhood). Therefore it was hard to collect data that are only related to the streets surrounding these playgrounds. However, it became clear that Acacia is a problem area, people feel unsafe and it can be labelled as an crime hotspot, using the data and results that are available.

The other neighborhood, Velve-Lindenhof, is a neighborhood that has been in the lift. This can be seen in the crime statistics that are available, about recent years. The number of crimes decreased faster than the average number in Enschede. Furthermore Velve-Lindenhof still has some troublesome locations, like a sex shop, but the neighborhood is no(t) (longer) a problem area and a crime hotspot. The safe feeling of citizens has increased over the years and citizens now feel safe in this neighborhood.

## 6. Offenders, targets and absence guardians of the neighborhood

This thesis sought to give an insight in the way (informal) social control works in a neighborhood and what factors are important. However, there are also other elements that can explain why certain unsafe situations happen in a neighborhood. Cohen and Felson (1979) were one of the first to look at the circumstances of an offender, rather than the supply of an offender. Three elements are central for a criminal to (possibly) commit a crime; *(1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians against a violation'* (p. 589). In this paragraph this theory will be applied in the neighbourhoods Velve-Lindenhof and Acacia.

### 6.1. Motivated offenders

#### *Acacia.*

The first neighborhood examined is Acacia. Acacia, as we saw, a small area located between areas Pathmos, Stevenfenne and Stadsveld. As chapter 4 already explained, Acacia is an area with poverty and a lot of people who live beneath, or on, the poverty line (interview 3). As Cohen and Felson (1979) stated, this theory does not look at the personal reasons people commit crime, but rather look at the circumstances that make it possible for them to commit crime. One of the first findings they do is connect illegal actions with routine activities people do to maintain the everyday sustenance (Cohen & Felson, 1979). As stated before, Acacia is a relatively disadvantaged neighborhood with poverty, a lot of school dropouts and clutter everywhere throughout the streets (interview 2 & 3). Together with a government who hasn't shown a lot of interest and involvement in the area (interview 3), makes it possible that there can be several motivated offenders in Acacia.

When looking at the findings in the results, there are some mixed opinions, summarised in appendix 8. One of the most common findings is that the neighborhood has the potential for motivated offenders. The area lends itself for motivated offenders because a lot of people live under the poverty line (see appendix 8). Furthermore the main reason for people to commit crime(s) is to attain food or improve the social position of their kid (interview 3, 5 & 6). Children are central in almost everything people do in Acacia. Furthermore people have problems with authority, there are differences in income in Stadsveld and there are/is no strong central leader(s) in the neighborhood (Interview 6). Chapter 7 and the concluding chapter will discuss why that can be an issue. All in all we can say that the neighborhood lends itself for motivated offenders.

#### *Velve-Lindenhof.*

The next neighborhood is Velve-Lindenhof. Velve-Lindenhof used to be a problem area (interview 5 & 7). There were five coffee shops located in the neighborhood, prostitutes and at the absolute low of this neighborhood, the MIRO-Riots occurred. These riots are an example of how bad things can get in a neighborhood in which the government shows almost no involvement (interview 5). Same as Acacia, Velve-Lindenhof was a relatively poor neighborhood with several rent houses. After the whole renewing of the neighborhood, with the help of central government funding, the whole neighborhood was changed. This led to better houses in Velve-Lindenhof. Moreover, the social control and ties were improved. The 'sick' neighborhood was successfully altered and improved (interview 5). This however, was not a process of one year but took at least 10 years to develop. By improving the social culture of the neighborhood and the people, families and systems, motivated offenders are petty.

Appendix 7 summarises the main points that the respondents brought forward. First of all it is important to mention that most of the respondents thought that most problems are not big and overall quality of live has improved (interview 1, 4 & 6). One of the reasons for this is the activities organised to boost social control. However, there are still some small attention points they bring forth. First of all is that the municipality is the only actor who have an insight in big problems such as school dropouts, poor family lines and poverty (interview 4). Furthermore there are still a lot of rent houses, housing people with a low income or no income, and there are still unemployed people. This fact can still be cause for problems in the future that can cause motivated offenders.

## 6.2. Suitable targets

Suitable targets is one of the elements that can contribute an offender to commit a crime. This paragraph will describe suitable targets within both neighbourhoods and the interpretation of the respondents.

### *Acacia.*

As stated above, acacia is still very much a poor area with problems. Housing are mostly owned still by housing corporations and the income is generally low (interview 3). When looking at the neighborhood the first thing that shows is that the houses are predominantly old and build in the post-war face. Making it perhaps easier for burglars and offenders to commit crimes. Furthermore, the gardens are mostly petrified and contain a lot of junk. Then the playground Robinia. Robinia is a playground that could have the potential to be a suitable target. However, because it is placed between houses there is the potential for social control from neighbours. On top of that is a big gate that can lock and exclude the complete play garden from offenders.

Acacia is still a very closed community, therefore it was very hard to find any people who live within this area and who are active in this area. However, the people that did wanted to talk had some interesting assumptions. First of all, they all thought Acacia was a rough zone in which the municipality had no real control (Interview 2, 3 & 6). People in this area did what they wanted to do, and did not need any professionals, institutions or municipality to solve their problems. One interviewee even called the whole area a tolerance zone from the municipality (Interview 3). Furthermore there are several places that are suitable targets for violations, vandalism and perhaps crime: *Cruyfcourt*, *Krajicek playground* and *the Halterplaza* (Interview 3 & 6). These places are known by the municipality but still they are listed as 'problem areas'. Furthermore the old style of houses can also be an suitable target for possible offenders (e.g. poor locks).

### *Velve-Lindenhof.*

This area is used two times, one time before the renovation and one time after the renovation. Velve-Lindenhof first of all, is a neighborhood with a higher average income and housing price. So one would think that the neighborhood could also be less prone to 'suitable targets'. Looking at the neighborhood and the three streets surrounding the playground, it all looks very promising. Everything is very open and the social control is strong in this neighborhood after the renovation. In which the playground had a central role (interview 5).

Velve-Lindenhof had a few strong leaders in their neighborhood which had an huge impact on the social control (Interview 5 & 6). Where in the past people participated in illegal behaviour, this has shifted to a family and parochial system in which this has become less (see appendix 9, suitable targets). One of the key factors in this change is the neighborhood council and the participation of citizens. All small problems are immediately addressed and, where necessary, police or professionals are informed (interview 1). However there are still two possible negative effects. First of all the playgrounds can be potential sensitive for loitering or vandalism.

## 6.3. Absence of capable guardians against a violation

The last factor that can co-explain criminals and why they commit crimes is the absence of capable guardians against violation. This will be explained by using the information from the theory and from the interviewees, summarized in appendixes 9 and 10.

### *Acacia*

Cohen and Felson (1979) looked at other factors that can explain why crimes occur. The third and last component of their theory is '*absence of capable guardians against a violation*' (p. 4). This is a very important component according to Cohen and Felson (1979), as they state in their research: '*(...) guardianship by ordinary citizenship of one another and of property as they go about routine activities may be one of the most neglected elements in sociological research on crime (...)*' (p. 4). Showing that ordinary citizens can perform an even bigger role in crime preventing than, for



instance, the police. In Acacia at first hand there is no clear capable guardian present. However, it was on a weekday that I walked through the streets, which is a typical work day. The play garden had the potential to have (informal) social control, and therefore capable guardians. Even more because all houses looked out on the play garden (see figure 5, appendix 3). Furthermore there was a person that had the leadership in the play garden, and therefore can fulfil as sort of a guardian function.

As stated before, Acacia is a closed community within Stadsveld, not letting in people outside their community, as is stated in interview 3; *'Neighbourhoods within Stadsveld are very autonomous, especially Acacia'* (N. 3). In the interviews the main thing that comes forth is that the parties have no real consultation with each other about the neighborhood; *'There is no real consultation between all parties, but we had that for a while'* (Interview 2). This shows that there is no clear link between actors that can act as capable guardians. Furthermore, (possibly) one of the most important actors, or guardians, in the neighborhood are the leader(s) of a neighborhood. In Acacia there is no sight on who the leader is and who can possibly be seen as one (Interview 3 & 6). This was already put forward by several interviewees, *'There is no clear leader in the neighborhood, professionals are not effective'* (interview 6); *'We don't know who the leader(s) of the neighborhood are, no joint consultation between all actors involved'* (interview 3). So all in all we can say that there is an absence of capable guardians.

#### *Velve-Lindenhof*

We saw already that Velve-Lindenhof is an improved neighborhood. However, we can still look at the guardians in this neighborhood. As we saw in the previous paragraph about Acacia, is that routine activities and active citizens are important criteria in order to prevent crime. The first time I visited Velve-Lindenhof, a person spoke to me and needed an explanation for my behaviour. Showing me that he was at least a possible guardian at that time. Furthermore the man told me that the social control in the neighborhood was very high and there were several capable guardians.

Velve-Lindenhof had a broad area of people and actors that invested time and money in the neighborhood (interview 5). This led to an experimental garden in Velve-Lindenhof where the municipality was willing to do everything to improve the neighborhood (interview 7). In the interviews, displayed in appendix 9, everything is summed up. In the beginning of this neighborhood, there were few guardians, but since the intervention this all changed, *'The neighborhood itself made a list of troublesome buildings and started to motivate the municipality'* (interview 7). From then on, certain leaders of the neighborhood got involved a lot and agreed to help change the neighborhood (Interview 5). However, a good collaboration of a wide range of professionals, is needed in order to deal with these problems; *'Shared authority is important in solving problems'* (interview 5). When all of these actors work together, there are several capable guardians in the neighborhood. However, there is possibly one threat in Velve-Lindenhof; *'aging is a possible threat for the neighborhood council and our expectations (municipality)'* (interview 4). This shows that guardians in Velve-Lindenhof are, and were, present but they only chose to invest their time and effort, in cooperation with other actors. All in all we can say that there was an absence of capable guardians in Velve-Lindenhof, however this has changed over time and now there are several capable guardians.

#### **Conclusion.**

This chapter has sought to give an answer to the following research question: *'To what extent can motivated offenders, suitable targets and other (than parochial social controllers) kind of guardians of violations be found on both hotspots?'* With the help of the theory and several people that were willing to be interviewed, an answer can be given.

First of all we saw that in Acacia there are still several problems and nuisance. Acacia is sensitive for motivated offenders, there are several suitable targets for motivated offenders, and there is a lack of capable guardians. Following the theory of Cohen and Felson (1979) we can say that all three factors can be found in Acacia, which makes the neighborhood attractive for offenders. Motivated offenders are present because a lot of people still live on, or under the poverty line and there is little enforcement from the municipality. Secondly, suitable targets are at hand because of

the low enforcement, people dealing in old iron, drugs etc. Finally, there are no capable guardians because these are unknown to a lot of actors, among these the municipality.

Secondly Velde-Lindenhof was examined. Velde-Lindenhof used to be a troublesome area but this has changed drastically. According to the theory of Cohen and Felson, we can answer the three factors. First of all Velde-Lindenhof has a smaller amount of motivated offenders. However, there might still be a change this can change because there is still a number of people living in that neighborhood, that live beneath the poverty line. Second, in Velde-Lindenhof there are few suitable targets, due to the big renovation of the neighborhood. There is still a change that the playground can be seen as a possible vandalism spot. Thirdly, there are several capable guardians available in the neighborhood. This will be further explained in the next chapter (7), as leaders of the neighborhood.

## 7. New-Parochialism in both areas.

In chapter 2 the 'Chicago Concept' was introduced. The concept, introduced by Carr (2005), will help map social control within both neighbourhoods. The concept will be used in the neighbourhoods Acacia and Velve-Lindenhof. In this chapter the social control in both neighbourhoods will be described and the concept will be applied in order to explain social control in Enschede. In order to answer the following research question; *'To what extent can features of new-parochialism, according to the concept of Carr, be found in both playground-areas?'*


### 7.1. Social control Velve-Lindenhof, before renovation.

This thesis follows the Chicago-concept from Patrick Carr (2005). The main goal of this concept is explaining social control and help understanding how social control works within a neighborhood. For this thesis the neighbourhoods Acacia and Velve-Lindenhof are chosen. First the different criteria and frameworks will be described. Then the concept can be filled in using the models described in the theoretical framework. According to Carr (2005) there is one, central, criteria for (informal) social control to exist within an area; *'informal social control cannot take place without community engagement(...)'* (p. 31). So the main criteria for informal social control lies within the parochial sphere. There is no interference necessary from the municipality but there needs to be some kind of community engagement within the neighborhood. First of all we take a look at Velve-Lindehof.

In order to describe the 'new-parochialism' introduced by Carr (2005), it is important to; *'Securing support and resources from the public sphere is an important underpinning of the new parochialism'* (p. 46). In the Beltway example, Carr saw that people did in fact found the correct institutions and politicians in order to achieve their goals. This criteria was met by the support of several professionals, which worked together with the leader(s) of the neighborhood. In the following this will be explained.

In his research Carr found that in Beltway the (informal) social control was low and at some points did not meet the criteria points mentioned above. In the following paragraph the concept will be discussed and important elements/points will be mentioned. Model 7.1 shows the Chicago concept as it is made up by Carr (2005), model 7.2 shows the same model applied in Velve-Lindenhof from around the time just before the neighborhood got an upgrade. Giving an insight in the social control in this area. Paragraph 7.2 will explain and visualize the current social control in Velve-Lindenhof and which roles different actors have. By comparing these two situations, factors can be found that can help improve social control in Acacia (Stadsveld). The neighborhood can then begin to change from a 'sick neighborhood' to a 'healing neighborhood' and eventually, as an ideal image, transform to a 'healthy neighborhood'.

In the models 7.1 and 7.2 we see the ‘new parochialism’ in Velde-Lindehof just before the renovation of the neighborhood. Velde-Lindehof got a huge upgrade and during that period the social cohesion in the neighborhood had to improve as well. The different criteria/factors used below are explained in paragraph 3.3 (operationalization).



Model 7.1. Chicago concept (Carr, 2005)

Model 7.2. Chicago concept in Velde-Lindehof 'Before'

**Denial.** Denial can have a negative influence on the New-parochialism. One cause can be different values. First of all there was some differences in thoughts between interviewees. But one of the main findings was; *'the neighborhood council has no contact with problem families'* (interview 4 & 7). Therefore they acknowledge that not all problems are visible for different actors. So there was some denial imminent. So there is a red line coming from 'denial'.

**Accountability.** In the beginning there were several issues with accountability. During the MIRO-riots, several actors did not know how or who, had to solve this problem. From there on, professionals jumped in this problem and helped battle Accountability. However, there is still a red line drawn because this element was still present. The interference will be further discussed below.

**Public interference.** In the healing process of Velde-Lindehof, the contribution of public interference was very important. Not only to counter the effects of denial and accountability, but also to influence the culture within the neighborhood. Influence not alter. There was no clear person or one institution that did all the interference, but it was the interference of professionals on specific areas that they were specialised in. And this worked. The need for professional interference was necessary to influence and change the culture to improve the social control within Velde-Lindehof. A very important element here was that all the people involved (in this model) were not afraid to work outside their borders in order to battle problems in Velde-Lindehof. Furthermore the municipality was very involved and concerned; *'The municipality gave me the assignment to exterminate all problems in Velde-Lindehof'* (interview 7). Showing that municipality took it serious and was willing to (help) battle problems.

**Community responsibility.** This all led to a collaboration between several professionals, institutions and funds to help improve the social control within Velde-Lindehof. All these people had a common goal between them; help improve the welfare of children and set up the basis for the new neighborhood. An example of this responsibility is the amount of tenants that filled in a survey about

the new neighborhood, 90% (interview 5). Which was unprecedented. The common goal led to an shift in the neighborhood which resulted in a better neighborhood. They did work together (all actors) on a value driven cooperation (interview 7). Therefore a green arrow towards the 'New-parochialism'.

### **Parochial (level of control).**

**Leader(s) of the neighborhood.** The first aspect of the parochial level of control are the leader(s) of the neighborhood. As model 7.2 shows, there are three leaders in Velve-Lindenhof, namely Gerrit Ansink, Marinus Gouma and Hannes Kiel. These three people can be stated as leaders within the neighborhood because Gerrit Ansink and Marinus Gouma were the leaders of the neighborhood council. They are both involved in a broad area within the neighborhood. Their involvement is not questioned by the interviewees; *'(..)Gerrit, lives in the middle of the neighborhood, concerned in the neighborhood, feels responsibility for the neighborhood'* (interview 7). Hannes Kiel, however is a different case. He is, so to say, an unofficial neighborhood leader. With the help of him, professionals had access to families with problems. In the interview, collected in appendix 6, by asking if he (Hannes) had contact with these problem families, the interviewee answered *'he is those families'* (interview 5). Stating the importance of Hannes in the neighborhood and the importance of him in reshaping the culture in Velve-Lindenhof.

**Main activist.** This second criteria is meant for people concerned within the neighborhood, but those who are limited by time or area (Carr, 2005). However, this was not mentioned by anyone. No people by name were mentioned. However, this was more of a collaboration between professionals, the municipality, neighborhood council and leaders of the neighborhood. They all helped set up frameworks for initiatives and gave an insight in how they could accomplish initiatives. This was an important 'basis' for citizens to initiate initiatives in the future (interview 5). Examples are the 'Bouwmaatjes', 'Straatspeeldag', speicla outings (interview 5), but also a neighborhoodcorporation, 'sinterklaas', and celebrating successes together (interview 7). Therefore they are chosen as main activist in the beginning years of the reshaping of Velve-Lindenhof.


**Main activities to maintain communities.** Main activities are necessary in order to maintain communities and, effectively use (informal) social control. There was one central goal that helped bring all the actors together; children (interview 1, 5 & 7), *'My goal always was improvement of the position of children'* (interview 5). This common goal was the basis for everyone to work together and create (informal) social control within Velve-Lindenhof.

### **Public (level of control)**

**Politicians.** For an effective use of social control it is important that citizens have a connection with important politicians in order to reach their goals. In Velve-Lindenhof there are several political figures that help facilitate initiatives, but also facilitate the professionals. Those people were Albert Fransen, city council manager, and the VVD that had some members that had a lot of support in the neighborhood. Furthermore they did not have a very important role, they were merely facilitating.

**Institutions.** This is the second criteria that is important for the public level of control. The district budget was one institution, so to say, that gave citizens the possibility to execute their initiatives. But a far more important element was the 'Vogelaarsgeld', which was funding from the central government to improve troublesome neighbourhoods. Which Velve-Lindenhof was labelled as. With the help of this money the neighborhood got an upgrade of all the houses and playgrounds. Further institutions that were important was the neighborhood corporation. However, did had not much to do with the area selected so it is not mentioned in the model.

## 7.2. Social control Velde-Lindenhof, after renovation.



Model 7.3. Chicago concept (Carr, 2005)

Model 7.4. Chicago concept in Velde-Lindenhof 'After'

In the models 7.3 and 7.4 above we see the Chicago concept designed by Carr, and the Chicago concept used in Velde-Lindenhof, after the renovation. The different variables are explained below using the operationalisation in paragraph 3.3.

**Denial.** After the renovation the danger of denial transformed. Denial was no longer a real threat to the New-parochialism in Velde-Lindenhof. The neighborhood council is one of the main institutions that battle denial; *'We try to indicate that self-reliance is becoming increasingly important'* (interview 1). Showing that the neighborhood council know that they have an important role in the neighborhood. However, there is one potential danger for the criteria denial; *'Addressing other citizens is not fully satisfactorily'* (interview 4). Showing that this threat is not vanquished, but this is constant process of battling denial.

**Accountability.** Accountability is, just as denial, a factor that needs constant battling. That is just what is happening in Velde-Lindenhof after the renovation. There is a understanding between several actors, in which they all try to battle accountability and are willing to solve problems (together). This is certainly underlined in the interviews: *'No locker to the wall mentality'* (interview 4). But also by the neighborhood council; *'Looking at what is possible at the municipality, or looking at what is possible at other institutions. You have to take those opportunities.'* (interview 1). Showing that both municipality and neighborhood council aren't afraid to take initiative.

**Public/private interference.** Because there was no real threat in denial and accountability, interference is only needed in a few cases. However, there is not only a public interference, where possible there can also be a private interference from the neighborhood council that is more effective. A nice quote that underlines the importance of collaboration between parties is also included by interviewees; *'Consultation of officials, neighborhood council, periodically, to see what can be discussed with each other'* (interview 4). This luxury has led to a government that no longer has to intervene every time, but a neighborhood council does the intervention. Therefore the new term in this model: Public/Private interference.

**Community responsibility.** The community responsibility is enormous in Velve-Lindenhof. This can be found back in the results of the interviews; *'Velve-Lindenhof itself also feels more like a village within Enschede'* (interview 1). However this remains a continuous process in which all actors need to work together to achieve initiatives and solve problems. So we can draw a green line towards the New-parochialism, because it has an positive influence on the process of (informal) social control.

#### **Parochial (level of control).**

**Leader(s) of the neighborhood.** The first aspect of parochial sphere are the leaders of the neighborhood. In Velve-Lindenhof Marinus Gouma and Slessor Ettiene are the leaders of the council and the neighborhood, according to the concept. They distinguish themselves because they participate and involve in a broader area outside their own interest and living area. An example here is that Marinus Gouma is also involved in zoning plans in the entire neighborhood, asks people for information, set frameworks for meetings, embellishes the neighborhood, etc. (interview 1). All in all, with the very broad area in which they occupy themselves, we can say that these persons are the leaders of Velve-Lindenhof. But still one of the most important people in this neighborhood is Hannes Kiel. So, together with Hannes, the neighborhood council fulfils a leading role in the neighborhood.

**Main activist.** This criteria differs from 'leaders' because people in this case are area and time bound or only participate until the(ir) problem is solved. It is not possible to name these people by name because they wish not to be mentioned, but there are in fact a lot of main activist in the neighborhood. For example the neighborhood watch (consist out of people who walk their dogs at night), members of the foundation of playgrounds and Velveinactie Group. So besides the main leaders of the neighborhood there are also many main activist that help promote (informal) social control; *'But there is a very active group of seniors, who are fairly active in the neighborhood room, there is a very active meeting group, there are a lot of creative groups, a lot of people who are actively involved with children and young people: Velveinactie.'* (interview 4).

**Main activities to maintain communities.** Main activities are necessary in order to maintain communities and, effectively use (informal) social control. Velve-Lindehof has an own website which states the mission, visions, goals, tasks and conditions. Yearly they have an meeting to evaluate and, if necessary, reshape these goals. But there is still one central goal and that is the welfare of children. This stands central in all the volunteers working. But besides these goals, etc., they also have a monthly meeting with all actors involved in the neighborhood, several groups that organise activities; Vleeshouwerij, Wijkschouw, Velvian-overleg (interview 1).

#### **Public (level of control)**


**Politicians.** To reach certain goals that citizens, or the council, has set, it is important that they have possibilities to reach (the correct) politicians. One of the most important persons mentioned is Barrie Langkamp, an employee of the municipality of Enschede (interview 1). He is one of the first spokespersons for the council. In combination with him, the council achieved a lot of affairs and relatively fast. There are also other actors and persons within the municipality that work together with the council, such as the police, neighborhood agent, neighborhood director and perhaps others. The neighborhood council itself thinks that the contact between (important) politicians is good, so we can say that this criteria is met. It is important to note that, again, this criteria is only facilitating.

**Institutions.** This criteria is, like politicians, an important criteria to help shape the new parochialism, because citizens need to be able to execute their initiatives in order to create, or improve, (informal) social control. First of all, the first institution all neighbourhoods have, is a neighborhood-budget which they are almost free to spend. Citizens can apply for an amount of money, but they have to meet certain conditions. As stated before, the council has direct contact with Barrie Langkamp, who does a lot for the neighborhood on behalf of the municipality of Enschede.

### 7.3. Social control Acacia.

The same concept of Carr will be used in Acacia, Stadsveld, in the west part of the city Enschede. As we saw in the paragraph before, there needs to be community engagement within a neighborhood to achieve (informal) social control; *'informal social control cannot take place without community engagement(...)'* (Carr, 2005. p. 31). In Stadsveld there is a community council that deals with budgets and has an advising role for citizens and municipality (Appendix 8). The role of this council, in their own opinion, differs from Velde-Lindenhof (interview 1 & 2). First of all they see themselves more as an advisory body, whereas Velde-Lindenhof takes initiative and see it as their role to help maintain a liveable and safe neighborhood. However, whatever role they take, it shows that there is some kind of community engagement. How great this engagement is can be questioned. First of all the role they position themselves is only advisory and they have a network which can be used by citizens who want to achieve something (interview 1). Secondly, they use professionals and the municipality to see and experience what is playing and measure the reactions in the neighborhood. Instead of actively asking in the neighborhood, approach citizens or involve citizens (because they do not see this as a role for the council). All in all the first criteria is met, but with some remarks and differences with Velde-Lindenhof. In the concept this will be explained and the social control can be examined.

The second criteria that is important in the New-parochialism of Carr, is that citizens, the council and other groups can secure support and resources from the public sphere (Carr, 2005). If all these criteria are met, then there is a basis for social control to work. The model in figure 7.5 and 7.6 show the Chicago concept, and the concept applied to Acacia, Stadsveld.



Model 7.5. Chicago concept (Carr, 2005)

Model 7.6. Chicago concept in Acacia, Stadsveld.

The models above shows the framework designed by Carr (2005), and in model 7.6 the concept applied in Acacia, Stadsveld. The concept will be explained using the operationalisation in chapter 3.3, and supported by the interviewees, organised in appendix 8.

**Denial.** The first negative element, outside the 'New-parochialism', is denial. First of all denial is a serious problem in Acacia, Stadsveld. Because there are a lot of differences in income, housing and norms and values not all the people in Stadsveld see situations as a problem, or want to do



something about it. All the interviewees agree that there is denial within Acacia. Not only from the citizens but also from the municipality of Enschede. This is supported by people from the district management; *'But that closedness of that community is also a reason for us, as well as 40 years of looking away, to do something about it'* (interview 3). Furthermore this can also be seen in a few, to no, initiatives that came out of Acacia. Furthermore the values and norms of citizens in this area are lower than commonly accepted within Stadsveld (interview 3).

**Accountability.** Second is accountability. In the example of Carr in Beltway they found that denial and accountability did not occur alongside each other often. However this is the case in Stadsveld. Members of the council acknowledge that in many cases they don't see themselves as responsible for situations (e.g. loitering youth, drug dealers (appendix 8)). This can also be taken out of the interviews, in which the neighborhood council state; *'There are no real problems present that we can solve'* (interview 2). Furthermore the people in Acacia have troubles with authority, so they depend heavily on themselves for solving problems (interview 3). And finally there is the limitation of the government; *'The government only looks at numbers and risk analyses'* (interview 6). Hereby going past the subjective 'safefeeeling'.

**Public interference.** In the example of Stadsveld there is not clear, in any case, that the municipality of Enschede, or any government, did any interference to counter the effects of denial and accountability. Who are in fact of frequent occurrence in Acacia, Stadsveld in many examples. So in this case it is possible to draw a red line, which shows a negative effect to the next factor, community responsibility. However, the municipality itself, thinks they do in fact counter these effects by using professionals, which have a better insight in the problems. However, there are no consultations or evaluations. So people work at different problems but do not use a integral approach.

**Community responsibility.** Without proper public interference, denial and accountability cannot be converted to a positive community responsibility. So any problems of denial and accountability cannot be countered by public interference into a community responsibility. That there is no common community responsibility is also supported in the interview; *'We often ask ourselves, does Acacia belong to Stadsveld?'* (interview 2), showing that they do not even agree if it is a part of Stadsveld. So in order to create a community responsibility the municipality should look at their own interference.

### **Parochial (level of control)**

**Leader(s) of the neighborhood.** In Acacia there is no clear leader within the neighborhood. According to the concept of Carr these people, or person, participate in a broad area of activities which are not limited to area or time. So there is/are no clear leader(s) within Acacia. This is supported by the interviews, in which they all don't know the real leader within Acacia and in Stadsveld (e.g. *'there is no real leader in Acacia'* (interview 6)). However, there is one person who claims that there are two leaders within Stadsveld, but I chose not to mention them because they do not fit within the criteria mentioned by Carr (especially in participating in initiatives outside their own interest and area, (interview 2)).

**Main activist.** The second criteria has the same answer as the previous, not mentioned or not present. The only mentionable institution is the neighborhood council, but they are only limited to other areas in Stadsveld, and not in Acacia. This is supported in the interview, in which they state: *'The neighborhood council should work on their visibility,...'* (interview 3). Meaning that they are not present in all areas of Stadsveld, and therefore Acacia, at the moment. However, as mentioned by Carr, this should rather be people or a person, rather than an institution. So in fact there is the need for someone to help boost initiatives in Acacia, and find activist in this area.

**Main activities to maintain communities.** This criteria was rather different than in Velve-Lindenhof. In Velve there was a clear common goal: Children. However, in Acacia, they only speak about a advisory task for the neighborhood council. Especially in the area Acacia there is no strong central goal. Because there are differences in goals between different actors (see appendix 8). Here lies room for creating citizens that are motivated trough a common community responsibility!

### **Public (level of control)**

**Politicians.** That the role of a public sphere should be limited to being supportive, is supported in the research of Carr. Not necessarily in dealing with problems. but more in recognising problems and creating support in the neighborhood/area (interview 6). Important people are the district director and a few people from the SP (political party), but; *'They are only interest for political support'* (interview 6). And the collaboration between all actors and the municipality is typed as 'bad'.

**Institutions.** It is important that the lines between (involved) citizens and institutions is effective in order to achieve social control. The one prominent institution mentioned by all interviewees is the district budget. This one is used the most in Stadsveld, but does not receive any initiatives from Acacia. However, it is worth noting that the district director can name several, but these are not mentioned by other people outside the public sphere (see appendix 8). On the contrary, several institutions/people are named that were positive to the neighborhood, but do not exist anymore; *'Integral youth policy is not applied in Acacia, although it was a success'* (interview 6).

### **7.4. Conclusion.**

This chapter described, and made the social control in both Velde-Lindenhof and Acacia, Stadsveld, insightful using the model of Carr (2005). This shows the relation between several actors and which roles they play in the neighborhood. This paragraph will describe the main conclusions that came forward. By doing so, an answer can be given to the sub-question: *To what extend can features of new-parochialism, according to the concept of Carr, be found in both playground-areas?*

First of all this chapter investigated Velde-Lindenhof before the renovation. The models 7.1 and 7.2 show the Chicago concept, and the Chicago concept applied in Velde-Lindenhof before the renovation. This showed that all factors were, at that point, present. Denial and accountability were both present and had a negative influence on social control. On the other hand, the public interference was coming up and changed denial and accountability into a community responsibility, that had a positive influence on the New parochialism. Therefore also on the social control. It was the municipality of Enschede and several professionals who did work integral together to achieve community responsibility (interview 5). In the parochial sphere of control, all three factors were present. There are 3 leaders that are known to all parties and take a leading role in the neighborhood, and there was one common goal/values: Children. Last there were main activists, not citizens, but professionals and district coaches. They helped set up this factor by giving frameworks for citizens and boosting initiatives. The public sphere was also met because there are several politicians and institutions that facilitated the parochial sphere. So in this extend the criteria, in the model of Carr, are met. But they differ from the example in Beltway.

Secondly was Velde-Lindenhof after the renovation. The threats of denial and accountability are reduced to an almost minimum due to agreements between the public and parochial sphere. But to battle with these two effects, both private and public interference was required. This differs from the model from Carr (2005). Furthermore there are still three leaders in the neighborhood, aside from some small changes. The most important conclusion here is that these three people all have a different kind of authority in the neighborhood. All three together have the potential to reach a big part (of the citizens) of the neighborhood. Furthermore the main goal still remains the same; the welfare of children. Besides that, the neighborhood council extended this with a goal, vision, etc. Moreover, there are now citizens (not named) that are the main activists, and no longer the professionals. This is the most important finding in the parochial sphere. The public sphere shows a few people and institutions that are, or were, important for citizens and initiatives. But again, this sphere was only facilitative.

The last model is applied in Acacia. Acacia has seen little to no change in living environment in the past 40 years (interview 3). This shows itself in threats from denial and accountability, hence the red arrow. Secondly, there is also a red arrow coming from public interference because this interference is not (always) present or is ineffective. One reason for this is poor communication, no consultation and evaluation between all factors involved (interview 2 & 6). This leads to no

community responsibility in Acacia, which has a negative influence on the new-parochialism. In the parochial sphere we see that it is not clear who the leader(s) are/is. Even more there are no main activists coming from Acacia. Striking is that no professionals or public interference is used (or this is not visible for the interviewees). There are some expectations and goals from the municipality and neighborhood council, but there is no commonly shared value that binds all parties. In closing, the public sphere does not fully support the parochial sphere because there is no integral policy and politicians only pursue their own interest.

So in closing we can see several changes that happened in Velde-Lindenhof. Where citizens did not fill in the criteria, professionals stepped in and set the framework for citizens. For instance the change in main activist over time, from professionals to citizens. Together with a municipality that was very helpful and facilitative, the stage was set for a change within Velde-Lindenhof. Looking at both Velde-Lindenhof and Acacia we see some pain points that can be named for Acacia:

- Denial and Accountability serious threats for (informal) social control;
- No, or not effective, interference from the public sphere;
- No community responsibility;
- Not clear who leader(s) are in Acacia;
- No 'main activist' in Acacia (and no interference from government);
- No common value/goal;
- No integral policy and not clear who important politicians are in the area.

## 8. Conclusion, discussion and recommendations

The previous chapters contained the analysis of the collected information of this research. The three sub questions were answered using these results and analysis. This chapter will use these conclusions and put them together in order to answer the central research question; *'To what extent contributes (new-)parochialism to social control in playgrounds in Acacia and Velve-Lindenhof?'.* To help support the answer, several sub questions were formulated;

- Q1: What kind of public unsafety can be found on both playground-areas?
- Q2: To what extend can motivated offenders, suitable targets and other (than parochial social controllers) kind of guardians of violations be found on both hotspots?
- Q3: To what extend can features of new-parochialism, according to the concept of Carr, be found in both playground-areas?

### 8.1. Conclusion.

The main research question can be answered by using the sub questions that were formulated in order to answer parts of the research question. These question all have the goal to help support an answer for the main research question. First, shortly, the main conclusions for the sub questions.

Q1, the first sub question is answered using data that was available and the findings in the interviews, brought together in appendix 3 till 10. The main findings are that Velve-Lindenhof has no real unsafety in the area any longer, opposed to before the renovation. The safe feeling has improved, Velve-Lindenhof is not a crime hotspot and can no longer be seen as an problem area. On the other hand, Acacia does have public unsafety in the area. The safe feeling of citizens is not guaranteed, it can be stated as a problem area and a crime hotspot, using the data that is available.

Secondly, q2, used the data in appendix 9 & 10 in order to answer the sub question. The main findings in Velve-Lindenhof are that there are not a lot of motivated offenders, but this can change in the future. There are few suitable targets, perhaps only the play garden. And lastly, there are several capable guardians in the neighborhood available. Acacia, however is a different case. There are several motivated offenders present in the neighborhood, there are several suitable targets for motivated offenders (e.g. illegal jobs) and there are no capable guardians. Possible capable guardians, such as leader(s) of the neighborhood, are not know by any of the actors.

Finally, q3 used appendix 6, 7 & 8 in order to give an answer. The most important results are shown in models 7.1 till 7.6 in the previous chapter. This has shown us the progress Velve-Lindenhof has made over the years and during the renovation. We saw that all the factors from Carr are applied in Velve-Lindenhof, before the renovation, with different actors. Together with professionals, the municipality and citizens the stage was set for (informal) social control, according to the model of Carr. Professionals and district coaches had an important role in facilitating and organising initiatives. After the renovation this factor was taken in by citizens (who wished to be unanimous), the professionals and municipality could change to a more facilitating role. This was the luxury of the strong network that existed at that time. Finally, Acacia was observed. Acacia cannot easily be compared to Velve-Lindenhof because they lack a lot of factors within the concept. Figure 7.6 shows that there are a lot of red lines and red factors, meaning that they lack certain factors. Therefore it is very hard to expect that (informal) social control can exist. The main points they lack in are, threats of denial and accountability, no public interference, no community responsibility, no clear leader(s), no main activist, no common value and no integral policy.

All in all there is a clear distinction between Velve-Lindenhof and Acacia. Velve-Lindenhof transformed from a problem area into a better neighborhood where there is lots of social control. Not only by public institutions, but especially by citizens in that neighborhood. Acacia however is still a closed community with not all the factors present mentioned in the model from Carr. The main research question stated in the beginning of this chapter is: *To what extent contributes (new-)parochialism to social control in playgrounds in Acacia and Velve-Lindenhof?* The research question

can be answered by using the conclusions from the sub questions. This question can be divided into the two areas, in which I will answer the main question.

### *Velve-Lindenhof*

First of all we saw that in Velve-Lindenhof, applying the New parochialism, the social control made the neighborhood more safe. All factors are present and can be filled in, in the model. The reason why there is (informal) social control can all be brought back to the concept applied. We can see why citizens and other actors effectively work together in order to improve the safe feeling, and the neighborhood. We saw how professionals played an important role within Velve-Lindenhof. Not only was the New-parochialism applied (in this thesis) in order to give an insight in the social control, but also to see the changing role of professionals and district coaches. At first they had a leading role in initiatives and social control. Later their role changed, from a leading role to a facilitating role, becoming a factor in the public sphere inside the New-parochialism. Figure 8.1 shows their new role in the New-parochialism.




Figure 8.1. New role professionals.

### *Acacia.*

Acacia, as described in the chapters 5, 6 & 7 is a different case. Acacia is not even in the phase of letting go control. Their absence in Acacia has led to the model shown in chapter 7 (model 7.6). The number of red lines and phrases show that there is still a lot of work that needs to be done. One of the most important things, that Velve-Lindenhof has shown, is that there is the need for leading figures within the neighborhood. To achieve effective collaboration between the public and parochial sphere, the first thing that needs to be done is (better) public interference in the area. The public interference within Acacia is not sufficient and needs to be changed. There are several professionals already active in the neighborhood, but they do not work (effective) together with other actors. To fully get an insight in the social control, using the model from Carr, there is the need for an insight in the neighborhood. This needs to be achieved with the help of professionals, district coaches, housing corporations, police, and all other actors available to get an insight in the problems within Acacia.

This way the municipality can find possible leader(s) of the neighborhood, or a shared value between all citizens. By doing so there lies a basis for working together on a shared value. Which was one of the key factors for social control in Velde-Lindenhof to grow and develop. In the next paragraph recommendations will be given based on the example of Velde-Lindenhof and the findings in Acacia. All in all there are several pain points visible in Acacia:

- Denial and Accountability serious threats for (informal) social control;
- No, or not effective, interference from the public sphere;
- No community responsibility;
- Not clear who leader(s) are in Acacia;
- No 'main activist' in Acacia (and no interference from government);
- No common value/goal;
- No integral policy and not clear who important politicians are in the area.

## **8.2. Discussion.**

This paragraph discussed the limitations of this research and also places the research in a context for further research.

This thesis has used the literature from Carr and Cohen & Felson in order to determine the social control and the effect of this in two areas; Velde-Lindenhof and Acacia. The theory of Carr was only used once, and in America. It has not yet been reproduced in other countries, or checking research has been done in scientific research. Therefore the recommendations are based on a single theory that worked in Belway, but not yet in other neighbourhoods. Moreover, it is no guarantee that the recommendations will have the desired effect. Every neighborhood is unique and can have its own dynamic. Furthermore the theory of Carr is still a bit vague and is possibly open for own interpretation. The factors of the model cannot all be operationalised fully in order to make an objective model. Other researches may interpret it differently, which can lead to whole other findings. Although these limitations are present, I still chose for this theory because there are no real models or theories that can explain social control in an area. The advantage of Carr's theory is that he looked at a small neighborhood, and examined it for 5 years.

Secondly, from the 9 people selected for interviews, only 7 were able to answer the questions. N8 and N9 were not available or sick in the time of this research. Because of the lack of time it was not possible to find other people/citizens that had the same characteristics. I chose to take the 7 interviews I had, and base my results on the findings of these people. In order to do a more successful and valid research, a larger group of people needs to be questioned, in all 3 cases (Velde before and after & Acacia). This way the group is increased and answers are more valid. Furthermore, it was hard to find people coming directly out of Acacia because this was a closed community. This was emphasized by the encounter with the administrator of the playground. However this research can still be useful, because as stated in the theory chapter, subject safety should be taken into account. The answers given in the results are based on opinions and fills in the subjective 'safe feeling'. Therefore being of value to further research and conclusions.

In closing I can say that, for further research, a few changes would be necessary. First of all a larger group of respondents should be chosen and interviewed. This increases the validity of the research and results are based on more people. This can cost a lot of time because most interviews lasted for more than one hour. Furthermore, there are several factors, from the model from Carr, that have a straight answer. By including a sort of 'quantitative questionnaires' these questions and answers can be processed quicker, increasing the validity. Another change I would consider is bringing in more statistics about certain areas that are known by the municipality. Due to the time I was not able to include all numbers that were available by the municipality. This adds an objective factor on the safety question. In closing, when comparing Velde-Lindenhof with Acacia, one can chose to look even further back at Velde-Lindenhof in order to compare that situation with how Acacia is currently. Even before the 'before-renovation', there were bigger problems in Velde-Lindenhof and professionals and

municipality were not so active as they were just before the renovation. From there on, even a better and in more detail, path can be described to alter Acacia from a problem area to a neighborhood with a lot of (informal) social control without the municipality being the leader.

### **8.3. Recommendations.**

Based on the conclusions, but with the discussion part in mind, several recommendations shall be given in this paragraph.

First of all there are little improvement points for Velde-Lindenhof. A few things that can become possible threats are:

- Aging among citizens (especially in the neighborhood council, leaders of the neighborhood)
- Responsibility among, and between, citizens.
- The possibility of loitering and vandalism around the play gardens.

These threats are visible for the actors interviewed, and have the potential to be threats to the neighborhood. First of all the first threat is a hard one to battle. The municipality has no real control over this. It is the neighborhood council that can motivate, or bring in younger people that can join the neighborhood council or can become potential leaders of the neighborhood. The municipality can only have facilitative role in this case. Secondly, the responsibility can be mentioned and express it, but it is up to the citizens themselves to do something with it. This can only grow over a period of years and with the help of all actors. Third threat is not yet comprehensive enough because there are play garden administrators that organise everything around the play garden (with the help of the SES). This way there is no change for loitering and vandalism. Moreover, there are several capable guardians that can address these problems and deal with them. However, this needs to be checked and evaluated over the year to maintain it.

So all in all I argue that Velde-Lindenhof has a good basis on which they can continue. The few threats mentioned should be held into account and not be discarded as not important. The municipality and other actors should keep investing in the human relations and the network. It is important that all actors have sight on the important people within the model of Carr.

Secondly I looked at Acacia. Acacia is a more troublesome neighborhood with bigger problems (see chapter 6) and there are more measures needed. Based on the conclusions and the example of Velde-Lindenhof, there are several points of improvement. These can be formulated on the hand of the conclusions in the previous paragraph.

I argue that the municipality should find a way to battle the threats mentioned in the conclusion. The first one is the threat of denial and accountability. Even before the public interference, there are a few simple things actors can do to battle these threats. First of all there is the need for a weekly or monthly integral consultation, to first find problems in the area (battle denial) and then discuss together what the correct approach is (battle accountability). These small interventions can have a huge effect, as did it have in Velde-Lindenhof.

Secondly the public interference can take place. If the interventions are successful and several actors are combined, including professionals, the interference can take place. An integral approach with several professionals on all areas (youth, welfare, corporations, etc.) will have the most effect. A broad, multiple year plan needs to be set up on how Acacia can best be approached. At first the problems need to be clear and the actors need to find a way to get inside the neighborhood Acacia. This is largely a task for professionals, information sharing (if possible) is essential in this stage. These techniques were used in Velde-Lindenhof with positive outcomes.

This interference, done by the public sphere(!), needs to be based on a commonly shared value. As we saw in Velde-Lindenhof, there was a shared value; welfare of children. This value based collaboration led to a community responsibility that motivated citizens and all other actors. This had a huge effect on the social control within Velde-Lindenhof. This is not the case in Acacia, there is no shared value, and projects and assignments are the only measure to help boost social control. This however, is ineffective. Which results in no involvement what so ever from citizens in Acacia. Finding

this shared value among professionals, municipality and mainly the citizens, can be difficult and will probably cost several years.

This integral approach is almost key for all the recommendations. To find the leader(s) of the neighborhood you need to invest in the neighborhood and the human relations. It is for the municipality almost impossible to find these leader(s) by themselves. The role of professionals and district coaches is essential in finding these persons. What we saw in Velve-Lindenhof is that the neighborhood benefited greatly from certain people taking the lead. By directly addressing and involving the leader(s) of the neighborhood, in an integral approach, most parts of Acacia can be reached. As well as finding the main and actual problems. These people can be hard to find. However it is important to look at the different types of authority that are present in the neighborhood, and how certain people fit in these authorities. A leader of a neighborhood council for example, can be not as important as an unofficial neighborhood mayor, which has a big family in the area. This should also be addressed using an integral approach with all involved policy fields and people.

The main activist factor is different though. What we saw in Velve-Lindenhof is that this factor cannot be filled in by citizens at this stage. So there is the need for another actor that can act as an acting 'main activist' within Acacia. So there should be a public interference in this stage. There are several professionals and district coaches available who are capable and able to help citizens and their initiatives to succeed.

That there is no integral policy with all actors is a shortcoming in Acacia. Furthermore model 7.6 showed that the public sphere is poorly represented. In Velve-Lindenhof there were several institutions that were involved in the neighborhood and facilitated the citizens (initiatives). However, in the model of Carr, the public sphere is only facilitative, and does not stand above the parochial sphere. Therefore, the public sphere has no real urgency. If the first recommendations are followed, and they are effective, the public sphere will become more relevant and important. Figure 8.2 summarises and puts the recommendations in the perspective of the model from Carr.




Figure 8.2 recommendations in Acacia.



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## Appendix 1.      Definition integrale veiligheid

### Definitie Integrale Veiligheid

Het integrale veiligheidsterrein omvat vijf 'veiligheidsvelden' met daarbinnen 'veiligheidsthema's'.


De essentie van deze velden: (in deel 2 van deze handreiking worden de velden en thema's verder uitgewerkt)

- 1 *Veilige woon- en leefomgeving*: Veiligheid en leefbaarheid in de alledaagse woon- en leefomgeving, in de wijk, de buurt en de straat. Hoofdthema's zijn sociale kwaliteit, fysieke kwaliteit, objectieve veiligheid en subjectieve veiligheid (veiligheidsgevoel). Bij sociale kwaliteit gaat het vooral om de thema's woonoverlast, alcohol- en drugsoverlast, overlast verwarde personen. Bij fysieke kwaliteit om vernielingen en verloedering/zwerfvuil. Bij objectieve veiligheid om verschillende vormen van vermogens- en geweldscriminaliteit zoals woninginbraak, auto-inbraak, fietsendiefstal, diefstal van motorvoertuigen, straatroof, bedreiging, mishandeling, huiselijk geweld.
- 2 *Bedrijvigheid en veiligheid*: Sociale veiligheid (overlast, geweld, vermogenscriminaliteit, ondermijning) rond verschillende vormen/locaties van bedrijvigheid: winkelgebied, bedrijventerreinen, uitgaansgebied, evenementen en toerismevoorzieningen/-locaties.
- 3 *Jeugd en veiligheid*: Jeugdoverlast en -criminaliteit, problematische individuele jongeren, veilig in en om de school, alcohol en drugsgebruik door jongeren.
- 4 *Fysieke veiligheid*: Verkeersveiligheid, brandveiligheid, externe veiligheid (rond gevaarlijke stoffen) en voorbereiding op crisisbeheersing.
- 5 *Integriteit en veiligheid*: Verschijnselen die meer fundamenteel onze rechtsorde en veiligheid bedreigen: radicalisering en polarisatie, georganiseerde (ondermijnende) criminaliteit, Veilige Publieke Taak, informatieveiligheid en ambtelijke en bestuurlijke integriteit.

*Van Gaalen, Et al., 2017, p. 5*


## Appendix 2. Models with denial and accountability

### Model 1. Denial and accountability as negative discourses.



In this first model we see that 'denial' and 'accountability' have an influence on the parochial level of control. They are separate from each other because they can exist together between citizens but can also be competitive with each other. In total, the parochial, public and discourses show us the 'New parochialism' as meant by Carr (2005).

### Model 2. Public interference.




In this model we see clear that all the interference and citizens thoughts are outside the 'New parochialism' because they don't belong there. What is different here is that public interference can cause that 'denial' and 'accountability' alter to 'community responsibility' which is positive instead of negative for the parochial level of control. From then on it is up to the main activist and leader(s) of the neighborhood to pick it up (e.g. a neighborhood watch) and maintain it. Possible with the help from the public level of control (e.g. funding's).

### Model 3. Example of 'New parochialism'.

In order to visualise the ideas and models used in chapter 2 I will take the example from the book and apply the models, which are extendedly explained. First of all I will describe the problem following the 'new parochialism' theory from Carr (2005). The model is stated in appendix 2, model

2. Following this model and the example, it look like this. In this model we can see the workings of Beltway in dealing with gang members but also how it came in existent. First of all I will explain the boxes at the top, outside the square.



**Denial:** citizens would not accept that there were gangs in the neighborhood because there were no obvious signs (all graffiti got removed immediately).

**Accountability:** as said before accountability and denial can compete or exist next to each other among citizens. In this case they were both present. Some citizens held the school responsible because they have all the children for the most part of the day and should see signs that are gang-related. Other people, school staff among them, blamed the parents who do not have enough control over their children.

**Public interference.** As Carr stated in his research is that in such a case public interference can help boost social control by changing denial and accountability to community responsibility. The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS) set to promote community responsibility by training citizens in certain neighbourhoods. They have been contracted by the Chicago Police Department to run Joint Community Police Training (JCPT) (Carr, 2005). On this

occasion they went to neighbourhoods and arranged meetings for citizens to train them to deal with community problems.

**Community Responsibility:** These trainings and help with problem solving had their results. The factors 'denial' and 'accountability' were transformed in community responsibility: Community is responsible and should (and can) solve it together. With the help of the training the citizens now also have the means and knowledge to deal with problems (within their possibilities).

**Parochial (level of control):** This level is key for the success of groups (Beltway Night Control) and informal social control. First of all the leaders of the neighborhood are Jane Pratt and Public people, who did help set up certain groups such as the CANS and police department. The main activist was and still is after the interference from the CANS is Jane Pratt. She helps sustain the groups and has a leading role within this neighborhood. Furthermore they have very specific goals set up, in front. The first one is '*promote neighborhood safety by patrolling the community and contacting police and proper authorities when action is required*' (p.128). The second one is '*to access community problems through the use of problem-solving techniques*' (p.128). Coming towards common goals for a group is crucial according to Carr in maintaining a group, as is also illustrated in his book in examples. But the neighborhood did not left it by these two common goals, in its first year they also had some other goals. First of all was the need for financial self-sufficiency, second the need to reduce disorder in the neighborhood and third the need to ensure that every home address in the area was identifiable (Carr, 2005). A lot of effort was put into this common goals.

**Public (level of control):** This last level is sort of supportive for the parochial level of control. One of the most common support is the financial support, however the neighborhood quickly had fundraisers and became financial independent. However they are still supported by institutions as the police and the CANS in order to give advice in certain situations.



## Appendix 3. Acacia

Figure 1, playground Acacia.



Figure 2, linked houses.






Figure 4, front gardens Acacia.





Figure 5, playgarden 'Robinia'.





## Appendix 4. Velve-Lindenholz







## Appendix 5. Question list.

Vragenlijst per onderwerp.

### Leaders:

#### **Wie zijn de voortrekkers van de raad?**

Hoe is de raad tot stand gekomen? Door wie?

Hoe worden de leiders van de raad gekozen?

Is er veel vernieuwing binnen de wijkraad? Nieuwe personen?

### Main activist:

Stel een groep mensen wil iets nieuws, hoe gaat dit in zijn werk?

Is dit veel voorgekomen binnen de wijk?

#### **Wie waren deze personen? Altijd dezelfde?**

Wat is de kans van slagen voor projecten die binnenkomen bij de wijkraad?

### Veiligheid.

Zijn er tot op heden nog veel veiligheidsproblemen geweest in Velve-Lindenhof?

#### **Wat zijn geslaagde initiatieven die tot op heden nog steeds in werking zijn? Wijkbewaking e.g.?**

Was Velve-Lindenhof destijds een hotspot? C.q. probleemwijk?

Zien de mensen Velve-Lindenhof (nog altijd) als een probleemwijk?

### Samenwerking.

#### **Waar werken jullie allemaal mee samen? Welke instanties of personen?**

Is er een actieve betrekking van de burgers? Op jullie site staan verschillende mogelijkheden tot inspraak, wordt hier ook gebruik van gemaakt?

### Doelen.

#### **Wat zijn de doelen van de wijkraad?**

Wat zijn de doelen van eventuele andere groepen binnen de wijk?

### Politieke personen/instanties

#### **Welke personen binnen de gemeente hebben jullie geholpen bepaalde doelen te realiseren?**

#### **Waren deze makkelijk te bereiken?**

Zijn deze personen nog steeds betrokken?

#### **Welke instanties of fondsen worden het meest aangewend of gebruikt om doelen te realiseren?**

### Moeilijkheden.

Wat zijn de voornaamste problemen waar jullie tegen aan lopen?

#### **(Verantwoording niet voelen / ontkennen dat er problemen zijn)**

Zijn er ook initiatieven geweest die geen kans van slagen hadden?

Zijn er ook groepen geweest die niet geslaagd waren?

### Groepen binnen de wijk (dus alles behalve de wijkraad).

Wie zijn de groepen?

Hoe hebben zij het zolang in stand kunnen houden?

Hebben zij een bepaalde strategie?

#### **Hoe komen zij aan middelen?**

Hoe zijn de groepen ontstaan?

Is er veel overeenstemming over de groepen binnen de wijk?

## Appendix 6. Velve-Lindenhof (before renovation, New-parochialism.

Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Denial		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Accountability		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Public interference
	N1	Neighborhood council meetings, meeting about old subjects (p. 11)			N1	MIRO-rellen, who has to deal with it? (p. 7)			N1	Not mentioned
	N5	Neighborhood center no contact with problem children (p. 2)			N5	Professionals jumped in when problems occurred (p. 10)			N5	Professionals did in family systems (p. 2) Professionals before renovation, represent all citizens (p. 7) Setting frameworks for initiatives, help setting it up (p. 9)
	N7	Different approaches from different people (p. 10)			N7	Human changes in organisations make it hard to keep a good working relationship (p. 9)			N7	Carte blanche from municipality (p. 2). Integral approach (p. 3). Winning trust of citizens (p. 7). Long term working, based on trust between actors (p. 9) Room from local council to act (p. 10). Evaluation (e.g. after a intervention) (p. 11). Value driven cooperation (p. 13).
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a
Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Community Responsibility		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Leader(s) of the neighborhood		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Main Activist
	N1	Not mentioned			N1	Gerrit Ansink and Marinus Gouma (p. 2)			N1	Neighborhood Council (p. 13)
	N5	Combining key figures to unite citizens (p. 9) Due to help professionals initiatives could be accomplished (p. 15). Acceptation within the whole neighborhood (p. 9) Strong collaboration between municipality and citizens (p. 11) Value driven cooperation (p. 13).			N5	Hannes Kiel (p. 2) Marinus gouma (different) (p. 5) Gerrit Ansink (p. 13)			N5	Neighborhood Council (p. 5) Bouwmaatjes (p. 7)
	N7				N7	Gerrit Ansink (p. 8) Marinus Gouma (p. 12). Hannes Kiel (p. 13)			N7	Neighborhood council (p. 4) In this case professionals (p. 4 & 11).
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a



Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Main Activities		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Politician(s)		Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Institutions
	N1	13 commissions that did something for the neighborhood (p. 2) Dealing with prostitutes and drugs (p. 13) Creating a beautiful neighborhood (p. 13)			N1	Barrie Langkamp (p. 9)			N1	Not mentioned
	N5	Future of children (p. 1 & 4). Controlling problems and solving them (p. 4). Earning trust of citizens (p. 8)			N5	Political figures from VVD (p. 8)			N5	Good collaboration with municipality (p. 4) Not always a good collaboration with Neighborhood Council (p. 12)
	N7	Children (p. 3)			N7	Hans smies(?) (p. 6). Mans (p. 6)			N7	Guarantee from municipality (p. 5). Neighborhoodcorporation (p. 5)
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a
Velve-Lindenhof (before)	Person	Professionals								
	N1	Not mentioned								
	N5	Jarabe (p. 1) Bennie Beuvink (p. 1) Chantal Schulte-Schieving, ons-huis (p. 15) Key role professionals (p. 2) Good cooperation with all actors (p. 4)								
	N7	School as central finding place of social problems with professionals (p. 3). Freedom to act (p. 8). Bennie Beuvink (p. 12)								
	N8	n/a								

## Appendix 7. Velve-Lindenhorf (after renovation, New-parochialism)

Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Denial		Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Accountability		Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Public interference
	N1	No. Council is very active to prevent this (p. 7)			N1	No. Council is very active to prevent this (p. 7)			N1	Weekly consultation hour involved actors (p. 4) Active neighborhood council (p. 4) Immediate action from neighborhood council when noticing problem (p. 8) correct use of power tool (council vs. Public) (p. 13)
	N4	No, District management knows what the main problems in Velve-Lindenhorf are (p. 3) Neighborhood council are the eyes for the municipality (p. 5) Adressing other citizens not fully satisfactorily (p. 6)			N4	No, Municipality main problem solver, neighborhood advisory organ (p. 3) Municipality decides how problems should be addressed, and with who (p. 5)			N4	Not really needed, citizens should organise itself (p. 3) Municipality needs citizens to solve problems (p. 4) Problem groups are addressed but also heard (p. 9) Different attitude for every problem (p. 11) Municipality does not want a leading role in initiatives (p. 11)
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a
Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Community Responsibility		Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Leader(s) of the neighborhood		Velve-Lindenhorf (after)	Person	Main Activist
	N1	Velve-Lindenhorf feels like a village instead of neighborhood (p. 2) Wijkkrant, volunteers asking, activities (p. 12)			N1	Marinus Gouma, Slessor Ettiene (p. 1)			N1	Ronnie, and others (p. 1) Same people who apply for district budget (p. 6)
	N4	Yes, but only because all actors work efficient together (p. 3) Revenue model, citizens effort is rewarded in the neighborhood (p. 4)			N4	Hannes Kiel, Hamers(?) (p. 7) Neighborhood council (p. 11)			N4	A lot of active people outside the neighborhood council (p. 2) Velveinactie (p. 2) Vleeshouwerij, speeltuin (p. 2) Velviaan-overleg (p. 11)
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a

Velve-Linden <span>hof</span> (after)	Person	Main Activities		Velve-Linden <span>hof</span> (after)	Person	Politician(s)		Velve-Linden <span>hof</span> (after)	Person	Institutions
	N1	Vleeshouwerij (p. 3) Wijkschouw (p. 4) Burgerteam (p. 8) Well-being of the neighborhood (p. 4, 8 & 10) Monthly meeting (p. 10) Multifunctional building with a lot of activities (p. 11)			N1	Neighborhood director (p. 8) Barrie Langkamp (p. 9)			N1	Agreements with municipality and other actors about the neighborhood (e.g. police, housing associations) (p. 4) District budget (p. 5)
	N4	Bringing together parties (p. 5) Children (p. 7 & 8) Getting people involved in the neighborhood (p. 10)			N4	Not mentioned			N4	District budget (p. 9)
	N8	n/a			N8	n/a			N8	n/a
Velve-Linden <span>hof</span> (after)	Person	Professionals								
	N1	Wijkagent (p. 8) Good collaboration with police (p. 8)								
	N4	Youth work, welfarework (p. 1) Working integrally with all parties necessary (p. 5) Looking at the networks that develop over time (p. 10)								
	N8	n/a								

## Appendix 8. Acacia. (New-parochialism)

Acacia	Person	Denial?	Acacia	Person	Accountability	Acacia	Person	Public interference
	N2	Yes! Few initiatives from Acacia (p. 5) No involvement in consultation (p. 6) People have their own problems (p. 6) People's limits are lower than standard (p. 7)		N2	Yes! There are no real problems (p. 7). Professionals should see problems better than us (p. 7). When the problem is too big, municipality should act (p. 7)		N2	No! Contact between municipality not great (p. 2) Shifts in council, civil servant shifts (p. 3) No monthly consultation (p. 4).
	N3	Yes, people solve their own problems (not always legal) (p. 5) Problems first have to become big (p. 9) See no clear problem between neighborhood council and municipality (p. 13)		N3	People in Acacia mostly deal with their own problems (p. 5) Problems with authority (p. 6) Busroute, province did not inform municipality (p. 14)		N3	Yes, assignments to professionals (p. 4 & 10) Professionals main interference (p. 4) Problems with authority makes it hard to interference (p. 6) Bettus Siemerink (p. 3) Only municipality interference when the problem is substantial (p. 9)
	N6	Yes, lack of a strong leader within Acacia (p. 5) SES helps finances playgardens (p. 8)		N6	Yes! Municipality only looks at numbers (p. 7)		N6	Difficult where to put an interference, but neighborhood district know's this (p. 5) no proces evaluation (p. 9)
	N9	n/a		N9	n/a		N9	n/a
Acacia	Person	Community Responsibility	Acacia	Person	Leader(s) of the neighborhood	Acacia	Person	Main Activist
	N2	No, no involvement from Acacia in Stadsveld (p. 5) No common identity in Stadsveld (p. 6). Homogeneous area within the neighborhood (p. 6)		N2	Hans maarten van der Ben (p. 3) Neighborhood Council (p. 8)		N2	Mainly neighborhood council (p. 7) Woman who want's to battle dog poop (p. 8)
	N3	Big area, hard to have common neighborhood feeling (p. 1) Recent years decline in neighborhood initiatives (p. 2)		N3	Not known by municipality (p. 4) Neighborhood council need to reinvent themselves (p. 12)		N3	No people from Acacia in neighborhood council (p. 1) Direct social control around playground Robinia (p. 6)
	N6	Not mentioned		N6	No person (p. 4) Patience (p. 6)		N6	A few that arrange daily work, no names (p. 2)
	N9	n/a		N9	n/a		N9	n/a



Acacia	Person	Main activities		Acacia	Person	Politician(s)		Acacia	Person	Institutions
	N2	Being well informed (p. 4) Advisory role (p. 4)			N2	A woman who helps boost initiatives (p. 5)			N2	Yes, does not mention any, neighborhood budget (p. 5)
	N3	Playground activities (p. 5) Main common goal: Child (p. 5)			N3	Hans Koning ter Heege (p. 7) Few people from the SP (self-interest)(p. 12)			N3	Neighborhood budgets, Jijmaaktdebuurt (p. 2) Small district budget (p. 7)
	N6	Providing safe playing place for children(p. 1 & 3) Social cohesion (p. 1) Free activities for all (p. 3)			N6	Collaboration between municipality and all actors is very bad (p. 7)			N6	negative influence on social control, e.g. hulptukker (p. 7) People on playgrounds not always capable (p.
	N9	n/a			N9	n/a			N9	n/a
Acacia	Person	Professionals								
	N2	Have a big role, know what's going on (p. 4). Youth workers now most (p. 8)								
	N3	Bettus Siemerink, help set up neighborhood council (p. 3) Aliva (p. 3) Marijke van Oostende, boost initiatives (p. 7)								
	N6	Aliva, good and bad professionals (p. 9) Poor collaboration (p. 12)								
	N9	n/a								

## Appendix 9. Cohen and Felson (1979) Velve-Lindenhof.

Velve-Lindenhof	Person:	Motivated Offenders	Suitable targets	Absence of guardians
	N1	Activities in neighborhood to boost social control (p. 13). Still some poverty and rent houses, so problems can occur (p. 14).	Is prevented by the neighborhood council and citizens (p. 8). Special app where people can mention loitering or vandalism (p. 9)	Wijkschouw & Burgerteam walks through the neighborhood in order to prevent crimes and disturbances. (p. 4)
	N4	Only one who has a view of motivated offenders is municipality (p. 6). Schooldropouts, poor family line are possible motivated offenders (p. 8). Low chance of being caught (p. 9)	Playgrounds can be possible loitering places (p.1). Wijkschouw in cooperation with municipality weekly check for debris (p. 5).	Possible danger of aging in neighborhood council as guardians (p. 3) Neighborhood council not able to deal with people who live in poverty (p. 6)
	N5	lot of people below poverty line (p. 7). Bringing food on the table for the family (p. 7). No jobs (p. 10).	Collecting old iron illegal (p. 8).	Adequate leaders of the neighborhood (p. 1). Effective provided that all leaders work together (p. 5).
	N6	Unemployed citizens (p. 1). Closed family system (p. 6).	Playgrounds sensitive for vandals (p. 4).	Workers/ board of play gardens effective guardians (p. 2). Playground central role in social control (p. 3). Bad cooperation with professionals can lead to absence (p. 9).
	N7	Drugsdealer, low chance of getting caught (p. 7). Money as motivation (p. 4)	Nuisance premises (p. 2) No control from municipality (p. 7)	Neighborhood council has picked this up (p. 3)
	N8	n/a	n/a	n/a

## Appendix 10. Cohen and Felson (1979) Acacia, Stadsveld.

Acacia	Person:	Motivated Offenders	Suitable targets	Absence of guardians
	N2	Neighborhood council no sight on this area (p. 1). Different culture (p. 5). Differences in income (p. 6).	Rough neighborhood (p. 5). Cruyfcourt, Hatterlerplaza, Krajceckveld, loitering places (p. 6).	Lines between people are short, positive in adresssing people (p. 3). No monthly/weekly contact with municiplaty, no sharing of info (p. 4). No active ties with neighborhood council (p. 6).
	N3	Relatively poor (p. 1). Competition between families (p. 5). Children are central, people do everything for them (p. 5). Problem with authority (p. 6). Neighbor fights (p. 6).	Outdated houses (p. 6). Cruyfcourt, Hatterlerplaza, Krajceckveld, loitering places (p. 9).	Autonomous system Acacia (p. 1). Closed community (p. 1, 5). Professionals hired to ballte these negative points (p. 3, 10). No joint consultation between all actors involved (p. 10).
	N6	No social control from leader (within the neighborhood) (p. 6)	Tolerance zone (p. 6).	No Leader(s) of the neighborhood (p. 5). Every time new college and council (p. 6). Aliva not effective (p. 9). amateurism in council and civil service (p. 10)
	N9	n/a	n/a	n/a

## Appendix 11. Resource mobilization.

### **Agency.**

*Collective action:* a plan of citizens that are willing to do an action or set up a group. A detailed plan from begging to end for this. A municipality can help set up a plan in this stage. This can be put under the factor; 'public interference'. In this stage the actors involved can chose who is best suited to help in this stage.

### **Strategy.**

*Public education.* This is a task for the 'main activist'. It is up to these people to organise and gather people to join the action or group. In the example of Acacia we see that this is a role for professionals and district coaches. However, it is important to gather and involve citizens in order to learn and educate them on how to do so.

*Structural change.* This has to be seen in a wider whole. The group or action should, in an ideal situation, contribute to structural change in a neighborhood. Why needs this to been seen in a bigger whole? Because then the common value that is present in a neighborhood ensures that the group will last over a longer time and people are more willing to participate in the group. So for example in Velve-Lindenhof, actions and groups should always set the 'child' central.

*Direct service.* The action or group should provide a direct service. A simple example used in Velve-Lindenhof, is a day to 'Slagharen'. A day out with the children, for the children. This fills in this criteria, but does not fill in the other two factors in this criteria.

### **Organization.**

*#Type meetings.* Types of meetings says something about the number of meetings, and the type of meetings. This criteria is therefore easy to measure and evaluate. This can be measured and evaluated by looking at the meetings and evaluate them by the other criteria mentioned above. This can also be achieved by organising meetings in advance.

*Task committees.* Task committees are groups that perform outside the core group and are autonomous from the group. This can be measure the same way as the types of meetings, after every month, in counting these groups and/or actions.