

# The influence of (non) governmental donors on the successful implementation of the Education For All policy in Nepal and Pakistan

A comparative case study research by Anna-Lena Karl



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successful implementation of the Education For All  
policy in Nepal and Pakistan

A comparative case study research by Anna-Lena Karl  
(s1869388)

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University of Twente, Enschede

Westfälische Wilhelmsuniversität, Münster

First Supervisor: Dr. Harry de Boer

Second Supervisor: Dr. Veronica Junjan

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## Abstract

In 2000, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) formulated and implemented the Education For All (EFA) policy with the support of numerous donors to increase quality of education and literacy rates worldwide. In this research, the influence of (non) governmental donors on the EFA policy implementation is analysed proposing the following research question: In which way do the different roles of western donors contribute to the success and failure of the implementation of the UNESCO Education For All policy in Nepal and Pakistan between 2000 and 2015? The aim of this research is to contribute to scientific research on policies as instrument of development aid and on effectiveness of international aid partnerships. Using the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a framework for the analysis, this research investigates behaviour of the EU, the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and three international NGOs. Data is gathered through document research and expert interviews. The findings indicate that no significant difference between donor behaviour in both countries is existent and donors equally contribute to the successful implementation through ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. Moreover, the findings indicate that infrastructural, societal and political differences indicate a cause for the different policy successfulness. Hence, the thesis contributes relevant findings to the literature on policy implementation and practical advice for a new approach to donor policies.

*Keywords:* Policy implementation, international aid donors, Education For All policy, Ownership, Alignment, Mutual Accountability

## 1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, international education policies have been implemented by development organisations to increase literacy worldwide (Niño-Zarazúa, 2016). Ever since an ongoing debate about education aid effectiveness has occupied international donor institutions (Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Michaelowa, 2004). The discussion peaked in 2005 when international donors<sup>1</sup> and partners<sup>2</sup> signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to increase the effectiveness of aid partnerships worldwide (Bigsten, Tengstam, Platteau & Aldashev, 2015).

In 2000, UNESCO implemented the *Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments* agenda which is hereafter referred to as the Education For All (EFA) policy, to increase literacy scores worldwide. The policy served as a strategy to effectively increase development cooperation through rationalization of donor behaviour (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015). Large amount of bilateral, multilateral and international financial aid was allocated by several governmental, non-governmental and private donors to reach the goals (OECD, 2012). For each country, a national policy plan was written in order to achieve the EFA policy's six goals of Early Childhood care and education, Universal primary education, Youth and Adult skills, Adult literacy, Gender equality and Quality of Education (UNESCO, 2015). In order to quantitatively analyse the progress of the policy, the Education For All Development Index (EDI) was created by UNESCO based on the four goals universal primary education, adult literacy, the quality of education and gender parity and equality (UNESCO, 2015a). The findings of the report indicate that the most frequently low scoring countries are located in South Asia (ibid). In 2011, the average youth literacy rate was 84.76% for Nepal and

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<sup>1</sup> For this research, the term *donors* incorporates international donor organizations and institutions. This includes the EU, national government organizations, Non-governmental organizations and non-profit organizations. Regarding research on health policy, donors are classified as “governments, multilateral agencies and private agencies that provide funds or conduct activities with the stated aim of improving health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)” (Khan, Meghani, Liverani, Roychowdhury & Parkhurst, 2018). More broadly, Ahsan (2003) argues “The terms foreign, international, external or development aid, or assistance, are considered here to be the actions taken by government, institutions or people in one country towards the government, institutions or people of another country.” (p. 236). The definition as adopted for this research reads: Donors are western governments, multilateral agencies, institutions, private agencies and people in one country that provide funds or conduct activities with the stated aim of improving health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

<sup>2</sup> For this research, the term *partners* incorporates all national and local governments, institutions and private actors. Private actors can be “religious or non-religious organizations, local or transnational school chains or single providers, for-profit or not-for-profit” (Moschetti & Verger, 2017, p. 5). This includes Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Zafar, 2015). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses the term *partners* interchangeably with the term *recipients* (OECD, 2012). For this research a joint definition is created. Thus, partners are defined as “governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions that receive goods and services from donors”.

70.77% for Pakistan (World Bank Group, 2018). While both countries have received substantial contributions from donor countries, the countries differ strongly in the literacy score and both failed to reach the overall goal of 97% net enrolment in the country by 2015 (UNESCO, 2015). The observable performance discrepancy between two countries that both receive substantial donor aid has provided the incentive for this research.

The aim of this research is to identify factors for the effectiveness of international aid partnerships and contribute to research on policies as instruments of development aid. The goal of this thesis is to describe the activities of donors in Nepal and Pakistan and explore differences in the contribution to the EFA policy using the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. The focus is on donor activities related to the second EFA goal – universal primary and secondary education - as citizens who have access to education have access to develop literacy skills (Comings, 2018). Hence, the research examines the question: *In which ways do western donors contribute to the success and failure of the implementation of the UNESCO Education For All policy in Nepal and Pakistan between 2000 and 2015?* The question is supported by the following two sub-questions: *How does the contribution of western donors to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal and Pakistan in 200-2015 differ between countries in which they are active? How does the contribution of western donors to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal and Pakistan in 200-2015 differ between different donor types?*

As Hobbes (2014) points out, actors involved in development cooperation “do not know what works, where, or why” (p.6). This research contributes to literature on policy implementation and provides insights about the effectiveness of the Paris Declaration as exploratory framework for effective aid. Based on the findings of this research, insights about a sustainable donor-recipient relationship to improve development cooperation in the long run, can be gained (Molenaers and Renard, 2008). Additionally, while the success in each country has been reported, this research provides a two-country comparison which is still absent (UNESCO, 2015). More practically, the research contributes significant factors for the successful implementation of future education aid policies and can be used to develop a new worldwide education agenda which has not yet been developed (Gulrajani, 2014). A new framework is especially necessary for Pakistan (Ahmad, Rauf, Imdadullah & Zeb, 2012). Policy research can provide relevant insights for successful policy frameworks to meet future goals (Collier & Dollar, 2001). Lastly, the findings contribute to insights about the relationship of donors and recipients which is scientifically as well as societally relevant for transparent exchange and trust-based relationships among international actors and societies (OECD, 2012).

In the following paragraphs, the theoretical framework is elaborated and the underlying methodology to conduct the research is outlined. The theoretical framework is divided in a description of donor involvement followed by an elaboration of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness to provide five exploratory factors of donor contribution. The methodology displays a coding scheme which is applied in the analysis to outline results of document research and interviews. Following the analysis, differences between both cases Nepal and Pakistan are extracted and the key contributions of this research are discussed. Finally, conclusions and implications are derived and incentives for further research are provided.

## 2. Theory

Leading theories of policy implementation literature are described before the influence of donor involvement on policy implementation is outlined. Based on this, the Paris Declaration is described as a framework for analysis and finally, expectations are developed.

### 2.1 Policy implementation

Howlett et al. (2009) develop five stages of the process of policy: Agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy-implementation and policy evaluation. While the government designs the goals, the implementation relies on organizations such as schools, hospitals and prisons (Clarke, 2008; Osborne, 2006)<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the government relies on the ability and capability of autonomous groups to reach the decided-on goals of the policy (Steen, Scherpenisse, Twist & Hart, 2015). The relationship between the policy maker (principal) and policy implementer (agent) is described by the principle-agent theory. Weber argues that the agent's deviating personal interests and goals from those of the principle leads to deviations of the policy implementation (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari, 2007). Commonly, the principle relies on the agent to contribute to the design and implementation of a policy, because the agent has expertise on a certain policy field. Additionally, the principle relies on the agent's own reports of actions and cannot with certainty know the actions of the agent. This enables the agents to perform tasks with minimal efforts. This asymmetry of information provides an incentive for the agent to deviate from the original policy when implementing it. Thus, the

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<sup>3</sup> Next to theorised factors of policy implementation, unintended circumstances like natural disasters, strong shifts in the public opinion or regime changes can influence unexpectedly the implementation of policies (Dunn, 2016).



successful implementation of policy can be restricted by the asymmetry of information and execution of tasks between the principle and the agent.

In his book, Lipsky (1980) argues that policy implementation requires contact staff at the local level which he labels '*Street - Level Bureaucrats*'. As policy cannot be defined precisely for all cases, the Street Level Bureaucrats develop coping mechanisms with a high level of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority to implement the policy. Lipsky's core argument is that policy is not only implemented but made at the Street-Level: "it is the decisions of street-level bureaucrats [...] that effectively become the public policies they carry out (Lipsky, 1980, p. 200). Thus, the successful implementation of policy depends on the relationships between principals and agents and can be influenced by actions of policy makers as well as policy implementers.

## 2.2 Involvement of donors

According to McConnell (2010) the successful implementation of a policy is influenced by the programme, process and political framework. Based on literature, profound research has been conducted about factors like centralization and network dynamics that influence the successful implementation of policy (Ali, 2006; Busetti and Dente, 2018; Eade, 2004; Heyneman & Lee, 2016; Martensens, 2008; Smit, 2005; Suratman, 2013). The influence of international donors on policy implementation has been subject to research and literature with diverse insights on discussions about effectiveness of donor behaviour, conflict of donor interests and financial aid indicates a possible influence of donor activities on the successful implementation of policy (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; Ika & Donnelly, 2017;). Since the Marshall plan aid policies have been a dominant instrument to improve country capacities and since 1990 education aid policies with a focus on primary education provision have evolved (Heyneman & Lee, 2016). For states that are dependent on external aid to implement policies, international donors are involved as donors to reduce uncertainties for aid exchange (Martensens, 2008). Additionally, donors can influence policy by dominating the decision which policies are implemented and the focus of the implemented policies (Eade, 2004). Stokke (1995) argues that, for donor governments, the motive of development assistance is "an instrument to pursue foreign policy objectives." (p.2). Thus, the success of a policy is variable. Moreover, success can dependent on interests and activities of donors. In the following paragraphs, the possible role of donors on the successful implementation of policies is more explicitly described. The possible influence on capacity development, monetary support and influence of donors are outlined.

### 2.2.1 Skill and knowledge capacity development

Donors can influence policy implementation by the support of capacity development (CD) in developing countries. In the literature, no unitary definition of capacity development has been established (Black, 2003). For his research, Brinkerhoff (2010) conceptualizes capacity as a field concerned with the “aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions necessary to act efficiently to achieve some intended purpose” (p.66). The purpose of development of capacity can be intended at multiple levels (individuals, organizations and institutions) and address numerous targets. Donors target capacity for stronger political influence and incentives as well as socio-economic development (Pronk, 2001). One aspect of socio-economic targeting is the capacity development of skills and knowledge which is achieved by means of trainings, study tours, technical assistance and technology transfer (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Research by Ika and Donnelly (2017) indicates that institutional capacity building is a significant success factor for development policies. Donors engaged in international development policies frequently design programs to strengthen institutions, yet the donor focus on fast and quantifiable results hinders the implementation of these programs (Datta, Shaxson & Pellini, 2012). Additionally, partnerships for capacity enable the provision of resources and knowledge and strengthen weak political and administrative systems (Worboys & Lockwood, 2007). For partnerships to be successful, communities must accept and anticipate change (Mohamad, Kesava, Razzaq, Hamzah & Khalifah, 2013). Mercer (2014) remarks that capacity building has been successfully implemented at high institutions for instance the ministry of education, but decentralized regions have not yet received enough attention. Consequently, by increasing the knowledge and skills of partners and investments in human resources, donors can possibly influence the successful implementation of policy and thus the extent of literacy through capacity building.

### 2.2.2 Specification of direction for monetary support

Donors can influence the recipient countries’ policy implementation by the specificity of the destinations of funds. For instance, earmarked funds, funds directed towards a certain project or sector, are used by donors to bypass local governments and target their influence more precisely (Eichenauer & Reinsberg, 2017; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000; Pettersson, 2007). Although research on effects of earmarked aid is scarce, research on the effectiveness of project-oriented funds indicates that donor weaken local government structures and omit the effective creation of public sectors by applying their own financial management while providing funds (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Eichenauer & Reinsberg, 2017; Knack, 2013).

Additionally, by supporting individual project areas, donors create small spots with high knowledge that might not be sustainable (Riddell and Niño-Zarazúa, 2016).

On the contrary, donors can direct their monetary aid towards programs or the overall national budget (macro support) (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006; Riddell and Niño-Zarazúa, 2016). The support of education programs increases the spread of knowledge across sectors and geographical areas. While the implementation of the program aid approach by donors is still limited, findings by Boak and Ndaruhutse (2011) indicate that using program-based aid modalities increases relations of donors and partner governments. Regarding the macro support to aid policies, commitment and a good governance environment in the recipient country is needed for the success of this partnership approach (Molenaers, Gagiano, Mets & Dellepiane, 2015). Through macro support, fiscal autonomy is granted to national governments and ex-post conditions based on whether actions are completed, emphasized. Furthermore, the approach decreases the amount of fragmented donor aid and supports the development of national public-sector capacities (Knack, 2013). Consequently, by specifying monetary support as earmarked funding or providing budget support, donors can possibly influence the successful implementation of policy and thus the extent of literacy through the specification of direction for monetary support.

### 2.2.3 Interests of donors

Donors can influence the subject of development policies based on their intrinsic preferences. Policies that are implemented are linked to certain goals that must be satisfied by the policy (McConnell, 2010). Scholars argue that donors dictate the goals of development policies and thereby enforce their own interests (Howlett and Giest, 2013; Peters, 2010; Giessen & Rahman, 2017). Practitioners indicate that donors “are driven by heterogeneous and sometimes incompatible objectives” which limits the representation of partner country interests in development policies (Development Partners Working Group, 2010). The donor interest model developed by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) predicts that “donors use aid instrumentally to promote their own economic, political and security interests” (Weiler, Klöck & Dornan, 2018, p.66). In their research, Ika and Donnelly (2017), distinguish between formal and informal interests and argue that regarding formal interests, donors aim to influence strategic policy designs and ensure that their interests are represented in the final development policies. Actors defend their interests in shaping the policy debate blocking or executing certain aspects of policy issues (Öberg & Thelander, 2015). Informal interests resolve from donors are bureaucratic agencies who have a constituency in the national country that. Hoeffler and

Outram (2011) conducted an in depth study about donor interests and found that donor's self-interests outweigh development interests in policy creation. Consequently, with the ability to decide during the policy discussions which issues are included and excluded from development policies, donors can possibly influence the successful implementation of policy and thus the extent of literacy through their interests.

In 2000, a new aid approach was enforced by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in order to reduce donor influence on (development) policies. Within the frame of the new aid approach, a new relationship between donors and recipient governments is suggested, aimed at providing more alignment and harmonization of the relationship (Molenaers and Renard, 2008). Riddell and Niño-Zarazúca, (2016) find that the necessity to create alignment, as success indicator of aid policy, leads to increased involvement of donors in planning and information management. This increases the quality and measurability of aid policies. Additionally, increasing accountability and quality of the partners ensures participation to of the partner to the donor. Mutual accountability decreases information asymmetry of principals and agents and thus creates more trust to the agent. With more trust towards the agent, the principal can more trustfully rely on the information and expertise of the agent and implement policies more successfully (Macey, 1992).

### 2.3 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

In 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was adopted by the OECD in order to first define partnership commitments that increase the effectivity of donor-recipient relationships and second, development aid policies by strengthening country systems (OECD, 2005). Several stakeholders including members of supranational organizations to local activists participated in the creation of the goals and strategy to implement the policy (OECD, 2012). The declaration entails key principles for international partnerships *Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual accountability* that provide an action framework for both donors and partners to conduct activities successfully and effectively in the future (OECD, 2005). All institutions that signed the Paris Declaration, commit to the implementation of the aforementioned principles in their development cooperation provision. The principles are developed based on profound experience from cross-sectoral aid practices and policies of OECD member states.

The declaration has a strong focus on the creation and sustainment of a partnership approach towards development cooperation. Donors of the OECD aim at providing more effective aid by increasing the responsibility of partner countries, and reducing the direct

involvement of donors (OECD, 2005). In the policy document, several descriptions of appropriate behavior to execute the commitments are listed, addressing partners as well as western donors. Additionally, quantitative indicators are developed that define the concepts of the five commitments more precisely and provide a clearer expectation of actions and results. A distinguishing feature of the Paris Declaration is that both donors and partners mutually agreed they will hold each other accountable. This provides each party with the legitimacy and responsibility to discuss progress of development programs (OECD, 2012). The fourth and fifth principles, Managing for results and Mutual accountability, both bind the other three commitments together and mark conclusive commitment of the donor to strengthen the role of the partner in development cooperation (Fig.1).

Next to the focus on a partnership approach, the Paris Declaration focused on a leadership approach. The transfer of leadership from donors to partners is a consistent focus throughout all five principles (OECD, 2005). This is based on the logic that aid is more effective if country systems are strengthened (Wood, Betts, Etta, Gayfer, Kabell, Ngwira & Samaranayake, 2011). Donors that increase the responsibility [ownership] of partner countries encourage partner countries to develop their own skills and capacities for strategy and program design (OECD, 2005). Country systems can be “strengthened when donors trust recipients to manage aid funds” and “undermined when donors manage aid through their own separate parallel systems” (Knack, 2013, p. 316).

Necessarily, granting more responsibility to the partners leads to a shift in power. One may assume that the reduction of power from donors can lead to conflicts in the donor-recipient relationship, however the commitments ensure that recipient countries take responsibilities and develop an intrinsic interest in securing effective aid. Research by Knack (2013) indicates that conflict is reduced by donors as they selectively choose national structures that they would like to work with. While searching for a partner country to pursue a project, donors use a selection based on the donor’s recent activities in the region, their risk tolerance and the quality and trustworthiness of national systems (Knack, 2013). Thus, the donors seem cautiously aware of the importance of national structures when choosing a partner.

### 2.3.1 Ownership

The first partnership commitment of the Paris Declaration is ownership. With ownership, leadership is directed towards the partner countries who are expected to increasingly lead the implementation of aid policies and set the agenda. According to the declaration, ownership implies that “[p]artner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies,

and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD, 2005, p.3). Authors of the Paris Declaration expected that capacities in the partner countries can be developed more sustainably and aid is distributed more effectively due to the increasing responsibility of the partner.

The increasing authority brings increasing responsibility of the partner (governmental) institutions. Partner countries are expected to take responsibility for development by establishing development strategies, including their financial management, in national program strategies. This is expected to manifest the development in the countries own structures and institutions. Additionally, partners commit to invest in coordination and creation of national structures in order to implement the national program strategies.

The increasing authority of partners leads to decreasing responsibilities of the donors. Granting ownership to the partner, donors commit to support strategies of partners rather than donors. Donors commit to support and strengthen capacities of partners in implementing national program strategies. Thus, donors commit to accept partner country leadership in the implementation of strategies.

Based on the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, donors are expected to diverge from solemn monetary project support towards “harmonized modalities of capacity building” (Molenaers and Renard, 2008, p.6). As a consequence of this new aid approach (NAA), the policy dialogue shifts from downward accountability, to the general public and the inclusion of national governments and parliaments in developing countries. According to Niño-Zarazúca (2016) the provision of ownership to local authorities is crucial as development is implemented by local governments. While several policies are designed by large international organizations, they are replicated across different contexts and unique needs and policy features can only be recognized by the individual recipient countries. However, additional research indicates that donors only slowly adopt the new role distribution and struggle with obliging the commitment of the Paris Declaration (Heyneman & Lee, 2016; Niño-Zarazúca, 2016).

### 2.3.2 Alignment

The second partnership commitment is alignment. The aim of alignment is that donors support partner countries’ strategies, interests, institutions and procedures (OECD, 2005). Donors are expected use partner’s systems and customize their activities to the agendas of the partners who lead the execution of aid policies. Alignment was chosen as a partnership commitment in order to strengthen the national structures and capabilities of partners. With stronger national structures, partner countries are expected to be able to create their own

sustainable development policies (OECD, 2005). Thus, alignment reflects the coordination of donors' capabilities and partners' interests.

Alignment has several implications for the partnership cooperation. First, partners are asked to invest in the strengthening of national structures. Partners can learn from donors and simultaneously decrease their independence from donor aid. The partners commit to introduce reforms and invest in human resources in order to develop strengthened structures of the administration that donors can rely on to implement policies. Reforms of the administration include public management reforms in order to “ensure that national systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and transparent” (OECD, 2005, p.4). The new reforms are expected to strengthen the partner countries independence once the donor aid decreases. Thus, partners are expected to strengthen their national capacities for policy implementation and communicate their national interests with the donors.

Furthermore, donors should subordinate their policies to partner interests. Donors should make use of the newly developed structures in the partner countries and avoid implementing their own management and monitoring structures. If the systems of the partner country do not function sufficiently, donors are expected to support the creation of functioning administration. Donors are expected to provide their expertise to the partner without enforcing their own idea(s) on them (OECD; 2005). Furthermore, alignment with donor institution entails that donors support and use the national financial systems. Donors agreed to consistently commit to the distribution of aid, use national procurement systems and untie donor aid in order to align stronger connections with partner needs and capacities. Thus, donors are expected to adjust their aid contribution to the national structures and interests of the partner.

The principle of alignment was considered necessary due to multiple donor engagement. After the announcement of worldwide initiatives for development like MDGs, SDGs and the EFA policy, the size of donor aid increases (Martin & Walker, 2015). Scholars argued that donors had to align their aid with partner strategies in order to ensure the quality of aid policies and secure efficient use of the increasing aid (Molenaers and Renard, 2008). Research indicates that misalignment negatively influences the growth effect of aid (Dreher, Minasyan & Nunnenkamp, 2015). In order to more successfully implement a policy, the correct instruments to reach the policy goals must be utilized (Howlett et al., 2015). Riddell and Niño-Zarazúa, (2016) report that the necessity to create alignment as aid policy success, leads to increased involvement in planning and information management of donors which increases the quality and measurability of aid policies. In 2011, the official OECD report did not indicate whether

alignment contributed to effective implementation of aid policies (Wood et al., 2011). Research by Weiler et al. (2018) shows that donors did not adopt to alignment successfully and “promote their own economic, political and security interests” (p.66).

### 2.3.3 Harmonization

The third principle of the Paris Declaration is harmonization. The aim of Harmonization is that “donor’s actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective” (OECD, 2005, p.6). Harmonization of the partnership is granted if the collaboration between donors and partners is transparent and goals are achieved due to collective inputs. Donors are expected to simplify procedures, share information with the partners and establish common arrangements among each other (OECD, 2005). With more harmonization, the effectiveness of aid is expected to increase as one collective vision and method of development assistance is practiced (OECD, 2005). Both donors and partners aim at creating incentives for administrators and policy implementers to use partner structures and collectively evolve development programs.

The partners have an important role in enforcing harmonization. The main responsibility of partners is to ensure that national programs are supported. Partners must engage in dialogues about development possibilities and country structures with donors. Thus, the partner can facilitate the donors’ decisions and planning and contribute to collective actions. Additionally, partners are expected to encourage participation in development cooperation at the national level. Thus, the partners are responsible for indicating country structures and programs to the donor to ensure collective actions.

Next to the partners, the donors have an important role in enforcing harmonization. While providing development aid, donors are expected to align their aid with the national country programs. Instead of single donors and individual donor interests and strategies, donors are expected to follow one strategy to ensure harmonization of interests. In order to create common arrangements, donors are expected to support the division of labor and delegate authority to the partners. Donors commit to “implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (*e.g.* joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows” (OECD, 2005, p.6). For donor practices this translates in providing program-related support with the goal to create one joint national strategy (OECD, 2005). Donors are expected to support the partner government programs and thus increase the strength and competence of national institutions. The indicators for harmonization implicit that government programs are most effectively supported by



Program - Based Approaches (PBA). Consequently, donors are expected to create common arrangements by PBAs to support harmonization.

Program-Based Approaches are an instrument to support national structures in the partner country. Before the Paris Declaration, aid was provided through single projects by numerous individual organizations (OECD, 2005). The partner country was challenged to coordinate numerous aid provisions, varying in topics and means of support (Sida, 2008). Thus, the partner country had to invest its own resources in the coordination of aid that was externally provided. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 aimed to shift the responsibility to both actors. When providing aid, donors are expected to harmonize their contribution with the current development programs of the country by providing program-based approaches (Indicator 9). According to the definition of the OECD DAC “Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) are a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of coordinated support for a locally owned program of development, such as a national development strategy, a sector program, a thematic program or a program of a specific organization”. Using Budget Support or sector budget support as aid modality is necessarily considered as program-based support as it supports national financial structures and procedures (Sida, 2008). Donors generally use national systems and procedures more if they provide budget support opposed to project-based support where they can create certain arrangements with the partner that violate PBAs. Consequently, the OECD suggest the use of PBAs in order to provide aid according to the partner’s preexisting programs and share the burden of aid coordination.

#### 2.3.4 Managing for results

The fourth commitment of the Paris Declaration is Managing for results. According to the declaration, “[m]anaging for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making “. The target for the principle is to “reduce the proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks by one-third” (OECD, 2005, p.10). In order to measure progress and results, result oriented assessment and evaluation centers should be created in the partner countries. With country structures for effective policy frameworks, the partner would institutionalize its independence from the donor. Both partners and donors are expected to engage in activities that strengthen demand and capacities for result-oriented evaluations and monitoring.

Partners are responsible to create a framework for new institutions. Partner countries are required to establish evaluation institutes and learn from donors how to conduct evaluations.

Most importantly, partners are expected to develop indicators for which data is aggregated with minimum costs. The progress of the development strategies should be investigated by national frameworks in order to determine their effectivity. With use of the new institutions, partners are expected to develop “cost-effective results-oriented reporting and performance assessment frameworks” (OECD, 2012, p.85).

Donors that commit to Managing for results commit to withdrawal. Donors are expected to support the development of evaluation institutes in the partner countries by supporting the development of technical reviews and evaluations in partner countries. This is expected to increase the ability of partners to develop new institutions and be independent from external expertise to conduct evaluations and reviews in the long-term. Furthermore, donors must rely on the data gathered and provided by the partner country in order to create evaluations for their constituents (OECD, 2005). Donors are expected to use the newly developed institutions when reviewing policies. Donors commit to only use their own aspects to create reports if the statistical systems of the partner country are “not reliable”. Thus, donors commit to support the creation of development evaluation frameworks in the partner country and rely on those for data of their valuation reports.

### 2.3.5 Mutual Accountability

The last commitment of the Paris Declaration is Mutual Accountability. For the partnership cooperation, mutual accountability means that “donors and partners are accountable for development results” (OECD, 2005, p.8). This is expected to increase transparency of development resources and support for development policies and assistance.

The principle of mutual accountability aims at strengthening mutual responsibility for process and positive results. Both, partners and donors are expected to increase participation and transparency. On the one hand, partners are expected to communicate with numerous development partners in order to maintain a transparency over policies. Partners are responsible to share information on aid flows with several stakeholders to encourage a broad range of acceptance for development cooperation (ibid). On the other hand, donors should provide detailed information about the size of aid and its distribution in a timely appropriate and comprehensive matter (ibid).

Both, managing for results and mutual accountability create the outskirts of the Paris Declaration framework to ensure the implementation of the first three principles ownership, alignment and harmonization. The first three principles of the Paris Declaration describe the process of development policy design and implementation (OECD, 2012). The last two

commitments address the institutional framework to ensure sustainable strengthening of the partners' independence for development (ibid). In dependence is expected to develop as the partner creates institutions for development evaluations and is informed by the donor about aid flows. Then, the partner should be able to oversee the activities of the donor and manage the development in the country. Thus, all five principles of the Paris Declaration together contribute to a framework of aid effectiveness. Mutual Accountability and Managing for results provide the shell of the framework to execute the key idea of the declaration that partnership cooperation between donors and partners is strengthened in both directions.




Fig. 1: The Paris Declaration pyramid.  
 (Source: Graphic - Authors creation; Content – OECD, 2012)

The Paris Declaration pyramid is used as a starting point of the analysis. The Pyramid argues that if donors and partners commit to the principles in their development cooperation, the cooperation is expected to be more successful. In this research, this argumentation is borrowed. The pyramid connects all five principles of the declaration. Hence, it is expected that if the context of the pyramid is reflected in donor behaviour, donor aid for literacy is more successful.

## 2.4 Expectations

*First, based on the commitment to ownership, it is expected that in countries where partners set the agenda, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.*

*Second, based on the commitment of alignment, it is expected that in countries where interests of donors are aligned with the partner's agenda, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.*

Third, based on the commitment of alignment, it is expected that in countries where donors use partner's systems, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.

*Fourth, based on the commitment of harmonization, it is expected that in countries where donors establish common arrangements, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.*

Fifth, based on the commitment of harmonization, it is expected that in countries where donors simplify procedures, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.

Sixth, based on the commitment of harmonization, it is expected that in countries where donors share information, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.

*Seventh, based on the commitment of managing for results, it is expected that in countries where national evaluation frameworks<sup>4</sup> exist, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.*

*Eights, based on the commitment of mutual accountability, it is expected that in countries where donors communicate financial aid flows, the goal of increasing literacy was likely to be achieved.*

The feasibility of the research limits its scope of analysis. In order to ensure feasibility of the research, only five of the eight expectations will be tested. According to the OECD, managing for results and mutual accountability complete the first three principles and are crucial to secure effective aid. Thus, all five principles will be tested with one expectation each. The expectations tested in this research are highlighted in italic.

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<sup>4</sup> National Evaluation Frameworks are “transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against (a) the national development strategies and (b) sector programs” (OECD, 2018, p. 10).

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1 Research design and data collection

The research design of this thesis is a bi-example case study. The two countries Nepal and Pakistan are chosen because their scores on the primary adjusted ANER score<sup>5</sup> vary strongly (Nepal 0.987, Pakistan 0.654). This research provides an in-depth analysis of activities conducted by donors in Nepal and or Pakistan dated between 2006 and 2015. For this research, the case study was the right method for the research object as the elaborate analysis of both cases enables detailed information on the causes of differences in literacy between Pakistan and Nepal. Due to the depth of concepts for effective development aid, the in-depth approach to the analysis with a bi-example case study is most suitable to study the complex involvement of donors. A crucial aspect of a case study is the dependency on in-depth information on a case/country (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

Due to the research design, limitations to this research derived. Due to the limited resources available, only five of eight expectations derived from the Paris Declaration could be tested. The expectations were select based on data accessibility through document research and interviews. Next, general performance bias that negatively influences the validity of data must be considered. In development aid a strong dependency on sponsors and financial aid increases the pressure and intrinsic preference of actors to perform well (Michaelowa & Borrmann, 2006). For this research, projects were chosen that ended at the latest in 2015. This time gap enables interview partners to talk with less severe consequences as evaluation reports, financial transactions and criticism has already been recorded. Finally, the limited number of cases donors limits this research to exploratory rather than explanatory research (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

Data is collected based on project reports, project evaluation reports and semi-structured expert interviews (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001; Weiss, 1995). The interviews are in-depth interviews to match the exploratory research character (Saunders et al. 2007, Yin, 2003). The utilized reports are published on the official website of the donors or provided upon request via mail. The interview partners are from donors only and are carefully selected based on their experience and involvement in education policy in Nepal and/or Pakistan. Due to geographical

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<sup>5</sup> The score of a country's adjusted net enrolment ratio (ANER) derives from the Education For All Development Index (EDI). The score reflects "the percentage of primary school aged children who are enrolled in either primary or secondary education" (UNESCO, 2015a, p.1). A score ranges from 0-100% equivalent to real numbers of 0.0 to 1.0. A score of 1.0 indicates that "all eligible children are enrolled in a given school year" (UNESCO, 2015a, p.1)

constraints, the interviews have been conducted as phone interviews in German and English. Due to their extent, the interview transcripts are not attached in the appendix but can be provided upon request. For the donors, the EU was chosen as accessible supranational organization. Data majorly relies on document research, more precisely on the Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union Co-operation with Nepal (2012) and the Evaluation of the European Union's cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2016). Email exchange with the assistant of a DEVE executive committee member was conducted, which is referred to as Interview EP. The German Ministry (BMZ) was chosen as a nation state donor due to its practice to outsource development to a state-owned consultancy company (Stubbs, 2003). Interviews have been conducted with two leading project implementers active in Pakistan (BMZ 1) and (BMZ 2), one leading project implementer active in Nepal (BMZ 3) and a member of the committee for development cooperation of the German national parliament (Interview BP). Additionally, two individual reports from the BMZ about Pakistan (Inquiry BMZ 1) and Nepal (Inquiry BMZ 2) have been provided upon request. As non-governmental donors, three NGOs were selected. A broad range of NGOs was active in Nepal or in Pakistan. The three NGOs for this research were selected based on their equivalent full-time employee size (Svindronová & Vaceková, 2014). All NGOs are internationally operating organizations and focus on securing children rights. The first NGO is active in Pakistan (NGO 1), the second one is active in Nepal (NGO 2) and the third is active in both countries and therefore chosen to ensure the validity of the two NGO interview partners (NGO 3).

### 3.2 Operationalization and measurement

The operationalization and measurement of the variables derives from the Paris Declaration Pyramid and classifications of the principles by the OECD (OECD, 2018).

*Ownership* is measured by the extent to which partners set the agenda. For this research, setting the agenda is conceptualized as a person with a Pakistani or Nepalese nationality has the authority to make decisions about the key project strategy. The commitment to ownership is considered to be fulfilled if a decision on a project strategy was made by a person employed by an organization of the partner country.

*Alignment* is measured by the extent to which donors align with partner's agenda. For this research, a partner's agenda is conceptualized as the sum of partner interests. In this research, the commitment to alignment is considered to be fulfilled if the main goal of a donor activity is an interest of the partners.

*Harmonization* is measured by the extent to which donors establish common arrangements. For this research, establishing common arrangements is conceptualized as the support of national programs. National programs are expected to be supported if the donor provides sector budget support or budget support<sup>6</sup>. In this research, the commitment to harmonization is considered to be fulfilled if aid is provided as budget or sector budget support<sup>7</sup>.

*Managing for results* is measured by the extent to which donors support the creation of evaluation frameworks in the partner country. For this research, support is conceptualized as the donors spend resources on the training of national evaluators. In this research, the commitment to managing for results is considered fulfilled if the project includes resources to train national evaluators.

*Mutual accountability* is measured by the extent to which donors share responsibility for aid. For this research, sharing responsibility is conceptualized as exchanging information on the flow of financial aid from donor to partner. The commitment to mutual accountability is considered to be fulfilled if the partners are informed by the donor about financial aid flows more often than once in a fiscal year.

### 3.3 Data analysis

Interview and document data is analysed using codes which systematically indicate and label relevant information of the data. The data analysis in this research is influenced by both deductive and inductive strategies (Boeije, 2010). First, a code for each commitment of the Paris Declaration is created providing an expectation indicator for the analysis. Each commitment is defined based on the original document. Using open coding, every principle is written as an a priori code (Thomas, 2006) The codes are modified according to each donor, hence information on the EC/BMZ/NGOs as a donor is coded as equivalently ending on EC/BMZ/NGO (Table 1). Moreover, the data is analyzed based on the a priori codes and salient themes are clustered (Boeije, 2010). The data is reassembled with a selective coding strategy whereby further sub codes as well as coding trees are developed to finally create a cognitive map and plot a network of the codes. The data is analysed with a software named Atlas.ti. The coding scheme can be found in the appendix (Table 4).

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<sup>6</sup> “Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) are a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of coordinated support for a locally owned program of development, such as a national development strategy, a sector program, a thematic program or a program of a specific organization” (OECD, 2018). If a donor provides budget or sector budget support, the donor contributes to the national budget and thus national programs by supporting national financial structures and procedures (Sida, 2008).

**Table 1.:** Coding scheme: A priori codes;

Paris Principle	Paris Declaration Pyramid	Code	Reference
1.Ownership	Partners set the agenda	1OW_DM_EC 1OW_DM_BMZ 1OW_DM_NGO	“[Donors] respect partner country leadership” (OECD, 2005, p.3). “[Partner countries] implement their national development strategies through broad consultative processes” (OECD, 2005, p.3)
2.Alignment	Aligning with partner’s agenda	2AL_IS_EC 2AL_IS_BMZ 2AL_IS_NGO	“Aid flows are aligned on national priorities” (OECD, 2005, p.3)
3.Harmonization	Establishing common arrangements	3HA_SA_EC 3HA_SA_BMZ 3HA_SA_NGO	“ <b>66% of aid flows</b> are provided in the context of program-based approaches” (OECD, 2005, p.10)
4.Managing for results	Establishing partner capacities for evaluation frameworks	4MR_DA_EC 4MR_DA_BMZ 4MR_DA_NGO	Donors “rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks.” (OECD, 2005, p.7)



5.Mutual accountability	Communicating financial aid flows with partners	5MA_DC_EC 5MA_DC_BMZ 5MA_DC_NGO	“Donors commit to: Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens. (OECD, 2005, p.8)
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#### 4. Education For All policy

The Education for All policy was introduced in 2000 in Dakar by the World Education Forum (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015). At the forum, 164 governments agreed on the agenda *Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments*. The policy implementation was targeted from 2000 till 2015 in 207 countries with the aim to increase literacy by increasing the quality, size and accessibility of education. The policy includes a detailed description of the six goals to establishing global education until 2015 and provides for donors and partners a general strategy to implement the framework (UNESCO, 2000). Additionally, the policy provides specific regional frameworks for action. Each framework includes a description of general challenges for the region, guiding principles for the policy implementation, specific goals and targets (ibid). In order to implement the agenda successfully worldwide, every country was commissioned to create a National Plan of Action by 2002. This way, the goals were written into specific national policies according to individual needs, resources and cultures (ibid). Each year, an EFA Global Monitoring Report was released identifying the process and problems of the implementation. In 2015, the final monitoring report “EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015 Education For all 2000-2015: Achievement and challenges” was released (UNESCO, 2015). Through several monitory reports submitted by country data sources and studies, UNESCO gathered worldwide data on the results of the policy implementation. According to the report, the aim of 97% literacy rate worldwide was not achieved due to insufficient monetary resources. Yet, great progress has been made for literacy throughout the world (ibid).

#### 4.1 Education For All policy in Pakistan

In Pakistan, the government together with donors and UNICEF authored the National Plan of Action “Our roadmap to EFA”. The report was finalized by mid 2001 and thereby the first national plan submitted worldwide (GoP, 2001). The goal of the Pakistani Government was to increase literacy from existing 49% in 2001 to 84% after completion of the implementation in 2015. The UNESCO itself describes the goals of the policy as ambitious (UNESCO, 2015, p.i). The government aimed at achieving the goal through creation and remodelling of several school buildings and literacy centres. Additionally, the government aimed at institutionalizing early childhood care and education in kindergarten. According to World Bank Data, the adult literacy score in Pakistan changed from 55.3% in 2001 to 70.77% in 2011 (World Bank Group, 2018). Thus, the country did not reach its goal while it still increased 15.47% in ten years. The same margin, an increase of about 15% in adult literacy, can be observed in Nepal.

#### 4.2 Education For All policy in Nepal

Compared to Pakistan, Nepal started in 2001 with a literacy score 0.72% lower than the score of Pakistan after nine years of policy implementation (World Bank Group, 2018). According to World Bank Data, the adult literacy score in Nepal changed from 70.05% in 2001 to 84.76 in 2011 (World Bank Group, 2018). The starting point on which to improve literacy was thus much higher in Nepal than in Pakistan. The goal of the GoN was to provide basic and primary education to all children in their mother tongue without the children facing cultural or ethnical discrimination (GoN, 2003). Thus, Nepal introduced a seventh EFA goal, including that education should be provided in a child’s mother tongue. The government envisions to achieve all EFA goals by reinforcing and improving current programmes (ibid). The implementation is divided into three phases: an immediate strategy (2001-2005), medium term strategies (2005-2012) and long-term strategies (2012-2015) (ibid).

#### 4.3 Success of the policies

The success of the policy was measured in both countries. With regard to the absolute success, neither policy reached the goal of 97% net enrolment and the policy implementation failed in both countries according to the goal definition by UNESCO (UNESCO, 2015). Although both failed, a comparison of the final literacy score in absolute terms indicates that the policy implementation was more successful in Nepal than in Pakistan. In relative terms however, the literacy score in both countries increased by a margin of about 15% in the decade

between 2001 and 2011 (World Bank Group, 2018). It can be argued that the increase in Pakistan who had a far lower literacy score than Nepal was a greater achievement than the increase in Nepal. However, it can also be argued that it is a bigger achievement to increase a relative high score (Neubourg & Notton, 2007). It can be concluded that the policies in both countries have been successful in increasing literacy to certain extent, while the implementation in Nepal was in absolute terms more successful. In the following sections, the results of this research are displayed answering the research question how donors contribute to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal and Pakistan.

## 5. Analysis

In the following paragraphs findings on the role of the EU, the BMZ and NGOs as a donor in Pakistan and Nepal are displayed. The findings of each donor in both countries are analysed. Finally, an answer is provided to the question how donors contribute to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal and Pakistan.

### 5.1 The EC as a donor

With a budget of 14.86 billion Euros in 2013 for external development cooperation, the European Union is a central donor for development assistance (European Commission, 2014). Centred around the European Commission and the European Parliament, the European Union has several committees and working groups that are involved in external relations and development cooperation. The leading European institutions are the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission for International Cooperation and Development and the Committee for Development (DEVE) of the European Parliament (European Commission, 2018). In official documents, the EC is the conductor and addressee of EU development cooperation. The framework for development policy is formalized in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 (European Union, 2010). Hence, the EU is through the EC as implementing agency a relevant actor for worldwide development cooperation.

The goal of EU involvement is poverty reduction and stabilization. The philosophy of the EU is to reduce conflict and conflict potential which could negatively influence the stability of the EU by reducing poverty (Interview EP, 2018). The strategic reduction of poverty includes measures to address the causes of vulnerability such as poor access to education. The means of the EU to provide aid are solemnly financial and political as the implementation of policies takes place in and by the partner country (ibid). Development assistance is provided through

long term-oriented programmes with the goal to secure predictable and reliable aid and thus support sustainable development (European Commission, 2018). While providing aid, the European Union aims to provide citizens in developing countries “control over their own development” (ibid). In 2011, the EU adopted the “Agenda for Change” which provided a new, more efficient strategy for development cooperation by focussing EU activities to three sectors in each partner country (European Commission, 2014). Hence, the European Union creates country specific policies to provide aid for poverty reduction in alliance with a self-interest in stable societies.

#### 5.1.1. Ownership

##### *Formal procedure to cooperation*

The EC communicates strategies for development cooperation regularly with partners. The EC communicates through EU delegations that are active in partner countries. Members of the delegation are recruited from the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs as a leader for all delegations (EEAS, 2018). The delegations discuss together with the countries long-term strategy plans for development cooperation. The European Parliament has to agree to the strategic plan. However, the partner countries are ultimately the deciders of the sectors (Interview EP, 2018). After the sectors are set, the EU either provides budget support, sector support or projects, grants and contracts to implement the agreed upon plan (European Commission, 2014). The budget and sector support contribute directly to the Government resources of the respective partner country. As several national and supranational actors provide budget support, the EU has to operate in a large network of multiple donors to participate in national partner strategies. The EU is one actor among multiple to take responsibilities of the partner’s development agenda (Particip, 2012). The EC is a small donor in Nepal and a medium-sized donor in Pakistan (ibid; De Biolley, 2016). By providing projects, grants and contracts as a supranational actor, the EU is able to take the role as coordinator for actions of different donors. Consequently, partners determine the key aspects of EU long-term strategies through country specific Delegations and receive budget, sector and project support from the EC.

##### *Pakistan*

The communication between the EC and the Government of Pakistan (GoP) was enforced by joint institutions. In 2004, both actors signed the EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement which is the key strategy document for their development cooperation. It was

reinforced by the EU-Pakistan 5- Year Engagement Plan in 2012 (De Biolley, 2016). The EC and Pakistan communicate their interests through the EU delegation to Pakistan which exists since 1985 (EC, 2018). With the Cooperation Agreement, both actors expanded their communication by establishing an EC-Pakistan Joint Commission. This includes resources for Political Dialogue among senior officials (De Biolley, 2016). The commission meets annually in Pakistan and Brussels and discusses the progress in development cooperation (ibid). Hence, the EC established an additional joint communication channel to ensure participation of the GoP in the development agenda.

While the governments communicated well, the partnership for ownership faced country specific challenges. According to the EC evaluation “efficiency has been variable and faced important obstacles” (De Biolley, 2016, p.23). Regarding the EC contribution, human resources were too little and overworked (ibid). The general security in the country created a risk for EC delegates. Regarding the contribution of the GoP, a lack of political will from the Pakistani government risked the effective and continuous implementation of the development cooperation EC’s aid budget help. The country faced several domestic and sub-regional power conflicts and experienced frequent natural disasters (De Biolley, 2016). Some agencies that were responsible to implement the development policies lacked managerial and organization capacities. However, the evaluation report also indicates that generally policies were implemented and expected outputs were delivered. Thus, the partner set the agenda. Consequently, ownership of the GoP was supported and the EC committed to ownership in their development cooperation in Pakistan.

### *Nepal*

The contribution of the EC is found on a request of the Nepalese Government. EU was asked by the Nepalese government to contribute to the implementation of the EFA policy due to its prior engagement in the country (Particip, 2012). The EC was already prior to the EFA policy involved in education in Nepal through the second Basic and Primary Education Program (BPEPII). Together with other donors, the EC provided capacities for the appraisal of the School Sector Reform Program (SSRP), participated in discussions and implemented policies (Particip, 2012). The EC included the Nepalese government EFA and SSRP programs in their sector budget support outline. Additionally, the EC kept an active dialogue with the Nepalese government about their support to education (Particip, 2012). Yet, the engagement of local stakeholders and civil society could have improved. Consequently, the EC included the

Nepalese Government in the establishment of their development budget strategy and provided ownership to the Nepalese Government.

Ownership of the Government of Nepal (GoN) changed during the implementation process. As a reaction to political instabilities and the “Royal Takeover” of the government in 2005, the EC dissolved discussions about the preparation of a Country Specific and projects during the period from 2007-2013. Continuous strikes, road blocks and insufficient planning capacity of the Nepalese government created unstable and unreliable political structures and led the EC to draw back its engagement in Nepal. Only half of the planned budget could be spent in Nepal (Particip, 2012). Consequently, the ownership of the Nepalese government decreased during the implementation process due to political instability.

Next to political instability, missing institutional structures negatively influenced ownership of the Nepalese government. The EC communicates through delegations. Yet, the delegation in Nepal was finalized only in 2011. Before 2011, the EC communicated the formulation and implementation of EC donor aid by the Nepalese delegation and the Indian delegation. While the Nepalese delegation could communicate with project stakeholders, large transaction costs arose because the Indian delegation had the authority for contracts and finances. As a consequence, decisions were communicated and managed among multiple actors and the Nepalese government did not have unitary ownership, but the partner set the agenda for development. The commitment to Ownership in Nepal was fulfilled.

### 5.1.2. Alignment

#### *Dispatchment of aid workers*

The EC implements its interest through several stakeholders. The European Union does not dispatch development aid workers to pursue the interest of the EU in partner countries (Interview EP, 2018). However, the European Union Co-finances projects of western government donors<sup>8</sup> who dispatch national consultants in partner countries and conduct trainings to educate consultants in the partner country. The GIZ engages employees in the strategy development and implementation in the partner countries and conducts trainings of the German capacity development approach to consultants of the partner country (Interview BMZ 1. 2018). This practice has been conducted in Pakistan as well as in Nepal. Additionally, the EU has a permit delegation in Pakistan and Nepal with consultants and diplomats that negotiate

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<sup>8</sup> From 2007-2014, the EU delivered over € 520 million to Pakistan. The aid was delivered through several channels: the government (30%), NGOs (31%), UN agencies (17%), EU Member States (10%), private sector actors and international financial institutions (12%) (De Biolley, 2016).

development principles. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU influences the interest that are exchanged between the GoP/Nepal and the EU when aid projects are set up.

### *Pakistan*

The Pakistani government values safety policies over social policies. Between 2000 and 2015 the Pakistani government introduced three policies to reach the goal of the EFA policy. The government emphasized education as a focal interest (UNESCO Islamabad, 2015). Yet, the government follows a security first response in case of security challenges to the country. In case of security issues, the country first supports objective means of stability (EC, 2007). According to an evaluation by the EU, the country struggles to address social and economic issues as factors for stability (EC, 2007). Thus, the Pakistani government has an interest in supporting education which is dominated by the support of objective measures for stability.

With the support of education, the EC enforced European values. Both the GoP and the EU perceived education as a focal sector. Next to rural development, democratisation, human rights, rule of law and trade, the EC supported education and technical and vocational training in Pakistan. Regarding the budget distributions, the priority sectors were rural development (33%), education (28%) and democratisation, human rights and security (15%). With the broad portfolio approach, the EC used its influence to strengthen human rights and labour right. The selected sectors by the EC overlapped. For instance, support of the sector rural development included the establishment of schools. Additionally, the support to education included the teaching of human and children rights. In 2014, Pakistan became a receiver of the EU Generalized Scheme of preferences (GSP+). The GSP+ is an instrument for EU to use trade benefits for least developed countries as a mean to strengthen human rights and the rule of law in the countries. Thus, the EU used political incentives and a broad portfolio of interventions in order to establish human rights and the rule of law next to the support for the EFA policy in Pakistan.

However, both, rural development and education which align with partner's agenda had a higher priority than democratisation and human rights. Hence, the commitment to Alignment by the EU in Pakistan is considered to be fulfilled.

### *Nepal*

The EU supported the Nepalese reforms to reach the EFA goals. The Nepalese government had a strong interest in the implementation of the EFA policy. The EU supported these interests through their engagement in committees. The EU was active in the

implementation of the broader Nepalese EFA policy and in the School Sector Reform Programs (SSRP). As a donor, the EU provided financial aid to the SSRP and facilitated its administration. Reports indicate “a high level of coherence of objectives in GoN and EC” (Particip, 2012, p.26). The sectors supported by the EU in Nepal were renewable energy, rural development, education, health, human rights, conflict mitigation, and trade related assistance. Until 2014, Nepal was a recipient of the GSP and received trade benefits for the exchange that human rights and the rule of law is strengthened in the country. Consequently, the EU aligned their financial and human resources through the support of the SSRP with the partner’s agenda and thereby committed to the principle of alignment.

### 5.1.3 Harmonization

For EC development cooperation, the character of aid modality is arranged via contracts with the agent of each individual project (Interview EP, 2018). This includes in which frequencies and instalments financial aid is distributed. Budget aid is provided to countries that are “stable enough and show a willingness to at least advance in human rights, corruption, etc.” (Interview EP, 2018, p.2).

#### *Pakistan*

In Pakistan the EC provided sector budget support (SBS) to the provinces which increased technical support and capacity strengthening. Especially in the several conflict areas of the country, the SBS strengthened local flexibility of resources. Consequently, the planning and consulting of local actors for reforms has improved. Yet, the execution of the budget was still weak as for instance socially desirable projects were funded opposed to economically sustainable (De Biolley, 2016). While the EC committed to provide 520 million between 2007-2014 to Pakistan only 290 million (56%) could be paid (De Biolley, 2016). Thus, the EC adapted their aid to support strategies of the Pakistani provinces by providing sufficient flexibility through budget support. Thereby, the EU established common arrangements and committed to the principle of harmonization.

#### *Nepal*

The EC had two different strategies in Nepal over the period from 2002-2013. With the second strategy, the National Indicative Plan (2007-2013), the EC changed from a prior rural development project approach to a sector support program in education (Particip, 2012). The EC provided budget support as aid modality together with a project approach. The EU initiated



three sector support programs together with the GoN. According to an evaluation by the EC, “a good mix of instruments and aid modalities was used “. Through various financing instruments, synergy was created in the education sector. Yet, the EC influenced the initiating of the School System Reform Program (SSRP) (Particip, 2012). Consequently, the harmonization with country programs is biased by possible influence of EU interest in the national program design. In conclusion, the EC adopted to the programs of the Nepal Government and provided sufficient flexibility through budget support to support national strategies. However, the national strategies are potentially influenced by the self-interest of the EC.

Although the EC was aware of the unstable political conditions that brought risk to effective use of budget support, the EC chose to provide its aid in budget form to increase the ownership of the provinces in Pakistan and the central government in Nepal. By providing sectoral and provincial budget support, the EU successfully established common arrangement and thus harmonized its aid with the national finance and policy structures according to principle of the Paris Declaration.

#### 5.1.4 Managing for results

The EC will in every case evaluate the effectivity of the projects in cooperation with the partner country. For that, the evaluation competence of the partner country must not be a formal goal (Interview EP, 2018). However, the analysis indicates that the EC may cooperate with partners to conduct an evaluation but does not create evaluation and monitoring capacities in the partner country as committed to in the Paris Declaration. The creation of capacity in the partner country is a key concept of managing for results as the Paris Declaration aims at strengthening partner structures. The Development cooperation of the EU worldwide is evaluated according to EU structures. All evaluation reports of EC guided development cooperation base their design and methodology on the “official published methodology guidelines of the DG DEVCO [The Commission’s Directorate- General for International Cooperation and Development] Evaluation Unit” (Particip, 2012, p.V). In Pakistan, the evaluation was carried out through the private consultancy firm Analysis For Economic Decisions (ADE). In Nepal, a consortium led by all European led institutions<sup>9</sup> carried out the data analysis for the report. The partner only influenced the evaluations by comments,

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<sup>9</sup>Analysis For Economic Decisions (ADE), Overseas development Institute (ODI), Information Center on European Institutions (ICEI), The European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)

consultations and provision of specific project information (De Biolley, 2016; Particip, 2012). Consequently, the EC does not build monitoring and evaluation framework capacities in the partner country to increase country capacity for evaluations. By using an independent private consultancy company, the EC dictates the framework of the evaluation. Thus, the EC does not establish partner country capacities for evaluation frameworks and thereby severely violates the principle of Managing for results of the Paris Declaration.

#### 5.1.5 Mutual accountability

The EC is in contact with the partner countries about their progress and reaches out to the partner country in terms of “problems (human rights violations, corruption...)” (Interview EP, 2018, p.1). As the EU primarily provides budget support for Nepal and Pakistan, it can be assumed that the EU has less ability to not communicate what the aid is used for as this is decided by the partner government. Additionally, an early provision of information about the budget is vital to the partner government as they have to plan their budget and development strategies. Thus, it can be expected that the EU has more pressure and urgency to communicate aid flows. However, the EU also supports nation states, NGOs and private actors who implement development projects. Thereby, the communication about aid is also externalized to the implementers (Interview NGO 1; NGO 2). The analysis of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development indicates that aid flows of projects are not communicated sufficiently with partners (see section 5.2.5), while the analysis of NGOs indicates that aid flows are transparent and regular (see section 5.3.5).

Consequently, the EU communicates financial aid flows with partners and thus mostly in line with the principle of mutual accountability. The aid delivery through NGO projects is successfully implemented according to the principle of mutual accountability and the budget support by the EU can be assumed to be successfully communicated according to the Paris Declaration. Yet, the provision of financial aid through the nation state at the example of Germany is not communicated according to the principle of the Paris Declaration.

#### 5.2 The German government as a donor

The German government contributed the sixth highest budget of Official Development aid to Nepal in 2007-2008 (Particip, 2012). In Germany, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and embassies of partner countries are the most relevant actors for national development cooperation. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is primarily responsible for immediate, humanitarian aid, the BMZ supports

long term aid aimed at establishing capacities (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The BMZ creates individual country strategies with each partner during government negotiations every two years with a partner country and consultations every other two years. The BMZ has two fully state-owned organisations that implement project interests of the BMZ. The Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit<sup>10</sup> (GIZ) is owned by the German State as well as the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Bankengruppe<sup>11</sup> (KfW) (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). Additionally, the BMZ financially supports NGOs that conduct projects related to the interests of the BMZ.

### 5.2.1 Ownership

#### *Formal procedures to cooperation*

The partner has the ability to influence decisions of the German state as a donor through government negotiations that take place every two years between a delegation of the German government and the partner government. Every two years, a delegation of the German Government meets with the Government of a partner country for government negotiations in which the frame for development aid is set. Both countries discuss the [partner] country strategy. The German delegation includes representatives of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy. This is the general procedure of the BMZ which takes place in every country in which the BMZ is active.

The usual process of the conversation and agreement to a subject is the following. The delegation of the German Ministry and the partner government meet, and the partner country states the needs and key support areas. The German Ministry then checks the need, whether they perceive the need in the country as well and whether sufficient financial and technical resources exist in order to conduct a project addressing this need. If the German Ministry agrees to the necessity of the need, the BMZ asks the GIZ to present a clear project proposal with technical and financial resources listed (Interview BMZ 2). The German Ministry is obliged to evaluate any project according to standard indicators, so if projects have goals that are not measurable by indicators, the goals must be changed accordingly. Additionally, The German Ministry must see and accept the need as such in order to provide its support for it. Although both interview partners in Pakistan and Nepal mentioned that the projects of the BMZ are according to the needs of the partner country and both, the partner country and the German Ministry, together discuss the country strategy, the BMZ solemnly decided to end the

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<sup>10</sup> *english*: German Corporation for International Cooperation GmBH

<sup>11</sup> *english*: Reconstruction Credit Institute Banking Group

partnership for primary education with Pakistan “because of the strong involvement of other international donors such as UNICEF, World Bank, USAID and DFID” (Inquiry BMZ 1, 2018).

Consequently, the German Ministry can make the final decision whether and how a subject area is supported financially and politically. As the partner is able to influence key decisions of the BMZ’s development strategy in a formal process, namely the three supported sectors in government negotiations, the partners set the agenda and the BMZ is thus committed to ownership. Nevertheless, the BMZ has a strong position in the final decision about the topic and methodology of development cooperation aid.

### *Involved decision makers in Pakistan*

Education has been a strong focus and interest of the German and Pakistani government since 1980 to 2015. The delegation of the Pakistani government includes representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Economic Affairs department, a subordinate department to the Pakistan Ministry of Finance for development cooperation, and the FATA secretary for a specific project.

Before 2010, minor education ministries existed in the provinces and federally administered areas though the education policy was in the competences of the national government. Curriculum development and schoolbook creation, and thus learning content and methods, were centralised by the national government making it the central negotiator for the BMZ. In 2010, the Pakistani Government passed the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendments which dissolved the centralised structure. With the amendment, several centralised government sectors, including education, were decentralised and competences were shifted to a provincial level. At the time the amendment was passed, however, these competences in education had not been established. Without sufficient preparation, the national administration of education dissolved to the province governments. Consequently, the original contract partner of the GIZ was dissolved and the GIZ had to rewrite the project proposal and re-establish the cooperation in the country. The new “partner” was the large amount of provincial and regional leaders with limited competences who were now together the highest decision authority on education. Thus, the BMZ negotiations were led by authorities who had limited competences in education as well as in political compromises (Interview BMZ 1). The process complicated further, as the national Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training was (re)established which led to a “fight” over mandates and responsibilities (Interview BMZ 1). While the partners set the agenda and the BMZ thus committed to ownership, both the donor and the partner were continuously challenged by finding the righteous, reliable and responsible negotiation partner.

Additional, not all regions, and thus not all partners for development cooperation, were bound to Pakistani law. The FATA region, on the border to Afghanistan, was as semi-autonomous region still ruled by the British colonial law. Here, political agents who are appointed by the governor were the leading executive and legislative authorities (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). They can decide where schools are build and were they are not. In the past, it has frequently been the case that schools have not been build according to demands but because the political agents decided they were build influenced by relationship, networks and dependencies (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). The political agents had a secretary, the FATA secretary, which was the head administration and coordinated educational matters through a small division. This was the main partner for the GIZ while conducting the project. Though because the region was 1.5 days car ride distance from the capital, this administration was poorly informed and faint (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). Consequently, while the the FATA secretary as a partner set the agenda, the implementation lacked a willingness of the partner.

#### *Involved decision makers in Nepal*

In Nepal, the situation was different, nearly reversed than in Pakistan. Generally, during government negotiations, representatives of selected sector ministries are involved together with the representatives of the Ministry of Finance (Interview BMZ 3, 2018). According to a Nepalese GIZ employee, government negotiations are held on an equal level of hierarchy as both governments decide together which strategies are pursued. Thus, “naturally, the stake of the Nepalese government is very strong and high” (Interview BMZ 3, 2018). Yet, the BMZ never had a focus on education in its development cooperation strategy with Nepal and thus never a long-term strategy regarding education in Nepal. The development cooperation focussed on good governance and sustainable energy projects (Inquiry BMZ 2, 2018). The BMZ solemnly supported NGOs financially who created their own strategy (BMZ, 2018). Consequently, significantly less financial resources and political influence was invested by the BMZ in the education sector in Nepal compared to Pakistan.

While the education sector in Pakistan changed to a decentralised structure, the education sector in Nepal was strongly centralised until 2015. Due to armed conflicts in the country from 1990s to 2006, the local government structures were dissolved. The central ministry alone was the key partner for development controlling all education processes: “Starting from the printing of the books, deciding of the curricula, every little thing, issuing registration applications for the schools, everything, law, standard regulation, monitoring, everything was organized from the center [central government]” (Interview BMZ 3, 2018).

Consequently, donors who were active in the Nepal had one central reference contact in contrast to donors in Pakistan who coordinated their projects with newly decentralized structures. Since government negotiations are a common practice of the BMZ, the partners would have set the agenda and the BMZ would have had commitment to ownership if the BMZ had had a project in Nepal.

### 5.3.2 Alignment

#### *Pakistan*

In Pakistan, the GIZ conducted three major projects related to education and one project related to capacity development of the FATA region. The education projects addressed 1) the creation of a national education plan including the curriculum and school books 2) access to primary education for boys and girls especially from poor and vulnerable social groups and 3) the development of capacity regarding the administration of education in two provinces.

After the constitutional reform in 2010, the third project expanded to all provinces and took the focus of German development cooperation in Pakistan upon request of the Pakistan government. As mentioned, the amendment aimed at increasing responsibility and competencies to the provinces and regions while they did not have the capacity to successfully execute the new competences. Thus, after the amendment, the Pakistani government had a strong interest in the help of the GIZ regarding this topic. The Pakistani government approached the GIZ which had been active in education capacity and national education reforms in Pakistan to identify the implications of the reform and create a project that would execute the implications successfully. The German Ministry immediately reacted to the new needs with high flexibility. The GIZ changed their project outlines by writing new project proposals. The two previous education projects were altered according to the new policy framework and a third project was developed. In the new project, the GIZ operated as a consultant and trained national actors active in government functions. This includes the development of curricular and teaching methods with the local actors during workshops in order to increase their participation and include them in decision making. These workshops and discussions about the execution of education are often “hard but they always end in a consensus that everybody can agree with” (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). During the governance negotiations the change in strategy was accepted and considered necessary by both country governments and picked up as new development cooperation focus. Consequently, the focus of the German Ministry aligns with the agenda of the partner and the BMZ thus fulfills the commitment to alignment according to

the Paris Declaration. Moreover, the incentive for the project was not only influenced by the interest of the partner but derived by the partner (Interview BMZ 1;2, 2018).

In the fourth GIZ project, the support of the education sector was a gradual genesis: In 2008, the FATA project started as a livelihood project supporting basic water transportation and infrastructure. In 2013, a project in the North-West Frontier Province ended and the resources were shifted to the FATA region. One source mentioned that it was a “coincidence” that one project ended and the resources could be used to compensate a need in the FATA region (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). A second source who was more involved in education in Pakistan however rejects a coincidence and argues that the inclusion of education resulted from an evaluation and was discussed by both the GIZ and the FATA secretary as partner (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). As the initial frame and necessary financial resources of the project had changed, the new FATA project structure was discussed during the governmental negotiations. Since both parties agreed on the new project concept, the German as well as Pakistani Government must have recognized and accepted the need as sophisticated and necessary to be funded. The reallocation of the project focus indicates a strong flexibility of the BMZ towards alignment of interests. The situation demonstrates that, as a donor, the German government aligned their resources to the agenda of the partner country flexible and quickly.

### *Nepal*

The BMZ and the GIZ in Nepal both confirm that the German government did not develop a long-term strategy or provide development aid in the education sector to Nepal until 2015 (Interview BM 3, 2018; Inquiry BMZ 2, 2018) Although the national government had a policy implementation framework for the Education For All Policy, the education sector was supported by a high variety of donors with a large budget (Particip, 2012). The BMZ was only the sixth largest ODA donor to Nepal in 2007-2008. On the contrary, large donors like the Asian Development fund, Japan, United Kingdom and the IMF contributed 115 million, 112million, 93million and 90 million respectively (Particip, 2012). Since education was a vital interest of the government which required large resources, it can be assumed that the sector was divided among the large donors. Information from the BMZ supports the perception that the BMZ was not large enough as a donor to engage in education (BMZ Inquiry 3, 2018). During the government negotiations the capabilities of the German development cooperation were transparent and the GoN communicated different interest than education with the BMZ. Hence, although the BMZ was not capable of fulfilling all interests of the GoN, the final strategy

implemented by the BMZ is still found on interests of the GoN. Consequently, the donor aligned with partner's agenda and thus committed to the principle of alignment.

### 5.2.3 Harmonization

#### *Pakistan*

Between 2002 and 2010, the Pakistani government developed two major policies (National Education Policy 1998-2010 & National Education Policy 2009) to reach the EFA goals (De Biolley, 2016). Both policies were developed with several stakeholders and focus on measures reach the EFA goals. Due to political unrests both policies were not implemented successfully and in 2013 the government developed the National Plan of Action 2013-16 to accelerate the process until the end of the policy process.

The GIZ conducted four projects that supported the aim of government to reach the EFA goals. The financial support for the projects was directed towards the education sector, yet it was not a sector budget support as the financial aid was addressed at activities to be conducted by the donor and partners. The financial aid was bound to goals and indicators that were set in the project proposal by the donor. Each project had an individual budget. The leaders of the project implementation had a "high flexibility" yet strict guidelines on what is allowed to be financed and how contracts must be made (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The project leaders enjoyed flexibility especially when facing high needs. The flexibility to spread funds over projects was for instance used when combined teacher trainings were conducted that are only financed by one project fund but provided to stakeholders of all three projects (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). If goals could not be reached as a consequence of flexibility, the GIZ had to explain their spending process. Deviations in the project budget above ten percent had to be justified and communicated with the BMZ. Within the flexibility, the GIZ was always bound to spend the money according to the goals of the project set by the BMZ. These goals were regularly measures and by indicators through the BMZ. Thus, the BMZ did not establish common arrangements through a (sector) budget approach with the national government program on education in Pakistan. Consequently, the BMZ was not committed to harmonization in Pakistan.

#### *Nepal*

From 2002-2007 the Nepalese government implemented the "Tenth Plan" which emphasized access and quality of education to all citizens including marginalized groups (UNESCO Kathmandu, 2015). When the Education For All Policy Program for Nepal was authored, the country had divided the policy process in immediate, medium and long-term



strategies (UNESCO, 2003). Consequently, the country had a long-term program to implement the Education For All policy. However, the German donor BMZ did not support the program approach. The BMZ provided only targeted funds to minor projects conducted by individual NGOs in Nepal (BMZ, 2018). These projects were all financed by individual project budgets and thus the BMZ did not establish common arrangements through a (sector) budget approach with the national government program. Consequently, the BMZ was not committed to Harmonization in Nepal.

#### 5.2.4 Managing for results

##### *Monitoring framework*

For each project, the BMZ has internal evaluation standards. The BMZ has certain indicators upon each project is evaluated (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The criteria for success is always if the goals of the project have been met (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). Additionally, the BMZ works with the principle that if a project has a value higher than 50.000 Euros, the evaluation is conducted by an external evaluation committee (Interview NGO 2, 2018). These regulations and standards apply to all organizations that implement projects supported by the BMZ. If the project is conducted by the GIZ (and below a value of 50.000 Euros), the GIZ must author an evaluation report according to the indicators of the BMZ. While the BMZ and GIZ consult local actors to different extents for the evaluation, the evaluation is always led by the GIZ and BMZ. The GIZ has a standard evaluation model based on which every project conducted by the GIZ is evaluated. This model is endorsed by the BMZ (Interview BMZ 3, 2018). Since the BMZ has the same standards for evaluations world-wide, it can be assumed that the BMZ does not commit to managing for results in any country it is active.

##### *Pakistan*

For the three education centred projects in Pakistan, the evaluation had to be conducted with little amount of resources in the last two weeks of the projects. The evaluation report used several mid-term evaluations and annual reviews conducted by steering committees and consultants prior to the end of the project (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). For the end evaluation, an independent Pakistani consultant was commissioned to help the team of international consults with national expertise on the Pakistani structures ((Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The necessity of this measure indicates that not sufficient Pakistani colleagues where part of the international evaluation team to provide national expertise. This conclusion is supported by general practice insights. The Pakistani colleagues only influenced the evaluation report by commenting on the

first draft authored by the GIZ Germany ((Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The interviewee mentioned that it “generally doesn’t exist that the partner has their own project evaluation department in Pakistan”. Thus, the BMZ does not establish partner capacities for evaluation frameworks as foreseen by the Paris Declaration. The principle of Managing for results is thus not fulfilled by the work of the BMZ in the education sector in Pakistan.

Data on the evaluation of the FATA development program in Pakistan was gathered using national structures. For the report, the GIZ worked closely with national consultants at the University of Peshawar. The GIZ developed new capacities in the country by initiating and developing a study program at the University of Peshawar related to development journalism (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). As part of the study, university students drove with a journalist into the FATA region and provided “soft data” through impressions and interviews for the evaluation report (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). The reason for the strong engagement of national actors was inaccessibility. Due to high safety risks, international actors were not allowed to enter the FATA region and only able to remotely control the project implementation (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). Thus, existing national structures like consultants were used to gather data and new structures with university students who could enter the region legally and collect data for the evaluation report were developed. Consequently, the use of national structures by the GIZ was based on a dependency on national structures. While the data was gathered by national actors, the evaluation report was still conducted according to the framework of the donor. Thus, the BMZ established partner capacities of evaluation frameworks and thus committed to Managing for results in one out of four projects in Pakistan due to regional restrictions. This is overall considered as no commitment to the principle of managing for results.

### *Nepal*

In Nepal, the Ministry of Finance has individual monitoring frameworks and procedures. The Ministry of Finance evaluates formally and informally the development aid of the BMZ as the Ministry is deeply involved in the development cooperation (Interview BMZ 3, 2018). According to the interviewee, the local governments always had a central role the evaluation of development cooperation due to their political importance. All levels of government had an active role and have been included in the evaluation process through “regular support measures and regular project implementation measures” (Interview BMZ 3, 2018, p. 36). However, this statement must be weigh with the status of the political situation in Nepal. During armed conflict from 1998-2006, local government officials have been severely harmed, and the local level of governance had to be dissolved due to safety issues for local

government actors. Due to the inferior ability of the local governments to develop structures and the fact that the GIZ must comply with the evaluation restrictions of the BMZ in every country, it can be assumed that the BMZ did not establish capacities for evaluation frameworks and thus did not commit to managing for results in Nepal.

#### 5.2.5 Mutual accountability

##### *Implementation through donor*

Both in Pakistan and in Nepal the implementation of the project is led by GIZ employees (Interview BMZ 2, 2018; Interview BMZ 3, 2018). The GIZ in Germany authors an initial project proposal to the BMZ, with consultation from the GIZ in the partner country (Interview BMZ 2, 2018). Necessarily, the GIZ employees in the partner country know the budget for the project fairly well. However, this is not in line with the principle of the Paris Declaration. In the declaration it is stated that donors should communicate with the partners. By only communicating the budget with the GIZ employees in the partner country, the communication about financial aid flows remains internally among the institutions of the donor is not shared with the partner. Consequently, the BMZ does not act according to the principle of Mutual Accountability in Nepal nor in Pakistan.

##### *Communication of services not finances*

During the government negotiations the partner government states a need and the BMZ provides a frame of financial possibilities. Once the project begins, the partner is informed about the start and the budget of a project expect for costs on human resources (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). Annually, a certain amount of cash is provided to the GIZ by the BMZ to implement their projects. This distribution is partly communicated with the partner to discuss whether the partner bears certain costs (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). The BMZ and the GIZ purposely do not practice regular communication with the partner about the distribution of financial resources (Interview BMZ 2, 2018; Interview BMZ 3, 2018). Moreover, the BMZ and GIZ foresee that the organisation does not communicate finances but services and accomplishments with the partner (Interview BMZ 2, 2018; Interview BMZ 3, 2018). The GIZ provides consultants who provide technical support service and thus argues that only technical support information must be exchanged (Interview BMZ 3, 2018). The Paris Declaration emphasises the mutual responsibility for aid which includes the mutual administration of aid flows. Thus, the BMZ violates the commitment to Mutual Accountability in its core. The principle of mutual accountability was created to increase communication and transparency about donor finances.

A regularity for communication is a key aspect of the principle. In the Paris Declaration, donors commit explicitly to transparency about aid flows, so partner countries can provide budget reports to citizens and legislative bodies. The BMZ does not communicate financial aid flows with partners and thus does not fulfil the principle of Mutual Accountability in Nepal nor in Pakistan.

### 5.3 Non-governmental organisations as donors

#### 5.3.1 Ownership

##### *Pakistan*

In Pakistan, the partner of the Ngo sets the agenda. The NGO works together with a children rights advocacy organisation consisting mostly of lawyers (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Like all partners who the Ngo works with, the partner in Pakistan initiated the project strategy. Therefore, the partner approaches the NGO with a need. Then the NGO asks the partner to write a conceptual note on an initial project proposal including a financial framework for the project execution (Interview NGO 1, 2018). The selected NGO either provides the full budget or, as for Pakistan, helps create a feasible framework to gain support from the BMZ as a financial donor. Then, the NGO discusses the interests of the BMZ with the ideas of the partners and together in a discussion at the same hierarchical level, the selected NGO and the partners model the project strategy (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Consequently, the partner is able to make key strategy decisions, initiate the project and set the agenda. Hence, the commitment to ownership by the NGO is fulfilled.

##### *Nepal*

In Nepal, the partners of the selected NGO set the agenda as well. The partners are closely engaged in a network of villagers and village communities. Together with the villagers, the partner formulates and conceptualises a need (Interview NGO 3, 2018). This need is communicated with the NGO who conceptualises a project proposal together with the partner (Interview NGO 3, 2018). This proposal is presented to backers as the NGO does not have its own financial capital to support projects. The project proposal is edited according to the demands of the backers, for the NGO listens to the demands of backers and must include them in the project proposal in order to execute the project. Consequently, the NGO provides ownership to the partners as the partners can decide which need is going to be addressed and thereby set the agenda. Nevertheless, it must be considered that the NGO's dependency on backers lead to strong influence of backers on the project strategy.

### 5.3.2. Alignment

#### *NGOs as an instrument*

The BMZ makes use of the approach of the selected NGO. In Pakistan, the cooperation with the GoP is difficult, so the BMZ cooperates with non-governmental organisations such as the selected NGO to bypass the Pakistani government (Interview NGO 1, 2018). As non-governmental organisations, the NGOs are not primarily addressing the government as a partner. This interaction shows the BMZ uses non-governmental organisations which can bypass partner government restrictions. This behaviour strongly violates the idea of the Paris Declaration that the donor's activities align with the interests of the selected partner's agenda.

#### *Pakistan*

In Pakistan, the selected NGO cooperates with a partner whose interests are strongly represented. The partner has the ability to create a project based on self-perceived need as the partner addresses the NGO with a request for support. To follow the request, the NGO has their own project budgets as well as projects that are co-financed by the BMZ. If the BMZ is involved, the selected NGO communicates with the partners and the BMZ about the focus of the project and the instruments to implement it. While the BMZ is involved, its influence is low. The NGO is not a state-owned company or other government actors so the support of the BMZ is guided by the office for private carriers which has significantly less influence on the project. Thus, the partners initiate the project and thereby define the key interest of the project. Consequently, the NGO aligns with the partner's agenda and the commitment to alignment is fulfilled.

#### *Nepal*

In Nepal, the interests of the partner are respected as well. The partner initiates the need for the project. Based on the exchange with the villagers, the partner proposes multiple project ideas to the NGO. Due to limited financial resources, the NGO cannot pursue all projects but chooses based on beneficiaries (Interview NGO 3, 2018). The NGO prioritises projects with benefits for the greatest amount of people in order to maximise the probability that the project is supported by brokers. For instance, a project to build a school for 150 children is chosen over a project to build a school for 40 children (Interview NGO 3, 2018). Additionally, the partners know which possibilities and restrictions the NGO will have from its backers, so during the conversations with the villagers these interests are considered. For example, the partners consider existing resources and demands in the catchment area, because backers support projects according to their perceived necessity (Interview NGO 3, 2018). Consequently, the

partner sets the agenda as the project always resolves out of a formulated need from the partner. Nevertheless, while backers do not influence the direction of the project, the interests of the backers strongly influence which project is chosen.

### 5.3.3 Harmonization

#### *Pakistan*

The support to the partner is project based. The project had a specific budget where project specific expenses were addressed ending after a restricted project period of three years (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Moreover, the partner had to communicate the project idea with the national government who had to approve the project (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Consequently, the project was in line with the formal interests of the national government but had an individual budget and does not support the national budget or a sector budget. Thus, the NGO did not establish common arrangements and thus did not fulfil the commitment of harmonisation.

#### *Nepal*

In Nepal, the support to the partner was project based as well. The GoN supported the project. Generally, the GoN pays the salary of teachers and provides material for education. The NGO only engages in projects where the GoN pays the teachers and provides the basic set of school books to ensure the sustainability of their projects (Interview NGO 3, 2018). As the government only provides the salary of teachers for schools/teachers where they perceive a need, the NGO implements projects in accordance with programs of the GoN. Yet, the support is based explicitly on the project and project related activities agreed upon with backers (Interview NGO 3, 2018). The project does not contribute to the sector budget support and consequently does not establish common arrangements. Thus, the NGO did not fulfil the commitment to harmonisation.

### 5.3.4 Managing for results

#### *Pakistan*

The NGO engages in evaluations. The evaluation for the specific project in Pakistan was conducted by external consultants. This is due to the engagement with the BMZ with a total project budget of over 50.000 Euros (Interview NGO 1, 2018). The NGO did not have resources in their budget to support capacity building of evaluation programs, but they generally school local financial accountants that help the partners to implement and supervise the project budgets from donors (Interview NGO 1, 2018). The partners have a monitoring department and made self-assessments throughout the project implementation period. However, because this was

their expected activity the BMZ did not provide additional resources in the budget for their support (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Hence, the NGO did not establish partner capacities for evaluation frameworks and did thus not commit to managing for results.

#### *Nepal*

The NGO does not engage in evaluation capacity development, due to too little capacities. The NGO does not dispose of an internal capital for projects. All measures must be financed through backers (Interview NGO 3, 2018). Consequently, the engagement of the NGO in evaluation capacity building depends on the budget of the backer. Generally, the backers have their own evaluation frameworks and the NGO relies on information of the partner for the measurement of effectiveness. Thus, the NGO does not establish partner capacities for evaluation frameworks and the commitment to managing for results is not fulfilled.

#### 5.3.5 Mutual accountability

##### *Pakistan*

The distribution of aid is communicated with the partner. The BMZ provides aid flows three times a year. The NGO cooperated with the BMZ who provides aid flows three to four times a year (Interview NGO 1, 2018). The BMZ provides the financial aid to the NGO who provides it to the partner. Before the start of the project, the BMZ, NGO and partner create a budget plan where the size of the budget and the activities related the expenses are listed. The list is made available to the partner (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Aid flows provided by the BMZ must be delivered to and spent by the partner within four months (ibid). Thus, the partner is constantly aware of the size and time of aid flows by the NGO and regularly receives aid. Hence, the NGO communicates financial aid flows with partners and commits to mutual accountability in Pakistan.

##### *Nepal*

In Nepal, the distribution of aid is communicated with the partner as well. The project's budget plan is created by the partner. Every project has a budget plan where expenses and activities are listed (Interview NGO 3, 2018). The budget plan is initially created by the partner and approved or slightly altered by the donor. The partner is in possession of the budget plan and aware of the time and size of aid flows (ibid). The plan is divided into different construction/project stages and for each stage a piece of the budget is transferred by the donor to the partner. The budget plan has a detailed description of activities that are expected to be conducted with this aid segment (Interview NGO 3, 2018). The regularity of aid flows depends on the practice by the backers, but the budget is always provided through multiple aid flows. The money is

provided with a general reference to the project stage. Thus, the donor communicates financial aid flows with the partner regularly and the partner is constantly aware of the size and time of the aid flows. Thus, the NGO is committed to mutual accountability in Pakistan.

#### 5.4 Results

The commitment of donors to the principles of the Paris Declaration does not differ between Pakistan and Nepal. The numerous insights gained based on this research can be clustered into two key findings. The commitment of donors to the principles of the Paris Declaration does not differ between countries yet it differs between donor types. First, in both countries, overall, donors show commitment to three out of five principles. In both countries, donors commit to the same three principles, namely ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. Thus, in both countries donors show the same behavior patterns as all donors individually commit or violate the same principles in each country. Second, the commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration varies between donor types. In both countries, the EU commits to four principles, NGOs commit to three principles and the BMZ commits to two principles. While those findings indicate a difference among donor types, they do not indicate a difference in donor commitment between both countries, neither generally nor specific. Consequently, the absolute difference in policy success between both countries cannot be explained using the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. But, this research could explore that the relative difference in success could possibly be related to the identical overall commitment of donors in both countries. Thus, this research found a similarity between the contribution of donors in Nepal and Pakistan and the relative increase in literacy in Nepal and Pakistan.

In the following tables, the results for the case studies are displayed. The term *Yes* indicates that a donor committed to the principles of the Paris Declaration. *No* indicates that the donor did not commit to the principle of the Paris Declaration. For instance, ownership is operationalized for this research as the partner sets the agenda. Thus, yes in the row of ownership indicates that the partner sets the agenda that the donor therefore committed to ownership. In some cases, donor behavior was contradicting towards the commitment. The considerable argumentations are listed in the table. Donor behavior which supports the commitment to the principle is marked with a plus sign (+). On the contrary, donor behavior which opposes the commitment to the principle is marked with a minus sign (-).



**Table 2.:** The commitment of donors in Pakistan

Paris Principle	Donors			Results
	EU	BMZ	NGO	
1.Ownership	Yes	Yes <i>-BMZ makes the final decision</i> <i>-changing decision making actors</i>	Yes	Commitment
2.Alignment	Yes <i>-strong normative influence of European values of human rights</i>	Yes	Yes <i>-+GoP approved the project but did not support the implementation</i>	Commitment
3.Harmonization	Yes	No <i>+ contribution to the country's EFA policy plan</i>	No	No commitment
4.Managing for Results	No	No <i>-once because of restricted access</i>	No <i>+ financial accountants</i>	No commitment
5.Mutual Accountability	Yes <i>-dependent on implementing agencies</i>	No <i>-German Government stirred GIZ in Pakistan</i> <i>-communication of services</i>	Yes	Commitment
Overall score			Commitment: No Commitment:	Three out of five (3/5) Two out of five (2/5)

**Table 3.:** The commitment of donors in Nepal

Paris Principle	Donors			Results
	EU	BMZ	NGO	
1. Ownership	Yes <i>-Two delegations made communication complicated</i>	Yes <i>-BMZ makes the final decision</i>	Yes <i>-Strong influence of backers</i>	Commitment
2. Alignment	Yes <i>-strong normative influence of European values of human rights</i>	Yes <i>-The BMZ is too small to be active in the GoN's interest in education</i>	Yes <i>-strong influence of backers</i>	Commitment
3. Harmonization	Yes	No	No <i>+ GoN supported the project</i>	No commitment
4. Managing for Results	No	No	No <i>+ reliance on partner data of effectiveness</i>	No commitment
5. Mutual Accountability	Yes <i>- dependent on implementing agencies</i>	No <i>-German Government stirred GIZ in Nepal - communication of services</i>	Yes	Commitment
Overall scores	Commitment: Three out of five (3/5) No Commitment: Two out of five (2/5)			

## 6. Conclusions and reflection

This research examined the contribution of donors to the successful implementation of the Education For All policy in Pakistan and Nepal. The aim of this research was to investigate whether differences in literacy scores between aid receiving countries are related to a difference in activities of international donors. To conduct the research, first key aspects of policy implementation theory were outlined, and a political framework was developed using all five principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Based on data gathered through document research and expert interviews, the research explored in which way commitment of donors to the Paris Declaration Principles could contribute to the successful implementation of the Education For All policy and thus increasing literacy. The findings of this research show that commitment to the Paris Declaration does not provide a sufficient framework to reason differences in policy success and thus literacy.

### 6.1 Answers to the research questions and implications

The main research questions underlying this research asks in which ways western donors contribute to the success and failure of the EFA policy in Pakistan and Nepal. The findings of this research show that, overall, donors contribute the same commitments to the implementation of the EFA policy in Pakistan and in Nepal. In both countries, donors overall commit to ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. Equally, in both countries, donors overall do not commit to harmonization and managing for results. Thus, donors contribute to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal and Pakistan by letting partners decide the agenda for development cooperation in alliance with partner countries' agendas. Yet, donors also do not contribute to a successful implementation by specifying their engagement to certain projects and not supporting harmonization with national policies. These findings can be complemented by a more detailed approach to donor contributions.

The first sub-question examines differences in the contribution of donors between countries in which they are active. This research shows that, although the settings of countries might differ, the approach of individual donors between countries is similar. All three donors commit to an equal amount and equal type of principles in each country. Hence, it can be concluded that contributions of individual donors to the successful implementation of the EFA policy are equally in Nepal and Pakistan.

The second sub-question examines how contribution to the successful implementation of the EFA policy varies among donor types. The findings of this research show that the EU is the most committed donor by committing to four out of five principles (80%) of the Paris

Declaration. The NGOs committed to three out of five principles (60%) while the BMZ committed to only two out of five (40%) principles and therefore to less than 50 percent. These findings support research by Hoeffler and Outram (2011) who conclude that the involvement of donors in the design of aid frameworks leads to policies oriented on donor interest instead of mutual donor and partner interests. Additionally, the key finding that commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration does not lead to more successful aid policies, is in alignment to research by Wood et al. (2013).

### *Implications*

This research provides profound knowledge about the effectiveness of donor influence which is scientifically as well as practically relevant. This research could break down donor behavior in five different characteristics and analyze the impact of each individual behavior characteristic on policy implementation by using the Paris Declaration as a framework for policy implementation. Additionally, this research emphasizes the necessity of policy implementation capacity at the local level. The findings contribute to research by (Ali, 2006) who argues that implementing agents must receive training in understanding policies. Moreover, the findings of this research support Lipsky's argument and provide empirical data for the necessity to include capacity development of local actors in policy implementation frameworks (Lipsky, 1980). Finally, this research identifies relevant limiting and contributing factors of donor behavior for aid effectiveness to the study of policy implementation research. These findings align with previous research by Bourguignon and Platteau (2017) who argue that governance structures in partner countries severely impact the success of donor aid.

Next to scientifically relevant implications, this research provides practical implications for the composition of aid policies. Findings of this research indicate, that regions with a security first approach tend to neglect development policies if the country is affected by natural catastrophes. In Pakistan, the government reset its focus after flood catastrophes which negatively affected the success of the EFA policy. In the future, a certain separate budget provided by donors for the implementation of policies under extreme circumstances could support the continuous implementation of development policies. Additionally, conclusions based on the second sub-question recommend donors to adopt their approaches to country specific characteristics. These findings are harmonious with research by Brynard (2009) who emphasizes that the specific situation where a policy is implemented is crucial to implementation performance. Finally, based on this research, the OECD is recommended to broaden its framework for aid effectiveness. The key finding of this research is that the donor-

partner relationship framework is not sufficient to explore the differences in policy success. The research findings therefore recommend the OECD to broaden its framework and include societal and political aspects in partner countries.

## 6.2 Limitations

While the study provides highly relevant insights for development policy, the research also shows limitations. Due to limited access to information and contacts, the German ministry was chosen as a state donor although they did not have a project in Nepal related education. Additionally, larger actors like UNICEF, USAID and the World bank did not react to initial contact. Due to the limited resources, the size of donors and countries was limited to three and two. Furthermore, no contact could be established with a representative of the partner. Next, because the study was a qualitative research study, the perceptions of the researcher might have influenced the results (Brymann & Bell, 2003). In order to minimize this influence, the argumentation for commitment to the principles was elaborated to ensure validity of the conclusions to the reader. However, the bias due to the approach could not be eliminated. Based on the case study design, the findings are limited to the cases examined and only scarcely generalizable (Robson & McCartan, 2016). However, the low sample size also limited the generalizability of the research findings.

## 6.3 Infrastructural, societal and political differences

Findings of this study show that the commitment to the framework of the Paris Declaration does not indicate a reason for differences in policy success. During the data aggregation, the researcher gathered data on additional factors that could possibly indicate a reason for the differences between both countries. The data was gathered due to indications addressed by interview partners and thus derives from an inductive observation of interview participants and not from theory.

### *Unforeseen external influences*

The implementation of the EFA policy was severely influenced by natural catastrophes. There was a strong willingness in the Pakistani government to increase literacy (UNESCO Islamabad, 2015). This is shown by the large extent of German state aid on education in Pakistan (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). However, the ministry decreased its focus on education leaving less room for the donors after three natural flood catastrophes in the country (Ministry of Education, Trainings and Standards in Higher Education, 2014). In 2009, The GoP initiated a

new policy which was considered to be more feasible under the new circumstances in the country (ibid). Hence, in Pakistan the implementation of the EFA policy could not be implemented as successfully, because the government had to shift priorities on natural catastrophes. Nepal on the contrary was affected by a severe earthquake only after 2015.

### *Sophisticated Nepalese Education system*

The education system in Nepal was already with the start of the policy further developed. While the Pakistani EFA policy ambitiously states goals, the Nepal government starts the policy reflective about current issues and possible issues during the implementation. Before the vision of the Nepalese EFA policy implementation is outlined, thirteen pages are dedicated to the review of current policies relatable to the EFA goals. Thus, the Nepalese government was from the beginning on aware of education issues in the country and able to reflect on profound experiences related to EFA goals. This is in strong contrast to Pakistan. The policy of the Pakistani government focused on the creation of schools and learning facilities (GoP, 2001). A large number of teachers was not available yet and still had to be trained (Interview NGO 1, 2018). During the implementation, frequently, teachers could not count until twenty or were illiterate themselves (Interview NGO 1, 2018; Interview NGO 2, 2018). Consequently, results indicate that the Nepalese education sector was more sophisticated at the beginning of the EFA policy implementation and the Pakistani government had to invest in establishing basic structures. The finding about the Nepalese education sector is in contrast to research conducted by Shields and Rappley (2008) who argue that inequalities deriving from the social cast system still negatively influence the education sector. In both studies, education quality is not measured based on quality assessments, but perceptions. This indicates a need for a comparative quality assessment of education sectors worldwide.

### *Different societal trust in western actors*

Next a different perception of the need, the Pakistani society has a different perception of aid provision. After the United States started military engagement in Pakistan as a cause to 9/11, the Pakistani society adopted an anti-western attitude (Interview NGO 2, 2018). The western actors are labelled as to be blamed for the underdevelopment of the country (Interview NGO 2, 2018). In the country, western actors are portrayed as untrustworthy. Different (political) actors such as the Taliban group advertise to boycott work provided by NGOs and other western donors in the region (Interview NGO 2, 2018). Consequently, the Pakistani

society has a culture-based repulsion and mistrust of western donors which is not existent in Nepal.

### *Different Societal Perception of Education*

The Pakistani society is more behindhand than the Nepalese society. Overall, the need for early education programs is higher in Pakistan than in Nepal (Interview NGO 2, 2018). Although the perception of education as a necessity is not spread everywhere in Nepal, it is far more sophisticated in Nepal than in Pakistan (Interview NGO 2, 2018). In Nepal, programs focusing on support for female education are accepted by society and people in rural villages are “easily convinced of the need” (Interview NGO 2, 2018; Interview NGO 3, 2018). In Pakistan however, the work of NGOs focuses strongly on establishing basic understanding for the need to send children to school. Structures in Pakistan are “underdeveloped and more backward” (Interview NGO 2, 2018, p. 2). The Pakistani villagers have not developed the perception that education is more valuable than child labor. Thus, programs in Pakistan have to start at a basic level with the creation of a consciousness for education and NGOs need to invest more time and spend more resources on “convincing” the local population (Interview NGO 2, 2018). Consequently, in Pakistan the societal perception of the need for Education For All is far less than in Nepal.

### *Conflicting interests of the Pakistani government*

The Pakistani government authored policies to reach the EFA goals yet behaved contradictory. The GIZ compliments the engagement of the Pakistani government to improve education in the country (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). Likewise, the official UNESCO Evaluation of Pakistan emphasises the ambitious actions of the government to increase literacy in the country (UNESCO Islamabad, 2015). Yet, a member of the German parliament development cooperation committee claims that the government hides child labour in coal mines in front of the German government actors (Interview BP, 2018). This is supported by a member of a selected NGO who argues that human rights are a difficult topic for the GoP and their partners faced several complications with the local government when advocating children rights (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Local government actors participated in workshops to control its content and prohibited the organisation to enlighten communities about children rights in education such as flogging (Interview NGO 1, 2018). Education in Pakistan is implementable until the point where projects focus on lobbyism and influence which supports the statement above. An additional NGO member mentioned that the will of the government to change

something in the education sector is low, shown in the low investment in teacher qualification and a refusal to provide Visas to NGOs (Interview NGO 1, 2018; Interview NGO 2, 2018). All these findings indicate that the Pakistani government implicates several policies that promote the EFA goals while their implementation in the country still faces mayor restrictions from the GoP. Zaidi (2005) argues that political will and leadership of relevant stakeholders is essential for successful implementation in the education sector in Pakistan which aligns with the findings of this research.

#### *(De)Centralization and Government reforms*

The GoP decentralized its institutional structure during the policy implementation. In 2010, the Pakistani Government passed the 18<sup>th</sup> constitutional amendments which transferred the responsibility for curriculum and syllabus development, policy and planning, and standard for education from a central national level to each province (De Biolley, 2016). The province governments did not have sufficient structural and human resources to capture the consequences of the amendment successfully (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). In the country, new structures regarding education standards and implementation practices had to be developed together with all newly responsible actors. The GoP could not develop a new strategy itself but asked the BMZ to facilitate the creation of a National Plan of Education and further country wide structures for education (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). Next to structural resources, the GIZ was asked to invest in a lack of human resources. After the amendment, the education sector was led by authorities who had limited competences in education as well as in political compromises. The GIZ initiated workshops and met with representatives from different administrative hierarchies to establish a consensus of principles for education (Interview BMZ 1, 2018). This involved agreement from a broad National Education plan to school book content and video material for teacher trainings. Consequently, the Pakistani government changed its institutional context while the country was unprepared to implement the changes. In Nepal, the decentralization only took place after 2015. The first regional elections to establish a profound regional system were conducted in 2017 (Inquiry BMZ 2, 2018). Originally, the country was a strictly unitary kingdom which centralised education to the national level. Because the effect started after 2015, its consequences are not comparable to Pakistan in the frame of this research. The importance of governance structures as observed in Pakistan and Nepal is compliable with research conducted by Michaelowa (2004) who emphasized that under bad governance the impact of aid can be negative.



#### 6.4 Further research

Finally, the findings of this research provide insights for further research related to development policies and donor behavior. First, this research provided an elaborate description of donor involvement and explored the activities of a supranational, governmental and non-governmental actor in Nepal and Pakistan. Further research might investigate the contribution of different donors or of partners to the successful implementation of the EFA policy in Nepal using the framework of the Paris Declaration Pyramid provided through this research. Second, the relative comparison of success shows that both Nepal and Pakistan improved within a margin of 15%. Further research might investigate additional aspects that can explain the equal marginal improvement. Additionally, further research can test why both countries still improved by 15% although neither donor fully committed to the Paris Declaration. The findings would have severe implications for the effectiveness of donor practices. Third, the Nepalese government introduced a reform that decentralizes the national education sector after 2015. Further research might include an inductive study to test the success of the decentralization and factors that influence the successful implementation of reform policies in Nepal in comparison to Pakistan. This research could combine public administration and development scholars. Finally, on the basis of this research, a multiple case study can be conducted to examine the influence of supranational, national and non-governmental donor behavior more generally. The findings of this research indicate infrastructural, societal and political differences as influence on policy success. Additional research can develop these findings further and contribute to a profound framework for successful policy implementation.

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## Appendix

**Table 4.:** Final Coding scheme

Paris Principle	Paris Declaration Pyramid	Code	Reference
1.Ownership	Partners set the agenda	1OW_DM_EC 1OW_DM_BMZ 1OW_DM_NGO	“[Donors] respect partner country leadership” (OECD, 2005, p.3). “[Partner countries] implement their national development strategies through broad consultative processes” (OECD, 2005, p.3)
2.Alignment	Aligning with partner’s agenda	2AL_IS_EC 2AL_IS_BMZ 2AL_IS_NGO	“Aid flows are aligned on national priorities” (OECD, 2005, p.3)
3.Harmonization	Establishing common arrangements	3HA_SA_EC 3HA_SA_BMZ 3HA_SA_NGO	<b>“66% of aid flows</b> are provided in the context of program-based approaches” (OECD, 2005, p.10)
4.Managing for results	Establishing partner capacities for evaluation frameworks	4MR_DA_EC 4MR_DA_BMZ 4MR_DA_NGO	Donors “rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks.” (OECD, 2005, p.7)
5.Mutual accountability	Communicating financial aid flows with partners	5MA_DC_EC 5MA_DC_BMZ 5MA_DC_NGO	“Donors commit to: Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget



			reports to their legislatures and citizens. (OECD, 2005, p.8)
External circumstances	Influences on donor behaviour related to events outside man's control	EC	Data
Infrastructural differences	Influences on donor behaviour related to the physical infrastructure of the country	ID	Data
Societal differences	Influences on donor behaviour related to the social norms and perceptions of the country	SD	Data
Political differences	Influences on donor behaviour related to the political system of the country	PD	Data