

Brexit Voting Differences and Their Origins

A Comparison Between England, Scotland and Wales

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Abstract

The following thesis will examine and analyze the differences between England, Scotland and Wales in the British referendum on EU membership of 2016. Existing scientific literature offers many singular approaches as to why there were differences in voting behaviour between the three British countries but mostly fail to acknowledge the possibility of a combination of plausible causes. Influencing factors of national identity, socio-demographics and attitude towards the EU are the origin of Scotland voting to remain in the EU while England and Wales favored the Brexit. As the socio-demographic factor of education and attitude towards the EU proved to be the most influential on the vote choice in the Brexit referendum, the strength of national identity in the three British countries appeared to account for certain differences between Scotland and its neighbors. This paper used the rich data set of wave 8 of the British Election Studies with over 30,000 respondents that originates from a widely respected as well as extensive questionnaire. Supporting this paper's theoretical framework and, moreover, its analysis the BES data set was ameliorated.

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1. Introduction

The democracy experienced today has changed greatly in comparison to its roots in ancient Greek direct democracy. Though, derivatives of direct democracy can still be seen nowadays. Most likely, the most known of them and the most widely spread is the referendum. Lupia and Matsusaka (2004, p. 465) define a referendum as “a process that allows citizens to approve or reject laws or constitutional amendments proposed by the government”. Non-academic sources like the Cambridge Dictionary say it to be “a vote in which all the people in a country or an area are asked to give their opinion about or decide an important political or social question” whereas the Wiktionary specifies it as a “direct popular vote on a proposed law or constitutional amendment”. The recent decade has been exciting for the world of referendums as well as their use and purpose. From exploiting a referendum to fit a certain political agenda or delaying legislation to the situation where legislative organs are evenly divided and the direct vote on an issue by the citizens is required to proceed or said organs simply shift the responsibility of the decision to the people, a referendum can possess a variety of functional purposes. Referendums can have a variety of intentions, shapes and characteristics. Some countries are more likely to have a referendum simply because it is constitutionally favorable or common for them (e.g. Ireland), others need to due to a lack of parliamentary majority, so the people have to cut a clear vote and for others the referendum constitutes a policy tool to fit their agenda.

In recent years, more and more countries, respective governments and citizen initiatives have made use of referendums in order to clarify issues around legislation or independence. Especially Europe and the EU have witnessed said increase in referendums. Various experts and scholars brought forward three perspectives for the trend of an increase in referendums worldwide. Mendelsohn and Parkin identified them as cognitive mobilization, disaffection and faux populism (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001). Cognitive mobilization describes “a dynamic process that allegedly has produced heightened popular demand for access to governmental decision-making” due to a higher awareness of the people of political matters and more specifically a higher willingness to participate directly in the political playing field (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001). Disaffection towards the government and its decision-making skills has been another proven cause of an increase in referendums. People seem to be more and more inclined to speak their mind privately as well as publicly and further express their discontent towards governmental activities if not seeming

satisfactory. This explains the rise in referendums as a sort of protection from the government or the state. The third perspective focuses on faux populism in which special interest groups and political entrepreneurs have discovered a new means of political access and, accordingly, have developed the tools and strategies needed to bend the use popular political action to their own narrow purposes” (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001).

Scotland voted on their independence of the United Kingdom in 2014. The independence vote failed by a margin of 10.6%. This is said to be due to historical ties and bonds, “the fear of building a workable, independent nation”, already granted increase in competences by Westminster in taxes, spending and welfare as well as the simple factor of defense and military (Russia Today, September 2014). In 2005, the European Union intended to improve European cooperation and collaboration of the member states by presenting the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE). Almost immediately, various member states wanted to let their citizens decide on the introduction of a European-wide constitution which would most certainly impede on sovereignty and discretion in decision-making processes but also strengthen supranational EU organs such as the Commission and furthering European integration overall. The most decisive referendums held on this matter took place in France and the Netherlands. According to the French ministry of the interior, their citizens voted against the TCE with majority of 55%. The Dutch result, however, was more evident with 61.5% of the voters deciding against a European constitution (Dutch Ministry of the interior, 2005). 2016 was the year when the United Kingdom went through with a majority vote of leaving the European Union for good. The famous Brexit was mainly due to topics like immigration, legislative shortcomings of the EU, overall strive for more autonomy in legislation and the impression of being better off without the EU in general. Lately, the referendum was predominantly used for one cause: independence. The recent referendum in Catalonia was about Catalonia’s independence from Spain whereas the Brexit represented the British desire for independence from the EU and gain more autonomy and discretion in national legislation. The main difference between the Brexit and other referendums is that the United Kingdom is a state bond itself made up of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The so-called Brexit means Britain’s exit from the European Union. Interestingly though, not all of the four countries of the UK agreed to leaving the EU by the majority. The Brexit was mainly about British shortcomings in the National Health Service (NHS), EU migration policy, economic disparities and due to various attacks in 2016 terrorism became a crucial part of the Brexit as well. According to the Office of National Statistics in the UK, immigration had peaked with a net

migration of 336,000. The British public perceived the migratory increase as rather negative. The BBC quotes Jay Lindop, from the ONS, who says the majority of people over [2015] came to the UK for work or study” while the government highlighted the challenge to reduce net migration to “sustainable levels” (BBC, November 2015). More than half of said migration was due to EU citizens with the primary intention to seek work. Without the EU migration policy of free movement of people this would likely decrease based on more British migration regulation. In terms of security it is claimed that the UK could face a higher risk of terrorism. Nigel Farage, main campaigner for the Brexit and UKIP leader, warned about migrants “seriously imperiling our security” as a matter to be resolved as soon as possible (The Guardian, February 2016). Contradictory, in a letter from 13 former British Armed Forces chiefs to the Telegraph it is “believe[d] strongly that it is in [Britain’s] national interest to remain an EU member” (The Telegraph, February 2016). The authors of the letter wanted to remind that a stronger position can be attained by remaining in the EU or “the bloc” in order to maintain a high level of security as well as coordination between European states. Arguably, the UK is the most prominent representative of the so-called Euroscepticism. Chris Gifford explains Euroscepticism “as an expression of the symbolic power of elites in producing a distinctive British political economy in opposition to European integration, which continues to naturalize national differentiation despite the realities of global and regional economic integration and interdependence” (C. Gifford, 2016). While England and Wales voted to leave the EU with majorities of 53.4% and 52.5% respectively, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU with majorities of 62% and 55.8% respectively.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Remain in EU</i>	<i>Leave EU</i>	<i>Turnout</i>
England	53.4%	46.6%	73%
Scotland	38.0%	62.0%	67.2%
Wales	52.5%	47.5%	71.7%
Northern Ireland	44.2%	55.8%	62.7%

Due to the nature of the data set used in the following research as well as the rather unsettled and rather difficult political landscape in Northern Ireland, this research will be restricted to Great Britain and its countries England, Scotland and Wales. More specifics in respect of the data at hand will be elaborated in the methodology of this research paper.

In light of the visible reported differences in voter turnout as well as actual result of the referendum, this thesis shall examine the explanatory research question as to **why Scottish citizens voted to remain in the EU while English and Welsh citizens voted to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum.**

In order to properly examine what the reasons were behind the voting differences between the three British countries at hand and highlight their origins it is crucial to elaborately establish variables that influences the vote choice of citizens in the British referendum on EU membership. Existing literature points in the direction of three main factors on whom vote choice in the Brexit was supposedly based on. First, socio-demographics such as age, socio-economic status and education are claimed to have an impact in determining what an individual's vote choice might look like. Secondly, national identity and, moreover, its strength and sense of belonging to a specific country are assumed to play a crucial role as well in public votes possibly affecting a nation's fate on a national but also international level. Finally, Euroscepticism has entered political discussions on EU affairs as an undeniable as well as considerable topic that is able to shape the discourse on the EU.

Therefore, the independent variables of this research shall be “attitude towards”, “socio-demographics” and “national identity”. The dependent variable shall be “vote in referendum i.e. Remain or Leave”. In order to answer the research question, it is useful to pose subquestions and with the help of their answers to answer the research question as a whole:

- 1. What were the differences in national identities between England, Scotland and Wales?**
- 2. What were the differences in socio-demographic factors between England, Scotland and Wales?**
- 3. What were the differences in attitude towards the EU between England, Scotland and Wales?**
- 4. Did national identity influence vote choice in the Brexit referendum?**
- 5. Did socio-demographic factors influence vote choice in the Brexit referendum?**
- 6. Did attitude towards the EU influence vote choice in the Brexit referendum?**
- 7. Did social classes have the same particular attitude towards the EU in England, Scotland and Wales?**
- 8. Did national identity influence attitude towards the EU in England, Scotland and Wales?**

2. Theory

There are several explanations offered by experts on why the UK was that divided on the topic of leaving the EU. Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Arthur Aughey explain Northern Ireland's result on the basis of their border with Ireland (Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, 2017). Due to the Brexit, Northern Ireland is the only country of the UK sharing borders with an EU member state namely Ireland. By exiting the European Union, the UK also may leave the European single market which is clearly undesirable due to the fact that Northern Ireland heavily relies on trade with the South of the island. Another argument is brought forward by Sara Hobolt (2016), Simon Usherwood and Katharine AM Wright (2017) and Duncan Shaw, Chris M. Smith and Judy Scully (2017) who claim that the most decisive factor for the referendum result lies within the respective campaigns and how both sides acted as well as interacted with each other in debates and other public platforms. Sofia Vasilopoulou suggests that the factors of around the Brexit referendum include "a profoundly Eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the 'Leave' campaign" (Vasilopoulou, 2016).

As indicated previously, there is a variety of explanations as to why the UK voted to leave the EU and more specifically what the reasons individually were on a country basis. This paper's variables though reflect on said explanations and will be elaborately discussed in the following.

2.1. National identity

The first independent variable "national identity" assesses the influence of the respective national identity of individuals in their casted vote. Existing credible literature points in the direction that national identity indeed played a role in the Brexit and what side to vote for.

National identity and the degree it is acted out have been crucial to the EU ever since its early stages. In some parts of legislation, the EU member states transfer legislative power to the EU and its organs in order to enhance EU-wide collaboration and cooperation. Thus, member states inevitably suffer the loss of sovereignty at least to a certain extent. This has been criticized throughout the history of the EU but received ever greater attention since the Euro crisis and the migration crisis. The Eurobarometer's statistics made use of the so-called Moreno question and modified it specifically for the UK. It was asked whether respondents see themselves as British

only; British and European, European and British, or European only. The findings since 1992 showed no significant fluctuation. In 1992, 55% of respondents identified as British only while in 2017 it was 62%. Throughout the years the percentages have been changing but did not vary significantly. The second largest percentage was always scored by “British and European” where people identify primarily as British but also as European. The other two categories scored poorly across the board with a range of 1-7%. These findings show that in general the British public put their national identity first before considering their European identity. However, insights from the British Social Attitudes indicate a slight change in the overall acknowledgment of European identity by the British. Said proportion has been rising from 10% in 1996 to 16% in 2015. Thus, the British still primarily identify as British but are more and more accepting of their European identity. Based on both findings, John Curtice argues that the British majority denies its European identity (Curtice, 2017, p.21-22). In turn, it can be said that in this respect the outcome of the Brexit referendum and the popularity of the Leave campaign are influenced by a lack of European identity if not its denial rather than by the strength of national identities in the UK. Henderson et al. (2016) though ascertained that “those in England who felt more British than English were [...] most positive in their attitudes towards the EU [whereas] those with a strongly or exclusively English sense of their own national identity were the most [...] hostile” (Henderson et al., 2016, p.194). In contrast, “[a Welsh or Scottish] identity [...] does not appear to structure attitudes on EU membership consistently” while additionally claiming that “if Euroscepticism is associated with English identifiers in England, it tends to be British identifiers who hold this attitude in Scotland” (Henderson et al., 2016, p.195).

Regarding the effect of national identity on the vote in the referendum as well as the differences between the four UK countries, the scholars are clearly on the same page. Their research shows that beside socio-demographics, national identity influenced the Brexit outcome as well. Like McCrone argues, the influence varied significantly between Scotland and England. ‘Englishness’ seemed to have a greater impact on the vote than ‘Scottishness’ (McCrone, 2017). It is found that “England’s choice for Brexit was driven disproportionately by those prioritizing English national identity” (Henderson et al., 2017). This is in line with McCrone who continues “that is to say, the more ‘English’ you thought yourself, the more likely you were to vote Leave. Being ‘Scottish’, on the other hand, made no difference at all” (McCrone, 2017).

2.2. Socio-demographics

“Socio-demographics” considers voting behavior across different social classes and demographics as well as the reasoning behind it. This is to see whether voting behavior across the social ladder is coherent and if different social classes voted similarly or not. More specifically, it shows whether there are differences between the same demographics of the different UK countries and further establish their significance for the outcome of the referendum.

As a start, it is crucial to generally touch upon the influence of socio-demographic factors such as age, education and socio-economic status on voting behavior in referendums but also other types of direct citizen participation. Most contemporary literature about the Brexit highlight the influence of age, education and economic status or social class as the most prevalent factors determining the vote. It has been found that especially in the Brexit referendum there was a huge gap in voting preference between opposing age groups. The younger generation aged 18-25 voted majoritively for Remain whereas the older generation aged 50 and older voted majoritively for Leave. According to Lord Ashcroft Polls integrated in the research of Nikolka and Poutvaara (2016), the Leave percentage of the population aged 18-44 is below 50% with the age group 18-24 being the lowest with less than 30%. In contrast, most of the older generations aged 44 and older voted Leave. All three age groups higher than age 44 (45-54, 55-64, 65+) were between 55% and 60% in favor of the UK leaving the EU. This is supported by the previous research NatCen conducted in their British Social Attitudes survey. The largest gap in percentage between Leave and Remain votes could be found in the youngest age group from 18-24 with 72% voting for Remain and only 28% for Leave (British Social Attitudes 34, p.7). It has also been argued that there is indeed a correlation between the level of education and the support for the Brexit in the UK. According to Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, the support for Leave is negatively correlated to the educational qualification, i.e. the higher the educational qualification, the lower the support for Leave (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). Among non-white British citizens the support for Leave seems to be even less. Only around 20% of said population voted for Leave. In regard to age, Goodwin and Heath's statistics indicate that the younger generations (18-30 years) barely support the Brexit and the independence of the UK from the EU whereas older generations tend to lean towards Leave (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). Additionally, John Curtice's research indicates the trend towards Leave among less educationally qualified and older people. He writes that “university graduates (48% expressed the view) were much more likely than those without any educational

qualifications (18%) to think that Britain's economy would be worse if the country left the EU. However, the two groups disagreed almost as much on the question of whether being in the EU undermines Britain's distinctive identity; only 35% of graduates agreed with that proposition, whereas as many as 63% of those without any qualifications agreed" (Curtice, 2017). This is also supported by findings of the British Social Attitudes 34 showing voting differences between educational levels. Generally speaking the higher the educational level of an individual citizen, the higher his or her likeliness to vote for Remain while the same holds true vice versa for the other end with lower educational level comes a higher likeliness for a Leave vote. This is deeply reflected in the data. As highest educational qualification the category 'degree' voted with the majority of 78% for Remain while 72% of the voters without any educational qualification voted for Leave. Noticeably, from the highest educational qualification to the lowest there was an increase from level to level for leaving the EU. Though there was an increase for Remain between the categories 'higher education below degree' and 'A-level' from 47% to 59%. In this respect, it is furthermore claimed that "education is [...] linked to social class" explaining that "someone with a degree is quite likely to be in a professional or managerial occupation, while someone without any qualifications at all is most likely employed in a routine or semi-routine (working class) occupation. However, the differences in referendum vote choice by social class are less marked than those in respect of education. While 36% of those in a professional or managerial occupation voted to leave the EU, the proportion among those in a routine or semi-routine job was 60%" (British Social Attitudes 34, p.8). Therefore, the following conclusion is drawn of a seemingly more significant influence of educational experience than social class per se on the Brexit vote. Interestingly though it is being continued by relativizing said argument by combining both factors of age and education into one variable to test whether one might account for other. Subsequently it has been found that "educational background that is by far the more important. Within each age group, there is a big difference between graduates and those whose highest qualification is a GCSE or less in the level of support registered for staying in the EU" (British Social Attitudes 34, p.8).

In terms of drawing a vague image of what to expect from this variable for this research, it seems helpful to take a look at research from David McCrone. McCrone's research indicates that "Scots were more likely to vote Remain than the English regardless of their socio-demography" (McCrone, 2017). This means that there are indeed socio-demographic influences on the Brexit vote but that those were not significant in the comparison between the English and the Scottish

voters. Henderson et al. research indicates that socio-demographic factors however played a crucial role in the vote result of the Brexit.

2.3. Attitude towards the EU

The variable “attitude towards the EU” reflects the greatly discussed presence of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom either in public debates, in parliament or even in street-level conversations. The British seem to be more and more dissatisfied with EU regulation especially in the sector of migration, economic as well as monetary issues and European integration. UK’s leading center for independent social research NatCen found out in their study series ‘British Social Attitudes’ that “73 % of those worried about immigration voted Leave” (British Social Attitudes 34, p.2). British citizens seem to make little difference between migrants coming from other EU member states or other regions of the world. This being said, the greatest worry appears to be access to welfare or any type of government support. According to the 34th edition of British Social Attitudes, “willingness to grant someone access to welfare may be regarded as an indication that they are thought to be part of the same society and thus as someone who is entitled to support from the rest of that society in a time of need” (British Social Attitudes 34, p.9). This is a rather far-fetched assumption that nevertheless needs addressing and resolving. Nicholas Startin (2015) gives another perspective on the UK’s Euroscepticism. His research shows that the British media are playing a crucial role as well as when it come to the question how Euroscepticism became socially acceptable and widespread in British politics and public opinion. However, the main decisive determinants were the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the economic crisis of 2008 (Startin, 2005, p.314). The Maastricht Treaty instituted a new era of European politics with the European Union increasing its political power as well as competence as opposed to its origin of a mere trading block. This relates to the discussion of having national competences taken away to a rather foreign power leaving the impression of being left with little discretion in national legislation and independency as a sovereign state. The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 that widened the Eastern borders of the EU enabled Eurosceptics “first, to link their anti-EU rhetoric to concerns about unemployment and job security arising from migration flows from the CEE states; second, to link their concerns to immigration and asylum and the perceived insecurity of the enlarged EU’s Eastern borders; and, finally, to exacerbate concerns about major companies relocating to the CEE states” (Startin, 2005, p.315). The final big contribution to British Euroscepticism is the Euro crisis of 2008 as well as the aftermath and how

the EU handled it. Initially praised as a common denominator in the EU and a sign of European harmony and solidarity, the Euro was labelled a failing currency and EU shortcomings in crisis management were put into focus. This provided a platform for new national parties across the EU such as the AfD in Germany or UKIP in the UK that originate from a purely economic point of view offering economic alternative ideas to the current European model but became rather populist and right-wing rhetoric as time went on.

As far as the outcome of this research is concerned in terms of the variable 'attitude towards the EU', it is expected to go along with a critical stance towards the EU and a typical British Eurosceptic attitude. Furthermore, it can be anticipated that it is quite possible that this variable is connected to the other variables of socio-demographics and national identity as the literature and previous studies have indicated and even proven. Clarke et al. identified the relationship between the attitude of UK citizens towards the EU and their vote in the 2016 independence referendum. According to them, "models for cost-benefit calculations and risk assessments documented the strong influence of negative attitudes towards immigration, as well as effects of the perceived loss of economic sovereignty and national identities" (Clarke et al., 2017).

3. Methods

The purpose of this paper is to examine the attitudes and opinions of the people and voters themselves as well as other significant factors supposedly influencing vote choice. There is almost no better way to extract this information by asking the people's opinion themselves literally. Clearly, a Bachelor student and his or her thesis cannot be expected to do this by him- or herself due to a lack of resources, skills as well as time. Thus, to see actual differences in of the UK countries data will be taken from the British Election Studies.

3.1. Data

This research will use data from the British Election Studies. In particular, the British Election Study's data set called "Wave 8 of the 2014-2018 British Election Study Internet Panel (2016 EU Referendum Study, Daily Campaign Survey)" will be used in this very research. This panel study is part of the Internet Panel conducted by the British Election Study within one period of governance (2014 - 2018). More specifically, this very study panel accounts for the period May 2016 to June 2016 which is exactly right before the Brexit referendum that took place on 23 June

2016. This gives a perfect overview of the British opinion on the Brexit to the point in time where they immediately voted on that matter. Therefore, the data set at hand is superior to other waves that would not have been as up-to-date. Also, the aforementioned fact that from wave to wave at least one third of respondents remain the same nullifies the necessity to include all waves since the first in early 2014 which would make for a more consistent survey answer pattern. Post-Brexit data pose the risk of not properly reflecting on people's stances on the Brexit and the referendum as such. It is possible respondents disregarded the actual chance of the opposing side to win the vote and subsequently disapprove of the outcome or even question the use of a referendum. Consequently, survey responses might be emotionally misguided and skew actual response patterns.

One reason for choosing this very source of data is that the BES has been delivering scientifically credible data for years, namely since 1964. Their data has been widely used by scholars as well as British national and international media (British Election Studies, 2017). Furthermore, BES' initiative of the BES data playground allows academics as well as non-academics to analyze data easily online or extract it for further use offline. According to the BES, the relevant surveys and their respective studies contain "around 30,000 respondents [...] each wave [and they] also defined a smaller core sample around 21,000 respondents in each wave that constitute a cross-sectional group which is more representative than the full sample".

The data of wave 8 will constitute the panel study type of research design in this very paper. It will provide proper insight in the overall development of the opinions of citizens between 2014 and 2016 so to see changes and if they were significant for the polls as well as find out about national identity influences and possible social strata and patterns as discussed in the theory section. The data set has 33,502 respondents of whom 24,432 participated in wave 7 as well accounting for a retention rate of 79.1%. The number of participants since wave 1 amounts to 11,408 respondents with a retention rate of 37.7%.

One major problem occurred during the investigation of the BES data sets. "Due to the very different political situation" data of Northern Ireland is not explicitly mentioned and marked as Northern Irish (British Election Study, 2016). In order to encounter such difficulty, the following was tried to do so. In the survey used for this research, the first question is about whether a participant is from Wales, England or Scotland. The second question is about whether a participant is a UK citizen, an EU citizen, Commonwealth citizen or another citizen. In order to

identify the Northern Irish participants, responses for the first question and the second one shall be cross-referenced. UK citizens including Northern Irish descendants will be further integrated into the research while respondents with different citizenship will be excluded from that point on. Unfortunately, the suggested solution failed to solve aforementioned issues due to the fact that the survey at hand is anonymous and therefore the task to identify individual Northern Irish respondents or the Northern Irish respondent group as such is all but impossible with the given tools and the data set.

Hence, the original data set will be used in its original form while the research and the subsequent analysis will exclusively focus on Great Britain which consists of Scotland, England and Wales. Though some changes were necessary which will be elaborated in the section about the methods used and applied.

3.2. Measures

The data will be assessed in a cross-sectional manner. The cross-sectional research design offers a good insight into associations which is of absolute advantage in this case. Additionally, its findings are based on routinely asking the same questions which will provide a proper understanding of the opinion of the British public during the Brexit. Though, a cross-sectional research design tends to be inaccurate due to the fact it is mostly impossible to include the whole population. A multivariate analysis with multiple regression model seems to be the perfect choice to process the data set in the most efficient and effective way possible.

The variable of national identity is included in the BES wave 8 data. More specifically, the variable is measured in separate national identities as in Englishness, Welshness and Scottishness. In addition, the British identity will be examined as well to not only determine differences in national identity between the countries but also their sense of belonging to the greater nation bond of Great Britain. For socio-demographics the survey's variables for age, education and socio-economic status or financial well-being will be taken. The educational variable will be use the indicator 'highest qualification' which will give the best overview of a respondent's personal education obtained. Furthermore, the socio-economic status variable will be measured by the indicator 'Income - gross household'. From all given indicators in this respect such as personal income or household size, the gross income of a respondent's household gives the most valid

indication of the respective respondent's financial situation as well as his or her socio-economic status. Other indicators might fail at sufficiently showing a person's financial sustainability, e.g. by focusing on personal income while disregarding the eventual influence of size of the respective household. The variable of attitudes towards the EU will be measured by an index created to provide an overview of several factors that together cover the aforementioned British attitude towards the EU as much and as sophisticated as possible. Enhancing this research's readability and coherence, specifics of said index' formulation will be elaborated in the respective section in the upcoming analysis. The dependent variable of voting Remain or Leave in the Brexit referendum will be reflected by the present data set's variable called 'Vote intention in referendum on EU membership'.

3.3. Recoding and regrouping

National identity

National identity was not measured per se in the BES questionnaire. However, the questionnaire included separate questions for respondents to indicate their Britishness, Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness on a scale of seven options. For instance, Welshness ranged from 'not at all Welsh' to 'very strongly Welsh'. This pattern counts for the above mentioned national identities as well. Thus, national identities were not measured at once but rather one national identity (e.g. Welshness) was measured for all countries simultaneously, subsequently the values for the country whose national identity was measured extracted for their respective country and collectively portrayed in cross tables. As a result, Englishness in England, Scottishness in Scotland, Welshness in Wales and Britishness in all three countries is illustrated. In order to simplify the strength of Britishness and national identities in the respective countries as well as to better illustrate, the initial seven possible scores from 'Not British at all' to 'Very Strongly British' including 'Don't know' were grouped together into three new ones being 'Not British', 'Moderately British' and 'Strongly British'. More specifically, the first two were grouped into one and the last two into one while the middle consists of three old scores. By doing so, differences between each strength score and furthermore between the three countries are more visible and clear-cut.

Gross household income

As with national identity, the categories of gross household income have been grouped as well. Also, here the intention was to find groups making differences between groups more visible as they were previous to grouping them because the steps between each category was too small resulting in 17 categories. Furthermore, there is no academic resource, governmental indication or generally accepted rule of thumb to be found which categorizes gross household income or income in general into social classes or a proper measure for socio-economic status.

Most measures make use of professions in order to define social classes. The British Office for National Statistics uses officially the so-called National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) which “has been constructed to measure the employment relations and conditions of occupations” (Office for National Statistics, n.d.). Unfortunately for this research, the NS-SEC is unsuitable since it is concerned with professions rather than with income related measures. The next alternative of employing the British Income tax rates as categories failed as the UK except Scotland has only four income tax rates which would inaccurately display social classes, e.g. the ‘higher rate’ ranges from £46,351 to £150,000 clearly not adequately displaying a coherent category of social class.

The most fitting classification of social class by income is introduced in the Great British Class Survey (GBCS). In the GBCS, Savage et al. established seven social classes mainly based on three types of capital: social, cultural and economic. Economic capital is composed of household income, household savings and house price. Amongst other things, the survey resulted in average household incomes per year for each of the seven newly established social classes. These classes are the following as well as their respective average household income per year in descending order: elite (£89,000), established middle class (£47,000), technical middle class (£38,000), new affluent workers (moderate household income), traditional working class (£13,000), emergent service sector (£21,000) and precariat (£8,000) (Savage et al., 2013). Unfortunately, this class system is also influenced by other factors than just income which makes it difficult to use in a purely income-based variable and thus increasing the chance of placing it in a slightly wrong context. However, the new categories of the gross household income will be based on the GBCS and its social classes.

The new categories reflect more and better on income classes. The lowest income category of £15,000 and less was chosen on the basis of the poverty threshold in the UK. This category can be seen as this research's equivalent to the GBCS' precariat. Poverty thresholds in the UK are calculated by the British Department for Work and Pensions in their annual Household Below Average Income (HBAI) report. According to the HBAI, the poverty line in the UK is measured as 60% of the average median income since the mean income is too vulnerable to extreme outliers. The median income in the UK for a single household is £25,688 per year (HBAI, 2018, p.3). Consequently, the poverty threshold is dated at £15,392 per year. The second category is designed as working class to capture both the aforementioned median household income as well as the mean household income which is at £30,888 per year. The middle class is represented by the household income between £50,000 and £70,000 while the upper middle class or elite is dated from £70,000 onwards in regard to the GBCS' elite average income of £89,000.

Attitude towards the EU

Similar to the previous variables of national identity and socio-demographics, the independent variable representing the attitude towards the EU needed to be refined prior to being used in any statistical context or analysis of any kind. The BES data set included numerous indicators closely related to a sophisticated measure of attitudes towards the EU. Unfortunately, said indicators were insufficient in being a proper measurement of the British attitude towards the EU. By taking only one indicator such as satisfaction with EU democracy, other factors would be left out and, therefore, inadequately representing the attitude towards the EU in the three British countries subject to this research. Respondents could very well be satisfied with the democratic processes within the EU while disapproving of the level of Britain's influence in world politics due to EU inflicted reasons.

In order to encounter the previously mentioned problem, there is a rather simple solution. This solution is to create an index which can in turn represents a sufficient measure of the British attitude towards the EU without a deficient inclusion of all or most concerning factors. The new variable shown in Table 6 is comprised of a total of eight different indicators from the BES wave 8 data. Though they do possess a certain similarity as the wording of each question is the same as well as the measurement level. These eight questions each touch upon one separate topic which have been crucial to the Brexit campaigns. The eight topics included are unemployment, immigration to the UK, risk of terrorism, international trade, working conditions of British workers,

general economic situation in the UK, personal financial situation and the National Health Service (NHS). The combination of topics and their respective variables seem to reflect the most upon the most pressing issues in regard to media coverage and campaigning. Unemployment, working conditions, general economic situation and personal financial circumstances are well-established factors influencing elections and other public votes. They influence people usually rather promptly and, therefore, are constantly on people's minds as well as their political agenda. While the NHS and the whole social insurance and health apparatus are also directly linked with people's needs and affect them mostly immediately, the issues around the NHS has been extensively used by the Leave campaigns, especially Nigel Farage's campaign brought it to its undeniable attention in public debates arguing leaving the EU would free up huge budget gains which could in turn be re-used for NHS purposes (Henley, 2016). Immigration and risk of terrorism made similar headlines at the time and become more and more recognition as pressing issues in today's political arena. International trade is to be seen as international economic factor along the personal and national ones. Furthermore, other variables such as satisfaction with EU democracy due to either different measurement levels or simply due to their rather vague nature in terms of indicating an actual attitude towards the EU.

Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on how strong the regarding topics were affected by leaving the EU on a Likert scale with a range of five answer options. The variable about terrorism, immigration and unemployment needed recoding since their measurement was opposed to the rest of the variables. More precisely, for these three variables the relationship between leaving the EU and its impact on the question's issue was vice versa: according to the setup of the answer possibilities, leaving the EU would be viewed positively and affect the issue at hand in a positive manner. However, to create an Index all included variables or indicators were needed to have the same measurement level as well as the meaning of the measurement level needed to be the same.

Next, the values for each category of the variables are simply added by SPSS. To return to the previous scale of five categories, the data is refined as well as rounded to establish a proper category pattern for further analysis. Additionally, the five answer categories were regrouped further into now three simple categories. The selection of three categories is based on previous tables such as national identity to continue coherence and both extreme answer categories of 'very negative' and 'very positive' only have small impact as they failed to surpass the hurdle of 2%.

4. Analysis

The following chapter will firstly introduce the overall findings as well as provide information necessary as basis for further deeper analysis. More specifically, an overview of each variable shall be given including descriptive statistics with appropriate interpretation. Due to the exclusive use of cross tables and the fact of having mostly interval or nominal variables, the statistical significance will be proven with the Pearson's Chi-Square test beneath every table. Results can be influenced by the large sample size at hand. For reasons of visual ease and enhanced interpretability, all percentages will be rounded which makes the total of 100% in the tables not always correct but will only deviate for a very little percentage. In order to maintain the statistical claim of every table representing 100% of relevant cases, the total percentage within each table will still remain 100%.

Like the descriptive statistics, the actual association of national identity, socio-demographic factors and attitude towards the EU on vote choice in the referendum on EU membership will be executed in cross tables with an indication of significance by means of the Pearson's Chi-Square test beneath every table for each country as the differences between England, Scotland and Wales are the main focus of this research. Strengths of associations between variables will be measured by Cramer's V. The general measure of association of Cramer's V will be categorized in weak (<0.29), moderate ($0.3-0.59$) and strong (>0.6) associations between variables as the value of Cramer's V can possibly range from 0 to 1. Unlike the descriptive statistics, the analysis will exclude 'Don't know' categories from consideration as they fail to be crucial to the analysis, draw the attention away from other important table contents and are dispensable in rather complex tables.

4.1. Differences between England, Scotland and Wales

In order to simplify the strength of the British and national identities in the respective countries as well as to better illustrate, the initial seven possible scores from 'Not British at all' to 'Very Strongly British' including 'Don't know' were grouped together into three new ones being 'Not British', 'Moderately British' and 'Strongly British'. More specifically, the first two were grouped into one and the last two into one while the middle consists of three old scores. By doing so, differences

between each strength score and furthermore between the three countries are more visible and clear-cut.

National identity

Table 1

British identity scale for each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Britishness</i>				<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Don't know</i>		
England	4%	31%	63%	2%	100%	20768
Scotland	20%	36%	44%	1%	100%	3895
Wales	8%	31%	61%	1%	100%	2266

Chi²=1,463.03; d.f.=4; p=0.000

Table 1 shows that the English and the Welsh respondents have a rather strong relationship with the British identity. Both countries seem to identify strongly British to at least 60%. Here it might be tempting to say that this low outcome for Scotland could have two simple reasons: either the grouping of the scores influenced the new score negatively or the Scottish merely do identify as British but not as strong as their British neighbors. And indeed, Scotland identifies the most as moderately British with 36% while the lowest is scored by Wales with 31%. Almost 20% of Scottish respondents do not identify as British. In light of the Scottish referendum on independence from the UK and therefore Great Britain in 2014, the strong result for Scottish respondents rather denying their British identity does not come as a surprise. In contrast, only 4% of the Welsh and 8% of the English can relate to the aforementioned Scottish. Moderately British seems to be middle ground where all three countries differ only marginally. With only 31% not having strong opinions on the British identity, it can be argued that Wales is the most divided. Though in comparison to England with 31% moderately British respondents it seems a rather exaggerated statement. As of Table 1 and the corresponding findings, there is a big difference in British identity characteristics between Scotland and its British neighbors, i.e. Scotland does not nearly identify as much with the collective British identity as England and Wales.

Table 2

National identity scale for each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>National identity</i>				<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Don't know</i>		
England	7%	25%	67%	2%	100%	20768
Scotland	12%	20%	68%	1%	100%	3895
Wales	25%	24%	50%	1%	100%	2266

In terms of their own national identity, bigger differences between the three British countries become apparent as shown in Table 2. With only 7% England has the least respondents weakly identifying with their nationality as opposed to Wales where every fourth respondent has weak bonds with their national identity. This reflects the other end of story: Wales looks to be the outlier in the opposed category as well with only every second respondent strongly identifying with the Welsh nationality. Scotland and England differ barely in this respect with 68% and 67% respectively. Across the board, Wales is the most distributed. With a closer look, the fourth category ('Don't know') strikes the eye. England has in both cases double the percentage compared to Wales and Scotland. However, with more than 20,000 respondents chances increase for people to be stuck between survey answers or being indecisive otherwise causing them to answer with 'Don't know' than they are with 3,895 Scots and 2,266 Welsh. Concluding from Table 2, England and Scotland have the strongest national identities. Additionally, Wales has the lowest national identity rate with every fourth person having a low sense of national belonging.

Education

Table 3 shows the proportion of each educational level in the three British countries. In all three countries people with no qualification make up for around 8% of the respondents. With the GCSE(D-G)-level differences start to become visible. Though these differences are not of massive nature, Table 3 points out the slight educational advantage Wales and Scotland have over England at least from the viewpoint of officially obtained educational qualification. At the

GCSE(A*-C)-level the difference between the highest and lowest scoring countries is still at a rather low level with six points. This is similar to the outcome for the A-level category where the highest percentage of 23% was scored by Scotland and the lowest by Wales with 19%. The scenario of rather similar numbers continues with the categories of undergraduates and postgraduates. In total, the British nations stay on a rather similar level when comparing individual educational levels. However, it becomes apparent that indeed England has less people with an undergraduate degree and higher with 40%. In this respect, Scotland lead the charts with almost every second respondent having obtained at least an undergraduate level. As Table 3 has shown, Scotland has a slightly higher educational level as England and Wales.

Table 3

Educational level of each country

<i>Country</i>	British educational level						<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
	<i>No qualifications</i>	<i>GCSE D-G</i>	<i>GCSE A*-C</i>	<i>A-level</i>	<i>Undergraduate</i>	<i>Postgrad</i>		
England	9%	6%	24%	22%	32%	9%	100%	20768
Scotland	7%	3%	17%	23%	36%	14%	100%	3895
Wales	7%	5%	22%	19%	35%	12%	100%	2266

Chi²=196.85; d.f.=10; p=0.000

Gross household income

Table 4 shows that there is only little difference between the countries in terms of gross household income in respect to their social classes which have been elaborated previously. There seems to be no virtual outlier separating the three British countries. England appears to have the edge over Scotland and Wales when it comes to the upper-middle class with an annual household income of at least £70,000. In the lower categories, namely the precariat and the working class Wales scores slightly higher than its neighboring nations. However, these marginal differences stay within three percentage points. The biggest wage group is between £15,000 and £35,000 per year which is in line to the previously stated HBAI that found the average British income is £26,000 per year. The precariat and the lower-middle class are both rather similar with 16% and 14%

respectively. Interestingly, every fifth respondent of each country respectively refused to answer. Income and other personal financial matters tend to be highly delicate and rather disclosed than up for public discussion especially in a survey. Table 4 illustrates well that there is virtually no difference between the distribution of gross household income groups in the British countries of England, Scotland and Wales. The most represented group within this research has a gross household income per year of £15,000 to £35,000.

Table 4

Gross household income per year in each country

Country	Gross household income per year							Total	N
	<i>less than £15,000</i>	<i>£15,000 to 35,000</i>	<i>£35,000 to 50,000</i>	<i>£50,000 to 70,000</i>	<i>£70,000 and more</i>	<i>Prefer not to answer</i>	<i>Don't know</i>		
England	16%	30%	14%	8%	7%	19%	6%	100%	20515
Scotland	15%	30%	15%	8%	6%	20%	6%	100%	3948
Wales	18%	33%	13%	7%	4%	20%	6%	100%	2315

Chi²=54.37; d.f.=12; p=0.000

Age

Table 5 shows the age group share each British country has along with the share of Great Britain to compare the three countries to the British average. As can be seen in Table 5, the smallest age group is represented by respondents aged under 18. Clearly, minors are not as equally interested as their older counterparts and furthermore campaigns disregard them mostly when mobilizing voters. The largest age groups are rather older generations starting at age 46 with the largest group being age 56-65 making up for 26% of all respondents. Notably, the age groups until age 25 score both poorly with less than 10% respectively. It can be argued that these groups rather shy away from huge surveys such as the BES and thus are not as easy to recruit as older age groups who are usually more likely to participate in such surveys for reasons of sharing

accumulated wisdom or acquired experience that might benefit next generations. In conclusion of Table 5, Wales seems to be slightly older than England and Scotland, though this could very well be due to the sample of respondents.

Table 5

Age groups in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Age group</i>							<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
	<i>Under 18</i>	<i>18-25</i>	<i>26-35</i>	<i>36-45</i>	<i>46-55</i>	<i>56-65</i>	<i>66+</i>		
England	2%	9%	12%	14%	20%	25%	19%	100%	20768
Scotland	1%	6%	11%	14%	20%	28%	20%	100%	3983
Wales	1%	6%	10%	12%	17%	29%	26%	100%	2324

Chi²=185.28; d.f.=12; p=0.000

Attitude towards the EU

Table 6

Attitude towards the EU in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Attitude towards the EU</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Negative</i>		
England	22%	49%	29%	100%	20072
Scotland	29%	52%	19%	100%	3865
Wales	27%	47%	26%	100%	2256

Chi²=518.47; d.f.=174; p=0.000

Table 6 shows that all three countries are rather similar to each other when looking at their scores for moderate attitude towards the EU. Negative attitudes towards the EU are more common among English and Welsh respondents with 29% and 26% respectively. The three countries are

divided by merely 6% in their respondents who share a moderate attitude towards the EU. Scotland has more respondents thinking positively in respect of to the EU. Wales follows shortly behind in this category with 27%. On the other side, almost only every fifth respondents had a positive attitude towards the EU. England also had the most negative attitude towards the EU with 29% of English respondents. Only every fifth Scottish respondent were opposed to the EU. The findings show that the most negative attitudes towards the EU can be found in England while the most positive ones are to be found in Scotland with Wales in the middle. According to the Brexit turnout and the vote outcome, it could be argued that between Wales and England who were the two countries voting in favor of the Brexit England was the actual driving force based on strong negative English opinions while Wales was just following the 'big brother' and its petulant attitude towards the EU.

4.2. National identity and vote intention

As can be seen in Table 7, the highest Remain voting rate was scored by English respondents with a moderate national identity with 70%. They are closely followed by their fellow countrymen weakly identifying with the English nationality by 67%. On the contrary, only 34% of English Remain voters had a strong national identity as opposed to 62% of Scottish and 52% of Welsh respondents. This shows that England is the outlier in terms how respondents vote in respect to the strength of their national identity. In other terms, the distribution of voters either for or against the Brexit is visibly more equally dispersed in Scotland and in Wales as it is in England. Along the actual Brexit outcome, Scotland voted for Remain with a majority of at least 9% regardless of weak, moderate or strong sense of national belonging. Evidently, England seems to be the only British country where national identity played a crucial role in the British EU membership referendum. This is reflected in the results of Chi-Square value and Cramer's V. According to the statistics, England had the only significant findings in addition to the strongest association by far between variables at hand. For the time being, it can be argued that this is the result of a large sample size for England compared to 3,651 Scottish and 2,158 Welsh respondents. However, the aforementioned clear differences between the impact of national identity on the vote intention in England in comparison to its British neighbors suspect otherwise. On the other side, with a Cramer's V of just 0.234 which is to be classified as a weak association the English pattern of a strong influence of national identity of the Brexit vote seems to be harshly put into perspective. It

is to be said that a rather equal number of respondents for each country would greatly benefit this very discussion in the sense that cross-country differences would be more significant in their statistical implication. In terms of small intriguing peculiarities, with close to 3% in each country respondents with weak national identity make up for the most share of respondents who wish not to vote. Highly speculative though possibly weakly supporting the previous mentioned argument, it is debatable that a strong national identity can be compelling to vote, especially in a referendum which was said to be about taking back control of a nation and its sovereignty.

Table 7

National identity scale and vote intention for each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>National identity</i>	<i>Vote intention</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Remain in the EU</i>	<i>Leave the EU</i>	<i>Not voting</i>		
England ^a	Weak	67%	30%	3%	100%	1344
	Moderate	70%	29%	2%	100%	4917
	Strong	34%	64%	1%	100%	13230
Scotland ^b	Weak	59%	39%	2%	100%	440
	Moderate	65%	34%	1%	100%	741
	Strong	62%	37%	1%	100%	2470
Wales ^c	Weak	50%	48%	3%	100%	550
	Moderate	56%	43%	1%	100%	511
	Strong	52%	47%	2%	100%	1097

a: $\chi^2=2,133.82$; d.f.=4; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.234$

b: $\chi^2=5,513$; d.f.=4; $p=0.239$; Cramer's $V=0.027$

c: $\chi^2=7,749$; d.f.=4; $p=0.101$; Cramer's $V=0.042$

4.3. Socio-demographics and vote intention

Education

Table 8

Educational level and vote intention in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>British educational level</i>	<i>Vote intention</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Remain in the EU</i>	<i>Leave the EU</i>	<i>Not voting</i>		
England ^a	No qualifications	21%	77%	2%	100%	1441
	GCSE D-G	29%	70%	2%	100%	905
	GCSE A*-C	30%	67%	2%	100%	3871
	A-level	47%	51%	2%	100%	3558
	Undergraduate	60%	40%	1%	100%	5271
	Postgrad	71%	29%	1%	100%	1590
Scotland ^b	No qualifications	43%	57%	0%	100%	223
	GCSE D-G	41%	57%	2%	100%	92
	GCSE A*-C	43%	56%	2%	100%	539
	A-level	57%	40%	3%	100%	706
	Undergraduate	74%	25%	1%	100%	1129
	Postgrad	83%	16%	1%	100%	442
Wales ^c	No qualifications	25%	71%	4%	100%	131
	GCSE D-G	34%	60%	5%	100%	93
	GCSE A*-C	38%	60%	2%	100%	404
	A-level	51%	46%	3%	100%	352
	Undergraduate	63%	39%	0%	100%	655
	Postgrad	80%	20%	0%	100%	224

a: $\chi^2=1,641.95$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.222$

b: $\chi^2=313.53$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.224$

c: $\chi^2=195.94$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.230$

Table 8 illustrates the different voting patterns between each country's educational level. The highest scoring educational level for Remain was the category of postgraduates with at least 70% in each country. The most inclined of EU membership was the educational elite in Scotland with 83% closely followed by their Welsh counterpart with 80%. In comparison, England scored poorly with 70% of their postgrad respondents favoring to remain in the EU. While England was the outlier in the elite category and their share of Remain voters, Scotland appears to be the outlier when it comes to the opposite: Leave voters. Though all countries are increasingly opposed of the EU the lower their educational level is, in Scotland respondents without any educational qualification intended to vote Remain with 43% while in England and Wales are at 21% and 25% respectively. This means that in Scotland almost every second respondent without education voted to Remain whereas in the neighboring British countries' respondents without education close to only every fourth respondents voting to Remain. All outcomes for each individual country reflects the actual outcome of the Brexit vote with England and Wales voting in favor of the Brexit with a majority and Scotland voting to remain in the EU with a majority. This is reflected especially in the lower educational levels where Scotland scored clearly different from its neighbors. Higher educational levels also seem to be more inclined to vote in general as can be seen in Table 8. Undergraduates and Postgraduates that were not fond of voting in the Brexit only made up for never more than 1% of their corresponding educational group. Undeniably, the educational level of a respondent did indeed influence his or her vote intention in the British referendum on EU membership though to be categorized as a weak association (<0.3) but still higher than aforementioned influences by previous variables.

Gross household income

The highest Remain voting rate was scored by Welsh respondents with a gross household income of £70,000 and more which is the highest income group accounting for the elite. For England and Scotland, the highest Remain-voting gross household income group were one wage group which is £50,000 and £70,000, one below the Welsh highest Remain-voting income group. In this very category, 63% of English respondents and 75% of Scottish respondents with a gross household income of £50,000 and £70,000 voted to Remain in the EU. Vice versa, the lower income groups were increasingly in favor of the Brexit. In all three countries the highest share of Leave voters could be found in the lowest income groups earning £15,000 and less per year.

Table 9

Gross household income per year and vote intention for each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Gross household income per year</i>	<i>Vote intention</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Remain in the EU</i>	<i>Leave the EU</i>	<i>Not voting</i>		
England ^a	less than £15k	37%	61%	2%	100%	3085
	£15k to 35k	43%	56%	1%	100%	5886
	£35k to 50k	51%	48%	1%	100%	3607
	£50k to 70k	63%	37%	1%	100%	1797
	£70k and more	60%	39%	1%	100%	143
	Prefer not to answer	38%	60%	2%	100%	3605
Scotland ^b	less than £15k	51%	46%	3%	100%	571
	£15k to 35k	62%	38%	1%	100%	1135
	£35k to 50k	69%	31%	1%	100%	742
	£50k to 70k	75%	24%	1%	100%	314
	£70k and more	70%	26%	4%	100%	23
	Prefer not to answer	59%	39%	2%	100%	721
Wales ^c	less than £15k	42%	56%	2%	100%	388
	£15k to 35k	50%	49%	1%	100%	743
	£35k to 50k	67%	32%	1%	100%	362
	£50k to 70k	67%	33%	0%	100%	142
	£70k and more	80%	20%	0%	100%	5
	Prefer not to answer	47%	51%	2%	100%	441

a: $\chi^2=462.18$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.113$ b: $\chi^2=80.09$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.107$ c: $\chi^2=72.18$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.132$

Table 9 clearly shows that gross household income influenced a citizen's vote in the Brexit and it can be said that the more a British citizen earned, the more inclined he was to vote against the Brexit and in favor of remaining in the EU. This can be related to the aforementioned claims that peoples' choices in elections and other public votes are influenced by the economic and financial impact of their vote's outcome on themselves. The strengths of all three relationships are rather weak whereas the strongest can be found in Wales with 0.132 and the weakest in Wales with 0.107. All associations of Table 8 are weak associations as they fail to proceed 0.3. Due to the fact that England has a large sample size, the possible threat of a small sample sizes negatively influencing the strength of the association indicated by Cramer's V can be excluded. Still, the visible pattern of respondents earning less being more inclined to vote Leave exists.

Age

Table 10 shows the differences between the three British countries and how their respective age groups in regard to their Brexit vote. As assumed, age does have an affect on the vote choice. The higher the age group, the higher the share of Leave voters. In other terms, the older a respondent, the more likely he or she was to vote in favor of the Brexit. This holds true for all three countries. England has the highest share of Leave voters in the oldest age group starting at age 66 and older. 64% of this very age group voted to Leave in England while their counterparts voted Leave with 44% in Scotland and 55% in Wales. While the majority of respondents aged 46 and upwards voted to Leave in England, the statistics paint a different picture for Scotland and Wales: in Scotland throughout all age groups the majority of respondents favored to remain in the EU and in Wales only at the two oldest age groups of age 56 to 65 and 66+ the majority of respondents were inclined to vote against EU membership. Interestingly though, the younger a respondent, the higher the chances of him or her not voting at all. While the non-voters amount to a rather small group of a maximum of 5%, their Welsh counterparts of under the age of 18 and between age 18 and 25 make up for 15% and 6% respectively in their corresponding age group. Similar to the influence of gross household income on vote intention, the strength of the association between age groups of each country and vote intention is rather weak with the highest Cramer's V of 0.179 scored in Wales. In fact, the statistical association of age groups within the countries and the vote intention is a weak association (<0.3).

Table 10

Age groups and vote intention in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Age group</i>	<i>Vote intention</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Remain in the EU</i>	<i>Leave the EU</i>	<i>Not voting</i>		
England ^a	Under 18	73%	24%	3%	100%	399
	18-25	71%	26%	3%	100%	1823
	26-35	57%	39%	3%	100%	2226
	36-45	49%	49%	2%	100%	2639
	46-55	41%	57%	1%	100%	3826
	56-65	38%	61%	1%	100%	4893
	66+	35%	64%	0%	100%	3685
Scotland ^b	Under 18	59%	37%	5%	100%	41
	18-25	80%	17%	3%	100%	233
	26-35	72%	27%	2%	100%	408
	36-45	66%	31%	2%	100%	509
	46-55	60%	39%	2%	100%	745
	56-65	59%	40%	1%	100%	1037
	66+	56%	44%	1%	100%	763
Wales ^c	Under 18	73%	12%	15%	100%	26
	18-25	65%	29%	6%	100%	126
	26-35	66%	30%	3%	100%	211
	36-45	63%	34%	3%	100%	264
	46-55	52%	47%	1%	100%	378
	56-65	47%	52%	1%	100%	629
	66+	44%	55%	1%	100%	579

a: $\chi^2=1,260.55$; d.f.=12; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.180$ b: $\chi^2=102.73$; d.f.=12; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.117$ c: $\chi^2=141.47$; d.f.=12; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.179$

4.4. Attitude towards the EU and vote intention

Table 11

Attitude towards the EU and vote intention in each country

Country	Attitude towards EU	Vote intention in Brexit			Total	N
		Remain in the EU	Leave the EU	Not voting		
England ^a	Positive	96%	3%	1%	100%	4257
	Moderate	48%	50%	1%	100%	9065
	Negative	4%	96%	0%	100%	5690
Scotland ^b	Positive	97%	3%	1%	100%	1107
	Moderate	63%	36%	1%	100%	1853
	Negative	6%	94%	1%	100%	686
Wales ^c	Positive	97%	2%	1%	100%	604
	Moderate	53%	46%	1%	100%	991
	Negative	4%	95%	1%	100%	567

a: $\chi^2=8,484.54$; d.f.=4; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.472$

b: $\chi^2=1,517.97$; d.f.=4; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.456$

c: $\chi^2=1,031.16$; d.f.=4; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.488$

Table 11 pictures the country differences in how respondents with either positive, moderate or negative attitudes towards the EU intended to vote. Unsurprisingly, it shows that respondents with a negative attitude towards the EU are strongly inclined to vote against EU membership and therefore vote for the Brexit and the Leave side while respondents intending to vote for EU membership and against the Brexit were previously sympathizing the EU. The only real difference between the three countries lies within their intermediate category: moderate attitude towards the EU. England's respondents with a moderate opinion about the EU intended to vote Remain with 48% which is less than the majority and thus according to the actual Brexit outcome. This holds true for Scotland as well. In the actual Brexit, Scotland voted to remain in the EU with a majority which is reflected in the survey's respondents pattern with 63% of participants having a moderate

attitude towards the EU voting against the Brexit. However, Wales did not vote accordingly. The majority of the Welsh voted to leave the EU in the Brexit while here two out three attitude categories favored the EU membership. This can have two rather simple causes. On one hand, creating an index reflecting attitudes towards the EU could have had on the impact of the distribution or at least the categorization and regrouping of variable values. However, regrouping the variable into three categories instead of five could not have the impact assumed as the extreme categories of 'very negative attitude towards the EU' and 'very positive attitude towards the EU' were only margins of very small percentages. On the other side, the variable reflecting on the respondents' vote choices in the referendum were still 'just' vote intentions. Clearly, intentions can be changed and vary greatly from the actual outcome of an individual's vote cast. Especially campaigning can be highly influential or even manipulative in the last weeks and days of a public vote. Furthermore, intentions and actual vote cast could differ even more than in other public votes as it is a dichotomous decision instead of more options as in general elections.

4.5. Strongest influences

The previous analysis of the influence of national identity, socio-demographics and attitude towards the EU on vote intention in the referendum on EU membership showed that some influences were more present than others. More specifically, the influences of a respondent's educational level as well as their respective attitude towards the EU were the strongest. The following will investigate said factors from a different perspective which will highlight the differences between the three British countries within a vote intention category.

Table 12 presents how exactly the categories of vote intention are composed in each country at the hand of the educational level. As can be seen, the differences between the countries are rather marginal. The distribution of educational levels within the Remain voters are virtually the same in all countries. Around 40% of Remain voters are undergraduates, 15-18% are postgraduates, 18-22% passed their A-levels, GCSE makes up for around 18% and 3-5% of respondents without any educational qualification are against the Brexit. A similar picture is painted for the share of Leave voters, however, in different proportions. The Leave voters are mostly composed of the levels GCSE A*-C (27-30%), A-level (19-25%) and undergraduates (24-29%). Again, it becomes evident that education played a crucial role in the Brexit referendum on how people voted. The educational level of the highest share of Remain voters is in fact two levels higher than the one of the Leave voting side.

Table 12

Country-level share of each educational level for each vote intention

<i>Vote intention</i>	<i>Country</i>	British educational level						<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>No qualifications</i>	<i>GCSE D-G</i>	<i>GCSE A*-C</i>	<i>A-level</i>	<i>Undergraduate</i>	<i>Postgrad</i>		
Remain ^a	England	4%	3%	15%	22%	41%	15%	100%	7681
	Scotland	5%	2%	12%	21%	42%	19%	100%	1970
	Wales	3%	3%	16%	18%	42%	18%	100%	987
Leave ^b	England	13%	7%	30%	21%	24%	5%	100%	8694
	Scotland	11%	5%	27%	25%	25%	6%	100%	1117
	Wales	11%	7%	29%	19%	29%	5%	100%	842
Not voting ^c	England	12%	7%	34%	24%	18%	5%	100%	261
	Scotland	2%	5%	18%	46%	23%	7%	100%	44
	Wales	17%	18%	20%	38%	7%	3%	100%	30

a: $\chi^2=58.15$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$ b: $\chi^2=36.42$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$ c: $\chi^2=23.11$; d.f.=10; $p=0.010$

The only category where the British countries greatly vary in their composition is the category of non-voters. However, those findings can be disregarded as their sample size is too small and would not make for a sufficient basis to draw proper conclusions from. There were only 261 English, 44 Scottish and 30 Welsh non-voters included.

Table 13 is constructed the same as Table 12 to show how exactly the categories of vote intention are composed in each country at the hand of attitudes towards the EU. Similarly, Table 13 fails to generate more than small though clearer differences between England, Scotland and Wales. Interestingly, the only country in which the majority of Remain voters had a positive attitude towards the EU is Wales with 52%. In addition, Scotland is the only country in which the majority of Leave voters did not have a negative attitude towards the EU with 48%.

Table 13

Country-level share of each attitude towards the EU for each vote intention

<i>Vote intention</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Attitude towards the EU</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Positive</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Negative</i>		
Remain ^a	England	47%	51%	3%	100%	8665
	Scotland	47%	51%	2%	100%	2268
	Wales	52%	46%	2%	100%	1131
Leave ^b	England	1%	45%	54%	100%	10169
	Scotland	2%	50%	48%	100%	1342
	Wales	1%	45%	54%	100%	1007
Not voting ^c	England	23%	64%	14%	100%	178
	Scotland	22%	67%	11%	100%	36
	Wales	25%	46%	29%	100%	24

a: $\chi^2=13.61$; d.f.=4; $p=0.009$ b: $\chi^2=19.09$; d.f.=4; $p=0.001$ c: $\chi^2=4.91$; d.f.=4; $p=0.297$

4.6. Influences of influences

Table 14

Gross household income and attitude towards the EU in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Gross household income per year</i>	<i>Attitude towards the EU</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Positive</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Negative</i>		
England ^a	less than £15k	20%	45%	35%	100%	3151
	£15k to 35k	20%	49%	31%	100%	6060
	£35k to 50k	21%	53%	26%	100%	2757
	£50k to 70k	26%	53%	22%	100%	1605
	£70k and more	31%	51%	19%	100%	1350
	Prefer not to answer	19%	48%	33%	100%	3743
Scotland ^b	less than £15k	26%	50%	24%	100%	592
	£15k to 35k	27%	54%	19%	100%	1174
	£35k to 50k	31%	53%	16%	100%	592
	£50k to 70k	39%	46%	14%	100%	308
	£70k and more	34%	51%	15%	100%	221
	Prefer not to answer	29%	52%	19%	100%	746
Wales ^c	less than £15k	25%	44%	31%	100%	400
	£15k to 35k	25%	48%	27%	100%	747
	£35k to 50k	34%	49%	18%	100%	284
	£50k to 70k	35%	50%	14%	100%	153
	£70k and more	46%	34%	20%	100%	82
	Prefer not to answer	23%	49%	28%	100%	458

a: $\chi^2=262.33$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.084$

b: $\chi^2=34.17$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.069$

c: $\chi^2=50.73$; d.f.=10; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.109$

Table 14 shows that the association between gross household income and attitude towards the EU is for all three countries close to 0.1 which speaks for a rather weak association. However, this means that attitude towards the EU is not as highly influenced by gross household income as it could be anticipated. The strength of association is also reflected in the scores. Moderate attitudes towards the EU scored the highest with around 45-55% in all income groups across all three countries. Though, it appears that the higher the gross household income, the more positive the attitude towards the EU becomes. In each country the share of positive attitudes towards the EU within one income group grew about 10% from the lowest income group to the highest. However, in Wales the difference measures 20%. This can be partly due to only 82 respondents within the Welsh respondent group of £70,000 and more gross household income per year. With a larger sample size for said income group the outcome might possibly paint a different picture.

Table 15 illustrates the relationship between national identity and attitude towards the EU in England, Scotland and Wales. Unfortunately, England is the only country where Chi-Square test proved to be significant while Scotland and Wales failed to reach the threshold of a p-value below 0.05. Additionally, the association between English national identity and attitude towards the EU appears to be only rather strong one among the three British countries with Cramer's $V=0.211$ while Scotland and Wales are far from Cramer's $V=0.1$. Again, this could be accounted for by the sample size. However, the relationship between the two variables seems to support the fact that in England national identity did indeed have more impact on attitude towards the EU. 40% of respondents with weak national identity had a positive attitude towards the EU while in Scotland and Wales it was 26% and 25% respectively. Similarly, 36% of English participants that strongly identified with their country were inclined to have a negative attitude towards the EU which is twice as much as in Scotland. In conclusion of Table 15, attitude towards the EU was indeed influenced by national identity in England in the sense that the stronger the sense of national identification the lesser respondents thought of the EU.

Table 15

National identity and attitude towards the EU in each country

<i>Country</i>	<i>National identity</i>	<i>Attitude towards the EU</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
		<i>Positive</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Negative</i>		
England ^a	Weak	40%	44%	17%	100%	1367
	Moderate	37%	50%	13%	100%	5037
	Strong	15%	49%	36%	100%	13668
Scotland ^b	Weak	26%	53%	21%	100%	456
	Moderate	31%	51%	18%	100%	753
	Strong	30%	52%	18%	100%	2570
Wales ^c	Weak	25%	50%	26%	100%	562
	Moderate	29%	48%	23%	100%	525
	Strong	28%	45%	28%	100%	1111

a: $\chi^2=1,781.93$; d.f.=4; $p=0.000$; Cramer's $V=0.211$ b: $\chi^2=4.03$; d.f.=4; $p=0.401$; Cramer's $V=0.033$ c: $\chi^2=7,38$; d.f.=4; $p=0.117$; Cramer's $V=0.041$

5. Conclusion

With the establishment of Euroscepticism in the daily political landscape and the rise of populist parties, the EU and the integrity of its legacy have been criticized further and further in the last two decades. The effects of globalization especially in the form of migration and corresponding consequences and crises have challenged the EU's right to exist as almost never before. In particular, the economic crisis in 2008 and the migration crisis which still lasts to this day have sparked questions in terms of how the EU respond to such threats. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the EU has been put under the microscope. Negative attitudes towards the EU and demands for institutional change within the EU have been integrated in the discussion on the state of the EU more and more. These public notions sparked debates in several EU member states whether the European Union as such is a sustainable and reasonable model for the future. As a sovereign nation, the United Kingdom decided to post a public vote on the membership in the EU in what would be called infamously the Brexit. Though the UK is a conglomerate of four different countries namely England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the vote on whether to leave the EU or to remain counted for the whole UK. Clearly, this provides a platform of possible voting differences and preferences between the countries which proved to be the final case. While the majority of English and Welsh voters opted to leave the EU, their Scottish and Northern Irish neighbors favored EU membership. The question arises as to why exactly the four countries voted differently and what were the causes that led to the outcome of the Brexit referendum in 2016.

This thesis attempted to answer this question. On the basis of the nature of the data set from the British Election Studies, this research paper focused on the voting differences in Great Britain disregarding Northern Ireland. Based on scientific literature, the influences of national identity, socio-demographic factors of age, education and socio-economic status in the form of gross household income per year on vote choice were established as proper and reasonable measures to answer the research question at hand. Each factor was elaborated for each country and compared. Moreover, differences between the countries in terms of how much the aforementioned factors determine vote choice were examined.

The resulting findings led to several conclusions. Firstly, the English and the Welsh identify much more with Great Britain than Scotland. Though, this fails to be reflected in national identity as England and Scotland prove to rather strongly identify with their respective country and its corresponding identity. In turn, national identity appeared to indeed influence vote choice in the

Brexit referendum, especially for England. Secondly, while socio-demographics did not differ greatly between the three British countries, they did influence a voter's choice. Gross household income influenced a citizen's vote in the Brexit and it can be said that the more a British citizen earned, the more inclined he was to vote against the Brexit and in favor of remaining in the EU. A similar picture is painted by education and age. The older a citizen the older, the more likely he was to vote Leave whereas the higher the educational level, the higher the chance of a Remain voter. Thirdly, the most significant impact on vote choice was attitude towards the EU though. As one might expect, attitude towards the EU was negatively positively related to vote choice, i.e. a negative attitude towards the EU was highly likely to be accompanied by voting Leave. Finally, it is to be concluded that the differences in the Brexit vote outcome between England, Scotland and Wales are mostly due to variations in the degrees of national identity and attitude towards the EU. **In other terms, Scotland voted to remain in the EU due to a rather strong national identity paired with a low sense of belonging to entirety of Great Britain in combination with an overall more positive attitude towards the EU.**

The scientific relevance of this research was the intention to contribute to existing literature in the way of providing a pluralistic analysis of possible causes of the Brexit outcome and voting differences between England, Scotland and Wales as opposed to most other expert papers that chose to investigate rather one single cause of said outcome. It is to say that this paper's approach might have failed to include all relevant vote-determining factors that would have been to be elaborated. Furthermore, the British Election Studies' data set of wave 8 excludes Northern Ireland from its data as the political landscape seems to be too disrupted to provide proper comparable data. This would have given a better comparison between all UK countries. Finally, it could be suggested that the questionnaire of the aforementioned data set should include an actual variable explicitly measuring and indicating attitude towards the EU as this is clearly a crucial issue in analyzing vote choice and would moreover provide a basis for further contribution of EU related debates and discussions.

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