

“The influence of three individual European Member States on the form and scope of the European Defence Union”

Bachelor thesis

Anne-Fleur Karssing
S1696610

04-7-2018

Dr. Shawn Donnelly
Dr. Guido Jansen

Word count: 20199

European Public Administration
University of Twente

0. Index

1. Abstract	5
2. Background: Introduction to the research problem	5
2.1 Formulation of the research question	6
3. Theory and formulation of hypotheses	8
3.1 Influence of Member States on international decision-making process	8
3.2 Formation of domestic attitudes of Member States	9
3.3 Important actors in preference formation of Member States	9
3.4 Where the attitudes of Member States could lead	10
3.5 Why Member States act on an international level the way they do	11
3.6 Formed attitudes of Member States poured into defined strategies	12
3.7 Hypotheses	12
4. Research design	14
4.1 Threats of research design	15
4.2 Case selection and sampling	15
5. Data	17
5.1 Conceptualization and operationalization	17
5.1.1 Operationalization strategies per actor	18
5.1.2 Data sources	20
6. Data analyses approach	22
7. Case study Germany	23
7.1 German national government	23
7.1.1 Derived data	23
7.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses	24
7.2 German main political parties	26
7.2.1 Derived data	26
7.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses	29
7.3 German interest groups	30
7.3.1 Derived data	30
7.3.2 Interpreted data and analyses	31
7.4 German domestic voters	32
7.4.1 Derived data	32
7.4.2 Interpreted data and analyses	32
7.5 Member State Germany	33
7.5.1 Position Germany	33
8. Case study France	34
8.1 French national government	34
8.1.1 Derived data	34
8.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses	36
8.2 French main political parties	38
8.2.1 Derived data	38
8.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses	39

8.3 French interest groups	40
8.3.1 Derived data	40
8.3.2 Interpreted data and analyses	41
<hr/>	
8.4 French domestic voters	42
8.4.1 Derived data	42
8.4.2 Interpreted data and analyses	42
<hr/>	
8.5 Member State France	43
8.5.1 Position France	43
<hr/>	
9. Case study Poland	44
<hr/>	
9.1 Polish national government	44
9.1.1 Derived data	44
9.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses	46
<hr/>	
9.2 Polish domestic voters	47
9.2.1 Derived data	47
9.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses	47
<hr/>	
9.3 Member State Poland	48
9.3.1 Position Poland	48
<hr/>	
10. Conclusion and discussion	49
<hr/>	
11. List of references	51
<hr/>	
12. Appendix	58

Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EAPC	European Association of Political Consultants
EC	European Commission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base Strategy
EDU	European Defence Union
EDF	European Defence Fund
EMF	European Monetary Fund
EFSP	European Foreign and Security Policy
EPACA	European Public Affairs Consultancies' Association
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Committee
ERP	European Recovery Programme
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDU	European Security and Defence Union
EU	European Union
LIG	Liberal intergovernmentalism
NAA	North Atlantic Alliance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WEU	West European Union

1. Abstract

This bachelor thesis examines the domestic preferences of three European Member States about the form and scope of the EDU, and the influence on the form and scope. Therefore, the research question is: 'To what extent does the attitude of the European Member States towards a European Defence Union influence the scope and form of the formation of the European Defence Union?'

France is considered to be a pacesetter while Germany and Poland are fence-sitters for different domestic and political reasons. The consequences are a grimmer EDU; this entails that the pace of the progress of the EDU could be slowed down or get stuck at the current pace.

2. Background: Introduction to the research problem

The research question of this bachelor thesis is: 'To what extent does the attitude of the European Member States towards a European Defence Union influence the scope and form of the formation of the European Defence Union?'

Since the Second World War and the establishment of the EU, the EU is developing into a more-integrated body about different topics and levels. Over the years, multiple important steps were taken regarding European Defence integration.

One of the steps is that, in 1996, NATO agreed upon the development of an ESDI by the WEU, and transformed it into the ESDP in 1999.

In December 2017, another important step was taken when the EU welcomed its firsts operational steps towards an EDU by formally establishing PESCO. This is an instrument within the EU Treaty that enables willing Member States to pursue greater cooperation in security and defence ("Europa.eu", 2017). However, PESCO is highly intergovernmental, meaning that the Member States will work together on different defence projects, but that no Member State can, or will be pushed into this cooperation. Because participation remains voluntary, it is left to the Member States to decide what the pace of the progress is going to be. Therefore, it is important to know and understand the attitude of Member States regarding European defence, and whether they have influence on further defence integration.

This is because, according to Mérand (2008), there is a great deal of social interaction between defence and security actors in Europe, meaning that Member States are in constant interaction with each other about defence issues. Because it is strongly institutionalized, the European defence and security field affects the practices, power relations, and social representations of security and defence actors (Mérand, 2008, P. 5). This means that such a security and defence field on a European level does influence to some extent, and on multiple levels, the Member States.

The question still remains, however, if, and how, the attitude of the European Member States influence the development of the European defence and security field, in the sense of further integration towards an EDU.

However, in addition to this, as one of the former studies about this subject describes, constant interaction between Member states is not enough and there are a lot of shortfalls

regarding European defence. One fundamental reason for these shortfalls is the low level of intensive and further integrated collaboration between the Member States (Solana, Saz-Carranza, García Casas & Estébanez Gómez, 2016, P. 22). However, in this study, regarding the Member States there is only studied what their attitudes towards European defence levels are, but does not discuss what kind of influence this has on European defence (Solana, Saz-Carranza, García Casas & Estébanez Gómez, 2016, P. 48).

Because of current shortfalls regarding defence, the EU is trying to create a further integrated European defence structure. This is needed on a less voluntary bases as well, because the EU and its Member States continue to face threats, which are increasingly take non-conventional or hybrid forms, like terrorist attacks, chemical attacks, and cyber-attacks, coming from different angles, and therefore, EU citizens and partners have asked for the EU to play a larger and more integrated role regarding collective security and defence ("Eeas.europa.eu", 2018).

Therefore, on the first of March 2017, the EC released a reflection paper about the future of the EU. This paper outlines the main trends and challenges that will shape the future of European security and defence. It also sets out three different scenarios for moving towards an ESDU, an EDU. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive, but the different levels of ambition underline these scenarios for the EU, regarding working together in the field of security and defence ("Europa.eu", 2018).

PESCO could be seen as the start of the formation of an EDU, because the EC recognises PESCO as a step further than the current Security and Defence cooperation, where the Member States would cooperate on security and defence more frequently and on a voluntary basis, depending on ad-hoc decisions when need arises ("Europa.eu", 2018).

Although the EU made feasible steps towards the establishment of an EDU through the establishment of PESCO, the question remains to what extent individual Member States actually have influence on the EDU, and especially how their attitudes are formed.

Therefore, the topic of this thesis is the EDU as is proposed in the three scenarios by the EC, and to what extent the attitudes of the individual Member States have influence on the scope and the form of the formation of the EDU.

2.1 Formulation of the research question

In order to investigate the influence of the Member States on the formation of the EDU, the proposed research question is: 'To what extent does the attitude of the Member States towards a European Defence Union influence the scope and form of the formation of the European Defence Union?'

The research question is an explanatory type of research question, because there is asked about what kind of influence the attitudes of the Member States have on the scope and form of the formation of the EDU.

The **independent variable** in this question is the attitude of Member States. The **dependent variable** is the **scope** and **form** of the formation of the EDU.

With **form** is meant how much delegation there is in the area of defence from Member States level to the European Union.

With **scope** is meant what actually happens with the delegation within the EU. This will be explained further in the 'Conceptualization and Operationalization' section.

In order to answer the above-stated main research question, multiple sub-questions will be answered and explained.

The sub-questions are:

1. Are the national governments of France, Germany and Poland pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters regarding the idea of the EDU?
2. How are the attitudes of the national governments of the Member States defined; do the national governments of France, Germany and Poland determine to use the pacesetter strategy, foot-dragger strategy or the fence-sitter strategy because it is derived from their national interest or because of it is derived from their national values and national identity?
3. How latched are national governments of individual Member States to the idea of the EDU?

In order to elaborate on this further, besides national governments, big political parties, interest groups and domestic voters will be taken into account as well.

In the sub-questions above, three Member States are taken into account. However, as will be explained below, LIG states that powerful Member States, like Germany and France, have more influence in the bargaining process regarding the EU than less powerful Member States, like Poland. Therefore, and because of the capacity of the bachelor thesis, only the national government and the domestic voters will be taken account for Poland. This is because, as will be elaborated further on in this thesis, for the present study there is focused on the influence of Member States on the EDU, and via these actors it is possible to conduct a conclusion about the Polish strategy.

Therefore, the following sub-questions are asked:

4. Are the main political parties of France and Germany pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters regarding the idea of the EDU?
5. Are domestic interest groups of France and Germany pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters regarding the idea of the EDU?

As will be elaborated further on in the theory section of this thesis, LIG expects that interest groups will be important for the formation of a domestic attitude by national governments, and their preferences will be reflected into main parties and policies created by governments. However, domestic voters are also important because they determine which kind of national government is voted in office. Therefore, the following sub-question will also be taken into account:

6. Are the domestic voters of France, Germany and Poland pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters regarding the idea of the EDU?

3. Theory and formulation of hypotheses

In the following section the theoretical foundation of this thesis will be explained. At the end of this section, multiple hypotheses will be derived.

3.1 Influence of Member States on international decision-making processes

In this section there will be explained how the individual Member States influence international bargaining and decision-making processes, from a Liberal intergovernmentalist (LIG) perspective. The LIG theory will be used as a thread throughout this paper.

Pollack (2001) describes international decision-making processes as a two-step process; based on preference formation and international bargaining.

During the first step, national government chiefs aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies, together with their own interests, and articulate national preferences towards European integration (Pollack, 2001, P. 225).

During the second step, the national governments have collected their preferences and brought them to the intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels. Here, agreements and decisions that are made reflect the relative power of each Member State, meaning that supranational organizations like the EC have little or no causal influence in this process (Pollack, 2001, P. 225).

Pollack (2001) also argued that major intergovernmental bargains on the European level are not driven by supranational entrepreneurs, transnational coalitions of business groups, or by unintended spillovers from earlier integration (Pollack, 2001, P. 225-226). Instead, he argued that a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful Member States drives it, and they also struck the most central bargains among themselves (Pollack, 2001, P. 226). In addition to this, Romaniuk and Stivachtis (2015) also argued that the outcomes of European negotiations are the results of the bargaining between sovereign national governments.

Also, the theory of LIG argues that major choices that are made on the European level reflect the preferences of national governments rather than the preferences of supranational organizations.

This means the decision-making process is driven by a process of preference convergence among the most powerful Member States, consisting out of national preferences that are influenced and formed by different domestic actors, and that the most powerful Member States have the biggest influence during such a bargaining process.

Pollack (2001) also stated that it could be that during such a bargaining and decision-making processes institutions are adopted. These institutions do not lead to the transfer of authority or loyalty from the nation state level to a new centre, but serve to provide information and reduce transaction costs of Member States (Pollack, 2001, P. 226).

3.2 Formation of the domestic attitudes of Member States

In this section, there will be explained how the attitude of an individual Member State is formed.

Before there is stated that a process of preference convergence among the most powerful Member States drives international bargaining and decision-making processes, consisting out of national preferences that are formed domestically. In the context of the present study, this means that a Member States' attitude regarding European defence integration is influenced and formed domestically, by different domestic actors.

According to LIG, national governments are seen as the dominant actors in shaping integration and they are the ones that are in control; they first define a set of interests, and then bargain among themselves in order to realize those interests (Romaniuk & Stivachtis, 2015, P. 186). National governments act purposively in the international arena based on goals that are defined domestically (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481), so each Member States' preference reflects the balance of their domestic interests (Romaniuk & Stivachtis, 2015, P. 186).

Moravcsik (1993) describes the foreign policy goals of national governments as varying in response to shifting pressures from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481).

Therefore, national interests are important and they also emerge through domestic political conflicts through different societal groups that are competing for political influence (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481).

Through this process of domestic attitude formation, the set of national interest or goals that Member States bring to international negotiations emerge (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483). Therefore, main political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters are important for the attitude formation process of national governments, which will be elaborated further on in the section below.

3.3 Important actors in preference formation of Member States

In this section the importance of different domestic actors in the domestic attitude formation of Member States will be explained.

Before there is stated that foreign policy goals of national governments are seen as goals varying in response to shifting pressures from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481). Therefore, it is important to explain which different kind of domestic actors, in the context of the present study, are taking into account regarding domestic preference formation.

According to Moravcsik (1993), the most fundamental actors in domestic politics are private individuals and voluntary associations with autonomous interests that are both interacting with civil society (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483). In the section above there is stated that main political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters are important for the attitude formation process of national governments. This is because, in order to stay in office, national governments need support from a coalition of main political parties, interest groups and domestic voters.

National governments are important for the domestic preference formation process, because politicians at the head of national government determine state priorities and policies (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483). However, the primary interest of a national government is to stay in office. In democratic societies, like the selected Member States, this requires the support of a coalition of (main) political parties, domestic interest groups and domestic voters, whose views are transmitted, even directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483). Therefore, main political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters are also important.

Main political parties are also important because they link society to national governments, because the preferences of societal groups are aggregated through political institutions like political parties (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481). However, according to Mair (2000), political party engagement has shifted; in the last quarter-century there has been a growing shift from engagement with the wider society towards a closer engagement with the state, meaning that voters can have a voice, in the direction in which Europe is going in the context of the present study, but it is hardly decisive because voters are rarely offered a choice of possible positions (Mair, 2003, P. 61).

Interest groups are an important kind of actor in the present study, because according to Moravcsik (1993), a fundamental influence on the formation of foreign policy preferences comes from the identity of important domestic societal interest groups, the nature of their interests and their relative influence on domestic policy (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483). According to Moravcsik (1993), interest groups are supposed to be embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, which constrains their identities and purposes decisively. This means that interest groups are part of civil society, and that their identities and purposes are formed through civil society as well. Therefore, interest groups articulate their preferences, and national governments aggregate them (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 483).

The domestic voters are also important in the present study, because they determine via their vote the main political parties that are in office as the national government.

Therefore, according to Moravcsik (1993), through the formation process of domestic national attitudes between the national government, main political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters, the set of national interests or goals that Member States will bring to the European negotiation table emerges.

3.4 Where the attitudes of Member States could lead

In this section, there will be explained where the attitudes of the Member States could lead from a European defence perspective. Therefore, in this section, the three scenarios about European defence will be described. In this thesis, these scenarios will form the foundation of the European defence direction to which the attitudes of the Member States could lead.

These scenarios, as will be explained in the 'Conceptualization and Operationalization' section, will be used as the operationalization of the scope of the dependent variable.

In a reflection paper that is released by the EC, these three scenarios about the formation of an EDU are presented:

Scenario A) Security and Defence Cooperation:

The 27 Member States would cooperate on security and defence level more frequently, but on a largely voluntary basis, and depending on ad-hoc decisions when the need arises. There is also relied on initial economies of scale ("Europa.eu", 2018).

Scenario B) Shared Security and Defence:

The 27 Member States would move towards a shared security and defence, showing greater financial and operational solidarity and would enhance their ability to project military power, by fully engaging in external crisis management, and by building partner's security and defence capacities. Considerable economies of scale in the defence market at the European scale would be in place, with favourable financing conditions across the defence supply chain ("Europa.eu", 2018).

Scenario C) Common Defence and Security:

The 27 Member States would deepen the cooperation and integration towards a common defence and security. Solidarity and mutual assistance would become the norm, underpinned by a certain level of integration of Member States' defence forces. Member States would have more efficient defence spending through more economies of scale, specialisation, sharing of expensive military assets and technological innovation aimed at reducing defence costs, and would be better equipped to face international competition ("Europa.eu", 2018).

3.5 Why Member States act on an international level the way they do

This section gives explanation from an international perspective about why Member States act on an international level the way they do. In the context of the present study, this could explain, besides domestic preference formation, the underlying reasons of why a Member State chooses a strategy.

As is stated before, the EU and its Member States increasingly continue to face threats like terrorist attacks, chemical attacks and cyber-attacks ("Eas.europa.eu", 2018). According to Walt (1985), alliances are mostly viewed as responds to threats. There could be argued that with the formation of the EDU, states are balancing with each other even more in order to ally together in opposition to a principal source of danger (Walt, 1985, P. 4).

Also, according to Börzel (2001), the Member States' response to Europeanization comes from their policy preferences and their action capacity.

Therefore, a response from policy preferences and action capacity from a Member State can be on the basis of their national identity, or on the basis of their national interests. National interest means when a Member State makes decisions coming from material interests, so in the present study this means only based on safety interests and on cost efficiency. A Member State is considered to base its choice of strategy based on national identity when they do not gain only material benefits from their decision, but if it is also in line with their national ideologies. This will be further explained in the 'Conceptualization and Operationalization' section.

3.6 Formed attitudes of Member States poured into defined strategies

In the sub-questions there is asked whether Member States use the strategy of pace-setting setter, foot-dragging or fence-sitting. Therefore, in this section there will be elaborated on the content of each strategy for the Member States.

In the 'Conceptualization and Operationalization' section, there will be elaborated on what each strategy entails for all the actors that will be analysed in the present study.

A Member State is considered to be a pacesetter when it actively pushes policies to the European level, which reflects a Member States' policy preference, and by minimizing the implementation costs (Börzel, 2002, P. 194). In the context of European defence it means that a Member States pushes policies, has the opinion that European defence should be a more integrated structure for multiple different reasons, and is trying to convince other Member States about its opinion.

A Member State is a foot-dragger when it tries to block or delays policies in order to prevent them altogether (Börzel, 2002, P. 194). In the context of European defence it means that a Member State is firmly against a further integrated European defence structure, or is even trying to make it less integrated.

A Member State is considered to be a fence-sitter when it neither systematically pushes policies, nor tries to block them at the European level, but is building tactical coalitions with both pacesetters and foot-draggers instead (Börzel, 2002, P. 194). This means in the context of European defence that a Member state is not against a further integrated defence structure, but is also not pushing it or trying to convince other Member States about its opinion due to multiple domestic reasons.

In the context of the present study, a strategy says something about the attitude that a Member State has about the form and scope of the EDU.

This is because the European policy process can be seen as a 'reciprocal relationship' between political negotiations at the domestic and the European level. As is stated before, at the domestic level, different domestic actors pressure their national governments to pursue policies at the European level that are favourable to their interests (Börzel, 2002, P. 195). So at the European level, the governments of the Member States push for European policies that satisfy the domestic pressures, while they are minimizing their adverse consequences at the domestic level (Börzel, 2002, P. 195).

3.7 Hypotheses

When taking all the above theory into account, five hypotheses have been derived. The first hypothesis, formed through the theory about Member States influencing international bargaining and decision-making processes, is that the attitude of the Member States towards an EDU does influence the scope and form of the formation of the EDU.

The second hypothesis, formed through the theory about why Member States act on an international level the way they do, is that Germany will turn out to be a fence-sitter, France a pacesetter, and Poland a pacesetter as well.

The third hypothesis, formed through the theory about why Member States act on an international level the way they do, is that the Polish national government would desire a more integrated European defence structure than German and France national governments, because of its higher level of threat experiencing than the other national governments.

The fourth hypothesis is, formed through the theory about how the attitude of an individual Member State is formed, that the majority of the national governments of the selected Member States will determine a national strategy that is derived from national interests rather than purely from national identity.

However, it could be that it will not become clear from the data about whether a Member State determines a national strategy perceived of national interests or national identity, because it gives signals about both options.

Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is, formed through the theory about how the attitude of an individual Member State is formed, that in the case of mixed data about, national governments determine a national strategy that is derived from a mixture of national interest and national identity.

4. Research design

The research design that will be used is the conduction of cross-sectional case studies of the selected Member States, which are derived from the **most current available data** that is relevant for the present study, regarding indications about the attitudes of Member States about an EDU, and wherein data sources of four different actors systematically will be investigated and aggregating the observation points.

As is stated before, different domestic actors influence the national governments in making policies and creating statements (Moravcsik, 1993, P. 481, 483). Therefore, data about the actors, national governments, main domestic political parties, interest groups, and the opinion of domestic voters, regarding European defence will be investigated and measured.

Therefore, three case studies will be conducted about each selected Member State. In these case studies, the relevant collected data from multiple data sources for the different actors will be described and analysed; in the 'Interpreted data and analyses' sections per actor, the derived data will be analysed and interpreted in order to interpret the findings and come to conclusions that are contributions of answers to the sub-questions and the main research question.

This will go through the following steps per selected Member State; first, data about the national governments will be described per data source. This will be explained further in the 'Data sources' section. Then, an overall conclusion is stated about the analysed and interpreted data about the national government, wherein the conclusions are lined up. Then, per data source via lining up expressions that could be relevant for the present study, the analyses and interpretation of the collected data will be described.

Secondly, main political parties that will be measured will be identified per case study. Then, data about the main political parties is described per main political party. Then, an overall conclusion is stated about the analysed and interpreted data about the main political parties, wherein the conclusions are lined up. Then, per selected main political party, via lining up expressions that could be relevant to the present study, the analyses and interpretation of the collected data will be described.

Thirdly, data about the interest groups that are relevant for the case study of selected Member State will be described per data source. Interest groups from the defence industry sector will be taken into account in the present study. Then, an overall conclusion is stated about the analysed and interpreted data about the interest groups, wherein the conclusions are lined up. Then, per data source, via lining up expressions that could be relevant to the EDU, the analyses and interpretation of the collected data will be described.

And fourthly, analysed domestic voter data will be described. The outcomes can be found in Appendix 6: 'Table 1: "Eurobarometer Poll outcomes"', where also will be referred to per case study. Then, an overall conclusion is stated about the analysed and interpreted data about the domestic voters, and there will be referred to Appendix 7: 'Table 2: "Analysed voter data"', wherein the full analyses of all the collected data can be found.

In the 'Conclusion and discussion' section, the outcomes will be lined up again and outcomes will be compared in order to derive at an answer to the main research question.

4.1 Threats to research design

Via the above-mentioned research design that will be conducted per Member State, data that is necessary for both the independent variable and dependent variable will be covered. This will be further explained in the 'Conceptualization and operationalization' section.

To a certain extent, there can be measured whether there is an association between the dependent and independent variable. However, there are some threats connected to cross-sectional research.

It is difficult to test whether there were other variables involved than the attitudes of the Member States by the scope and form of the formation of the EDU (non-spuriousness), especially because the present study is dependent on the most current available data that is derived from different data sources.

This threat will be countered via answering the sub-questions that were posed in the beginning of this proposal, because these sub-questions try to explain what is behind the attitude of Member States.

Another threat is that there also cannot precisely be measured whether the attitude of the Member States caused the scope and form of the formation of the EDU, or the other way around. This means that it is more difficult to measure to what extent the attitude of Member States actually influenced the scope and the formation of the EDU.

This threat will be tried to counter in via looking at (policy) statements from political parties and the heads of governments in order to distinguish their attitude towards an EDU, and the reasons that were given with it. Another way to encounter this threat is using the theory of Moravcsik (1993), which states that only Member States domestically create attitudes towards the formation of the European Defence Union, meaning that it works one-way.

4.2 Case selection and sampling

In order to collect data about the attitudes of the Member States, Germany, France and Poland will be used as cases.

For Germany and France this will be done via collecting the most current and available data that is able to reflect the attitude of the national governments, main political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters.

For Poland this will also be done via collecting data that is able to reflect the overall attitude of Poland, but only data about national governments and domestic voters will be collected and analysed. This is because, as is stated before, according to Pollack (2001), powerful Member States, like Germany and France, have considerably more influence in the bargaining process regarding the EU than less powerful Member States, like Poland.

However, as will be elaborated further below, the attitude of Poland is important for the present study because of its special geographical location. Therefore, there is chosen to streamline the Polish data and analysis this way.

The three Member States are selected because of their particular distinctions and influence within the EU. Their national governments tend to have different opinions about European defence, which makes them interesting for the present study, because it is interested in those distinctions and how they are formed.

There will be elaborated further on the case selection; when looking at different distinctives of the selected Member States, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, proposed his own ideas to the EU about further European defence integration structures, with the European Intervention Initiative as an example (Witney, 2018). This indicates that France is particularly interested in European defence.

Germany tends to lean towards further European defence integration, but seems to not agree with France on the form and scope of the formation of this further integration, especially about the costs and mutual solidarity, and is therefore an interesting case to take into account in the present study, because Germany and France are both big actors in the European bargaining process (Perring, 2017).

Because both Germany and France are bigger powers within the EU, it is interesting to take Poland as a Baltic State into account, because Poland is in the sense of power a smaller Member State, and it experiences a more direct threat with Russia, as it is a direct neighbour of Poland. Therefore, because of this, there is a possibility that Poland is having different interests for the establishment of the EU than Germany and France. Because of this, Poland is interesting because it tends to add a contrasting perspective to the present study.

5. Data

In this section the concepts that will be used in the present study will first be conceptualized and then operationalized. Then, the strategies will be operationalized per actor, and then the possibilities of a Member State regarding European and strategic autonomy will be defined as well. There will also be elaborated further upon if a Member State perceives its choice of strategy of national interests or on national identity.

As a final section, the data sources that will be used in the present study will be described briefly.

5.1 Conceptualization and operationalization

The **dependent variable**, the **scope** and **form** of the formation of the EDU, will be conceptualized in two parts.

The **form** of the formation of the EDU will be conceptualized as the degree of delegation that Member States hand towards the EU. This will be operationalized in the sense of the cooperation spectrum; a Member State can prefer the level of coordination or the level of cooperation in the area of European defence. A Member State wants to have **collective national defence coordination**, **European defence cooperation**, or **shared defence cooperation** (common defence).

This because the form of the formation is about to what extent the Member States, in this research, are willing to transfer (some of) their delegation about European defence towards the EU.

With **national defence coordination** as the loosest form, a Member State prefers following its domestic own preferences, and does not want to pull resources together, or make joint-defence decisions.

With **European cooperation**, a Member State supports pulling together decision-making and resources on the same level regarding European defence. With the resources is meant the property of the individual Member States. Member States are also under legal obligations to give up legal sovereignty permanently and there will be a form of military command.

With **common defence**, a Member State is willing to transfer its entire jurisdiction regarding the EU in the area of defence.

The **scope** of the formation of the EDU will be conceptualized in the three scenarios of the Defence Union that are formed by the EU, meaning what could happen with the gained delegation from the Member States within the EU. This will be operationalized in **stage A 'Security and Defence Cooperation'**, **stage B 'Shared Security and Defence'**, or in **stage C 'Common Defence and Security'**.

The **independent variable**, the domestic attitude of the Member States regarding the formation of an EDU, is conceptualised in how Member States act in respect to policies regarding defence and European defence. This is operationalized in whether a Member State is considered to be a **pacesetter**, **foot-dragger**, or **fence-sitter** regarding defence and European defence.

In order to determine how **latched** the national governments of the selected individual Member States are to the idea of the EDU, the above-mentioned data sources regarding the national governments will be investigated. There will be analysed what the attitude of a

Member State is regarding **European, strategic autonomy**. This again will be operationalized in whether a Member State is a pacesetter, fence-sitter, or foot-dragger regarding European and strategic autonomy.

5.1.1 Operationalization of strategies per actor

In the sub-questions there is asked whether national governments, political parties, interest groups, and domestic voters, are pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters.

Before there is already explained what these three strategies entail for a Member State and when it is considered to use a strategy in the context of the present study, and in this section there will be elaborated on what the strategies entail for the other actors. The definitions and elaborations that will be given are made-up definitions in the context of the present study, and are derived as self-created definitions and from the work of Börzel (2001), because Börzel (2001) states in her work about the strategies overall and in the context of the national governments, but does not cover the other actors that are used in the present. Therefore, Börzel (2001) is not cited at the part of the other actors.

A **national government** is considered to be a pacesetter when the government actively shapes European policies according to domestic preferences. In the ideal situation, domestic policies are exported to the European level and are subsequently adopted by other Member States (Börzel, 2002, P. 197). If the pace-setting strategy is successful, the subsequent downloading of the European policy, as is explained in the theory part, creates few problems for the pace-setter because it can then easily be incorporated into existing arrangements (Börzel, 2002, P. 197).

Foot-dragging is the opposite of pace setting; it aims at stopping, or at least containing the attempts of other Member States to upload their domestic policies to the European level (Börzel, 2002, P. 203). However, with the foot-dragging strategy it is seldom able to prevent costly policies altogether, but it aims at obtaining some compensation in the form of side-payments and package deals (Börzel, 2002, P. 203). Therefore, a national government is considered to be a foot-dragger when they are trying to stop other, even contradicting, policies regarding European defence from other Member States from being implemented on the European level.

The strategy of fence-sitting is considered to be a more ambivalent strategy, which consistently aims neither at initiating or promoting specific policies at the European level, nor at preventing attempts of other Member States to do so (Börzel, 2002, P. 206). So fence-sitters neither set pace, nor try to put the brake on policies that are pushed to the European level. Instead, fence-sitters tend to take a neutral position, or they try to build different changing coalitions together with foot-draggers and pacesetters, depending on the involved issue (Börzel, 2002, P. 206).

Therefore, a national government is considered to be a fence-sitter when it has a neutral position regarding the EDU, meaning that it is not trying to push policies regarding European defence to the European level, or is trying to stop other Member States to push policies regarding European defence.

In order to assess which strategy a national government uses, different data sources will be collected and analysed.

A **political party** is considered to be a pacesetter when, on the level of European defence, it is pleading for the implementation in parliament, or states in statements as an example, about certain policies that are in line of stimulating the formation of the EDU.

A political party is considered to be a foot-dragger when it is pleading in parliament, or states in an official statement, for certain policies that are in line against the formation of the EDU.

A political party is considered to be a fence-sitter when it is not trying to push towards further formation of the EDU, nor is trying to stop policies that are in the line of favouring the EDU from being pushed towards the European level.

In order to assess which strategy a political party uses, different data sources will be collected and analysed.

An **interest group** is considered to be a pacesetter when it is in favour of ideas that could lead to policies that are in the line of the formation of the EDU, and when they are trying to influence political parties in order to achieve this.

An interest group is considered to be a foot-dragger when it is against ideas that are leading to a further integration of the EDU.

An interest group is considered to be a fence-sitter when it is not forming an opinion either in favour or against the formation of the EDU, and is also not trying to influence political parties or policies that are formed in the area of European defence.

In order to assess which strategy an interest group uses, different data sources will be collected and analysed.

In order to derive at whether **domestic voters** of a Member State are pacesetters, foot-draggers or fence-sitters, the outcome of the data of the Eurobarometer Poll will be analysed.

If the outcome is that the domestic voters agree upon a statement, or answer yes, or are in favour of, regarding the majority of questions of the above question areas more than the average of the domestic voters of the average of the EU, the domestic voters of a Member State are considered to be pacesetters.

If there is agreed less upon a statement regarding the above question areas by the voters of the specific Member State than the average of the EU, the domestic voters of a Member State are considered to be foot draggers.

If it turns out that the domestic voters of a Member State do not know or do not care about the survey questions regarding the above question areas more than the average of the domestic voters of the EU, the domestic voters of the Member State are considered to be fence-sitters.

A Member State is defined and considered to be a pace-setter regarding **European and strategic autonomy** when it strives to further European integration regarding European defence, and is even willing to give up (pieces of) national autonomy in order to succeed. In the case of European autonomy, a Member State is considered to be a foot-dragger when it is against losing autonomy to further European integration regarding European defence. The Member State will actively try to find ways to not have to participate in further European integration that will lead to a, eventually further, loss of autonomy for the Member State in the area of European defence.

However, there are also Member States that are not making effort regarding European and strategic autonomy, both striving for further integration nor being against it. These Member States are neutral regarding the area and could be fine either way.

In the sub-questions there is also asked about the determination of a strategy by the national government, and based upon what a national government determines its strategy. A Member State is considered to base its **choice of strategy** on national interests when it makes decisions coming from material interests or safety interests.

A Member State is considered to base its choice of strategy based on national identity when they do not gain only material benefits from their decision, but if it is also in line with their national ideologies.

It will become clear on bases of what a Member State forms its attitude when the below stated data sources regarding national governments will be analysed. From this data, it will become clear if promises or decisions are made mainly are based on national (material interest) or are in the line of national identity.

5.1.2 Data sources

For Germany and France data will be collected from the following actors: national governments, main political parties, interest groups and domestic voters.

For Poland data will be collected for only the national government and domestic voters, because Pollack (2001) states that powerful Member States have more influence in the bargaining process regarding the EU, and in this case regarding European defence than less powerful Member States; Poland in this case.

It is important to note that, despite the fact that for Poland data of only two different kinds of actors will be collected and analysed, the same kind of data sources for these actors will be used for collecting and analysing.

The following actors and different kinds of data sources, and therefore data collection methods, will be used in the present study:

For actor 'national governments', official press statements, policy documents, policy statements, and meetings on a European level European defence where the national governments of these three Member States, will be used as data sources, for Germany, France, and Poland.

For actor main 'political parties', official press statements and news articles, documents, and the official website will be used as data sources, for Germany and France.

For actor 'interest groups', of groups that active in and for the defence industry sector, press statements, documents about ideas and visions, and relevant literature will be used as data sources, for Germany and France.

For actor 'domestic voters', the outcomes of the Eurobarometer Poll surveys about humanitarian aid and civil protection will be used as data source, for Germany, France, and Poland.

The Eurobarometer Poll consists out of surveys, which monitor the evaluation of the public opinion in all the EU Member States, and each survey consists out of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country ("European Commission", 2018). This data is appropriate for the present study because it shows how citizens of different Member States think about

European defence. Therefore, data of the areas of the Eurobarometer Poll about 'Common Security and Foreign Policy and European Security and Defence Policy', 'Policies national or EU level', 'Role of the European Union', 'Security and Stability', and 'Support for Key European policies', will be used ("European Commission", 2018).

6. Data analyses approach

In this section, there will be explained how the collected data will be analysed, as how there is operationalized in the 'Conceptualization and operationalization' section.

The **dependent variable**, the **scope** and **form** of the formation of the EDU are split into two parts.

The **form** is operationalized in if a Member State, according to the data, is leaning towards collective national defence coordination, European defence cooperation, or shared defence cooperation.

The **scope** is operationalized in the three stages of the EDU that are set out by the EC, in stage A 'Security and Defence Cooperation', stage B 'Shared Security and Defence', or in stage C 'Common Defence and Security'.

The **independent variable**, the **domestic attitude** regarding the formation of an EDU is operationalized in whether a Member State is considered to be a pace setter, foot dragger, or fence-sitter regarding defence and European defence.

Per selected Member State, all the different data that is collected from the national governments, the big political parties, the interest groups, and the domestic voters will be analysed and categorized to the extent whether the different sources are considered to fit within the above categorizations.

At the beginning of each section, there will be shortly explained per actor in which category the actor is placed. This will be elaborated further on in the section, through analyses of the derived data. In the 'Conclusion' section of this paper, the conclusions of the Member States will be compared through a short overview of the conclusions per Member State.

7. Case study Germany

In the following section, data that is derived from multiple data sources for the different German actors will be described and analysed and interpreted per actor.

7.1. German national government

7.1.1 Derived data

Official press statements

In 2018, the German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen said during the Security Conference in Munich that in her opinion the Member States already achieved much by agreeing to establish PESCO, but that PESCO should not be a rival to the alliance that was established by NATO. NATO will always be a collective defence, but PESCO allows Europe to act more on its own. She also said that Member States need to build on the momentum of PESCO and consider a similar type of agreement for European foreign policy decision-making (Deutsche Welle, 2018).

In 2018, during a military conference in Berlin, Ursula von der Leyen, has vowed to lift the German military spending to 1,5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2025. This is a marked increase from the current levels, but it is still short of the two per cent target that NATO countries are committed to formally (Buck, 2018). According to Leyen, Germany is probably expected to reach the 1,3 per cent in 2019. Leyen also said that this is the case because Germany wants to remain a reliable partner within the alliances that Germany has.

In 2018, Germany has voiced its concerns on fair burden sharing in the next European budget. The German foreign minister, Heiko Mass, and the German finance minister, Olaf Scholz, said in a joint statement that Europe is ready to take responsibility for strengthening the EU, but that this requires a fair burden sharing of all Member States (Rettman, 2018). The ministers added to their statement that the spending plan from the EC for 2021-2028 would considerably increase the additional burden on Germany by 10 billion euros a year (Rettman, 2018).

Official policy documents

In 2011, the most recent version of the German Defence Policy Guidelines (2011) was published. According to these Guidelines, security is not defined in geographical terms only. Developments in regions at the periphery of Europe and outside the European zone of stability and security can have an immediate impact on the security of Germany (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 1).

In the Guidelines is also stated that Germany is committed to serving world piece as a strong partner in united Europe. There is also stated that the German security interests are a result of the German history, Germany's geographic location in the centre of Europe, the international political and economic relations of Germany and the German's resource dependency as a centre of high technology and an exporting nation with few national resources (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 3-4).

One of the German's security interests includes the strengthening of the transatlantic and European security partnership, and one of the missions of the Bundeswehr is to support multinational cooperation and European integration (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 4, 9).

There is also stated that the commitment to a free and united Europe, and the objective of participating in a European integration process that encompasses all suitable political areas, has characterised German politics since the establishment of the European Communities. Therefore, Europe must improve its ability to undertake action in the area of security policy so that it can independently assume responsibility for meeting collective security challenges within, and beyond, Europe's borders (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 7-8). According to the Defence Policy Guidelines, the consistent development of Europe's civilian and military capabilities, together with the cooperation in the field of technology and industrial policy within the EU, will strengthen Europe politically, while also serving the German national security interests (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 8). Therefore, Germany coincides with its partners in this area, and will also develop bilateral and multilateral initiatives that are aimed at further European integration process.

Official policy statements

In 2010, as a member of the second Merkel cabinet, the German Federal Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, put in the speech that he gave at the 46th Munich Security Conference that 'the world is shaped by globalisation, and, as problems become more global, responsibility too must be organised more globally'. He also said that he finds it more necessary than ever before that there is a forward-looking foreign and security policy that is a clear compromise and commonly agreed upon, binding rules (Archiv der Bundesregierung, 2010). Guido Westerwelle also stated that the Germany would be leading the way towards a common defence policy. He also said that in the long run, a European army under complete parliamentary control is indispensable. Therefore, the EU must be able to undertake its own crisis management and also must be in position to act, jointly, swiftly and flexibly (Archiv der Bundesregierung, 2010).

Meetings on European level

In 2018, during her speech at the Munich Security Conference, Ursula von der Leyen mentioned the increased cooperation within the EU. She stated that Germany wants to retain the transatlantic, and develop the European parallel to the transatlantic agreement regarding the European latest defence initiatives. She also stated that the EDU, and that the EU has begun at the political level to create an 'army of Europeans' (Federal Government, 2018).

7.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the data, the **German national government** is considered to be interested in **European defence cooperation**, fits with **stage B 'Shared Security and Defence'**, and is considered to be a **fence-sitter** regarding pushing policies that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence on the European level.

It also becomes clear that the German government is considered to base its choice of strategy on **national interests** rather than on national identity, because in the above-

observed data it becomes clear that Germany handles out of safety, security and material interests.

Regarding how **latched** the German national government to the idea of the EDU, it is considered to be a fence-sitter because it does not mind further European defence integration, but is not pushing for it is leaning back because of the costs.

There is derived at this conclusion because, as will be elaborated on further below, the national government wants to strive to more integration of the EU regarding European defence, and wants to have more shared cooperation regarding military and civil resources, together with more integrated and efficient policies in the area.

However, the government is in favour of joint solidarity but is also concerned about fair-burden sharing regarding the costs. Therefore, for now, the government is willing to increase the defence spending on a national level. At this stage, the government still wants to keep control in the hands of their own nation, instead of transferring their jurisdiction completely to the EU, but steps are being made.

Below there is explained per data source for the national government how the above conclusions about the German national government are conducted.

Official press statements

The statement made by the German defence minister about that Member States needs to consider a similar type of agreement as PESCO for European foreign policy decision-making, indicates a vision about the European integration (DW, 2018).

Also, in another statement of the German defence minister, there is stated that there is vowed to lift the German military spending to 1,5% of gross domestic product by 2025 in order for Germany to remain a reliable partner within the alliances that Germany has (Buck, 2018). This means that Germany is interested in increasing their defence spending.

In a joint statement by the German foreign and finance ministers there is said that they think that Europe is ready to take responsibility for strengthening the EU regarding defence, but that it requires a fair burden sharing of all Member States, because according to the spending plan from the EC for 2021-2028 there would be an increase on Germany by 10 billion euros a year (Rettman, 2018). This means that German is open for more integrated defence on the European level, but is concerned about the costs.

Official policy documents

The German Defence Policy Guidelines states that one of Germany's security interests includes the strengthening of the European security partnership and to support the multinational cooperation and European integration (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 4, 9).

In the Guidelines there is also stated that Europe must improve its ability to undertake action in the area of security policy in order to independently assume responsibility for meeting collective security challenges that are within and beyond Europe's borders (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 7-8).

According to the Guidelines, the consistent development of Europe's civilian and military capabilities together with cooperation in the field of technology and industrial policy within the EU will strengthen Europe politically (German Ministry of Defence, 2011, P. 8).

The Guidelines also states that Germany coincides with it partners in the area of defence, and will also develop a bilateral and multilateral initiatives that are aimed at further European defence integration process.

The above statements in the Guidelines indicate that the German government wants to strengthen European security partnership and to support the multinational cooperation and European integration, and that Germany will also develop bilateral and multilateral initiatives for further European defence integration.

Official policy statements

The German Federal Foreign Minister has put in his speech that the responsibility of global problems should be organised more globally. He also stated that he finds it very necessary that there is a forward-looking foreign and security policy that is a clear compromise and commonly agreed upon binding rules. He also said that there is a way towards such a common defence policy, and that in the long run, a European army under complete parliamentary control is indispensable in order for the EU to undertake its own crisis management and to act jointly (Archiv der Bundesregierung, 2010). This indicates that the German government is interest in a European security policy with commonly agreed upon binding rules, and that a European Army in the long run under parliamentary control is indispensable.

Meetings on European level

The German Minister of Defence stated in one of her speeches that Germany wants to develop the European parallel to the transatlantic agreement regarding the European latest defence initiatives, and that the EDU is now launched and that the EU has begun at the political level to create an 'army of Europeans' (Federal Government, 2018).

7.2 German main political parties

In the following section, data about two main German political parties; the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), will be described and analysed. There has been acknowledged that the German Greens Party is a big political party as well. However, because of the capacity of this bachelor thesis and the fact that this political party is currently not in the national government, there is chosen to leave this party out of this research because according to liberal intergovernmentalism, big political parties can influence national government once in government. The Christian Social Union (CSU) is also left out, because the CDU and to SPD tend to differ more about their opinions about European defence and are therefore more interesting for the present study.

7.2.1 Derived data

Christian Democratic Union

In 2018, Germany's Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have reached preliminary agreement on renewing the 'grand coalition' in power since 2013, and a German government that is mandated to pursue specific European policies is a precondition of progress on European integration (Barber, 2018). The CDU and SPD agreement states that Germany is ready to pay for higher European budget contributions. It also says that Germany

is willing to allocate funds for social convergence, economic stabilisation and structural reforms in the Eurozone (Barber, 2018). In the agreement there is also stated that there is support for the transformation of the crisis-fighting ESM into the EMF, and that it should be anchored into European law rather than staying under the control of national governments (Barber, 2018). This is relevant because it implicates that this actor has, besides the EDU, different focus points as well regarding European integration.

In 2015, the CDU Federal Expert Committees are making themselves strong for an EDU. The press office of the CDU Germany announced that the CDU Federal Specialist Committees on European policy, together with the foreign, security and human rights policy, strongly support the increased political cooperation within the framework of an EDU. Together, the committees called for a permanent and structured cooperation of national armed forces (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, 2015). The committees argued that the path to the European Defence Union should be through PESCO. PESCO facilitates bilateral and multinational military co-operation and joint procurement programs under the umbrella of the EDA (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, 2015).

During the third and fourth December 2007, the CDU agreed during the 21st Party Congress on a Party Manifesto of the CDU about Freedom and Security. In this Party Manifesto, the CDU laid out principles from their perspective about freedom and security for Germany. In the following section there will be elaborated on different statements.

In principle 345 there is stated that the CDU has the opinion that Germany should not only be regionally, but also globally prepared to assume jointly with other democracies within the framework of international organisations regarding responsibility, wherein the concept of the current security network should be followed (Grabow, 2007, P. 63).

In principle 346 there is stated that, in order to be able to fulfil the German responsibilities regarding security, the means and instruments for the security, foreign and development policies must be provided in line with the tasks and responsibilities of Germany. Therefore, according to the CDU, a successful foreign policy must seek the interests of Germany (Grabow, 2007, P. 63).

According to principle 346, one of those interests is about recognition, and is about if Germany practices international solidarity, Germany shall also experience solidarity from other nations. Therefore, it is not in the Germans interest not to limit the German policies to the nation alone but to also seek for equity of interests (Grabow, 2007, P. 63).

According to principle 348, in order to respond to the future foreign policy challenges the CDU wants to further develop the EU, maintain the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the global order. The starting point is that the CDU wants to deepen the transatlantic economic integration in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the German economy (Grabow, 2007, P. 64).

An important statement is made in principle 349, wherein is stated that, according to the CDU, NATO still remains indispensable to Germany's and Europe's security and is the central instrument of the German and European policy for security and defence (Grabow, 2007, P. 64). Therefore, NATO must be the permanent place for the transatlantic security and policy dialogue (Grabow, 2007, P. 64).

In principle 353 the CDU states that the CDU strives for a strategic partnership of the EU with Russia, which is founded on the universal values of the European Council. In this partnership, the economic, political and social collaboration with Russia will be strengthened, together

with the democratic development, the rule of law and the civil society in Russia through an open and comprehensive dialogue (Grabow, 2007, P. 64).

According to principle 358, the CDU advocates a comprehensive and networked approach, which takes into consideration all the security-policy instruments and merges them into one single concept. In addition to that, the CDU states that a close cross-cutting collaboration is needed and that the military and civil instruments of the UN, the NATO and the EU need to be coordinated more effectively with one another in their various approaches in order to get a better and more efficient resolution of crises (Grabow, 2007, P. 65).

Social Democratic Party

In 2017, the SPD wrote a governance program, which entails the visions, perspectives and principles of the SPD. Herein is stated by the SPD that they want to work more closely together with the rest of the Member States regarding the area of defence policy to advance the integration of the armed forces of the Member States as part of a comprehensive, preventive and internationally embedded Security and Defence Policy, in order to create a big opportunity for the 27 Member States of the European Union to become more efficient and cost effective through more cooperation in defence spending as well (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99). Together with the other Member States that share the SPD goals, the SPD wants to agree on the establishment of an EDU, which must be subject to democratic and constitutional control (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99). The permanent cooperation that is provided by the Lisbon Treaty is an important step towards an EDU and already enables concrete measures of closer cooperation and the division of labour on the way towards a European Army. Such a Union should be seen as complementary to NATO, and not as its competition, because according to the SPD, NATO is, and remains a major player in the transatlantic partnership (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99). This is because according to the SPD, NATO is indispensable for peace and security in a time of new international uncertainties and challenges (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99).

The SPD also states that they are against the increase of defence spending. Instead of increasing the defence spending, the SPD wants to invest more on an initiative for disarmament and ban for the export of small arms outside the EU and NATO (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P 99).

There is also stated that the SPD wants to re-evaluate the civilian dimension of the EFSP, by, among others, building a European Civil Peace Corps (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99).

However, the SPD acknowledges that there are gaps regarding German defence equipment and materials and in defence staff. Therefore, the SPD states that they will fill the identified gaps in defence staff and defence materials and equipment quickly, and they will secure the necessary increase of the defence budget. However, the SPD also states that they will turn decisively against the, according to the SPD, completely unnecessary and unrealistic increase rates of the German defence budget (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 104-105).

In 2018, the SDP has different standpoints about European defence on their website. One of them is that the SDP strives towards an investment program for the future of the EY. Another standpoint is that they are striving towards the establishment of a common European Army. Another standpoint is that the small arms exports to countries outside the EU and the NATO should be stopped (SPD, 2018).

7.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the data, the selected main **German political parties** are considered to be interested in **European defence cooperation**, fit with **stage B 'Shared Security and Defence'**, and are considered to be **fence-sitters** regarding pushing policies that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence towards the EU.

This is because the political parties want to work more closely with the rest of the Member States, and want to have more shared cooperation regarding military and civil resources, together with more integrated and efficient policies in the area.

However, they are in favour of solidarity but are having second thoughts about the costs. At this stage, they still want to keep defence jurisdiction and costs on national level, or partly anchored in European law with the EMF for example.

Below there is explained per selected political party how the above conclusions about are conducted.

Christian Democratic Union

In the agreement of the CDU and the SPD there is stated that that there is German support for the transformation of the crisis-fighting ESM into an EMF, and that it should be anchored into European law rather than staying under the control of national governments (Barber, 2018). This indicates that the CDU supports the establishment of the EMF that should be anchored in European law.

In a press statement of the CDU, there is stated that the CDU Federal Expert Committees are making themselves strong for an EDU, meaning that they strongly support the increased political cooperation within the framework of an EDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, 2015). The committees called for a permanent and structured cooperation of national armed forces, and that the path towards an EDU Should be through PESCO. This means that PESCO should facilitate bilateral and multinational military co-operation and joint procurement programs under the umbrella of the EDA (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, 2015).

In the most recent version of the CDU Party Manifesto, principles regarding freedom and security for Germany are laid out.

In principle 345 there is stated that Germany should both be regionally and globally prepared to assume jointly with other democracies within the framework of international organisations regarding responsibility, wherein the concept of the current security network should be followed (Grabow, 2007, P. 63).

Principle 346 states that Germany is able to fulfil its responsibilities regarding security when the means and instruments for security, and foreign and development policies must be provided in line with the tasks and responsibilities of Germany. This means that, according to the CDU, a successful foreign policy must seek the interests (recognition and international solidarity) of Germany first (Grabow, 2007, P. 63).

According to principle 349, NATO still remains indispensable to Germany and Europe's security and is therefore the central instrument of the German and European policies for security and defence (Grabow, 2007, P. 64).

In principle 358 the CDU advocates for a comprehensive and networked approach, which takes all the security-policy instruments into consideration and merges them into one single

concept. In addition, the CDU also states that a close cross-cutting collaboration is needed and that the military and civil instruments of the UN, the NATO, and the EU need to be coordinated more effectively with one another in order to get a more efficient resolution of crises (Grabow, 2007, P. 65).

Social Democratic Party

In the governance program of the SPD there is stated that the SPD wants to work more closely together with the rest of the Member States regarding the area of defence policy in order to advance the integration of the armed forces of the Member States as part of an internationally embedded Security and Defence policy (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99).

The SPD also wants to agree on the establishment of EDU, which must be subject to democratic and constitutional control. This is because according to the SPD the permanent cooperation that is provided by the Lisbon Treaty is an important step towards an EDU. Such a Union should be seen as complementary to NATO. The SPD also wants to re-evaluate the civilian dimension of the EFSP by building a European Civil Peace Corps. However, the SPD is against the increase rates of the German defence budget (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2017, P. 99).

This means that the SPD is interested increasing the defence cooperation with the different Member States, and they support the establishment of an EDU but it should have the same structure as NATO.

On their official website, the SDP stated that they strive towards an investment program for the future of Europe, together with striving towards a common European Army in the long run (SPD, 2018).

7.3 German interest groups

7.3.1 Derived data

Press statements

Rheinmetall AG is an international technology group that is specialised in security and mobility. Challenges like urbanization, migration flows, globalization, climate change, and intensity of conflicts and military disputes need efforts to improve security and mobility (Rheinmetall Defence, 2018).

In 2018, there is a press statement published wherein is stated that Rheinmetall has overcome multiple competitors and has won the first request for proposals for preliminary studies relating to the EU defence research, that is financed by the EU's EDU. The EC has put Rheinmetall in charge of a consortium consisting of partners from nine different Member States (Rheinmetall Group, 2018).

Dr. Thomas Weise, spoke person of Rheinmetall, stated in a press release that Rheinmetall is very pleased that their proposal has met with success in this early stage of the formation of the EDU, and that it fits to their strategy of expanding the Rheinmetall Group's European-themed activities in Brussels in pursuit of further EU projects that are aimed at strengthening Europe's strategic autonomy with regard to security and defence policy (Rheinmetall Group, 2018).

This project is an important step towards improving interoperability during joint operations that are conducted by forces from multiple European nations (Rheinmetall Group, 2018).

Documents about ideas and visions

In Germany, the self-regulation of lobbying has not been extensively developed in Germany; there is no generally binding code of conduct for all lobbyists in Germany (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015). The deficiencies in self-regulation fit with the lack of organisations that are created by and for lobbyists. Germany has only two umbrella organisations: the 'Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikberatung e.V.' (de'ge'pol), and the 'Deutscher Rat für Public Relations' (DRPR) (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015).

De'ge'pol states that the European politics permeates federal, state, and local politics through financial flows, laws, and court decisions. Topics that are currently discussed are also being parallel discussed in other Member States. Because of that, governments learn from each other, companies and industries organize European project teams, and trade unions and NGO's mobilize across Europe, in order to create on European public (Meier, 2010, P. 19). Therefore, the de'ge'pol itself has been in dialogue with different European sister organizations like the EPACA and the EAPC. With these sister organizations, de'ge'pol agrees upon the professional policy. These contacts also serve to exchange the de'ge'pol members with foreign partners and for the initiation of joint projects (Meier, 2010, P. 19).

In 2007, an EDTIB emerged by the EU Member States. This should lead to self-sufficiency for security of supply on a European level instead of national.

In 2013, the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence requested a study about the status of EDTIB. This study showed that the EDTIB is trapped between national and global developments; a key step would be a revision of the 2007 EDTIB strategy (Briani et al., 2013, P. 1). According to the conducted study in 2013, from a national perspective, the EDTIB landscape in Europe is unevenly divided. This entails that Germany, together with France, Spain, Italy, and Sweden; hold about 80% of the relevant DTIB of the EU. Together with Poland, they represent 75% of the EU defence budget (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25). Regarding the supply side structure, Germany has perpetuated duopolies (see Appendix 5) with the suppliers (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25).

7.3.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the data, the researched **German interest groups** are considered to be interested in **European defence cooperation**, fit with **stage B 'Shared Security and Defence'**, and are considered to be **fence-sitters** regarding pushing policies that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence towards the EU.

This because the groups want to have more shared cooperation regarding military and civil resources, together with more integrated and efficient policies in the area. However, they still want to keep from the jurisdiction by their own nation, instead of transferring their jurisdiction completely to the EU.

Below there is explained per data source for the interest groups how the above conclusions about the interest groups are conducted.

Press statements

In a press statement of Rheinmetall there is stated that Rheinmetall won the first request of proposals for preliminary studies relating to the EU defence research, which is financed by the EU's Defence Union. This means that Rheinmetall is in charge by the EC of doing further research of the possibilities of the EDU (Rheinmetall Defence, 2018). This is important because this project is an important step towards improving interoperability during joint operations that are conducted by forces from multiple European nations.

Documents about ideas and visions

De'ge'pol states that the European politics permeates federal, state, and local politics through financial flows, laws, and court decisions. In order to do so, de'ge'pol has been in dialogue with different European sister organisations like the EPACA and EAPC. With these sister organisations, de'ge'pol agrees upon professional policy, but these contacts serve also another important goal; it serves to exchange the de'ge'pol members with foreign partners and for the initiation of joint projects (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015).

According to the study about EDTIB, Germany holds, together with four other European Member States, 80% of the relevant EDTIB of the EU (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25). Germany also has perpetuated duopolies with defence suppliers, indicating that the German government has influence on the defence market (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25). This means that the German defence suppliers are more likely to move in the direction that the German government wants.

7.4 German domestic voters

7.4.1 Derived data

In Appendix 6, 'Table 1: "Eurobarometer Poll outcomes"' is listed. In this table, the answer percentages of the German domestic voters for the questions per area can be found.

7.4.2 Interpreted data and analyses

According to the findings that are listed in Appendix 7: 'Table 2: "Analysed voter data"', the **German domestic voters** are considered to be **pacesetters** regarding European defence because the majority of answers to the survey questions were scored higher by the German domestic voters than the average of the EU.

However, in the area 'Common Security and Foreign Policy, and European Security and Defence Policy' for question 1, and in the area 'Role of the European Union' for question 1, the domestic voters are considered to be foot-draggers for these specific questions because there was a lower positive outcome percentage scored by the German domestic voters than the average of the EU.

Because the answers to the other questions showed that the German domestic voters are considered to be pacesetters, they are considered to be pacesetters.

7.5 Member State Germany

Because Germany is facing different inputs of different actors in the overall policy-process, there is elaborated on how the conclusion about the position of Germany is conducted in the sections above, through elaborating on the different actors and their input.

7.5.1 Position Germany

When adding up the above sections about the German actors it becomes clear that **Member State Germany** is considered to be leaning towards **European Defence cooperation**. Germany is also considered to fit within **stage B** of the stages set out by the EC, the '**Shared Security and Defence**'. The national government, the researched political parties, and the interest groups are considered to be **fence-sitters** regarding European defence. The German domestic voters, however, are considered to be pace setters. Therefore, Germany is considered to be a **fence-sitter**.

8. Case study France

In the following section, data that is derived from multiple data sources for the different French actors will be described and analysed and interpreted per actor.

8.1 French national government

8.1.1 Derived data

Official press statements

In 2018, the French prime minister stated in his speech on the presentation of the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen that Europe is only able to face its challenges by having a security policy, which Europe started to work on, but which Europe must be much more ambitious for by having a common policy on security for the European borders and for the harmonization of the European rights, and by having a sovereign policy for development, security and protection (Macron, 2018).

In the same speech Macron stated that unity is the only solution to the different challenges that Europe currently is facing, and that Europe should not give in to division. He also stated that Europe does no longer functions on the basis of successive hegemonies anymore; it can build itself on constant solidarity. Therefore, Macron believes in a much bigger European budget in which France will contribute its share, promoting the strength of Europe's historical policies, but also the new policies, promoting an ambition to a coherent vision of Europe (Macron, 2018).

In the official 2018 New Year Greetings, Macron said that France is focussing on four priorities regarding diplomacy: security, solidarity, influence and independence, in order to build peace by combating the causes of insecurity and instability. In order to accomplish this, France must be a strong and independent European power, because a strong and sovereign Europe is one of the best ways to ensure peace (Macron, 2018). Macron also stated that Europe should provide more protection and that it should getting back to the basics of sovereignty.

Macron also highlighted the need for European defence, which is making strong progress and is seen as fully complementary with the commitment to NATO (Macron, 2018). He also stated that the EDF allows the EU to complete concrete projects regarding defence.

Official policy documents

In 2017, the French Defence and National Security Strategic review is written, wherein Florence Parly, French Armed Forces minister, stated that France wants to help launch a new dynamic Europe, that recognizes that European defence is not limited to institutional advances, but is primarily based on the political will and military capacity of the Member States that need to take responsibility in order to deal with threats and challenges that are facing Europe. This will also enable Europe as a whole to act military whenever necessary (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017, P. 10).

In the Strategic review, in principle 188 there is stated the EDF is seen as a major step for the EU, and that the success of the EDF depends on the ability to integrate the specificities of

defence and on the insurance of budgetary means of the European ambitions (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 59).

In principle 189 there is stated that the French government thinks that in order to make PESCO work, commitments must be strong enough to promote unifying and ambitious projects, and especially the needs of a European Army to act in operations (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 60).

In principle 196 there is stated that France sees Germany as a key partner for the reinforcement of a common European defence and security. Also, bilateral cooperation is enhanced in all areas that are of decisive importance for the future of the European defence (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 61).

In principle 202 there is stated that while strengthening the CSDP, France supports the optimal combination of different European defence cooperation formats. Institutional frameworks such as NATO and the EU have been usefully complemented by the launch of different other initiatives (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 63).

In principle 203 there is stated that now a new Europe is emerging, France must propose ambitious defence partnerships to the other Member States. This should imply support, both within and outside the EU and NATO, for all the promising initiatives that strengthen the strategic convergence between Europeans and their common security interest. France wants to work towards the strategic autonomy of Europe, which requires the development of a common strategic culture that includes a common European defence body, the ability to intervene militarily, and that adaptation of common budgetary instruments (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, P. 63). France itself is already thinking about, and creating, such an ambitious cooperation framework: the 'European Intervention Initiative' in order to set an example for the other Member States.

According to the strategy, France wants to participate fully in building a strong European defence industry via its involvement in the EDF (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 67).

Official website

In 2013 there was published on the official France Diplomatie website that the French government believes in the need for the construction of Europe to be anchored in a shared or even a common approach to its defence. The page about the French vision regarding European defence also states that in response to the many challenges that Europe is facing, France thinks that the European Council should come up with a method of concrete progress that is starting with the improvements to the tools and structures that are already in place and relying on the possibilities for cooperation offered by existing treaties, and France is keen for all the Member States to engage in the debate and to determine future directions for the EU as a whole. The European Council must also serve as an opportunity to promote a competitive European defence industry and a factor for growth and strategic independence (European defence, 2013).

The French government considers pooling resources and cooperation as realistic ways as well in terms of capability development. Europeans must also revive a number of major structural programmes via placing a greater reliance on the EDA (European defence, 2013). Furthermore, according to the France Diplomatie website, the EU must set out its global approach more explicitly via better linkages between development initiatives and security ("European defence", 2013).

Meetings on European level

In 2018, Emmanuel Macron opened a debate about the Future of Europe in the EP, with an opening speech wherein he pleaded for European sovereignty and democracy (Multimedia European Parliament, 2018).

According to Macron, the to-be-discussed budget must be the expression of a coherent efficient political project that is based on convergence. He also stated that France is willing to increase its contribution to this, but only if the budget is completely recasted, and that Europe needs to create its own resources.

Macron also stated that Europe needs to provide a dignified funding for European defence, and therefore the convergence on fiscal and social matters should be created, and no ambition level should be too high: France will pursue these objectives (Multimedia European Parliament, 2018).

8.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the data, the **French national government** is considered to be interested in **common defence cooperation**, fits with **stage C 'Common Security and Defence'**, and is considered to be a **pacesetter** regarding pushing policies that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence on the European level.

However, after analysing the data it is difficult to determine whether French government based its strategy of choice on national interests or on national identity, because it observed showed a mixture of **both**.

Regarding how **latched** the French national government to the idea of the EDU, it is considered to be a pacesetter because it is even proposing further integrated defence structures itself, and is pleading for a more integrated European defence structure.

This is because the national government wants to strive to more integration of the EU regarding European defence, and wants to have a common defence cooperation regarding military and civil resources, together with more integrated and efficient policies in the area. The government is in favour of joint solidarity and an EDF where to every Member States contribute resulting from their capacities. The French government also wants to work towards a common sovereign policy for development, security and protection.

However, the statements that are made by Emmanuel Macron can sometimes considered to be vague regarding clarity about his direct vision of European defence; sometimes it is not that straight-forward. However, because of the message of conviction that he is trying to spread during his speeches regarding European defence, conclusions could still be derived from this.

Below there is explained per data source for the national government how the above conclusions about the French national government are conducted.

Official press statements

The French prime minister stated in a speech that Europe is only able to face its challenges by having a security policy which Europe should be much more ambitious about via working towards a common policy on security for the EU (Macron, 2018).

This indicates that the French wants to have more integration on EU level regarding defence. He also stated that Europe should build upon constant solidarity and a tighter European budget, in which France wants to support via contributing its share to the European budget, which indicates that France is willing to pay for it as well.

In his New Year greetings, Macron stated that a strong and sovereign Europe is one of the best ways to ensure peace. He also highlighted the strong need for European defence, which should be fully complementary to NATO, and also stated that the EDF will allow the EU to complete concrete projects regarding defence (Macron, 2018).

This indicates that the French national government is in favour of the EDF and in favour of more defence integration.

Official policy documents

In the French Defence and National Security Strategic review, multiple statements regarding the French national government's visions about European defence are made.

There is stated that France wants to help launch a new dynamic Europe wherein European defence is not limited to institutional advances, but is primarily based on the political will and military capacity of the Member States that need to take responsibility in order to deal with threats and challenges that are facing the EU. This will enable Europe to act as a whole military wise, which means that the French government is in favour of more integrated European defence (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017, P. 10).

In principle 188 is stated that the EDF is seen as a major step for the EU, and that its success depends on the ability to integrate the specificities of defence and on the insurance of the budgetary means of the European ambitions (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 59).

In principle 189 there is stated that in order to make PESCO work, there is a need of one European Army to act in operations (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 60).

Principle 196 states that bilateral cooperation is enhanced in all areas that are of decisive importance for European defence (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, 2017, P. 61).

The aforementioned three principles also indicate the French further integration preferences.

Principle 203 states that France must propose ambitious defence partnerships to other Member States, which should imply support for both within and outside the EU and NATO for all promising initiatives that strengthen the strategic convergence between Europeans and their common security interest. There is also stated that a strategic autonomic Europe requires the development of a common European strategic defence body, the ability to intervene military, and the adoption of common budgetary instruments (Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale, P. 63).

Official website

The official France Diplomatie website states that the French government thinks that there is a need for the construction of Europe to be anchored in a shared, or even a common approach to its defence. It also states that the European Council should come up with methods of concrete progresses regarding the improvements of tools and structures regarding common defence (European defence, 2013).

There is also mentioned that the French government sees pooling resources together and cooperation as realistic ways towards further capability development (European defence, 2013).

Meetings on European level

In the debate that Macron opened on the Future of Europe in the EP, he pleaded for European sovereignty and democracy, and that France is willing to increase its contribution towards the European budget in order for Europe to create its own defence resources. Therefore, the convergence on fiscal and social matters should be created in order to provide dignified funding for an EDU (Multimedia European Parliament, 2018).

8.2 French main political parties

Currently the French government exists out of three political parties: La République En Marche! (REM), the current biggest political party in France and the party of Macron, Les Républicains (LR), and the Socialist Party (PS). Because REM and LR have the most seats in the French National Assembly of the three parties, they are selected because, according to liberal intergovernmentalism, they have the most direct influence during the bargaining process. The Socialist Party is not taken into account here because currently the Socialists have a small number of seats in the French National Assembly.

8.2.1 Derived data

La République En Marche!

In 2017, REM created a new charter of values, which is the base of the adhesion of REM and brings together their members, wherein the EU and its sovereignty, globalisation and the creation of an EDF, is put at the heart of the new charter of values (La République En Marche!, 2017).

In 2017, the party program of REM was written down. There is written that REM wants to create, together with other Member States, an EDU via the creation of an EDF that will finance common military equipment's, and via the creation of permanent European Headquarters (Macron, 2017, P. 21).

In 2016, a program for defence and the EU was published on the official website of REM. The first objective of the defence program is to give armies the means that ensure the strategic sovereignty of France, because the French armed forces are active all over the world to ensure security, and therefore REM wants to increase the defence budget to 2% of GDP in 2025 (Macron, 2016).

The second objective is 'to act for a Europe of defence become indispensable'. One of the goals under the objective is the development of 'the Europe of defence', via the strengthening of the coordination of the operations with the European allies through a permanent European Headquarters in connection with National Command Centres and NATO (Macron, 2016), via the creation of a European Security Council, that exists out of military, diplomats and intelligence experts in order to advise European decision-makers.

REM also wants this to be done via the activation of battle groups, because these multinational forces were set up more than ten years ago but have never been deployed in the field (Macron, 2016).

Through the activation of the battle groups, common European defence interventions will be possible in external operations. REM will also support the creation of an EDF in order to finance joint programs like the 'European drone' (Macron, 2016).

Les Républicains

In 2016, a news article was published on the official Republicans website on the topic of the European project, wherein Nicolas Sarkozy, chairman of the Republicans, proposed that a second Schengen should be created; a 'Euro Schengen' wherein France and Germany must provide leadership of the Euro area (Republicains, 2016). This relevant because it implicates that this actor has different focus points and priorities than the EDU, a 'Euro Schengen' instead.

In 2016, an official leaflet from the Republicans was published about their proposals regarding the EU, wherein is stated that they want to build a better 'Schengen 2'.

According to the Republicans, a 'Schengen 2' is essential in order to protect Europe and face the migration crisis. 'Schengen 2' requires common rules on immigration and asylum in the fight against illegal immigration (Republicains, 2016, P. 2). This relevant because it implicates that this actor has different focus points and priorities than the EDU, a 'Schengen 2' instead.

In 2015, the website of the Republicans published three different urgent measures in order to fight terrorism; protect France of jihadists, muscle the repression, and fight against mosques that diffuse hate (Republicains, 2015). These three measures are conducted nationally and are consisting out of actions that should be taken on a national level instead of on a European level.

8.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the data, the biggest main French political party, **REM**, is considered to be interested in **common defence cooperation**, fit with **stage C 'Shared Security and Defence'**, and is considered to be a **pacesetter** regarding pushing policies that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence towards the EU.

This is because REM wants to create an EDU with an EDF for common military equipment and with the creation of permanent European Defence Headquarters.

The second biggest political party, the Republicans, however, are less focused on European defence, but are more focused on solving things on the French national perspective. Because the Republicans are considerably smaller than REM regarding the seats in national parliament, for this thesis there will be looked at REM.

Below there is explained per political data how the above conclusions about are conducted.

La République En Marche!

At the heart of the REM's new charter of values, the EU and its sovereignty, globalisation and, most importantly, the creation of an EDF are placed.

The Republicans believe that a 'second Schengen' should be created wherein France and Germany must provide leadership of the Euro area (La République En Marche!, 2017).

In the party program of REM there is stated that they want to create an EDU together with the other Member States, via the creation of an EDF that should finance the common military equipment's, and via the creation of permanent European Defence Headquarters (Macron, 2017, P. 21).

The first objective in REM's defence program is to increase the French defence budget to 2% of GDP by 2025 (Macron, 2016). The second objective is the development of European defence, via the development and strengthening of European Headquarters in connection with National Command Centres and NATO, and via the creation of a European Security Council, and also via the activation of European battle groups (Macron, 2016). This is because through this activation, common European defence interventions will be possible in external operations.

Les Républicains

On the official leaflet of the Republicans there is stated that 'Schengen 2' is also essential in order to protect Europe (Republicains, 2016, P. 2). This indicates that the Republicans could be more focused on the Eurozone economic protection than on European defence.

On the website of the Republicans three different urgent measures are stated in order to fight terrorism (Republicains, 2015). These three measures are meant for conducting nationally instead of on a European level, what could be an indication for the opinion of the Republicans about European defence.

8.3 French interest groups

8.3.1 Derived data

Literature

According to Calcara (2017), the French defence industry is characterised by a large number of joint ventures between French and foreign companies, and by the presence of internationalised firms that have businesses in various countries, and defence firms continue to be largely influenced by the French state control (Calcara, 2017, P. 531). There is also stated that the French government operates as a controlling shareholder rather than a state-owner, because it uses tools like the shareholder position and special voting shares agreements (Calcara, 2017, P. 531).

In 2017, the French state controlled 11% of the Airbus Group (see Appendix 1), 27% of the Thales Group (see Appendix 2), 15.6% in Safran (see Appendix 3), and continues to control the entire French naval and land defence sector (Calcara, 2017, P. 531). In Thales and Safran, the French government has double voting rights regarding the held shares, and in Thales the French government has a 'special right provision' which gives the government the right to appeal against any decisions to sell strategic assets to foreign groups and to appoint two state representatives in the company's board of directors (Calcara, 2017, P. 531).

Despite several formal changes in the governance structures of the French defence companies, the French government still maintains the substantial control over the strategic activities of the defence companies (Calcara, 2017, P. 532).

Woll (2009) speaks in her article about a paradox of the transformation of interest groups in France; while traditional groups like trade unions and employers' organizations struggle to adapt to new modes of representation, and partly fail to do so, a multitude of new associations actively take part, and flourish, in policy deliberation and local administration (Woll, 2009, P. 3).

She also argued that interest group consultation only supplements the bureaucratic decision-making, and that the central government has plenty of room for manoeuvres to escape pressures that are put on specific policy proposals (Woll, 2009, P. 3). However, according to Woll (2009), interest groups do take part in the implementation process behind policy projects and do contribute to the atmosphere in which different objectives become defined (Woll, 2009, P. 3).

Woll (2009) also stated that, despite the French traditional mistrust towards all kinds of civil groups, the French government does support 'associational life', and it increasingly consults with stakeholders and interest groups (Woll, 2009, P. 19).

Documents about ideas and visions

In 2013, as is stated before; in the study report that was conducted on EDTIB there was stated that from a national perspective, the EDTIB landscape is unevenly divided. This entails that France, together with Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden; hold about 80% of the relevant EDTIB of the EU. Together with Poland, they represent 75% of the European defence budget (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25).

Regarding the supply side structure, France has a widely developed EDTIB. However, France prefers the 'national champions' regarding defence suppliers (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25).

8.3.2 Interpreted data and analyses

After analysing and interpreting the researched literature on **French interest groups**, they are considered to be interested in **common defence cooperation**, to fit within **stage C** of the stages set out by the EC, the '**Common Security and Defence**', and are considered to be **pacesetters**.

This is because, according to the literature, the French defence industry is characterised by a large number of joint ventures between French and foreign companies, and that that defence firms are largely influenced by the French government. According to other literature, French interest groups do have some influence on the French policy making, but the French government still has plenty of room for escape manoeuvres. This indicates that the French interest groups are likely to have the same interests as the French national government.

Below there is explained per data source for the interest groups how the above conclusions are conducted.

Literature

Calcara (2017) states that the French industry regarding defence is characterised by a large number of joint ventures between French and foreign companies, and that defence firms continue to be largely influenced by the French state control (Calcara, 2017, P. 531). Despite several formal changes in the governance structures of the French defence companies, the French government still maintains substantial control over the strategic activities of the defence companies (Calcara, 2017, P. 532).

Because of this, the French government controls the defence industry and therefore it will follow the preferences of the French government regarding European Defence. Woll (2009) argued in her article that interest group consultation only supplements the bureaucratic decision-making, and that the central government has plenty of room for manoeuvres to escape pressures that are put by interest groups on specific policy proposals (Woll, 2009, P. 3). However, interest groups do take part in the implementation process behind policy projects and contribute to this atmosphere as well (Woll, 2009, P. 3). This indicates that French interest groups do have some influence regarding policy-making and decision-making, but this is not much.

Documents about ideas and visions

In the study that was conducted about EDTIB there was stated that France, together with four other Member States, holds about 80% of the relevant EDTIB of the EU (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25).

Regarding the supply side structure of the defence industry, France has a widely developed EDTIB. However, France prefers 'national champions'; indicating that smaller suppliers do not have a big chance in having supply opportunities (Briani et al., 2013, P. 25).

8.4 French domestic voters

8.4.1 Derived data

In Appendix 6, 'Table 1: "Eurobarometer Poll outcomes"' is listed. In this table, the answer percentages of the French domestic voters for the questions per area can be found.

8.4.2 Interpreted data and analyses

According to the findings that are listed in Appendix 7: 'Table 2: Analysed voter data', the French **domestic voters** are considered to be **pacesetters** regarding European defence because all the positive related questions had a higher percentage than the average of the EU. However, there was only one question, in the 'Support for Key European policies' area, question 2, where the French domestic voters turned out to be foot-draggers for this specific question.

Because the answers to the other questions showed that the French domestic voters are considered to be pacesetters, they are considered to be pacesetters.

8.5 Member State France

Because France is facing different inputs of different actors in the overall policy-process, there is elaborated on how the conclusion about the position of France is conducted in the sections above, through elaborating on the different actors and their input.

8.5.1 Position France

When adding up the above sections about the French actors, it becomes clear that **Member State France** is considered to be leaning towards **common defence cooperation**, to fit within **stage C** of the stages set out by the EC, the '**Common Security and Defence**', and is considered to be a **pacesetter**. The national government, the biggest French political party, REM, and the interest groups are considered to be **pacesetters** regarding European defence. The French domestic voters are considered to be **pacesetters** as well.

9. Case study Poland

In the following section, data that is derived from multiple data sources for the different Polish actors will be described and analysed and interpreted per actor.

9.1 Polish national government

9.1.1 Derived data

Official policy statements

In 2018, during the conference 'The Brussels Summit: A Future for Europe', Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that Europe needs to be a more solid Europe that is based on solidarity. He also stated that Europe must find a way to respond efficiently to the threats that Europe is facing, but at the same time needs to maintain sovereignty of the individual Member States. He also said that Europe needs good protection of the borders and a higher level of security, and that there should be a 'joint response in the context of the migration crisis ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

In 2018, at the Brussels Forum, Morawiecki said that Poland is a committed supporter of the creation of a European army in the long term, and that PESCO marked a first step in the right direction ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

In 2018, during the Munich Security Conference, Morawiecki stated Poland's vision about the future of Europe. He stated that in his opinion, a stronger Europe means a Europe with a better security sector, closer cooperation in the area of defence and a greater border protection.

In addition, according to Morawiecki, Europe needs to remember that the Russian issue is no longer just Central and Eastern Europe's issue, but is also a question for the European Union and the entire NAA ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

He also thinks that it is hard to talk about a common security and defence policy of the EU when a majority of its Member States do still not meet the requirement of the allocation of the 2% GDP to defence as the NATO target. Therefore, he thinks that in the context of the 29 countries that compromise NATO, there should be established a way in order to reach the 2% NATO threshold. Because, according to Morawiecki, if Europe wants to be more self-sufficient, it really has to protect its safety and take a greater care of it ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

He also stated that common defence requires a joint strategy and joint responsibility, but this must be enforceable at a national level. However, there should be common, uniform response to the dangers of misinformation ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

Morawiecki concluded that, in order to focus on all challenges that are surrounding Europe, Europe needs a stronger, more solidarity-based and uniform policy between the EU and NATO ("Premier.Gov", 2018).

Official policy documents

In 2017, the official Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland was written. Therein is stated that Poland is a member of NATO, and that Poland's membership in NATO is a key to the

Polish policy of collective defence (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 31). The new reality of NATO when it faces collective challenges requires the adoption of the NATO Command Structure.

There is also stated that all the European actions in the security domain should complement and enrich NATO operations in a non-competitive manner.

There is also stated that the upcoming years will also bring opportunities to strengthen the position of Central and Eastern European states, both in NATO and the EU. According to the Defence Strategy, a prerequisite for this should be elaborating within the EU on common positions regarding crucial policy aspects and effective cooperation in many areas, including the area of defence (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 32).

In the Defence Strategy there is also stated that in the most ideal situation, NATO remains the world's most powerful military alliance, and Poland will make every effort to ensure that it remains a guarantor of peace and prosperity in Europe.

This is because according to the Defence Strategy, the EU, together with the NAA, has contributed to producing un-paralleled stability of the European continent (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 44). Therefore, Poland sees the importance of the continuation of the political and military engagement of the US.

In addition, there is stated that an essential element of the Polish security will be via the enhancement of military cooperation, especially in the Baltic Sea, with Romania and all other countries of NATO's Eastern Flank.

This cooperation should establish the creation of joint commands and units, and in joint acquisition of military equipment (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 45).

Official website

In 2018, the official website of the Polish government published a speech from the Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz, wherein he delivered information about his foreign policy tasks.

One of the statements that are made by Czaputowicz, is that the military presence of the US in Europe and its strong position in NATO has fundamental significance for the military security for Poland and the region as a whole (Polska, 2018).

In addition to this, there is also stated that Poland is interested in sustaining strong transatlantic bonds, because a fundamental task of the Polish security policy is to strengthen this.

There is also stated that Poland will seek to increase NATO's military presence and infrastructure in the region, because only credible deterrence can secure Poland's peace and security. In addition to this, there is stated that one of the aims of Polish foreign policy is to make the Alliance's operations more effective, especially regarding its collective defence. Czaputowicz made a strong statement about the fact that both the EC and the EP are not empowered to instruct national governments and parliaments, while he recalled on Art. 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (see Appendix 4) (Polska, 2018).

In his speech, he also advocated equal opportunities to each Member States' defence industries of access to the EDF.

Meetings on European level

In 2017, Morawiecki stated before the PESCO establishment ceremony on the 13th of November 2017, that the Polish government wishes to develop the defence potential of the entire EU with the full convergence with NATO ("Premier.Gov", 2017).

9.1.2 Interpreted data and analyses

The **Polish national government** is considered to be interested in **European defence cooperation**, that fits with stage **B ‘Shared Security and Defence’**, and is considered to be a **fence-sitter** regarding pushing policies towards the European level that are formed out of national interest regarding European defence.

The national government based its strategy choice on **national interests** because it became clear that Poland is feeling indirectly threatened by Russia.

Regarding how **latched** the Polish national government to the idea of the EDU, it is considered to be a foot-dragger, because it does not mind further European defence integration, prefers NATO integration before European integration. There are also statements indicating that the Polish government wants to keep the defence jurisdiction firmly to itself of transferring it.

This is because the national government wants to strive towards more defence integration with NATO instead of European defence. However, the Polish national government is not opposing more European defence integration and is supporting the EDF on basis on joint solidarity, but is focusing on more NATO integration instead. The Polish government also wants to work towards closer defence cooperation.

In the subsections below there is explained per data source for the national government how the above conclusions about the Polish national government are conducted.

Official policy statements

Morawiecki stated at a Brussels Summit that Europe needs to be more solid and that it should be more based on solidarity. He also stated that Europe must find a way to respond efficiently to the threats that Europe is facing, but that at the same time the sovereignty of the individual Member States should be maintained (“Premier.Gov”, 2018). During the Brussels Forum, Morawiecki said that Poland supports the creation of a European Army on the long term and he sees the establishment of PESCO as a first step in the right direction (“Premier.Gov”, 2018).

During the Munich Security Conference, Morawiecki stated that according to him, a stronger Europe means a Europe with closer defence cooperation (“Premier.Gov”, 2018). However, Morawiecki has the opinion that it is hard to talk about a common European security and defence policy when a majority of the Member States do still not meet the requirements of the allocation of the 2% GDP to defence as the NATO target, and that there should be focused first upon.

He also stated that common European defence requires a joint strategy and joint responsibility, but that it should be enforceable at national level. In addition to that, Europe also needs a stronger, and more solidarity-based and uniform policy between the EU and NATO (“Premier.Gov”, 2018).

Official policy documents

In the official Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland there is stated that Poland’s membership in NATO is a key to the Polish policy of collective defence (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 31). Therefore, when facing collective challenges, the adoption of the NATO Command Structure is required. In addition to this, there is also stated that all the

European actions regarding defence should complement and enrich NATO operations in a non-competitive way.

There is also stated that elaboration with the EU is needed on common positions regarding crucial policy aspects and effective cooperation in the area of defence. However, in addition to this, in the most ideal situation, NATO remains world's powerful military alliance and a guarantor of peace and prosperity in Europe (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 31).

In addition, there is stated that an essential element of the Polish security will be via the enhancement of military cooperation in the Baltic Sea, with Romania and all other countries of NATO's Eastern Flank (Ministry of National Defence, 2017, P. 44). This cooperation should then establish the creation of joint commands and units, and joint military equipment. This indicates that the Polish government supports more defence integration, but prefers more NATO integration instead of European defence integration and tries to focus on that first.

Official website

One of the statements that the Polish Foreign Minister made in his speech about his foreign policy tasks in 2018 is that the military presence of the US in Europe and its strong position in NATO has fundamental significance for the military security for Poland. In addition to this, one of the fundamental tasks of the Polish security policy is to strengthen the strong transatlantic bonds (Polska, 2018).

There is also stated that Poland wants to increase NATO's military presence and infrastructure in the region. In addition to this, one of the aims of Polish foreign policy is to make the Alliance's operations more effective, especially regarding its collective defence. Czaputowicz also made a strong statement about the fact that the European Commission and the European Parliament are both not empowered to instruct national governments and parliaments, while he recalled on Art. 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union. This indicates that Poland does want to keep the jurisdiction regarding European defence in its own hands (Polska, 2018).

This indicates that Poland, in case of further defence integration, wants to keep jurisdiction regarding defence in its own hands.

Meetings on European level

The Polish prime minister stated that the Polish government wishes to develop the defence potential of the EU in full convergence with NATO ("Premier.Gov", 2017).

9.2 Polish domestic voters

9.2.1 Derived data

In Appendix 6, 'Table 1: "Eurobarometer Poll outcomes"' is listed. In this table, the answer percentages of the French domestic voters for the questions per area can be found.

9.2.2 Interpreted data and analyses

According to the findings that are listed in Appendix 7 'Table 2: Analysed voter data', the **Polish domestic voters** are considered to be **pacesetters** regarding European defence

because the majority of answers to the survey questions were scored higher by the Polish domestic voters than the average of the EU.

However, in the area 'Common Security and Foreign Policy, and European Security and Defence Policy' for question 2, in the area 'Security and Stability' for question 1, and in the 'Support for Key European policies' area for question 2, the domestic voters are considered to be foot-draggers for these specific questions because there was a lower positive outcome percentage scored by the Polish domestic voters than the average of the EU.

Because the majority of the answers to the questions showed that the Polish domestic voters are considered to be pacesetters, they are considered to be pacesetters.

9.3 Member State Poland

Because Poland is facing different inputs of different actors in the overall policy-process, there is elaborated on how the conclusion about the position of Poland is conducted in the sections above, through elaborating on the different actors and their input.

9.3.1 Position Poland

When adding up the above sections about the Polish actors, it becomes clear that **Member State Poland** is considered to be leaning towards **European defence cooperation**, to fit within **stage B** of the stages set out by the EC, the '**Shared Security and Defence**', and is considered to be a **fence-sitter** regarding European defence.

The national government is considered to be a **fence-sitter** regarding European defence. The Polish domestic voters are considered to be **pacesetters**.

Poland is considered to be a fence-sitter, because it supports the further integration of European defence, but clearly prefers the further integration of NATO before European defence integration.

10. Conclusion and discussion

In this section, the main research question will be answered, and after that the sub-questions will be answered, together with looking at the outcome of the hypotheses.

As became clear from the 'Theory' section in combination with the below-described findings, the answer to the **main research question**, 'To what extent does the attitude of the European Member States towards a European Defence Union influence the scope and form of the formation of the European Defence Union?' is that the domestic attitude of the Member States does influence the form and scope of the formation of the EDU.

In the 'Theory' section, there is explained how domestic attitudes are formed, via explaining how the different domestic actors are able to influence each other, and how that could influence the preference formation of the Member States and the bargaining process about the form and scope of the EDU.

In the 'Data', and 'Analyses' sections there is elaborated on what the different opinions are of the different domestic actors about the EDU.

Member State Germany is considered to be a fence-sitter regarding the EDU, because it is not so keen in the, on solidarity and capacity based, military involvement, and is not pushing policies regarding European defence, but is making coalitions with France.

Member State France is considered to be a pace-setter, because it actively pushes policies regarding European defence to a European level, even via the creation of its own defence structure ideas, in order to try convincing other Member States.

Member State Poland is considered to be a fence-sitter as well, because it does show interest in more European defence integration, but clearly prefers further NATO integration before European defence integration and is willing to tag along with NATO if it provides more safety for Poland.

The answer to **sub-question 1**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that the national government of Germany is considered to be fence-sitter, of France to be a pacesetter, and Poland to be a fence-sitter.

The answer to **sub-question 2**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that the German strategy choice is perceived of national interests, the French choice is based on a mixture of national interests and national identity, and the Polish choice is perceived of national interests.

The answer to **sub-question 3**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that, regarding to latching to the EDU, the German national government is considered to be a fence-sitter, the French government is considered to be a pacesetter, and the Polish government is considered to be a foot-dragger.

The answer to **sub-question 4**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that, the German main political parties are considered to be fence-sitters regarding the EDU, and that the biggest main French political party is considered to be a pacesetter regarding the EDU. However, the smaller analysed main French political party is considered to be a fence-sitter regarding European defence because it is focusing on other political issues. The answer to **sub-question 5**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that, the German interest groups are considered to be fence-sitters, and the French interest groups are considered to be pacesetters regarding the EDU.

This was a more unexpected outcome, because according to Moravcsik (1993), interest groups influence governments, but the data showed, especially for France, that the government has strong influences on the defence industry.

The answer to **sub-question 6**, as is stated in the 'Analyses' section before, is that, the German domestic voters are considered to be pacesetters, the French domestic voters are pacesetters, and the Polish domestic voters are considered to be pacesetters as well regarding European defence.

In the following section, the outcome of the five derived hypotheses will be discussed.

The **first hypothesis**, that the attitude of the Member States towards the EDU does influence the scope and form of the formation of the EDU, turned out to be true because, according to the earlier-stated theory by Pollack (2001), Member States have more influence in the international bargaining process than European institutions (Pollack, 2001, P. 225).

The **second hypothesis**, that Germany would be a fence-sitter, France a pacesetter, and Poland a pacesetter as well, turned out to be partly true because the hypotheses about Germany and France were true, but Poland turned out to be a fence-sitter. This was an unexpected outcome.

The **third hypothesis**, about that Poland would desire a more integrated European defence structure than Germany and France because its higher level of threat experiencing, turned out to be false. This is because Germany and France both prefer a more integrated European defence structure, than Poland, because Poland prefers a more integrated NATO structure before integrated defence structure.

The **fourth hypothesis**, about that the majority of the national governments of the selected Member States determine a national strategy that is derived from national interests instead of national identity, turned out to be true. This is because both the German and Polish government based their strategy choice on national interests.

This also partly answers the **fifth hypothesis**, that Member States could also determine a strategy that is derived from a mixture of both national interests and national identity, because the French government based its strategy choice on a mixture of both.

The used research design, the conduction of cross-sectional case-studies, turned out to be useful because there was the possibility to zoom in deeply on the individual Member States, the different actors and all different kinds of data sources. The shortfall, however, is that the different data sources were varying a lot regarding the time they were published. However, there was the ability to derive at an argued conclusion because a lot of different data sources were used.

Consequences of the influence of the Member States on the formation of the EDU could be a grimmer EDU; entailing that the pace of the progress of the EDU could be slowed down or get stuck at the current pace. This could be problematic, because the amount and different kinds of threats that the EU and its Member States are facing are increasing.

Therefore, further and deepening research about the effects of the attitudes of the individual Member States on the EDU, or even on alternatives for an EDU, could be helpful in order to come up with solutions that help the EU with tackling its threats.

11. List of references

- About us | Rheinmetall Defence. (n.d.). Retrieved on the 22th of May, from https://www.rheinmetalldefence.com/en/rheinmetall_defence/company/about_us/index.php
- About Us | Thales Group. (n.d.). Retrieved on the 8th of June 2018, from <https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/global/about-us>
- Architecture of a European security policy | Archiv der Bundesregierung. (2010, February 6). Retrieved on the 29th of May 2018, from https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/EN/Archiv17/Artikel/2010/02/2010-02-06-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-westerwelle_en.html
- A Security and Defence Union in the making: recent developments and what's coming up | European External Action Service - European Commission. (2017, October 10). Retrieved on 21 February 2018, from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34278/security-and-defence-union-making-recent-developments-and-whats-coming_en
- Barber, T. A. (2018). Grand coalition in Germany will not paper over the cracks | The Financial Times. Retrieved on 29st of May 2018, from <https://www.ft.com/content/0460a636-f9e5-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a>
- Börzel, Tanja. (2002). Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting. Member State Responses to Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v.40, 193-214
Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tanja_Boerzel/publication/5015704_Pace_Setting_Foot-Dragging_and_FenceSitting_Member_States_Responses_to_Europeanization/links/53408f60cf2f2a588b24386/Pace-Setting-Foot-Dragging-and-Fence-Sitting-MemberStates-Responses-to-Europeanization.pdf?origin=publication_detail
- Briani, V., Marrone, A., Mölling, C. and Valasek, T. (2013, June). *The development of a European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)*. Luxembourg: Publications Office. Retrieved on the 26th of June, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/433838/EXPOSEDE_ET%282013%29433838_EN.pdf
- Buck, T. (2018). Germany pledges to boost defence spending | Financial Times. Retrieved at 22th of May 2018, from, <https://www.ft.com/content/5b683346-578b-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0>
- Calcara, A. (2017). State–defence industry relations in the European context: French and UK interactions with the European Defence Agency. *European Security*, 26(4), 527-551. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2017.1384379
- CDU Federal Expert Committees make themselves strong for European Defence Union |

- Christian Democratic Union of Germany (2015, August 19). Retrieved 29st of May 2018, from <https://www.cdu.de/artikel/cdu-bundesfachausschuesse-machen-sich-fuer-europaeische-verteidigungsunion-stark>
- Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen: Germany will spend more on its military | Deutsche Welle | (2018, February second). Retrieved at 28th of May 2018, from <http://www.dw.com/en/defense-minister-ursula-von-der-leyen-germany-will-spend-more-on-its-military/a-42619237>
- Debate on the Future of Europe with Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic: Extracts from the opening speech | Multimedia European Parliament. (2018, April 17). Retrieved 4th of June 2018 from https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/debate-on-future-of-europe-macron-opening-speech_l153413-V_v
- Defence | Airbus. (n.d). Retrieved at the 8th of June 2018, from <https://www.airbus.com/defence.html>
- Ein besseres Europa - das geht so. Sozial Demokratische Partei Europas. (n.d.). Retrieved 28th of May, from <https://www.spd.de/standpunkte/europa/>
- Eurobarometer | European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission. (2017, May 3). Retrieved 12 March 2018, from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/eurobarometer_en
- European Commission - Press release - European Commission welcomes first operational steps towards a European Defence Union | Europa.eu. (2017, December 11). Retrieved 21 February 2018, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5205_en.htm
- European Commission - Press release - Questions and Answers: the Future of European Defence | Europa.eu. (2017, June 7). Retrieved 21 February 2018, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1517_en.htm
- European defence | Diplomatie. (2013). Retrieved 6th of June, from <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/actions-andpositions-of-france-in/article/european-defence-18592>
- European Defence Agency - European Union - European Commission | Europa.eu. (n.d.). Retrieved 15 March 2018, from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eda_en
- Factsheet on Defending – European Commission | Europa.eu. (n.d.). Retrieved 20th of February 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet_en.pdf

- Grabow, K. (2008). *Freedom and Security, Principles for Germany*. Hanover: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved 28th of May, from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13533-544-2-30.pdf?110509134343
- Implementing the Global Strategy: EU delivers on security and defence | EEAS – European External Action Service - European Commission. (2018, June 27). Retrieved 3th of July 2018, from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and-defence_en
- La République En Marche!. (2017). *Le programme d'Emmanuel Macron* [PDF]. Retrieved 10th of June, from <https://storage.googleapis.com/en-marche-fr/COMMUNICATION/Programme-Emmanuel-Macron.pdf>
- Les Republicains. (2016). *Refondons Le Projet Européen* [PDF]. Retrieved 8th of June, from <https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/republicains/pages/6886/attachments/original/1464939850/2016-05-30-IR-tract-europe.pdf?1464939850>
- Lobbying Landscape in Germany | Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union. (2015, February 21). Retrieved 23th of May, from <http://www.aalep.eu/lobbying-landscape-germany>
- Macron, E. (2018, May 19). European Union - Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, on the presentation of the Charlemagne Prize. Retrieved 8th of June, from <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/speech-by-m-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-receiving-the-charlemagne-prize/>
- Macron, E. (n.d.). Le programme d'Emmanuel Macron pour la défense | La République En Marche !. Retrieved from <https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/defense>
- Macron, E. (2018, January 8). New Year greetings by Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, to the diplomatic corps. Retrieved from <https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article8461>
- Mair, P. (2003). Popular Democracy and EU Enlargement. *East European Politics And Societies*, 17(1), 58-63. doi: 10.1177/0888325402239683
- Mair, P. (2000). The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. *West European Politics*, 23(4), 27-51. doi: 10.1080/01402380008425399
- Meier, D. (2010). *Was ist Politikberatung? Berater, Auftraggeber, Tätigkeiten und fie de'ge'pol als Berufsverband* [PDF]. de'ge'pol - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikberatung e.V. Retrieved 22 March 2018, from

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559675bfe4b0d2540b662c7c/t/559a9338e4b069786e95d592/1436193592653/was_ist_politikberatung.pdf

Mérand, F. (2008). *European defence policy* (p. 198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Minister, T. (2011). Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together [PDF] | German Ministry of Defence. *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 1-11. Retrieved 23th of May, from <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/16136/0c1b6d8d0c0e6ba0aed5f0feb0af81d8/g-03-110527-vpr-engl-data.pdf>

Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 31(4), 473-524. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>

Nouvelle charte des valeurs de LaREM | La République En Marche! (2017, November 16). Retrieved 10th of June, from <https://en-marche.fr/articles/communiqués/communiqué-nouvelle-charte-des-valeurs-delarem>

Nuclear Power in the European Union - World Nuclear Association | World-nuclear.org. (2018, April). Retrieved 22 March 2018, from <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx>

Perring, R. Brussels plough cash into plans for EU Army - but Germany warns it's not enough | Express.co.uk. (2017, December 14). Retrieved 22 March 2018, from <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/892221/EU-army-latest-news-Germany-FranceEU-defence>

Polish Foreign Minister delivers speech on foreign policy tasks in 2018 | Polska. (2018, March 21). Retrieved 10th of June 2018, from <https://www.polska.pl/politics/foreign-affairs/polish-fm-delivers-speech-foreign-policy-tasks-2018/>

Polish Ministry of Defence. (2017, May). *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland* [PDF] (p. 69). Retrieved 10th of June 2018, from http://en.mon.gov.pl/p/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2017/07/korp_web_13_06_2017.pdf

Pollack, M. (2001). International Relations Theory and European Integration. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 39(2), 221-244. doi: 10.1111/1468-5965.00286

Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki: Europe needs a new vision | Premier.Gov (2018, March 22). Retrieved 12th of June 2018, from

<https://www.premier.gov.pl/mobile/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-europe-needs-a-new-vision.html>

Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki: I believe in Europe and in a great future ahead of us | Premier.Gov (2018, March 8). Retrieved 12th of June 2018, from <https://www.premier.gov.pl/mobile/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-i-believe-in-europe-and-in-a-great-future-ahead-of-us.html>

Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki on the future of Europe during the Munich Security Conference | Premier.Gov (2018, February 17). Retrieved 12th of June 2018, from <https://www.premier.gov.pl/mobile/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-on-the-future-of-europe-during-the-munich-security.html>

Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki: we will explain our approach towards relocation policy and refugees | Premier.Gov (2017, December 14). Retrieved 15th of June, from <https://www.premier.gov.pl/mobile/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-we-will-explain-our-approach-towards-relocation-policy.html>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2005, May). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/22/groupKy/125>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2018). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2017, November). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/25/groupKy/144>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2017, November). Retrieved 15th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/29/groupKy/181>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2011, November). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/10/groupKy/40>

Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2010, November). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/10/groupKy/250>

- Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2007, April). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/22/groupKy/123>
- Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2006, September). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/24/groupKy/133>
- Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2006, September). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/24/groupKy/134>
- Public Opinion - European Commission | European Commission. (2005, May). Retrieved 10th of May 2018, from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/22/groupKy/126>
- Refondons le projet européen | Republicains. (2016, June 3). Retrieved 13th of June 2018, from https://www.republicains.fr/tract_refondons_projet_europeen_20160602
- Rettman, A. (2018, May 3). Germany and France lead EU budget concerns. Retrieved 22th of May 2018, from <https://euobserver.com/economic/141740>
- Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale. (2017). *DICoD - Publishing Bureau*, Paris. Retrieved at the 8th of June 2018, from <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/content/download/514655/8664340/Revue%20strat%C3%A9gique%20de%20d%C3%A9fense%20et%20de%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20nationale%202017.pdf>
- Rheinmetall-led soldier systems consortium awarded European Defence Fund contract | Rheinmetall Group. (2018, February 19). Retrieved at the 23th of May 2018, from https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/rheinmetall_ag/press/news/latest_news/index_14016.php
- Romaniuk, S., & Stivachtis, Y. (2015). Sovereignty and European Integration: Deconstruction or Reconstruction of State Authority? *Review Of European Studies*, 7(11), 184-199. doi: 10.5539/res.v7n11p184
- Safran Defense | Safran-Group. (n.d.). Retrieved on 28th of May 2018, from <https://www.safran-group.com/defense>
- Solana, J., Saz-Carranza, A., García Casas, M., & Estébanez Gómez, J. (2016, April 18).

- On the way towards a European Defence Union - A White Book as a first step. Policy Department, Directorate-General For External Policies. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535011/EXPO_STU%282016%29535011_EN.pdf*
- SPD-Parteivorstand. (2017, July). *Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit, Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland* (p. 116). Berlin: IMAGE Ident Marketing GmbH. Retrieved from https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Regierungsprogramm/SPD_Regierungsprogramm_BTW_2017_A5_RZ_WEB.pdf
- Terrorisme contre la République, contre la civilisation, contre la France : la guerre est declare | Republicains. (2015, October 1). Retrieved 6th of June 2018, from https://www.republicains.fr/tract_terrorisme_contre_france_guerre_declaree_2015_0701
- Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. *International security*, 9(4), 3-43. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540>
- We must shape the future – not endure it | Federal German Government. (2018, February 18). Retrieved 22th of May 2018, from https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2018/02_en/2018-02-16-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz_en.html?nn=709674
- What is duopoly? Definition and meaning | Business Dictionary. (n.d.). Retrieved at 26th of June, from <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/duopoly.html>
- Witney, N. (2018, May 22). Macron and the European Intervention Initiative: Erasmus for soldiers? | ECFR. Retrieved at 25th of June 2018, from https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_macron_and_the_european_intervention_initiative_erasmus_for_sold
- Woll, C. (2009). The Demise of Statism?. Appleton, Andrew M., Mazur, Amy G., Brouard, Sylvain. *The French Fifth Republic at Fifty: Beyond Stereotypes*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.226-246, 2009. Retrieved from, <https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00972850>

12. Appendix

1. Airbus is a global leader in the defence sector; the largest defence supplier in Europe, and among the top 10 defence companies worldwide (Defence, n.d.).

2. The Tales Group is a French multinational company that has operations in 56 countries, and designs and builds electrical systems in order to provide services for aerospace, defence, security, space and ground transportation (Thales Group, n.d.).

3. Safran is a French multinational defence company that develops rocket engines, aircraft engines, and aerospace-components. As a partner of national governments and their armed forces, Safran designs, develops, produces and sells systems and equipment that fits each country's specific defence needs (Safran Defense, n.d.).

4. Art. 5(2) of the TEU: "the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States," and "Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States."

5. According Business Dictionary, a duopoly is a market situation, in which only sellers supply a particular commodity to many buyers. A seller can exert some control over the output and prices, but must consider the reaction of its sole competitor (Business Dictionary, n.d.).

6. Table 1: "Eurobarometer Poll outcomes".

The questions that are asked by the Eurobarometer Poll are categorised in a table for different areas. Each survey consists out of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. In this section, there will be looked at the German, French and Polish answers to the Eurobarometer Poll questions that are relevant for the present study in the following areas ("Public Opinion - European Commission", 2018): 'Common Security and Foreign Policy and European Security and Defence Policy', 'Policies national or EU level', 'Role of the European Union', 'Security and Stability', and 'Support for Key European policies'.