The influence of the voter's occupation on their voting behavior in the European Constitutional Treaty Referendum

Bachelor Thesis

European Public Administration

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Abstract

The European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) is the only treaty of the European Union that never entered into force, because of the rejection of the French and Dutch voters in a national referendum. By providing politicians with a possible factor that led to this result, measures can be taken in the future to prevent such an outcome. It is assumed, that the extent to which voter's fear for the consequences of work migration and competition on the labor market, following the ECT, differs per occupation. Therefore, this paper tries to answer the question if the voter's occupation influenced their voting behavior in Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. As data source a Flash Eurobarometer survey is used, and the respondents are grouped into four occupation categories. Voters that seek a job and manual workers, are hypothesized to have voted against the ECT more often, than self-employed voters and employees (non-manual workers), who are hypothesized to have voted in favor of the ECT more often. Using the Chi-square test of homogeneity and Cramer's V, the correlation and strength of the relationship is tested, as well as if the occupation influenced the voting behavior per country. It is found, that occupation had a small effect on the voting behavior in the ECT. Occupation influenced the voting behavior in the referendum in France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but did not influence the voting behavior in Spain.

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Introduction

Historically the European Union (EU) has been an economic enterprise, created to secure peace and foster economic growth. Political elites justified further European integration through the establishment and consolidation of the customs union with the promise that it would increase standards of living (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), hoping that this message would convince the public of the benefits of European integration. In 2005 however, the French and Dutch citizens rejected the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) in national referenda, and with that arguably further European integration. Although the ECT was not the first treaty, that got rejected by the citizens, it was however, the only treaty that was not ratified at all. The EU is recognized as a democratic body with sovereign member states, that is supposed to involve the European citizens in their democratic process. If a European treaty is decided upon, it therefore needs to be ratified in all member states. While some member states do that in the national parliaments, other countries hold a referendum. The ECT was signed by the European Union leaders in 2004. In the ratification process, ten countries decided to hold a referendum on this issue, while only Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg did so. The reason for that was, that after the rejection of the ECT in France and the Netherlands, which made a ratification in all member states and therefore the enforcement of the treaty impossible, a ratification in the other member states became irrelevant. In general, the population of all four member states appreciate the European Union (European Commission, 2005). However, in France and the Netherlands most voters rejected the ECT and in Luxemburg only 56,52% voted in favor. Excluding the good outcome of Spain (81,1% in favor), the question arises why so many people voted against the ECT, although they have a positive image of the EU.

Having two of the founding member states of the EU rejecting the Constitutional Treaty, that would have served as symbol for European unity and integration, led to a crisis for the EU and marked the beginning for poplar Euroscepticism. Since then, various scholars found many explanations for the outcome of the referenda (Aarts & Van der Kolk, 2006; Franck, 2005; Hobolt & Brouard, 2011; Lubber, 2008; Marthaler, 2005; Taggart, 2006). Regarding the French referendum, Taggart (2006), Marthaler (2005), both see the general unemployment situation as one of the main reason why the French voters rejected the ECT. They theorize that the Bolkestein Directive, which was meant to liberalize the supply of services inside the EU, was one reason for the rejection of the ECT. Opponents of the Treaty used the Bolkestein directive, which was in fact unconnected with the ECT, to play on the French fear of work competition from low-wage countries in Eastern Europe. Since especially

manual workers see themselves in competition with migrants it is expected that the voting behavior differs per occupation, which voters occupy. Although, Dumont and Poirier (2006) state that the fear for unemployment, due to the Bolkestein directive, could have influenced the voting decision of the Luxembourgish voters they agree together with Hausemer (2005), that it was not the deciding factor and that the satisfaction with the national government might have influenced the voting decision as well. Aarts & van der Kolk (2006), Hobolt & Brouard (2011) and Lubbers (2008) explain the 'No' vote in the Netherlands with cultural factors and the fear to lose the national identity and national influence in the EU. The satisfaction with the national government and the lack of 'No' campaigns are factors with which it is tried to explain the high outcome of the Spanish referendum in favor for the ECT (Torreblanca 2005; Erkan, 2010).

Different occupation groups view some societal challenges in different ways. Evans (2017) argues, that occupation groups can help to account for some factors that might influence political choices. Weatherford already found in 1979 that different occupational classes are more sensitive to economic events, which then leads to different advantage against disadvantage calculus, deriving from occupational characteristics.

In this research is asked, if the voter's occupation influenced the voting decision in the referendum on the ECT in Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and to what degree. Therefore, the following explanatory research question is asked: *Did the voter's occupation influence their voting decision in the referendum regarding the European Constitutional Treaty in Spain, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and if so, to what extent?* Next to this research question, an additional question is asked to account for eventual country differences. *Does the degree of effect of occupation on voting behavior, as far as it exists, differ per country?* The aim of this paper is to find out if and to what extent the voter's occupation influenced the voting behavior in the ECT referendum. To contribute new knowledge of the effects the occupational status has on the voting behavior in referenda regarding European integration, the conclusion discusses to what extent these findings can be generalized. This paper furthermore tries to point out to politicians if this factor influences the voting behavior in EU referenda regarding European integration. Due to the fact, that one of the most recent referendum regarding European integration, the Brexit referendum, had drastic consequences for the EU, it should be of immense importance to prevent comparable outcome in the future.

Theory

Public support for the EU

Public support for the EU in general and European integration in specific is crucial for the survival and the well-functioning of this union of states. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) state in analyzing the public support for further EU integration in connection to the Maastricht Treaty: “The growing importance of public opinion obviously comes at a crucial point in the integration process. Public support will be important, if Europeans are to accept truly borderless trade and the economic dislocations, that will come with the transition to economic and monetary union. As the public debates surrounding the Maastricht referenda in Denmark, Ireland, and France have shown, elites must convince their domestic audiences that the benefits of further integration are worth the costs.” (Eichenberg, Dalton, 1993, page 3).

As already stated in the introduction, justify political elites European integration with the promise of increasing standards of living and economic stability and growth (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). In the Lisbon Strategy, the predecessor of the Europe 2020 strategy, is defined how the European leaders want to accomplish this economic stability and growth and the following increase of living standards. In the Lisbon strategy the economic goals for the EU from 2000 to 2010 are defined by the European Council. The objective of the strategy is "to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010 capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion and respect for the environment" (European Commission, 2010, page 1). The EU aimed at achieving economic growth and stability with the hope to gain more public support for the European project and further European integration, by creating more and better jobs.

In 2005, when the ECT referendum was held in Spain, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, this strategy of gaining public support by promising better living standards, seems to have failed. While Spain had earlier voted in favor for the treaty, rejected the French the ECT, followed by the Dutch, that rejected the ECT as well and Luxembourg, that voted in favor with a slight majority. The public was not convinced of the benefits of European integration and the elites had to realize that they did not have enough public support to ratify the ECT. So, while the relevance of public support is obvious to achieve the ratification of European treaties, different ideas in the scientific literature exist which factors influence the public support.

In the scientific literature different strands of research try to explain which factors influence public support for European integration. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) identify six strands: One strand is the cognitive mobilization, raised by Inglehart (1970). As De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) state, does Inglehart (1970) suggest, that a process in which one's capacity to understand political topics and connections is build, increases the likelihood for that person to support the EU. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) state that in a later work, Inglehart (1977) argued, that citizens, that hold non-material values, like concerns with democracy, in higher regards, than material values, are not only favorable to the EU in general, but view European integration as a way to facilitate social reforms. However, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) note, that there is only limited support for the idea among scholars and a lack of scientific evidence. The second strand, as de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) identify, is emphasizing the satisfaction with the incumbent government (Franklin et al., 1995). Franklin (1995) argues, that EU referenda outcomes are tied to the popularity of the government in power. They claim that this is even the case, if a subject voted on, in the referendum, has little to do with the reasons for government popularity. The third strand de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) identify is the considerations of national identity. Carey (2002) argues, that feelings of national identity are highly important in one's support for the EU. The fourth strand is the perception on immigration (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005). De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) argue, that an increasing and negative emphasis on immigration-related issues in national politics, causes citizens to take the issue of migration into account, when forming an opinion about the EU. The last strand of research in the field of citizens support for the EU, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) identify, is the utilitarian and economic approach. These studies explain support for European integration in terms of income, education, occupational skills and proximity to border regions.

The rational, utilitarian theory for public support

As already stated in the introduction, identify Taggart (2006) and Marthaler (2005), both the general unemployment situation as one of the main reason why the French voters rejected the ECT. They theorize that the Bolkestein Directive, which was meant to liberalize the supply of services inside the European Union (EU), was one reason for the rejection of the ECT. Opponents of the Treaty used the Bolkestein directive, which was in fact unconnected with the ECT, to play on the French fear of work competition from low-wage countries in Eastern Europe. Since especially manual workers see themselves in competition with migrants it is expected that the voting behavior differs per occupation, which voters occupy. Since the Bolkestein Directive is a European directive and applies EU wide, there is enough reason to expect that voters in the whole EU share the same fears regarding the work migration and labor market competition.

It is assumed, that based on their occupation, people have actual and perceived advantages or disadvantages in life thanks to the EU. It is assumed that taken all personal advantages and disadvantages, based on the occupation and in connection with the EU, together and weighted against each other, individuals tend to support further European integration or not. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) state, that in the utilitarian theory, the citizens support, for further European integration, is largely based on a costs and benefits evaluation. Citizens support European integration to the extent that policy outcomes result economic benefits, that were predicted beforehand in theory and by politicians (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). Pepermans and Verleye (1998) found, in the light of this research tradition, that pride and satisfaction in the national economy are a key explanatory variable in support for the euro across the EU countries. Important for the rational calculation of advantages and disadvantages is, despite the integrated intentions of the European market, that the performance of the market is still measured at the national level (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). Anderson and Reichert (1995) state that Smith and Wanke (1993) have found out, that the EU may have benefited from increased economic integration, but that for the individual member states the economic success may differ. “Hence, EU membership is not necessarily a positive sum game where everyone wins; instead, it frequently involves both winners and losers.” (Anderson and Reichert, 1995, page 4). Anderson and Reichert (2005) state, that their results suggest, that not only countries who benefit economically from the EU are in total more likely to support the EU integration, but that the same counts as well for individuals. They state, that the more an individual personally benefits from the economic integration of its national country in the common market of the EU, the more likely it is to support European integration in general. However, how and if some individual benefits from European integration, differs per occupation status.

Occupation

Voters can be grouped in various ways. A largely discussed one is the grouping by classes. In the scientific literature there is an ongoing discussion, if political behavior is influenced by class behavior or not and how to conceptualize class (Evans, 2017). Evans (2017) states that there are several reasons why occupation groups are a suited conceptualization. He argues, that occupation groups can help to account for some factors that might influence political choices. Two factors he mentions are firstly, strong reactions to unemployment and secondly, feeling threatened by immigration (Evans, 2017). The occupation group can account for variations in these orientations, which in turn then shape electoral behavior. Weatherford already found in 1979 that different occupational classes are more sensitive to economic events such as unemployment rates, thus pointing to plausible class differences

in the voting decision calculus deriving from occupational characteristics. Evans (2017) states, that usually manual workers have jobs with lower wages, less secure regular incomes, and less secure positions than non-manual workers. He states, that manual workers tend not to have a lot of autonomy or hour flexibility. Evans (2017) states that furthermore, manual workers have less guarantees for sick payment and worse pension expectations than non-manual workers who occupy relatively secure salaried positions with occupational pensions and other benefits. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) state, that unskilled workers and unemployed workers are more likely to be opposed to immigration than highly skilled workers or owners of capital. Although these results are based on data from the United States labor market, it is reasonable, according to Hix and Noury (2007) to assume that a similar effect holds in the EU, due to the fact, that most EU member states have a more rigid and inflexible job market than the United States. The opposition to immigration can be explained with the fact that on average, immigrants are willing to accept lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs than the original national workforce (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). Therefore, unemployed and unskilled workers are more likely to be in competition for jobs with immigrants than higher-skilled workers. Hix and Noury (2007) state that capital owners on the other hand benefit from higher levels of immigration, because more immigration will lower factor production costs and more immigrants will mean a larger workforce.

For this research four occupation groups are conceptualized, based on assumptions about their different advantages and disadvantages calculation in relation to the EU. These expectations are assumed, based on the findings in the scientific literature stated beforehand and will not be tested in this research. To investigate the influence occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referenda, the following for groups are conceptualized: The first group are the voters that seek a job. *H1: Voters that seek a job voted with 'No' in the ECT referendum more often, than voters that have a job.* This result is expected based on the assumption, that this group of individuals did not benefit economically from the EU, who has promised to create more and better jobs in the Lisbon strategy, as stated earlier. The second group are the manual workers. *H2: Manual workers voted with 'No' more often, in the ECT referendum, than non-manual workers.* This result is however based on a different assumption. It is assumed, that this group tends to feel threatened by the open market and the possibility of increasing work migration, due to the Eastern expansion of the EU in 2004 and the possibility of a Turkish candidate state as proposed in the ECT. Due to the low skilled work, this occupation group is more extraditing to work competition, than the next occupation group, the employees. This third group is mostly higher skilled and therefore not as much threatened by the mostly low skilled work migration from Eastern European countries. Besides, their occupation gives a reasonable high job security and pension. *H3: Employees (non-manual workers) voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT*

referendum, than the voters that are not occupied as employees (manual workers), in the ECT referendum. The last occupation group conceptualized for this research are the self-employed. *H4: The self-employed voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT referendum, than voters that are not self-employed.* This hypothesis is based on the assumption, that self-employed, as capital owners, benefit from higher levels of work migration, because it lowers factor production costs and because more immigrants form a larger workforce, from which the best suited workers can be picked.

The ECT referendum voting per country

Next to answering the research question, this research aims at testing, if the expected influence occupation had on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum, differs per country. The Figure 1 is provided to give an overview of the relationship of the variables this research is based upon. Occupation is taken as the independent variable that influences the dependent variable voting behavior. The extent to which this occurs, differs per country. For that reason, the relationship between occupation and voting behavior is moderated by the country investigated.

Figure 1: Modeling the relationship between occupation and voting behavior, moderated by the country.



With voting behavior, the decision of the people, that voted in the national ECT referenda, to vote with yes or with no is meant. In Spain the result of the ECT referendum is explained by two main factors. Erkan (2010) finds in his case study about the European Constitution referendum in Spain, that the higher a person's confidence in the Spanish government is, the more likely it is, that this person votes in favor of the ECT. This is, because the government's support for the ECT, is then automatically linked to voters' opinion about the government. If they support the government they tend to vote in favor for the ECT and the other way around (Hausemer, 2005). Torreblanca (2005) on the other hand argues, that in Spain the support for the Treaty was gained by a campaign that used easy slogans ('it's about Europe, it's about you') and let famous personalities, read out selected

articles of the Constitution on television. Furthermore, he states that 332 out of 350 members of Spain's Congress of Deputies supported the European Constitutional Treaty (Torreblanca, 2005). Consequently, almost no significant campaigns were run to mobilize votes against the Treaty. If the support for the Spanish government and the general support for the EU were the main factors, that decided the outcome of the ECT, there is no reason to assume that these non-economic reasons differ per occupation group. Therefore, occupation is expected to not have a significant influence on the ECT in Spain. *H5: In Spain the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be small and not significant.*

Marthaler (2005), Franck (2005), Grossman and Woll (2011) and Brouard and Tiberj (2006) claim that one event that led people to vote against the ECT in the French referendum was the debate over the Bolkestein services directive. This directive was created to open free movement of services within the EU. This directive, although in fact completely unconnected with ECT, led to the fear, that an influx of work migration would lead to unemployment. Therefore Marthaler (2005) thinks, that the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004, the proposal of the Bolkestein directive and the possibility of Turkey becoming a candidate state of the EU, which was connected to the ECT, affected the fear for work migration and therefore the voting in the ECT referendum in France. Work migration poses assumable a threat to only manual workers and the unemployed, who viewed migrants as competition, and not to the employees and self-employed, occupation is expected to have an effect on voting behavior. Therefore, the following is hypothesized: *H6: In France the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is expected to be significant and higher than in Spain.*

In the Netherlands the main reasons that are assumed to have influenced the voting behavior are non-economically. In the scientific literature reasons related to the national identity and culture, like the fear of losing the national sovereignty or a fear for a loss of identity due to, among other reasons, migration, influenced the voting decision in the ECT referendum in the Netherlands (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2005; Brouard & Tiberj, 2006; Dumont & Priorier, 2006). Aarts and van der Kolk (2006) view the disagreement with further expansion of the EU as a factor that influenced the voting decision in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders, a former member of the Dutch conservative party VVD, left the party, since he disagreed with the possibility of a Turkish membership of the EU. He claimed that admitting Turkey as candidate state would be a threat to the Dutch identity, because of the declining voting power in the EU, due to the fact, that voting power would be more dependent on population size than before (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2006). They find that the disagreement with further expansion derived from the believe, that the Dutch language would be used less often, and the Dutch culture would be threatened (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2006). There is no reason to expect that these factors differ per

occupation group, which means, that the hypothesis, as defined earlier in connection to the different occupation groups, are expected to be not applicable in the Netherlands. *H7: In the Netherlands the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be smaller than in France and not significant.*

It is argued, that popularity of the government, influenced the voting decision in the ECT referendum in Luxembourg (Hausemer, 2005). In Luxembourg the Prime Minister's popularity is seen as one of the factors deciding the outcome of the referendum in favor for the Treaty. Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who enjoyed broad popularity throughout society, declared that a rejection of the ECT would make him resign (Hausemer, 2005). There is however, no reason to expect this factor of influence to differ between the occupation groups, which weakens the expected influence of occupation on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum. However, another factor that tends to have influenced the voting behavior is, that Luxembourgish citizens linked a perceived bad economic situation in the country to the EU (Dumont & Priorier, 2006). The citizens feared that large companies would move away from Luxembourg, causing unemployment. Furthermore, the opening of public sector jobs to non-Luxembourgish citizens, increased the fear for unemployment (Dumont & Priorier, 2006). This factor relates to the work migration, that is assumed to have different consequences for the four occupation groups. For that reason, at least, some effect of occupation on voting behavior can be expected. *H8: In Luxembourg the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is hypothesized to be significant and higher than in the Netherlands and Spain, but smaller than in France.*

Although other researchers do not give reason to expect occupation to be likely to have influenced the voting decision in the Netherlands (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2005) and Spain (Torreblanca, 2005; Erkan, 2010), these cases are included in this research to have expected contradicting cases to compare the outcome of the findings in Luxembourg (Hausemer, 2005; Dumont & Priorier, 2006), for which it is expected to have some influence, and France (Marthaler, 2005; Franck, 2005; Grossman and Woll, 2011; Brouard and Tiberj, 2006), for which it is expected to have a high influence, too. As stated before, is it possible to account for events, like migration and developments on the job market with occupation group. In the four countries, the importance of these factors is assumed to have differed, as discussed in this paragraph.

Data and measures

Data Sources

To answer the research question, already existing surveys are used. As data source the Flash Eurobarometer is used. The Flash Eurobarometer was founded by the European Commission. It is meant to be a small-scale survey, that are conducted in all EU member states. The Flash Eurobarometer data have been used before by Glencross and Trechsel (2011). The questions and answers are already coded into quantitative data. The unit of analysis must be the individual voter. All surveys were conducted via telephone. For this Flash Eurobarometer new and independent samples are drawn by random (Gesis, n.d.) of the population of 18 year and above, registered to vote (European Commission, Flash EB 168, 171, 172, 173, 2005). Since the referenda of Spain, France the Netherlands and Luxembourg were hold on different dates, the Flash Eurobarometer conducted the surveys as soon as possible after the referendum date. For that reason, was the survey conducted at different point of times. The Flash Eurobarometer 168 (The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in Spain) was conducted on the 21st and 22nd of February 2005 and the used sample consists of 2014 individuals (European Commission, Flash EB 168, 2005). The Flash Eurobarometer 171 (The European Constitution: Post-Referendum in France) was conducted on the 30th of May and 31st of May 2005 and the used sample consists of 2015 individuals (European Commission, Flash EB 171, 2005). The Flash Eurobarometer 172 (The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in The Netherlands) was conducted between the second and fourth of June 2005 and the used sample consists of 2000 individuals (European Commission, Flash EB 172, 2005). The Flash Eurobarometer 173 (The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in Luxembourg) was conducted between the 11th and the 18th of July 2005 used sample consists of 1001 individuals (European Commission, Flash EB 173, 2005).

Operationalization

The variable occupation is measured by a question asked in the four surveys of the Flash Eurobarometer (168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). The question asked is: “As far as your current occupation is concerned, would you say you are self-employed, an employee, a manual worker or would you say that you are without a professional activity?” (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). Then 22 answer possibilities are given, of which 21 are coded into four groups, which were conceptualized in the chapter earlier: Self-employed, employee, manual worker and voters that are seeking a job. These are the labels and given by the Flash Eurobarometer. Due to the

fact, that the two categories manual worker and employee do not seem to be mutually exclusive, the category employee should be understood as individuals that are non-manual workers. The following table visualizes the operationalization of the variable occupation.

Figure 2: Values of the occupation categories in the Flash Eurobarometer survey

Self-employed	**Employees**	**Manual worker**	**Seeking a job**
Farmer, forester, fisherman	Professional II (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	Supervisor / foreman (team manager, etc. …)	Seeking a job
Owner of a shop, craftsman	General management	Manual worker	
Professional I (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect…)	[1] Director or top management	Unskilled manual worker[HK2] [HK3] Other	
Manager of a company	Middle management;		
Other	Civil servant		
	Office clerk		
	other employee (salesman, nurse, etc.…)		

For the first group, the self-employed, five answer possibilities are given: “Farmer, forester, fisherman; Owner of a shop, craftsman; Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect…); Manager of a company; Other” (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173, 2005). For the second group, the employee, seven answer options are given: “Professional (employed

doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect); General management; Director or top management; Middle management; Civil servant; Office clerk; other employee (salesman, nurse, etc.…)" (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). For the third group, the manual worker, four answer options are given: "Supervisor / foreman (team manager, etc.…); Manual worker; Unskilled manual worker; Other" (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). For the fourth group, without a professional activity, five answer options are given: "Looking after the home; Seeking a job; Other; Student; Retired" (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). However, there is no theoretical background, to assume that somebody who looks after the home, is a student, retired or does something else than seeking a job, is in competition with work migrants for a job. Therefore, there is no reason to expect for these respondents to have their occupation influence their voting behavior. These respondents are excluded from this research. Therefore, the first group is reduced to only respondents that seek a job. The last answer possibility, which is not grouped into the four categories, is the refusal to answer.

The variable voting behavior is measured by a question asked in the four surveys of the Flash Eurobarometer (168,171,172, 173; 2005). The question asked in all four questionnaires is: "How did you vote in that Referendum? Did you vote "Yes" in favor of the treaty that establishes a Constitution for Europe or "No" against it?" (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). Then four answer options are given: "You voted 'YES'; You voted 'NO'; You Voted 'Blank'; Don't know, no answer" (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173; 2005). For this research, only the answer possibilities "You voted Yes" and "You voted No" are included, because the percentage of the people, interesting for this study, that voted blank (3%) and said don't know (6%) are relatively small and it is more interesting to see if the occupational status has an influence if voters vote 'No' or 'Yes', than voted blank and don't know. There is no theoretical background to expect the occupation to make people vote blank or don't know.

Of the 7030 respondents 1262 respondents indicate that they did not vote in the ECT referendum and are therefore excluded from the sample for this study. Of the 5768 respondents that did vote, 5231 state that they had voted with 'Yes' or 'No' in the referendum. The 537 respondents that state that they voted blank or state that they don't know are excluded from this study. Of the 5231 respondents 3129 respondents fall in the four categories of Self-employed, employee, manual worker and seeking a job or refused to answer. That leaves 2350 respondents who are irrelevant for this study, because they do not fall in these occupation categories, as explained in the operationalization and are therefore excluded from the study. So, concluding, is a sample of 3129 relevant respondents used for this study.

Analysis

The referendum data and the survey data

The distribution of the voting behavior, per country, according to the sample is interesting, because it is supposed to reflect the real outcome of the referendum in the four countries. To see how accurate the survey was in capturing the actual outcome of the referendum, these data are compared. To analyze if a statistically significant difference between the voting behavior expected in the Flash Eurobarometer survey and the actual results of the ECT referendum exists, all respondents, that state that they voted are included in the sample, regardless, if they fit in the four occupation groups or not. In Figure 3 is the results of the ECT referendum displayed, according to the outcome of the question regarding the voting behavior of the Flash Eurobarometer, excluding the answer possibilities, 'voted blank' and ''don't know'. The reason for excluding the answer option 'don't know', is that during the referendum, voters did not have the chance to say don't know if they voted. They had the options to vote for or against the ECT, or hand in an invalid ballot. The reason to exclude the answer possibility 'voted blank', is, that the results of the ECT referendum, that were published, do not include the option. To compare them more easily, only the answer options of the survey, you voted with 'Yes' and you voted with 'No', are included.

Figure 3: ECT referendum results, according to the Eurobarometer survey and the published results of the referendum, including all voters, in percentage, per country



According to this figure, 86% of the Spanish population is supposed to have voted with 'Yes', and only 14% with 'No'. However, according to the actual results of the ECT referendum per county, only 77% of the Spanish population, that voted in the referendum, voted with 'Yes' and 23% with 'No' (Torreblanca, 2005). For France the Flash Eurobarometer expects a 50% spread of votes for and against the ECT, while the actual results, show a distribution of 45% of French voters in favor of the ECT and 55% against it (BBC, 2005). 41% of the Dutch voters should have voted with 'Yes' and 59% with 'No'. The actual results show that only 39% of Dutch voters, voted with 'Yes' and 61% with 'No' (The Guardian, 2005). For Luxembourg the Flash Eurobarometer states that 65% of the voters to have voted with 'Yes' and 35% of the voters to have voted with 'No', while 57% voted with 'Yes' and 44% with 'No' (Fondation Robert Schuman, 2005). The actual results of the ECT referendum and the outcome according to the Flash Eurobarometer survey differ between 2% and 9%. The results of the Flash Eurobarometer survey are not matching the actual outcome of the ECT referendum. By using the goodness of fit Chi-square test it can be said that the expected results based on the survey and the actual results of the referendum are significantly different, using an alpha of 0.05 [Spain: Chi-square=102.667; Df=1; p=0.001; France: Chi-square=119.709; Df=1; p=0.001; The Netherlands: Chi-square=71.364; Df=1; p=0.001; Luxembourg: Chi-square=112.410; Df=1 $p=0.001<\propto=0.05$]. This means, that the findings, based on this sample, are not matching the actual results of the referendum. This means, that the sample of the survey is not representative for the actual outcome of the referendum. The expected influence that the occupation has on the voting behavior, based on the sample might therefore be not representative for the whole population.

Descriptive statistics

As stated in the operationalization, excludes the sample, for the following statistical tests and analyses, respondents that did not vote, respondents that voted blank and 'don't know' and respondents that do not belong in the operationalized occupation group.

Occupation

Figure 4: Distribution of occupation groups, regarding the Flash Eurobarometer survey, in percentage per country



As can be seen in figure 4, are 60% of the 3129 sample of respondents, that voted with 'Yes' or 'No' and can be grouped in the four occupation categories employees and form the largest occupational group. The second biggest share are the manual workers (20%) and followed by the self-employed that make up 15% of the sample. The smallest share of the respondents, 5%, are seeking a job. The sample of Luxembourg has the biggest share of employees with 75% in comparison with the other three countries (France 61%, the Netherlands 57% and Spain 54%). The sample of Luxembourg has however the smallest share of self-employed (8%), manual workers (16%) and people that seek a job with only 2%. In comparison, in the sample of Spain 4% are seeking a job, in the sample of France 6% and in the sample of the Netherlands 7%. In total, is the share of respondents, that seek a job the smallest of the four occupation groups. In the sample of the Netherlands are 18% of the voters self-employees and 19% manual workers. In the sample of Spain 20% of the individuals are self-employed and 23% are manual workers. In the sample of Luxembourg and France is the difference in the share a bit bigger. 11% are self-employed and 21% are manual worker in France. 8% are self-employed and 16% are manual workers in Luxembourg. The sample of Spain has the biggest share of manual workers and self-employees in comparison with the other four samples.

Voting behavior

Figure 5: Distribution of the voting behavior, of the voters that can be grouped in the four occupation categories and excluding voters that state that they voted blank or don't know, in percentage, per country



Most 'Yes' voters are to be found in Spain with 75% (25% 'No' voters), followed by Luxembourg with 47% (53% 'No' voters). This is not surprising, because these two countries had the majority voting in favor in the result of the actual ECT referendum. What is surprising however, is that according to the sample used in this research, the majority of the Luxembourgish voters would have voted against the ECT, which it did not. This flaw can be explained by the selective sample. It excludes students, retired people and people that look after the home, which results of 2350 individuals. When these people are included in the sample, 65% voted with 'Yes' and 35% with 'No'. These different results are statistically significantly different [Chi-square=291.882; Df=1; p=0.001] Apparently this group of voters have a strong influence on the voting behavior. According to the used sample, received the Netherlands the smallest share of 'Yes' votes (32%) and consequently the biggest share of 'No' votes (68%), while in France 35% of the respondents state that they have voted in favor and 65% against the ECT.

Hypotheses testing

Occupation on voting behavior in the ECT

Table 1: Distribution of the voting behavior depending on the occupation group in percentage, according to the Flash Eurobarometer

		You voted with 'Yes'	**You voted with 'No'**	**Total**
Self-employed	Count	266	176	442
	Percentage	60%	40%	100%
Employee	Count	1038	843	1881
	Percentage	55%	45%	100%
Manual worker	Count	235	357	592
	Percentage	40%	60%	100%
Seeking a job	Count	96	118	214
	Percentage	45%	55%	100%
Total	Count	1635	1494	3129
	Percentage	52%	48%	100%

To answer the research question, if the voter's occupation influences their voting decision in the referendum regarding the European Constitutional Treaty and if so, to what extent, the first four hypotheses, as stated in the theory, need to be tested. As first hypothesis is stated that voters that seek a job voted with 'No' in the ECT referendum more often, than voters that have a job. Secondly it is hypothesized, that manual workers voted with 'No' more often, in the ECT referendum, than non-manual workers. As third hypothesis is stated, that employees (non-manual workers) voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT referendum, than the voters that are not occupied as employees (non-manual worker), in the ECT referendum. Fourthly is hypothesized, that self-employed voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT referendum, than voters that are not self-employed.

To test these hypotheses, new variables per occupation group are constructed. This means, that for each occupation group a dichotomous variable is created. For the first hypothesis, the variable consists of two values. The first value is seeking a job and the second value is other, including all voters that are self-employed, employees (non-manual workers) and manual workers. For the second hypothesis, the variable consists as well of two values. The first value is manual worker and the second value is other, including all voters that are self-employed, employees (non-manual workers) and voters that seek a job. For the third hypothesis, the variable consists as well of two values. The first value is employee and the second value is other, including all voters that are self-employed, manual workers and voters that seek a job. For the fourth hypothesis, the variable consists as well of two values. The first value is self-employed, and the second value is other, including all voters that are employees, manual workers and voters that seek a job. To test the hypotheses a chi-square test of homogeneity is used, per variable, to test if a correlation exists and Cramer's V is used, to test the strength of the correlation. According to the rule of thumb (Cohen, 1988) is the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable small, when the effect is between 0.06 and 0.1, medium, when Cramer's V is between 0.17 and 0.3, and large, if it is between 0.29 and 0.5.

These tests lead to the conclusion, that the first hypothesis can be confirmed. Voters that seek a job voted with 'No' statistically significantly more often, than voters that have a job [Chi-square=4.919; Df=1; p=0.027; Cramer's V= 0.040]. The p-value is with 0.027 smaller than the alpha of 0.05 which means, that the null hypothesis (Voters who seek a job did not vote with 'No' statistically significantly more often, than voters that have a job.) can be rejected. Being a voter that seeks a job influences the voting decision. The direction the effect has, can be deflected from the table (Table 1). Voters that seek a job voted more often with 'No' (55%) than with 'Yes (45%). To answer the question of the size of the effect, Cramer's V is used. Regarding the first hypothesis, has being a voter that seeks a job, a very small effect on the voting decision, which can be deflect from Cramer's V=0,040. Voters that seek a job voted more often with 'No' (55%), than with Yes (45%), the effect is however very small.

Following the first hypothesis, can the second hypothesis be confirmed as well. Manual workers voted with 'No' statistically significantly more often, than voters that are not employed as manual workers [Chi-square=45.512; Df=1; p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.121]. The p-value is with 0.001 smaller than the alpha of 0.05 which means, that the null hypothesis (Manual workers did not vote with 'No' statistically significantly more often, than voters that are not employed as manual workers.) can be rejected. Being a manual worker influences the voting decision. The direction the effect has, can be

deflected from the table (Table 1). Manual worker voted more with 'No' (60%) than with 'Yes (40%). Being a manual worker has a small effect on the voting decision, which can be deflect from Cramer's V=0,121. This means, that manual workers voted more often with 'No' (60%), than with Yes (40%) and the effect, being a manual worker has on voting behavior can be considered small, but significant.

The third hypothesis be confirmed. Employees (non-manual workers) voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT referendum, than the voters that are occupied as self-employed, manual workers or by seeking a job [Chi-square=17.124; Df=1; p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.74]. The p-value is with 0.001 smaller than the alpha of 0.05 which means, that the null hypothesis (Employees did not vote with 'Yes' statistically significantly more often, than the voters that are not occupied as employee (non-manual workers) can be rejected. Being an employee influences the voting decision. The direction, that the effect has, can be deflected from the table (Table 1). Employees voted more often with 'Yes' (55%) than with 'No' (45%). Being an employee has a very small, but significant effect on the voting decision, which can be deflected from Cramer's V=0,074. This means, that employees voted more often with 'Yes' (55%), than with 'No' (45%) and the effect, being an employee has on voting behavior can be considered as very small, but significant.

The fourth hypothesis be confirmed. Self-employed voters voted with 'Yes' more often, in the ECT referendum, than the voters that are not self-employed [Chi-square=13.235; Df=1; p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.65]. The p-value is with 0.001 smaller than the alpha of 0.05 which means, that the null hypothesis (Self-employed did not vote with 'Yes' statistically significantly more often, than the voters that are not self-employed.) can be rejected. Being self-employed influences the voting decision. The direction, that the effect has, can be deflected from the table (Table 1). Self-employed voted more often with 'Yes' (60%) than with 'No' (40%). Being self-employed has a very small, but significant effect on the voting decision, which can be deflected from Cramer's V=0,065. This means, that self-employed voted more often with 'Yes' (60%), than with 'No' (40%) and the effect, being an employee has on voting behavior can be considered as very small, but significant.

After having confirmed all four hypotheses, the research question can be answered. Based on the fact, that all occupation categories have a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior, it can be concluded, that occupation influences the voting behavior in the ECT referendum. Self-employed voters and employees, voted more in favor for the ECT than against it. Manual workers and voters that seek a job voted more against the ECT than in favor of it. The size of the effect of occupation on voting behavior varies per category, between not big enough to be significant and small.

Occupation on voting behavior in the ECT per country

To answer the question, if the outcome of the influence of the occupation on the voting decision differ per country, the following four hypotheses are tested. H5: In Spain the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be small and not significant. H6: In France the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is expected to be significant and higher than in Spain. H7: In the Netherlands the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be smaller than in France and not significant. H8: In Luxembourg the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is hypothesized to be significant and higher than in the Netherlands and Spain, but smaller than in France. To test these hypotheses, again, the Chi-square test of homogeneity is used to test if a correlation exists and Cramer's V are used to test the strength of the correlation.

Spain:

Table 2: Distribution of the voting behavior depending on the occupation group, in Spain in percentage

		You voted with 'Yes'	**You voted with 'No'**	**Total**
Self-employed	Count	89	21	110
	Percentage	81%	19%	100%
Employee	Count	255	49	304
	Percentage	84%	16%	100%
Manual worker	Count	102	27	129
	Percentage	79%	21%	100%
Seeking a job	Count	32	6	38
	Percentage	84%	16%	100%
Total	Count	478	103	581

	Percentage	82%	18%	100%

The statistical tests lead to the conclusion, that the fifth hypothesis (In Spain, the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be small and not significant) can be confirmed. For the Spanish Voters the occupation does not have a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior [Chi-square=1.685; Df=3; p=0.640; Cramer's V= 0.054]. The p-value is with 0.640 bigger than the alpha of 0.05 which means, that the null hypothesis (In Spain, the occupation does not have a significant relationship with the voting behavior.) cannot be rejected. In Spain the occupation did not influence the voting behavior in the ECT referendum.

France:

Table 3: Distribution of the voting behavior depending on the occupation group, in France, in percentage

		You voted with 'Yes'	**You voted with 'No'**	**Total**
Self-employed	Count	57	51	108
	Percentage	53%	47%	100%
Employee	Count	281	277	558
	Percentage	50%	50%	100%
Manual worker	Count	54	139	193
	Percentage	28%	72%	100%
Seeking a job	Count	27	47	74
	Percentage	37%	64%	100%
Total	Count	419	514	933

	Percentage	45%	55%	100%

The sixth hypothesis (In France, the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is expected to be significant and higher than in Spain.) can be confirmed as well. For the French Voters the occupation does have a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior [Chi-square=33.881; Df=3; p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.191]. The p-value is with 0.001 smaller than alpha with 0.05. The null hypothesis (In France, the occupation does not have a significant relationship with the voting behavior.) can be rejected. In France, the occupation influences the voting behavior in the ECT referendum and its effect is significant and medium strong. In comparison to Spain is this effect bigger, especially because for Spain the effect was not significant. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis can be confirmed.

The Netherlands:

Table 4: Distribution of the voting behavior depending on the occupation group, in the Netherlands, in percentage

		You voted with 'Yes'	**You voted with 'No'**	**Total**
Self-employed	Count	89	95	184
	Percentage	48%	52%	100%
Employee	Count	284	370	654
	Percentage	43%	57%	100%
Manual worker	Count	45	147	192
	Percentage	23%	77%	100%
Seeking a job	Count	32	59	91
	Percentage	35%	65%	100%

Total	Count	450	671	1121
	Percentage	40%	60%	100%

The seventh hypothesis (In the Netherlands, the effect of occupation on voting behavior is hypothesized to be smaller than in France and not significant.) cannot be confirmed. For the Dutch voters the occupation does have a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior [Chi-square=31.352; Df=3; p=0.001; Cramer's V=0.167]. The p-value is with 0.001 smaller than alpha (0.05). The null hypothesis (In the Netherlands, the occupation does not have a significant relationship with the voting behavior) can be rejected. In the Netherlands the occupation did influence the voting behavior in the ECT referendum. However, as expected, is the effect occupation has on voting behavior smaller in the Netherlands, than in France.

Luxembourg:

Table 5: Distribution of the voting behavior depending on the occupation group, in Luxembourg, in percentage

		You voted with 'Yes	**You voted with 'No'**	**Total**
Self-employed	Count	31	9	40
	Percentage	78%	23%	100%
Employee	Count	218	147	365
	Percentage	60%	40%	100%
Manual worker	Count	34	44	78
	Percentage	44%	56%	100%
Seeking a job	Count	5	6	11
	Percentage	46%	45%	100%

Total	Count	288	206	494
	Percentage	58%	41%	100%

The eighth hypothesis (In Luxembourg, the effect that the occupation has on the voting behavior in the ECT referendum is hypothesized to be significant and higher than in the Netherlands and Spain, but smaller than in France.) can be confirmed. For the Luxembourgish voters the occupation does have a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior [Chi-square=14.060; Df=3; p=0.003; Cramer's V= 0.169]. The p-value is smaller than alpha (0.05). The null hypothesis (In Luxembourg, the occupation does not have a significant relationship with the voting behavior) can be rejected. In Luxembourg, the occupation influences the voting behavior in the ECT referendum. The effect is medium, and as expected bigger than in the Netherlands and Spain, but smaller than in France. Therefore, the eighth hypothesis can be confirmed. In France occupation has the biggest effect on voting behavior, in Luxembourg and the Netherlands the effect size is almost the same, but 0.002 bigger in Luxembourg and in Spain the effect is not significant.

Conclusion

Based on the findings, presented in the previous chapter, the research question (Did the voter's occupation influence their voting decision in the referendum regarding the European Constitutional Treaty in Spain, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and if so, to what extent?) can be answered. In general influences the voter's occupation the voting decision to a small extent. As argued in the theoretical chapter (Evans, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hix and Noury, 2007), did manual workers and voters that seek a job vote with 'No' more often than with 'Yes', while self-employed and employees voted with 'Yes' more often than with 'No'. In the theoretical chapter is argued that this can be based on an advantage/ disadvantage calculus (Evans, 2017). It is assumed, that migration and developments on the labor market are two factors that influence this calculus (Evans, 2017; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). Manual workers and voters that seek a job are assumed to be impact by work migration and the resulting larger workforce on the labor market more strongly, than self-employed and employees, that are non-manual worker, because work migrants are mostly seeking manual work and are in competition with manual workers and voters that seek a job (Evans, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Employees and self-employed are assumed to be more positive about the work migration and the labor market, because they have better labor conditions in the first place, in terms of job security and do not have to fear to be replaced easily by migrants (Hix and

Noury, 2007). On these assumptions, the first four hypotheses were based, which have all been confirmed. The occupation of the voters influenced their voting behavior in the ECT referendum. Future research can test if the fear for work migration and competition on the labor market are the only and main factors that influence the occupation groups and the resulting voting behavior in the ECT referendum, or if other factors influenced the advantage/ disadvantage calculus and how strongly. The results of the analysis show, that the size of the effect occupation has on voting behavior is rather small. It would be interesting for future research to search for factors that impacted the voting behavior in the ECT referendum more strongly, to give lead to politicians, which factors were most important, that led voters to reject the ECT.

However, this study closes a research gap regarding the importance of the occupation of the voters for their voting decision in the ECT. This research answered the question if and to what extent the occupation influenced the outcome of the referendum, to give an indication to campaigners and politicians if this factor led partly to the rejection of the treaty. After having shown that the occupation did matter in the voting decision in the ECT referendum, it is now interesting to see if any general conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The ECT was a treaty that would have facilitated further European integration. Further European integration almost always means changes in regard to the labor market and the economy. Some examples from past treaties are the freedom of movement, EU expansions and the introduction of the euro. The effect these changes have on the occupation groups and their advantage/ disadvantage calculus have, differ. For that reason, an effect of voters' occupation on their voting behavior can be expected to differ on all referendums regarding European integration and does not limit these findings to only the ECT referendum.

Interesting for future research could be as well, to test if the level of education has a bigger effect on voting behavior, than the occupation and how big the effect of the occupation still is, when controlling for the level of education. As stated in the operationalization, do the occupation groups entail different occupations. The problem with grouping them in the four occupation groups, is that jobs with different conditions are grouped together. This is especially true for the self-employed and employees. A doctor and an office clerk have different conditions in terms of educational level. For that reason, it would be interesting to see if the effect, that the educational level has on voting behavior, is bigger than the one the occupation has. On reason to believe that the occupation matters for the voting behavior and the reason why it was chosen for this research, is that the occupation allows to account for some factors and conditions, for which some occupations have a comparable situation. One example, as stated in the theoretical chapter, is migration. Self-employed have to worry less about work competition than manual workers. Although this is still presumed to be true, does another

operationalization maybe account for these differences more precisely. Therefore, it might be better to differentiate between the level of education instead of the occupation groups. A highly educated and specialized manual worker does not have to fear to lose its job due to work migration, because most migrants are mostly competing for low educated jobs (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). That means, that a highly educated manual worker might share the same views about migration and the developments on the labor market than a highly educated employee. A low educated employee must face competition on the labor market to a similar extent as a low educated manual worker, which could lead to more similar views about migration, than the view that a highly educated employee and a low educated employee have. Therefore, future research could either test the effect the level of education of voters has on their voting behavior or control for the level of education when testing the effect occupation has on voting behavior, to see if occupation still a significant effect on voting behavior has, when all voters are assumed to have the same educational level.

If taken all countries separately, the occupation has an effect on voting behavior only for France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. For Spain the occupation does not have a significant effect on the voting behavior. In the theoretical chapter is stated that, no statistical significant relationship is expected for Spain and the Netherlands, because the main reasons for voters to vote against or in favor for the ECT, as stated in the scientific literature (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2005; Torreblanca, 2005; Erkan, 2010), were unrelated to the occupation status. While in Spain, almost no relevant campaign was held, that tried to convince voters on the advantages or disadvantages of the ECT (Torreblanca, 2005; Erkan, 2010), in the Netherlands the leading theme in the campaign were related to the Dutch identity and sovereignty, for which no reason could be found to expect, that their effect on voters differs per occupation group (Aarts & van der Kolk, 2005). However, as shown in the analysis, does occupation influence the voting behavior in the Netherlands. For future research, it could be interesting to find out why this is the case. In France and Luxembourg occupation has, as expected, an effect on voting behavior. Presumably, this is the case, because in the campaigns, that were run in these countries, economic arguments were put forward to vote against the ECT (Hausemer, 2005; Dumont & Priorier, 2006; Marthaler, 2005; Franck, 2005; Grossman and Woll, 2011; Brouard and Tiberj, 2006).

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