

Bachelor Thesis

**The Influence of Decentralization and Power Sharing on
Service Delivery in Fragile States: A Case Study of Iraq**

Silvan Nesat Lange (s1853082)

4th July 2018

Joint Degree *Public Governance across Borders* (BSc)

University of Twente and Universität Münster

**First supervisor: Dr. Veronica Junjan
Second supervisor: Dr. Irna van der Molen**

Abstract

This study applies a process tracing approach in order to examine service delivery in the fragile context of Iraq since 2003, thereby taking into account the country's institutional arrangements. For this purpose, it describes and applies theories of decentralization and of power sharing as well as their effects on service delivery to the Iraqi case. The thesis assesses the progress that has been made in decentralizing the Iraqi political institutions, the different forms of formal and informal power sharing arrangements, and the current status of service delivery with a specific focus on the water sector. It concludes that decentralization has only taken place to a limited extent, thus not allowing for possible positive impacts on service delivery to come into effect. Moreover, the different power sharing mechanisms make sectarian political parties disproportionately powerful. This provides the context for a flawed institutional framework for service delivery since party elites are able to maintain power both on the national and on subnational levels by controlling the state institutions and resources. This thesis proposes further research on the design of institutions and their capture by political elites in fragile environments.

Table of Contents

1 Background	1
1.1 Case Selection and Relevance	2
1.2 Research Questions	3
2 Theory	4
2.1 Fragmentation and Diffuseness of Public Institutions	4
2.2 Service Delivery in Fragile States	5
2.3 Decentralization and Service Delivery	7
2.3.1 Effects of Decentralization on Service Delivery	8
2.3.1.1 Allocative Efficiency.....	8
2.3.1.2 Electoral Incentives.....	8
2.3.1.3 Corruption	9
2.3.1.4 Government Inefficiency	10
2.4 Power Sharing and Service Delivery	10
3 Conceptual framework	12
3.1 Fiscal decentralization	13
3.2 Administrative Decentralization	13
3.3 Political Decentralization	14
3.4 Power Sharing	14
3.5 Public Service Delivery	15
Answer to the First Sub Research Question	15
4 Data & Documents	16
4.1 Methodology	17
5 Analysis	18
5.1 The Iraqi Context since 2003	18
5.2 From an Authoritarian to a Fragile State	19
5.3 Decentralization in Iraq	21
5.4 Power Sharing in Iraq	23
Answer to the Second Sub Research Question	25
5.5 Service Delivery in Iraq	27
5.5.1 Case Study of the Water sector.....	30
5.5.1.1 Governance Structure	31
Answer to the Third Sub Research Question	33
6 Conclusion	34
6.1 Summary of the Empirical Findings	34
6.2 Answer to the Main Research Question	35
6.3 Strengths, Weaknesses and Recommendations for Further Research	40
8 References	41
7 Appendix	46

1 Background

Within the broader topic of service delivery in fragile contexts, this research focuses on Iraq, a country marked by sectarian violence, terrorism and general insecurity, which lead to an exceedingly fragile situation for the state and its inhabitants. A defining feature of fragile states is the restricted access to public services (Baird, 2010) as a result of violent conflicts, the breakdown of social order, flawed political institutions, and corruption. Those factors contribute to an unstable environment and accordingly create a shaky foundation for effectively delivering public services (OECD, 2008).

Especially people struck by economic deprivation and violence suffer from the absence of public services. A lack of basic security, health services, water services, and education means a lower quality of life and potentially creates grievances among the affected population, which contributes to a lack of state legitimacy. Effective service delivery in turn cannot only bring advantages to people in unstable situations but also improve their perception of the state. Once the public sector becomes more efficient in delivering basic services, citizens who benefit from the improvements start attributing legitimacy to the state (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). For this reason, a growing number of non-governmental, governmental, and international organisations works to improve service delivery in fragile states.

A large amount of publications identified excessive centralization of political institutions as a cause of inefficient service delivery, and thus proposes decentralization as a suitable measure to bring considerable advantages for the effectiveness of a country's public sector (Azfar et al., 1999). The World Bank (2016) supports this point by asserting that decentralization has downright positive effects on service delivery in general. Although the Iraqi political system is characterized by on-going decentralization efforts, the public authorities in charge of providing services are experiencing a general decline (World Bank, 2017a). Violent conflicts lead to the destruction of basic infrastructure as well as a shortage of trained personnel and supplies for delivering services (Baird, 2010). Yet, there are more subtle processes that have an impact on the public authorities' capacity to effectively deliver services. Corruption, inefficient allocation of resources and a lack of accountability in the national and subnational provision of services are issues that can emerge in such situations (OECD, 2008). In spite of the studies referred to above, there are still some puzzles to be solved regarding decentralization and service delivery in fragile environments. This thesis addresses the issue of the provision of services in institutional context characterized by on-going decentralization efforts and different types of power sharing mechanisms.

The Iraqi political institutions contain a number of power-sharing mechanisms, which are both formally enshrined in the Iraqi constitution and informally agreed upon by the major political parties. Examples for formal arrangements are the consociational nature of the state (McGarry & O'Leary, 2007) and the proportional representation electoral system (Al-Rikabi, 2017), whereas the rule to have a Shiite prime minister, a Kurdish president and a Sunni speaker of parliament, is an example of an informal arrangement (Public International Law & Policy Group, 2014).

Therefore it is of interest to investigate the status of decentralization and the functioning of the Iraqi political institutions, including power-sharing mechanisms, in order to assess the implications for the state's service delivery. While in stable environments the interaction between the political and administrative systems is mostly well ordered and relies on clear rules and regulations, this might not be the case in fragile states. Uncertainty about procedures, lack of information and corruption are only few of the issues with negative consequences for the link between the political and the administrative domain. Thus, the aim of this research is to develop an explanation of how decentralization and power-sharing mechanisms in the Iraqi political system are designed and how they shape the public authorities' capacity and effectiveness in delivering services in a fragile environment.

1.1 Case Selection and Relevance

The choice to examine Iraq as a case within the broader context of service delivery in fragile environments was informed on the basis of two criteria according to Blatter and Haverland (2012): *accessibility* and the *theoretical and practical relevance* of the results.

Accessibility is given due to the presence of a large number of NGOs as well as UN agencies and organisations cooperating with the US military since 2003. Hence, documents in English about the status of reconstruction efforts, project execution and other current issues are regularly published by many different organisations. Access to these sources of information is an important aspect for meaningfully answering the research questions. Despite the possibility that some documents are inaccessible because they were published in Arabic or Kurdish, the large amount of public opinion surveys and policy documents published in English by think tanks, NGOs, the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF will be sufficient for analysing the Iraqi public sector. This research also makes extensive use of works by Iraqi experts published in English.

The other aspect, namely the *relevance* of the results, arises from the current status of state-building efforts in Iraq, which was under authoritarian rule for decades and only in 2003 formally became a democracy in the aftermath of a US military intervention. The Iraqi political system is still in the transition process to converting into a functional democracy and its society is divided among many fault lines. Since the Iraqi political institutions are suffering from numerous issues typical for fragile states there are on-going efforts to stabilize them. Applying theories of power sharing, decentralization and service delivery in fragile contexts to the Iraqi case thus might be helpful for understanding the complex environment in which the state institutions act.

The results of this research will shed light on the challenges for providing public services in unstable post-conflict situations, marked by ethnic and sectarian divisions and a lack of institutional capacity. This lack of capacity both within the political and the administrative domain can potentially lead to the underprovision of services or the establishment of parallel structures (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010). The results of a case study of the Iraqi context are therefore of *theoretical relevance*, not only for Iraq itself but also for fragile states in general. Understanding how decentralization efforts and

power sharing mechanisms shape the delivery of services by public agencies in fragile environments is of great importance for creating an effective public sector capable of properly providing basic services.

The study's results are also of direct *practical relevance* for Iraqi policy making for two reasons. First, the state institutions had to retreat from parts of the country due to the presence of the so-called Islamic State (IS). This makes it necessary to completely reestablish a functioning public service delivery in the provinces where control was regained. Second, large parts of the Iraqi population are suffering from poverty, war, and displacement. Thus, in order to alleviate the effects the conflict has on those people and at the same time gain legitimacy, the Iraqi state institutions have to address their needs appropriately.

1.2 Research Questions

Decentralization and power sharing can have diverse effects on outcomes in service delivery and on general governance performance indicators (Azfar, 1999; Kahkonen 2001; Cammett & Malesky, 2012; Ahmad et al., 2005). However, the concrete form decentralization and power sharing mechanisms take is always country and context dependent. Thus, the following research question will be a guideline for developing an explanation of how service delivery functions in the context of the Iraqi political institutions:

What is the function of decentralization efforts and power sharing mechanisms within the Iraqi political institutions in shaping the delivery of basic public services since 2003?

The answer to this descriptive research question will provide an analysis of the functioning of Iraqi public authorities' service delivery within a political system marked by on-going decentralization efforts and different kinds of power sharing arrangements. In order to answer this research question, three theoretical and empirical sub research questions will be posed. For a better understanding of how the governance of the public service delivery functions this study contains an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi water sector:

- 1. What are the known forms in the academic literature in which decentralization and power sharing affect service delivery in fragile environments?***
- 2. What is the status of decentralization and of power sharing in the Iraqi political system since 2003?***
- 3. What is the status of public service delivery in Iraq since 2003, particularly in the water sector?***

In order to answer the main research question a longitudinal study will be conducted by analysing policy and legal documents as well as statistics by international organisations, think tanks, NGOs and the Iraqi government.

In order to establish the general framework of analysis for the research, this thesis will start with exploring theories of service delivery with specific attention to characteristics of fragile environments. Subsequently, theories of decentralization and power sharing and their impact on service delivery will be presented. It follows a conceptualization of the most important terms of this research. This section will provide the answer to the first sub research question by describing the positive as well as negative effects decentralized approaches to institutional design, and power sharing mechanisms within the institutions, can have on a country's governance performance in general and service delivery in particular.

The *analysis* chapter starts with a description of the Iraqi political context since 2003 and continues by analysing the country's state of fragility. The section on the general Iraqi context will be followed by an assessment of the current status of decentralization efforts, i.e. to what extent powers and responsibilities have been devolved from the central government to subnational levels. Also the formal and informal power sharing arrangements within the political and administrative institutions will be explained. The answer to the second sub research question will close this section. After having assessed the status of decentralization and power sharing mechanisms, an analysis of the country's service delivery with a particular focus on the water sector will be conducted. This analysis provides the answer for the third sub research question.

Finally, the main research question will be answered in the concluding section of this thesis. The empirical findings provided by the answers to the three sub research questions will be used for this purpose. The conclusion presents reflections for further research as well as recommendations for practice.

2 Theory

The theoretical section of this thesis starts with defining state fragility, thereby highlighting its most important aspects. After having assessed the theoretical dimension of service delivery in fragile contexts, the possible positive and negative impacts of decentralization and power sharing on service delivery are examined. This section closes with answering the first sub research question.

2.1 Fragmentation and Diffuseness of Public Institutions

In the context of this research the institutional arrangement comprises two components, which are the degree of decentralization of the institutions as well as power sharing mechanisms within them. Institutions in this case include "public organizations that stand in a special relationship to the people

they serve [,] can invoke the authority of the state and can, thereby, enforce their decisions” (Frederickson et al., 2016: 73). However, the institutions’ decisions, aims and preferences are not clearly ordered, but diffuse and fragmented. Especially in the context of post-conflict societies with unstable institutional settings, on-going decentralization efforts, and power sharing mechanisms the consequence can be unclear responsibilities and a lack of capacity, which in turn leads to an increased fragmentation of the institutional landscape. According to the Garbage Can Model, problems are steadily “flowing” into public institutions, where decision makers have to find solutions. Yet, this is not an ordered process but one of chaos in which currently available solutions are simply matched to the appearing problems. “In the absence of structural constraints, simultaneity, not means-ends sequences, determines the linkages between problems and solutions and between institutional answers and questions” (Frederickson et al., 2016: 85). Institutional answers to problems are always on an ad hoc basis, depending on the currently available solutions. Institutions that are marked by informal power sharing mechanisms such as quotas can be even more fragmented because members of different social groups have aims and preferences that are opposed to each other.

The political and administrative spheres of a country’s institutional arrangements are marked by a principal-agent relationship between elected politicians and non-elected bureaucrats. This relationship is hierarchical with the elected politicians trying to shape the context of the bureaucrats’ work in their favour by passing laws and regulations (Frederickson et al., 2016). The two premises of this theory are that there is a goal conflict between principals and agents, and that the latter have an informational advantage over their principles (Waterman & Meier, 1999). The relationship between the political principals and the administrative agents can be more complicated in contexts where decentralization is still in progress. The hierarchy between federal politicians as well as subnational politicians on the one hand and bureaucrats working in the subnational and federal ministries on the other hand might be more diffuse in a changing environment for decision making authority.

Hence, the contexts in which politicians and bureaucrats operate are not clearly ordered and the institutional preferences, aims, decisions, and relationships are characterised by diffuseness and fragmentation. In contexts of power sharing arrangements and on-going decentralization efforts the institutional setting might be even less ordered.

2.2 Service Delivery in Fragile States

The modern state has four core functions, which are security governance, political governance, socio-economic governance and administrative governance. Only a state that fulfils those core functions is seen as legitimate by its citizens. Once this is not any longer the case and one or more core functions are deficient, a state can become fragile (Hirschmann, 2016). State fragility is not an easily definable and clearly distinguishable concept. It is always context dependent and can materialize itself in many different forms. While some definitions highlight certain aspects of state fragility as essential, other definitions stress distinctive factors. According to the OECD (2007: 1) “States are fragile when

state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations”. This definition focuses on the lack of capacity or political will by states to implement policies that benefit their citizens. Although it is relatively established and accepted by most development agencies and organisations (McLoughlin, 2009) a more comprehensive definition, which also incorporates other aspects of fragility, is necessary. The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (2010: 1) defines fragile states as “states that are failing, or in danger of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive socioeconomic entitlements or governance legitimacy”. This definition again stresses the state’s failure to provide economic benefits to its citizens but at the same time adds the dimension of state legitimacy. Putzel (2010: 2) found a more concise definition declaring the key characteristic of a fragile state as its “failure [...] to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force”. As will be seen later, this aspect of state fragility is particularly applicable to Iraq where a number of irregular armed groups exercise considerable influence in parts of the country.

A number of constituting elements of state fragility crystallize from the above-presented definitions. First, a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens challenges the very foundation of the state. Second, the absence of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force may nurture violent conflicts, as non-state armed groups are less restricted to extend and retain their influence. Finally, the lack of capacity and political will of the state prevents an improvement of its citizens’ living conditions in general and economic standing in particular. The latter factor is especially important when analysing the political-administrative link of a country. A lack of capacity or political will by a state leads to either a flawed implementation of policies or even their complete absence. This situation has serious repercussions for the state’s service delivery, which becomes ineffective or is simply not present.

After having defined state fragility, the next step is to find and develop a conceptual frameworks for examining service delivery in fragile contexts. The reasons for the flawed or absent delivery of services in fragile states are manifold. Financial constraints lead to a lack of technical equipment and trained personnel, especially in the sanitation and health sectors (OECD, 2008). Also economic factors have an important role for inefficient service delivery. Among them is the restricted access to funds by individuals and organisations as well as dysfunctions in the banking systems and public finances (USAID, 2006). The results of those constraints are difficulties to finance local projects for service delivery as well as inefficient information systems that make routine tasks disproportionately expensive. Another aspect that negatively affects a country’s service delivery is corruption. As an example, it does not only lead to less investments and lower economic growth but also to decreased spending in the education sector (Mauro, 1997). Corruption can occur in the form of informal payments given in order to receive certain services much faster, or at all (Davis, 2003). Fragile states are often unable to adequately control or support service providers in order to allow for equal access of all citizens, particularly the poor (Berry et al., 2004). In those circumstances corrupt

behaviour by employees of the public sector or service providers is less likely to be detected.

Two further factors that limit the effectiveness of service delivery are longer periods of violence that lead to the destruction of equipment as well as the inaccessibility of the affected areas by the state. Vaux and Visman (2005: 10) highlighted that “service delivery is closely associated with conflict and may be one of the main causative factors in the minds of certain combatants“. Thus, conflicts in fragile environments are often about access to public services by the state. When those conflicts emerge in multi-ethnic countries it is possible that they acquire an ethnic dimension. The result can be the exclusion of parts of the population on the basis of ethnicity, sect or political affiliations (Parvanello & Darcy, 2008). Vaux and Visman gave the example of the distribution of water wells by the government in northern Nigeria and how this can lead to social tensions between different groups. The state is able to “use service delivery as a way of winning hearts and minds, or it may seek to deny such services to sections of the population that it considers troublesome“ (Vaux and Visman, 2005: 10).

To conclude, service delivery can be ineffective or absent because of economic constraints and a lack of administrative capacity as a result of state fragility. Especially the poor who are either simply disregarded or cannot afford to bribe officials in charge of service delivery suffer most from this situation. If an ethnic or religious component adds to this, large parts of the population of fragile states can be excluded from the services. Thus the universal and equitable delivery of services is often impeded. This happens because the state is unable to exercise a sufficient degree of supervision over service providers, parts of the national territory are inaccessible due to armed conflicts, or as part of a targeted policy of exclusion of social groups.

Decentralization might be an appropriate measure for mitigating the adverse effects of state fragility on service delivery. In the following section, the theoretically known advantages and disadvantages of decentralized service delivery will be described.

2.3 Decentralization and Service Delivery

Seabright (1995: 62) defined decentralization as a process in which “[...] the power to decide what a policy should be is devolved to some mechanism of local public choice in the regions and localities concerned”. In the decades since the end of the Cold War, efforts to devolve state responsibilities to lower governance levels were widespread. Especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe decentralization was part of the processes of transformation to democracy (Ahmad et al., 2005). The transfer of government functions to lower tiers occurs in different dimensions and is usually politically motivated (Azfar et al., 1999). Governments can decentralize fiscally, administratively and politically (Schneider, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2005). Those three kinds of decentralization are often not clearly distinguishable and can overlap, as some functions of one form of decentralization are necessary for other forms of decentralization to be effective. A more concrete description of the three types of decentralization will be provided in the operationalization section.

Decentralization can have a wide range of effects on a country's governance performance, thereby affecting the service delivery by public authorities directly or indirectly. There is a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature about whether the consequences of decentralization are rather positive or negative, and an assessment must be made in each individual case. However, as Bardhan (2002) has noted, a large part of the literature on decentralization focuses on the US, and thus on a country with a different institutional setting than most developing or transitioning countries. This is probably even more the case in countries that find themselves in fragile circumstances because of violence, extreme poverty and flawed state institutions. Therefore, while applying the theoretical framework to the case, one has to keep aspects of fragility in mind in order to make a meaningful analysis.

2.3.1 Effects of Decentralization on Service Delivery

In the following section the theoretically possible effects of the decentralization of political institutions on a country's service delivery will be described. Those are *allocative efficiency* of subnational governments, *electoral incentives* for politicians striving to be re-elected, possibly more or less *corruption* within the institutions and *government inefficiency*.

2.3.1.1 Allocative Efficiency

To begin with, the decentralization of a political system, and particularly of fiscal matters and service delivery, can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. Since local governments are closer to the inhabitants of the different jurisdictions, they have more complete information than a distant central government could have. Therefore, the expectation is that they are better able to adjust the delivery of public services to the demands in their locality (Goel, 2017). Another factor that increases the allocative efficiency of public services is the so-called yardstick competition between local governments and bureaucracies. This effect occurs when citizens are able to compare the performance of their local government with governments in neighbouring jurisdictions. After having evaluated their performances citizens can decide to either stay in their current jurisdiction or move in order to use the services of another, more effective local government (Tiebout, 1956; Salmon, 1987). As local governments are aware of the possibility that inhabitants, and thus taxpayers, could move to other jurisdictions, they have to provide services that match the wishes and needs of the residents, thereby increasing the overall efficiency of the national public service provision. However, the inhabitants of countries in fragile situations might face the issue of restricted mobility. In this situation, "alternative service providers such as private firms and NGOs are potentially important in providing exit options" (Azfar et al., 1999: 3).

2.3.1.2 Electoral Incentives

Another potential advantage of decentralizing service delivery is the increased electoral

accountability of local politicians as opposed to politicians of the central government.

“According to the electoral control mechanism, decentralization reduces the incentives for officials to divert rents and increases the probability of “bad” incumbents to be voted out of office, therefore affecting the overall efficiency of the government positively” (Adam et al., 2008: 4)

According to Seabright (1995), in centralized systems the electorate is not able to fully monitor government actions, resulting in a relatively low electoral accountability in comparison with a decentralized system. Even if the inhabitants of a province or locality perceive a government’s performance as disadvantageous for the own benefit they cannot directly hold it accountable. This is because the inhabitants of one jurisdiction are only part of a broader electorate composed of the inhabitants of all the other provinces and localities of a country. The politicians in the central government only need the votes of a majority of the overall constituency to be reelected (Hindrick & Lockwood, 2005). Thus, those politicians might not be tempted to act in the interest of any specific province or locality, or can even deliberately neglect a province in which the population is considered to be troublesome or just not part of the “right” ethnic or sectarian group. In a decentralized system, however, the inhabitants of a locality or province can directly decide if they reelect their government or not and have considerable influence on the outcome of elections. Subnational governments are ideally more oriented towards the interests of the subnational unit’s inhabitants because of the increased danger of being voted out of office as a consequence of a bad performance.

2.3.1.3 Corruption

Another advantage of the decentralization of political institutions in general and public service delivery in particular can be decreased corruption. Using the results of two surveys about decentralization efforts in the Philippines and Uganda, Kahkonen (2001) indicated that, although corruption is an issue on all levels of governance, it is less pronounced at the local level. However, in a highly regarded article, Treisman (2000) found that decentralized systems are more prone to corruption than centralized ones because of the absence of strict hierarchies in which officials of the central government can effectively control and reduce rent-seeking and extraction by officials on the local levels. Treisman (2000: 441) found “a reason for caution in decentralizing political power in countries at low levels of development that are vulnerable to corruption”. Yet, Fisman and Gatti (2002) criticised this finding on the ground that Treisman defined decentralization in terms of the presence or absence of federalism without having regard to the many different shapes decentralization can take. In their study on decentralization and corruption Fisman and Gatti (2002) found that adding the *federalism* variable as used by Treisman did not alter the results that more decentralization goes hand in hand with lower corruption levels. Local governments are “closer to the people” and thus the (electoral) monitoring and the government’s accountability to the jurisdiction’s inhabitants are

increased, thereby improving the politicians' performance and decreasing corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Azfar et al., 2001).

Two further potential issues of decentralizing political institutions are the danger of *overgrazing* and *elite capture*. The former means that different levels of government have the authority to regulate the same companies, which then have to pay more bribes in return for facilitated regulation processes (Treisman, 2000). This can be especially problematic for private firms that want to invest in the affected country, and can potentially decrease the inflow of foreign direct investments. The second potential issue is the capture of subnational institutions by local elites, leading to the diversion of resources towards their benefit at the expense of the non-elite inhabitants of a jurisdiction (Shah & Thompson, 2004). According to Bardhan and Mokherjee (2000), the lower the level of government, the more prone are the institutions to capture by local elites. Also a high level of ethnic, sectarian or any other form of heterogeneity increases the possibility of such a situation to occur (Bardhan 2000).

2.3.1.4 Government Inefficiency

Stein (1998) conducted a study of decentralization efforts in Latin America. He found that although decentralization brings the government closer to the people and thus improves public service delivery according to the citizens' demands, the state tends to be inflated in such systems. The more decentralized a country, the bigger the government, since positive effects from economies of scale in centralized systems disappear. Thus, one could conclude that more decentralization leads to less government efficiency. However, Stein (1998: 20) highlighted the possibility that "because local governments can be trusted to deliver public goods that are more in line with voter preferences, they are given more resources to manage. Hence, this result per se is no indication of inefficiency".

Not only a bigger government, and thus higher costs for running it, but also the inability to coordinate services on the different governance levels can have a negative effect on a country's service delivery performance (Treisman, 2000). This applies particularly to policy areas in which local and central governments have shared competences, such as education services (Shah & Thompson, 2004). Especially in developing or fragile states confusion about the responsibilities of each level can occur, which can then lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in the policy areas in question. Adding up to this issue comes that central governments usually have the advantage of attracting more qualified personnel than subnational governments, since they offer better career opportunities and tasks with less political intervention. Not only do they have better trained personnel, but also because of their size, central governments are often better able to improve their capacities through investments in technological innovations and research than smaller subnational governments (Prud'homme, 1995).

2.4 Power Sharing and Service Delivery

Power sharing agreements based on elite pacts of major social factions, which are divided along

sectarian, tribal or ethnic lines are common practice in post-conflict societies in order to prevent a new outbreak of violence (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Lijphardt (2012) described the “consensus” model of democracy, in which large majorities that include a wide range of groups are necessary for forming governments. Although the impact of diverse forms of power sharing mechanisms and agreements on service delivery has not been studied much some authors have published empirical and theoretical works on this topic (Cammett & Malesky, 2012; LeVan, 2011; Horowitz, 2014). According to those works power sharing influences service delivery rather indirectly by affecting the overall governance performance.

There is some reason to believe that governments of national unity, i.e. governments that comprise parties of all important societal groups, significantly slow down the legislative process and can even lead to policy stalemates and gridlocks as a wide range of, often conflicting, interests has to be accommodated (LeVan, 2011; Horowitz, 2014). This can potentially have indirect repercussions for the effectiveness of the service delivery since necessary public sector reforms and other legislative projects for improving the service delivery get stuck in the legislative process. Especially in fragile countries that have urgent needs for infrastructural improvements and the enhancement of public sector efficiency, this can be an obstacle to the economic development.

Another aspect of power sharing mechanisms, though often rather informal, can be quotas for public offices on the basis of sectarian or ethnic affiliations (Lijphardt, 1996). To our knowledge there are no works on the impact of political quotas on service delivery in Iraq. However, there is some literature on the effects of ethnic quotas on political mobilization and resource distribution by the state in other contexts. Two examples from research conducted in India shall serve here to highlight the mixed results. According to Duflo (2005) ethnic quotas can lead to the allocation of goods in favour of the ethnic kin of public officials who came into office thanks to those quotas. Yet, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) state exactly the opposite, as they did not find any evidence for preferential treatment of kin groups by officials. Thus, results regarding the preferential treatment of social groups by politicians and bureaucrats who came into office thanks to quotas are not clear.

One can expect that employment on the basis of sectarian affiliation or patronage networks instead of merit can lead to a lower quality of personnel on all levels, and thus to a lower governance performance. Planning and executing projects can become more inefficient since parts of the ministry staffs are only to a limited extent capable of adequately fulfilling their tasks due to a lack of formal education or management skills. Cammett and Malesky (2012) pointed out that such quotas can lead to administrative inefficiency as different social groups can use ministries controlled by them to block policies they perceive as disadvantageous.

Studying the case of Kenya, LeVan (2011) indicated some potentially negative effects of political inclusion in the form of grand coalition governments that include all major social groups. First, decreased vertical accountability as a consequence of the incapability of citizens to reward or punish politicians through electoral means as well as the difficulty to attribute responsibility for

certain policies to politicians or parties in a grand coalition. Second, in order to sustain power sharing agreements and thus social peace, elites divert resources through patronage networks, which significantly increases the government's budgetary spending. LeVan (2011: 41) connects to this point by stating that power sharing is "[...] resource distribution rather than an aggregating device for formulating a shared policy agenda".

In an empirical study Cammett and Malesky (2012) found that the aspect of power sharing mechanisms that influences the governance performance most is the electoral system. Closed-list proportional representation systems, in which citizens vote for parties as a whole instead of for individual politicians, have a positive influence on a number of governance indicators. This is because lower incentives to rely on personalistic campaigns make parties and coalitions stronger. One can "[...] expect more programmatic party politics and consequently a higher likelihood of public goods expenditures over particularistic benefits" (Cammett and Malesky, 2012: 988).

There is not much literature on the impact of formal and informal power sharing mechanisms on a country's service delivery. However, the few works that have been published (LeVan, 2011; Horowitz, 2014; Cammett & Malesky, 2012) imply a rather negative effect due to the necessity to accommodate a wide range of interests in the political process. The potential consequences of this can range from slowed down legislative processes to undermined relationships of accountability between citizens and politicians, and to a decreased overall administrative efficiency.

3 Conceptual framework

The main concepts of this research are *fiscal decentralization*, *administrative decentralization*, *political decentralization*, *power sharing* and *service delivery*. The design of a country's institutional arrangements is usually determined by law, particularly the constitution. In ethnically heterogeneous societies the bodies in charge of drafting the constitution often choose power sharing approaches so that one social group is not able to dominate the others. This is reflected in political institutions that are not characterized by simple majoritarian approaches but by the constant need to create coalitions across political parties in order to achieve policy goals. Another important choice to be taken for the design of political institutions is whether they should be centralized, and thus located at one specific locality, or decentralized, which implies the existence of a number of power centers across a country. The impact of decentralization on service delivery is a widely studied field, while the implications of power sharing have been studied with a focus on the overall governance performance.

All three forms of decentralization need to have a somewhat advanced status so that local or provincial institutions have autonomy in effectively providing services. When this is not the case and subnational entities have only limited autonomy, one can expect that elite power sharing arrangements in fragile environments further undermine the institutions' accountability and responsiveness to the citizens. Those kinds of arrangements in flawed institutional settings, where the political and the

administrative sphere are not clearly separated, potentially enable parties to take control of state institutions on all governance levels. This in turn allows party elites to distribute state resources for their individualistic purposes, and even slow down the process of decentralization itself so as to retain their powers. Thus, the service delivery performance by public institutions would suffer from such a situation.

3.1 Fiscal decentralization

An important aspect of the decentralization of government functions is the transfer of fiscal responsibilities to lower governance levels. Subnational governments and also private organisations are able to fulfil their obligations adequately when they have a certain degree of fiscal autonomy (World Bank, 2001). Sufficient revenues allow for taking decisions on expenditures for programmes and projects necessary for local or regional development. Fiscal decentralization can take several forms, in which local governments either raise taxes by themselves or receive shares of the central government's revenues.

Fiscal decentralization rests on four main pillars (Feruglio, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez, 1999; McLure & Martinez-Vazquez, 2000). First, the *assignment of expenditure responsibilities*, meaning the allocation of expenditure responsibilities and obligations to sub-national governments according to the functional competences of each governance level. Second, the *allocation of revenue sources*, i.e. the decision from which sources the national and subnational governments receive their revenues. Third, the *design of intergovernmental transfers*, which is necessary since often the available revenues of local and regional governments do not match the expenditure pressures. Finally, the *structuring of subnational borrowing and debt*, which is necessary for determining a subnational government's capacity to borrow either directly from capital markets or through the central government as an intermediary.

3.2 Administrative Decentralization

Administrative decentralization means the devolution of government responsibilities regarding the authority to plan and implement policies, and manage the own staffing resources (Schneider, 2003). Rondinelli (1981) categorized administrative decentralization into three forms, which can be seen as "points along a continuum of administrative autonomy" (Schneider, 2003: 38): *deconcentration*, *delegation* and *devolution*.

Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralization and means the simple transfer of administrative work from central ministries and agencies to regional and local offices. Those offices are in a hierarchical relationship with the central government and their staffs merely carry out tasks assigned to them, thus having no discretion. Yet, Rondinelli (1981: 137) saw the "shifting of workload from central government ministry headquarters to staff located in offices outside of the national capital" as a stepping stone of centralized governments in developing countries towards more

decentralization. *Delegation* comes closer to real decentralization, as responsibilities and competences for planning and implementing specific policies are devolved to subnational authorities and organisations, which are not directly controlled by the central government but stand in a contractual accountability relationship to the latter. The agencies that receive authority have the technical capacity to plan and implement specific projects and programmes. Finally, *devolution* means the transfer of government functions to public agencies, which are part of the governmental structures but enjoy considerable degrees of autonomy. Their legal status explicitly grants them governance functions within clearly delineated geographical areas. The relationship between those jurisdictional units and the central government is neither hierarchical nor contractual but a reciprocal one, as both are part of a country's political system (Rondinelli et al., 1983).

3.3 Political Decentralization

Schneider (2003) describes political decentralization in the terms of representation of interests vis-à-vis the state institutions. The different “systems of representation [e.g. through political parties] are bound by the institutions of the state itself, which sets the rules for representation and thus shapes what issues get politicized and how” (Schneider, 2003: 39). Local elections are the means through which citizens can articulate their locally defined interests and demands, and thus constitute the key factor of politically decentralized systems. Rodden (2004) supports this point by highlighting regional and local elections as the defining factor of political decentralization. Additionally, “popular elected officials have higher levels of policy autonomy than appointed officials and preside over larger shares of the public expenditure” (Rodden, 2004: 488). This point again reveals the interrelationship between the three different forms of decentralization.

Treisman (2007) published a more detailed classification of political decentralization separating it into three different forms. First, *decisionmaking decentralization*, which is present when subnational governments have the competence to make decisions in certain policy areas. Second, *appointment decentralization*, meaning a decentralized system in which subnational officials are elected through popular vote by the inhabitants of a jurisdiction. Third, *constitutional decentralization*, i.e. decentralized political systems in which lower tier institutions can influence decisions of the central government through veto-powers and other means. Thus, although not its only characteristic, subnational elections are an important indicator of political decentralization.

3.4 Power Sharing

Power sharing democracies are based on nonmajoritarian, formal and informal arrangements of social elites that guarantee inclusion into the political process. Power sharing (or consociational) mechanisms have several key characteristics, including large coalitions (or “governments of national unity”), reservations and quotas for public offices, a wide range of veto rights as well as a certain

degree of group autonomy for minorities (Lijphardt, 2012; Cammet and Malesky, 2012). Ethnically heterogeneous countries find themselves in different contexts with different institutional backgrounds. Different aspects according to the individual situation can be picked out of the broad menu of possible power sharing approaches. Thus, each country has a mix of arrangements in order to share power. Depending on the situation in a country it might be better to have informal power sharing agreements between elites, such as reservations for political posts or quotas in order to preserve peace, or rather rely on formal power sharing mechanisms, such as federalism or veto rights in the political system.

3.5 Public Service Delivery

Public service delivery is one of the most important functions of the modern state. It is the provision of basic services by state institutions. This can include health services, education, water and sanitation services, garbage collection and electricity. As explained in the theory section, the delivery of those services is much more complicated in fragile environments, which are marked by violence, uncertainty and the public institutions' lack of capacity (OECD, 2008). Those institutions have changing and inconsistent preferences for action (Frederickson et al., 2016), which, in the Iraqi context, can potentially be shaped by tribal, ethnic or sectarian elites.

Answer to the First Sub Research Question

What are the known forms in the academic literature in which decentralization and power sharing affect service delivery in fragile environments?

A country's institutional design consists of various components that constitute the framework for national political, administrative and economic processes. Two of those components are the degree of decentralization of the institutions and the power sharing mechanisms within those institutions. Both can affect a country's service delivery in different ways.

According to the academic literature, decentralization has a number of theoretical effects on a country's primary service delivery. Since decentralized institutions are closer to the people they ought to serve, they allow for an informational advantage over centralised institutions and thus increase the allocative efficiency of public services. However, the public sector efficiency can generally be reduced as a result of its extension. This results in higher operating costs adding up to a lack of coordination of services by a central agency. Another potential positive effect is that, given a certain degree of political decentralization, politicians' accountability to the citizens increases. As the inhabitants of local jurisdictions are able to reward or punish their politicians, the latter constantly have to assure a sufficient level of support through citizen-oriented policies. In addition to that, decentralization can have diverse effects on corruption. On the one hand it is possible that increased electoral monitoring and accountability reduce corruption, and on the other hand a lack of central control can lead to bribe extraction on various levels ("overgrazing") and to the capture of the political institutions by local

elites keen to safeguard their position. Yet, whether decentralized service delivery brings more advantages or disadvantages, and thus is successful or not, always depends on the social and political context of a country.

Although a rather understudied field, power-sharing mechanisms also potentially have a number of effects on service delivery, though often rather indirectly. First, the presence of grand coalitions with parties representing all major social groups can lead to policy gridlock. Second, quotas for public offices based on ethnic or sectarian affiliation can lead to a decreased administrative efficiency as ministries controlled by different social groups can block each other. Collaboration or alliances across ethnic and sectarian lines are possible in countries depending on the size and political and economic significance of the groups vis-à-vis the rest of the population (Posner, 2004). However, the implications of such alliances for a countries service delivery have, to our knowledge, not been studied. Another possible effect of public sector quotas for social groups is that bureaucrats who were employed on the basis of social belonging instead of professional qualification or merit are less efficient. Results are mixed regarding preferential treatment of ethnic kin by public officials employed on the basis of quotas. Fourth, closed-list proportional representation electoral systems lead to a better governance performance than open-list proportional representation systems as the focus shifts to parties and their programmes instead of individual politicians' achievements, which in turn increases the universal spending on public goods.

4 Data & Documents

In order to examine the current situation in Iraq it is necessary to make a secondary data analysis of a wide range of policy documents, data and statistics, surveys and opinion polls as well as technical and project reports. For that purpose, extensive use will be made of documents by international organisations, development assistance organisations, think tanks and the Iraqi government. The criteria for the selection of those documents are the credibility of the publishing organisations as well as the quantity of in-depth information relevant for the topic of this thesis. Therefore, also works of Iraqi sources will be taken into account, which provide an emic and potentially more informed viewpoint on certain issues. This approach is complemented by making use of the snowballing effect, i.e. searching for further relevant sources among the references of the studied documents, thereby enabling the researcher to obtain a picture as complete as possible. Also the national legal framework, which determines the setting in which decentralization, power sharing and service delivery take place has to be taken into account. Thus, an in-depth analysis of the relevant legislation as well as constitutional stipulations is necessary. Tables 1 to 4 in the appendix present a list of the policy documents used for the analysis of this thesis.

4.1 Methodology

This longitudinal study examines service delivery in Iraq from 2003 to 2018 by applying a process tracing approach, which means “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011: 823). The relationship between the main concepts *decentralization* and *power sharing* as well as *service delivery* will be gradually assessed by answering the empirical sub research questions and finally the main research question. To do so, this study makes use of the *analytic induction* method according to Patton (2002). It will assess to what extent predictions materialize in practice that have been derived from the theory on decentralization and power sharing as well as their influence on service delivery.

In addition to Blatter and Haverland’s criteria (2002), the choice to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi case was motivated by the country’s difficult environment for service delivery as a consequence of state fragility, which makes it an extreme case in reference to Seawright and Gerring’s case study typology (2008). Large parts of the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of the institutional design on service delivery published so far focus on functional institutional environments, while the Iraqi context is unstable.

As a starting point, the analysis section begins with a short introduction into the political and societal background of Iraq since the US invasion in 2003, followed by a description of the causes and consequences of state fragility in Iraq. This part serves as the background for better understanding the context in which power sharing and decentralization in Iraq takes place. It follows an analysis of the extent to which the political system has been decentralized so far as well as of formal and informal power sharing agreements. After having assessed the state of fragility, decentralization efforts and power sharing mechanisms in Iraq, the answer to the second sub-research question will follow: *What is the status of decentralization and of power sharing in the Iraqi political system since 2003?*

The next section will be devoted to service delivery in Iraq. By making use of a range of in-depth analyses of the Iraqi public sector, it is possible to assess the current state of service delivery as well as the challenges and issues the public sector in general is facing. This section closes by answering the third sub-research question: *What is the status of public service delivery in Iraq since 2003, particularly in the water sector?*

Finally, the results of the former chapters will be jointly assessed in the concluding part of the analysis so as to answer the main research question of this thesis: *What is the function of decentralization efforts and power sharing mechanisms within the Iraqi political institutions in shaping the delivery of basic public services since 2003?*

In the course of this research the *bias* threat to validity can occur (Maxwell, 2009). It is defined as the distortion of “data collection or analysis [...] by the researcher’s theory, values, or preconceptions” (Maxwell, 2009: 243). It is possible that the theoretical lens through which this work approaches the topic as well as certain preconceived opinions or ideas the author holds about the

research influence the way in which documents are analysed. During the process of data collection two strategies for countering this validity threat will be applied as proposed by Maxwell (2009). First, searching for discrepant data so as to find evidence that does not support expectations about the topic. By thoroughly analysing both supporting and divergent data it will be less likely that results going against certain preconceptions are ignored. Second, applying the *triangulation* strategy, meaning the collection of data and information from a great variety of sources. This includes the use of qualitative and quantitative data on service delivery and governance performance indicators of Iraqi public institutions.

5 Analysis

The following section will analyse the Iraqi context based on the theoretical framework as developed before. It starts with a brief description of political developments in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003, followed by an assessment of the country's fragile context. Subsequently, an analysis of decentralization efforts, power sharing mechanisms, and the country's service delivery follows, concluding with the answer to the second sub research question.

5.1 The Iraqi Context since 2003

Iraq stretches from the desert of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the south to the mountains of Kurdistan in the north, and from the edges of the Iranian plateau in the east to the Syrian and Jordanian deserts in the west. It is a country that borders three regional powers, namely Turkey and the two theocracies Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, which are bitter rivals. With a population of about 39 million, and approximately 29-34 per cent Sunnis and 64-69 per cent Shiites (CIA Factbook, 2017), Iraq is central to their struggle for regional hegemony. However, Iraq is not only divided along sectarian, but also along ethnic lines. The Kurds, who make up 15-20 per cent of the Iraqi population, live in the country's north in a polity with extensive autonomy. Ethnic Arabs constitute 75-80 per cent of the population and the remaining 5 per cent are composed of Turkmen, Yazidis and other smaller ethnic groups (CIA Factbook, 2017).

Iraq became a democracy only recently after it was liberated from Saddam Hussein's 24 years lasting authoritarian rule in 2003 by the forces of the so-called Coalition of the Willing led by the US. Before the invasion, the Iraqi nationalist Baath party, which was led by Saddam Hussein and composed of members of the Iraqi Sunni minority, exclusively oriented towards the interests of that part of the population. The other two main segments of the Iraqi population, Kurds and Shiites, were completely disregarded by the state. This disregard did not only materialize itself in the form of discrimination and exclusion from the political process, but also in the form of brutal and targeted

violence (just two examples are the *Anfal* campaign against the Kurds from 1986-89 and the draining of the marshes of southern Iraq that were inhabited by Shiite Arab tribes).

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), installed by the US and its allies, was quick in completely dismantling the authoritarian structures, including the security sector. This process was termed De-Ba'athification, as it mainly aimed at high-ranking public officials and military figures affiliated to the Ba'ath party. Yet, by doing so, the complete state structures were removed and in addition to polarizing the Sunni-Shia divide it also led to the subsequent instability of the government and security forces (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Following the unravelling of existing structures, the CPA adopted the "Transitional Law" in the beginning of 2004 in order to allow for a transition to a free-market democracy. In December 2005 a committee of the National Assembly, which had been elected shortly before and served as an interim parliament, drafted the new Iraqi constitution. Its aim was to accommodate the country's communities and allow for participation in the political process by all ethnic and sectarian groups (McGarry & O'Leary, 2007). However, as a consequence of the US administration's sectarian paradigm of Iraq, and the resulting policies in the time between the invasion and the election of the National Assembly (which was largely boycotted by Sunnis), sectarian identities gained importance and thus sectarian parties won most of the votes (Al-Tikriti, 2008). This situation laid the foundations for a politicization of sectarian identities in the very beginning of the existence of the new, democratic Iraqi state (Cammett, 2013), which culminated in a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis from 2006 to 2008. Also the surge of the IS in 2014 and the ease with which it occupied large swaths of mainly Sunni-inhabited Iraqi territory, including its third largest city Mosul, can be explained by discrimination and neglect at the hands of the Shiite-dominated central government (Bahney & Johnston, 2017).

5.2 From an Authoritarian to a Fragile State

Although Iraq is a formally democratic country since the Baath regime was overthrown in 2003, it is still characterized as a *hybrid regime* without fully developed democratic institutions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Contributing to this assessment is that Iraq finds itself in a fragile situation (Marshal & Elzinga-Marshall, 2016). One can derive three theoretical dimensions from the definitions of state fragility presented in the theoretical section. Those are a low overall state legitimacy, a lack over the legitimate use of force in parts of the country as well as a lack of political will or state capacity to improve the citizens' economic conditions.

One of the main pillars of an effective and stable state is that the citizens living in its jurisdiction see its rule as legitimate. However, in the Iraqi case this is not given for large parts of the population, especially in the country's Kurdistan region and the western, Sunni-inhabited provinces. Those groups fear the dominance of the state institutions and thus state-sanctioned discrimination by the Shiite majority. In western Iraq and the Kurdistan region 52 per cent and 47 per cent respectively blame former Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's sectarian rule as the reason for the rise of IS

(Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2017). Also under the Shiite Prime Minister from 2014 Haider al-Abadi, whose rule was not characterized by such an extent of sectarianism as al-Maliki's, Kurds and Sunnis did not feel fairly represented by the central government, whereas Shiites did (GQR, 2015). Moreover, Sunnis and Kurds question the army as a symbol of national unity, since 58 per cent and 60 per cent respectively see it as solely representing the Shia majority (GQR, 2017). Finally, the voter turnout in the most recent 2018 national elections was at only 44,5 per cent, which is the lowest value since Iraq became a democracy in 2003 (Alaaldin, 2018). This last point shows that although growing disillusionment with the political system and the resulting lack of state legitimacy is more widespread among Kurds and Sunnis, it seems to be a phenomenon present among the whole of the Iraqi population, including the Shiites.

In addition to a lack of legitimacy, the Iraqi state is partly not capable of effectively enforcing its monopoly over the legitimate use of force in its entire territory. After the security services had been dismantled by the CPA in 2003, sectarian militias filled the vacuum and thus became the de facto security sector in many cities and villages (Boduszyński, 2016). Especially since the fight against IS began, those militias (which are mainly Shiite) gained power as a result of being put under the umbrella of the so-called *Popular Mobilization Forces* (PMU), from then on receiving official support by the state. However, since the militias are now regulated by law a complete disarmament and reintegration into society as well as a moderation of their particular subnationalisms is more difficult (O'Driscoll & Van Zoonen, 2017). Thus, although IS is almost defeated the reestablishment of the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force in parts of the country will be a difficult and prolonged process.

The third dimension of state fragility, which is the political will and state capacity to improve the living conditions of the citizens, is also partly given in Iraq. The state suffers from high corruption and damaged infrastructures as a result of violent conflicts (Bertelsmann, 2016). The public sector capacity is generally low because of inefficient staffing, an incomplete legal framework for public administration as well as redundant administrative structures and unclear responsibilities (Taylor, 2011). It is difficult to determine the presence or absence of the political willingness to improve the situation for certain social groups. However, when looking at Sunni and Kurdish perceptions of the government it becomes clear that the majority does not feel adequately represented (GQR, 2015). Sunni displeasure with the political realities became apparent when protests broke out in the region Anbar in 2013 and a high-profile Sunni politician announced that Sunnis demanded a federal region with autonomy rights in Iraq (Alkifaey, 2016). Things did not get better with the resignation of al-Maliki who was known for his politics of sectarianism. In 2015, one year after the change of government, 60 per cent of the Sunnis said that the government of al-Abadi was equally or less inclusive than that of al-Maliki (GQR, 2017). This seems to suggest that Sunnis feel a general aversion towards Shiite politicians and parties in power. Since all the major Iraqi political parties are sectarian, politicians continuously strive to gain votes from their respective sect. As a consequence of this,

disproportionately favouring the own sectarian or ethnic kin at the expense of other groups becomes the norm. Politicians are able to dominate the institutions by solely garnering support among their kin groups through the use of state resources, and do not have to pay attention to other social groups for being re-elected.

5.3 Decentralization in Iraq

Before the overthrow of the Baath regime in 2003, the Iraqi state was highly centralized. Governors of the provinces were appointed by the central government and their main task was to exercise control over the population and sporadically put down revolts (Baram, 2003). Thus, one of the first tasks of the CPA was to lay the foundation of a subsequent dispersion of authority and power. Article 4 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) stated that the powers should be divided between the federal government and subnational entities (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004). In addition to that, the CPA issued Order 71, which filled the vague provisions of Article 4 of the TAL with more concrete specifications of how the decentralization of political powers should take place.

In 2005 the new Iraqi constitution came into effect by referendum and thereby replaced the CPA legal acts. Ten articles of the constitution (Article 116-125) regulate the subnational structure of the political system. The two main entities below the central government are *regions* and *governorates not incorporated in a region* (or provinces). Of the former, until now only the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) came into existence, which is composed of the governorates Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Halabja. Although the KRG does not have responsibilities in the fields of foreign policy and national security, it enjoys extensive competences regarding public service delivery, except for water, education and health, where competences are shared with the Iraqi central government (Cravens, 2011). The federal nature of Iraq, as stated in Article 1 of the constitution, counts only towards regions, and thus, until now only towards the KRG. Regarding the governorates, Iraq is still a unitary state (Cravens, 2011). However, according to Article 119, two or more governorates can merge in order to form a region after having a popular vote through referendum. The layer below the regions and governorates are the *districts*, which represent the municipal or local level, but are only a deconcentrated branch of the central Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MoMPW) (World Bank, 2016). Finally, according to Article 124, the mayoralty of Baghdad (officially *Amanat*) has a special status, representing a governorate on its own without the possibility to merge with other governorates. Hence, the Iraqi political system is composed of four governance systems, which are the central government and regional governments, governorates, districts and the *Amanat* of Baghdad (Cravens & Brinkerhoff, 2013). *Figure 1* in the appendix shows a map of the Iraqi governorates including the KRG.

In 2008 the *Council of Representatives* (COR), which is the Iraqi national parliament, passed the law *The Provinces not Associated in a Region* (hereinafter referred to as *Law 21*), which further defined responsibilities and competences of the 15 governorates outside the KRG (the status of the

sixteenth governorate Kirkuk is still disputed). Within those governorates, the provincial councils are the highest legislative entities. Yet, in accordance with the subordination principle, legislative acts issued by the councils cannot contradict federal law in an exclusive area of competence of the federal government or the constitution, which have a higher position in the hierarchy of norms (Constitution of Iraq, 2005; Law 21, 2008). Apart from legislative acts, the provincial councils have to elect the governors, and jointly work on provincial budgets, which have to be coordinated with the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (Law 21, 2008). At the next lower level, the district councils have the competence to make budget plans and organize some local services (Law 21, 2008). Nevertheless, unlike provincial councils, district councils are not elected by citizens (World Bank, 2016). After years without progress, the COR passed a major amendment of Law 21 in 2013. The changes included a further formalization of the budget allocation mechanism by the central government according to the governorates' needs. Furthermore, governorate incomes stemming from investment projects, taxes and fines as well as sales of state property were more clearly defined, and a mechanism, which provides an allocation of 5% of the revenue of each barrel of crude oil produced within the jurisdiction of a governorate, was established (World Bank 2016).

In spite of the formal legislative acts governing the affairs of the subnational entities there are still some issues for decentralizing the political processes and institutions. As a consequence of differing interpretations of provisions from Law 21, confusions over the distribution of competences between provincial council members and staff from the regional departments of central ministries emerged (Cravens & Brinkerhoff, 2013). While the central government highlighted the term "administrative decentralization", which would effectively mean the simple deconcentration of the federal ministries' staffs and tasks, provincial councils stressed that they were the "highest legislative authority" in the provinces (Ottaway & Kaysi, 2012). In this sense, the central government retains the upper hand and provincial councils as well as the elected governors do not have much power. The departments at the provincial and local levels are staffed and controlled by their central ministry equivalents, hence curbing the governorates' authority. It remains to be seen whether this situation changes in the future since the 2013 amendment of Law 21 foresees the devolution of tasks and competences of eight federal ministries, a process which is still under way (World Bank, 2016).

Until 2018, elections for the provincial councils have taken place three times. The first time was in January 2005 before the new constitution was drafted. However, the governorate elections in 2009 and 2013 were the first to take place under Law 21, and thus in a more established context for subnational governance. As on the federal level, the major parties in the governorate elections were of sectarian nature and had close ties to their national counterparts. Exemplifying for those connections was a trade-off, in which Prime Minister al-Maliki offered a competitor's party the governorship of the Maysan governorate in exchange for supporting his bid for a second term as Prime Minister (Wicken, 2012). In the last governorate elections in 2013, parties that campaigned with local issues

had only relatively small gains, while sectarian and (Kurdish) ethnic parties gained the majority of seats (Ali, 2013).

Although the governorates are dependent on the MoF for receiving their budgets, they are a step closer to fiscal independence after the amendment of Law 21. Still, the governorates' spending constituted only 5.3 per cent of the overall recurrent government spending in Iraq in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Even with this small amount of spending the provincial councils and governors have very little discretion due to the requirement to coordinate their budgets with the MoF. While the deconcentrated departments have to submit requests to their parent ministries, which subsequently accumulate and forward them to the MoF, provincial councils and governors have to send requests directly. This process leads to a disadvantageous position for governorate governments vis-à-vis the deconcentrated ministry departments (Cravens & Brinkerhoff, 2013). Further exacerbating the dependence of the governorates on the MoF is that the allocation of funds for the governorate investment budgets is on an ad hoc basis and does not function with a fixed mechanism. Once governorates raise taxes, fees or other sources of local funding, in accordance with the 2013 amendment of Law 21, they suffer budget allocation reductions from the central government. Yet, while income from oil makes up 70 per cent of the overall budget of the Iraqi government, revenues from other sources constitute only 30 per cent, of which taxes contribute approximately half (World Bank, 2016). Hence, although the fiscal decentralization is in progress, governorates are still restricted in their budgetary choices.

5.4 Power Sharing in Iraq

Power sharing mechanisms in Iraq are both formal and informal. The former are most clearly visible in the constitution, which allows for a dispersion of powers across various institutions. One of the most salient aspects in this regard is the federal nature of the Iraqi state (although only vis-à-vis regions and not governorates). This federalism comes with a certain degree of flexibility since until now only one subnational, federal unit exists, and the inhabitants of the governorates are formally free to decide if they want to merge in order to form a distinct region. Those regions in turn enjoy the freedom to decide how federal legislation in areas of shared competences should be implemented, as well as to potentially give up their powers to the federal government after a council vote and referendum (Constitution of Iraq, 2005). Thus, formal power sharing in the Iraqi constitution has been labelled "liberal consociationalism" (McGarry & O'Leary, 2007) as it leaves subnational units flexibility and the inhabitants freedom in deciding their political fate. This is especially important since some parts of the population favour the option of centralized governance from Baghdad over more decentralization. For 49 per cent of all Iraqis (and noticeably 80 per cent of the Kurds) it is "very" or "somewhat" important that political authority gets decentralized, whereas 51 per cent prefer centralized governance (GQR, 2015). While the constitution permits the inhabitants of different

governorates to decide how they are governed, it does only allow for interference in regional affairs by the central government after explicit consent through provincial council vote and referendum.

Another important determining factor of power sharing in Iraq is the proportional representation electoral system. The direct transfer of votes into parliamentary seats leads to a fragmented party constellation and thus induces cooperation across party – and often sectarian – boundaries. This system has a high chance of leading to coalition governments composed of parties with diverging interests. Those interests have to be accommodated and parties need to share powers in the government, e.g. through the distribution of certain ministries. The direct representation of citizens' votes is also in conformity with the constitutional requirement that all social groups are represented in the legislative branch of the political system (Constitution of Iraq, 2005). Hence, the representation of the interests of smaller ethnic groups in parliament is facilitated. In addition to being based on proportional representation, the Iraqi electoral system is characterized by semi-open lists in which citizens have to vote for parties and individual candidates on the party lists since the parliamentary elections in 2010 in order to make politicians more loyal to their voters than to the party (Al-Rikabi, 2017).

Power sharing mechanisms in Iraq do not only exist formally but also informally. First, until now all governments included elements of the three biggest social groups, which are the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias. Moreover, the three highest positions to be elected by the COR are split up among those groups. The Prime Minister is a Shiite, the Speaker of Parliament a Sunni and the Presidency, which is a rather ceremonial position, is occupied by a Kurd (Public International Law & Policy Group, 2014). Those posts are assigned two deputies, each from one of the other major social groups (Ltaif, 2015). Second, in line with the communalist and confessionalist approach to the consociational democracy in Iraq, the staffing of the civil service is determined by an informal quota system, called *muhassasa*, which allocates positions according to the ethnic or sectarian affiliation (Ghanim, 2011). Even whole ministries are “reserved” for certain sectarian groups, an example for which is the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which has been under Shia control since 2006. The allocation of some ministries to certain groups has become so established “that they are seen as ‘owning’ the institution, and fiercely oppose any policies that might threaten their position” (Boduscyński, 2016). Abdullah (2017: 101) cites an retired Iraqi official of Shia sectarian belonging with the words “The problem in Iraq is that when a minister takes his/her job, s/he starts to change the entire ministry into his/her party i.e. the ministry of industry and mining over the last few years”. Also smaller minorities such as Turkmen, Yazidis and Christians fall under the communalist system, though they do not benefit from the quota system. Those groups have 8 reserved seats in parliament (Castellino & Cavanaugh, 2013) and Article 125 of the constitution grants them educational, administrative, political, cultural rights.

Answer to the Second Sub Research Question

What is the status of decentralization and power sharing in the Iraqi political system since 2003?

The Iraqi political-institutional arrangement consists of four governance systems: the central government and regional governments, governorates, municipalities and the *Amanat* of Baghdad. Regions are the only subnational units in a federal relationship with the Iraqi central state. Although two or more governorates can form a region after a popular referendum, until now only the KRG region came into existence. The 15 governorates that are not integrated into a region still do not have enough authority so as to speak of an advanced decentralization of the political system. Thus, although the legal framework provides for formal decentralization, in reality the Iraqi political institutions are still highly centralized and the decentralization of political institutions and processes evolves slowly (World Bank, 2016). This becomes especially clear when looking at the local level, where the municipalities do not have any autonomy at all and are merely deconcentrated branches of the MoMPW.

Of the three forms of decentralization, administrative decentralization has mainly taken place in the form of deconcentration. Every ministry has branches in the governorates, which exercise control over their respective areas of competence on the provincial level. Those regional offices are in a hierarchical relationship vis-à-vis the ministries, and due to unclear provisions in the relevant laws they engage in continuous turf wars with the local and provincial councils and governors, which in turn restricts the latter in exercising more authority over issues regarding their jurisdiction (Cravens & Brinkerhoff, 2013).

Also in the fiscal dimension, the Iraqi political system is still highly centralized. Investment budgets are almost exclusively allocated by the MoF and also the governorates' budgets have to be coordinated with the ministry. An example for the broad powers of the central government is the budget cut for the KRG. Revenues transferred were traditionally at 17 per cent (El Meehy, 2017) but in the most recent budget (after the unconstitutional referendum for independence within the KRG) the budget was cut to an unspecified percentage proportional to the KRG's population (Aboulenein & Rasheed, 2018). Considering that governorates are much less autonomous than regions, it is likely that the federal government in general and the MoF in particular have more authority and can easier control the provincial budgets.

In spite of the fiscal centralization three of the four aspects of fiscal decentralization have been partly fulfilled. First, as described above, currently eight ministries are in the process of being devolved to the provincial level, thus bringing more expenditure responsibilities to the provincial level. Until now governorates are responsible for planning and executing projects and have their own separate budget stream apart from the central ministries (Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013). Since the spending of governorates makes up approximately 5 per cent of the overall recurrent spending of the Iraqi state, the extent of the governorate's *expenditure responsibilities* is rather low. Second, the *allocation of revenue sources* has been better specified with the amendment of Law 21 in 2015.

Because of low tax revenues, the most important source of income for the governorates are profits from oil, with 5\$ for each drilled or processed barrel being transferred to the governorates. Third, *intergovernmental transfers* have been more formalized since the amendment of Law 21. Nevertheless they are still negotiated and on an ad hoc basis. Fourth, a *structuring of sub-national borrowing and debt* has not been established until now and governorates are not able to take on debt.

Regarding political decentralization only the *appointment decentralization* aspect has been fulfilled. The inhabitants of the jurisdiction elect provincial council members, which in turn elect the governor. Still, on the local level there are no elections and the district managements are just branches of the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MoMPW). Moreover, although the elected provincial politicians formally have authority in a range of policy areas, this is not the case in reality. The interpretation of “administrative decentralization” by the central government basically allows for the control of provincial departments by central ministries. Hence, provincial councils and governors do not have much decisionmaking authority and are rather in charge of implementing decisions and projects of central authorities. Furthermore, although Article 65 of the Iraqi constitution foresees *constitutional decentralization* with the establishment of a second parliamentary chamber called *Federation Council*, which is composed of representatives of the governorates, this institution has not been established by law.

The second important aspect of the Iraqi institutional design are formal and informal power sharing. The formal mechanisms are regulated by the constitution, which provides for a liberal form of consociationalism with a flexible federalism in which the governorates’ populations can decide about their status. Also the electoral system serves as a basis for power sharing in the federal institutions. As a consequence of the proportional representation system citizens’ votes are directly transferred into the parliament, which leads to a large number of political parties and thus the need to build alliances and coalitions in order to form majorities. Given the wide range of, mostly sectarian, parties the electoral system induces cooperation across sectarian or ethnic lines. Moreover, the party lists are semi-open, meaning that voters can choose a party as well as individual politicians within the party list.

The major factions in the Iraqi political landscape have agreed on reservations for political positions based on sectarian and ethnic affiliation. The speaker of parliament is usually a Sunni, the President a Kurd and the Prime Minister a Shiite, and each of those positions has deputies of the other two major social groups. In addition to that, an informal quota based on sectarian belonging for positions in the public service (*muhasasa*) has been established. After each election there are negotiations about which party receives which ministries, where the big ones with many high-value tendering processes, such as the ministries of energy and oil, are the most contested ones (Boduscyński, 2016). Other ministries are continuously controlled by certain sectarian or ethnic groups as part of the elite power sharing deal. Generally, the Iraqi form of power sharing is focussed on sectarianism and political parties (which are mostly sectarian as well) and also the tailoring of the governorates’ boundaries follows sectarian or tribal lines with some exceptions.

5.5 Service Delivery in Iraq

The following chapter provides an overview over service delivery in Iraq since 2003. It highlights the specific challenges and obstacles faced by the service-providing institutions operating in the fragile environment of Iraq. After a general outline of the provision of services, the focus will shift to the water sector. This case study will start with an introduction into challenges for the water sector since 2003 and continue by analysing its governance, including the administrative structure as well as the state of decentralization. Because of the distinct character of the KRG with its own constitution and governance system, the focus of this analysis rests on service delivery in the governorates not integrated into a region.

The Iraqi public sector is inefficient and its service delivery flawed. After years of sanctions before 2003 and continuous armed conflicts after the toppling of the Baath regime, service delivery has been negatively affected as a consequence of a generally low public sector capacity, damaged and insufficient infrastructures, inefficient institutions and correspondingly high levels of corruption. The worrisome state of public service delivery is most clearly seen when considering that 60 per cent of Iraqi households do not have access to either improved water and sanitation services, health services, at least 12 hour electricity a day or general food security (Joint Analysis Policy Unit, 2013).

The general capacities of public institutions in charge of delivering services are low, a situation for which the De-baathification after 2003 was the cornerstone. The CPA did not only empty the top three levels of the ministries (since all senior bureaucrats were members of the Baath party), but also dismissed large numbers of lower ranking public employees, such as teachers and engineers (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). Capable bureaucrats on all levels lost their jobs, which heavily affected the public sector capacity for the following years. Adding up to this comes that since 2003 employment in the public sector is mostly based on sectarian affiliations rather than on merit, which further lowers the institutional capacity and increases the public sector size (World Bank, 2017a). The bloated and inefficient public sector is another reason for the low service delivery performance of Iraqi institutions. While in 2003 0.9 million individuals worked in the core public sector, this figure has increased to more than 3 million in 2015, constituting around 40 per cent of all formal jobs and 60 per cent of all full-time jobs and thus making the state the country's largest employer (Bertelsmann, 2016; World Bank, 2017a). The oversized public sector devours large parts of the Iraqi yearly budget since wages for public employees make up approximately 30 per cent of the total government expenditures (World Bank, 2017a). Another issue connected to the public sector inefficiency are the large numbers of so-called "ghosts", who can be "real" or "unreal". The former are individuals who do no or little work for the institution at which they are employed but nevertheless receive salaries, while the latter appear on government payrolls but are non-existent and their wages go into the pockets of influential individuals (Abdullah, 2017). The practice of having ghost jobs and hiring personnel not based on merit but on networks of clientelism leads to an inflated public sector, which in turn requires funds for salaries that could otherwise be used for improving service delivery

(World Bank 2017). From 2013 to 2016 only between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the total government spending were directly allocated in the provision of public goods and services (International Monetary Fund, 2017).

The infrastructure for delivering services is often insufficient due to damages stemming from armed conflict and a lack of investments by the state. The Iraqi health sector is in a precarious situation in which hospitals suffer from a lack of medical equipment as well as trained staff with only 6.9 doctors and 13 beds per 10.000 inhabitants (World Bank, 2014). Likewise, the electricity system has suffered from sanctions and armed conflict, making it difficult to meet the electricity demands of the population with only 7.6 hours of supply a day on average (World Bank, 2017a). The territorial coverage of public service delivery is very low with a value of 0.83 on a scale from 0 (lowest value) to 4 (highest value) in the IDP 2016 Indicators (Institutional Profile Database, 2016). This figure demonstrates an uneven provision across Iraq, where some governorates receive disproportionately high service provisions while others are neglected.

There is a need for investments by the state aimed at mending damages of infrastructures that are already in place and creating new facilities for supplying of the population with public services. Regarding the Iraqi government's investment budgets, severe problems in the planning and execution remain. An example is the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which is especially important after the destruction of much housing space in the country's north and west during the fights against IS since 2014. As a consequence of a lack of investment planning, including feasibility studies, project calculations and appraisals, the ministry has to rely on subcontractors with often low capacities (World Bank, 2014). According to available data Iraq has a housing deficit of 2 million units and 30 to 40 per cent of the population lives in very poor housing conditions (World Bank, 2017a). Also other ministries have problems with their investment planning, which lead to low execution rates. The actual spending of the foreseen investment budgets of the ministries in September 2011 was often below 50 per cent. Two examples are the MoMPW, which spent 35.4 per cent of its budget, and the Ministry of Health (MoH) that had an even lower budget execution rate of 11.3 per cent (World Bank, 2014). Those figures were taken before IS occupied large parts of the Iraqi territory and thus it is likely that they were even lower since 2014.

The Iraqi citizens feel the lack of effective investments by the public sector and thus see the responsiveness of the central government to their needs and demands as deteriorating. According to a survey (GQR, 2015) the central government's responsiveness is seen as worsening by 85 per cent of the population in the KRG, 68 per cent in the South and 50 per cent in the West, while only a small minority of around 20 per cent sees improvements. Those values are even worse for the local governments' responsiveness (except for the KRG). In the South and the West 72 per cent and 66 per cent respectively see a decline of responsiveness on the local level, indicating that local and provincial governments do not have the capacities to respond effectively to citizen's demands (GQR, 2015). A further reason for this situation is that the Iraqi institutions have low statistical capacities. The last

nationwide census (including the Kurdish governorates) was conducted in 1987 (World Bank, 2017a) and Iraq's value in the World Bank's Statistical Capacity Index, which measures a country's capability to produce high-quality population and economy-related data, is at 52.2, similar to the value of Afghanistan (51.1), and below the average of the Middle East and North Africa region (61.1) (World Bank 2017b). Reliable data on the population is necessary in order to ensure a broad coverage and an equitable access to public services. Incorrect or simply non-existent population statistics increase the risk of underprovision of services in certain parts of the country.

Another key aspect of the low service delivery performance is the Iraqi public sector's rampant corruption, resulting in the country being ranked 169 of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2017). Corruption in Iraq occurs in three different forms: classical rent-seeking which is an economic form of corruption and facilitated by Iraq's distributable oil wealth, clientelism, which is a political form of corruption and is closely connected to the *muhasasa* system, and corruption protection, i.e. the protection of individuals and institutions from legal prosecution that engage in the former two kinds of corruption (Abdullah, 2017). Rent-seeking is particularly damaging to the public service delivery since revenues from oil exports do not benefit the poor but are distributed among elites. Not only grand corruption but also its "petty" form, which is the payment of bribes in return for better services or other smaller favours, is an issue and affects the equitable access to public services. Of the citizens who had contact to a public official at least once in 12 months, approximately 12 per cent paid bribes leading to the estimation that in 2011 a total of 1.9 million bribes were paid to Iraqi officials (UNODC, 2017). Also private firms are confronted with corruption in interactions with public institutions. In 2011 companies that applied for at least six public services, permits or licenses were requested to pay bribes in 33 per cent of the cases. Moreover, approximately 30 per cent of the firms expected to give gifts in order to be awarded government contracts and more than 40 per cent were expected to make informal payments for obtaining import licenses (World Bank, 2011).

Apart from the state as well as NGOs and international organisations in the refugee camps, also sectarian militias affiliated with religious or political organisations deliver services. After the dismantling of the Iraqi state in 2003 a number of militias (particularly Shia ones) filled the vacuum that had been left (O'Driscoll & Van Zoonen, 2017). The most prominent ones are the Badr organisation, which controls the MoI since many years, and the Mahdi army, loyal to the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr (Boduscyński, 2016). Especially the latter has created networks for the provision of social services in southern Iraq and thereby gained influence (Pollack, 2008). Thus, a main mechanism for the persistence and extension of the militias' influence is that they fill voids in the delivery of services left by the government. Out of this situation emerges a vicious circle in which the militias gain popularity among the population and at the same time undermine the government legitimacy (O'Driscoll & Van Zoonen, 2017). In a study conducted in eight southern governorates Brinkerhoff et al. (2012) show the close links between the provision of public services, in this case in the water

sector, and citizens' trust in the state. The prominent position of militias in providing services contributes to the continuity of Iraq's fragile situation since the state lacks both legitimacy and the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in parts of the country where sectarian militias are seen as more trustworthy than governmental institutions.

5.5.1 Case Study of the Water sector

The efficient provision of services in the water sector is of great importance due to a number of water-related challenges Iraq faces. This case study will analyse those challenges and subsequently assess the governance structure of the Iraqi water sector in order to provide a picture of the status of the country's service delivery

5.5.1.1 Water-related Challenges

Iraq, which draws 88 per cent of its water supply from surface water sources (mainly the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), is facing water shortages as a consequence of droughts, unsustainable use of water sources and pollution (UN Iraq, 2013). Since the flow of the two rivers is continuously declining, increased usage is made of groundwater as a response to the lower quantities of available surface water (Voss et al., 2013). Insufficient and damaged distribution networks and irrigation systems result in a national leakage rate of 24 per cent on average, while some networks with higher capacities also have higher rates, e.g. in the *Amanat* of Baghdad with around 40 per cent (MoMPW & Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2015). Not only climate factors (with high rates of evaporation) and the waste of water are responsible for the Iraqi water scarcity. Since upper-riparian states, particularly Turkey and Iran, are able to control the flow of water by damming the Tigris and Euphrates rivers or their tributaries, the water levels of the two rivers have fallen to less than a third of the normal capacity (UN Iraq, 2013).

Issues related to the unsustainable use of water sources also have a direct impact on the population. In Iraq water is mainly used for the industry, drinking, hydropower production as well as irrigation and agriculture. The latter takes a share of 92 per cent of the total amount of used water (Al-Ansari, 2016), which has an extremely low quality and exceeds national pollution limits threefold, but nevertheless is not treated when used for irrigation purposes (UN Iraq, 2013).

Access to improved drinking water sources is at 91 per cent on average but with high disparities between urban and rural areas, with the cities having a rate of 98 per cent as opposed to just 77 per cent on the land (UNICEF, 2011). Likewise, there are differences in access to improved drinking water sources among the governorates, as in Salahaddin, Wasit and Diyala only 80 to 82 per cent of the population have access, while that rate is at close to 100 per cent in the governorates of Basra, Dohuk and Baghdad (UNICEF, 2011). *Figure 2* in the appendix shows the access rate to improved water sources and sanitation facilities for the urban and rural populations. Disparities among the governorates cannot only be seen in the access to improved water sources, but also in the

distribution and capacity of wastewater treatment facilities. Generally, around 70 per cent of the total Iraqi wastewater is not treated and directly flows into rivers, while the remaining processed 30 per cent only serve 8 per cent of the population (al-Ansari, 2016). The two governorates with the highest capacity of wastewater treatment are Baghdad and Basra, where the plants have a daily capacity of 1.200.000 and 70.000 cubic meters respectively. Yet, other governorates such as Wasit and Diyala as well as many middle-sized cities do not have large-scale plants at all (Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013; Government of Iraq, 2018). Several of the wastewater treatment plants that are operating are old and in need of repair, such as the three biggest plants in Baghdad that were constructed in the 1940s and 50s (Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013).

5.5.1.2 Governance Structure

Public institutions are operating in the context of declining water resources, high regional disparities in the supply of the population, and the destruction of infrastructure. The governance of the water sector, as in other sectors, is still highly centralized. The main public entities involved in the management of water services are central ministries in Baghdad and their provincial branches operating in the governorates.

The MoMPW is the most important institution in the process of planning and implementing projects in the water sector (Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013). As explained in the analysis of decentralization in Iraq, municipalities are not autonomous entities but can rather be seen as branches of the MoMPW, which sends staff to its deconcentrated provincial directorates. The second important institution is the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), which is in charge of managing the country's water resources, such as rivers and groundwater. Other ministries that are only partly relevant are the Ministry of Planning with its statistical sub unit, the Ministry of Environment and the MoH (Dunia Frontier Consulting, 2013). The large number of ministries leads to a generally uncoordinated and limited national water policy (UN Iraq, 2013), as interactions between the ministries are spontaneous and on an ad hoc basis due to the lack of a law that formalizes mechanisms of coordination in the water sector (Government of Iraq, 2018).

Although mainly central ministries are in charge of regulating the water sector, some decentralization of the institutions in this area has taken place. The provincial governments have some authority in the planning and implementation of projects as well as the maintenance of already existing facilities. While the office of the governor makes strategic decisions regarding new projects together with final decisions in tender processes, the provincial councils give advice to the governor's office on new projects and exercise oversight over the implementation process (Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013).

The provincial government's budgets are separated from the federal one, but as explained in the analysis of decentralization in Iraq, the overall share of the governorates' spending of the total national recurrent spending is at around only 5 per cent. This is also reflected in the governorate's project budgets, which are only used for smaller projects below \$30 million (Dunia Frontier

Consultants, 2013). Hence, the planning and implementation of bigger projects, such as irrigation networks and wastewater treatment plants are done by the MoMPW. Although provincial governments have only small budgets and mixed results in their execution, they “ [...] have identified priorities, managed tenders, and entered into contracts faster than central government ministries” as a consequence of “decisions to support smaller scale investments in repair and refurbishment and extending services to unserved areas” (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009: 595). Thus, provincial governments were not so much involved in planning large-scale projects but in patching and maintaining the existing infrastructure for service delivery, which is especially important in the northern and western regions, which are most heavily affected by the recent fights against IS.

The provincial directorates of the ministries are still the main entities for planning and implementing larger projects in the water sector on the level of the governorates. Those directorates suffer from problems such as a low quality of staff, the absence of performance standards, weak accountability mechanisms and a lack of management autonomy from the political sphere (Government of Iraq, 2018). Furthermore, many directorates in the conflict-affected parts of the country lost important water network maps and schemes (Government of Iraq, 2018), adding up to the low capacities and the absence of adequate population statistics, which in turn reduces their capability to mitigate regional disparities in the provision of water services.

In a study conducted in the four southern governorates of Basra, Dhi-Qar, Al-Muthanna and Messan the MoMPW in cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (2015) analysed the internal structure of the provincial water and sewerage directorates of the MoMPW. A noticeable result is the relatively low span of control, which is the number of subordinates of each organisational manager. The sewerage directorate of the 2.5 million inhabitants city Basra has a span of control of 13, meaning that each manager has just 13 subordinate employees (MoMPW & JICA, 2015). Although other directorates have higher spans of control this figure indicates that at least some directorates have a low management efficiency due to a disproportionately high number of middle ranking managers.

In addition to the partly low managerial efficiency, the ministries and directorates in charge of providing water services face financial and budgetary constraints. The two most important ministries for the water sector, which are the MoMPW and the MoWR, had a budget execution rate of just 35.4 per cent and 39.8 per cent respectively in September 2011 (World Bank, 2014). The ministries are characterized by a low capacity to charge and collect tariffs, which could theoretically be used for financing water supply-related projects in the governorates. The water tariffs are very low and only cover 2 to 5 per cent of the recurrent costs for water services supply and maintenance (UN Iraq, 2013), and since the armed conflict against IS has started, the water tariff collection has stopped in all governorates (Government of Iraq, 2018). Thus, financing the country’s provision with water services is difficult since governorates cannot draw from tariffs for the upkeep of the water supply infrastructure, and ministries are not capable of executing their budgets as planned.

Answer to the Third Sub Research Question

What is the status of public service delivery in Iraq since 2003, particularly in the water sector?

Prior to 2003 the Iraqi public service delivery was relatively efficient but started to decline as a consequence of years of domestic and international conflicts as well as sanctions since 1990 (World Bank, 2017). In 2003 the complete Iraqi public service was dismantled, and in the process of De-baathification public employees, who were members of the Baath party were dismissed. This led to a severe loss of skilled bureaucrats on all levels and thus to a deteriorating general public sector capacity. Continuous armed conflicts, especially the civil war from 2006-2008 and the emergence of IS in 2014, resulted in the further decline of the service delivery infrastructure. The practice of staffing ministries based on sectarian affiliations and not merit did its part in the decline of the capacity for delivering services. As a consequence, the core public sector employment grew threefold from 2003 to 2015 and currently a large part of the Iraqi annual budget is devoted to paying the salaries of public employees, which leads to a lower spending in other areas of importance. Also investments into the infrastructure remain problematic since the budget execution rates of most of the ministries are very low due to a lack of budget planning capacities. This leads to a neglect of important infrastructure and a gap between the supply and demand of public services. Additionally, there is little reliable census data, and thus investment planning is further constrained since estimations for the spatial demand of e.g. electricity and water supply cannot be made. High levels of corruption, experienced by both individuals and private companies, contribute to issues in the delivery of public services. The necessity to pay bribes so as to receive better services challenges the notion of equitable access for all citizens while political forms of corruption lead to the distribution of state and particularly oil revenues among elites and thus to lower investments in the country's infrastructure.

The water sector in Iraq is currently facing diverse challenges, such as destroyed or damaged infrastructure, regional disparities in the provision of treated water and improved drinking water sources as well as a general scarcity of water. As in other service delivery sectors in Iraq, decentralization has taken place only to a limited extent and central ministries (particularly the MoMPW and the MoWR) are still in charge of regulating the most important areas in the provision of access to water sources and wastewater treatment. For this reason, the ministries have deconcentrated directorates in each governorate that operate next to provincial governments. The latter, which consist of the governorates' offices and the provincial councils, only have little authority in the planning and implementation of new projects such as wastewater treatment plants. However, with their rather small budgets, provincial governments are more effective in planning and implementing small-scale projects. The deconcentrated branches of the central ministries, which are in charge of managing the existing infrastructure and controlling the implementation of projects, partly have inefficient management structures with a high ratio of middle managers. Apart from that, the ministries have low budget execution rates and the collection of the already low water tariffs has stopped. Those two factors are also likely to influence the directorates' performance.

6 Conclusion

The aim of this study was to analyse how the decentralization efforts as well as formal and informal power sharing mechanisms within the Iraqi political institutions shape the country's service delivery. The first sub research question was of theoretical nature and provided a description of the possible effects of decentralization and power sharing on a country's governance performance in general and service delivery in particular. The answer to the second sub research question provided an illustration of the state of decentralization as well as power sharing arrangements in Iraq since 2003. Finally the analysis of service delivery by the Iraqi state, particularly in the water sector provided the answer to the third sub research question.

6.1 Summary of the Empirical Findings

The Iraqi political institutions are still characterized by a high degree of centralization with on-going decentralization efforts as well as a variety of power sharing mechanisms. Although the Iraqi state has a federal character towards its regions, currently only one of those regions exists, namely the KRG. Regarding the governorates the state has a centralized character and one can rather speak of a deconcentration of the Iraqi ministries that have directorates in each governorate. Also in the fiscal dimension the Iraqi political system is still highly centralized. The governorates' fiscal autonomy is low because they have little expenditure responsibility; an insufficient allocation of revenue sources, which mainly come from an oil income transfer mechanism; as well as intergovernmental transfers on an ad hoc basis instead of an ordered mechanism. Political decentralization is somewhat advanced since the appointment dimension has been fulfilled with the election of government councils, which together with the governor's offices, constitute the provincial governments. Decisionmaking, on the other hand, is narrow and restricted to issues that can be solved with funds from the small provincial budget streams. Constitutional decentralization has not yet taken place since a second chamber of parliament composed of the governorates' representatives has not been established.

Power sharing mechanisms in the Iraqi political institutions are formally and informally present. The constitution foresees a flexible kind of federalism in which the governorates have considerable influence in the decision to remain a governorate or merge with others in order to form a federal region. In addition to that, the Iraqi electoral system is based on proportional representation, which leads to the existence of many smaller parties and thus the need to form coalitions on the federal level. This kind of executive power sharing induces parties to cooperate across sectarian or ethnic lines in order to be able to form a government. Moreover, electoral lists are semi open, which allows citizens to vote for both parties and individual candidates.

The informal power sharing mechanisms are not laid down in the constitution but agreed upon by the most important parties, which represent Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. High positions in the state, particularly the post of the Prime Minister, President and Speaker of Parliament as well as their

deputies, are reserved for members of those three groups. Furthermore, a quota system for the civil service called *muhassasa* is in place, leading to the employment of public officials on the basis of their ethnic or sectarian affiliations. Even whole ministries are reserved for certain social groups or subgroups and their political organisations. Generally, the Iraqi form of power sharing is focussed on sectarianism and political parties (which are mostly sectarian as well), and also the tailoring of the governorates' boundaries follows sectarian or tribal lines with some exceptions.

The delivery of services within this institutional context is flawed. This is due to a lack of capacities on all levels of the public sector as a consequence of the dismissals of skilled bureaucrats in the process of De-baathification as well as the subsequent staffing of those ministries based on sectarian quotas instead of merit. Armed conflicts and the resulting destruction of service delivery infrastructures resulted in the further decline of the country's service delivery capacity. The Iraqi public sector is bloated, thus requiring high spending for public employee salaries, which could otherwise have been invested in the provision of basic services. The investment into the country's infrastructure is imperfect at best, since ministries have low budget execution rates. Even if ministries were to fully execute their budgets, investments would still be ineffective due to a lack of adequate statistical data as well as the pervasive corruption within the political institutions. Especially the Iraqi water sector has suffered from armed conflicts in the years after 2003. There are high regional disparities regarding access to improved water sources as well as treatment capacities of wastewater. Decentralization has only been partly fulfilled and central ministries still retain much authority in the planning and implementation of water services-related projects. The provincial governments have only small budgets, allowing them to plan smaller infrastructure projects and patch existing facilities. The deconcentrated branches of the central ministry, however, have much higher budgets and more authority but are partly inefficiently staffed. Adding up to low budget execution rates, this puts into question their ability to effectively manage the country's water sector.

6.2 Answer to the Main Research Question

What is the function of decentralization efforts and power sharing mechanisms within the Iraqi political institutions in shaping the delivery of basic public services since 2003?

Since the Iraqi state is still centralized and decentralization is only slowly evolving, the theoretical effects of the latter on the country's service delivery can only materialize to a limited extent. Power sharing mechanisms in the institutions seem to provide effective impediments to service delivery efficiency and governance performance. The slow progress that is being made in decentralizing the political institutions can partly be attributed to the immobility of the parliament on those issues as a consequence of the executive power sharing arrangements on the federal level. The variety of parties in the grand coalitions since 2005 had to accommodate their and the electorates' interests. As mentioned before, especially Sunnis are against more decentralization and thus it was

more difficult for the different parties to find a common denominator regarding this issue. An example for the legislative gridlock in the COR is the absence of a law on the establishment of the Federation Council, to be passed with a two-thirds majority (Constitution of Iraq, 2005). Until now there has not been much progress on this issue and in the beginning of 2018 the Iraqi Supreme Court issued a ruling in which it committed the COR to pass the required law (Rudaw, 2018).

Also some of the theoretical effects of decentralization on service delivery can often not become reality because of the environment in which Iraqi institutions act. To begin with, the effect of allocative efficiency according to Goel (2017) is unlikely to have improved. Although it is probable that provincial governments in Iraq have better information about the needs for the delivery of certain services than the federal government does, a general lack of population statistics as well as lost plans and schemes for providing basic services (such as in the case of the water sector) are an obstacle to the design and planning of service infrastructures. Furthermore, the problems of coordination among the different ministries in charge of the water sector are indicative of the diverging aims and preferences of the groups in control of those ministries, which contributes to a lower service delivery performance. Turf wars between provincial governments and provincial directorates of the ministries as a consequence of the unclear legal framework potentially exacerbate this issue. This situation can be seen as a special instance of the principal-agent relationship in which elected politicians in the governorates and unelected bureaucrats are not in a hierarchical relationship but on the same level. Hence, they vie for competences, which potentially increases the fragmentation and diffuseness of the preferences and aims of the institutions. National and subnational entities thus face difficulties for effectively delivering services, with the result being the current spatial inequalities such as in the water sector. The challenges subnational governments face in the provision of services are also reflected in citizens' perceptions of their performance. Only 38 per cent of the population see their local governments as "very" or "somewhat" effective (GQR, 2015). Given this perception it is questionable whether the subnational governments are really more efficient in allocating resources with their provincial budget streams.

In addition to that, the current state of fiscal decentralization hardly allows for more autonomy in the allocation of public goods and services by the governorates. First, provincial governments have to coordinate budget plans with the MoF, which gives the ministry leverage over the governorates' spending. Second, there are no or only insufficient mechanisms allowing the governorates to make longer term budget planning. Currently governorates have to negotiate with central ministries for their yearly budget and although a mechanism for sharing oil revenues recently came into existence, it only benefits the areas where oil is actually produced, which are mainly the KRG and the Shiite south. Some governorates have only little oil resources and thus do not benefit from the revenue allocation mechanism. An example for this is Diyala where no oil is produced at all (Aresti, 2016). Yet, only 80 per cent of the inhabitants have access to improved drinking water sources, highlighting the insufficient condition of the service delivery infrastructure in this governorate. The mechanism for

allocating oil revenues among the governorates is a useful tool for giving the provincial governments more fiscal autonomy, but without also apportioning a share of the oil income to governorates that produce only small quantities, geographical inequalities in the delivery of services may widen.

Another aspect of the allocative efficiency of decentralized institutions is the yardstick competition. Citizens compare the services provided in the different local jurisdictions and based on that information make an assessment of whether they stay or move to another locality. Although municipalities exist in Iraq, they are only branches of the MoMPW and thus entirely centrally controlled. Real competition between the municipalities in terms of taxes and service provision is unlikely. In spite of the sometimes big spatial inequalities in the delivery of services, it is questionable whether citizens have enough information to evaluate the effectiveness of their municipalities due to a lack of reliable statistical data. Moreover, in a country with highly politicized sectarian and ethnic belongings as well as a strong tribal culture it might not be realistic for individuals to leave their kin groups so as to live among members of other social groups. The Iraqi institutions do not have the capacities as in western industrialized countries on which much of the literature on yardstick competition focuses. Besides, traditional forms of solidarity networks within families and tribes are still very important (Bertelsmann, 2016), thus further impeding citizens from moving to other parts of the country, as they cannot rely on a state welfare system.

In spite of some political decentralization allowing for the election of provincial councils, impediments to electoral accountability of politicians on the provincial as well as on the federal level remain. The results of this thesis suggest that the political accountability mechanism theoretically following decentralization does not work properly in fragile environments marked by elite-level power sharing agreements and a flawed institutional framework. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein, many previously exiled politicians returned to Iraq with US backing and led the newly formed political parties without having much connecting points to the experiences and wishes of the local population. The parties created by those politicians penetrate every aspect of the state and are so entrenched in the institutions that “[political] parties and the state have become virtually indistinguishable” making Iraq a “partyocracy” (Boduszyński, 2016: 117). The accountability of politicians vis-à-vis the voters suffers from this situation since many citizens do not see the government as responsive to their needs. As Seabright (1995) argued, in centralized systems the electorate of a locality or province constitutes only a small part of the total national electorate, making its vote rather dispensable. In politically decentralized systems, however, citizens should in theory be able to articulate local or provincial demands vis-à-vis the political institutions of the state by voting for the appropriate parties. Yet, in Iraq also most of the parties on the governorate level represent sectarian interests as do their sister parties on the federal level. Hence, because of the propensity of provincial electorates to vote mainly on the basis of sectarian identity rather than provincial interests, electoral accountability between voters and politicians is likely to be impaired.

Since on the provincial level the deconcentrated directorates of the ministries have much more influence than the provincial governments it is difficult to punish those responsible for bad governance. In accordance with LeVan's (2011) findings in Kenya, even if the citizens wanted to vote the head of a ministry with a bad performance out of office, this would be problematic due to the prevalence of grand coalitions as well as quotas and reservations. Here, the MoI serves as an example, since its informal reservation for the Badr Organisation as part of the governing coalitions realistically prevents citizens from electorally punishing politicians affiliated to it. Since fighting IS as part of the PMU, the Badr Organisation is likely to convert gains on the battlefield into political capital, as especially in Baghdad and the country's southern governorates the citizens approve an increased involvement of the militias in political processes (GQR, 2017). The legitimacy of those militias does not only rest on their fight against IS, but also on their capability to replace the state in the provision of public services in parts of the country. Thus, the organisations that challenge the very legitimacy of the Iraqi state are in control of some of its key institutions.

In addition to the difficulty of punishing politicians at the central level for bad ministry directorate performances at subnational levels, federal politicians are also able to influence processes on lower levels. The al-Maliki trade off in 2010 was exemplary as he secured support by the followers of al-Sadr through conceding the governorship of Maysan province and awarding them high-profile positions on the federal level (Wicken, 2012). This kind of behaviour by federal politicians highlights the elite level power sharing nature of the Iraqi state and moreover shows the strong influence of party leaders on the provincial party branches, which further undermines relationships of accountability between citizens and provincial politicians. The propensity of the electorate to vote along sectarian lines instead of on the basis of political programmes indicates that the sectarian party system with its power sharing arrangements and trade-offs on the elite level will not change any time soon.

The authority of the federal political parties was theoretically reduced with the electoral reform in 2010, which allows the electorate to vote for individual candidates in addition to parties. On the one hand this step reduces the political parties' power in creating closed lists solely composed of candidates of the party leadership's choice. On the other hand it can exacerbate the already existing clientelistic and individualistic behaviour of politicians. Abdullah et al. (2018: 8), who conducted a field study in Iraq, including interviews with high-level politicians, noted that "[...] citizens do not only support ethnic or sect parties, but they prefer candidates within those parties who are affiliated to their family or tribe, or who provide some immediate gifts". Moreover, parties buy support by providing citizens with public sector jobs (Abdullah et al., 2018), which can be an explanation for the high share of public employees among the total number of employed Iraqis. As Cammett and Malesky (2012) suggested, by distributing resources in that manner politicians keep their individualistic support base but the overall governance performance, including service delivery, suffers due to reduced funds. The sectarian party elites thus benefit especially from the informal power sharing mechanisms as they

can ultimately retain and widen their influence within the state institutions by occupying influential positions, making appointments for individualistic or party purposes, and distributing state resources.

Corruption in Iraq is present in different forms throughout the country's institutions. While decentralizing them should in theory decrease corruption, many Iraqi citizens perceive their subnational governments as even more corrupt than the central government. In 2015, 45 per cent of the citizens said that they could not trust local governments and that if the latter received more authority there would be more corruption (GQR, 2015). Not only smaller forms of corruption are an issue, also clientelism and patronage networks are widespread in the Iraqi institutions. When having a look at the water sector in southern Iraq, it becomes clear that among the employees is a very high rate of managers as opposed to relatively few clerks. This may be the result of staffing based on *muhassasa* as well as on clientelistic considerations by politicians and parties in control of the responsible ministries. Informal power sharing agreements, such as quotas and reservations, can thus serve to disguise openly clientelistic staffing practices. Many public organisation managers are then not in their positions because of personal merits but rather as a consequence of their affiliation to a certain sectarian organisation, tribal leader or high-ranking party officials.

Although it is difficult to measure to what extent the Iraqi political institutions have been captured by local elites, the "partyocracy" also constitutes a form of elite capture, though not directly on the local level. Many Iraqi citizens are loyal to sectarian or tribal leaders, also in their views on political events and in their voting behaviour. 29 per cent of the population stated that tribal leaders have a "strong influence" on their opinions of political events, while this value is at 41 per cent for religious leaders (The International Republican Institute, 2012). Moreover, in a 2014 survey 37 per cent and 48 per cent of the respondents even went so far as to say that tribal leaders and religious leaders respectively were "total influential" when deciding for whom to vote in the parliamentary elections (GQR, 2014). Thus, tribal and religious leaders have much authority in the country's political processes, which can also be reflected in their control of national and subnational state institutions.

To conclude, the Iraqi institutional arrangement is characterized by a weak separation between the administrative and the political sphere due to a range of elite level power sharing mechanisms, which contribute to the pervasiveness of political parties in the state institutions. The parties' control of political processes and resource distribution negatively affects the administrative capacity of institutions in charge of providing basic services. Vertical and horizontal forms of separation of powers are flawed and political party elites are able to distribute state resources through clientelistic patterns so as to retain their power bases. Thus, many of the theoretical advantages the decentralization of political institutions can bring have not materialized in practice due to the power sharing arrangements, which in the Iraqi context dispersed power among the different sectarian groups but ultimately led to the opposite effect of centralizing power in the hands of a sectarian party elite. Because of this situation, the main aspects of state fragility, which are a low legitimacy, a lack of the

monopoly over the legitimate use of force in parts of the country, and a lack of capacity or political will to improve the citizens' living conditions are unlikely to change in the future. As a consequence of a poor and inequitable service delivery performance citizens do not attribute much legitimacy to the state. Moreover, if the state is not able to satisfy especially the Sunni part of the population with better services, its discontent and consequently the danger of a continued insurrection against the state is likely to grow. Apart from the institutions' lack of capacities, it is also questionable whether the party elites really have the political will to improve the economic situation of the country's inhabitants, or if they continue to maintain their power through the control of state institutions and the distribution of state resources. In this case, public service delivery in Iraq is not likely to improve much in the years to come.

6.3 Strengths, Weaknesses and Recommendations for Further Research

This research did not only analyse decentralization efforts and power sharing mechanisms individually, but evaluated them jointly so as to make an assessment of how those important aspects of the Iraqi political-institutional design affect the context in which services are delivered. In the process of this research also the diverse effects of state fragility had to be taken into account. Thus, this study provided insights into the difficulties of providing services in ethnically divided post-conflict societies that are characterized by formal and informal power sharing mechanisms for maintaining social cohesion as well as on-going decentralization efforts. Although focussing on the Iraqi case, this thesis made a theoretical contribution by showing how elites interested in maintaining their power are able to dominate state institutions with the help of power sharing arrangements. When the three kinds of decentralization are not equally advanced, subnational institutions are not autonomous and can thus be better kept in check and consequently be controlled by those elites. While the latter benefit from the control of state institutions and resources, the population suffers from a decreased public service delivery performance.

Decentralization and power sharing both theoretically should disperse powers. Yet, the former potentially allows for the capture of subnational institutions by local elites, while the latter can lead to the capture of federal institutions by a self-interested national elite. Hence, this study also made a practical contribution by demonstrating the necessity to make institutions on all levels resilient against the capture by those elites and their political parties in fragile contexts characterized by power sharing arrangements. An important step towards this aim is the creation of a precise and unambiguous legal framework for decentralization - both in the constitution and in subsequent pieces of legislation - so that competences of subnational entities are clear and they can operate free from intervention of higher levels.

This study also had some limits and weaknesses. First of all, due to missing Arabic language skills, some policy documents could not be evaluated. In addition to that, information and data on

many issues is either insufficient or non-existent. This especially applies to the informal power sharing mechanisms, patronage networks as well as the internal structures and hierarchies of Iraqi political parties and ministries. Another potential weakness of this research is the difficulty to establish the direct effect of such institutional arrangements as in the Iraqi case on the country's service delivery. Instead, this study rather conducted an analysis of the institutional context in which service delivery takes place and subsequently assessed how it shapes the latter. Also the comparability and measurement of data from different sources is often problematic. As an example, the World Bank found that public sector employment in Iraq has grown threefold from 2003 to 2015. Yet, there is no clear definition of what exactly constitutes the core public sector employment in the different sources. This is also the case for other statistics used for the analysis of service delivery in Iraq.

Generally, more empirical and theoretical research is needed regarding power sharing mechanisms and how they influence institutional capacities and service delivery. This is particularly valid for informal arrangements such as quotas and reservations, which are a widespread means for stabilizing post-conflict states. Also the contexts in which political parties are able to capture state institutions in fragile contexts need some closer examination in order to understand how institutions can be designed so as to guarantee a clear separation of the administrative and the political sphere. In the Iraqi case there is a need for more detailed information on how exactly the *muhassasa* arrangement works. Currently, much of the information is superficial and more of a general description of this mechanism without going much into detail. For this purpose in-depth interviews with Iraqi officials as well as analyses of the public sector and political parties including staffing practices would be necessary.

8 References

- Abdullah, S. M. (2017). Clientelism, rent-seeking and protection: a study of corruption in Iraq after 2003. PhD Thesis. Newcastle University.
- Abdullah, S., Gray, T., & Clough, E. (2018). Clientelism: factionalism in the allocation of public resources in Iraq after 2003. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 54(4), 665-682.
- Aboulenein, A., Rasheed, A. (2018). Iraqi parliament approves budget, Iraqi lawmakers boycott vote. *Reuters*. Retrieved June 15, 2018, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-budget/iraqi-parliament-approves-budget-kurdish-lawmakers-boycott-vote-idUSKCN1GF0PP>
- Adam, A., Delis, M., Kamas, P. (2008). Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from OECD Countries. CESifo Working Paper. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2458/4a380f3bced04c36b78eb428395a084a279c.pdf>
- Ahmad, J., Devarajan, S., Khemani, S., & Shah, S. (2005). Decentralization and Service Delivery: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3603. *World Bank*.
- Alaaldin, R. (2018). What Iraq's Election Results mean for US Policy there. Retrieved, Mai 28, 2018, from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/18/what-iraqs-election-results-mean-for-u-s-policy-there/>
- Al-Ansari, N. (2016) Water Resource Policies in Iraq. Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies. Retrieved March 16, 2018, from https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B09_WSWMFYjNUm4tQ0FtUjYxNjg/view

- Ali, A. (2013). 2013 Iraqi Update #19: Iraqi Provincial Election Results: Final but not Decisive. Retrieved June 8, 2018, from <http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2013/05/2013-iraq-update-19-iraqi-provincial.html>
- Alkifaey, H. (2016). The Battle Between Tie and Turban. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter. Retrieved June 13, 2018, from <https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/28280/AlkifaeyH.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Al-Rikabi, H. (2017). Reforming the Iraqi electoral system. Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from <http://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/877564352413.pdf>
- Al-Tikriti, N. (2008). US Policy and the Creation of Sectarian Iraq. *Middle East Insitute*. Retrieved June 4, 2018, from <http://www.mei.edu/content/us-policy-and-creation-sectarian-iraq>
- Aresti, M. (2016). Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing in Iraq. Natural Resource Governance Institute.
- Azfar, O., Kahkonen, S., Lanyi, A., Meagher, P., & Rutherford, D. (1999). Decentralization, governance and public services: The impact of institutional arrangement. A review of the literature. College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector.
- Azfar, O., Kahkonen, S., & Meagher, P. (2001). Conditions for effective decentralized governance: A synthesis of research findings.
- Bahney, B., Johnston, P. (2017). ISIS could rise again. *Rand Corporation*. Retrieved June 10, 2018, from <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/12/isis-could-rise-again.html>
- Baird, M. (2010). Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict Affected States. World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, World Bank.
- Baram, A. (2003). Chapter 5: Saddam's power structure: The tikritis before, during and after the war. *Adelphi Series*, 43(354), 93-114.
- Bardhan, P. (2002). Decentralization of governance and development. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 16(4), 185-205.
- Bardhan, P. & Mokherjee, D. (1998). Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries. Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Barry, C., Forder, A., Sultan, S., Moreno-Torres, M. (2004). Approaches to Improving the Delivery of Social Services in Difficult Environments, *PRDE Working Paper*. Retrieved March 12, 2018, from <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12823/files/pr040003.pdf>
- Batley, R. & Mcloughlin, C. (2010). Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery, *Development Policy Review*, 28(2), 131-154.
- Blatter, J., & Haverland, M. (2012). *Designing case studies: Explanatory approaches in small-N research* (Research methods series). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bertelsmann (2016). Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Iraq Country Report. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Iraq.pdf
- Boduszyński, M. P. (2016). Iraq's Year of Rage. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(4), 110-124.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Johnson, R. W. (2009). Decentralized local governance in fragile states: Learning from Iraq. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 75(4), 585-607.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S. (2012). Service delivery and legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states. *Public Management Review*, 14(2), 273-293.
- Cammett, M. (2013). Democracy in Post-Invasion Iraq. Retrieved June 10, 2018, from <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/Democracy%20in%20PostInvasion%20Iraq.pdf>
- Cammett, M., Malesky, E. (2012). Power Sharing in Postconflict societies: Implications for Peace and Governance, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(6), 982-1016.
- Castellino, J., & Cavanaugh, K. A. (2013). *Minority rights in the Middle East*. OUP Oxford.
- Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (2010). An operational definition of 'fragile states'. University of Oxford. Retrieved March 5, 2018, from <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b1ee5274a31e00009a0/CRISE-InBrief-05.pdf>
- CIA Factbook (2017). Iraq. Retrieved June 13, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>

- Clayton, A., Noveck, J., Levi, M. (2015). When Elites Meet: Decentralization, Power Sharing, and Public Goods Provision in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone. *Policy Research Working Paper 7335*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Constitution of the Republic of Iraqi (2005). English Translation. Retrieved May 19, 2018, from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en
- Coalition Provisional Authority (2004). Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html>
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(4), 823-830.
- Cravens, L. (2011). Analyzing Decentralization in Iraq. Amman, Jordan: UN Habitat
- Cravens, L., Brinkerhoff, D. (2013). Provincial governance in Iraq: Councils, contestation, and capacity building. RTI Press
- David, J. (2003). Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector, *World Development*, 32(1), 53-71.
- Dunia Frontier Consultants (2013). Water and Sewage Sectors in Iraq: Sector Report – February 2013. Retrieved March 17, 2018, from http://www.meti.go.jp/meti_lib/report/2013fy/E002792.pdf
- Dunning, T., & Nilekani, J. (2013). Ethnic quotas and political mobilization: caste, parties, and distribution in Indian village councils. *American political Science review*, 107(1), 35-56.
- Duflo, E. (2005). Why political reservations?. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2-3), 668-678.
- World Bank (2001). Intergovernmental Fiscal relations. Retrieved May 5, 2018, from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscal.htm>
- Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech under Attack. Retrieved May 27, 2018, from http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf
- El Meehy, A. (2017). Revisiting Decentralization in Iraq: Challenges and Policy Recommendations.
- Food and Agriculture Organisation (2012). Iraq Agriculture Sector Note. Retrieved July 2, 2018, from <http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i2877e/i2877e.pdf>
- Feruglio, N. (2007). Fiscal Decentralization: An overview. *UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre*. Retrieved May 4, 2018, from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/FeruglioandAndersonoverviewofFiscaldecentralization.p>
- Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2000). *Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries*. World Bank Washington (No. 2290). DC. Working paper.
- Frederickson, H., Smith, K., Larimer, C., Licari, M. (2016). *The Public Administration Theory Primer* (3rd ed.). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Ghanim, D. (2011). *Iraq's Dysfunctional Democracy*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC_CLIO
- Goel, R., Mazhar, U., Nelson, M., & Ram, R. (2017). Different forms of decentralization and their impact on government performance: Micro-level evidence from 113 countries. *Economic Modelling*, 62, 171-183.
- Government of Iraq (2018). Reconstruction & Investment. Retrieved June 12, 2018, from <http://www.cabinet.iq/uploads/Iraq%20Reconstruction/Iraq%20Recons%20&%20Inves.pdf>
- Greenberg Quinlan Rosner (2014). Iraq Mood Improving Despite Divisions General Overview: January-March 2014 Survey Findings, Retrieved June 2, from <https://ndi.org/sites/default/files/GQR-Iraq-Survey-Jan-Mar-2014.pdf>
- Greenberg Quinlan Rosner (2015). Lack of Responsiveness Impact Mood: August-September 2015 Survey Findings. Retrieved June 2, from https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/August%202015%20Survey_NDI%20Website.pdf
- Greenberg Quinlan Rosner (2017). Improved Security Provides Opening for Cooperation: March-April 2017 Survey Findings. Retrieved June 2, from <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20April%202017%20Survey%20Public%20Final%20%281%29%20%281%29.pdf>
- Hindriks, J., & Lockwood, B. (2009). Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation and voter welfare. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 25(3), 385-397.
- Hirschmann, K. (2016). Wie Staaten schwach werden: Fragilität von Staaten als internationale Herausforderung (Lizenzausgabe für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung). *Schriftenreihe / Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Band 1747*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2014). Ethnic power sharing: Three big problems. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(2), 5-20.

- International Monetary Fund (2017). Iraq: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No 17/252. Retrieved June 3, from <https://www.imf.org/~media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17252.ashx>
- Institutional Profiles Database (2016). IPD 2016 Database.
- Kahkonen, S. (2001). Decentralization and Governance: does decentralization improve public service delivery? *World Bank PREM Notes*.
- Law 21 (2008). The Provinces not Associated in a Region No. 21 of 2008. Iraqi Local Governance Law Library. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from <http://www.iraq-ig-law.org/en/content/provinces-not-associated-region-no-21-2008>
- Le Van, A. C. (2011). Power sharing and inclusive politics in Africa's uncertain democracies. *Governance*, 24(1), 31-53.
- Lijphart, A. (1996). The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. *American political science review*, 90(2), 258-268.
- Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. Yale University Press.
- Ltaif, E. A. (2015). The Limitations of the Consociational Arrangements in Iraq. *Ethnopolitics*, (38).
- Marshall, M. & Elzinga-Marshall, G. (2016). State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016. *Center for Systemic Peace*. Retrieved May 27, 2018, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFIImatrix2016c.pdf>
- Mauro, P. (1997). Corruption and growth, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 681-712.
- Maxwell, J. (2009). Designing a Qualitative Case Study. In L. Bickman & R. Debra (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods* (pp. 214-253), Los Angeles: SAGE.
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2007). Iraq's constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 5(4), 670-698.
- McLoughlin, C. (2009). Topic Guide on Fragile States. *Governance and Social Development Resource Centre*, University of Birmingham.
- McLure, C., & Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2000). The assignment of revenues and expenditures in intergovernmental fiscal relations. *core course on Intergovernmental Relations and Local Financial Management*, World Bank Institute, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works & Japan International Cooperation Agency (2015). Report on Data Collection Survey on Water Sector in Southern Iraq. Retrieved March 16, 2018, from http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000020477.pdf
- O'Driscoll, D. & Van Zoonen, D. (2017). The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State. Middle East Research Institute.
- OECD (2007). Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations.
- OECD (2008). Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings, and Lessons, OECD, Paris.
- UNODC (2013). Corruption and Integrity Challenges in the Public Sector of Iraq. Retrieved May 29, 2018, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/2013_Report_on_Corruption_and_Integrity_Iraq.pdf
- Ottaway, M., & Kaysi, D. (2012). *The state of Iraq*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Parvanello, S., Darcy, J. (2008). Improving the provision of basic services for the poor in fragile environments. *Overseas Development Institute*. Retrieved March 12, 2018, from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=982C80ECE7E38B81C602EA4335FA4ABA?doi=10.1.1.552.1013&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Pollack, K. (2008). Muqtada al-Sadr: Iraq's Shadowy Power Broker. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/muqtada-al-sadr-iraqs-shadowy-power-broker/>
- Posner, D. (2004). The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *The American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 529-545.
- Prud'Homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. *The world bank research observer*, 10(2), 201-220.
- Public International Law and Policy Group (2014). Power-Sharing in Iraq: Impossible or Inevitable? *Roundtable Series Report*.
- Putzel, J. (2010). Why development actors need a better definition of 'state fragility'. *Crisis States Research Centre*.

- Rodden, J. (2004). Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and measurement. *Comparative politics*, 481-500.
- Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Government decentralization in comparative perspective: theory and practice in developing countries. *International review of administrative sciences*, 47(2), 133-145.
- Rondinelli, D. A., Nellis, J. R., & Cheema, G. S. (1983). Decentralization in developing countries. *World Bank staff working paper*, 581.
- Rudaw (2018). Iraqi Federal Court “commits” parliament to pass law forming Federal Council. Retrieved, June 19, 2018 from <http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/18012018>
- Salmon, P. (1987). Decentralisation as an incentive scheme. *Oxford review of economic policy*, 3(2), 24-43.
- Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and measurement. *Studies in comparative international development*, 38(3), 32-56.
- Seabright, p. (1995). Accountability and Decentralisation in Government: an incomplete contracts model. *European Economic Review*, 40, 61-89.
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294-308.
- Shah, A., & Thompson, T. (2004). *Implementing decentralized local governance: a treacherous road with potholes, detours, and road closures* (Vol. 3353). World Bank Publications.
- Sissons, M., Al-Saiedi, A. (2013). A Bitter Legacy. Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq. *International Center for Transitional Justice*. Retrieved June 11, 2018, from <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf>
- Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2011). Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress. Retrieved March 12, from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6E513B08495C919C8525782A006191AC-Full_Report.pdf
- Stein, E. (1998). Fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America. *Inter-American Development Bank*.
- Taylor, A. (2011). Iraq Public Sector Modernisation Programme. UNDP. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from mptf.undp.org/document/download/8973
- The International Republican Institute (2012). National Survey of Public Opinion in Iraq: September 1-7 2012. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20November%2027%20Survey%20of%20Iraq%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20September%201-7%2C%202012.pdf>
- Tiebout, C. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy*, 64(5), 416-424.
- Transparency International (2017). Iraq. Retrieved June 12, 2018, from <https://www.transparency.org/country/IRQ>
- Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. *Journal of public economics*, 76(3), 399-457.
- Treisman, D. (2007). *The architecture of government: Rethinking political decentralization*. Cambridge University Press.
- UN Iraq (2013). Water in Iraq Factsheet. Retrieved June 19, 2018, from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Water-Factsheet.pdf>
- UNICEF (2011). Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey. Final Report. Retrieved June 15, 2018, from https://mics-surveys-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/MICS4/Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa/Iraq/2011/Final/Iraq%202011%20MICS_English.pdf
- USAID (2006). Service Delivery in Fragile States: Framing the Issues. Retrieved March 7, 2018, from <http://marshallcenterciss.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16378coll5/id/329>
- Vaux, T. & Visman, E. (2005). Service Delivery in Countries Emerging from Conflict. Centre for International Co-operation and Security.
- Vazquez, J. (1999). The assignment of expenditure responsibilities. *Conference Paper*, World Bank. Retrieved May 4, 2018, from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/854751468321587835/pdf/938800WP0Box380nsibilities00PUBLIC0.pdf>

- Voss, K. A., Famiglietti, J. S., Lo, M., Linage, C., Rodell, M., & Swenson, S. C. (2013). Groundwater depletion in the Middle East from GRACE with implications for transboundary water management in the Tigris-Euphrates-Western Iran region. *Water resources research*, 49(2), 904-914.
- Waterman, R., Meier, K. (1999). Principal-agent models: An expansion? *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8(2), 173-202.
- World Bank (2011). Enterprise Surveys. Iraq Country profile 2011. Retrieved June 8, 2018, from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/647031468182646596/pdf/682910WP0ES0Bo0B00PUBLIC00Iraq02011.pdf>
- Wicken, S. (2012). Sadr's Balancing Act on Maliki. *ISW Backgrounder*. Retrieved June 6, 2018, from http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_SadrsBalancingActonMaliki.pdf
- World Bank (2014). Republic of Iraq Public Expenditure Review. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2016). Decentralization and subnational service delivery in Iraq: status and way forward. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2017a). Iraq Country Diagnostic. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2017b). Statistical Capacity Indicator Dashboard Iraq. Washington DC: World Bank. Retrieved June 16, from, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity/SCIdashboard.aspx>

7 Appendix

Table 1 *Decentralization in Iraq*

Document	Publisher
Law 21 Provinces not Associated in a Region	Council of Representatives Iraq, 2008
Constitution of Iraq	
Decentralization in Iraq	UN Habitat, 2011
Analyzing Decentralization in Iraq	Cravens, 2011
Revisiting Decentralization in Iraq: Challenges and Policy Recommendations	El Meehy, A. 2017
Provincial Governance in Iraq: Councils, Contestation, and Capacity Building	Cravens, L., Brinkerhoff, D. 2013
State of Iraq	Ottaway & Kaysi, 2012
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period	Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004
Decentralized local governance in fragile states: Learning from Iraq	Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Johnson, R. W., 2009
Sadr's Balancing Act on Maliki	Wicken, S., 2012
Iraqi Provincial Election Results: Final but not Decisive	Ali, A., 2013

Table 2 *Power Sharing in Iraq*

Document	Publisher
Reforming the Iraqi electoral system	Al-Rikabi, H., 2017
The Limitations of the Consociational Arrangements in Iraq	Ltaif, E. A., 2015
Lack of Responsiveness Impacts Mood: <i>August – September 2015 Survey Findings</i>	Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2015

Iraq's constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription	McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B., 2007
Minority rights in the Middle East	Castellino, J., & Cavanaugh, K. A., 2013
Clientelism, rent-seeking and protection: a study of corruption in Iraq after 2003	Abdullah, S. M., 2017
Iraq's Dysfunctional Democracy	Ghanim, D., 2011

Table 3 *Service Delivery in Iraq*

Document	Publisher
Iraq Budget 2013	Joint Analysis Policy Unit, 2013
Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011
Iraq Country Diagnostic	World Bank, 2017
Service delivery and legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected states	Brinkerhoff, D., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S., 2012
Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Iraq Country Report	Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016
Iraq's Year of Rage	Boduszyński, M. P., 2016
Iraq: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No 17/252	International Monetary Fund, 2013
Republic of Iraq Public Expenditure Review	World Bank, 2014
IPD Database	Institutional Profiles Database, 2016
Improved Security Provides Opening for Cooperation: <i>March-April 2017 Survey Findings</i>	Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2017
Lack of Responsiveness Impact Mood: <i>August-September 2015 Survey Findings</i>	Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2015
Statistical Capacity Indicator Dashboard Iraq	World Bank, 2017
Iraq	Transparency International, 2017
Corruption and Integrity Challenges in the Public Sector of Iraq	UNODC, 2013
Enterprise Surveys. Iraq Country profile	World Bank, 2011
The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State	O'Driscoll, D. & Van Zoonen, D., 2017

Table 4 *The Iraqi Water Sector*

Document	Publisher
Water in Iraq Factsheet	UN Iraq, 2013
Groundwater depletion in the Middle East from GRACE with implications for transboundary water management in the Tigris-Euphrates-Western Iran region	Voss, K. A., Famiglietti, J. S., Lo, M., Linage, C., Rodell, M., & Swenson, S. C., 2013
Report on Data Collection Survey on Water Sector in Southern Iraq	Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works & Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2015
Water Resource Policies in Iraq	Al-Ansari, N., 2016
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey: Final Report	UNICEF, 2011
Water and Sewage Sectors in Iraq: <i>Sector Report</i>	Dunia Frontier Consultants, 2013

Figure 1 Map of the Governorates of Iraq (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2012)



Figure 2 Access to Improved Water Sources and Sanitation Facilities (World Bank, 2014)

