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Anti-Corruption Methods in the Education Sector in Iraq

A Bachelor thesis on corruption in fragile contexts and the combat of corruption in the sector of education in order to reach SDG4

Bachelor of Science
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“Corruption is the thief of economic and social development; stealing the opportunities of ordinary people to progress and to prosper.”

**- Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013)**

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the UNDP anti-corruption measures in education and their implementation in Iraq in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Quality Education). To assess this specific fragile context, the thesis addresses the following research question: *To what extent has Iraq implemented the methods and tools to fight corruption in education in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 4?* This assessment begins by addressing fragility, corruption, and corruption in connection with education, which are explored in light of public governance. The consequences of fragility on service delivery and on corruption are outlined. This paper argues, that the implementation of the UNDP methods reduces corruption in education and would therefore support the successful implementation of SDG4 in Iraq. The case study of Iraq uses a longitudinal research design, while applying the method of process tracing and is based on secondary data. It concludes that only one out of four dimensions of the UNDP anti-corruption methods were fully implemented, endangering the successful implementation of SDG4 by 2030 in Iraq. The research contributes to the field of public governance providing knowledge about the implementation of anti-corruption measures in highly corrupt countries.

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Abbreviations

COI	Commission of Integrity
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EMIS	Educational Management Information System
FBSA	Federal Board of Supreme Audit
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IDP	Internal Displaced People
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IGs	Inspector Generals
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MTEFs	Medium-term expenditure frameworks
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEM	Public expenditure management
PFM	Public financial management
PTA	Parents Teacher Association
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIM	Student Information Management
SMCs	School management committees
TI	Transparency International
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S.	United States

1. Background: Introduction and Research Question

This thesis focuses on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) anti-corruption methods and tools in education and their implementation in Iraq to increase the chances of achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Qualitative Education) by 2030. It is written in the perspective of public governance, and addresses fragility, corruption, and corruption in relation to education.

In September 2015, the world community agreed upon the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals¹ (SDGs), including the SDG4 (United Nations, 2015a). The SDGs are the successors of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)² (UNDP, 2018). In contrast to the MDGs, the SDGs have a broader framework ranging from hunger and poverty to climate change while not only addressing developing countries but also including developed nations. The SDGs aim to hold the entire world accountable for to sustainable development.

Looking at the outcome of the MDGs, countries characterized by violent circumstances and weak institutional capacity had their difficulties in achieving the MDGs (UNDP, 2016b). Well-established, effective and successful policy implementations, as it can be found in stable and developed countries, cannot be presumed in a fragile context. For that reason, a special focus on fragile contexts and their policy implementation is necessary, since the prevailing research does not sufficiently consider fragile environments and their circumstances. Fragile states are characterized by weak state capacity and the risks of breakdown due to unplanned events, often being unable to fully accomplish basic service deliveries such as health services, education and clean water (OECD, 2009b). Iraq itself suffers from instability, which originates from various violent conflicts in the past. Currently it is exposed to new rising conflicts and terrorism such as ISIS, failing to provide basic services. This situation is reflected in the ranking of the Fragile States Index in 2017 and 2018. The index ranks the most fragile states and categorized Iraq on place 10 and 11. Thus, Iraq was chosen as adequate example of a fragile country (Messner, 2017, 2018).

Just like other fragile countries, Iraq has not been able to fulfil all MDGs (UNDP, 2015). To control the achievement of the SDGs, the SDG Index Score is monitoring the progress of the countries, calculating a ranking of countries measuring how many of the SDGs have been realised. In this ranking, Iraq occupies position 118 of 157, indicating persisting problems in the successful implementation. In one goal (no poverty) only Iraq receives a

¹ An overview of the SDGs is provided in the Appendix, Figure 2

² An overview of the MDGs is provided in the Appendix, Figure 3

green rating indicating SDG achievement; however, nine goals (2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16)³ are ranked red, signifying distance from SDG achievement (Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, & Teksoz, 2017). According to UNDP “fragility remains the greatest impediment of the aspirations of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (UNDP, 2016b, p.13).

This thesis is developing a description of the factors that may hamper policy implementation as well as presenting anti-corruption tools, in order to support the successful implementation of the SDGs in Iraq. Analysing the implementation of 17 goals is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, the focus lies on the Education Goal, stated in SDG4. The goal promises inclusive and equitable quality education and promotes lifelong learning opportunities for all (UNESCO, 2016). According to SDG Index and Dashboards Report Sachs et al. (2017), *Qualitative Education* belongs to the goals, which is far from being reached in Iraq. This goal has been chosen because of its importance for social development, economic growth and the reduction of poverty. Infant child mortality, for instance, reduces with the higher education of the mothers (Campos & Pradhan, 2012; Schultz, 2002). On the personal economic perspective, each year of schooling raises the chance of employment and at the same time increases the personal income according to the number of years at school (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004; UNICEF, 2017a). Yet, many are excluded from education. In 2016, 263 million children and youth were not participating in any education, losing the potential for their development and the development of their home country (UNESCO, 2018).

Appropriately, the Nobel peace prize winner Malala Yousafzai acknowledged the importance of education during the World Largest Lesson:

“All the SDGs come down to Education. If we have more educated population we will reduce the poverty levels and achieve zero hunger, we will assure better child and maternal health, we will reduce inequalities and gender discrimination, and we will realize children’s rights and human rights.” (Yousafzai, 2015)

Scientists back the multidimensional importance of education for society, as described in Yousafzai’s quote. Especially in countries affected by conflict, good basic education plays a decisive role. The provision of education services can, for example, strengthen the capacity of reconstruction by preparing opportunities for peace-building (Vaux & Visman, 2015). Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) found that education has positive effects on the economic

³ See overview of SDGs in Appendix, Figure 2

development of a country. Education has an impact on monetary and non-monetary aspects, leading to higher civic participation; it impacts health and to some extent social cohesion (Haveman & Wolfe, 1984; Preston & Green; Tarabini, 2010). Education also affects various other developments within a nation positively. These include the disaster preparedness, sustainable practices and agricultural productivity. Furthermore, studies show that access to the justice system for an individual improves with wider education (Antoninis et al., 2016). Concluding, *Qualitative Education*, as laid out in SDG4, has a significant impact on various positive milestones on both, the personal and national level. It requires special attention in order to promote its successful implementation in each country.

Next to fragility, various scholars identified corruption as one of the major obstacles in achieving the MDGs; it continuously negatively affects the implementation of the SDGs by 2030 (Anger, 2010; Dridi, 2014; Goetze, 2017; Timilsina & Torres, 2014). Currently, Iraq is on position 169 of 180 on the Corruption Perception Index 2017 (Transparency International, 2018a). Corruption is a cross-sectional phenomenon that not only hinders economic growth by slowing down (foreign) direct investments, but also degrades the welfare of the poorest by increasing inequality and causing underfunding of the education and health sector. Corruption facilitates terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and money laundering indirectly, by enabling money to flow into these organisations (Anderson, Kaufmann, & Recanatini, 2003; Collier, 2002; Kaufmann, 1997; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1998).

In line with high corruption rates, student dropout figures are five times higher in countries with higher corruption than in countries with lower rates (Dridi, 2014). Moreover, corruption has a negative and significant effect on school enrolment rates and school persistence to grade five in primary education while it increases illiteracy and repetition rates (Dridi, 2014). Consequently, corruption does not only affect the economy as such but also the educational sector to quite an extent. The “Iraq Country Report on Out-of School Children“ reflects that 28.4 percent of the children in Iraq (without Kurdistan region) were out of school in 2013 (UNICEF, 2017b). Decreasing corruption in education and by thus increasing educational quality in Iraq entails great social benefits. Reducing corruption improves education outcomes largely by improving the effectiveness of public expenditure (Azfar, 2005). To explore meaningful approaches within the field of corruption in education, more research is needed, as indicated by several reports (Transparency International, 2013b; Wood & Antonowicz, 2011).

Looney (2008) recognised the need for action by stating, “aside from the lack of security, corruption is the biggest threat to progress in stabilizing Iraq.” (p. 428). Together

with the acknowledgement that in 2013, 23 percent of the Iraqi population believed that their education system is corrupt/extremely corrupt, improvement is desirable (Transparency International, 2013a). To breach this gap, this thesis will address the issue of the impact of corruption in the framework of achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Qualitative Education) in Iraq.

The UNDP published a report focusing on methods, tools and good practices in fighting corruption in the education sector. Four main categories are being identified to tackle corruption in the education sector, namely rule of law, public administration and systems, transparency and accountability as well as capacity development (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). By analysing the implementation of those methods and tools within the mentioned categories, this paper seeks to identify whether Iraq has adopted the advised methods to reduce corruption in the education sector, taking into account that corruption is a major obstacle in achieving the SDG4. The UNPD report has been chosen due to its measurable categories and comprehensive literature review of successful approaches to combat corruption in education. As such, it is a good reference point to compare the actions undertaken in Iraq.

In order to provide this information, background knowledge on Iraq's context, the concept of fragility and Iraq's perception of corruption will be provided. To discern how corruption in education can be tackled, Iraq's anti-corruption methods in education will be collected. Additionally, this paper contributes towards the achievement of SDG4 in Iraq in the long run, as it helps assessing its obstacles systematically. This will benefit the children and youth as well as the development of the country. Hence, the implementation of methods and tools to reduce corruption in education are a focal point. This research will concentrate on the following descriptive question:

To what extent has Iraq's government implemented the methods and tools to fight corruption in education as indicated by UNDP in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 4?

Before providing an answer to the main question, four sub-questions will be analysed, providing an in-depth understanding of the research topic.

1) *What explanations does the current literature provide for the existence of corruption?*

Within this sub-question, various concepts of corruption are laid out, while possible reasons for corruption as well as places where corruption might occur are being pointed out.

2) *What is the evolution of the political-administrative relations in Iraq and how did that lead to a fragile environment?*

Here, an overview of the political-administrative environment in Iraq's history is provided, explaining the roots of fragility.

3) *What is the perception of corruption in Iraq, how has it developed and what is the current extent of corruption?*

The link between the political-administrative evolutions is being presented to identify possible corruption threats and perceptions of corruption in the Iraqi context.

4) *What is the current organisation of Iraq's education system and what are its challenges?*

This sub-question, describes the way the education system is organised in Iraq and outlines the main challenges.

The underlying assumption is that as long as the UNPD anti-corruption methods and tools are not applied, a full achievement of SDG4 is unlikely due to the ongoing setback constituted by corruption. Despite this, one needs to keep in mind that various factors influence the success of the quality of the educational sector: corruption is one major hindrance but by far not the only one. Whereas limited financial capital, quality of teachers or infrastructure are factors that impact on the quality of education, this paper focuses on corruption. The paper is structured as follows: The subsequent chapter presents the theoretical framework, providing background to the concepts of fragility, corruption and corruption in education. This is followed by the data and document chapter, outlining the methodology and data collection methods. The analysis answers the sub-questions and the main question before the conclusion of this thesis is posed.

2. Theory

The following chapter provides the theoretical background on service delivery, fragile states, corruption, and corruption in education, in particular. The theoretical background provides the theoretical lenses needed to conduct the analysis.

2.1 Functions of State and Fragility

Stable states need to fulfil mainly four core functions including security governance, political governance, socio-economic governance and administrative governance. In case deficits in those core functions occur, fragility of the state can develop (Hirschmann, 2016). The delivery of qualitative education, as written down in the SDG4, belongs to the broader topic of service delivery. The delivery of services, such as education, is one of the core functions of

a state and is exercised by administration. Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari (2015) outlined that Weber and Wilson see politics and administration as two separate spheres. Each sphere has its own tasks. Typically politics instruct the administration, while at the same time politics aim to control administration (Frederickson et al., 2015). According to the New Public Management, service delivery should be conducted using market mechanisms and promoting deregulations to enable a more effective service delivery for the state citizens (Frederickson et al., 2015).

In a fragile context, states are often unable to provide service deliveries as described in New Public Management. For fragile states, the sustainment of core functions, that is defense, international affairs, economy, government operations and the rule of law, is already a difficult task; especially challenging is the provision of security, enabling economic development and the safeguarding of essential needs (Jennings et al., 2011; OECD, 2009b). In academic literature, the term fragile is considered to be the precursor of state failure. Although, on an international level, the term of 'fragile state' has not been defined precisely, nevertheless many refer to the OECD definition; "[s]tates are fragile when state structure lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their population " (OECD, 2009a, p. 16). However, this definition has been criticized because of the missing differentiation between 'fragility' and the general conditions of so-called 'underdevelopment' (Putzel, 2010). According to Putzel (2010) not only fragile countries but all poor countries lack the capacity to reduce poverty and promote development. For this reason, explaining why some poor countries are unstable while others achieve stable conditions under low economic growth is necessary to define the causes of fragility.

According to Putzel (2010), the Crisis State Research Centre identified four indicators of state fragility: 1) failure of the state to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, 2) failure to develop rudimentary bureaucratic capacity, 3) failure to enforce institutional rules and 4) deficit in territorial control. As mentioned previously, basic service deliveries are often performed poorly in the fragile context including social services like health, education and clean water (Barid, 2010). The provision of quality education in Iraq takes place in such a fragile context, where the state is challenged with security threats such as ISIS (O'Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017).

Fragility influences the service delivery negatively (Barid, 2010; Jennings et al., 2011). Consequently, reasons for fragility need to be identified in order to tackle those and improve the quality of service delivery in the long run. François and Sud (2006) identified

several causes such as colonial legacy, maladministration by an elite, legacy of interference or abandonment by forewing powers for fragile situations. Besides these, Hirschmann (2016) defined four historical causes of state fragility. The first one is the constructed statehood due to the colonial times; especially in Africa and Asia arbitrary border demarcation took place by the European colonist, resulting in the emergence of unnatural countries. The second cause is identified as the collapse of artificial socialist states and the fragility of the neighbouring countries. State weakness through involuntary integration of different ethnic groups can be the third possible cause for fragility. Lastly, the fundamental questioning of the government system due to undesirable developments in important policy areas can cause fragility (Hirschmann, 2016).

When the borders of the Arabic states were drawn under the rule of the French and the British, long-term consequences had not been given much consideration (Buchta, 2016). The effects of fragility are multifaceted, ranging from the tarnished relationship between states and people to the occurrence of conflicts. People in fragile states often experience an inadequate rule of law. As described by OECD (2009b), Jennings et al. (2011) and Barid (2010), the state does not provide the people with all the necessary services; in that case, other actors try to step in and fill this gap. As a result of this development, criminality, terrorism and arms smuggling may increase. In fragile states, the relationship between state and citizens is weakened by corruption, clientelism, missing rule of law and maladministration (Hirschmann, 2016). Hence, fragile states are often characterized by poor economic performance, authoritarianism or militarism, as a result, which is accompanied by a rapid population growth (Gros, 1996).

2.2 Corruption

In the following, the concept of corruption, its causes and its theoretical lenses are outlined. As mentioned in chapter 2.1, corruption may be one of the consequences of fragility and is therefore a widespread phenomenon in fragile countries. Besides the issue of service delivery, corruption is another major obstacle for the development of a country. Much literature has been produced on the definition of corruption, putting forth the difficulties in defining this complex term precisely. As Tanzi (1998) accurately depicted, corruption is like “[...] an elephant, while it may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed.” (p. 6). The most commonly used definition of corruption is from the World Bank, defining it as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Bhargava, 2006, p. 1). Transparency International (TI) offers a slightly different description, defining it as “the

abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2018b).

The literal meaning of corruption is “something spoilt” (Caiden, Dwivedi, & Jabbar, 2001). Corruption itself is barely a new phenomenon, considering that it has been discussed in the book ‘Arthashastra’ over 2000 years ago (Noonan, 1984). Notwithstanding, today corruption is a major obstacle to providing the necessary conditions for effective policy implementation and service delivery by weakening resource base, wasting available resources or reducing the general access to services (Anderson et al., 2003).

Depending on the theoretical lens, definitions of corruption can differ. With regard to the principal-agent theory⁴ “corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interest in pursuit of their own.” (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 24). Johnston (1996) supports this definition, as it takes the issue of accountability in the conduct of public office into account. Williams (1999) suggested that definitions of corruption need to aid to our understanding of corruption, rather than providing obstacles for doing so. Therefore, new concepts are needed regardless of whether they can include all facets of corruption. The new concepts may still provide a more comprehensive insight into corruption (Williams, 1999). He points out that “[h]ow corruption is defined depends on the context in which it is located, the perspectives of the definers and their purpose in defining it.” (Williams, 1999, p. 512). Acknowledging the cultural differences is of vital importance, since some countries perceive gifts as corruption, while in others they are simply viewed as a polite gesture without any intention. Along these lines the definition of corruption has to be carefully evaluated within the context of Iraq.

Treisman (2000) identified six robust and significant variables. The causes for reduced corruption included British heritage, protestant traditions, log per capita GDP, federal structure, uninterrupted democracy as well as the openness to imports (Treisman, 2000). One year before, results of good governance research were published, a concept which includes the aim for corruption-free governance. This analysis suggested that rich nations have better governments than poor ones; ethnolinguistically homogeneous countries have better governments than the heterogeneous ones. In addition, common law countries possess better governments than the French civil law or socialist law countries and predominantly protestant countries enjoy better governments than other predominant religious groups (La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999).

Researchers focused on specific causes of corruption such as the degree of democracy, federalism or media. The results suggest that a low degree of democracy, fiscal centralisation and low media coverage contribute to the existence of corruption (Arıkan, 2004; Chowdhury,

⁴ A detailed description of the principal-agent theory follows in the theoretical lenses section

2004; Di Tella & Franceschelli, 2011). Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) conducted another analysis of the general causes of corruption, with a higher sample size and the theoretical background of Treisman (2000). Their results differed from previous analyses stating that they did not find any evidence for history of common law, history of British rule, or the association between decentralization and corruption. In contrast, they found evidence that protestant culture is associated with lower levels of corruption and that richer countries are less corrupt. Long exposure to uninterrupted democracy, broad media coverage and higher wages were found to lead to lower corruption, while political instability has increased the level of corruption (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008).

Having addressed the term and causes of corruption, possible theories to explain corruption in a broad sense will be outlined. The variety of definitions suggests that there are also different theoretical lenses. One predominant theory, which builds the backdrop for many anti-corruption efforts is the *principal-agent theory* (Andvig et al., 2001; Johnston, 2005; Lawson, 2009; Riley, 1998). This theory is based on two key assumptions: first of all there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, whereas the agents have more information compared to the principal, resulting in an information asymmetry in favour of the agent (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Williams, 1999). Depending on the perspective the definition of the principal and agent may differ; sometimes the principals are the rulers, while the agents are the bureaucrats. This perspective is the classical version of the principal-agent model (Frederickson et al., 2015). The less classical perspective refers to the rulers as agents while the citizens act as principals. In this context, the ruling elite has to be controlled by the public, rather than the bureaucrats (Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Besley, 2006). The underlying assumptions are that the problem of corruption comes from the agent and that the principal will always take responsibility for controlling corruption (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). Thus, the classical principal-agent theory ignores the corrupt behaviour of the ruling elites around the world and is therefore limited.

Recently, several researchers (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2011) have criticized the one-sidedness of the principal-agent view in regard to anti-corruption policies, referring to contexts where systematic corruption takes place. Thereupon, the *collective-action problem* is suggested as a good theoretical lens for corruption. The collective action problem refers to the dilemma of some individuals acting according to their own individual interests, while it would be best to act collectively towards a goal, which influences the outcome for the whole group (Olson, 1965). The issue of free riding is highly intertwined with this theory, resulting in situations where collectives are not

able to realize their full potential; a collective benefit is not provided which produces the ‘tragedy of the commons’ as proposed by Hardin (1968). Corruption causes loss of state resources and leads to a reduced ability of delivering public services. As Marquette and Pfeiffer (2015) suggested, collective benefit can be conceptualized as the percentage of the public purse allocated to the provisions of services, whereas free riding reduces the state capacity to care of all citizens.

Marquette and Pfeiffer (2015) used a different approach arguing that the theories of principal-agent, collective action and problem-solving need to be combined to explain corruption and achieve success in anti-corruption efforts. Each theory has components giving causes of corruption. The *principal-agent theory* highlights the individual role by referring to the principal and the agent who have diverging interests. The problem is described as double principal-agent problem where in the first scenario the political leader is the principal and the agent are the bureaucrats while in the second scenario the officials, politicians and bureaucrats, are described as agents whereas the public is the principle. The theory concentrates on the rational choices of individuals and focusing is on monitoring mechanisms, transparency in governments and attempts to implement watchdogs.

The second theory, the *collective action*, concentrates on the context in which corruption takes place. It highlights the importance of group dynamics in an environment where corruption is perceived to be normal, suggesting that anti-corruption efforts are less likely to be effective. Collective action sees corruption as the manifestation of free riding, where personal interests possess a higher degree of importance than the benefit of the group, such as the benefit of good governance principles (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015).

Both theories conclude that a more effective monitoring and sanctioning may increase accountability, and therefore corruption. Together with the problem-solving theory, a more holistic theoretical framework can be created. The *problem-solving theory* argues that both, the principal-agent theory and the collective action theory “have framed corruption only as a problem, which has failed to recognize that, in some contexts and for some people corruption functions to provide solutions to problems they face” (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015, p. 1). The authors state that corruption is needed for some political leaders to mobilize and redistribute goods since structural factors do not provide a sufficient framework for instance for service delivery. Trying to maintain the power, political stability is generated as a by-product, which then serves as a public good. Moreover, citizens may view corruption as a solution-mechanism, gaining access to service delivery they would have been excluded from otherwise (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015). Several authors (Hickey & Du Toit, 2013; Walton, 2013)

described situations where corruption can offer social protection mechanisms or where patronage works as reducer of poverty by giving the poor resource security. In this context, the family is often attributed high value, creating a network to find ways of accessing social services (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015).

2.3 Corruption in Education: Areas and Typologies

Education is an area that is very sensitive to corruption mainly for three reasons. First, it has an attractive structure for patronage and manipulation of local sentiment due to a high visibility representation. Second, decisions are often made by gatekeepers who can influence them according to their will. Third, most of the time, funds are spent in small amounts with weak accounting and monitoring systems, enabling division of funds. Beside financial losses and ineffective systems, the real damage occurs when a new generation grows up believing that personal success comes through favouritism, bribery or fraud, rather than hard and honest work (Chapman, 2005). This is a major contribution to the pervasive nature of corruption, making corrupt behaviour into something ordinary.

Corruption can manifest in the education sector in various ways. There are blatantly illegal acts of bribery or fraud, next to actions undertaken to secure a modest income by educational personnel paid too little or late. Sometimes, it is difficult to identify corruption, since the cultural perspective on what is considered corruption may differ per country, as outlined in chapter 2.2. In some instances, corruption occurs simply because of incompetence of the involved people. Wherefore training particularly in accounting may have a high impact and lead to the reduction of corruption (Chapman, 2005). For a clear definition, Hallak and Poisson (2001) characterized corruption in education as "the systematic use of public office for private benefit whose impact is significant on access, quality or equity in education." (p. 8). In addition, they developed a systematic overview of possible corrupt practices in the education sector in the areas of 1) Finance, 2) Allocation of specific allowances, 3) Construction, maintenance and school repairs, 4) Distribution of equipment, furniture and materials, 5) Writing of textbooks, 6) Teacher appointment and management, 7) Teacher behavior, 8) Information system, 9) Examinations and diplomas, and 10) Institution accreditation, which can be seen in the Appendix, Table 1 (Hallak & Poisson, 2007).

Hallak and Poisson (2001) created a typology of corrupt practices by looking at the areas of management or planning within education ministries. In Chapman's (2005) classification the corrupt practices were identified around the administrative level of government or the agency involved in the implementation of educational policies. A third

typology which addresses the direct or indirect effect on students can be identified. Here, the typology distinguishes between the student and faculty exchange, the student and administrator exchange, and last the student-staff exchange (Cárdenas, 2006). The fourth typology of Azfar (2001) is based on the administrative procedures providing loop holes for corruption.

Acknowledging corruptive practices in education, Heyneman (2004) tried to develop specific characteristics of a corruption-free education system, consisting of (1) equality of access to educational opportunity, (2) fairness in the distribution of educational curricula and materials, (3) fairness in accreditation in which all institutions are judged by professional standards equally applied and open to public scrutiny, (4) fairness in the acquisition of educational goods and services as well as the (5) balance and generosity in curricular treatment of cultural minorities and geographical neighbours and the (6) maintenance of professional standards of conduct by those who administer education institutions and who teach in them, whether public or private (Heyneman, 2004). By defining the characteristics, corruption may be easier to identify within the education setting.

Although all suggested anti-corruption methods may have been implemented, there is still a risk that corruption occurs again, hence sustainability of the reforms needs to be assured. Several case studies (de Asis, 2000; Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, & Parris, 2000) have shown that anti-corruption methods and reforms may have been successful but after a while fields lapse back into corruption. Recorruption expresses the new occurrence of corruption in a before nearly corruption-free place where anti-corruption strategies have been deployed successfully before. Reforms should aim to improve attitudes and professional incentives as well as to strengthen accountability and reduce opportunities for different types of corruption. Following, anti-corruption reforms must include prevention, education and enforcement in order to be effective. In addition, a system of external accountability needs to be established. Everyone in government and administration need to be conscious of the ongoing fight against corruption, a single reform is not enough (Dininio, 2005).

This chapter enables the answer of sub-question one: *What explanations does the current literature provide for the existence of corruption?* First of all, corruption can have historical roots due the emergence of fragility, which can be caused by four possible historical developments. These include 1) the constructed statehood, 2) the collapse of artificial states, 3) the involuntary integration of different ethnic groups or 4) the undesirable developments in important policy areas (Hirschmann, 2016). Fragility weakens the state structure and its administration and thus, the delivery of basic services. Consequently, the relationship between

state and population is weakened and enables the rise of corruption and clientelism. Fragility and corruption are highly intertwined and influence each other, while worsening the situation of the state. The definition of corruption is highly controversial, which influences the research for causes of corruption. However, as William (1999) stated, it is rather important to see the definition of corruption in each cultural context. The specific causes of corruption can differ in each country depending on the circumstances and the characteristics of state and society. Nevertheless, researchers identified general causes for the existence of corruption. These include interrupted democracy, low media coverage, political instability, high level of poverty, heterogeneity, and a non-protestant culture (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008; Treisman, 2000). The theories of principal-agent, collective action theory and problem-solving theory identify different causes of corruption. The first one assumes that corruption comes into existence because of misconduct of the agent, which is classically the administration. The second argues that corruption arises due to free riding in society instead of working for the benefit of the group. The last theory states that corruption occurs because of the need of citizens to access services and should rather be seen as a solution mechanism.

Concluding, the explanation of the existence of corruption is difficult due to its multidimensional facets and wide-ranging causes, starting from history over mismanagement of the government to the personal gain of some people. Therefore, the reasons for the existence of corruption always need to be considered carefully for each context, taking the theory and the countries social and historical background into account.

3. Data/Documents

3.1 Methodology

The thesis is going to examine UNDP anti-corruption measures in the sector of education in Iraq, via explaining different theories of corruption, taking the Iraqi context and its background with corruption into account. The aim of the research is to evaluate the implementation of the suggested UNDP anti-corruption methods and tools in the area of education, in order to reach the SDG4 in the long-run.

The type of research is a case study, using a longitudinal research design (Babbie, 2013). Hereby, the collection of data comes from the same country (Iraq) on more than one occasion and over a period of time (mainly 2003-2018), with the focus after the years of 2011 (year of publication of UNDP report). The method applied is the process tracing, using qualitative data. In contrast to cross-sectional studies, which look at the sample at a specific

time, a broader picture of the situation in Iraq in regard to corruption can be explored. Since all the findings relate to just one country, Iraq, an intensive research in this particular setting is enabled. The findings of the thesis will not be generalized, since all results are based on one case. In qualitative research, one rather talks about transferability than generalizability (Maxwell, 2009).

The thesis uses an intensive research design, addressing and concentrating on a narrow and specific phenomenon in a particular context and providing in-depth research. This intensive research is contrast to an extensive research, where several studies are undertaken, and aims to lay out differences and comparability of the data (Maxwell, 2009). Maxwell's (2009) suggestions are applied in order to address validity threats and biases. The triangulation and searching for discrepant evidence and negative cases will be applied. Within the triangulation, diverse information collection takes place, while the search for discrepant evidence is necessary to avoid ignoring data and drawing conclusions which may not be right (Maxwell, 2009). Triangulation is secured by including different sources from international organisation, national ministries or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Eurocentrism and Westernized interpretations can be reduced through including the analysis of the work of researchers such as Abdullah (2017b) and Al-Ali (2014), who originate from Iraq. In order to provide answers to the sub-research questions and consecutively answer the main research question, an analysis taking the theoretical framework as groundwork is necessary. Hereby, the theoretical knowledge will be applied to the Iraqi context, assessing its applicability. First, the analysis section will start with an introduction of the Iraqi context, to provide an overview of the political-administrative evolution in Iraq. This is followed by the application of the theoretical reasons for fragility within the Iraqi context. Moreover, the history of the perception of corruption and the current status of corruption in Iraq is provided. Afterwards, the education system of Iraq is presented for a better understanding of possible problems within the system and to identify possible corruption loopholes, which will then be analysed in the next sub-category. The analysis chapter concludes with a detailed examination of the application and implementation of the suggested anti-corruption methods and tools by UNDP in Iraq.

3.2 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation

The main concepts of research are *service delivery*, *fragility*, and *anti-corruption methods in education*. The *service delivery* is defined as the provision of basic services by the government (Barid, 2010). This research focuses only on the service delivery regarding

education, working towards the achievement of SDG4 in Iraq. Hereby, the fragile context of Iraq needs to be considered. Fragility is a sensitive term, pushing countries sometimes unwillingly in a specific category, possibly causing multi-layered consequences for the attractiveness of a country for example. In this thesis, *fragility* is operationalized as followed: Fragility occurs when four characteristics take place. State fragility therefore exists when the state fails to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, fails to develop rudimental bureaucratic capacity and fails to enforce institutional rules. Moreover, it has deficits in its territorial control (Putzel, 2010). Indices such as the Fragile State Index and the Transformation Index provide empirical data on that topic (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Messner, 2018).

The delivery of education (public service) is influenced by corruption. Thus, anti-corruption efforts in education will be operationalized to reduce corruption in education. Hereby, *anti-corruption methods* will be operationalized by using the methods and tools as suggested by UNDP, and follows their suggested operationalisation. The methods and tools of UNDP are categorized within the dimensions of 1) rule of law, 2) public administration and systems, 3) transparency and accountability and 4) capacity development (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011).

Within the category of rule of law, anti-corruption laws show the willingness of the government to address the problem of corruption. Here analysed, are *legislation*, *sanctions* and the availability of *code of conducts* for educational personnel. The second dimension, public administration and systems, consists of three sub-categories namely better financial system, independent audit bodies and IT for administration. In regard to the availability of a *better financial system*, one has to investigate the financial management and school grants disbursement. The category of school grants disbursement should include the involvement of a third party for disbursement, textbook grants transfer to school, school bank accounts and returns and liquidations. Secondly, *independent audit bodies or committees* should be in place in the categories: education in general; school grants; examinations, diplomas and entrance to university; as well as teacher certification. The last sub-category includes a better *IT for administration*, including a system for teacher deployment and payment, hence reducing risks of corruption at higher education due to, for example, admission processes. The next category addresses transparency and accountability. It focuses on several sub-categories including advocacy and awareness raising about corruption as well as anti-corruption education within the curriculum of the country, open and transparent procurement processes and participatory monitoring and social accountability. The last-mentioned sub-category includes the role of

school management committees as well as the budget tracking and monitoring. Other sub-categories totalling up to seven, are the information and the use of media, the available accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism and the availability of surveys regarding public expenditure or service delivery surveys. The last category includes “capacity development” in forms of, for example, training for education budgeting or trainings for headmasters in school management (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). An overview of the operationalisation of the anti-corruption methods can be found in the Appendix, Table 2.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

The research question will be explored by analysing mainly qualitative, secondary data. The researcher is going to rely on secondary data from trustworthy sources, since the opportunity to conduct surveys or interviews is not given. Considering possible language barriers, the researcher is only able to work with documents translated into English. Another limitation could be the accessibility of data in a fragile context like Iraq. Therefore, the researcher works with the so called “snowball system” starting with documents from established universities, international organisations, newspaper articles or foundations such as TI or Bertelsmann Stiftung. By studying these sources, new documents can be identified to explore further information on the specific topic of anti-corruption methods in education in Iraq. Specifically, information from ETICO, from the International Institute for Educational Planning, from documents of the Ministry of Education of Iraq will be extracted. Furthermore, documents of the Commission of Integrity of the Republic of Iraq are being used as well as policy documents from cooperation partners such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO or the World Bank. An overview of the applied documents for the main research question can be found in the Appendix, Table 3-6.

4. Analysis

The chapter aims to resolve the sub-questions in order to provide an in-depth answer to the main research question. After a brief context background, the perception of corruption and the current status of corruption are outlined, followed by the explanation of Iraq’s education system. The chapter concludes with a careful analysis of the application of the UNDP methods and tools to reduce corruption in the education sector.

4.1 Context Iraq

4.1.1 Iraq before 1958 and General Information

Iraq has been part of the Osmania Empire since 1534, since then and until today; Iraq is the most ethnic and confessionally diverse country of all the 22 Arab States. The population consists of Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen and other small minorities. The Arabs hold the majority with a share of 75-80 percent in the population, followed by the Kurds who make up 15-20 percent of the Iraqi population. Regarding regional disparity, the Kurds live predominantly in the north and northeast. Iraq has always been a Muslim country, with the application of the Arab Shia. However, the Muslim community is divided into the Shiites and the Sunni population. Currently, Iraq has a population of 39 million citizens, divided in 29-34 percent Sunnis and 64-69 percent Shiites (CIA Factbook, 2018).

During the First World War, British troops occupied Baghdad and promised the Arabs support for the development for an independent Arabic state if they started an armed rebellion against the Ottomans. In 1918, the British occupied Iraq and put it under direct rule of the British Empire, which was against their promise to the Arabs, who had undertaken the armed rebellion as agreed. The background to the event is the *Skypes-Picot-Agreement* between the French and British, dividing the Ottoman Empire into two zones of influence. After the First World War, the League of Nations confirmed the artificial borders without any consideration of the ethnical and cultural background of the people living there (Buchta, 2016). This decision has had massive impact until today. It caused various conflicts and contributed to the rise of terrorist groups (Hirschmann, 2016).

Due to a rebellion of the Arabs in 1920, the British decided to give up their direct rule and created a monarchy under British rule with the Sunni prince Faisal I as king. Two years later, the British forced the king to sign a British- Iraqi alliance in favour of the British. As a consequence, strong protest arose among the Arabic Shiites. Some of the leading pastorate supported the protest and called for active involvement. After the British arrested some prominent leaders of the movement, a few leading pastorate Shiites fled to Iran. This had consequences for the relationship among the Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, since the Arab Sunnis perceived it as betrayal that the Shiites searched for protection in Iran, the enemy of the Sunnis. Throughout history, the Kurds rebelled against the central government, calling for more independence. There has always been a consequent social disadvantage of the Shiites, who constitute the majority of the population. Although, the British created an Iraqi state in 1921, it remained an artificial construction. In 1930, Iraq reached its formal independence from Britain (Buchta, 2016; Hirschmann, 2016).

4.1.2 Iraq between 1958 and 2003

Together with a bloody military coup in 1958, the liberal-democratic monarchy found its end and was followed by a row of authoritarian regimes led by Sunni military. Its peak was reached with the Baath rule in 1968, where General Hassan al-Bakr jointly with his relative Saddam Hussein organised the coup. The Baath regime secured its power through a totalitarian ruling system, applying repressions and terror. The Mukhabarat (secret police) was very active during this time, encouraging citizens towards denunciation of close relatives who might work against the regime (Al-Ali, 2014). In contrast to the oppression, the regime worked for the modernisation of the country and the strengthening of women rights. Due to the nationalisation of the oil sector and the oil boom in 1973, the government was able to offer a comprehensive welfare programme. Together with the establishment of thousands of public jobs this calmed the critics in society, the Baath party soon turned into a mass party. In any event, the Kurds were still rebellious, aiming for autonomy. In 1974, a civil war with the Kurds broke out; who were supported by Iran, which increased pre-existing rivalry between the two countries. During the conflict, Iraq and Iran came to an agreement on Iran ceasing to support the Kurds while in turn receiving territorial concessions, which resulted in the defeat of the Kurds. From then onwards, the Iraqi government put their efforts towards an Arabization of the Kurds region in North Iraq (Buchta, 2016).

In 1979, Saddam took over the power, by forcing al-Bakr's resignation and executing 500 high-level party members of Baath. Scared of being whipped away by the ongoing revolution in Iran, Saddam started a prevention war in 1980. Eight years later, a cease-fire agreement was signed, ending the war with over 150,000 dead in Iraq and 300,000 in Iran. During the war massive human rights violations took place especially against the Kurds. Although it was a military deadlock, Saddam was able to promote the end of the war as his victory. Saddam tried to reach a debt relief from the Gulf States, which financed the war against Iran, by threatening them with Iraq's military power. The Iraqi government had serious debts, the economy was weak, and the majority of the industrial infrastructure was damaged. These factors increased the fear of instability and rebellion (Buchta, 2016).

With the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, to avoid the paybacks of the debts, Saddam crossed a red line and the U.S. turned against his regime, which resulted in a total defeat of Iraq in 1991. As a consequence, Bush called for a revolution against Saddam, resulting in a revolution of the Shiites against the repressive government. After Saddam realised that the U.S. would not invade Iraq, he was able to squash the rebellion with military means, killing 100,000 Shiites including religious leaders, which resulted in a trauma of the Shiites and their

pronounced disappointment towards the U.S. (Buchta, 2016). The international community reacted with UN sanctions, forbidding imports to and exports from Iraq. The sanctions lead to a depletion of the country, to thousands of deaths because of starvation and the non-investments in education, infrastructure and housing. Saddam retribalized Iraq and empowered the Islam to strengthen his power. Later the sanctions were reduced with the 'Oil for Food Programme' enabling Iraq to export oil for financing basic food requirements (Al-Ali, 2014).

4.1.3 Iraq after 2003

As a consequence of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. got concerned about Iraq's military strength and worried about Iraq sending weapons to Al-Qaida. The U.S. did not consider that Iraq and al-Qaida were ideological opposites, and without any UN authorisation, the U.S. and UK invaded Iraq in March 2003 with the Coalition of the Willing (Al-Ali, 2014).

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established by the U.S., started with a so-called De-Baathification with the De-Nazification as a role model. Leading personnel in Civil Service and the top four ranks of the Baath Party leadership were removed from office. Furthermore, the Iraqi military, security services and other organisations were dissolved to demolish any opportunity for the Baathist to come back into power (Al-Saiedi & Sissons, 2013). In June 2004, the power transfer from the CPA back to the Iraqi government started, which was responsible for preparing democratic elections in 2005. During the transition time, Iraq was confronted with increasing security threats and bombings. The Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which was elected in 2005, decided that a committee out of members of parliament should be constituted to discuss a new constitution. Yet, the Sunni boycotted the elections, they were under-represented in the committees and because of the U.S. wish not to extend the referendum date, "consensus-building was sacrificed in order to satisfy external political concerns" (Al-Ali & Dann, 2006, p.440). The constitution referendum showed the division between Shiites (95-98 percent yes votes) and the Sunni (81-97 percent no votes) in the country. Society and politics got increasingly polarized along the lines of the sectarian powers, which culminated into a civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites from 2006-2008. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida played an important role in the outburst of civil war (Buchta, 2016).

4.1.4 Consequences of Political-administrative Evolution

Following, the second sub-question, "*What is the evolution of the political-administrative relation in Iraq and how did that lead to a fragile environment?*" is answered. Taking Hirschmann's (2016) reasons for fragility, into account, Iraq clearly falls in the category of a

constructed state as a consequence of colonial times. It is unlikely that the ethnic groups (Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shiites) would have formed a country under different conditions. As can be seen, the Kurds in North Iraq have been striving for their independence and autonomy since the establishment of the country itself. The Shiites and Sunnis have their political conflicts, sometimes resulting in violence. Iraq is an artificial, constructed country, created by the colonial powers France and Great Britain with the Sykes-Picot-Agreement. The random fixation of borders has contributed significantly to the fragility of the country, as pre-existing natural or ethnical borders were disregarded. Jointly, France and Great Britain supported minorities in Iraq to slow down the construction of a nation state, in order to increase their own influence in the area and delay any form of Arabic nationalism. In this fashion, they put the Sunni king in power to decrease the power of the majority population, the Shiites. Throughout their history, fragility was fuelled by playing with the ethnical and secretariat differences of the population. Saddam also used this technique to increase his power, knowing full well that this may further divide society. This is particularly evident in the killing of 10,000 Shiites after the rebellion.

The invasion in 2003 significantly contributed to the increasing fragility of the country through the dissolution of the military and security services, the dissolution of the existing state structures through the removal of high officials. All this was done during the process of De-Baathification, resulting in a more fragile and insecure state, faced with increasing security threats. The unstructured re-building of the Iraqi state after the invasion, led to a power- vacuum, providing favourable conditions for radical and terrorist groups to take over. The state fragility of Iraq needs to be seen in the context of internal and external factors contributing to its fragility. After all, one can argue that the “[e]xternal invasion, in this sense, was the most effective factor of state fragility in Iraq while historical factors reinforced the problem.” (Ibrahimi, 2018, p. 9). Domestic political change is usually not peaceful and stable when external actors intervene militarily, as this weakens the already weak structures of the state, causing further fragility (Flibbert, 2013).

Thus, Iraq fails to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (e.g. ISIS), fails to develop rudimental bureaucratic capacity (e.g. problems in public services), fails to enforce institutional rules and has deficits in territorial control (e.g. with regard to ISIS). Concluding, Iraq fulfils all the characteristics of a fragile state according to Putzel (2010). Hereby, one needs to remember the role external powers have played with regard to the current situation of Iraq. To connect this with corruption, fragility enables to a large extent the

emergence of corruption. Consequently, the next chapter analyses the development of the drivers and perception of corruption in Iraq.

4.2 Perception and Drivers of Corruption in Iraq

Highly intertwined with the historical context and the social, political and economic development of Iraq is the emergence of corruption. The theoretical causes of corruption as discussed in theoretical section will be applied to the Iraqi context.

With its history as described, Iraq qualifies for the first cause of corruption, the interrupted democracy. Iraq had a politically rather instable environment, especially after the invasion of 2003, confirmed by the Political Instability Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit that ranks Iraq at place 6 of 165 (the lower rank the more stable), which fulfils the second condition (The Economist, 2009). The numbers of corruption cases reduce when media coverage is high, enabling the public to name and shame, and creating fear of getting caught in its illegal actions. Freedom House (2017) certified Iraq's Press Freedom Status as "not free", giving a score of 71 points of 100, with 0 signifying most free and 100 least free. The World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (2018a) indicated the same by scoring Iraq on rank 160 out of 180 countries, with rank 180 standing for most oppressed. Both stated that Iraq is one of the world's deadliest countries for media representatives, exposed to political and economic pressure. Insulting the government, for instance, is highly punishable and investigations about corruption or embezzlement often lead to serious threats towards the journalist (Freedom House, 2013). Subsequently, the media coverage is relatively low, especially in topics sensitive to influential people, fostering corruption further, condition three is met. As mentioned, another cause for corruption may be the poverty level. According to the World Bank (2018) the poverty rate increased from 19.8 percent to 22.5 percent in 2014. Due to the various ethnical groups in Iraq, several languages are spoken, leading to a heterogenic ethnolinguistically country. Nevertheless, the majority can speak Arabic. Following the argument of La Porta et al. (1999), this heterogeneity is another cause for corruption (condition five). To sum up, Iraq fulfils five identified theoretical causes of corruption, namely interrupted democracy, low media coverage, political instability, high level of poverty, heterogeneity in an ethnolinguistic population.

But how did the perception and the existence of corruption develop in detail over time? The next section provides an overview of the development of corruption in Iraq. During the years of Saddam, Iraq received great economic success through the production of oil. The state funds, however, were misused for the family of the ruler or the inner close associated

elites, or for constructing palaces for personal use. In consequence, a centralized patronage system, a patron-client network was in place. Saddam used an extensive system of state patronage to sustain his power, a system which some commentators would define as a corrupt form of clientelism. Every form of non-state corruption was severely punished by the government. Any form of corruption or misuse of public money was considered as act against the Baath party and by association the president and the Iraqi system. Because of strict punishment including the death penalty, Iraq was free of corruption in regard to bureaucratic corruption during the authoritarian regime (Abdullah, 2017a). State corruption, as described above, was limited to the closer circle of Saddam.

After the invasion of Kuwait, the situation changed from a national centralized system of political patronage towards a nepotistic form of corruption. Due to the high cost of the war, funds were limited, Saddam had to reduce the state patronage system. As a consequence, he no longer supported his allies with money but placed his family in strategic government positions, maintaining control over state institutions. In connection with the UN sanctions, the administrative corruption to gain access to public services such as education increased dramatically (Abdullah, 2017a).

After the U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam in 2003, the types of corruption changed once again. Abdullah (2017a) differentiated between political drivers and economic drivers of corruption in Iraq. The political drivers included security, militias and sectarianism. As a result of the invasion and demolishment of the Iraqi security forces, there was a lack of security, which was followed by looting and kidnapping (first political driver). Kidnapping activities grew to such a dimension, that some families' major source of income was based on ransom money. Weapons and lawlessness promoted these activities, fostering corruption also where people were trying to safeguard themselves from those groups (Williams, 2009). At the same time the role of militias increased (second political driver). Due to the De-Baathification, many people lost their jobs, especially those who worked for the interior and defence ministries as well as people from military and police, many of whom were threatened to be killed by Shia radical groups. As a consequence, they formed militias groups. The reasons for the existence of those groups differed from self-defense, economic gain (through to smuggling), and political, ideological or religious causes. The third political driver was sectarianism, particularly visible at the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which was formed by sectarian structure choosing members according to their ethnic and religious affiliations. The structure of the IGC, increase the animosity between Sunni and Shiites communities, taking into account that the sectarian structure was flawed because of the in part random allocations

to the ethnic groups (Abdullah, 2017a). Thus, the creation of communitarian citizenship between Iraqis has been undermined, focussing on the sectarian division of power. This development had high impact in the design of the constitution, which resulted in the formation of a government with sectarian quotas, called *muhasassa* system (Al-Ali, 2014).

Next to the three political drivers, there are four economic drivers of corruption. Most of the economic drivers got established through the economic reforms by the CPA. Only few Iraqi experts were contacted to be involved in the reconstruction process and most of them had been living in exile for years. Moreover, next to the low numbers of experts, a language problem existed, resulting in only little Arabic communication about the reconstruction process to the public. As a consequence, many perspectives on the reconstruction process remained unheard as relevant stakeholders were not consulted. Secondly, the budgetary spending of the CPA system had problems in accounting and transparency. The CPA received its funds from two sources, one being the Iraqi oil revenues and the second one U.S taxpayers' money. The majority of the Iraqi funds were used by 2004, while the U.S. fund still stood around 15 billion (from 18 billion in total). The interim government had only 2.8 billion US-Dollar left to spend (Le Billon, 2005). It stayed unclear for which project which money was spent and accountability was missing on why which funds (Iraqi or U.S.) were used. The strong pro-market policy was the third driver of economic corruption; however, in fact the CPA administration was an occupying power, enabling Iraqi market opportunities to foreigners, especially US firms. In many occasions, limited competition and an intransparent bidding process could have been observed (Abdullah, 2017a). In numbers, Iraqi companies received only two percent of the value from reconstructions contracts, while UK and US firms got contracts in volume of 85 percent of the value (Whyte, 2007). The fourth economic driver for corruption is intertwined with the free market policy and the entry of political elites into the economic system. Connected with the *muhasassa* division, many political actors have become active in the market economy, using their position to influence the market or receive economic benefits, by maintaining favourable connections to companies and thus creating massive misallocation of public funds. This may result in rent-seeking that occurs from an artificial monopoly, which is another form of corruption in Iraq (Abdullah, 2017a).

The special circumstances of Iraq have created an environment, where corruption has been more widespread and the effects of corruption have been more distinct than observed in other post-conflict situations (Looney, 2008). Abdullah (2017a) highlighted the role of clientelism in public sector corruption in Iraq. On the individual level, clientelism can take the forms of distribution of jobs, ghost jobs or retirements. In the following, forms of clientelism

which may affect the education sector will be explored.

Together with the reconstruction of Iraq after the invasion, it was assumed that the patronage network in the public-sector would be replaced by fair standards in selecting people for their jobs. However, with the creation of the sectarian division in the Iraqi government, a new criterion to select people occurred, contradicting the principle of equality. The sector of education does fall into the category of public sector jobs. People supporting the politicians may be rewarded with jobs, which goes hand in hand with the expectations that they would vote in favour of that politician. Originating in procedures, the problem of unqualified personnel emerges. Another aspect, which imposed massive problems on Iraq are the so called ‘ghost jobs’. The Iraqi military, is a prominent example, where 50,000 ‘ghosts’ are confirmed. There are two types of ghosts, the ones who do not turn up for work and therefore are absent, and those who exist only on paper but not in reality, producing salaries for real identities/people (Abdullah, Gray, & Clough, 2018). Abdullah et al. (2018) indicated that the security sector is not the only area facing such issues. Different scholars (Abadzi, 2007; Bold et al., 2017; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, & Rogers, 2006) reported massive ghost or absenteeism practices in the area of education, indicating that every fifth government primary teacher in developing countries is absent. Correspondingly, it may be assumed that the educational sector has similar problems; this assessment will be conducted in the main research question. Taking the massive negative effects into account that ghost jobs create, their prevention is indeed of utmost importance in each sector. Independent of the area, ghost jobs waste an immense amount of public money, decreasing the efficiency of organisations and in case of education and thus, deny children access to qualitative education.

A third major type of public sector corruption, is the so called ‘corruption protection’, which is defined as “an action carried out to prevent perpetrators of corruption from being brought to justice.” (Abdullah, 2017a, p. 69). Anti-corruption bodies in Iraq act in a politicised environment and are prone to corruption themselves due to corruption protection. Powerful groups in Iraq influence the corruption investigation and are thus able to manipulate the system. Correspondingly, they influence who is brought to court and who will be protected from the anti-corruption system (Abdullah, 2017a). As a consequence, trust in the anti-corruption bodies has dwindled, seeing they are affected by political and sectarian powers. To combat corruption in education the functioning of anti-corruption institutions are of utmost importance.

This sub-chapter provided an answer to the third sub-question, “*What is the perception of corruption in Iraq, how has it developed and what is the current extent of corruption?*”.

Summing up, historical moments – colonialism, authoritarian regime, and invasion – have influenced the perception and the amount of corruption in Iraq. In the beginning of the authoritarian regime corruption was limited to the elites and the patronage network. As a consequence of the UN sanctions and the Oil for Food Programme, the amount of corruption dramatically increased and was no longer limited to the government. Caused by the deteriorating situation of the population, who suffered most from the imposed sanctions, already basic services were often only available through providing a bribe to the responsible public servants. The rising instability caused by the invasion and the system of sectarianism led once again to an increase in types and amount of corruption. Hereby, one distinguishes between political and economic drivers of corruption. The political ones include the lack of security, the formation of militias and the introduction of the sectarianism. On the economic side, the drivers are highly intertwined with the CPA economic reforms. The drivers are intransparency in the reconstruction process, problems in accountability of the CPA budget, strong pro-market policy and, fourth, the rise of artificial monopolies due to political elites entering into the economic system, which were enabled to rent-seek with the *muhasassa* system. The predominance of corruption may be attributed to this system, supporting nepotism, clientelism and affiliated religious groups. The *muhasassa* system influenced the emergence of corruption-protection, as new persistent form of corruption in Iraq, which leads to the inefficiency of the anti-corruption bodies. All those developments led to the weak ranking of Iraq in the Corruption Perception Index of TI.

4.3 Iraq's Education System

Corruption affects all factors needed for the achievement of SDG4 negatively, for instance sufficient infrastructure or the availability of qualified teachers. To understand the ways in which corruption affects the education sector, the next step is to consider the educational system itself. The following chapter provides the answer to the fourth sub-question, “What is the current organisation of Iraqis’ education system and what are its challenges?”.

The educational system differs, depending on the geographical region- Iraq Centre and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In Iraq Centre, the main focal area of this thesis, the educational system consists of two years kindergarten, six years primary and compulsory stage and is ending with six years of secondary stage, composed of three years of lower and three years of upper secondary level. After school, a higher-education through university is possible. The education system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq provides nine years basic and compulsory

education and three years upper secondary level.




Figure 1 - Structure of the education system in Iraq (UNICEF, 2017a)

The National Education Strategy and Higher Education for the years 2011-2020 provides the framework for the educational system to improve the institutional framework and the education infrastructure. Along with access and retention, which includes education for children with disabilities and girls, the quality of education as well as education finance and research possibilities are addressed (UNICEF, 2012, 2017a).

The quality of education remains a significant concern in Iraq. Currently, 3 out of 10 schools teach the curriculum via conducting multiple shifts⁵. Students who learn in one of the 4326 primary schools or 1665 secondary schools in Central Iraq with a shifting system have lower passing rates. In Iraq, the overall passing rate is 91 percent. Of students attending in a morning class 87 percent pass, while only 67 percent of evening class students pass. Thus, the shift system affects learning outcomes negatively and is therefore not the desired outcome of SDG 4, the qualitative education. Simultaneously the school infrastructure shows large deficits, many schools are suffering from poor maintenance. According to UNICEF (2017a), a survey of the Ministry of Education of 2016 states, that more than 40 percent of the schools need renovation. Not only is renovation needed, some schools do not actually meet Iraq's

⁵ Due to the high number of students, the capacities of the schools are not sufficient. It follows a shift system, whereas one part of the students has lessons in the morning and the other part in the evening.

construction standards: this concerns 15.3 percent of primary schools. In total, more than 50 percent of the public schools in Iraq do either offer unqualified education or do need rehabilitation. However, in contrast to the rising demand of financial capital for the infrastructure of schools, only 5.7 percent of the government expenditure is spent in the educational sector which brings Iraq to the bottom rank of the Middle East countries. Often, the expenses (6.8 Trillion IQD (approx. 5.6 Billion US-Dollar) in 2015-16) are not spent in investment projects (e.g. new schools or maintenance) and the budget is poorly implemented (UNICEF, 2017a).

Further great problems of the current education system are the dropout rates and the high level of repetition in Centre Iraq. The dropout rates, in nearly all educational levels, have increased; with the girl's dropout rates being comparatively higher to those of the boys. In the lower secondary levels 4.7 percent of the girls dropped out of school, while 3.6 percent of the boys left school. The repetition rates are alarming, ranging from 14.6 percent in primary school to 27 percent in lower secondary school and 22.1 percent in upper secondary school. The Kurdistan region has significant lower repetition rates than Centre Iraq. It is important to consider, that high dropout rates in schools are not only significant regarding the human rights situation in Iraq⁶ but rather cause long-term economic issues for the individual as well as for society. This contribute further to the high youth unemployment (71 percent of young men employed, 7.8 percent of young women employed). Furthermore, it highlights the existing gender gap in enrolment and employment, which needs to be closed to reach SDG4. The Iraqi government has lost 1.5 trillion IQD (1.2 Billion US-Dollar) alone, owing to inefficient use of resources resulting from high dropout rates and repetitions. The Iraqi economy was losing around 1.1 trillion IQD (907 Mio. US-Dollar) because of unrealised potential wages in 2014-2015, since education carries high value through life-long higher earning of workers, increasing with more years spent at school (UNICEF, 2017a).

As a result of the security threats from ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the Iraq government is facing problems with increasing enrolment rates due to Internal Displaced People (IDPs). In 2016, 48, 3 percent of all IDPs children were out of school. At the same time, the number of teachers has not increased which results in a lower pupil-teacher ratio. Likewise, not all teachers active in the educational sector are qualified for the job which then affects again the quality of the teaching in schools, which could result in higher repetition rates. As a result,

⁶ Education is a human right according to Article 26 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights (United Nations (2015b))

Iraq now experiences a rapid growth of private schools, trying to offer better qualitative educational services (UNICEF, 2017a). This situation should be closely monitored to not develop a two-class system for the poor and the rich. Although, private schools may help to decrease the pressure on the public-school system, it still needs to be supported financially to lower the school fees, enabling a more inclusive learning for all. Concluding, one major challenge of the Iraqi education system is the shifting system, which results in a higher level of repetitions and elevated dropout rates. Moreover, there is a big gender gap in enrolment and the system is increasingly constrained by the number of IDPs. On top of that, the quality of teachers is not always according to the Iraqi standard and the demand of investments in schools (e.g. renovation, materials) is very high.

4.4 Anti-Corruption Efforts: UNDP Anti-Corruption Methods

The following section outlines the categories of the UNDP anti-corruption methods and their implementation in Iraq. Hereby, the Iraqi interpretation of categories of rule of law, the public administration and system, transparency and accountability, and the capacity development is explained. The aim of the chapter is to identify if the Iraqi government has implemented the methods and tools taking into the account the good practices described in the UNDP document, after its publication in 2011. Some of these recommendations are rather general, which is why actions to combat corruption in the education sector taking place before 2011 will also be outlined.

4.4.1 Rule of Law

The rule of law category consists of legislation, sanctions and the existence of a code of conduct. In the following, Iraqis implementation of rule of law, with regard to the mentioned sub-categories will be analysed.

4.4.1.1 Legislation

The *legislation* of Iraq provides the basis for tackling corruption within the country. Without sanctioning corruptive behaviour improvement is difficult to achieve. After the invasion, Iraq ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2008, a first step to provide anti-corruption legislation in Iraq (UNODC, 2018). This process was followed by the development of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which was developed together with UNDP (Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010). Furthermore, article 136b of the Criminal Code was repealed in 2007, stating that ministers were allowed to protect their employees from corruption prosecution (Global Justice Project: Iraq, 2009). This removal was a major improvement in the legislation framework to fight corruption. At the same time, Iraq is involved in different

international initiatives such as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and various OECD programmes, showing the government's willingness to react to the high percentage of corruption within the country, at least in terms of legislation (Agator, 2013; Pring, 2015).

According to the national legislation, especially within the Iraqi Penal Code, Law 111 (1969), amended in 2010, Iraqi laws criminalize various forms of corruption. Those include public sector bribery (Article 15,16,18,21, Law 111 of 1969), embezzlement (Article 315) and obstruction of justice (Article 229). In addition, a mandatory disclosure of assets by public officials (Law 30 of 2011) is in existence, while courts do have the power to freeze, seize, and confiscate certain assets (Article 101). Although, an Anti-Money Laundering Act came into force in 2004, it does not fulfil international standards in hindering money laundering (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Whistleblowers are protected by the Iraqi law, but in practice political pressure takes place, especially in the field of corruption as investigated by Freedom House (2013). In addition, the Public Procurement Law from 2004 and the Investment Law, seek to reduce corruption and illegalize corruption by enabling competitive bidding, raising concerns about corruption (U.S. Department of State, 2013). A national anti-corruption strategy has been published by the Iraqi government for the timeframe of 2010-2014 (Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010). The next national strategy to combat corruption was supposed to be active from 2014-2018, however, this strategy could not be found. To improve the overall situation regarding corruption, the Iraqi government signed a memorandum with UNDP, allowing the latter to provide assistance to the Iraqi anti-corruption bodies, supporting their investigations regarding corruption (UNDP, 2016a). Global Integrity (2008) scores Iraq's anti-corruption laws with 89 point of 100, since attempted corruption, extortion, offering and receiving a bribe are illegal by law. Using confidential state information and/ or using public resources for private gain is illegal. Yet, bribing a foreign official is not illegal, which highlights the room for improvement.

The institutional framework executes the national legislation in terms of corruption, consisting of six parts. In the following, anti-corruption bodies and committees responsible for corruption cases are presented. The Commission of Integrity (COI) is the main anti-corruption body in Iraq, established as an independent body from the government in 2004. The COI is active in two fields, the legal field and the educational-informative field. Within the legal dimension, the commission is responsible for carrying out investigations of corruption, suggesting the modification of laws along the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity in the public and private sector. Moreover, its functions include the oversight of financial disclosure of senior Iraqi officials and the proposal of new laws in line

with the mentioned principles. With regard to the educational informative field, the Commission is active in improving and evolving the teaching of ethical and integrity values in schools through the development of curricula that include those values (Abdullah, 2017a; Commission of Integrity, 2018).

The next institution is the Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA), formerly known as the Board of the Supreme Audit, one of the oldest institutions in the Republic of Iraq. Just like the COI, the FBSA is an independent body, reporting to the parliament. Its tasks range from protecting public funds, increasing efficiency of the institution over conducting audits of various public sectors and improving audit standards to ensure international criteria (Abdullah, 2017a; Agator, 2013). The offices of Inspector Generals (IGs) were established in 2004 to undertake audit investigations and performance reviews in the ministries. The IGs are placed within every Iraqi Ministry to increase accountability, integrity, transparency and efficiency in the ministerial operations. To avoid corruption within the IGs their salary is equivalent to a vice ministers position (Abdullah, 2017a).

To improve coordination between the anti-corruption bodies and their framework, the Anti-Corruption Committee was created in 2008. It is supposed to share information and oversee the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and consists of representatives of the COI, the FBSA and the IGs. The committee is chaired by the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers. Besides the independent committees, a parliamentary committee has been established after 2003, consisting of different members of parliament from different sectarian background. To be able to investigate corruption, the judicial system must be in place. In Iraq, the judicial system is separated from executive and is considered to be independent (Agator, 2013).

4.4.1.2 Sanctions

The topic of sanctions is highly intertwined with the legislation of the country. First of all, types of corruption need to be defined as illegal in order to be able to impose sanctions. The severity of penalties has to be included in the national law. Secondly, sanctions need to be executed, otherwise they remain an empty threat.

The Iraqi Penal Code, defines the sanctions for corruption including bribery, embezzlement and officials overstepping the bounds of their duties (Iraqi Penal Code, Law 111, 1969). The punishment for bribery can reach up to ten years imprisonment in some cases, the gift offered or received during the bribery will be confiscated. Embezzlement, in comparison, is penalized more severely; it ranges from a fine to life imprisonment, depending on circumstances and dimension of the embezzlement. Similar to bribery, the offender needs

to make restitution for the funds or reimburse the value of the benefits he or she has received due to the illegal action. For the third mentioned type of corruption, overstepping bounds of duties, punishment ranges from detention to restitution for the property towards the compensation of a person who suffered harm as the result of the offenses (Bajalan, n.d.).

After all, sanctions can only be effective if the actual implementation is being conducted while having working anti-corruption institutions. In contrast to the fairly good assessment of Global Integrity (2008) regarding the anti-corruption laws in Iraq, the actual law enforcement is rated with only 40 out of 100 points. Global Integrity is criticizing the practical implementation of the anti-corruption laws, which is often influenced by political interference. Ten years later, the Report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) still highlights problems with Iraq's legal framework and its implementation, stating its insufficiency to fight corruption effectively and thus, impose effective sanctions. TI supports this argument, by referring to missing forms of corruption in the legislation, making sanctions impossible (Agator, 2013). In addition, the report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) refers to a lack of willingness to engage in anti-corruption work as well as a lack of human and financial capital. Furthermore, the above-mentioned anti-corruption bodies and their personnel are subject to political influence, sectarian pressure and intimidation. The CIO is often described as having a high number of bureaucratic barriers, while the judiciary may itself be prone to corruption.

4.4.1.3 Code of Conduct

In 2017, the code of conduct for teachers in Iraq has been released in order to promote positive discipline. Due to the language barrier, the exact content of the code of conduct cannot be outlined since it is only available in Arabic. Nevertheless, the provision of a first code of conduct for teachers is already a positive step in the right direction (Global Education Cluster, 2017). Hereby, it is important to ensure that dissemination of the codes comes and goes hand in hand with the in-depth understanding of the content for the educational personnel. There is need for consultation and information dissemination at every level in the educational sector, including all people related to school such as children, education authorities parents and teachers (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011).

Before concluding the rule of law section, one needs to keep in mind that anti-corruption legislation has no proven direct impact, rather an indirect one, on corruption in education. However, it represents the willingness of the government to address issues of corruption. Moreover, the laws are known by the public and thus, public pressure may be created to improve situation of corruption. The sanctions for corruption in the area of education pose another problem, since they have usually lower penalties in practice compared

to corruption in other areas. The provision of a Code of Conduct has a proven positive impact on the behaviour and performance of education staff. To conclude, it is important to mention that there is a discrepancy between the theoretical and the practical provision of protection against corruption. On the one side, Iraqis legislation scored 89 out of 100 points⁷ at the Global Integrity Index (2008) for its legal framework combating corruption. Iraq has adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption, developed a National Anti-Corruption strategy and criminalized various forms of corruption. Taking the theoretical legal side into account, Iraq's government provides a good framework for combating corruption. The same is valid for the anti-corruption bodies in place in (COI, FBSA, Anti-corruption committee, IGs). Notwithstanding, in practical terms the Iraqi rule of law has some weaknesses. The Global Integrity Index (2008) rates the actual law enforcement with only 40 out of 100 points, indicating a weak practical implementation of anti-corruption laws. Besides, sanctions are not always clear or executed and the anti-corruption bodies are subject to high political influence and sectarian pressure. Furthermore, the judiciary sector may itself be prone to corruption as well as conducting 'corruption protection'. As described in Ch. 4.2, anti-corruption bodies in Iraq are part of the corruption system, since they are systematically manipulated, undermining the justice system. A former head of the Commission of Integrity in Iraq framed the current role of anti-corruption bodies in Iraq in a negative light by referring to them as means of committing corruption (Abdullah, 2017a). By implication, an effective implementation of anti-corruption methods in the category of rule of law is not given, only the successful implementation of a code of conduct for teachers. Consequently, the Iraqi government needs to work on the practical implementation of its legal framework, working towards effective combat of corruption in general and in the sector of education in particular.

4.4.2 Public Administration and System

The public administration and system category consists of three sub-categories: Financial system, independent audit bodies and IT systems for administration. In the following, Iraqis implementation of the suggested UNDP methods will be analysed.

4.4.2.1 Financial System

According to UNDP, an enhanced financial system can be achieved by advancing the financial management in the education sector as well as improving disbursement of school grants.

⁷ 100 points as the best score, while 0 points indicate the worst enforcement

4.4.2.1.1 Financial Management

One of the methods to combat corruption in the education sector is to strengthen the financial management. This includes the involvement of public fiscal management (PFM), public expenditure management (PEM) and medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). The findings from Wood and Antonowicz (2011) indicated, that there may be no direct impact of financial management process on the reduction of corruption. However, the introduction of those systems increases the financial capacity of the government, creating an environment with improved good governance principles.

The report of World Bank Group (2010) indicates the progress in the reform of public expenditure management, positively impacting the capital budget execution rates. Nonetheless, several improvements in the area are still needed. This includes the proper functions of government financial management information system. In addition, the report called for a medium-term perspective in the budgeting for better planning and increased flexibility. The World Bank Group (2010) raised awareness about the need for a demanding reform agenda and created a reform program design in line with a strategy and an action plan. To some extent, reforms started from 2016 with the World Bank financing a project to modernize the PFM system, lasting from December 2016 until November 2021. The total costs amounted to 41.50 million US-Dollar. Hereby, an integrated financial management information system will be designed and implemented; a development of PFM capacity will take place as well as an internal audit modernization at the Federal Ministry of Finance. Further, the establishment of an PFM system at subnational level and project management and reform coordination will take place (The World Bank, 2016). Thus, reforms are on their way; however, one needs to see and evaluate how effective they are. Nevertheless, financial management has been identified as a field that has to be improved in order to provide better accountability and better planning skills.

4.4.2.1.2 School Grants Disbursement

Literature showed different successful school grant disbursement, avoiding corruption in the distribution. The use of a third party for disbursement and textbook grants transfer to schools have reduced the amount of wasted money through corruption. To avoid full disbursement of the grand in cash, school bank accounts have helped to reduce corruption in schools. Furthermore, the return and liquidations of grants need to be assured by following up at the schools, which need to justify their spending (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011).

The education system in Iraq is highly centralized, this includes the supply of text books and teaching aids (Issa & Jamil, 2010). In line with the invasion of 2003, the need for

school books was high. Starting in 2003, the government jointed a partnership with UNESCO to distribute school books throughout the country. The distribution took place during a time of high insecurity and violence; however, monitoring has been conducted and 100 percent of the books reached the schools, enabling the children to start studying again. . This project took place as an immediate aid to secure the running of the schools; it has not been implemented for long- term development. The team recognized the need for decentralized distribution systems for each grade (Commisso, 2004). Nevertheless, it secured the basis for teaching and the future delivery of text books. Recently, IDPs have been facing a similar problem of limited access to school. The provision of online books shall provide access to education for people who may not easily attend school (UNESCO, n.d.b). On the platform, electronic versions of all available Iraqi textbooks for schools can be found. Providing text books online, reduces the possibility of corruption since the delivery is not necessary and everyone with internet access can use this literature.

Concluding, Iraq may follow a more decentralized approach in school grant disbursement, Sierra Leone could serve as a role model that decreased budget leakages (98.6 percent of funds transferred) through the use of a third party for grant disbursement during a pilot project in 2003 (Lewis & Pettersson Gelandar, 2009). The same approach could be useful in the distribution of textbooks; although, the introduction of an online library constitutes another good approach to provide broader access to education.

4.4.2.2. Independent Audit Bodies

Audit bodies play an important role in monitoring the use of public funds. Hereby, one can distinguish between national-wide audit bodies and sub-national or regional bodies. Wood and Antonowicz (2011) suggested the implementation of independent audit bodies for the disbursement of scholarships and school grants, audit bodies for the examinations, diplomas and entrance to university as well as a body monitoring teachers certification and examination. Independent bodies on school level have been shown, that the devolution of power to parents and communities can reduce corruption.

In Iraq, the FBSA is responsible for the overall monitoring of the accountability of public funds, overseeing public contracts and ensuring the efficiency of government institutions, the public sector and of public servants. It is detecting cases of corruption, fraud or waste and financial management abuse. In case of any violations, the matter will be transferred to the IGs for further investigation. The Inspector General conducts investigations and then forwards the findings to the Minister or the Head of Administration (Agator, 2013; Harb, 2014). Iraq's public education system is free fees, thus, audit bodies for scholarships are

not needed. Iraq's education system enables the parents the participation in a so-called parent-teacher councils, which have to be established in every school according to the Regulation No (1) of 1994. The council consists of parents and teachers and focus on regulating the student-teacher relationships, controlling discipline and addressing other school-related topics (USAID, 2016). Further independent audit bodies could not be identified.

Having a closer look at the FBSA, it becomes apparent that it is relatively weak in implementing audit measures. The anti-corruption bodies are often highly influenced by political pressure, while being overstrained with the high numbers of cases of corruption each year. At the same time, the FBSA lacks support in the internal audit work (Salih & Hla, 2015). Resultantly, the position of the FBSA needs to be strengthened in the system of independent anti-corruption bodies. Moreover, Iraq's government should consider the establishment of further independent audit bodies in the sector of education, for instance, an audit body for examination, entrance to university or the body controlling for teacher's certificates. Nepal's Public Accounts Committee, which examines the public accounts and the report of the Auditor General, while owning the power to pursue the clearance of arrears, could be a good role model (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). Concluding, the role of independent audit bodies in Iraq still needs to be strengthened in order to create a less corruptive environment.

4.4.2.3 IT Systems for Administration

The UNDP report emphasizes the importance of using software and technology to reduce corruption. The application of software systems can help in the area of teacher registration and payment, student records, they provide transparency for examinations and access to university as well as accountability through monitoring systems (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). Iraq implemented the educational management information system (EMIS), which provides information about the distribution and allocation of educational resources and services and supports monitoring the performance of the education system. The EMIS affords an overview about the educational system by providing data about education related topics such as teachers, principals and school information (UNESCO, n.d.a). However, UNICEF (2017a) indicated the insufficiency of the current EMIS, providing a too narrow scope of information by only providing data on enrolment rates and the amount of teachers. The collection of more specific data, especially in regard to quality and learning outcomes is crucial. To supplement the EMIS, Iraq introduced in partnership with UNESCO the Student Information Management System (SIM), enabling access to more detailed information on students, teachers and schools to allow more precise educational planning (Subhee, 2017). One can

conclude that the most needed IT systems have been implemented; however, improvements are desirable, especially in the availability of in-depth data.

To conclude, the successful implementation of the methods and tools within the public administration and system varies per category. For the financial management, the Iraq government is currently partnering with the World Bank to reform the public financial management, which includes the financial management information system. The project runs until 2021 and includes capacity development in the area of financial management. Nonetheless, the MTEF has not been implemented, as suggested. Subsequently, the medium-term perspective should be included, and a further evaluation should be undertaken after the accomplishment of the World Bank project in 2021. Also, the school grants disbursement shall be conducted in the most decentralized way or with the involvement of a third party. The education system is highly centralized and all textbook distributions took place in a centralized manner. However, the provision of an online library for school books is a positive approach. In regard to the IT system, Iraq has implemented the suggested systems, especially the EMIS. After all, the narrow availability of data is still to be criticized; specific data with regard to quality or learning outcomes is not available. Therefore, the existing system should be more enhanced, further, among other points elaborating on more diverse data collection and entry to fulfil the suggestions by Wood and Antonowicz (2011).

4.4.3. Transparency and Accountability

This category plays an important role in the awareness and delivery of information about corruption. Sub-topics researched are advocacy and awareness-raising, anti-corruption education, open and transparent procurement processes, as well as participatory monitoring and social accountability. Further, the availability of information and the use of media will be assessed, followed by an examination of the accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism. This section concludes with the availability of surveys in regard to anti-corruption work.

4.4.3.1. Advocacy and Awareness-raising

The Commission of Integrity has been active in anti-corruption campaigning, launching a national campaign in 2017 that promotes the engagement of NGOs and civil society in tackling corruption. The campaign, supported by UNDP and under the leadership of the Prime Minister's office, involved nearly 300 Iraqi NGOs. The campaign aimed for improved transparency, integrity and accountability and hoped to raise awareness to 3 to 4 million citizens (Hilal, 2017). Also, the German Development Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)) launched an Anti-Corruption and Integrity Programme

in Northern Iraq in 2016, sharing knowledge about corruption country wide (GIZ, 2017). In 2007, the Iraq Foundation (2007) launched an Anti-Corruption and Transparent Project to mobilization of public opinion against corruption and encourage transparency and accountability within the governmental institutions. Hereby, a partnership was created between the COI and the Lebanese Chapter of TI, holding meetings for experts from both sides. At the same time, community workshops have been undertaken, brochures distributed, and a TV show was planned. These are examples of wide ranging campaigns trying to advocate for a corruption-free Iraq. Besides, other small initiatives took and take place, not to forget about online awareness campaigns. Since 2011, social media activism is on the rise in Iraq, advocating for reforms to fight corruption. The youth, in particular, has been a driving force for social media activism, covering demonstrations, or activities involving corruption (Kirstensen, 2011).

The above-mentioned examples of corruption awareness campaigns in Iraq did not focus on specific sectors but tried to make society aware of the costs of corruption as a whole. Structuring initiatives tackling the specific sector of education could be formed. The corruption-free education campaign in Peru could be used as indicator. That campaign evoked a higher number of complaints and increased the awareness of teachers, children, parents and local communities at the same time (Castilla, 2008). Another successful example is the “Eradicate corruption in education” campaign undertaken in Mali by the Association of Journalist Against Corruption, supported by USAID. The campaign enabled the establishment of a more transparent student evaluation system and other transparent process in the school environment (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). It would be helpful to consider the establishment of an anti-corruption campaign especially for education.

4.4.3.2. Anti-corruption Education

It is important to remember that corruption is a phenomenon affecting the society as a whole. By providing knowledge in schools about the concept of corruption as well as transparency, human rights, the facets of corruption and its practices, corruption may be subject to change in time. Teaching the values of honesty and integrity, while making aware of the negative impacts of corruption, future generations may shift their mindsets regarding corruption.

In 2013, Iraq has launched its first anti-corruption curricular for both primary and secondary schools (INEE, 2013). Within the curricular, preventive aspects are highlighted, while providing information about the possible types of corruption and giving references to possible sanctions that result from corruption. The main topics of the integrity curricular include the concept of corruption, anti-corruption, ethical issues, corruption and human rights

as well as corruption and the market economy. Additionally, the topics of corruption and the law as well as corruption and democratic society will be tackled (Sustainable Research & Development, UNDP, & Ministry of Education, 2011). By addressing corruption within a teaching environment, a raised awareness, comes together with the opportunity to discuss experiences in regard to corruption; students can reflect on corrupt behaviour and situations where they have been personally confronted with corruption, while being aware of their own personal rights. Although the inclusion of the topic of corruption into the school curricula offers a good entry point to start discussing corruption in society, it is in itself not sufficient to combat corruption. Especially, when one takes into account that evidence on the direct effect of those approaches has not been published. Concluding, Iraq has successfully implemented anti-corruption education in its system. It is crucial that the lessons learned are not just theoretical ones but are being applied to real life scenarios, and thus affording the chance to combating corruption in a sustainable manner.

4.4.3.3. Open and Transparent Procurement Processes

Public contracting is one of the major areas, where corruption can be tackled effectively by installing transparent and open bidding processes. In Iraq, Order 87 outlines the major principles of its procurement system, including “international standards of transparency, predictability, fairness and equality of treatment” (Order Number 87 Public Contracts, 2004). Moreover, it states that “procurement process integrity, minimum ethical standards and non-conflict of interest” (Order Number 87 Public Contracts, 2004) need to be assured. For the public procurement process there are risks of corruption in the phase of need assessment, in the planning phase, the selection procedure and in the execution of contracts.

Especially, the textbook procurement in the area of education has a high risk of corruption due to its high costs and scope of the procurement. Before 2003, the Iraqi Government did not apply a public procurement system and used the same textbook printers and suppliers for decades, resulting in market monopoly, high prices and unreliable quality. As part of the emergency textbook provision project, the World Bank introduced a number of changes in the system of procurement. First of all, it opened the market to international competition and divided printing contracts between printing and procurement of paper. Secondly, the capacity of the Ministry of Education staff was increased through training in procurement and project management. The reforms saved approximately 9 million US-Dollar due to competitive bidding in the school year 2004-2005 and produced standardized procedures and bidding documents for further national procurements (Mosler, Ali, & Lipson, 2015).

Upon request of the Iraqi government, the OECD provided policy recommendations for improvement in the public procurement regulations and procedures of the 2008 Procurement Regulation. The OECD (2010) proposed following policy options, seeking to improve procurement regulations. To achieve open and public tender procedures it is key to avoid single source or direct negotiations. There ought to be a balance between transparency with efficiency as well as shorter procedures, for this reason; they suggest the establishment of an independent audit body for streamlining. In addition, the evaluation criteria need to be available to the public to avoid biases, favouritism and corruption. The OECD (2010) favours the inclusion of abnormally low offers, enhancing a more cost-effective competition. Moreover, the contract execution needs to be more transparent by controlling for subcontracting (e.g. capping subcontractors to 30 percent according to international standards) and by improving access of local small and medium-sized enterprises to procurement contracts since they are familiar with the local conditions. The fourth proposal is the ensuring of effective financial guarantees and their timely reimbursement by easing bid bond requirements and compensate bid bonds. In addition, the civil servant's professionalism needs to be increased by training them in the latest procurement rules and regulations; best would be an ongoing training for procurement officials. The OECD also proposed to ensure co-ordinated control mechanisms, which are crucial for preventing the waste of public money and general irregularities. This includes a clearly defined accountability chain. Furthermore, the OECD (2010) suggested the improvement of a rapid dispute resolution, taking into account that it is a guarantee for the integrity of the procurement and contract process. It is equally important, to raise awareness of dispute settlement arrangements among contractors in Iraq, because limited knowledge about the availability was reported. The last proposal refers to the development of specific tools to fight corruption in procurement. Hereby, the government shall focus on the prevention of corruption and violations of integrity, the effective sanctioning and the raising of awareness and education of the population (OECD, 2010)

The cooperation between anti-corruption bodies and bid protest forums is not sufficient in practice in Iraq. At the same time, the lack of interaction between those bodies undermines anti-corruption efforts in the public sector (Rahman, 2014). Ergo, it is recommended to establish stronger national cooperation within the established bodies, enabling a more open and transparent procurement process. To enable an transparent and open procurement in the education sector, Iraq's government should think about introducing the TI's Integrity Pact, which consists of a process that includes an agreement between the

government and the bidders for public sector contracts (Transparency International, 2009). This agreement includes that no bribes, gifts or payments are involved, neither on the side of the principals nor of the bidder. Moreover, all bidders have to disclose all payments in connection with the contract and the non-bribery commitment in combination with the sanction remain in force until the contract is executed. Besides, each bidder must follow a code of conduct alongside with a compliance programme. A set of sanctions are specifically mentioned in the Integrity Pacts, those include denial or loss of contract, liability for damages to the principal and the competing bidders, forfeiture for the bid, and debarment of the violator by the principle for an appropriate period of time. An independent external expert will monitor the process (Kühn & Sherman, 2014). In comparison to the Saddam regime, the current situation of the procurement process has been improved. However, fundamental problems still exist and the system is far from being transparent and open. Consequently, the policy recommendations together with improved cooperation between anti-corruption bodies need to be implemented in order to create an open and transparent procurement process in the education sector.

4.4.3.4. Participatory Monitoring and Social Accountability

Wood and Antonowicz (2011) provide some insights in the effectiveness of the role of school management committees and the budget tracking and monitoring via score cards or children's monitoring, for participatory monitoring and social accountability in schools.

4.4.3.4.1. Role of School Management Committees

Literature provides several examples of increased transparency as a result of parental involvement with the membership of the school management committees (SMCs). The SMCs have the responsibility for the school planning, school budgeting and finances and its positions are usually filled with the head teacher, parents and community members. It is important to keep the balance between the powers of the SMCs members, in some cases, the head teacher dominated and rarely gave in sights in the finances. Thus, the effectiveness of an SMC depends on the participations rights and varies per region. Also, more committees need to be established as so far, they are not yet in place throughout the whole country.

The occupation of ISIS and an insufficient educational infrastructure in Iraq caused by an unstable security situation has led to some regions lacking proper educational standards. The NGO Save the Children supported therefore schools in a southern Iraqi region and established at the same time SMCs in 40 Iraqi schools (Save the Children Japan, 2013). Moreover, schools that benefited from UNICEF support established SMCs or Parents Teacher Associations (PTA) in a total of 432 schools in 2016 (UNICEF, 2016). Especially PTAs have

a long tradition in Iraq and are required by law. They need to be reactivated further in the future to be certain that this useful body is fully active and effective in the management of the school and its relationship with the students (USAID, 2016). An overall data set about the establishments of SMCs or PTAs could not be found; however, the existing support to establish or to reactivate those committees and associations should be ongoing since they constitute an important tool to involve the community and the parents.

4.4.3.4.2. Budget Tracking and Monitoring

The report of Wood and Antonowicz (2011) highlighted the importance of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and NGOs in budget tracking and monitoring. The World Bank (2012) indicated the importance of CSOs in the Iraqi context. It referred to a nascent, active CSO sector in Iraq, focussing mainly on governance, human rights, democracy and environment. Some CSOs are specialized in budgets, abuse of office and corruption. The Global Education Monitoring Report highlights the significance of the civil society as supporters of the work of internal and external auditors (Antoninis, 2017). A successful global example of civil society engagement is a project of the Commonwealth Education Fund, which enhanced local community participation to monitor education-related budgets and expenditures both on local and national level. Tools and procedures have been developed such as working in groups to avoid bribes (Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). The report of the Commonwealth Education Fund (2013) laid out the different levels of possibilities to involve the civil society in budget tracking or monitoring. Hereby, the civil society can be influential in the decision-making process or at the final expenditure, controlling for the proper use of public money.

In Iraq, grass root data on the activities of CSOs in Iraq in regard to specific budget tracking and monitoring activities could not be identified; therefore, a specific analysis is not possible. Withal, the Global Partnership for Education, a fund for education in developing countries, could support the Iraqi government in the implementation of SDG4. Currently, Iraq is not a member in this multi-stakeholder platform (Global Partnership for Education, 2018). There is a need for the availability of data in this sector, right now, as the influence of the CSOs in Iraq in regard to budget tracking and monitoring cannot be assessed.

4.4.3.4.2.1 Score Cards and Children's Monitoring

Community score cards or report cards are considered to be a flexible and useful tool to raise awareness in the communities and identifying possible mismanagement. Hereby, the beneficiaries of the public services are reporting on the current status of the delivery.

In several countries, community score cards have been successfully used, monitoring public services in general, specific sectors (e.g. education or/and health) or in specific areas

such as textbook distribution. There has been evidence of the application in India, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Ghana, Armenia, and Congo among others (Labrecque & Batonon, 2015; Wood & Antonowicz, 2011). In Iraq, no data about the application of score cards was found. In any case, the use of score cards in a fragile country like Congo can give insights for possible application strategies in Iraq. Hereby, Congo's population has limited access to information and hence, lack understanding as to what rights and responsibilities they have in regard to public services. Moreover, the accountability between service providers and service users is weak and the voice of citizens in service delivery is rarely heard (Labrecque & Batonon, 2015). These characteristics also fit the Iraqi context. The project improved access to services as well as, the population's understanding of their own role in the education and health sector and increased the cooperation between service providers and users (Labrecque & Batonon, 2015).

Concluding, information about Iraq's implementation of score cards could not been found, and one can therefore, assume that they have not been implemented. The Congolese application could be used as a model to develop an approach for the fragile context of Iraq.

Children's monitoring can be a promising tool in overseeing the school management. A successful case study in Uganda, proved the positive effect on the decline of teacher absenteeism or the reporting of corruption (Anyuru, 2006). Similar to the community score cards, specific data on the country level could not been identified for Iraq. Government and civil society are recommended to engage with the method of children's monitoring.

4.4.3.5. Information and the Use of Media

As described in the previous chapters, the media plays a key role in reducing corruption by providing access to information. Iraq does not score well in the Freedom House Index (score 71 out of 100) and the World Press Freedom Index (score 160 out of 180), indicating serious concerns about the freedom of press (Freedom House, 2017; Reporters Without Borders, 2018a). In June 2018, two reporters covering corruption in Iraq have been arrested and were denied information about the reasons for the investigation. In theory, journalists are protected by Iraqi law. In practice, however, judicial pressure and sometimes death threats are applied by local officials to prevent investigations into corruption (Reporters Without Borders, 2018b). Nevertheless, reports about corruption in education happen, disclosing fake degrees, bribes or the loss of funds in the education sector (Iraq-Business news, 2017; PRI's The World, 2010). With the rise of social media, journalists get the opportunity to spread news faster and more widely, thus also enables quicker dissemination of news on corruption. Concluding, alongside with the analysis of Ch. 4.2, one can say that Iraq does not provide a

healthy environment for journalism and media coverage. In theory, Iraq's government enables the freedom of expression and access to information; in practice this is not the case. Respectively, Iraq's government does not fulfil the requirements by Wood and Antonowicz (2011) in the area of information and the use of media to combat corruption in education.

4.4.3.6. Accountability Mechanisms Around Teacher Absenteeism

As highlighted in Ch. 4.2, absenteeism is causing serious damages in Iraq. Absenteeism can of course be caused by illness, trainings or special circumstances. In contrast, it can also take the form of structural absenteeism as indicated by different reports in developing countries (Abadzi, 2007; Bold et al., 2017; Chaudhury et al., 2006). Brombacher et al. (2012) performed an analysis of student performance in a sample of 54 schools in Iraq, indicating an average teacher absenteeism rate of 8.9 percent on the day of visit. The range of the teacher absenteeism reached from zero percent to 46 percent in the schools and is therefore highly dependent on the location of the school. Banerjee and Duflo (2006) researched that incentives may be successful to counteract absenteeism. Another tool would be the implementation of systematic monitoring rather than involving headmasters, who may be subject to manipulation of the teacher absenteeism report cards. There are highly effective projects, aiming for the reduction of teacher's absenteeism by being cost-effective. The NGO Seva Mandir implemented a cost-effective monitoring project in India, by providing cameras to the teachers. The teachers took a picture with the students at the beginning and at the end of the school day. This monitoring method was combined with financial incentives to go to school and punishments if not. The project had massive impact on the absenteeism of teachers, which declined from 42 percent to 22 percent (Duflo & Hanna, 2005). Similar projects could be implemented in Iraq, especially in schools facing issues with high absenteeism (like the school with 46 percent), considering that teacher absenteeism is a form of corruption by denying access to education.

4.4.3.7. Surveys

Anti-corruption work can be supported by surveys such as public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) or quantitative service delivery surveys (Ochse, 2004). The report of UNDP Regional Centre in Cairo (2010) highlights the usefulness of PETS to track budget flows but refers to the problems of Arab states in their accountability, stating their problems in low levels of democracy participation, weak governmental capacity and little room for effective local governance. Thus, countries with internal conflict struggle with access to basic service; the provision of any surveys in that area is not mentioned. It is likely, that the Iraqi government has not been investing in surveys that support anti-corruption work and promote

accountability. Correspondingly, improvement is desirable.

Some of the methods and tools suggested in the category of transparency and accountability have been implemented partially in Iraq, while others could not be accessed due to the non-availability of data. Concerning the advocacy awareness raising category, the Iraqi Commission of Integrity made a step into the right direction by launching a national campaign in 2017 and involving NGOs and civil society in combating corruption. To take this further, the organisation of an anti-corruption campaign specifically for the sector of education would be desirable for the future. The Iraqi government performed well in the implementation of the tool of anti-corruption education within the schools. In 2013, the First Anti-Corruption Curricular in Iraq was launched, fulfilling the requirement of Wood and Antonowicz (2011).

In the sub-category open and transparent procurement process, Iraq installed good improvements after 2003 by introducing international competition and other reforms, enabling a more effective bidding. However, the new regulations still have some weaknesses, as indicated in the OECD (2010) policy recommendations for a more transparent public procurement process. Those policy recommendations should be implemented by the Iraqi government to ensure open and transparent procurement processes. Just as in previous categories, there are practical problems with the cooperation between anti-corruption bodies and bid protest forums. To further increase transparency, it would be helpful to apply the procurement processes as described in the TI's Integrity Pacts. The role of PTAs is required by law, while the establishment of SMCs was observed by beneficiaries' schools of UNICEF and Save the Children. An overall data set was not found though; therefore, a conclusion about the whole of Iraq is not possible. Nevertheless, the existence and proof of those bodies is already a good sign on the way of combating corruption via the implementation of the methods and tools by Wood and Antonowicz (2011).

Regarding the availability of data, similar problems occurred in the sub-category budget tracking and monitoring including around the existence of score cards and children's monitoring. Support in tracking could be provided by the Global Partnership Fund for Education and lessons can be learned from the application of community score cards in Congo, a country with a comparably fragile situation. Both, Iraq's commitment to freedom of expression and the use of media need to be strengthened; as the current situation is unacceptable. Conjointly, concrete accountability mechanisms addressing teacher absenteeism should be established. In this context, the project of the NGO Seva Mandir can be used as a good practice. Lastly, the provisions of anti-corruption surveys such as public expenditure

tracking survey and quantitative service delivery surveys are important to promote transparency in the education sector.

4.4.4. Capacity Development

In accordance with the previous descriptions, several donors and international organisations support Iraq in providing capacity development through technical assistance and trainings. In Iraq, of the UN-organisations especially the UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO are particularly active in providing trainings and advice in the sector of education (UNDP Iraq, 2018; UNESCO Iraq, 2017; UNICEF Iraq, 2018). Moreover, the World Bank is supportive in financial terms for example through active involvement in projects related to procurement improvements (World Bank Group, 2010).

5. Conclusion

To gain a deeper understanding of corruption in Iraq, in particular the genesis and background of educational corruption, this thesis looked at the theoretical concepts of fragility and corruption (Ch.2). Both have been outlined by determining the causes of corruption, the perception of corruption in Iraq and its development, while considering Iraq's education system as such. To sum up, corruption and fragility in general are highly intertwined. Corruption has multidimensional causes and consequences and often historical origins, as seen in Ch. 4.1. The chapter 4.2 clearly outlined how the existence and the perception of corruption in Iraq has changed over time.

Taking the theoretical concepts of corruption into consideration, all three concepts (principal-agent, collective action, problem-solving) can be applied in the Iraqi context in different times. Clientelism and bribery for example, can be perceived through the lens of the classical principal-agent theory, where the principal (ruler e.g. ministry of education) demands the agent (educational personnel) to conduct the educational tasks. However the agent calls for favours or bribes in order to deliver his educational services. Here, the responsibility for controlling those corrupt activities lies with the principal. Nonetheless, supporters of the collective action theory could argue that in the time after the U.S. invasion, insecurity was very high and corruption was perceived to be normal and necessary. Iraqis would pay ransom money to safeguard each other from being kidnapped. In spite of that, corruption in Iraq can be also seen in the light of problem solving. Especially in the time of the UN sanctions and the De-Baathification, many people lost their jobs. Hardship and poverty rose and caused citizens to help themselves by bribing the administration in order to

get access to basic services such as health, education or the provision of food. For an overall comprehensive picture of corruption in Iraq, it is useful to combine all three theories, providing a profoundly holistic approach to corruption in Iraq. The sub-question about Iraq's education system highlighted serious challenges in the provision of qualitative education. Multiple school shifts (morning and evening), school infrastructure, high dropout rates as well as gender gap and quality of teaching personnel pose enormous problems to the quality of the Iraqi educational system. To achieve SDG4 by 2030, they need a lasting structural improvement.

After answering the sub-questions, the main research question, *“To what extent has Iraq implemented the methods and tools to fight corruption in education as indicated by UNDP in order to achieve the SDG4?”*, has been carefully analysed. Hereby, the dimensions 1) rule of law, 2) public administration and systems, 3) transparency and accountability and 4) capacity development were considered.

For the rule of law dimension, the analysis highlights the discrepancy between theoretical protection laws against corruption and the practical implementation of those. Important anti-corruption bodies have been created but even those are subject to political interference and cannot act completely independent. Until the theoretical provisions of anti-corruption laws and bodies do not correspond with the practical implementation, the implementation of the rule of law vis-a-vis corruption in education remains unsuccessful. Hence, according to Wood and Antonowicz (2011), the first dimension, rule of law, has not been sufficiently implemented. The second dimension, public administration and systems, included some successful implementations of a public financial management system or the educational management information system. Although, Iraq's government is on its way to fully implement the suggested tools and methods, there are still some major weaknesses like the unavailability of in-depth data or the centralization of the school grants disbursement. The next dimension, transparency and accountability, was constrained due the non-accessibility of data in many sub-categories. However, the anti-corruption curricular is for example one of the right steps towards a corruption education. Nevertheless, the public procurement processes do still not comply with the OECD policy recommendations and it is still not yet possible to access the data about budget tracking or monitoring initiatives. Thus, Iraq does currently not apply all the suggested methods and tools and still needs to improve in the category of transparency and accountability. The dimension of capacity development is fairly good implemented in Iraq since international and local NGOs or IOs contribute to capacity development in the public sector and also in the educational sector. As a result, this category

is fulfilled according to the suggested methods and tools for combating corruption in the education sector.

In conclusion, three out of four dimensions were not fully implemented or data was too limited/ unavailable to fully assess the overall situation. The dimensions of rule of law, public administration and system, and transparency and accountability need to be improved. Iraq only fulfilled the standards in the dimension of capacity development. To answer the main question, Iraq implemented the suggested methods and tools by Wood and Antonowicz (2011) in one out of four dimensions only. As a result, the successful implementation of SDG4 remains doubtful, as long as the defects in those three remaining dimensions prevail. In order to achieve the goal by 2030, the Iraqi government needs to implement the existing laws, systems and methods to combat corruption, allowing a thorough and sustainable implementation. It is important to consider the risk of recorruption, as highlighted by Dininio (2005). Consequently, each reform undertaken by Iraqi government to combat corruption needs to change attitudes, strengthen accountability and provide professional incentives. Especially, the social attitudes, manifested in the *muhasassa system* need to be tackled. The current system often prevents prosecution of corruption because of sectional division. This is accompanied by groups protecting each other, which results in false accusation of non-corrupt politicians and prevents the prosecution of corrupt people (Abdullah, 2017a). This can be seen in the anti-corruption institutions, which sometimes are involved in the corrupt system by conducting ‘corruption protection’. The government can decrease the amount of nepotism and clientelism by changing social behaviour. Including education, prevention and effective enforcement can reduce the risk of recorruption in education in Iraq.

The thesis outlined Iraq’s current shortcomings in the fight against corruption in the educational sector. By introducing best practices from other countries and suggesting to join certain initiatives, possible ways forward have been outlined. In regard to the practical implication, this paper outlined different barriers for the achievement of SDG4. In regard to quality of education, Iraq needs to increase its expenditure in education, abolish or reduce the system of multiple shifts and reduce the dropout rates. In a broader framework, the thesis elaborated on conditions of fragile states, identifying causes for their fragility, and discussed why the latter prevails in Iraq. Thus this paper contributes to the general understanding of fragile contexts.

During the research, the researcher faced access issues due to the availability of data, resulting in non-findings in some of the categories. However, in case specific data could not be found, best practices of anti-corruption work were outlined. Moreover, the available data

was in parts quite general; it needs to be elaborated further and provide more in-depth data. Due to the non-existence of an overall data system, and therefore using the snowball system, no holistic approach to all existing actions is given. In addition, the researcher experienced a language barrier and the problem that some of the policy documents were only available in Arabic. The results of the conducted study can be partially transferred to countries facing similar problems regarding corruption and fragility; however, this needs to be conducted carefully. Eventhough, the researcher tried to avoid westernized biases by using a broad range of literature, the cultural background and thus, its concepts of fragility and corruption may have influenced the research. Further research should elaborate on data-collection in the education sector of Iraq, providing further information on the specific types of corruption in education in Iraq (ghost teachers, bribes etc.). This could be done through conducting a survey gaining more insights for an effective anti-corruption work. The data gained could be used to apply the theoretical framework of corruption in education from Azfar, Young, and Swamy (2001), Heyneman (2004), Hallak and Poisson (2007) and Rumyantseva (2005), checking which types of corruption in education exist in Iraq. Following the most pressing corruption issues in education, specifically tailored programs and tools can be developed to challenge those types of corruption. Thus, anti-corruption campaigns can get more effective by tackling the specific types. The provision of detailed data increases the chances of achieving the SDG4 in Iraq by 2030.

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7. Appendix

Appendix A



Figure 2 - Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, n.d.)

Appendix B



Figure 3 - Millenium Development Goals

Appendix C

Areas of planning/management	Major opportunities for corrupt practices
Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transgressing rules and procedures / bypass of criteria • Inflation of costs and activities • Embezzlement
Allocation of specific allowances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favouritism / nepotism • Bribes • Bypass of criteria • Discrimination (political, social, ethnic)
Construction, maintenance and school repairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud in public tendering (payoffs, gifts, favouritism) • Collusion among suppliers • Embezzlement • Manipulating data • Bypass of school mapping • Ghost deliveries
Distribution of equipment, furniture and materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud in public tendering (payoffs, gifts, favouritism) • Collusion among suppliers • Siphoning of school supplies • Purchase of unnecessary equipment • Manipulating data • Bypass of allocation criteria • Ghost deliveries
Writing of textbooks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud in the selection of authors (favouritism, bribes, gifts) • Bypass of copyright law • Students forced to purchase materials copyrighted by instructors
Teacher appointment, management, payment and training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud in the appointment and deployment of teachers (favouritism, bribes, gifts) • Discrimination (political, social, ethnic) • Falsification of credentials/use of fake diplomas • Bypass of criteria • Pay delay, sometimes with unauthorized deductions
Teacher behaviour (professional misconduct)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ghost teachers • Absenteeism • Illegal fees (for school entrance, exams, assessment, private tutoring, etc.)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favouritism/nepotism/acceptance of gifts • Discrimination (political, social, ethnic) • Private tutoring (including use of schools for private purpose) • Sexual harassment or exploitation • Bribes or favours during inspector visits
Information systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manipulating data • Selecting/suppressing information • Irregularity in producing and publishing information • Payment for information that should be provided free
Examinations and diplomas, Access to universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selling information • Examination fraud (impersonation, cheating, favouritism, gifts) • Bribes (for high marks, grades, selection to specialized programmes, diplomas, admission to universities) • Diploma mills and false credentials • Fraudulent research, plagiarism
Institution accreditation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fraud in the accreditation process (favouritism, bribes, gifts)

Table 1 - Major opportunities for corruption by area of educational planning/management (Hallak & Poisson, 2007)

Appendix D

	Category	Sub-category	Sub-Sub-category
1.	Rule of law	<i>Legislation</i>	
		<i>Sanctions</i>	
		<i>Code of conduct</i>	
2.	Public administration and system	<i>Better financial system</i>	Financial management
			School grants disbursement
		<i>Independent audit bodies</i>	In general, school grants, examinations, diplomas and entrance to university
		<i>IT for administration</i>	System for teacher deployment and payment
3.	Transparency and accountability	<i>Advocacy and awareness raising</i>	
		<i>Anti-corruption education</i>	
		<i>Open and transparent procurement processes</i>	
		<i>Monitoring and social accountability</i>	Role of school management committees
			Budget tracking and monitoring Including score cards and children's monitoring
		<i>Information and the use of media</i>	
		<i>Accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism</i>	
		<i>Availability of surveys</i>	
4.	Capacity development		

Table 2 - Operationalisation of UNDP methods and tools

Appendix E: Overview used documents for UNDP methods and tools analysis

	Sub-category	Documents	Source
1	Legislation	United Nations Conventions against Corruption	UNODC, 2018
2	Legislation	National Anti-Corruption Strategy	Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010
3	Legislation	Criminal Code 136b	Global Justice Project, Iraq, 2009
4	Legislation	Iraq: overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 2013 +15	Agator, Maxime; Pring, 2015
5	Legislation	Iraqi Penal Code	
6	Legislation	Freedom in the World Iraq: 2013	Freedom House
7	Legislation	Investment Climate Statement-Iraq+ Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern - Iraq	U.S. Department of State, 2013,2014
8	Legislation	UNDP is proud to support the fight against corruption	United Nations Development Programme, 2016
9	Sanctions	Effective Legal and Practical Measures to Combat Corruption in Iraq	Banjalan, n.a.
10	Sanctions	Global Integrity Report: Iraq	Global Integrity, 2008
11	Sanctions	BTI 2017 Country Report: Iraq	Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018
12	Code of Conduct	Code of Conduct for teachers	Global Education Cluster, 2017

Table 3 - Rule of Law

	Sub-category	Documents	Source
1	Financial system	Modernization of Public Financial Management	The World Bank, 2016
2	Financial system	Public Financial Management Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa	World Bank Group, 2010
3	Financial system	Overview of the Education system	Issa & Jamil, 2010
4	Financial system	Textbook Program in Education	Commisso, 2004
5	Financial system	Online Textbooks Provisioning in Iraq	UNESCO, n.d.
6	Financial system	Governance in Education	Lewis& Petterson, 2009
7	Independent audit bodies	Iraq: overview of corruption and anti-corruption	Agator, 2013
8	Independent audit bodies	Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq	Harb, 2014
9	Independent audit bodies	Activating the role of parent-teacher councils	USAID, 2016
10	Independent audit bodies	Audit Quality in Federal Board	Salih & Hla, 2015
11	IT systems	Educational Management Information System	UNESCO, n.d.
12	IT systems	The Costs and Benefits	UNICEF, 2017
13	IT systems	Successful Completion of Student Information Management System Pilot Project in Baghdad	Dhea & Subhee, 2017

Table 4 - Public Administration and System

	Sub-category	Documents	Source
1	Advocacy and awareness	Commission of Integrity launches campaign to engage non-governmental organizations in the fight against corruption	Hilal, 2017
2	Advocacy and awareness	Applying the BMZs Anti-Corruption Strategy in Practice	GIZ, 2017
3	Advocacy and awareness	Iraq Anti-Corruption and Transparency Project	Iraq Foundation, 2007
4	Advocacy and awareness	A network for social media	Kirsten, 2011
5	Advocacy and awareness	Corruption-free education	Castilla, 2008
6	Anti-corruption education	Launch of Iraq's First Anti-Corruption Curricula for Primary and Secondary Schools	INEE, 2013
7	Anti-corruption education	Integrity and Anti-Corruption Curriculum	Sustainable Research, UNDP, Ministry of Education, 2011
8	Open and transparent procurement	Order Number 87, Public Contracts, 2004	Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004
9	Open and transparent procurement	Navigation through Fragility: Procurement Solutions for Iraqi Education	Mosler, Ali & Lipson, 2013
10	Open and transparent procurement	Supporting Investment Policy and Governance Reforms in Iraq	OECD, 2010
11	Open and transparent procurement	Enhancing the Effectiveness of Public Procurement System of Iraq Through Reforming the Bid Protest Processes	Rahman, 2014
12	Open and transparent procurement	The Integrity Pact	Transparency International, 2009
13	Open and transparent procurement	Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement	Kühn & Sherman, 2014
14	Participatory monitoring and social accountability	Encouraging Elementary School Students to Improve their Schools through Classroom Cleaning and Children's Club	Save the Children Japan, 2013
15	Participatory monitoring and social accountability	Annual Report 2016 Iraq	UNICEF, 2016
16	Participatory monitoring and social accountability	Activating the Role of parents-teacher councils	USAID, 2016
17	Budget tracking	Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Iraq	World Bank, 2012
18	Budget tracking	Accountability in education	Antoninis, 2017
19	Budget tracking	Civil Society Engagement in Education Budgets	Commonwealth Education Fund, 2013
20	Budget tracking	About us	Global Partnership for Education, 2018
21	Scorecards and children's monitoring	Accountability in Local Service Delivery	Labrecque & Batouon, 2015
22	Scorecards and children's monitoring	Fighting Corruption in Education	Wood & Antonowicz, 2011

23	Information and the use of media	Freedom of the Press 2017	Freedom House, 2017
24	Information and the use of media	World Press Index	Reporters Without Borders, 2018
25	Information and the use of media	Corruption	Iraq-Business news, 2017
26	Information and the use of media	Iraq's corrupt school system	PRI's The World, 2010
27	Accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism	Education Data for Decisions Making: Iraq Education Survey	Brombacher et al., 2012
28	Accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism	Addressing absence	Banerjee & Duflo, 2006
29	Accountability mechanisms around teacher absenteeism	Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School	Duflo & Hanna, 2005
30	Surveys	Preventing Corruption in the Education System	Ochse, 2004
31	Surveys	Voice and Accountability for Improved Service Delivery	UNDP Regional Centre in Cairo, 2004

Table 5- Transparency and Accountability

	Sub-category	Documents	Source
1	Capacity Development	Overview: Our Projects	UNDP Iraq, 2018
2	Capacity Development	UNESCO Iraq's Thematic Areas of Action	UNESCO Iraq, 2017
3	Capacity Development	Overview Iraq Country Programme 2016-2019	UNICEF Iraq, 2018
4	Capacity Development	Public Financial Management Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa	World Bank Group, 2010

Table 6 - Capacity Development