

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

Benedikt Draws

FACULTY OF BEHAVIOURAL, MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
BSC EUROPEAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

**SUPERVISOR**

Prof. Dr. Paul Benneworth

**SECOND READER**

Dr. Martin Stienstra

**STUDENT NUMBER**

S1017772

## **Abstract**

As consumer action and conscious buying behavior has become increasingly widespread during the last few decades, companies have reacted to the consistent threat of customer action and changed their monitoring of public opinion and business strategies accordingly. This study therefore aims at answering the question which factors lead to a successful consumer boycott as a response to exploitative corporate behavior. In order to find an answer, a theoretical framework is developed, methodology and hypotheses derived and 100 successful and unsuccessful boycotts between 1955 and 2012 are examined. The findings are translated into a model showcasing the factors determining boycott success and are further used to propose a public government mechanism to address perceived exploitative corporate behavior before it comes to boycotts. Furthermore, concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are given.

## List of Tables

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Table 1: Overview of hypotheses.....                              | 20 |
| Table 2: Measurement of independent and dependent variables ..... | 23 |
| Table 3: Level of significance .....                              | 25 |
| Table 4: Chi-squared test H1 .....                                | 33 |
| Table 5: Chi-squared test H2.....                                 | 34 |
| Table 6: Chi-squared test H3.....                                 | 35 |
| Table 7: Chi-squared test H4.....                                 | 35 |
| Table 8: Summary of findings.....                                 | 36 |

## List of Figures

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Figure 1: Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility .....               | 8  |
| Figure 2: Conceptual Framework .....                                     | 16 |
| Figure 3: Conceptual Framework including CSR pyramid.....                | 17 |
| Figure 4: Distribution of boycott success.....                           | 27 |
| Figure 5: Distribution of boycott magnitude .....                        | 28 |
| Figure 6: Distribution of boycott duration.....                          | 29 |
| Figure 7: Distribution of boycott categories .....                       | 30 |
| Figure 8: Distribution of ethical distance.....                          | 30 |
| Figure 9: Boycott success over time .....                                | 31 |
| Figure 10: Boycott success before and after 1991 .....                   | 32 |
| Figure 11: The governance & enforcement of CSR via consumer action ..... | 40 |
| Figure 12: Proposed CSR enforcement mechanism .....                      | 41 |

## Table of Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Abstract.....   | 1  |
| List of Tables .....                                    | 2  |
| List of Figures .....                                   | 2  |
| Table of Contents.....                                  | 3  |
| 1. Introduction .....                                   | 5  |
| 2. Theoretical Framework.....                           | 7  |
| 2.1 Breaches to Corporate Social Responsibility .....   | 7  |
| 2.2 Boycott .....                                       | 8  |
| 2.2.1 Boycotts and Buycotts as an economic problem..... | 9  |
| 2.2.2 Ethical consumerism.....                          | 10 |
| 2.2.3 Customer engagement in a boycott .....            | 11 |
| 2.3 Boycott participation .....                         | 13 |
| 2.3.1 Successful and unsuccessful boycotts.....         | 13 |
| 2.3.2 Factors determining boycott success.....          | 14 |
| 2.3.3 Conceptual framework .....                        | 15 |
| 3. Methodology .....                                    | 18 |
| 3.1 Approach to the research .....                      | 18 |
| 3.2 Hypotheses .....                                    | 18 |
| 3.3 Operationalization .....                            | 20 |
| 3.3.1 Creating valid case stories .....                 | 20 |
| 3.3.2 Overview of the boycott cases .....               | 21 |
| 3.3.3 Coding.....                                       | 22 |
| 3.4 Analytic plan.....                                  | 24 |
| 4. Results .....  | 27 |
| 4.1 The distribution of success.....                    | 27 |
| 4.2 Boycott magnitude distribution .....                | 28 |
| 4.3 Boycott duration distribution.....                  | 28 |
| 4.4 Human issue distribution.....                       | 29 |
| 4.5 Date boycott distribution.....                      | 31 |
| 5. Analysis .....                                       | 33 |
| 5.1 Hypothesis 1 .....                                  | 33 |
| 5.2 Hypothesis 2 .....                                  | 34 |
| 5.3 Hypothesis 3 .....                                  | 34 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 5.4 Hypothesis 4 .....  | 35 |
| 5.5 Summary of findings .....                                       | 36 |
| 6. Discussions and overall model for CSR.....                       | 37 |
| 6.1 Discussion.....   | 37 |
| 6.1.1 Magnitude and boycott success.....                            | 37 |
| 6.1.2 Duration and boycott success .....                            | 38 |
| 6.1.3 Ethical Distance and boycott success.....                     | 38 |
| 6.1.4 Time and boycott success .....                                | 39 |
| 6.2 Overall model, findings summary and proposed CSR mechanism..... | 40 |
| 7. Conclusion.....  | 43 |
| References .....  | 46 |
| Appendix 1: Statistical Outputs.....                                | 49 |
| Appendix 2A: List of Boycotts.....                                  | 54 |
| Appendix 2B: Summary Table of List of Boycotts .....                | 92 |
| Appendix 3: Boycott Sources .....                                   | 95 |

## 1. Introduction

Multinational companies nowadays have to balance competitive forces on a global scale with customer demands across markets, often resulting in general corporate misconduct, broadly termed “exploitative corporate behavior”. Whereas customers’ buying decisions are often informed by price and globalization led to an increased number of corporate competitors, companies try to find ways to minimize costs while maximizing profits at the same time. This can result in a number of unethical business strategies and practices, for example tax evasion, child labor, environmental pollution, animal harm, wage dumping or exploitation of labor. On the one hand customers contribute to such practice with a demand for bargains, on the other hand the absence of government regulation, differing laws and the lack of criminal or moral persecution often make it easy for companies to pursue such behavior.

Once customers become aware of exploitative corporate behavior, it has been shown that an effective way to get companies to change their conduct is customer activism (Friedman, 1999; Klein & John, 2001). Through either abstaining from purchasing products or a shift in buying behavior to a different or more responsible company an individual can have an impact on the behavior of a company (Friedman, 1996; Smith, 2007; Kimeldorf et al., 2006). If the pressure on a company either in economic terms or through sustained damage to the brand is too high, research has found that companies will ultimately change their behavior (Friedman, 1999). Even though customer action is an effective means, the willingness of customers to change their buying behavior largely depends on the distance to the ones affected by the corporate conduct, the costs and troubles this causes as well as the type of exploitative behavior a company executed. Dissatisfaction with corporate behavior therefore does not always automatically result in consumer activism.

If however this change in consumption and awareness of misconduct turns into a mass movement, be it propelled by social media, classic journalism, unions or other forms of activism, this collective behavior is called a boycott (Klein et al., 2004; Friedman, 1991). A boycott is usually considered to be successful if a company changes its exploitative behavior and gives in to the demands of the boycotters (Klein et al., 2004). Ideally other companies in the same industry learn from that change in conduct and adapt the new standards that have been set, which might also seem preferable to governmental regulation for most companies.

As consumer activism and conscious buying behavior has become increasingly widespread during the last few decades, companies have reacted to the consistent threat of customer action and

changed their monitoring of public opinion and business strategies accordingly. We therefore ask the overall research question:

*“Which factors lead to a successful consumer boycott as a response to exploitative corporate behaviors?”*

To answer this question, chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework that distinguishes factors contributing to boycott success into boycott duration, magnitude, historical development and ethical distance in the light of corporate responsibility towards society. In chapter 3 four hypotheses are derived from the literature review, which aim at determining the driving factors for boycott success. Furthermore an explanation of the underlying methodology is given, which consists of a newspaper collection of 100 successful and unsuccessful boycotts that occurred between 1955 and 2012 because of exploitative corporate behavior. Chapter 4 presents the results of the dataset regarding each of the independent variables through the use of bar charts. In chapter 5 an analysis of the 100 boycotts is conducted with chi-square tests, indicating that three of the four factors, namely magnitude, duration and historical context, have influence on the successfulness of boycotts with different degrees of significance. In chapter 6 these findings are translated into a model that gives an overview about the determining factors for boycott success, indicating that boycott duration is the most significant one. Furthermore a discussion about implications for boycotters and ways to build up the necessary pressure on companies in order to make them more socially responsible is lead and a CSR enforcement mechanism is proposed. This thesis ends with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research in chapter 7.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Breaches to Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate Social Responsibility is a “concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission in Öberseder et al, 2011, p.450). All kinds of consumer activism and customer value ground on the assumption that companies have a responsibility towards society, which then again is expressed in their corporate behavior and their CSR policies. Various studies provide evidence for the causal relationship between companies and customers through their responsibility towards society (e.g. Mohr et al, 2001, Öberseder et al., 2011). Mohr et al. (2001) not only prove the mere existence of responsibility, but also conclude that “consumers are more likely to boycott irresponsible companies than to support responsible companies” (Mohr et al, 2001, p.69). However, as CSR is merely a “self-regulatory system” (Sheehy, 2012, p. 104) companies’ intentions often remain unclear or even contradict with their actual behavior.

Because CSR “lack[s] an agreed upon definition” (Rivoli & Waddock, 2011, p.87), the UN tried to establish a common framework in 2000 which defines itself as “a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles” (UN Global Compact, 2012). These ten principles correspond with the categories Human Rights, Labour, Environment and Anti-Corruption. Because these principles do not have any binding nature, only serve as a general definition of CSR and are meant to give incentives to companies to implement such policies, there are only very few grounds to hold companies accountable and enforce legally binding legislation about exploitative corporate behavior, as those policies are often voluntary and neither enforceable nor actionable.

To follow up on this problem, one can consult Carroll’s (1979) in depth analysis of CSR definitions over the decades that led to a three dimensional model, which he later adjusted through addition of a fourth dimension (Carroll, 1999). This “Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility” shows the required and optional responsibilities of a company through the symbolization of the four pillars that CSR is based on. In a simplified explanation by Duarte et al. (2010) it is summarized in the following four categories:



**Figure 1: Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility**

*Source: Carroll (1999); Duarte et al. (2010); author's own design*

Since legal responsibilities are the obligations towards the jurisdiction of a sovereign state and the economic responsibilities are the necessary factors for the company to survive, these are the necessary conditions for a company that they should fulfill in order to obey the law and to remain competitive. As ethical responsibilities refer to the acting according to moral obligations of a society and discretionary responsibilities even go a step further and belong to “voluntary activities that contribute to societal development” (Duarte et al., 2010, p.104), it becomes obvious that both ethical and philanthropic responsibilities become incidental when compared to the economic interests and legal obligations of a company.

These responsibilities can be translated into motives that a company pursues. While economic and legal considerations have an egoistic background and only serve the company, ethical and philanthropic actions serve the society as a whole. Since it is up to the customer to balance his satisfaction about companies' motives, Kim and Lee “evaluate the two possibly contradictory CSR motives – public-serving vs. firm-serving motives” (Kim & Lee, 2012, p.167) and conclude that consumers tend to balance these two motives of a company against each other and become more satisfied when the public-serving motives prevail while they tend to become dissatisfied with firm strategies when the firm-serving motives dominate. If this dissatisfaction increases and leads to consumer action, customers turn companies' ethical and discretionary responsibilities into economic and legal problems, hence causing companies to even change their behavior if that activism prevails.

## 2.2 Boycott

Following up on the model by Duarte et al. (2010) and Figure 1, the only responsibilities that a company is truly interested in are the legal and economic ones. As it has been noted that CSR will

only be implemented if consumer action becomes an economic problem for a company, focus will be drawn on consumer behavior that can result in economic pressure. As multinational companies are global actors, governments and customers often lack legal instruments to hold companies accountable for exploitative corporate behavior, thus limiting legal mechanisms as well. The emphasis therefore lies on boycotts and companies in chapter 2.2.1. As economic responsibilities therefore remain the main focus of companies, it is up to consumers to turn their dissatisfaction about companies' ethical responsibilities into economic problems for a company. These accountability mechanisms for the ethical responsibilities of companies can be found in the concept of "ethical consumerism", which is the subject of chapter 2.2.2 and shifts the focus from company to customers, as they are the ones that can turn an ethical problem into an economic one. In order to find out not only what consumer activism can look like, chapter 2.2.3 revolves around the decisions why customers engage in boycotts.

### **2.2.1 Boycotts and Buycotts as an economic problem**

To focus on companies first, two forms of consumer action that can turn an unethical corporate behavior into an economic problem and therefore upscale discretionary or ethical responsibilities (Duarte et al., 2010) are boycotts and buycotts. Turning to the theory on boycotts, by far the most research has been conducted by Friedman, who generally refers to a boycott as "an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual customers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace" (Friedman, 1999, p.4). And as Klein et al. confirm, "boycotts are an extreme case of a broader category of consumer behavior in which social and ethical issues [...] influence purchase decisions" (Klein et al., 2004, p.92). A more detailed definition has been given by John and Klein (2003), who state that the requirements for a boycott have been given "when a number of people abstain from purchase of a product, at the same time, as a result of the same egregious act or behavior, but not necessarily for the same reasons" (John & Klein, 2003, p.1198). Smith et al. (2004) therefore conclude that boycotts are an appropriate means to investigate ethical consumerism and consumers' believe that companies have breached their social responsibilities.

Contrary to a boycott, a buycott focusses not on abstaining to purchase products or services from a certain company, but to rather actively decide to support the corporate behavior of a different or competing company that might offer a similar, but ethically sound product. Brown and Dacin find that not only bad reputation of a company adversely affects their economic performance, but that good reputation, or "positive ethical consumerism", can also lead to support for socially responsible companies (Brown & Dacin, 1997, p.80). This concept that contrasts the idea of boycotts led Friedman to conduct a study that focuses solely on buycotts.

While he acknowledges that the original boycott intends to “reward [companies] for behavior which is consistent with the goals of the activists” (Friedman, 1996, p. 440), he concludes that in practice ‘real’ boycotts are rather unusual. Moreover, boycotts are often used in order not to reward companies, but to punish the ones that are left out of the boycott, which Friedman calls “boycotts in disguise” (Friedman, 1996, p. 449). Sen and Bhattacharya, who also focus on the impact of positive consumerism, find in their study that “consumers company evaluations are more sensitive to negative CSR information than positive CSR information, whereas only those most supportive of the CSR issues react positively to positive CSR information” (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001, p. 238). This basically implies that exploitative corporate behavior and boycotts provoke stronger feelings and reactions than corporate CSR initiatives and boycotts. Similar studies have been conducted about “carrot mobs”, which indicate boycotts of small businesses (Jebe, 2011) and about “Conscientious Consumption” (Kimeldorf et al., 2006).

Both boycotts and boycotts start at the level of “discretionary” or “ethical responsibilities” of a company according to the model of Duarte et al. (2010), as customers are either dissatisfied with the exploitative corporate behavior, resulting in a boycott, or trying to reward positive corporate behavior and the fulfillment of CSR with the deliberate and informed choice to buy that brand or product. This way consumers transform their dissatisfaction on an ethical level into economic pressure of a company, since the decrease (boycott) or increase (boycott) of income will be recognized and perceived as economic pressure if it happens on a large enough scale. As both boycotts and boycotts are forms of consumerist behavior the next section will outline the overarching concept of ethical consumerism.

### **2.2.2 Ethical consumerism**

In order to shift the focus from the company to the customer, the mechanism that describes the transformation from customers’ disappointment about the ethical responsibilities into economic pressure on companies can be found in the concept of ‘ethical consumerism’. Brown and Dacin (1997) extensively shed light on ethical consumerism in the context of CSR. Their study summarizes that “negative CSR associations can have a detrimental effect on overall product evaluations, whereas positive CSR associations can enhance product evaluations (Brown & Dacin, 1997, p.80). This means that not only bad reputation of a company adversely affects their sales, but that good reputation, or “positive ethical consumerism” as mentioned above, can also lead to support for socially responsible companies. This implies that customers can either be dissatisfied with an exploitative corporate behavior and therefore refrain from economically supporting this conduct through the purchase of other brands, or they can actively support the

socially or environmentally responsible behavior of another company through an informed choice to buy their products or services.

As cited in Smith (2007), ethical consumerism can be defined as “personal consumption where choice has been informed by a particular ethical issue – be it human rights, social justice, the environment or animal welfare” (Ethical Consumerism Report, 2005, p.7). In more detail, “ethical purchasers [...] have political, religious, spiritual, environmental, social or other motives for choosing one product over another. The one thing they have in common is that they are concerned with the effects that a purchasing choice has, not only on themselves, but also on the external world around them” (Harrison et al (2005) in Smith, 2007, pp.6-7). As illustrated by Smith (2007), one can differentiate between “consumer support for prosocial corporate conduct (positive ethical consumerism)” and “consumer punishment of CR failings, most notably in consumer boycotts (negative ethical consumerism)” (Smith, 2007, pp.3-4). There are a number of studies that conduct research on positive ethical consumerism, which according to Smith “is influenced favorably by the perception that the company or brand is engaged in socially responsible behavior or the product itself is socially responsible” (Smith, 2007, p.14). Because the size of boycotts as a form of positive ethical consumerism always depends on the number of participants, the next section will cover the decisions for customer engagement.

### **2.2.3 Customer engagement in a boycott**

As it is not only important what consumer activism can look like, but the intention behind individuals’ decisions to engage in boycotts, this section will deal with behavioral explanations of customer engagement. Klein et al. (2004) identify four factors that serve as predictors of boycott participation in their study, namely:

1. The desire to make a difference
2. The scope for self-enhancement
3. Counterarguments that inhibit boycotting
4. The cost to the boycotter of constrained consumption

While the “desire to make a difference” merely reflects a customers’ own intention and is based on ideology with the intent to change the decisions of a company, the “scope for self-enhancement” is more expressed in the guilt a consumer might feel and the moral obligation towards another group of consumers that might have already started to boycott a certain product and now expects the same from this consumer. Klein et al. identify “counterarguments”, which stand for hurdles and barriers that might bring consumers to refrain from participating in a

boycott, such as “unintended harm” that a company might experience as well as the question “whether his or her individual contribution will play any role in achieving the collective action goal” (Klein et al, 2004, p.97.). The last factor relates to mainly economic considerations, as the boycott of a products and the accompanied abstinence or alternation through another product is often affiliated with an increase in costs or a decrease in convenience. These identified factors are also in line with research conducted by Sen et al. (2001, p. 399), who find that “consumer’s likelihood of participating in [...] boycotts is jointly determined by their perceptions of the boycott’s likelihood of success, their susceptibility to normative social influences, and the costs they incur in boycotting”.

Almost two decades earlier, Garrett (1987) not only identified factors that influence boycott participation, but drew conclusions about determinants of boycott success as well as boycott failure from it. His study finds “awareness of consumers, the values of potential participants, the consistency of boycott goals with participant attitudes, the cost of participation, social pressure, and the credibility of the boycott leadership” (Garrett (1987) cited in Smith, 2007, p.20) to be the crucial factors in boycott participation. In general this leads to the conclusion that firstly, the lower the preference for a product and the lower the cost of refraining from consuming it (e.g. through the availability of substitutes), the higher the likelihood of boycott participation and secondly, the higher the expectation about overall boycott participation, the higher is the likelihood of boycotting through an individual. Klein et al. (2004) argue in the same way, introducing the term “egregiousness”, which in contrast to Garrett does not relate to the nature of a product, but to the nature of the misconduct. They bring forward the argument that after the initial breach of customers’ trust in them (the firm’s “egregious act”), boycott participation then depends, besides the above mentioned factors, on the “perceived egregiousness” through the customer (Klein et al, 2004, p.96), which is proven through the existence of a relationship between boycotting and egregiousness.

After examining 30 boycotts of the 1980’s, Garrett proposed three determinants of boycott effectiveness, “economic pressure”, “image pressure” and “policy commitment” (Garrett, 1987, p.49). The first determinant represents the monetary loss a company experiences during a boycott, the second stands for the negative publicity that is reflected on the company and the last determinant reflects the degree to which a company is willing to withstand loss in sales and the bad public image before altering their CSR policies. However, these factors for boycott success all have to be put into perspective, since “criteria for the success of consumer boycotts are often hard to identify” (Friedman, 1991, p.155) due to the complex nature, the diversity and the nontransparent nature of boycotts.

## 2.3 Boycott participation

As the previous parts described, a boycott can turn the corporate breach of an ethical responsibility into an economic problem for the company that, if large enough, can cause that company to change its corporate conduct. As many boycotts either fail to gain the necessary momentum or to attract a critical mass of participants, it is important to note that only successful boycotts either get companies to change their behavior or governments to implement the necessary legislation. This in turn can even mean that not only a single company, but the whole industry has to change its behavior. Unsuccessful boycotts on the other hand are defined by having failed to get a company to change its behavior. While the reasons might be vague, the boycott was ultimately unsuccessful to build an economic pressure so high that the company saw no other alternative than to give in to the boycotters' demands to prevent further damages.

### 2.3.1 Successful and unsuccessful boycotts

While the most outstanding factor differentiating between a successful and an unsuccessful boycott has been identified – either a change in behavior or no change in behavior – it has to be noted that it is not always that clear whether or not a boycott is successful. This can be a major analytical problem, as it is crucial to identify whether or not consumer activism was effective and exploitative corporate behavior stopped. Friedman (1991) discusses the “criterion problem” in that sense, in which it is often difficult to identify clear “criteria for the success of consumer boycotts” (Friedman, 1991, p.155). Furthermore, some boycotts may result in short-term success while not being effective in the long-term and, according to the “third criterion problem”, to some definitions even the correct implementation of a boycott through the absence of purchases through customers can be regarded as a success, without reaching the objective to change corporate conduct. Friedman therefore concludes that “success on one type of criterion is not necessarily related to success on the other. Friedman hence proposes that consumer groups should ask themselves before initiating a boycott “if (1) consumers care about the boycott issues and objectives, (2) the boycott task is likely to be successfully executed, and (3) its execution is likely to lead to the desired consequences specified by the boycott objectives” (Friedman, 1999, p.22).

It has to be noted though that some boycotts are simply unsuccessful and neither bring short-term or long-term change in corporate behavior. The reasons are diverse and can range from the “cost of boycotting” (Klein et al., 2004) which keeps people from participating to sparse media coverage or adapted corporate crisis management, allowing companies to react to and intervene in emerging boycotts at an earlier stage and handle customer dissatisfaction before it reaches a

critical mass. This in turn reduces the risk of resulting in economic problems and therefore giving in to boycotters' demands. Furthermore, part of the truth is also that firms are reluctant "to report sales declines due to boycotts or to publicize concessions to boycott organizers" (Klein et al., 2004, p.92). It therefore can be presumed that while boycotters tend to overstate the size and effectiveness of a boycott in order to attract more participants and increase the chances to be successful, companies will do the exact opposite in order to understate impacts and to question the legitimacy of boycotters' intentions.

### **2.3.2 Factors determining boycott success**

While the steps leading up to a boycott and the possible outcomes have been explained, the factors that define whether or not a boycott is successful have yet to be mentioned. The four factors that seem to be most interesting when determining the successfulness of a boycott and that will be further analyzed by this research are magnitude, historical development, duration and ethical distance. For duration, the "place and time considerations" of the "taxonomy of consumer boycotts" by Friedman (1991) will be adduced. While Friedman provides evidence for a higher frequency of national boycotts, followed by local and regional boycotts, he also distinguishes boycotts by their duration. Boycotts with a duration of more than a year are thereby classified as "long-term", those "ranging between three months and a year" will fall into the category "medium-term" and those that find an end in the first three months will be referred to as "short-term" boycotts (Friedman, 1991, p.152).

Regarding ethical distance the basic assumption for a measurement is based on the differentiation between "Individualism" and "Collectivism" that Hofstede makes in his 'Cultural dimensions theory' (1984). Building on this distinction, a more detailed perception of distance can be found in Edward T. Hall's theory of space (1966), dividing these into "intimate distance", "personal distance", "social distance" and "public distance" (Hall, 1966, pp.117-125). While the intimate distance is self-centered and very close to the actual person, personal distance describes contact with relatives or friends that are still close to a person. Social distance relates to interactions between more remote persons, such as fellow workers or members of the same community and public distance describes interactions "well outside the circle of involvement" (Hall, 1966, p.123).

In combination with ethical issues that cause customer dissatisfaction, "be it human rights, social justice, the environment or animal welfare" (Ethical Consumerism Report, 2005, p.7) the classification of ethical distance can be used to differentiate between ethical issues both close as well as not so close to a customer. Lastly, the perception, awareness and reaction to boycotts have immensely changed over time, especially since customers' demand for corporate

responsibility has increased during the last decades. However, with the increased threat of customer action, companies have also become more aware and eager to react early if threatened by a boycott, which means that boycotts nowadays emerge, develop and end differently than historic boycotts. It is therefore of interest to analyze which of the groups tend to be more successful.

### **2.3.3 Conceptual framework**

In order to answer the overall research question “Which factors lead to a successful consumer boycott as a response to exploitative corporate behaviors?” the aforementioned concepts and theories can be transferred into a model, which shows the governance mechanism at hand and also the scope of this research (Figure 2).

The first stage of the model is an exploitative corporate behavior, which can be anything from pollution, environmental destruction, animal harm, workers’ exploitation, unfair wages, child labor, wrong labelling or other values that can be perceived as responsibilities towards society. Once such a corporate misconduct has been detected, this model proposes an accelerator such as a “shitstorm” on social media or broad media coverage to inform a critical mass of customers about that misconduct. As individuals have ethical standards and expectations towards a company’s societal behavior which is described in the concept of ethical consumerism, consumers will likely make up their minds whether they can still support this company through continued purchase of their products, or if they choose abstain from buying or supporting this company. This choice usually depends on the costs it would cause the customer, the alternatives that are available and the perceived sincerity of the corporate misconduct or egregious act. If, according to the proposed model, enough customers decide to not purchase products or services from that company anymore, they turn an ethical problem into an economic problem for the company and we speak about a boycott.


A boycott does however not automatically imply a change in behavior or an improvement in conduct. As there is a lack of legal enforcement mechanisms and regulation, we propose in the model that the most effective way to force companies into a change of their behavior is through customer action over a long enough period and with a large enough impact, so that the economic pressure on the company grows to an extent where it has to give in to customers’ demand, hence making it a successful boycott and leading to a corporate behavior change. This can either happen through the implementation of comprehensive CSR policies, or it could also be achieved through governmental regulation that requires companies or even a whole industry to change their conduct, if that exploitative corporate behavior is deemed to breach national laws. As



regulatory instances become aware of consumer dissatisfaction with exploitative corporate behavior at this stage, a boycott can also serve as a signal for legislators to implement and enforce the rule of law.

While the left side of the model, describing the lead up to a boycott and the right side, showing what happens with CSR once a boycott has been successful, have been explained, the factors that determine whether or not a boycott is successful according to Figure 2 have yet to be mentioned. The four factors that seem to be most interesting when determining the successfulness of a boycott and that are further analyzed by this research are magnitude, historical development, duration and ethical distance. For the duration of a boycott, a classification proposed by Friedman is followed that differentiates between short-term, medium-term and long-term boycotts. Magnitude is a combination of economic impact and damages to the company together with the number of participants. Ethical distance does not so much take into consideration all of the ethical issues, but merely a division into human-related and non-human related issues. And finally the historical development is examined through comparing boycotts from before 1991 with boycotts after. Not only did the iron curtain fall shortly before that period, but during that time for the first time extensive research was conducted about boycotts, which brought much more attention to the underlying concept.

**Figure 2: Conceptual Framework**




*Source: author's own design*

If we take a look back at the concept of Duarte et al. (2010), it was found that discretionary and ethical responsibilities only play minor roles in the considerations of companies, as they are predominantly concerned with economic and legal responsibilities. This was also emphasized by

our statement that CSR will only be implemented if consumers turn ethical responsibilities of a company into an economic problem, thus shifting the focus from the narrow end of the pyramid in Figure 2 to the large economic side. Figure 3 therefore shows the concept of Duarte et al. (2010) implemented into the Conceptual Framework of this study. Rotated by 90 degrees to the left, with increased media attention and boycott progress also comes the upscaling shift from an ethical problem into an economic one and an eventual corporate behaviour change, as the boycott progresses.

**Figure 3: Conceptual Framework including CSR pyramid**



*Source: author's own design*

As the implementation of the “Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility” concludes the conceptual framework of this thesis, the next chapter gives a more thorough overview about the methods and data collection and derives four hypotheses from this literature review.

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1 Approach to the research

In order to be able to answer the research question “Which factors lead to a successful consumer boycott as a response to exploitative corporate behaviors” reliable findings need to be generated that can be related to the model in Figure 3. While it is mentioned that there might be other influences than the identified factors on the successfulness of a boycott, for this research it is important to isolate the four factors “magnitude”, “historical development”, “duration” and “ethical distance” in order to measure their direct influence on the successfulness of boycotts. These factors are used to derive four hypotheses which give a clear statement about their impact on the successfulness of boycotts.

With respect to the measurement of these four factors and to ultimately test the hypotheses we need a dataset of clearly identified boycotts with a start and end point indicating whether or not they were successful. Furthermore, in that dataset all of the four factors should be identified and measured. Attention also has to be paid to make sure that the dataset is objective and not biased, for example through the use of broad search terms and the utilization of an independent database, guaranteeing objectivity and the accumulation of a lot of cases and therefore a large dataset. This is important as it is a prerequisite that allows us to make use of statistical analysis and to draw broader conclusions.

The approach will therefore be as follows: In Chapter 3.2 four hypotheses are derived from the four factors that were identified in Figure 3 to be the dominant influences on boycott success. Continuing with the operationalization, Chapter 3.3.1 gives an overview about how the dataset was collected and assembled and what conditions had to be fulfilled in order to be added to the dataset. In 3.3.2 some general facts about the list of boycotts are given and influential as well as other outstanding boycotts are highlighted and presented. Chapter 3.3.3 discusses how the variables are coded in order to retrieve measurable and generalizable results and in 3.4 an analytical plan is presented which introduces the chi-squared test as the tool of choice in order to test the influence of each of the four factors on the successfulness of a boycott.

#### 3.2 Hypotheses

As this research aims to find an answer to the above mentioned research question several hypotheses have been developed. Based on the theoretical conceptions, one can assume that there are different factors influencing consumers’ decisions whether or not to take part in a

boycott. Since boycott participation is expected to play a dominant factor in the successfulness of a boycott, it is supposed that a higher rate of participation in a boycott or a high loss for the boycotted firm leads to a higher rate of success for the boycotters. It is therefore assumed:

*H<sub>1</sub>: If the magnitude of the boycott is high, it is more likely to be successful.*

The other factor that is expected to be a crucial factor in boycott successfulness is time. While short boycotts only have a temporary effect on the company, longer boycotts might lead to the fear of sustained damage to the image of a company. Furthermore, the longer a boycott lasts, the more companies might realize that a boycott does not wear out, but instead leads to sustained disadvantages for the firm. The associated hypothesis therefore is:

*H<sub>2</sub>: If a boycott lasts longer, it is relatively likely that it will be more successful than a shorter boycott.*

Since it is supposed that customers make a difference between different kinds of social issues, it is expected that the issue that leads to a boycott plays a role in the successfulness of that boycott. Since people tend to be more loyal towards other people, and as it is expected that unions have a major influence on the mobilization of boycotters, it is assumed that the boycotts relating to human issues tend to be more successful than those concerning environmental or animal related issues. The proposed hypothesis is:

*H<sub>3</sub>: If a boycott is related to human issues, it is relatively likely to be more successful than a boycott related to other issues.*

Another observation is that the perceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility and boycotts have changed over time. As stated in the introductory chapter, the concept of CSR only emerged during the last decades, customers increasingly hold companies accountable for their conduct towards society and it is easier to mobilize customers nowadays. It is therefore proposed that boycotts nowadays tend to be more successful than past boycotts. Since the conceptual framework of boycotts by Friedman in 1991 was seen as a milestone in boycott research, boycotts before and after 1991 will be tested. The proposed hypothesis therefore is:

*H<sub>4</sub>: If a boycott was conducted before 1991, it is relatively likely to be more successful than boycotts after 1991.*

**Table 1: Overview of hypotheses**

| <b>Overview of hypotheses</b>   |
|---|
| H <sub>1</sub> : Success boycott with high magnitude > Success boycott with low magnitude<br>H <sub>10</sub> : Success boycott with high magnitude ≠ Success boycott with low magnitude               |
| H <sub>2</sub> : Success of high boycott duration > Success of low boycott duration<br>H <sub>20</sub> : Success of high boycott duration ≠ Success of low boycott duration                           |
| H <sub>3</sub> : Success of human issue related boycott > Success of other issue related boycott<br>H <sub>30</sub> : Success of human issue related boycott ≠ Success of other issue related boycott |
| H <sub>4</sub> : Success pre-1991 boycott > Success post-1991 boycott<br>H <sub>40</sub> : Success pre-1991 boycott ≠ Success post-1991 boycott   |

*Source: author's own design*

This study is using an inferential statistical method to test these hypotheses, allowing us to either confirm or reject the null hypotheses. The advantages of a statistical method are that it allows us to make clear statements about the outcome, since it will return numbers that can be interpreted to either reject or confirm our null hypotheses. Furthermore, we are able to make statements about the level of influence of the independent variables on the successfulness, which can be translated into a visualization of the strength of the relationships.

### 3.3 Operationalization

As the four factors need to be identified in real case stories in order to measure their impact on boycott success, the next chapter focuses on how those case stories are retrieved and coded in order to get a measurable output out of them.

#### 3.3.1 Creating valid case stories

This study is based on qualitative data that has been collected through LexisNexis, a provider of more than 36,000 sources for media and news, which includes all major publishers and includes articles and sources of the last decades (LexisNexis, 2014). This large database provides the objectivity and fulfils the criteria and requirements set out in chapter 3.1.

With the use of LexisNexis a new dataset of 100 boycotts has been created, starting in 1955 with the boycott of the Montgomery Bus Company and ending in 2012 with a boycott of PepsiCo. The conditions for inclusion into the database are:

- The boycott has to be defined as such in the media
- Boycotters and the ones boycotted must be clear

- There has to be a start and an end to the boycott
- Success or failure of the boycott have to be identifiable
- Duration of the boycott has to be observable
- Cause of the boycott must be visible

The database of boycotts was created through the manual search on the LexisNexis Academic webpage via access through the network of the University of Twente.

Two different search terms, “boycott” and “consumer boycott” were used to keep the search results as neutral as possible. Only English news was then searched through, and the results were sorted by relevance through the function LexisNexis offers. Each search term resulted in around 1000 related news articles, which were then searched through for boycotts that met the criteria mentioned above.

Once a boycott seemed eligible, new searches for related articles to that specific boycott were initiated in order to find as much information as possible. In cases in which the search for details on a boycott did not result in enough output, the boycott was dropped. The same applied for boycotts, which did not indicate if or when they started or ended, and whether or not they proved to be successful.

When a boycott met all criteria and was added to the database, the bibliographic reference was retrieved and exported to the appendix.

### **3.3.2 Overview of the boycott cases**

In order to give more insight into the type of cases that constitute the dataset of this study, some general information will be given about some of the cases. Furthermore, the most significant or outstanding boycotts will be highlighted to demonstrate the effect that boycotts can have.

One of the most prominent cases in this study is the boycott of the Montgomery Bus company in 1955, which was fuelling the civil rights movement against racial segregation. When Rosa Parks refused to stand up from her seat for a white person demanding to sit on that seat, she was arrested for that action. Led by Martin Luther King and other political groups, this event led to a boycott of more than 12 months and high public pressure, so that a court ultimately ruled that Alabama’s racial segregation laws for buses were illegal.

Out of the 100 cases, 8 are related to environmental causes, 10 are human rights related, 28 are related to workers’ rights, 22 are caused by discrimination, 7 are related to animals, 8 to politics, 14 are economic related and 3 had other causes.

The duration of the boycotts ranges from one day up to 17 years. The longest boycott took place in South Africa and started in 1969. Since the Barclays Bank was involved in investments in the apartheid regime became public, the bank lost 36 million pounds and had a 12% drop in market share, and lost 12,000 customers in the period between 1983 and 1985 alone. The bank eventually refrained from some of the apartheid related business.

Four boycotts only lasted for one day, hence making them the shortest of the 100. The first of the four boycotts was aimed at Greek stores due to price increases after the implementation of the Euro, but despite high rates of participation, led to no success. The second boycott was aimed at Esso gas stations in the UK due to the company denying global warming effects and the blockade of renewable energy. The rather low participation only led to an official statement in which Esso informed their protesters to be wrong. The third boycott was aimed at telecommunication provider MTN in Nigeria due to high tariffs for phone calls. Even though around one million customers were counted to participate in the boycott, no reduction of tariffs was accomplished. A similar boycott marks the fourth and last one-day boycott of this study. In 2004 around 430,000 Zimbabweans (or 51% of all mobile users) boycotted against high mobile fees, but were also unable to obtain price changes.

### 3.3.3 Coding

In this chapter the different variables of the hypotheses are explained and operationalized in order to be able to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, the variables' values and levels of measurement are elaborated in order to be able to find suitable statistical tests for the analysis.

### Independent Variables

*Level of Magnitude:* For the variable 'level of magnitude' two separate indicators of the variable 'magnitude' in combination with 'duration' were consulted. Since not all of the boycotts had information on both financial impact as well as number of participants in the boycott, a way which allowed categorizing magnitude based on either financial impact or number of participants had to be found. Since for all boycotts there was either the financial impact of the boycott or the number of participants available, the respective information was taken, categorized into low or high and then combined with the duration of the boycott, which was either short-term, medium-term or long-term. When one variable was high and the other low, the more dominant one was chosen as the level of magnitude. If both variables were low or high respectively, the level of magnitude was also low or high. In case one variable was low and the duration medium, or duration was medium and the other variable high, it was judged by the more extreme outlier. The

variable ‘level of magnitude’ has a dichotomous level of measurement with the values low and high.

*Boycott duration:* Boycott duration has an ordinal level of measurement and follows the classification of Friedman (1991) into small-term, medium term and long-term boycotts. In this logic, small-term boycotts are the ones that last up to three months, medium-term boycotts have a duration of three to twelve months and anything longer than one year falls into the category long-term boycott.

*Boycott category:* This variable is measured with the help of the “ethical categories” of the Ethical Consumer Research Association (2015). With slight changes to the original classification, the categories chosen for this study are Environment, Human Rights, Workers’ Rights, Discrimination, Animals, Politics, Economic, and other. The level of measurement is nominal, and each of the 100 boycotts was divided into one of the categories to ensure cases can be tested with one another. The categories Human Rights, Workers’ Rights and Discrimination can be combined into the term “human-related”, while the other categories constitute “non-human related” boycotts.

*Time:* Time has a dichotomous level of measurement, as in this study its only values are pre-1991 and post-1991. Since the boycotts range from 1955 to 2012, they can easily be separated into these two groups in order to be able to compare them.

### Dependent Variable

*Boycott success:* Boycott success has a dichotomous level of measurement since only two values apply to this variable, ‘successful’ and ‘not successful’. Only these two values were included to measure the success of boycott. This means that articles have to show an outcome after the boycott which either indicates change in the company or the return to pre-boycott conduct.

**Table 2: Measurement of independent and dependent variables**

| Variable                     | Measurement  |
|------------------------------|--|
| <b>Independent Variables</b> |  |
| Level of Magnitude           | Low, high (dichotomous)  |
| Boycott duration             | Small-term, medium-term, long-term (ordinal)   |
| Boycott category             | Environment, Human Rights, Workers’ Rights, Discrimination, Animals, Politics, Economic, other (nominal) |



|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| Time                      | Pre-1991, Post-1991 (dichotomous)        |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> |  |
| Boycott success           | Successful, not successful (dichotomous) |

*Source: author's own design*

In order to showcase some of the decisions when coding the dataset, two examples for each independent and dependent variable are given (case numbers from Appendix 2 are used). Arla Foods in case 17 is a clear example for high level of magnitude. Boycott duration is higher than one year, up to 50,000 stores were affected and the company lost 800,000 pounds a day at the boycotts peak. The boycott against Michelin in case 6 is one of the cases where both duration as well as participation are low. As the boycott only lasted for 2 months and few people participated, this was coded as having a low level of magnitude.

Regarding boycott duration, case 50 is a clear case of a short-term boycott, as it only lasted for one day. An example for a long-term boycott is case 3, which lasted for 7 years. For the next variable “boycott category”, case 34 shows an instance of sexual harassment, which is therefore categorized as an example of discrimination and hence a human-related boycott. Case 16 on the other hand is a boycott for animal rights and therefore non-human related.

Regarding time, the previously mentioned case 13 against the Montgomery Bus Company took place in 1955, hence pre-1991 and the boycott in case 50 against Esso took place in 2001, thus representing a post-1991 boycott. Finally, to show examples for successful and unsuccessful boycotts, we look at car manufacturers BMW (case 73) and Ford (case 75). While Ford agreed to stop pro-homosexual policies due to boycott pressure, a three year boycott did not stop BMW from selling the Rover group. An example of an unclear success is the boycott after the infamous Exxon Valdez spill (case 10). Even though Exxon had to pay a substantial amount in fines, this was partly due to court sanctions and is thus only termed a partial success and left out of the statistical calculations.

### 3.4 Analytic plan

Recalling chapter 3.2, this study is using inferential statistics and hypothesis testing. The analysis of the dataset is conducted with the help of chi-squared tests, as these are nonparametric tests that allow examining whether there is a relationship between two variables in a population (Babbie, 2010, p.483). It is based on the assumption that there is no relationship and thus aims to either confirm or reject the null hypothesis. A chi-squared test observes the distribution of values and computes how that would be spread “if there were no relationship between the two

variables” (Babbie, 2010, p.483). It then compares the actual distribution with the expected distribution and returns a value that indicates the “discrepancy between the observed conjoint distribution in the sample and the distribution we would expect if the two variables were unrelated to each other” (Babbie, 2010, p.484). The test also returns a p-value which can then be interpreted regarding its significance with the help different alpha-levels, as can be found in Table 3. These levels of significance are then used to differentiate between different degrees of influence of the independent variables of the hypotheses. As the N=100 constitutes a rather small dataset and is rather exploratory, the  $\alpha$ -levels 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 were chosen as the small sample size bears greater risks of standard errors. The choice to use a 10%  $\alpha$ -level is backed by Andrew Noymer in the Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods, who states that “standard errors will be larger in smaller data sets, so it may make sense to choose 0.1 for alpha in smaller data sets” (Noymer in Lavrakas, 2008, p.18). It is noted however that this also increases the chance of Type I Errors, which means that the chance to incorrectly reject a true null hypothesis is higher in this research at the 10%  $\alpha$ -level than in studies that make use of a 5%  $\alpha$ -level.

**Table 3: Level of significance**

| $\alpha$ -level | Significance    |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| >10%            | Not significant |
| <10%            | *               |
| <5%             | **              |
| <1%             | ***             |

*Source: author's own design*

De Veaux et al. (2008) lay out some assumptions and conditions that data has to fulfil in order to be eligible for a chi-squared test. As the dataset in this research consists of counts, it does fulfil the “Counted Data Condition”. Because the boycotts and everyone involved are also independent from one another, it also passes the “Independence Assumption”. Furthermore, each one of the cases has also been collected as a random sample to the highest possible degree, hence complying with the “Randomization Condition”. And lastly, given that 100 boycotts have been collected and that they are not being split into more than three values of the independent variables, the expected number of cases in each cell is at least five, thus fulfilling the “Expected Cell Frequency Condition” (De Veaux et al., 2008, p.632f).

Regarding the limitations of this study, most critical is probably the collection of the 100 boycotts that was done manually through LexisNexis. While the cases were collected as objectively and randomly as possible, a fully random sample cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, some

weaknesses to the research design have to be mentioned. As 'boycott duration' is both an independent variable as well as one of the determinants of the independent variable 'magnitude', the possibility of multicollinearity between these two variables cannot be ruled out. Due to the limitations in exhaustiveness of the dataset however, concessions had to be made.

It also has to be mentioned that the collection of 100 boycotts consists of explorative data. The strength of the dataset lies not in the richness of information about each boycott, but rather in the collection and assembly itself, which for the first time brings together such information as length, economic impact, participants and a classification about this broad number of boycotts over such a long period of time. It is therefore noteworthy that while the dataset doesn't allow testing much more variables, the strength of this research rather lies in the summarizing and coding of boycotts on a large scale. However, and to recall the chance of Type I Errors, this also means that we are facing an increased likelihood to determine a relationship which does not exist.

Once the dataset of 100 boycotts is split into the variables and values according to the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3.2, chi-squared tests are conducted with the help of SPSS. The statistical outcomes are interpreted and the null hypotheses of each hypothesis either confirmed or rejected. Furthermore, a model of our conceptual framework is derived indicating the strength of influence of each factor in line with the levels of significance in Table 3.


## 4. Results

In order to analyze the findings and to give an answer to the overall research question, this chapter presents the results of the coded dataset and shows the tendencies of the boycotts per variable from the hypotheses. To be able to do this, a summary table of the Table of boycotts in Appendix 2A has been created in Appendix 2B, and figures presenting the main outcomes are shown in the following subchapters.

### 4.1 The distribution of success

The distribution between successful and unsuccessful boycotts in the dataset of this thesis is shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Distribution of boycott success**




For the dependent variable ‘boycott success’ there is a distribution in the dataset of 52 successful boycotts, 33 unsuccessful boycotts and 15 cases that could only be identified to have had partial success, hence they were added to the unsuccessful boycotts, as only cases that showed a clear change in company behavior through the circumstances of the boycott were deemed successful. With this final result of 52 successful and 48 unsuccessful boycotts, the dataset has an equal distribution of cases. With a total N of 100, boycott success serves as our dependent variable and will be used in the chi-squared tests for each of the independent variables.

## 4.2 Boycott magnitude distribution

Figure 5 shows the overall distribution between boycotts with a high level of magnitude and boycotts with a low level of magnitude.


Figure 5: Distribution of boycott magnitude



For the variable 'level of magnitude' Figure 5 shows contradicting results for both values. While the bars indicate a higher number of unsuccessful cases for boycotts with low magnitude, the successful cases clearly dominate for boycotts with a high level of magnitude. In total numbers, for low magnitude 26 boycotts were successful and 33 were not, while for high magnitude 26 boycotts were successful and 15 were not. This result mirrors the expectancy of our alternative hypothesis, as it is supposed that boycotts with a higher economic impact and a higher number of participants create a higher level of pressure on companies and lead to more successful boycotts. However, these numbers only indicate a tendency and the significance of this result will be tested with a chi-squared test in Chapter 5.1.

## 4.3 Boycott duration distribution

Figure 6 gives an overview about the distribution of boycott success for the different types of boycott duration.

**Figure 6: Distribution of boycott duration**

As figure 6 shows, there seems to be a shift in successfulness from short-term over medium-term to long-term boycotts. While there are 17 successful and 26 unsuccessful boycotts that lasted shorter than 3 months (short-term), the result for medium-term boycotts that lasted between 3 and 12 months is rather equal (9 successful and 7 unsuccessful cases). For long-term boycotts the picture changes, as there is a ratio of 26 successful cases to 15 unsuccessful cases for boycotts that lasted longer than 12 months. While a shift in successfulness can be seen, no statement can be made about the statistical significance yet. It does however seem that boycott duration is a factor for its success.

#### 4.4 Human issue distribution

The distribution of boycott categories will be shown in two figures. Figure 7 indicates the boycott success for all categories, while Figure 8 highlights the differences in successfulness between human related and non-human related boycotts.

Figure 7: Distribution of boycott categories




Figure 8: Distribution of ethical distance




Regarding the distribution of boycott success for boycott categories, no clear tendency can be identified at the first look. Those categories where successful boycotts outweigh the unsuccessful ones are 'environment' (5 to 3), 'politics' (5 to 3), 'animals' (5 to 2) and 'other' boycotts (2 to 1). For 'human rights' (3 to 7), 'economics' (4 to 10) and 'workers' rights' (13 to 15) the unsuccessful cases dominate. The category 'discrimination' has an equal distribution of 11 successful and 11 unsuccessful cases.

As no clear distribution can be seen and since the human and non-human related boycotts are compared by the chi-squared test, we also look at the differences between these two categories. Figure 8 however indicates that there is no significant difference to be expected, since the distribution between successful and unsuccessful boycotts looks almost identical for both human and non-human related boycotts. In absolute numbers, 31 human related boycotts were successful and 29 were unsuccessful, while 21 successful non-human related boycotts face 19 unsuccessful cases. All doubts can however be removed through a chi-squared test.


#### 4.5 Date boycott distribution

Regarding the distribution of boycott success over time, Figure 9 displays the differences per decade while Figure 10 differentiates between success of boycotts before 1991 and after 1991.

**Figure 9: Boycott success over time**





**Figure 10: Boycott success before and after 1991**

Regarding the distribution of the last variable ‘Time’, it can be observed that there is a visible difference between the decades. While the two successful cases in the 1950s and 1960s do not have much explanatory power, it can be seen that up until the 2000s every decade had more successful than unsuccessful boycotts (Figure 9). While that ratio was small in the 1950s and 1960s with 1 successful compared to 0 successful boycotts, that ratio increased in the 1970s (4 to 1), the 1980s (11 to 9) and almost came to an equilibrium in the 1990s (20 to 19). After that the 2000s saw a turn in proportions (13 to 17) and there is no clear indication for the 2010s (2 to 2), as the dataset only includes boycotts up until 2012.

When we turn to the tested variable, which is pre 1991 and post 1991, this change over the decades can also be seen in the bar chart for these two values (Figure 10). While there were 25 successful and 13 unsuccessful boycotts before 1990, after 1990 there 27 successful boycotts were opposed by 35 unsuccessful cases. While this is no indication for significance at this point, it does seem that either customer influence on companies or corporate reaction to customer action has changed over time.

## 5. Analysis

In this chapter the results of the chi-squared tests are presented and put into perspective. This is done by a short introduction summarizing the main findings of the chi-squared tests in Appendix 1 and a statement whether or not the null hypotheses can be rejected. This is then followed by a table summarizing the counts of successful boycotts for each given variable and a deeper analysis interpreting these numbers.

### 5.1 Hypothesis 1

In order to test the first hypothesis “*If the magnitude of the boycott is high, it is more likely to be successful*” a chi-square test was conducted. Based on  $\alpha=0.1$ , the null hypothesis can be rejected (Appendix 1, Table H1). It is therefore concluded that the success of a boycott is determined by its magnitude and more specifically, boycotts with a high level of magnitude are more likely to be successful than boycotts with a low level of magnitude.

**Table 4: Chi-squared test H1**

|           |      |                | Successful |      | Total |
|-----------|------|----------------|------------|------|-------|
|           |      |                | No         | Yes  |       |
| Magnitude | low  | Count          | 33         | 26   | 59    |
|           |      | Expected Count | 28,3       | 30,7 | 59,0  |
|           | high | Count          | 15         | 26   | 41    |
|           |      | Expected Count | 19,7       | 21,3 | 41,0  |
| Total     |      | Count          | 48         | 52   | 100   |
|           |      | Expected Count | 48,0       | 52,0 | 100,0 |

With a successful to unsuccessful ratio of 26 to 33 for boycotts with low magnitude versus 26 to 15 for high-magnitude boycotts, Table 4 already indicates a difference in successfulness between the two types of boycotts which is then also confirmed to be significant by a chi-squared test.

In order to relate this hypothesis to the overall research question and to put it into perspective, the test sample shows that magnitude is a factor for the successfulness of boycotts.

## 5.2 Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis can be rejected with an  $\alpha=0.01$  level (Appendix 1, Table H2) and therefore leads to the conclusion that the success of a boycott depends on its duration. More specifically, a boycott with a high duration is more likely to be successful than a boycott with a low duration.

**Table 5: Chi-squared test H2**

|                  |       |                | Successful |      | Total |
|------------------|-------|----------------|------------|------|-------|
|                  |       |                | No         | Yes  |       |
| Boycott duration | short | Count          | 30         | 19   | 49    |
|                  |       | Expected Count | 22,5       | 26,5 | 49,0  |
|                  | long  | Count          | 10         | 28   | 38    |
|                  |       | Expected Count | 17,5       | 20,5 | 38,0  |
| Total            |       | Count          | 40         | 47   | 87    |
|                  |       | Expected Count | 40,0       | 47,0 | 87,0  |

In this sample, out of 49 short-term boycotts 30 were unsuccessful while 19 were successful. Contrarily, out of 38 long-term boycotts, 10 were unsuccessful and 28 were successful. As the numbers tell and as Figure 6 illustrates, a clear difference in successfulness can be seen. A chi-squared test also confirms a strong significance in rejecting  $H_0$ .

In this case a low duration included every boycott from the sample that lasted less than 3 months and a boycott with a high duration lasted for more than 12 months.

Regarding the overall research question it can be concluded that the length of a boycott is a factor in the outcome or successfulness of the boycott, meaning long boycotts tend to be more successful than short ones.

## 5.3 Hypothesis 3

Turning to the third hypothesis, with a p-value of 0.935 (Appendix 1, Table H3) it can be concluded that there is no relationship between the variables ‘success of human related boycotts’ and the ‘success of other issue related boycotts’. Based on this sample there is no evidence that a boycott which was caused by human related reasons is more successful than a boycott that was caused by environmental, animal, political or economic related issues.

**Table 6: Chi-squared test H3**

|                  |                   |                | Successful |      | Total |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------|------------|------|-------|
|                  |                   |                | No         | Yes  |       |
| Ethical Distance | Not Human related | Count          | 19         | 21   | 40    |
|                  |                   | Expected Count | 19,2       | 20,8 | 40,0  |
|                  | Human related     | Count          | 29         | 31   | 60    |
|                  |                   | Expected Count | 28,8       | 31,2 | 60,0  |
| Total            |                   | Count          | 48         | 52   | 100   |
|                  |                   | Expected Count | 48,0       | 52,0 | 100,0 |

Taking a look at the outcomes, it can be seen that 31 human related boycotts were successful while 29 were not. Out of the non-human related boycotts 21 were successful while 19 were not. Figure 8 illustrates the success of both variables and it can be seen that the ratio between unsuccessfulness and successfulness almost looks identical. A chi-squared test also confirms that there is not enough evidence to reject  $H_0$ .

## 5.4 Hypothesis 4

Lastly, a chi-squared test was conducted to test the fourth hypothesis which claims that boycotts that happened before 1991 were more successful than boycotts which occurred after 1991. Looking at the results, the null hypothesis can be rejected with an  $\alpha=0.05$  level, indicating that there is a connection between the two variables. Consulting Figure 10 the inference which can be drawn is that boycotts tended to be more successful pre-1991 than post-1991.

**Table 7: Chi-squared test H4**

|       |           |                | Successful |      | Total |
|-------|-----------|----------------|------------|------|-------|
|       |           |                | No         | Yes  |       |
| Time  | Pre 1990  | Count          | 13         | 25   | 38    |
|       |           | Expected Count | 18,2       | 19,8 | 38,0  |
|       | Post 1990 | Count          | 35         | 27   | 62    |
|       |           | Expected Count | 29,8       | 32,2 | 62,0  |
| Total |           | Count          | 48         | 52   | 100   |
|       |           | Expected Count | 48,0       | 52,0 | 100,0 |

As can be seen in Table 7, this result also mirrors in the absolute numbers. While there is an expected count of 19.8 successful boycotts before 1990, there are actually 25 cases which turned

out to be successful. After 1990, 32.2 expected successful boycotts oppose an actual count of 27, thus indicating a lower percentage of successful boycotts in recent years compared to the decades before.

### 5.5 Summary of findings

The following table gives an overview about the outcomes of the chi-squared tests per hypothesis, indicating whether or not the null hypotheses could be rejected and also indicating the level of significance of the outcomes.

**Table 8: Summary of findings**

| Hypothesis     | Significance    | Interpretation           |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| H <sub>1</sub> | *               | H <sub>0</sub> rejected  |
| H <sub>2</sub> | ***             | H <sub>0</sub> rejected  |
| H <sub>3</sub> | Not significant | H <sub>0</sub> confirmed |
| H <sub>4</sub> | **              | H <sub>0</sub> rejected  |

*Source: author's own design*

As can be seen in Table 8, while the null hypothesis of H<sub>3</sub> is confirmed, the null hypotheses of the other hypotheses can all be rejected at different levels of significance. These findings are further discussed in chapter 6.

## 6. Discussions and overall model for CSR

### 6.1 Discussion

The following subchapters discuss the findings for  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$ ,  $H_3$  and  $H_4$  based on the analysis in chapter 5.

#### 6.1.1 Magnitude and boycott success

As the level of magnitude is determined by duration, financial impact and number of participants it can be inferred that the bigger a boycott gets, the more likely a company becomes to give in to the demands of the boycotters.

As Pruitt and Friedman (1986) found, even the announcement of a boycott can lead to a substantial financial loss of a company, thus recommending to react to boycott intentions as early as possible while carefully balancing the costs and benefits of the boycotters' demands. This knowledge of the sensitivity of companies regarding costs and losses plus the result that a higher level of magnitude leads to a higher possibility of boycott success can lead to different inferences.

On the company side, an imminent boycott should be identified as early as possible, ideally during the "action-considered" or "action-organized" stages of the boycott (Friedman, 1991). As they face "economic pressure" as well as "image pressure" (Garrett, 1987) in these situations, it is in their interest to get in contact with the initiators of the boycott. If the demands of the boycotters are known, the costs of coming to an agreement can then be weighed against the costs of a boycott.

Boycotters should therefore be aware of the pressure even a planned boycott can put on a company and very reasonably determine whether or not to take action against the firm. However, as was identified earlier, motivation for boycott participation depends on various factors, such as cost to the boycotter, the likelihood of success, social pressure or the credibility of boycott leadership (Klein et al, 2004; Sen et al, 2001; Garrett, 1987).

While the success of a boycott depends on the participation of every single boycotter, it is, amongst other factors, the expected participation and success of the boycott that keeps individuals from participating. And since companies often cannot afford to wait whether a small movement or complaints from a small group turn into a boycott or not, immediate action is required.

While companies are trying to cope with the constant threat of boycotts, boycotters can try to profit from the increasing media attention that unethical behavior of companies gets and from the growing awareness and ethical consumerism in the public. As consumers have become more aware of misconduct through media reports and as they are increasingly aware of the impact their purchasing choices have (Harrison et al (2005) in Smith, 2007, pp.6-7), more consumers will be willing to make sacrifices and to engage in and commit to boycotts, which will increase their magnitude and result in even higher pressure on the companies.

### **6.1.2 Duration and boycott success**

The influence of duration on a boycott can be explained by various reasons. First, a boycott becomes costlier for the company over time. If that company realizes that the boycott does not wear out over time it might be more willing to give in to the demands of the boycotters. It can be stated that the “economic pressure” became too high (Garrett, 1980).

Additionally it can be argued that through a higher coverage in the media, reporting and also social media, the company might fear a decrease in public standing and damages to its reputation, thus being willing to give in to boycotters demands through “image pressure” (Garrett, 1980). Also, as the influence of social media has increased over the last years and since bad press has resulted in a lot of outrage and even ‘shitstorms’, companies nowadays cannot afford to let certain news about their products, let alone boycotts, swell to a point where they cannot control and channel the conversation anymore. Since this pressure increases over time and because an ongoing boycott also motivates those consumers, whose suspicion in the boycott’s “likelihood of success” held them from participating, to join the boycott, a company is more willing to give in to the demands of the boycotters if they cannot silence the protest in the short term.

### **6.1.3 Ethical Distance and boycott success**

Even though the inference is drawn that human related boycotts are not more successful than other boycotts, the findings have to be put into perspective.

This study suspected that due to ethical distance and a loyalty or connectedness to other human beings, boycotts concerning this value would be more successful. Even though this is not the case, it cannot be argued that there is no higher level of identification with human related boycotts. There might be other factors that affect boycott participation and outcome. It can even be the case that companies are also more reluctant to give in to demands which are made in human-related boycotts, since these boycotts are often about the increase of salaries and would therefore lead to very high additional costs to the companies.

Nevertheless, as no evidence was found that show a higher rate of success for human related boycotts than for boycotts which were caused by the violation of other values, there can only be an open discussion about the different ethical values and it once more confirms the statement that “criteria for the success of consumer boycotts are often hard to find” (Friedman, 1991, p.155).

#### **6.1.4 Time and boycott success**

As was shown earlier, customers have become more aware of their consumption and have developed an ethical consumerism (Smith, 2007). Furthermore, customer values have been identified and an increased sensitivity about them has been observed (Smith, 1996). At the same time, the technological progress in such form as social media has made it easier for consumers to express their discontent and to unite with similar thinking people.

Additionally, the responsibility of companies towards society has risen over the years and the public has become more and more aware in order to hold the corporations accountable towards this responsibility (Duarte et al., 2010; Kim & Lee, 2012). But why has the successfulness of boycotts decreased over time while there is evidence that consumers are both more aware and more willing to display their dissatisfaction and take action against that bad behavior? The answer must lie on the company side.

There are various reasons that can explain this decrease in successfulness of boycotts. The positive scenario would be an increased awareness and acceptance of their corporate social responsibilities towards society. As they have identified their legal and moral obligations, they are more willing to commit to their economic, legal, and even ethical and discretionary responsibilities (Duarte et al., 2010) which have been turned into economic problems. In case there is a boycott, there are either not enough participants because the matter is not so crucial or enough people realize that the company already does everything in their power to fulfil their responsibilities so that a boycott does not gain enough momentum in order to be successful.

However, in a negative scenario a company has become better prepared than they used to be to the threat of a boycott. As there are certain indicators, firms might have become able to identify public dissatisfaction with their products or conduct and control the outrage from an early point on. With an early reaction to these indicators companies are able to become active instead of reactive and let their PR departments work on a strategy on how to deal with the boycott or even how to prevent one from emerging. As it is known that for example social media monitoring has become important for a company over the years, it can be expected that bigger firms are




constantly trying to observe all activities and reports concerning their products and public image in order to be able to quickly respond or develop action plans.

## 6.2 Overall model, findings summary and proposed CSR mechanism

If we take the findings for all chi-squared tests of the hypotheses in chapter 5 and take into account the strength of inference based on the significance of the  $\alpha$ -level that was used, the data can be transformed into the following model:

Figure 11: The governance & enforcement of CSR via consumer action



Source: author's own design


As Figure 11 is a revised version of our conceptual framework in Chapter 2.3.3, we can use the results of the chi-squared tests and the associated rejected and confirmed hypotheses to determine the influence of the four identified factors on the relationship between a boycott and its success. Based on the levels of significance, it can be summarized that according to the data of this study, duration has the strongest impact on boycott success, followed by historical development in that there is evidence that boycotts before 1991 tended to be more successful than boycotts after 1991. For boycott magnitude there is also evidence about its influence on boycott success, even though it has the lowest level of significance of the confirmed factors and the increased chance of a Type I error has to be recalled here. And lastly, there is no statistical

evidence that ethical distance has an impact on boycott success, as there is no significant difference between the successfulness of human related boycotts compared to non-human related boycotts.

In order to make use of this model, the initial situation at the beginning of this thesis will be picked up on. As was mentioned in chapter 2.1 there is an absence of regulatory frameworks and CSR enforcement mechanisms to hold companies accountable for exploitative corporate behavior, therefore resulting in customer dissatisfaction and possibly consumer action in the form of boycotts. Based on the findings of this thesis in Figure 11, a pro-active system of governance is proposed that can channel consumer commitment into a regulatory mechanism, therefore addressing exploitative corporate behavior before it comes to boycotts.

It usually takes an eye-catching event and media attention to set off the train of events that lead to a boycott and therefore a possible change in corporate conduct. As there is a lack of regulatory frameworks, companies usually forego their responsibility towards society until lots of people (numbers) would be willing to boycott for a long time while bearing the costs of this boycott would impose on them (commitment), as this study found. In order to tackle this governance problem, we therefore propose a governance framework that would take into account the key factors influencing boycott success, magnitude and duration in the form of numbers and commitment.

**Figure 12: Proposed CSR enforcement mechanism**



*Source: author's own design*

Figure 12 shows a possible aggregation mechanism based on this research should there be the governmental wish to better channel public ethical decisions and dissatisfaction into a corporate regulatory mechanism. If that was the case, the mechanism would propose to install a public body for each of the categories we used to determine boycott category (Environment, Human Rights, Workers' Rights, Discrimination, Animals, Politics, Economic, other) on a quasi-statutory basis. This task could also be taken care of by NGOs. These bodies, or sectoral monitoring groups, would identify breaches (be it through input from the public) before there was media coverage and then start the mechanism. Once misconduct was identified they would lay that to the population, e.g. through the use of a mobile application as an aggregation mechanism. At this stage a high number of potential consumers would not only have to sign the petition, but they would have to demonstrate commitment or willingness to sacrifice in order to signal dissatisfaction. This would then trigger a response from the legislative authorities that could take regulatory action which, if necessary, would be enforced by the courts if the company response deviated from the proposed regulatory framework. This way consumer dissatisfaction would be funneled into information towards regulatory bodies that could set up an appropriate regulatory framework, which would have moral authority through the high number of participants and level of commitment of the people. This framework would put pressure on companies to either comply or to be held accountable through the legal system. As this pro-active system would be capable of identifying exploitative corporate behavior and consumer commitment before being turned into boycotts, this is our proposed answer of a CSR enforcement mechanism to tackle the governance problem of CSR.

## 7. Conclusion

In order to give an answer to the research question, a further look has to be taken at the analysis of the four hypotheses and the model that was derived from it. Out of the four null hypotheses, three could be rejected, meaning that in those cases enough evidence was found to support the claims about effect on boycott success. If the significance levels are taken into account, it can be concluded that out of the factors that were examined for this study, boycott duration has the highest influence on boycott success, followed by date (boycotts preceding 1991 to be more successful than boycotts after 1991) and boycott magnitude. No support however could be found for the claim that there is a difference in boycott success between those cases relating to human issues and those relating to non-human issues.

Now what do these differences in strength imply? First of all, time might be one of the key factors, since it not only means ongoing losses for a company, but also a sustained damage of its public image over time, both of which mean tremendous pressure for a company. If a firm is located in a contested market and at risk of losing customers to competitors, it might very well not be willing to be subject to a public outcry for a substantially long time. Of course, this information is also valuable to organizers and participants of boycotts, as they know that their chance of being successful in forcing a company to change its conduct increases over time.

However, as there is also evidence for a higher rate of successful boycotts before 1991 than after, it can also be suspected that companies have found ways and means to either respond to boycotts in the early stages or to identify whether or not a planned boycott will have enough momentum to be hurting their business. Especially nowadays, posts on social media can result in sizes that are not manageable for companies anymore, making it especially important to stay ahead of things and be constantly aware of dissatisfied customers and faults with either the product of the corporate behavior. The increasing number of unsuccessful boycotts indicates that companies either became more complicit with CSR procedures and therefore gave consumers less of a target or managed to maneuver around boycotts through social media monitoring and preventive interaction with customers. As no definite reason for the decline in successful boycotts can be presented and revisiting the concept of Duarte et al. (2010), it can only be emphasized that customers were more successful before 1991 to turn an ethical egregious breach into an economic problem for the companies and therefore getting CSR implemented than after 1991.

In terms of our model in Figure 11, the least significant factor for boycott success turns out to be boycott magnitude. As it takes into account not only time, but also economic damages to the company and/or number of participants, it gives a broader indication about the real size of a company. As the findings show, these boycotts with higher magnitude do indeed have a higher chance of being successful, even though the significance of the test does not indicate this to be as high of a factor as duration and time. There are a number of reasons why this variable does not seem to have as big of an influence on boycott success as the other variables. Some strong or weak cases might have mitigated each other's effects, as duration as well as economic impact and number of participants have been used for the measurement and might have levelled each other out. Furthermore it has to be acknowledged, that the criteria were quite subjective or at the very least no measurable scale was used for the division of boycotts into levels of magnitude.

There is however no evidence for a higher success rate of human issue related boycotts compared to economic, environmental, animal or political related issues. As discussed in the analysis, there might also be a variety of reasons for this outcome. Since mass dismissals of employees and worker's rights are always a big economic factor for a company, sometimes there is no way for a company to find a common ground with boycotters. Furthermore, as companies also have to satisfy the demands of their stakeholders, these interests might have a higher weight than that of employees and customers. Additionally, not always do boycotts regarding human issues find approval in the broad mass. As soon as strikes affect the everyday life of a broader population, the intentions behind it may quickly be deemed less important than personal comfort. Let's assume a flight pilot union that calls for strikes and boycotts during vacation time in order to get airlines to increase the wages of pilots. Not only does the public in these situations regard pilots' salaries as already high enough, but the circumstance of personally suffering a shortened, stressful vacation, not knowing whether their flights will reach their destination will possibly result in a very low public support of such a boycott.

To revisit Chapter 6.2, the findings of this study were translated into a proposal for a pro-active governmental mechanism to establish regulatory frameworks in cases of exploitative corporate behavior. This is not only a proposal to fill the gap which is left through the current lack of regulatory mechanisms, but this could also serve as means to interact with the public and to motivate democratic participation and overcome political vexation. Even though the 2019 European Parliament election indicated an increase in voter turnout, a decline in political activity throughout all layers of population can be observed. A mechanism like the one proposed in this study could help to increase the "level of democracy", strengthen democratic processes and increase citizens' participation in corporate governance. Even though this is only hypothetical,

the integration of citizens, especially through technological means such as an App, could also increase youth interest in politics and give young people the option to have influence in democratic procedures and on corporate behavior. Especially recent events such as the “Fridays for Future” movement have shown that there is indeed the willingness and maybe even the urge to hold both politics and companies accountable to their social responsibility. Despite the fact that this is an exploratory piece of research with a relatively low number of cases, if these results were replicated more widely this would be a reasonable mechanism to counter this need for a democratic process.

It has to be mentioned though that more research is needed to establish the validity of the model, as this is only a first draft or proposal for a CSR enforcement mechanism. Especially the commitment of citizens, which was established through the independent variable ‘magnitude’ in this thesis, has to be defined for the mechanism. Future research therefore has to ask ‘What does it mean for customers to signal value?’, as it is not enough to sign a petition, but a true sign of commitment is needed that signalizes the willingness to bear the costs that a boycott would bring. Furthermore the question ‘How does regulation fit with government economic interests?’ has to be addressed, as governments often profit either directly or indirectly from exploitative corporate behaviors of companies and are also reluctant to punish powerful corporations or risk losing fiscal revenues or future investments. And if NGOs were to play a role in the mechanism as the public bodies it has to be asked “How can NGOs, that are not perfect in terms of knowledge, resources, behavior or independence, play this kind of deliberative democratic role?”, therefore carefully considering how to ensure the independence and neutrality of these bodies.

## References

- Alves, I. (2009). Green Spin Everywhere: How Greenwashing reveals the Limits of the CSR Paradigm. *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, 2(1), pp. 1-26.
- Babbie, E. (2010). *The practice of social research*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Brown, T., & Dacin, P. (1997). The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses. *Journal of Marketing*, 61, pp. 68-84.
- Burke, L., & Logsdon, J. (1996). How Corporate Social Responsibility Pays Off. *Long Range Planning*, 29(4), pp. 495-502.
- Carroll, A. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. *Academy of Management Review*, 4(4), pp. 497-505.
- Carroll, A. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct. *Business & Society*, 38(3), pp. 268-295.
- De Veaux, R., Velleman, P., & Bock, D. (2008). *Stats: Data and Models*. Pearson Education.
- Duarte, A., Mouro, C., & Gonçalves das Neves, J. (2010). Corporate social responsibility: mapping its social meaning. *Management Research: The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management*, 8(2), pp. 101-122.
- Freidberg, S. (2003). Cleaning up down South: Supermarkets, ethical trade and African horticulture. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 4(1), pp. 27-43.
- Friedman, M. (1985). Consumer Boycotts in the United States, 1970-1980: Contemporary Events in Historical Perspective. *The Journal of Consumer Affairs*, 19(1), pp. 96-117.
- Friedman, M. (1991). Consumer Boycotts: A Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda. *Journal of Social Issues*, 47(1), pp. 149-168.
- Friedman, M. (1996). A Positive Approach to Organized Consumer Action: The "Boycott" as an Alternative to the Boycott. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 19, 439-451.
- Friedman, M. (1999). *Consumer Boycotts - Effective Change Through the Marketplace and the Media*. London: Routledge.
- Garrett, D. (1987). The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts: Environmental Opposition to Marketing. *Journal of Marketing*, 51, pp. 46-57.
- Garriga, E., & Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 53, pp. 51-71.
- Hall, E. T. (1966). *The Hidden Dimension*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Harrison, R., Newholm, T., & Shaw, D. (2005). *The Ethical Consumer*. London: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. (1984). Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 1(2), pp. 81-99.

- Holbrook, M. (1994). The Nature of Customer Value: An Axiology of Services in the Consumption Experience. In R. Rust, & R. Oliver, *Service Quality: New Directions in Theory and Practice* (pp. 21-71). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Hou, J., & Reber, B. (2011). Dimensions of Disclosures: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting by Media Companies. *Public Relations Review*, 37, pp. 166-168.
- Jebe, R. (2011). Will Business Do Anything for Money?: Carrot Mobs and Sustainability in Small Businesses. *Working Paper Series*.
- John, A., & Klein, J. (2003). The Boycott Puzzle: Consumer Motivations for Purchase Sacrifice. *Management Science*, 49(9), pp. 1196-1209.
- Kim, S., & Lee, Y. (2012). The complex attribution process of CSR motives. *Public Relations Review*, 38, pp. 168-170.
- Kimeldorf, H., Meyer, R., Prasad, M., & Robinson, I. (2006). Consumers with a Conscience: Will They Pay More? *Contexts*, 5(1), pp. 24-29.
- Klein, J., & John, A. (2001). Exploring Motivations for Participation in a Consumer Boycott. *Centre for Marketing Working Paper*, 01(701), pp. 1-22.
- Klein, J., Smith, N., & John, A. (2004). Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation. *Journal of Marketing*, 68, pp. 92-109.
- Klein, N. (1999). *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies*. Picador.
- Kotler, P., & Armstrong, G. (2011). *Principles of Marketing*. New Jersey: Pearson.
- Lavrakas, P. J. (2008). *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods*. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- LexisNexis. (2014). *About Us*. Retrieved July 21, 2014, from LexisNexis: <http://www.lexisnexis.nl/english/about-us/about-us.page>
- Mohr, L., Webb, D., & Harris, K. (2001). Do Consumers expect Companies to be Socially Responsible? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior. *The Journal of Consumer Affairs*, 35(1), pp. 45-72.
- Öberseder, M., Schlegelmilch, B., & Gruber, V. (2011). "Why Don't Consumers Care About CSR?": A Qualitative Study Exploring the Role of CSR in Consumption Decisions. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 104, pp. 449-460.
- Pruitt, S., & Friedman, M. (1986). Determining the effectiveness of consumer boycotts: A stock price analysis of their impact on corporate targets. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 9(4), pp. 375-387.
- Rivoli, P., & Waddock, S. (2011). "First They Ignore You...": The Time-Context Dynamic and Corporate Responsibility. *California Management Review*, 53(2), pp. 87-104.
- Schwartz, M., & Carroll, A. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 13(4), pp. 503-530.
- Sen, S., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2001). Does Doing Good Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 38(2), 225-243.



- Sen, S., Zeynep, G.-J., & Morwitz, V. (2001). Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 28(3), pp. 399-417.
- Sheehy, B. (2012). Understanding CSR: An Empirical Study of Private Regulation. *Monash University Law Review*, 38(2), pp. 103-127.
- Smith, N. (1996). Ethics and the Typology of Customer Value. *Advances in Consumer Research*, 23, pp. 148-153.
- Smith, N. (2007). Consumers as Drivers of Corporate Responsibility. *Centre for Marketing Working Paper*, 07(103), pp. 1-33.
- United Nations. (2012). *Overview of the UN Global Compact*. Retrieved April 26, 2012, from United Nations Global Compact: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html>
- United Nations. (2012). *The Ten Principles*. Retrieved April 26, 2012, from United Nations Global Compact: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>

## Appendix 1: Statistical Outputs

H1:

**Magnitude 2 Categories \* Success 2 Categories Crosstabulation**


|                        |      |                | Success 2 Categories |      | Total |
|------------------------|------|----------------|----------------------|------|-------|
|                        |      |                | No                   | Yes  |       |
| Magnitude 2 Categories | low  | Count          | 33                   | 26   | 59    |
|                        |      | Expected Count | 28,3                 | 30,7 | 59,0  |
|                        | high | Count          | 15                   | 26   | 41    |
|                        |      | Expected Count | 19,7                 | 21,3 | 41,0  |
| Total                  |      | Count          | 48                   | 52   | 100   |
|                        |      | Expected Count | 48,0                 | 52,0 | 100,0 |

**Chi-Square Tests**

|                                    | Value              | df | Asymptotic<br>Significance<br>(2-sided) | Exact Sig. (2-<br>sided) | Exact Sig. (1-<br>sided) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Pearson Chi-Square                 | 3,628 <sup>a</sup> | 1  | ,057                                    | ,069                     | ,044                     |
| Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup> | 2,894              | 1  | ,089                                    |                          |                          |
| Likelihood Ratio                   | 3,660              | 1  | ,056                                    |                          |                          |
| Fisher's Exact Test                |                    |    |   |                          |                          |
| Linear-by-Linear<br>Association    | 3,591              | 1  | ,058                                    |                          |                          |
| N of Valid Cases                   | 100                |    |   |                          |                          |

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19,68.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table



H2:

**Boycott duration 2 Categories \* Success 2 Categories Crosstabulation**


|                               |                |                | Success 2 Categories |      | Total |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|------|-------|
|                               |                |                | No                   | Yes  |       |
| Boycott duration 2 Categories | short          | Count          | 30                   | 19   | 49    |
|                               |                | Expected Count | 22,5                 | 26,5 | 49,0  |
|                               | long           | Count          | 10                   | 28   | 38    |
|                               |                | Expected Count | 17,5                 | 20,5 | 38,0  |
| Total                         | Count          |                | 40                   | 47   | 87    |
|                               | Expected Count |                | 40,0                 | 47,0 | 87,0  |

**Chi-Square Tests**

|                                    | Value               | df | Asymptotic<br>Significance<br>(2-sided) | Exact Sig. (2-<br>sided) | Exact Sig. (1-<br>sided) |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Pearson Chi-Square                 | 10,500 <sup>a</sup> | 1  | ,001                                    | ,002                     | ,001                     |
| Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup> | 9,142               | 1  | ,002                                    |                          |                          |
| Likelihood Ratio                   | 10,805              | 1  | ,001                                    |                          |                          |
| Fisher's Exact Test                |                     |    |   |                          |                          |
| Linear-by-Linear<br>Association    | 10,380              | 1  | ,001                                    |                          |                          |
| N of Valid Cases                   | 87                  |    |   |                          |                          |

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17,47.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table



H3:

**Human related Boycott \* Success 2 Categories Crosstabulation**


|                       |                   |                | Success 2 Categories |      | Total |
|-----------------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------------|------|-------|
|                       |                   |                | No                   | Yes  |       |
| Human related Boycott | Not Human related | Count          | 19                   | 21   | 40    |
|                       |                   | Expected Count | 19,2                 | 20,8 | 40,0  |
|                       | Human related     | Count          | 29                   | 31   | 60    |
|                       |                   | Expected Count | 28,8                 | 31,2 | 60,0  |
| Total                 |                   | Count          | 48                   | 52   | 100   |
|                       |                   | Expected Count | 48,0                 | 52,0 | 100,0 |

**Chi-Square Tests**

|                                    | Value             | df | Asymptotic<br>Significance<br>(2-sided) | Exact Sig. (2-<br>sided) | Exact Sig. (1-<br>sided) |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Pearson Chi-Square                 | ,007 <sup>a</sup> | 1  | ,935                                    | 1,000                    | ,549                     |
| Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup> | ,000              | 1  | 1,000                                   |                          |                          |
| Likelihood Ratio                   | ,007              | 1  | ,935                                    |                          |                          |
| Fisher's Exact Test                |                   |    |   |                          |                          |
| Linear-by-Linear<br>Association    | ,007              | 1  | ,935                                    |                          |                          |
| N of Valid Cases                   | 100               |    |   |                          |                          |

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19,20.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table



H4:

**Year two categories \* Success 2 Categories Crosstabulation**


|                     |           |                | Success 2 Categories |      | Total |
|---------------------|-----------|----------------|----------------------|------|-------|
|                     |           |                | No                   | Yes  |       |
| Year two categories | Pre 1990  | Count          | 13                   | 25   | 38    |
|                     |           | Expected Count | 18,2                 | 19,8 | 38,0  |
|                     | Post 1990 | Count          | 35                   | 27   | 62    |
|                     |           | Expected Count | 29,8                 | 32,2 | 62,0  |
| Total               |           | Count          | 48                   | 52   | 100   |
|                     |           | Expected Count | 48,0                 | 52,0 | 100,0 |

**Chi-Square Tests**

|                                    | Value              | df | Asymptotic<br>Significance<br>(2-sided) | Exact Sig. (2-<br>sided) | Exact Sig. (1-<br>sided) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Pearson Chi-Square                 | 4,669 <sup>a</sup> | 1  | ,031                                    | ,040                     | ,025                     |
| Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup> | 3,821              | 1  | ,051                                    |                          |                          |
| Likelihood Ratio                   | 4,730              | 1  | ,030                                    |                          |                          |
| Fisher's Exact Test                |                    |    |   |                          |                          |
| Linear-by-Linear<br>Association    | 4,623              | 1  | ,032                                    |                          |                          |
| N of Valid Cases                   | 100                |    |   |                          |                          |

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18,24.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table



**Appendix 2A: List of Boycotts**

| Case no. | Case     | Description                               | Category              | What has been boycotted? | Magnitude   | Level of Magnitude | Outcome  | Successful | Search Term      |
|----------|----------|---|-----------------------|--------------------------|---|--------------------|--|------------|------------------|
| 1        | ANC 1986 | Apartheid/ oppression/ racial segregation | People – human rights | White-owned businesses   | One week, nationwide, allegedly supported by 400,000 people. 27 shops were forced to shut down business | low                | Partly successful, reached a revocation of at least some race restrictions | No         | Consumer boycott |
| 2        | ANC 1990 | Right of legal protest/ equal treatment   | People – human rights | White-owned businesses   | 2 months, no data on participants   | low                | Successful, Rights were granted and local liaison committee established    | Yes        | Consumer boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|   |   |                                   |             |   |  |      |  |     |                     |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|-------------|---|--|------|--|-----|---------------------|
| 3 | Daishowa<br>1991                          | Logging/harvesting<br>land        | Environment | Japanese<br>paper<br>company                        | 7 years, 20<br>million dollar<br>loss in sales   | high | Company sued<br>boycotters, but<br>boycotters<br>successful in the<br>end. Daishowa<br>stopped logging                                       | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 4 | Israel's<br>wireless<br>operators<br>2005 | Expensive cellular<br>prices      | Economic    | Cellular<br>telephone use                           | 52.7% of<br>Israel's<br>population,<br>short term (1<br>month)                               | low  | Unsuccessful,<br>Israeli wireless<br>operators did<br>not make any<br>change in the<br>prices and said<br>boycott did not<br>affect business | No  | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 5 | Cadbury<br>2009                           | Environmental<br>damage/emissions | Environment | Cadbury<br>products with<br>palm oil<br>ingredients | 3 months,<br>Zoos in NZ<br>started to<br>boycott<br>Cadbury<br>products on<br>their premises | low  | Successful,<br>Cadbury<br>dumped palm oil<br>as an ingredient<br>and changed to<br>more expensive<br>cocoa butter                            | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 6 | Michelin                                  | France's veto in UN               | Politics    | French-based  | 2 months,  | low  | Not successful,  | No  | Consumer            |



# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|   |                          |   |                                |  |  |     |  |    |                     |
|---|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|--|-----|--|----|---------------------|
|   | 2003                     | resolution/<br>disagreement about<br>Iraq war   |                                | products -><br>Michelin<br>tyres                                 | only few<br>people asked<br>their local tyre<br>dealers to<br>avoid using<br>Michelin tyres              |     | No change in<br>tyre sales, no<br>change in<br>countries<br>position |    | boycott             |
| 7 | INKA 2002                | Price increases since<br>EURO<br>implementation | Economic                       | Shopping in<br>general in all<br>stores in<br>Greece             | 70% of Greek<br>population<br>participate,<br>80% reduction<br>in shopping.<br>Duration: 1<br>day        | low | No change in<br>prices   | No | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 8 | Maple Leaf<br>Foods 1998 | Salary cuts                                     | People –<br>workers’<br>rights | Products of<br>the company,<br>initiated by<br>workers’<br>union | 6 weeks,<br>Low<br>participation,<br>no measurable<br>impact on<br>sales or profits<br>of the<br>company | low | Workers were<br>forced to accept<br>concessions                      | No | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 9 | Lucky                    | Workers’  | People –                       | Supermarket  | 2 months,  | low | Lucky stores   | No | Consumer            |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                       |   |                          |   |  |      |   |     |         |
|----|-----------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--|------|---|-----|---------|
|    | Stores 1983           | rights/salary cuts  | workers' rights          | chain that sells 'Red Roach lettuce'              | 43% of Lucky stores customers changed their shopping habits, 21% boycotted the chain (75.000 households asked) |      | refused to stop selling the lettuce brand   |     | boycott |
| 10 | Exxon 1989            | Massive oil spill (10.9 million gallons) after Exxon Valdez crash/pollution | Environment              | Gasoline and other products provided by the Exxon | 10,000 out of 7,000,000 member cards were sent back to Exxon, >1 year, demonstrations in 9 US-states           | low  | Exxon spent 3.5 billion dollars to clean the oil spill (BUT: partly due to court sanctions) | No  | Boycott |
| 11 | Adolph Coors Co. 1987 | Workers' rights/ rights to unionize   | People – workers' rights | Products of the brewery (beer)                    | 10 years of boycott and a 20 month   | high | Employees reaffirmed the right to freely  | Yes | Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |  |   |                                |   |   |      |   |     |         |
|----|--|---|--------------------------------|---|---|------|---|-----|---------|
|    |  |   |                                | through<br>AFL-CIO  | strike of 300<br>workers.<br><br>Market share<br>dropped from<br>47% to 22% |      | choose union<br>representation  |     |         |
| 12 | Californian<br>grape<br>growers<br>1970 (1 <sup>st</sup><br>boycott) | Workers' rights/<br>salary increase /<br>receive contracts            | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | California<br>table grapes<br>were<br>boycotted,<br>initiated<br>through<br>UFW | 5 years, at<br>least 100,000<br>members<br>participated                     | high | Workers<br>received<br>contracts and<br>salary increases  | Yes | Boycott |
| 13 | Montgomer<br>y Bus Co.<br>1955                                       | Racial equality/racial<br>segregation in buses                        | People –<br>human rights       | Bus transport<br>was<br>boycotted<br>through black<br>customers                 | 381 days,<br>30,000<br>boycotters<br>daily                                  | high | Successful, racial<br>segregation on<br>buses was<br>outlawed. Most<br>famous boycott<br>for racial<br>equality | Yes | Boycott |
| 14 | Nestlé 1984  | High infant mortality<br>rates in developing<br>countries through use | other                          | American<br>and<br>international  | 7 year boycott<br>through<br>'International                                 | high | Nestle agreed to<br>change its<br>marketing   | Yes | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |            |  |                          |   |  |      |  |    |         |
|----|------------|--|--------------------------|---|--|------|--|----|---------|
|    |            | of Nestlé formula                                |                          | boycotts of Nestle chocolate and other products | Nestle Boycott Committee' representing 87 labor, religious and health organizations in 10 countries<br>Cost for boycott campaign: 3.5 million \$ |      | practices for infant formula in developing countries to conform to voluntary guidelines of the World Health Organization.<br>Costs: between 15-20 million \$ |    |         |
| 15 | Tesco 2007 | Workers' conditions, dismissal of workers        | People – workers' rights | Products of 100 Tesco supermarkets              | 3-4 days strike of all drivers, 1 day boycott by consumers   | low  | Not successful, workers were fired or received worse contracts   | No | boycott |
| 16 | P&G 2007   | Animal rights/against animal testing of products | Animals                  | P&G products, initiated through                 | 3 years  | high | P&G loses 12.5 million \$ in sales each year through   | No | boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                          |   |                                |  |  |      |   |     |         |
|----|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|--|------|---|-----|---------|
|    |                          |   |                                | 'Uncaged'  |  |      | campaign,<br>nevertheless no<br>change  |     |         |
| 17 | Arla Foods<br>2006       | Danish Muhammad<br>cartoons/ religious<br>mockery | Politics                       | All Danish<br>products that<br>this company<br>mainly sold<br>in Muslim<br>countries | >1 year,<br>boycott in<br>50,000 stores,<br>company<br>losing 800.000<br>pounds a day<br>at the boycotts<br>peak | high | Company<br>practically<br>incapable to<br>change situation,<br>no change        | No  | boycott |
| 18 | Gainers<br>1986          | Wage cuts and<br>pension protection               | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Products<br>from Gainers<br>meat-packing<br>plant                                    | 6 ½ months,<br>1080 workers<br>striked, 10,000<br>people<br>boycotted<br>products                                | low  | Company<br>eventually hired<br>strikers back and<br>increased wages             | Yes | boycott |
| 19 | Paramount<br>studio 2000 | Discrimination of<br>sexual orientation           | People -<br>discriminatio<br>n | A TV show<br>in which anti-<br>homosexual<br>comments<br>were made                   | 2 months,<br>multiple gay<br>activist groups<br>involved, plus<br>support from                                   | low  | Advertisements<br>of the show was<br>ended and<br>sponsorship<br>quit, however, | No  | boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                |  |                          |   |   |      |   |     |         |
|----|----------------|--|--------------------------|---|---|------|---|-----|---------|
|    |                |  |                          |   | public and a producer   |      | the show continued airing   |     |         |
| 20 | Coca-Cola 2003 | Death of 9 workers for being union members in Colombia | People – workers' rights | Coca Cola products worldwide  | 2 years, ten thousands of people worldwide participate, several universities banned Coca Cola since                   | high | Coca Cola still denied involvement in the murder, but agreed to pay 10 million \$ to the Colombian Foundation for Education and Opportunity | No  | boycott |
| 21 | Mexmode 2001   | Working conditions / worms in salad of cafeteria       | People – workers' rights | Products of Nike and Reebok, since Mexmode is a manufacturer for both firms | Only 4 weeks, since 900 striking workers were fired, but then an activist coalition from 85 colleges and universities | low  | Workers were hired back, conditions improved and they were granted rights to form labour unions. Nike was afraid to get negative            | Yes | boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                 |   |                          |                                       |   |      |   |     |         |
|----|-----------------|---|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|------|---|-----|---------|
|    |                 |   |                          |                                       | imposed<br>pressure on<br>Nike and<br>Mexmodo   |      | publicity   |     |         |
| 22 | Denny's<br>1993 | Racial<br>discrimination/<br>unequal treatment of<br>black customers and<br>staff | People –<br>human rights | Branches of<br>Denny's<br>restaurants | NAACP<br>called for a<br>nationwide<br>boycott, that<br>lasted for 2<br>years,<br>respondents<br>unknown,<br>estimated<br>thousands | high | Denny's agreed<br>to generate more<br>than \$ 1 billion<br>in wages and<br>revenue for<br>minorities.<br>Furthermore, 18<br>students<br>received<br>25,000\$, 6 agents<br>received<br>35,000\$, 150,000<br>claimants<br>received 177\$<br>each, 136,000<br>claimants<br>received 132\$<br>each and lawyer | Yes | boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                   |  |                       |  |   |      |  |     |         |
|----|-------------------|--|-----------------------|--|---|------|--|-----|---------|
|    |                   |  |                       |  |   |      | got 8.7 million dollars  |     |         |
| 23 | Adams's Mark 1999 | Mistreatment of African-American students/ racial discrimination | People – human rights | NAACP initiated a boycott of the complete hotel chain, nationwide (23 cited) | 2 years, “all-out, long-term, massive boycott of the entire Adam's Mark chain”  | high | Boycott was lifted after a settlement that included a 2 million \$ payment   | Yes | boycott |
| 24 | Cincinnati 1999   | Unarmed black man shot by police officer/ racial unrest          | People – human rights | Economic boycott of Cincinnati   | 2 years, festivals with stars was cancelled that would have attracted 10,000 people, city lost 7.9 million \$ in income | high | Only partial success, after two years a festival was conducted with 500,000 people, and only 52 protesters. No changes in treatment of black community | No  | boycott |
| 25 | London            | Unethical behavior   | People -              | All London   | 3 months,   | low  | No change in   | No  | boycott |



CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                        |   |                            |   |   |      |  |     |         |
|----|------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|---|------|--|-----|---------|
|    | Drugs 1992             | towards newborns/<br>promoting use of<br>formulas instead of<br>breastfeeding | discrimination             | Drugs Stores,<br>until they<br>stop<br>promoting<br>the use of<br>formulas<br>instead of<br>breastfeeding | provincewide  |      | promotion<br>policies  |     |         |
| 26 | Arizona<br>1987        | Recognition of<br>Martin Luther King<br>Day as a public<br>holiday            | Politics                   | Conventions<br>and events in<br>Arizona were<br>the target of<br>the tourism<br>boycott                   | 6 years,<br>Arizona lost<br>166<br>conventions<br>and the 1993<br>Super Bowl,<br>losses of<br>about 350<br>million \$ | high | Law was<br>eventually<br>passed that<br>declared Martin<br>Luther King Day<br>as holiday | Yes | boycott |
| 27 | New<br>Orleans<br>1991 | Anti-abortion laws/<br>self-determination of<br>the women's body              | People -<br>discrimination | Meetings and<br>conventions<br>have been<br>cancelled by<br>at least 10                                   | 2 years,<br>estimated 100<br>million \$ in<br>losses, 17<br>groups (one   | high | No change in<br>legislation  | No  | Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                                       |  |                                |   |   |      |  |     |         |
|----|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|---|------|--|-----|---------|
|    |                                       |  |                                | associations<br>and more<br>civil rights<br>groups                      | group 12,000<br>members<br>alone)   |      |  |     |         |
| 28 | Atlanta<br>2001                       | Confederate battle<br>emblem on the state<br>flag/             | Politics                       | Conventions<br>and events in<br>case the flag<br>doesn't get<br>changed | Threat of<br>boycott for<br>more than 1<br>year, estimated<br>100-300<br>million \$ costs                         | high | Flag has been<br>changed in light<br>of the threat for<br>a boycott                    | Yes | Boycott |
| 29 | Fitzhenry<br>and<br>Whiteside<br>1986 | Workers' rights/<br>wage increases,<br>additional holidays     | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Assembly<br>line workers<br>at the<br>Toronto<br>newspaper              | 2 months,<br>union<br>mobilized<br>75% of the<br>workers to<br>strike and had<br>broad<br>acceptance in<br>public | low  | Wage increases<br>over a 17 month<br>contract,<br>including one<br>day more<br>holiday | Yes | Boycott |
| 30 | J. P. Stevens<br>Co. 1977             | Workers' rights/ the<br>right to unionize,<br>break companies' | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Textile goods<br>manufactured<br>by Stevens                             | 2 years, Full-<br>time boycott<br>in 28 cities  | high | Collective<br>agreement,<br>workers were   | Yes | Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                                     |  |                                |   |  |      |  |     |         |
|----|-------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|--|------|--|-----|---------|
|    |                                     | resistance to unions                     |                                | Co.   | nationwide.<br>Thousands of<br>citizens plus<br>Politicians,<br>churches,<br>other unions,<br>civil-rights<br>organizations,<br>women's<br>group,<br>students and<br>Stevens stock-<br>holders<br>involved |      | granted the right<br>to assemble in<br>unions                  |     |         |
| 31 | Farah<br>Manufacturi<br>ng Co. 1972 | Right to be<br>represented by a<br>union | People –<br>workers’<br>rights | National<br>boycott of<br>Farah<br>products | 22 months,<br>union spent 5<br>million\$, 4000<br>workers and<br>thousands of<br>activists and<br>consumers  | high | Contract was<br>reached that<br>allowed workers<br>to unionize | Yes | boycott |
| 32 | Radio Shack                         | Right to unionize                        | People –                       | National                                    | 8 months, not  | low  | Boycott failed,  | No  | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                     |   |                       |   |   |     |  |     |         |
|----|---------------------|---|-----------------------|---|---|-----|--|-----|---------|
|    | 1979                |   | workers' rights       | Boycott of the companies' electric stores | big interest of public, boycott failed to materialize |     | but after court judgement, Radio Shack payed 330,000\$ in damages for preventing unions and blocking formations of unions  |     |         |
| 33 | Sherman Wilcox 1990 | Physical abuse of employee/ racial misbehaviour | People – human rights | The whole grocery store                   | 7 days, 90% of the customers boycotted the store      | low | Employee was hired back, payed wages and charges against employee were dropped. Furthermore, the store started further programs for black employees and families | Yes | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                          |   |                            |  |  |     |   |     |         |
|----|--------------------------|---|----------------------------|--|--|-----|---|-----|---------|
| 34 | Remington<br>1990        | Sexual harassment of<br>a woman                               | People -<br>discrimination | All razor<br>products of<br>Remington,<br>after a<br>woman was<br>sexually<br>harassed by<br>players of a<br>team<br>Remington<br>owns | 16 days,<br>response rate<br>unknown   | Low | Surprisingly,<br>sales went up<br>and Remington<br>could increase<br>profits in<br>autumn period.<br>A player of the<br>team was fined<br>2,000\$ | No  | Boycott |
| 35 | Nike 1990                | Unequal treatment of<br>black<br>people/employees             | People –<br>human rights   | Nationwide<br>boycott of<br>Nike<br>products by<br>PUSH<br>organization  | 2 months,<br>only a<br>relatively small<br>black<br>community<br>involved, only<br>little response | low | Nike agreed to<br>elect a black<br>board member<br>within 12<br>months,<br>otherwise little<br>success  | No  | Boycott |
| 36 | Dayton<br>Hudson<br>1990 | The support of<br>abortion by funding<br>'Planned Parenthood' | People -<br>discrimination | Target stores<br>across the<br>nation were<br>boycotted,   | 3 months, 650<br>'pro-lifers'<br>protested and<br>thousands  | low | 9% drop in<br>earning during<br>the 3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter of<br>the year. Dayton  | Yes | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                  |  |                         |  |  |      |  |     |         |
|----|------------------|--|-------------------------|--|--|------|--|-----|---------|
|    |                  |  |                         | which belong to Dayton Hudson                    | picketed the chain   |      | Hudson withdrew its funding  |     |         |
| 37 | Burger King 1990 | TV programs sponsored by Burger King that violate Christian values (television violence, sex and anti-Christian bigotry) | People - discrimination | All Burger King branches and products nationwide | 2 months, 1,600 Christian leaders (representing 60,000,000 people)   | low  | Although no measurable effect on sales, Burger King accepted to end sponsoring some programs             | Yes | Boycott |
| 38 | StarKist 1987    | Animal Protection/ Dolphins in fishing nets for tuna   | Animals                 | All tuna that is sold by StarKist                | 3 ½ years, 1.5 million \$ spent on campaigns, massive newspaper campaigns and letters to the public and politics | high | StarKist changed fishing nets and labeled tuna 'dolphin-safe'. Soon after, Starkists competitor followed | Yes | Boycott |
| 39 | Coca Cola        | Racial discrimination  | People -                | Products of                                      | 8 months.  | low  | Coca Cola  | Yes | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |               |                                   |                |   |   |     |   |    |         |
|----|---------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|---|---|-----|---|----|---------|
|    | 2000          | of employees                      | discrimination | the Coca Cola Company                             | 2000 African-American employees affected. They settled in court before the actual boycott started. Only several picketing actions |     | agreed to a 192.5 million \$ settlement. Payments to African-American employees                     |    |         |
| 40 | Campbell 1993 | Genetically modified food/ tomato | Environment    | Food provided by Campbell, especially tomato soup | <3 months, 1,500 celebrity chefs joined boycott, 140,000 school teachers received educational material                            | low | Campbell first continued their modified tomatoes, then later dropped it, but said for other reasons | No | Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                                      |   |                                |   |   |      |   |     |         |
|----|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|---|------|---|-----|---------|
| 41 | Diamond<br>Walnut<br>Growers<br>1991 | Worker's rights/<br>unlawful wage cuts<br>and replacement.<br>Workers accepted<br>30% wage<br>concessions to rescue<br>company, but when<br>the company<br>recovered and they<br>wanted old salaries,<br>they were replaced | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | International<br>boycott of<br>products by<br>Diamond<br>Walnut<br>Growers<br>(mainly nuts) | 13 years, 500<br>workers that<br>were fired,<br>hundred<br>thousands of<br>leaflets. At<br>least 10<br>purchasers<br>choose<br>different<br>walnuts | high | After 13 years, a<br>contract was<br>reached with<br>wage increases,<br>training and<br>workers on<br>strike can return | Yes | Boycott |
| 42 | Florida<br>Citrus 1994               | Discrimination of<br>homosexuals/<br>homophobic<br>statements of<br>spokesman (also<br>radio host)  | People -<br>discriminatio<br>n | Orange juice<br>produced by<br>Florida Citrus<br>in shops and<br>bars                       | 1 week, 40 gay<br>bars in<br>Arizona, 1000<br>consumers   | low  | Boycott resulted<br>in 'boycott' of<br>fans of the<br>spokesman. No<br>impact on sales                                  | No  | boycott |
| 43 | Philip<br>Morris 1991                | Donations to a<br>homosexual-critical<br>Senator/<br>discrimination of<br>homosexuals   | People -<br>discriminatio<br>n | Products of<br>the Philip<br>Morris range,<br>including<br>tobacco                          | 13 months,<br>10,000 gay<br>bars<br>nationwide<br>stopped   | high | PM doubled<br>their<br>contributions to<br>AIDS research<br>(3 million \$)  | Yes | Boycott |



CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |  |  |                          |   |  |      |  |     |         |
|----|--|--|--------------------------|---|--|------|--|-----|---------|
|    |  |  |                          | (Marlboro) and Miller beer                                    | selling PM   |      |  |     |         |
| 44 | Californian Grape Growers 1973 (2 <sup>nd</sup> boycott) | Workers' rights/ salary increase/ receive contracts                    | People – workers' rights | California table grapes were boycotted, initiated through UFW | 2 years, 17 million Americans boycotted grapes                         | high | Farmworkers were allowed to organize and bargain for contracts         | Yes | Boycott |
| 45 | Californian Grape Growers 1984 (3 <sup>rd</sup> boycott) | Workers' rights/ salary increase/ mistreatment                         | People – workers' rights | California table grapes were boycotted, initiated through UFW | 16 years, only 5% of customers were aware of the boycott when it ended | high | Not successful. unlike the previous boycotts, boycott dragged out      | No  | Boycott |
| 46 | Miami 1990   | Racial unrest after refusal to honor Nelson Mandela and disrespect him | People - discrimination  | Tourism boycott of Miami, black organizations called off      | 3 years, 50 million \$ losses for Miami                                | high | Investments of 1.6 million \$ into minority businesses and black owned | Yes | Boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                              |   |                            |  |  |      |   |     |          |
|----|------------------------------|---|----------------------------|--|--|------|---|-----|----------|
|    |                              |   |                            | conventions  |  |      | communities,<br>hire more blacks<br>and scholarships          |     |          |
| 47 | Reebok<br>1991               | Media campaign<br>showing a half-naked<br>woman/ sexism/<br>inappropriate nudity              | People -<br>discrimination | Shoes<br>manufactured<br>by Reebok                                 | <2 months,<br>1000<br>protesters<br>wrote letters<br>to the<br>company                                   | low  | Reebok changed<br>the<br>advertisement                        | Yes | Boycott  |
| 48 | NY Movie<br>Theaters<br>1988 | Price increase of<br>Movie Theater tickets<br>from 6\$ to 7\$                                 | Economic                   | All movie<br>theaters in<br>NYC that<br>increased<br>ticket prices | 46 days, 1074<br>supporters, 44<br>theaters were<br>targeted   | low  | Boycott ended<br>due to lack of<br>support from<br>moviegoers | No  | Boycott  |
| 49 | Nabisco<br>1994              | Offensive advertising<br>to attain more<br>consumers/ tobacco<br>advertising towards<br>youth | other                      | All tobacco<br>products of<br>Nabisco                              | 5 years, ten<br>thousands in<br>the US alone,<br>worldwide<br>protests, over<br>120 actions in<br>the US | high | Nabisco sold its<br>tobacco branch<br>to Philip Morris        | No  | Boycott  |
| 50 | Esso 2001                    | Ongoing pollution,  | Environment                | Esso stations  | 1 day, 2,000   | low  | Only statement  | No  | Consumer |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |             |   |                         |  |  |      |  |    |                  |
|----|-------------|---|-------------------------|--|--|------|--|----|------------------|
|    |             | blocking of renewable energy/<br>denial of global warming   |                         | (gas and shops)                                      | protesters (urging ten thousands of customers to boycott), 310 outlets in UK and Ireland boycotted |      | of Esso explaining boycotters to be wrong and misinformed                              |    | boycott          |
| 51 | Levi's 1992 | Halted donations to boy scouts after disacceptance of homosexual became public/"promoting homosexual lifestyle" | People - discrimination | Levi's clothing                                      | ~6 months, newsletter to 400,000 people, 175,000 churches  | low  | No change, Levi's received support through some customers and especially gay community | No |                  |
| 52 | Gap 2009    | Not using the word 'Christmas' in commercials and advertisements/religiousness                                  | People - discrimination | Gap Inc. and its brands Old Navy and Banana Republic | 2 weeks, rather small participation (BUT: allegedly 2.5 million online supporters                  | low  | Unclear whether Gap caved in. However, new commercial was 'Christmassy' enough         | No | Consumer Boycott |
| 53 | Disney 1996 | Support of  | People -                | Disney, its  | 9 years, one   | high | No change in   | No | Consumer         |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                      |  |                |                                   |   |     |   |     |                  |
|----|----------------------|--|----------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----|---|-----|------------------|
|    |                      | homosexuality                                      | discrimination | branches, parks and products      | group involved (AFA), rather small participation                                    |     | Disney policies, however AFA saw improvement                                |     | Boycott          |
| 54 | Econet Wireless 2003 | Bad customer service/ Overloaded Wifi-Networks     | Economic       | Econet Wireless Services          | 24 hours, 140,000 customers were mobilized, but boycott failed, network use went up | low | No change,  | No  | Consumer Boycott |
| 55 | MTN 2003             | High GSM-tariffs for phone calls                   | Economic       | Use of mobile phones              | 1 day, 1 million costumers participated   | low | No success, operators argue that a tariff reduction for now is not possible | No  | Consumer boycott |
| 56 | Jordan red meat 2009 | Local meat prices increased by 25% before Ramadan/ | Economic       | Local meat from various suppliers | 5 weeks, nationwide, meat sale was  | low | Boycott successful, local meat prices were                                  | Yes | Consumer boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                                      |  |                          |  |   |      |  |     |                     |
|----|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|--|---|------|--|-----|---------------------|
|    |                                      | price increase   |                          |  | lowered by<br>40%   |      | lowered to<br>standard   |     |                     |
| 57 | Mobile<br>Telecom<br>Company<br>2004 | High fees/costs for<br>mobile use                              | Economic                 | Cell phone<br>use  | 24 hours,<br>430,000 (51%<br>of all) mobile<br>users<br>boycotted   | low  | No change  | No  | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 58 | Shell 1995                           | Environmental<br>pollution/ plans to<br>sink an oil platform   | Environment              | Shell stations<br>worldwide,<br>predominantl<br>y in Germany | ~1,5 months,<br>20% drop in<br>sales at 1,700<br>filling stations,<br>in some<br>countries 70%<br>sales drop,<br>protest actions<br>by<br>Greenpeace<br>(on platform<br>also) | low  | Idea of deep-sea<br>disposal was<br>abandoned due<br>to high protest | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 59 | Barclays<br>Bank 1969                | Banks involvement<br>and investments in<br>apartheid regime in | People –<br>human rights | Bank<br>accounts   | 17 years, but<br>especially<br>between 1983   | high | Bank partially<br>refrained from<br>business in SA                   | Yes | Consumer<br>Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |              |   |                          |                         |  |     |   |     |                  |
|----|--------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|--|-----|---|-----|------------------|
|    |              | SA/ racial matters  |                          |                         | and 1985, the bank lost 12,000 student customers, market share drop by 10% and 36million pounds loss |     |   |     |                  |
| 60 | Triumph 2001 | Working conditions/ cheap labour in Burma                         | People – workers' rights | Bras and other garment  | 1 year campaign against Triumph, then 1 month boycott  | low | Company stopped production in Burma   | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 61 | Texaco 1996  | Racist comments of the executives/ bad treatment of black workers | People - discrimination  | Gas stations nationwide | 2 months, black leaders (incl. Rev Jesse Jackson) called for boycott, sales down by 20%              | Low | 176 million \$ spending towards blacks after a lawsuit (plus a plan for higher employment of blacks and other | No  | Consumer boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                          |  |                                |   |   |      |   |     |                     |
|----|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|---|------|---|-----|---------------------|
|    |                          |  |                                |   |   |      | minorities, better payment  |     |                     |
| 62 | IBP Co.<br>1986          | Worker's rights/<br>demand for wage<br>freeze for 3 years/<br>2,800 workers locked<br>out by company | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Meat from<br>IBP  | 7 months,<br>relatively small<br>participation  | low  | Court judgement<br>forced IBP to<br>hire workers<br>back and they<br>were heavily<br>fined          | No  | Consumer<br>Boycott |
| 63 | Colt<br>Firearms<br>1987 | Worker's rights/<br>receiving contracts  | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Guns and<br>weapons<br>manufactured<br>by Colt                  | 4 years, 1,100<br>workers that<br>walked out,<br>low<br>participation<br>in public, sales<br>were not<br>affected | high | Colt hired<br>replacement<br>workers, union<br>sued them, but<br>no success                         | No  | Consumer<br>Boycott |
| 64 | Coca Cola<br>1990        | 66.7% price increase<br>of Coke  | Economic                       | Products<br>(especially<br>Coke) of the<br>Coca Cola<br>Company | 2 weeks,<br>nationwide,<br>politicians,<br>consumers,<br>shops,<br>tourism,                                       | low  | Coca Cola<br>agreed to a price<br>cut of 20% after<br>they saw the<br>huge impact of<br>the boycott | Yes | Consumer<br>Boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                    |  |          |                                |   |      |  |     |                  |
|----|--------------------|--|----------|--------------------------------|---|------|--|-----|------------------|
|    |                    |  |          |                                | everyone involved, huge boycott (estimated 600,000 members)       |      |  |     |                  |
| 65 | Kraft 1994         | Tobacco advertisement of parent company Philip Morris/ youth addiction | other    | All food manufactured by Kraft | 9 years', millions of customers and organizations                 | high | Implementation of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) to save public from smoking risks | Yes | Consumer Boycott |
| 66 | Cuepacs 1998       | Increase in price for chicken  | Economic | Chicken boycott                | 10 days, no big impact, chicken supplier said "business as usual" | low  | No drop in prices, no effect   | No  | Consumer Boycott |
| 67 | Japan Asia Airways | Flight safety/ outdated aircraft                                       | Economic | Flights with JAA until         | 6 months, 27.2% decline   | high | JAA agreed to replace old  | Yes | Consumer boycott |



CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                                    |   |          |   |  |     |  |     |                  |
|----|------------------------------------|---|----------|---|--|-----|--|-----|------------------|
|    | 1985                               |   |          | they replace old planes                             | in passengers, 26 travel agents and 69 other organizations joined                            |     | aircrafts stepwise within a year   |     |                  |
| 68 | Argentina Beef Industry Union 2010 | Beef prices increased by 50%/                                 | Economic | All beef distributed by the union                   | One week, almost all customers nationwide  | low | Beef prices fell again, were lowered by industry, but partly due to lower demand | No  | Consumer boycott |
| 69 | Osem 2011                          | High prices compared to other countries/ monopoly on products | Economic | Materna infant food and other products, mainly food | 4 week threat of boycott, cottage cheese leaders and all student unions involved, nationwide | low | Prices cut by 5-10% before boycott could start, additionally coupons in packages | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 70 | Meat Producers' Association        | Recent price increases in meat                                | Economic | All meat provided by the                            | 2 weeks, nationwide, medium  | low | No results, meat prices will further increase                                    | No  | Consumer boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                |   |                          |   |  |      |  |     |                  |
|----|----------------|---|--------------------------|---|--|------|--|-----|------------------|
|    | 1990           |   |                          | association in Groceries and supermarkets   | participation  |      |  |     |                  |
| 71 | Folgers 1991   | Using coffee beans from civil war region (El Salvador)                | Politics                 | Folgers brand of coffee   | 1 year, activist group involved and later restaurant chains nationwide, 60,000 members | high | Successful, Folgers developed a brand without beans from El Salvador           | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 72 | Taco Bell 2001 | Low wages paid to tomato pickers/ wage increases/ human rights abuses | People – workers' rights | Taco Bell branches and Taco Bell has been banned from colleges and high school nationwide | 3-4 years, especially students active, TB banned from many colleges                    | high | Agreement was reached, higher wages for workers and improve working conditions | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 73 | BMW 2000       | Sale of the Rover   | People –                 | Any series  | 3 years,   | high | 500 million  | No  | Consumer         |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |            |   |                         |  |   |      |  |     |                  |
|----|------------|---|-------------------------|--|---|------|--|-----|------------------|
|    |            | group despite other promises/ loss of working places        | workers' rights         | cars produced by BMW                             | nationwide, impact unclear, but sales dropped noticeable  |      | pound loan to Rover, only repayable when back to profit                  |     | boycott          |
| 74 | KFC 2003   | Animal cruelty  | Animals                 | KFC restaurants and all chicken meals sold there | 5 years, nationwide, 12,000 protesters  | high | KFC agreed to obtain chicken from suppliers that kill chicken less cruel | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 75 | Ford 2006  | Buying ads in homosexual magazines/ promoting homosexuality | People - discrimination | Cars manufactured by Ford                        | 2 years, Ford lost 12.7 billion \$ in 2006, sales have fallen in 10 out of 12 months, 700,000 people signed online petition | high | Ford agreed to stop pro-homosexual policies                              | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 76 | Kmart 1996 | Worker's rights/  | People –                | Kmart stores                                     | 1 ½ years, est.   | high | No change, only  | No  | Consumer         |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                         |   |                                |  |   |      |  |     |                     |
|----|-------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|---|------|--|-----|---------------------|
|    |                         | sufficient wages/<br>health care benefits/<br>contracts       | workers'<br>rights             | nationwide                                       | 20,000<br>supporters of<br>boycott  |      | PR campaign to<br>explain Kmart<br>practices   |     | boycott             |
| 77 | AT&T 1990               | Support of pregnancy<br>prevention/ 50,000<br>yearly donation | People -<br>discrimination     | Phone<br>services<br>provided by<br>AT&T         | 2 months,<br>threat by<br>20,000<br>supporters of<br>boycott                  | low  | Donations were<br>halted, boycott<br>successful  | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 78 | McDonald's<br>1990      | Environmental<br>hazards/ use of<br>polystyrene<br>containers | Environment                    | McDonald's<br>franchises                         | 3 years, at<br>least 100,000<br>people<br>involved,<br>banned from<br>schools | high | McDonald's<br>phased out<br>polystyrene<br>containers,<br>introduced paper<br>packages | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 79 | Tnuva 2011              | Unjustified price<br>increases                                | Economic                       | Cottage<br>cheese and<br>other dairy<br>products | 2 weeks, sales<br>went down<br>between 14-<br>21%                             | low  | No change in<br>prices, only few<br>discounts  | No  | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 80 | Gallo<br>Winery<br>2005 | Worker's rights/<br>wage increase and<br>new contracts        | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Wines from<br>Gallo                              | 3 months, est.<br>5,000<br>consumers<br>mobilized                             | low  | Successful, new<br>contract for the<br>300 workers                                     | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                             |   |                                |                         |  |      |  |     |                     |
|----|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--|------|--|-----|---------------------|
| 81 | Perdue 1980                 | Workers' rights/<br>right to form unions                                    | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Perdue<br>chickens      | 18 months,<br>5,000 workers,<br>est. 10,000,<br>unclear<br>whether<br>boycott<br>affected sales                                  | high | Not successful,<br>some of the<br>workers were<br>fired  | No  | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 82 | General<br>Electric<br>1986 | Involvement in<br>nuclear sector/<br>possible support of<br>nuclear weapons | Politics                       | Electric<br>products    | 7 years,<br>boycott has<br>cost GE 100<br>million \$ in<br>annual sales,<br>at least 50<br>hospitals quit<br>supply<br>contracts | high | Successful, GE<br>sold nuclear unit  | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 83 | Hoechst<br>1987             | Distribution of<br>abortion pills   | People -<br>discriminatio<br>n | All drugs by<br>Hoechst | 10 years,<br>coalition of<br>pro-life<br>organizations<br>and thousands<br>of consumers  | high | Successful after<br>announcement<br>of boycott of<br>new allergy drug,<br>which might<br>have cost | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                  |   |                             |   |  |      |  |     |                     |
|----|------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|--|------|--|-----|---------------------|
|    |                  |   |                             |   |  |      | Hoechst 1.63 billion\$   |     |                     |
| 84 | Safeway<br>1997  | Workers' rights/<br>wage increases after<br>acceptance of wage<br>rollbacks | People –<br>workers' rights | Safeway<br>supermarkets<br>nationwide       | 7 months,<br>65% of<br>customers<br>boycott, half<br>of the<br>remaining<br>35%<br>supported<br>strike                 | high | Successful,<br>workers were<br>hired back and<br>received higher<br>wages                            | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 85 | Gillette<br>1986 | Animal testing  | Animals                     | Razors and<br>other<br>hygienic<br>products | 10 years, no<br>impact on<br>revenues<br>(sales even<br>increased<br>from 2.8mil to<br>9.6mil \$ over<br>the 10 years) | high | Company<br>stopped animal<br>testing after ten<br>years of pressure<br>through PETA<br>and consumers | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 86 | Revlon<br>1989   | Animal testing/<br>animal cruelty   | Animals                     | Cosmetics<br>produced by<br>Revlon          | 1 week,<br>worldwide<br>boycott  | low  | Revlon feared<br>huge<br>consequences,   | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                       |  |                                |   |  |      |   |     |                     |
|----|-----------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|--|------|---|-----|---------------------|
|    |                       |  |                                |   | started,<br>already<br>100,000<br>customers<br>mobilized   |      | stopped animal<br>testing after 1<br>week                                   |     |                     |
| 87 | Petco 2005            | Animal cruelty/<br>selling large birds   | Animals                        | All Petco<br>stores<br>nationwide                                       | 2 years,<br>around 1.8<br>billion \$ in<br>sales lost, plus<br>900,000 to<br>settle lawsuits                           | high | Successful<br>PETA<br>campaign, Petco<br>agreed to stop<br>large bird sales | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 88 | American<br>Girl 2005 | Supporting abortion<br>rights and acceptance<br>of lesbians/<br>donations to pro-life<br>group | People -<br>discriminatio<br>n | Dolls<br>manufactured<br>and<br>distributed by<br>American<br>Girl Inc. | 3 months,<br>however sales<br>went up in<br>business year<br>2005, from<br>379mil\$<br>(2004) to<br>436mil\$<br>(2005) | low  | Company cut<br>ties with pro-life<br>group, no<br>donations<br>anymore      | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 89 | Bi-Mart<br>1999       | Worker's rights/<br>unfair labour  | People –<br>workers'           | All Bi-Mart<br>stores   | 5 years,<br>number of  | high | Not successful,<br>boycott ended  | No  | Consumer<br>boycott |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                  |   |                                |  |  |     |   |     |                     |
|----|------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|--|-----|---|-----|---------------------|
|    |                  | practices   | rights                         | nationwide<br>(52 stores)                        | participant<br>unknown, but<br>majority of<br>the 2,800<br>workers voted<br>against union<br>in middle of<br>boycott |     | so union could<br>focus on Wal-<br>Mart instead, 'a<br>bigger threat to<br>organized<br>labour' |     |                     |
| 90 | Wal-Mart<br>2005 | Unfair labour<br>practices/ right to<br>unionize/ wage<br>increases and<br>healthcare benefits              | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | School<br>supplies at<br>Wal-Marts<br>nationwide | One year,<br>Education-<br>and Teachers<br>Associations<br>with 4 million<br>members<br>combined                     | low | Wal-Mart didn't<br>agree to any kind<br>of improvement  | No  | Consumer<br>Boycott |
| 91 | Gillette<br>2003 | Use of RFID on their<br>products/ consumer<br>tracking and<br>identification/ breach<br>of consumer privacy | People –<br>human rights       | All Gillette<br>products<br>worldwide            | 1 month,<br>boycott<br>campaign was<br>started,<br>allegedly<br>78.000<br>members of                                 | low | Successful,<br>Gillette stepped<br>back from<br>technology                                      | Yes | Consumer<br>boycott |



CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                    |  |                         |                                 |   |      |  |     |                  |
|----|--------------------|--|-------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------|--|-----|------------------|
|    |                    |  |                         |                                 | organization (CASPIAN), but no loss in sales                                    |      |  |     |                  |
| 92 | Holiday Inn 1987   | Offering erotic movies on demand   | People - discrimination | Hotels of the Holiday Inn chain | 3-6 months, 800 conservative Christian leaders representing 600,000 Christians  | low  | No success, boycott fizzled out  | No  | Consumer boycott |
| 93 | Holiday Inn 1993   | Running luxury hotel in Tibet/ Chinese control of the region/suppression | Politics                | Holiday Inn hotel chain         | 4 years, International Free Tibet campaign with hundreds of thousand supporters | high | Successful, Holiday Inn did not renew contract for hotel after boycott spread over to the US | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 94 | Mary Kay Inc. 1999 | Animal testing   | Animals                 | Cosmetics products produced by  | Almost 10 years, 600.000 members of   | high | Mary Kay agreed to stop testing, however stated it   | No  | Consumer boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                     |  |                                |  |  |      |   |    |                     |
|----|---------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|--|------|---|----|---------------------|
|    |                     |  |                                | Mary Kay   | PETA<br>appealed to<br>boycott, plus<br>advertisement<br>s against<br>company  |      | had nothing to<br>do with boycott<br>and sales<br>unaffected  |    |                     |
| 95 | Wells Fargo<br>1999 | Support of violation<br>of workers' rights,<br>bank supported<br>company that led<br>workers off | People –<br>workers'<br>rights | Bank<br>accounts of<br>Wells Fargo<br>Bank were<br>cancelled | 19 months,<br>bank lost 1.3<br>billion \$ in<br>deposits<br>through<br>withdrawal<br>and an<br>initiative to<br>ban ATM<br>charges was<br>approved,<br>costing<br>another 20<br>million \$<br>annually | high | Partly successful,<br>Wells Fargo<br>stepped back as<br>leader of<br>supporters of<br>steel company,<br>however<br>continued to<br>lend them<br>money | No | Consumer<br>boycott |
| 96 | Arnott 2001         | Closing factory and  | People –                       | Biscuits   | 15 months,   | high | Not successful,   | No | Consumer            |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                        |   |                         |   |   |     |  |     |                  |
|----|------------------------|---|-------------------------|---|---|-----|--|-----|------------------|
|    |                        | laying off workers  | workers' rights         | produced by Arnott nationwide (Australia) | 10,000 signatures received in support, sales dropped by 5% nationwide |     | factory was closed as proposed by company and 600 workers lost their jobs  |     | boycott          |
| 97 | Dr Pepper 1995         | Unequal treatment of white and black employees/ not enough blacks in management positions | People - discrimination | Dr Pepper Cola US nationwide              | 2 months, NAACP called their members and consumers to boycott         | low | Not successful, Dr Pepper only declared that allegations were wrong and that they did in fact employ more blacks than NAACP said | No  | Consumer boycott |
| 98 | MacMillan Bloedel 1995 | Deforestation/ environmental harm/ extensive logging                                      | Environment             | Paper produced by MacMillan               | 7 months, Greenpeace and other environmental organizations mobilized  | low | Successful, MacMillan signed and accepted 127 recommendations for a new  | Yes | Consumer boycott |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|     |                  |  |                         |   |  |     |  |     |                  |
|-----|------------------|--|-------------------------|---|--|-----|--|-----|------------------|
|     |                  |  |                         |   | 10,000s of supporters  |     | logging agreement  |     |                  |
| 99  | PepsiCo 2012     | Partnership with research company that used aborted fetal cells/ 'supporting' abortion | People - discrimination | All Pepsi beverages                                 | 12 months, 35 pro-life groups supported boycott, nationwide (US) and partly in other countries | low | Successful, Pepsi agreed to end partnership with stem cell company | Yes | Consumer boycott |
| 100 | Whole Foods 2009 | Anti health-care statements and attitudes of the company's CEO                         | Politics                | The Whole Foods grocery chain with all its branches | 3 months, 23.000 supporters of the boycott and coverage in all big medias                      | low | No impact, company even increased revenue                          | No  | Consumer boycott |

**Appendix 2B: Summary Table of List of Boycotts**

| Case | Magnitude      | Duration    | Ethical Distance  | Historical Development | Successfulness |
|------|----------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------|
| 1    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 2    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 3    | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 4    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 5    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 6    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 7    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 8    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 9    | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 10   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 11   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 12   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 13   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 14   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 15   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 16   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 17   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 18   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 19   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 20   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 21   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 22   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 23   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 24   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 25   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 26   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 27   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 28   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 29   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 30   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 31   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 32   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 33   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 34   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 35   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Not successful |
| 36   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 37   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 38   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990               | Successful     |
| 39   | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990              | Successful     |
| 40   | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990              | Not successful |
| 41   | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990              | Successful     |

CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|    |                |             |                   |           |                |
|----|----------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------|----------------|
| 42 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 43 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 44 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 45 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 46 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 47 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 48 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 49 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 50 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 51 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 52 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 53 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 54 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 55 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 56 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 57 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 58 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 59 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 60 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 61 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 62 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 63 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 64 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 65 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 66 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 67 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 68 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 69 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 70 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 71 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 72 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 73 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 74 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 75 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 76 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 77 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 78 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 79 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 80 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 81 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 82 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 83 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 84 | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 85 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 86 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Pre 1990  | Successful     |
| 87 | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 88 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |

# CONSUMER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICIES OF COMPANIES

|     |                |             |                   |           |                |
|-----|----------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------|----------------|
| 89  | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 90  | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 91  | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 92  | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Pre 1990  | Not successful |
| 93  | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 94  | High magnitude | Long-term   | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 95  | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 96  | High magnitude | Long-term   | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 97  | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Human related     | Post 1990 | Not successful |
| 98  | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Not human related | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 99  | Low magnitude  | Medium-term | Human related     | Post 1990 | Successful     |
| 100 | Low magnitude  | Short-term  | Not human related | Post 1990 | Not successful |

### Appendix 3: Boycott Sources

1. "SOUTH AFRICA: 100 PERCENT CONSUMER BOYCOTT, CAPE SHOPKEEPERS SAY." IPS-Inter Press Service. (April 8, 1986 , Tuesday ): 410 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"SOUTH AFRICA: CONSUMER BOYCOTT'S RESUME IN EASTERN." IPS-Inter Press Service. (April 7, 1986 , Monday ): 263 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
2. "SOUTH AFRICA IN BRIEF; Eastern Transvaal consumer boycott to end on 13th August." BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (August 10, 1990 , Friday ): 106 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
3. "Friends of the Lubicon call off seven-year Daishowa boycott." Calgary Herald (Alberta, Canada). (June 13, 1998 , Saturday, FINAL EDITION ): 470 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
4. "Consumer wireless boycott a success; Over half of the respondents in a survey used their cellular telephones less. 30% did not know about the boycott.." Globes [online] - Israel's Business Arena. 333 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
5. "Why palm oil does not deserve its bad press." New Straits Times (Malaysia). (January 16, 2010 Saturday ): 997 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
6. "Michelin unscathed by consumer boycott." Tire Business. (April 28, 2003 , Monday ): 622 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
7. "More Greek consumers participate in boycott day." XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE. (September 3, 2002 , Tuesday ): 229 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
8. "Boycotts are a Canadian anomaly." The Toronto Star. (April 24, 1998 , Friday, METRO EDITION ): 821 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
9. "Cesar Chavez Vows 'High Tech Boycotts'." The Associated Press. (September 5, 1983 , Monday, PM cycle ): 329 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
10. "Consumer Boycott Unlikely To Hurt Exxon, Analysts Say; Oil Giant's Size Said to Offer Protection." The Washington Post. (May 5, 1989 , Friday, Final Edition ): 1207 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"Taking on the system; Boycotts target corporate image; Most have little economic impact." The Houston Chronicle. (June 24, 1997 , Tuesday, 3 STAR Edition ): 1171 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
11. "ADOLPH-COORS; Adolph Coors announces Detroit City Council lifts boycott." Business Wire. (November 6, 1987 , Friday ): 244 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"Teamsters Defeated At Coors; Workers Soundly Reject Affiliation." The Washington Post. (December 17, 1988 , Saturday, Final Edition ): 583 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
12. "This Day in Labor History: July 29, 1970." Lawyers, Guns, and Money. (July 29, 2012 Sunday 6:04 PM EST ): 1185 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.



13. "Nation Celebrates 50th Anniversary Of The Montgomery Bus Boycott." Jet. (December 19, 2005 ): 626 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
14. "NESTLE BOYCOTT BEING SUSPENDED." The New York Times. (January 27, 1984 , Friday, Late City Final Edition ): 523 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
15. "MP in call for Tesco boycott over threat to strike drivers." Evening News (Edinburgh). (May 23, 2007, Wednesday ): 576 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
16. "Fight to stop animal tests." York Press. (May 16, 2007 Wednesday ): 354 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
17. "Power to the people." The Grocer. (October 14, 2006 ): 1864 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
18. "25 years later United they fought; Gainers strike of 1986 galvanized country as Alberta's labour movement rallied around workers locked out by Peter Pocklington." Edmonton Journal (Alberta). (June 13, 2011 Monday ): 1534 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
19. "Advertiser Shuns Talk Show As Gay Protest Gains Power." The New York Times. (May 19, 2000 , Friday, Late Edition - Final ): 897 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
20. " Nike on the run after Coke's cave-in." The Times (London). (April 23, 2005 , Saturday ): 559 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10
21. "Mexican Labor Protest Gets Results ." The New York Times. (October 8, 2001 Monday ): 1139 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
22. "Denny's, via restructure and PR, becomes model of diversity." O'Dwyer's PR Services Report. (November, 1998 ): 1255 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
23. "Boycott power still persuasive." Cox News Service. (July 14, 2003 Monday ): 820 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
- "PROTESTERS CALL FOR BOYCOTT OF ADAM'S MARK." Buffalo News (New York). (August 12, 2001 Sunday FINAL EDITION ): 763 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
24. "PROTESTERS PUSH CINCINNATI BOYCOTT"; Statewide message: 'Don't come to town!'. Dayton Daily News (Ohio). (May 31, 2002 Friday CITY EDITION ): 720 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
25. "Formula hijacking nature." The Vancouver Sun (British Columbia). (November 13, 1992 , Friday, 1\* EDITION ): 527 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
26. "Boycotts not always an effective weapon." USA TODAY. (January 11, 1993 , Monday, FINAL EDITION ): 242 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
27. "Meeting planners avoid 'incorrect' cities." Crain's New York Business. (January 20, 1992 ): 932 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
- "Political correctness a factor in tourist and convention business." United Press International. (September 13, 1992 , Sunday, BC cycle ): 486 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
28. "Newly Designed State Flag Should End Talk of Boycott in Georgia." Atlanta Journal and Constitution. (January 25, 2001 , Thursday ): 523 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
29. "Strikers at Fitzhenry and Whiteside ratify first contract despite boycott." The Globe and Mail (Canada). (September 12, 1986 Friday ): 452 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.

30. "WHEN A UNION GOES ALL OUT IN A BOYCOTT DRIVE -." U.S. News & World Report. (June 20, 1977 ): 1210 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
31. "Farah strike: Panel takes up 'key moment for working-class history'." El Paso Times (Texas). (April 27, 2011 Wednesday ): 597 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
32. "Radio Shack to pay \$330,000 to union." The Globe and Mail (Canada). (October 20, 1981 Tuesday ): 513 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
33. "BOYCOTTS BATTERING MORE TARGETS NATIONWIDE; ECONOMIC PROTESTS CAN BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO GET RESULTS.." Palm Beach Post (Florida). (November 19, 1990 Monday ): 1549 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
34. "Kiam reports upsurge in sales." United Press International. (October 10, 1990 , Wednesday, BC cycle ): 363 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
35. "When Games Turn Nasty." Newsweek. 1326 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
36. "PRO-LIFERS: BOYCOTT ALL DAYTON HUDSON CORPORATION STORES." Abortion Report. (November 29, 1990 ): 164 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
37. "Burger King to mark end of boycott with ad campaign." United Press International. (November 1, 1990 , Thursday, BC cycle ): 550 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
38. "Ready, Aim, Boycott Media-savvy boycotters find that high--pressure tactics can force corporate c." The San Francisco Chronicle. (FEBRUARY 24, 1993 , WEDNESDAY, FINAL EDITION ): 1967 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
39. "Group expected to end its boycott of Coca-Cola." The Atlanta Journal and Constitution. Home Edition (December 6, 2000 , Wednesday, ): 376 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
40. "Biotech Tomato Headed To Market Despite Threats; Opponents of Genetic Engineering Warn of Boycotts." The Washington Post. (January 12, 1993 , Tuesday, Final Edition ): 855 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"Campbell Soup Co. Urged to Stop Using Genetically Modified Foods." Sacramento Bee. (July 20, 2000 , Thursday ): 486 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
41. "POLAND'S SOLIDARITY UNION BACKS WALNUT BOYCOTT." Journal of Commerce. 357 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
<http://www.teamster.org/content/justice-diamond-walnut>
42. "GAY RIGHTS GROUP FIRST TO CALL LIMBAUGH BOYCOTT ON FLORIDA CITRUS." States News Service. (February 24, 1994 , Thursday ): 489 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17263546>
43. "COMPANY NEWS; Philip Morris to Increase AIDS Donations." The New York Times. (May 30, 1991 , Thursday, Late Edition - Final ): 383 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
44. "Chavez's hard-fought gains are eroding." USA TODAY. (March 31, 2006 Friday ): 436 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
45. "UFW CALLS OFF ITS BOYCOTT OF GRAPES AFTER 16 YEARS." Contra Costa Times (California). 483 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
46. "Miami Agreement Ends A Costly Black Boycott." The Washington Post. (May 13, 1993 , Thursday, Final Edition ): 733 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.

47. "BOYCOTTS ARE BUSTING OUT ALL OVER U.S.." St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri). (February 4, 1993 , THURSDAY, FIVE STAR Edition ): 1438 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
48. "METRO DATELINES; Koch Ends Boycott Over Movie Tickets." The New York Times. (February 22, 1988 , Monday, Late City Final Edition ): 145 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
49. "INFAC T Removes Nabisco As Boycott Target Philip Morris's Kraft Now Primary Focus of Mounting Consumer Pressure." PR Newswire. (June 16, 1999 , Wednesday ): 678 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
50. "2,000 EXPECTED TO PICKET ESSO PETROL STATIONS." Press Association. (December 1, 2001 , Saturday ): 331 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
51. "Quayle's comments fuel boycott against three firms." Marketing News TM. (July 20, 1992 ): 1338 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
52. McEwen, Alvin. "AFA tries to sugarcoat the end of its embarrassingly premature boycott against GAP." Pam's House Blend. (November 28, 2009 Saturday 10:30 AM EST ): 528 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
Post, The Christian. "AFA Ends Boycott of Gap Inc. After New Christmas Ad." Dakota Voice. (December 3, 2009 Thursday 7:00 AM EST ): 478 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
53. "Ford target of boycott." CNN.com. (June 1, 2005 Wednesday 8:01 AM EST ): 391 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
54. "Zimbabwe; Econet Scoffs At CCZ's Failed Demo." Africa News. (January 15, 2003 Wednesday ): 555 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
55. "Nigerian GSM Boycott Observed by Almost Half of Total Subscribers." World Markets Analysis. 340 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
56. Obeidat, Omar. "Meat boycott successful - Consumer Protection Society." Jordan Times (Amman). (September 20, 2009 Sunday ): 456 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
57. "Zimbabwe; Consumer Council Calls for Boycott of Econet Services." Africa News. (January 14, 2003 Tuesday ): 509 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
58. "Other European News; Oil Rig Deep-Sea Disposal Abandoned." Facts on File World News Digest. (June 22, 1995 ): 666 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
59. "Education Guardian (Teach In): Students press on / NUS boycott campaign against Barclays Bank." The Guardian (London). (December 16, 1986 ): 132 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
60. "Triumph tires of labouring point." MX (Melbourne, Australia). 194 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
61. "California Treasurer Urges Penalties for Texaco Executives." (November 26, 1996 , Tuesday, PM cycle ): 237 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
62. "More Jobs, Higher Wages Giving Workers Something To Cheer About Today." The Associated Press. (September 7, 1987 , Monday, BC cycle ): 585 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
63. "Strike-bound Colt Firearms near sale." United Press International. (November 17, 1989 , Friday, BC cycle ): 577 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
64. "roundup: turkish boycott against cola price hike." Xinhua General News Service. (MAY 16, 1990 , WEDNESDAY ): 562 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
65. "Infact Lifts Boycott of Philip Morris/Altria's Kraft Foods Citing Global Tobacco Treaty as Major Victory for People over Tobacco Giant's Profits." PR Newswire. (June 23, 2003 Monday ): 1073 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.

66. "MEGAT JUNID LEAVES THE CHICKEN TO MTUC, CUEPACS AND TRADERS." Malaysia General News. (March 2, 1998 , Monday ): 366 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
67. Aviation Week & Space Technology. (January 27, 1986 ): 84 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"JAPAN ASIA AIRWAYS TO START REPLACING OLD PLANES IN MARCH."  
Central News Agency - Taiwan. (FEBRUARY 6, 1986 , THURSDAY): 171 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
68. "Argentina beef prices likely to fall after boycott." CNN.com. (February 18, 2010 Thursday 11:39 AM EST ): 442 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
69. "Osem cuts prices on 35 food products." Globes (Tel Aviv, Israel). (October 24, 2011 Monday ): 240 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
70. "meat boycott ends in failure." Xinhua General News Service. (JUNE 5, 1990 , TUESDAY ): 374 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
71. "P&G, PRESSURED BY BOYCOTT, TO MARKET COFFEE BLEND WITHOUT SAVADORAN BEANS." WALL STREET JOURNAL. (November 15, 1991 , Friday ): 38 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"Neighbor To Neighbor Ends Coffee Boycott." The Associated Press. (March 20, 1992 , Friday, AM cycle ): 520 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
72. Springgay, By Jessica. "Taco Bell boycott reaches resolution, ending protest at UC-Davis." University Wire. (March 15, 2005 Tuesday ): 477 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
73. "OPTIMISM GROWING FOR BMW; UK BOYCOTT OVERCOME." Birmingham Evening Mail. (May 27, 2003 , Tuesday ): 296 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
74. "PETA ends boycott of KFC;PETA hands out free faux-chicken sandwiches in Windsor." Canwest News Service. (July 15, 2008 Tuesday ): 379 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
75. "Shhh -- There's a Boycott Going On." Christian Newswire. (April 11, 2007 Wednesday 4:56 PM GMT ): 899 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
pam, . "Wildmon's shop calls off Ford boycott, claims success." Pam's House Blend. (March 11, 2008 Tuesday 6:00 AM EST ): 339 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
76. "Jesse Jackson Tapped For Kmart Union Rally Pressure on at San Jose superstore." The San Francisco Chronicle. (OCTOBER 3, 1997 , FRIDAY, FINAL EDITION ): 671 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
77. "AT&T Unions Seek AFL-CIO Support for 'Electronic Picketing'." The Associated Press. (May 2, 1989 , Tuesday, PM cycle ): 482 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
78. "CONSUMER ACTIVIST KNOWS HOW TO SAY NO - AND MAKE IT COUNT." SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER. (May 9, 1991 , Thursday ): 1187 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
79. "Protest leader: Time for soul-searching at Tnuva." Globes (Tel Aviv, Israel). (October 2, 2011 Sunday ): 282 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
80. Raine, George. "Union to protest planned job cuts at Charles Krug; St. Helena winery wants to use land manager for farming work." THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE

- (California). (June 1, 2006 Thursday ): 581 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
81. "National Support For Perdue Boycott Announced." The Associated Press. (February 25, 1981 , Wednesday, AM cycle ): 423 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  82. "BOYCOTT OF GE IS CALLED OFF AS AEROSPACE UNIT IS SOLD." WALL STREET JOURNAL. (April 6, 1993 , Tuesday ): 57 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  - "GE Cancels Contract To Make Nuclear Parts Watchdog group says boycott is working." The San Francisco Chronicle. (NOVEMBER 27, 1990 , TUESDAY, FINAL EDITION ): 319 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  83. "RU-486: PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY GIVES UP RIGHTS." Abortion Report. (April 9, 1997 ): 1267 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  84. "SAFEWAY BOYCOTT GAINS MOMENTUM." Canada NewsWire. (May 22, 1997 , Thursday ): 650 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  85. "Taking on the system; Boycotts target corporate image; Most have little economic impact." The Houston Chronicle. (June 24, 1997 , Tuesday, 3 STAR Edition ): 1171 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  86. "REVLON-ANIMAL-TST-BAN; Revlon ends all animal testing within week of international boycott." Business Wire. (June 30, 1989 , Friday ): 332 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  87. "Petco agrees to stop large-bird sales, ending PETA boycott." The Associated Press State & Local Wire. 483 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  88. "They still deck halls with plenty of dolls." The Salt Lake Tribune. (December 16, 2006 Saturday ): 1168 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  89. "Eugene, Ore.-Based Store Operator's Workers Vote to Oust Union." The Register Guard. (June 14, 2002 , Friday ): 476 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  - "Union ceases Bi-Mart boycott." The Associated Press State & Local Wire. (April 2, 2004 , Friday, BC cycle ): 263 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  90. "Teachers unions call for Wal-Mart boycott." Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN). (August 16, 2005 , Tuesday, Metro Edition ): 543 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  91. " M&S faces righteous wrath over 'spy in a suit'." The Times (London). (August 26, 2003 , Tuesday ): 1347 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  92. "Hotel chain under fire for in-room films; Church leaders join boycott prompted by erotic movies." THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER. (November 8, 1987 Sunday ): 1353 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  93. "After boycott, Holiday Inn to pull out of Tibet." (August 1, 1997 , Friday, BC cycle ): 256 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  94. "Mary Kay officially swears off animal tests." Charleston Gazette (West Virginia). (May 09, 1999 , Sunday ): 342 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  95. "United Steelworkers Boycott of Wells Fargo Scores Biggest Victory to Date; Union's Key Role in Victory of San Francisco's Proposition F to Ban ATM Surcharges Will Cost Union-Busting Bank Over \$20 Million Annually." PR Newswire. (November 3, 1999 , Wednesday ): 586 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
  - "Wells Distances Itself From Steel Company." The San Francisco Chronicle. (JULY 2, 1999 , FRIDAY, ): 632 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.

96. "Boycott bites into sales." Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia). 309 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"The cookie crumbles." Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia). 283 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
97. "Dr Pepper Denies Bias Allegations By NAACP." The Associated Press. (March 16, 1995 , Thursday, BC cycle ): 196 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
98. "Greenpeace lifts MacMillan boycott Progress made, group says." The Toronto Star. (July 8, 1995 , Saturday, SATURDAY SECOND EDITION ): 207 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
99. "Pro-Life Groups Call for Pepsi Boycott Over Aborted Fetal Cell Lines." Christian Newswire. (May 25, 2011 Wednesday 7:30 AM GMT ): 569 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.  
"Boycott Ends: PepsiCo Will Not Use Aborted Fetal Cell Lines for Flavor Enhancers." Christian Newswire. (April 30, 2012 Monday 7:30 AM GMT ): 585 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.
100. TBlumer, . "Wholly Ineffective: Lefty Boycott of Whole Foods Has No Noticeable Financial Impact." BizzyBlog. (November 5, 2009 Thursday 12:34 PM EST ): 818 words. Nexis NL. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/10.