

# The Road to the National Prevention Agreement

A qualitative study of the political factors which resulted in the  
development of the National Prevention Agreement



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## Abstract

This research investigated the effect of political parties within the political arena in the process of developing the National Prevention Agreement in the Netherlands. The main research question for this research was “How did political parties in the Dutch cabinet, parliament and ministerial positions affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement?”. Three expectations were formulated. First, the researcher expected the degree of party mandate fulfilment to affect the policy output. The second expectation was that the new cabinet would create an attention shift. The third expectation was that ministerial allocation would affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement. Using parliamentary documents, newspaper articles and interview data, the researcher found minimal effect of party mandate fulfilment as well as mixed evidence regarding ministerial allocation. The results supported the expectation of an attention shift.

# Table of Content

Abstract .....	1
List of Abbreviations.....	4
Overview of Tables and Figures .....	4
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Context .....	1
1.2. Explanations from literature .....	2
1.3. Research Question.....	4
<b>2. Theory</b> .....	<b>6</b>
2.1. Parliament Party Influence on Policy .....	6
2.1.1. Party Mandate Model .....	6
2.2. Attention and Priority Shifts in Government.....	7
2.3. Ministerial and Portfolio Allocation.....	9
2.4. Expectations .....	11
Figure 1. Expectations based on literature.....	11
2.4.1. Expectation: mandate fulfilment .....	12
2.4.2. Expectation: attention shift.....	12
2.4.3. Expectation: ministerial allocation .....	13
2.5. Conceptualisation .....	13
<b>3. Methods</b> .....	<b>15</b>
3.1. Operationalisation .....	15
3.2. Data Collection.....	16
3.2.1. Standpoints and Priorities.....	16
3.2.2. Sources .....	17
3.3. Research Design .....	18
3.4. Case Selection .....	19
<b>4. Results and Analysis</b> .....	<b>20</b>
4.1. Data Analysis .....	20
4.1.1. Coding scheme .....	20
4.1.2. Setting.....	21
4.1.3. Process.....	23
4.2. Results .....	27
4.2.1. Party Mandate Fulfilment.....	27

4.2.2.	Party Standpoints 2012 – 2017 .....	28
4.2.3.	Party Standpoints 2017 – present .....	36
4.2.4.	Mandate fulfilment political parties .....	44
4.2.5.	Summary standpoint parties – Analysis .....	46
4.3.	Attention shift – Results .....	52
4.3.1.	Standpoint and priorities cabinet - Before .....	52
4.3.2.	Standpoint and priorities cabinet – After.....	53
4.3.3.	Inclusion in election manifesto.....	54
4.3.4.	Effect of public opinion.....	55
4.3.5.	Attention shift and electoral strength – Analysis.....	56
4.4.	Ministerial Allocation – Results.....	57
4.4.1.	Before .....	57
4.4.2.	After.....	58
4.4.3.	Analysis .....	59
<b>5.</b>	<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>62</b>
5.1.	Sub-question 1 .....	62
5.2.	Sub-question 2 .....	62
5.3.	Sub-question 3.....	63
5.4.	Answering the research question.....	63
5.5.	<i>Discussion</i> .....	63
References	.....	66
Appendix	.....	71
Appendix 1: Coding Scheme.....		71
Appendix 2: Participating actors smoking discussion group (“ <i>thematafel roken</i> ”).....		75
Appendix 3: Interview Questions.....		76

## List of Abbreviations

**WHO:** World Health Organisation

**FCTC:** Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

**NPA:** National Prevention Agreement (*Nationaal Preventieakkoord*)

**PHWS:** Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (*Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport*)

**NPP:** National Prevention Programme (*Nationaal Programma Preventie*)

**POS:** Point of Sales

**PvdA:** Partij van de Arbeid (*Labour Party*)

**CU:** ChristenUnie (*Christian Union*)

**GL:** GroenLinks (*Green Left*)

**PvdD:** Partij voor de Dieren (*Party for the Animals*)

## Overview of Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Expectations based on literature pg. 11

Table 1: Overview setting political arena 2012 – present pg. 22

Table 2: Overview party and cabinet standpoints pg. 47

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Context

According to the World Health Organisation, more than 7 million people die each year as a result of smoking (WHO, 2018). In the Netherlands alone, 20.000 people die annually due to smoking (Rijksoverheid, 2018). To combat this problem, the Dutch government presented the National Prevention Agreement (*Nationaal Preventieakkoord*, NPA) in 2018. This agreement is a plan to combat smoking, extensive alcohol consumption and obesity in society. For the remainder of this thesis, only the smoking section of the agreement is meant when referred to the NPA. The NPA states as its goal to have a smoke-free society by 2040: “people who are born now should not know what a cigarette is” (Kieskamp, 2018). Concretely, the Agreement aims to achieve a smoking rate of less than 5% among adults aged eighteen and older, and a 0% smoking rate among pregnant women in 2040. The Agreement outlines measures to be taken, such as increasing excise duty on tobacco and removing tobacco products from view in supermarkets (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). The Agreement is also supported and facilitated by several partners, including insurance companies, municipalities and social organisations.

The National Prevention Agreement is not the first step taken to tackle smoking. In the 1950s, the government was officially made aware of an association between lung cancer incidence and smoking. Apprehensive of worrying heavy smokers too much and for a critical response from the tobacco industry, the Health Council of the Netherlands only advised the government to warn young people not to start smoking. Years later, in 1977, a Tobacco Memorandum (*Tabaksmemorandum*) was compiled in response to a publication by the Health Council to implement a broad spectrum of tobacco control policies. This memorandum was never turned into legislation and the centre-right governments that followed chose information provision as their policy, not legislation and price increases. In 2002 the adjusted Tobacco Legislation brought the number of smokers below 30% for the first time ever (Willemsen, 2017). In 2013, the cabinet started the National Prevention Programme (*Nationaal Programma Preventie*, NPP), which focused on reducing the number of people who suffer from a chronic disease as well as reducing the health differences between highly educated and low-educated people (Rijksoverheid Archive, 2013). A clear termination goal in regards to smoking was not included in the programme.

The NPA, the newest in a long line of the policies shortly summarised above, states concrete goals regarding terminating smoking in society. This begs the question why the goals in the NPA were only set when they were, not earlier. In 2005, the Netherlands ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), thereby agreeing to implement tobacco control measures included in the framework, such as price and tax measures, among others (Willemsen & Heijndijk, 2015). However, the Netherlands still is still far from complying with all obligations outlined in the FCTC (Willemsen & Heijndijk, 2015). This suggests that international agreements are not enough, termination of smoking requires national level action.

## 1.2. Explanations from literature

Possible explanations for the inaction at the national level can be found in academic literature. Termination literature summarises a few obstacles which stand in the way of achieving termination. For example, anti-termination coalitions, which is cooperation among those opposed to termination, are identified as important obstacles (deLeon, 1978). These coalitions are inclined to prevent change, favouring the status quo. Members of such coalitions often unite to make termination difficult (Zhang, 2009). In the case of terminating smoking in society, an anti-termination coalition seems to be present in the form of the Platform for Tobacco Sales Outlets (*Platform Verkooppunten Tabak*), for example. This platform is an umbrella organisation for other organisations who represent the interests of participants, such as the tobacco and retail sector, who experience harm from tobacco control policies (TabakNee, n.d. ; Rijksoverheid, 2016) A fear of radical change is also noted as an obstacle to termination. As a result of this fear, certain policies and programmes endure, despite existing knowledge and information that would justify discontinuation (Geva-May, 2004). Looking at the short history of tobacco control policies, it is clear that in the past, radical changes have been consistently avoided.

These obstacles provide hints as to why termination is difficult. However, another interesting direction suggested by the literature is politics. Frantz (2002) identifies termination as a political process where vested interests play an important role, rather than as a process where more rational factors such as costs are guiding (Frantz, 2002). Furthermore, DeLeon (1978) includes government redirection of specific policies in his definition of termination. This shows that, at the national level, the political arena is a specific area to study in search of an explanation of why the

NPA was developed when it was. Within the national political arena, it is political parties which are fundamental in the functioning of representative democracy. Political parties offer voters different policy packages to choose from during elections. During elections, political parties can also be rewarded or punished for their performance in office. Furthermore, political parties facilitate selecting citizen representatives by campaigning for the policies which are to be enacted by their candidates. Political parties are also believed to be essential in the distribution of posts in government (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). Translating this into the national political context of the Netherlands, three actors come to mind: the parliament where the citizens' representatives are active, the cabinet where policies are enacted and the different ministerial posts distributed within this cabinet. Given the essential role assigned to political parties in the literature, the question arises how political parties can influence policy outputs in relation to the three actors mentioned above.

In order to enter the legislature, where citizens are represented, politicians must be elected by the electorate, after having advocated their positions clearly along party lines (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). The assumption by voters is that by voting for a certain party, that party and its politicians will pursue policies it promised to pursue during the campaign, thereby maintaining its marked 'brand name' (Fortunato, 2019; Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). When, according to the voters, the party fails to pursue those policies forcefully enough, the party can be expected to gain an image of incompetence or untrustworthiness among voters (Fortunato, 2019). This suggests that parties have an incentive to stick to their promises. Therefore, it is appealing to study if this is indeed the case and how this affects policy outputs.

Concerning parties in a cabinet, literature suggests that all coalition members must approve a policy decision before it is taken. This implies that the presence of certain parties in a cabinet can either lead to deadlocked decision-making or certain policy outputs (Bäck, Debus & Tosun, 2015). Research on the partisan theory approach, focusing on the role of ideology in governments, assumes that left and right wing governments will adopt policies which are in line with their supporters' preferences and interests. However, this assumption has been criticised. Counter arguments include that institutional features, such as parliamentary procedure, affect the policy positions parties adopt. Furthermore, scholars have argued that changes in policy are better



explained by shifts of attention rather than by party ideology. Based on the case of public expenditure in Italy, Russo and Verzichelli (2016) argue that political parties are the drivers of attention shifts in government. The question therefore arises if there was an attention shift in the case of the NPA and what role political parties played.

In terms of ministers within a cabinet, coalition governance literature focused on issue attention in coalition agreements suggests that when parties enter a multi-party cabinet they are inclined to enforce different control mechanisms, thereby limiting so-called agency loss when power is delegated to individual minister. This literature sees coalition agreements as a public establishment of a policy equilibrium and a way of managing conflict between party leaders during negotiations (Klüver & Bäck, 2019). Furthermore, literature argues that an important determinant for policy influence by governing parties lies in how ministerial posts are allocated among parties (Costello & Thomson, 2008). Regarding the NPA, it is intriguing to see how allocation of ministerial posts affected party influence on policy.

### 1.3. Research Question

Using this literature as a starting point, this research will aim to explain why the NPA was developed when and how it was by looking at the effect of political parties in the cabinet, in parliament and in the allocation of ministerial portfolios. Therefore, the main research question is: “How did political parties in the Dutch cabinet, parliament and ministerial positions affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement?” To answer this research question, the researcher will first answer three sub-questions. The first is “How did the positions of political parties in the Second Chamber affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement?”. Second, the researcher will answer the sub-question “To what extent can an attention shift and the role of political parties herein, be observed in the cabinet?”. The third sub-question for this research is “To what extent is political party influence noticeable in the allocation of ministerial portfolios?”.

The literature shortly summarised above indicates the importance of political parties. This research has scientific relevance because it adds to this literature. This research can help illustrate the role political parties play in the political arena, specifically in the Netherlands and possibly in

a broader context. Additionally, this research provides an integrated approach to understanding the role of political parties in a termination effort within the national political arena of the Netherlands. This understanding also links with the societal relevance of the research. By clarifying how political parties affect the policy outputs in the Netherlands, a better understanding is also created of the role political parties play in shaping the society in which we live.

## 2. Theory

This chapter will outline the relevant literature. Following the short literature review, the expectations based on this literature will be summarised. The chapter will be concluded with the conceptualisation of the most important concepts.

### 2.1. Parliament Party Influence on Policy

The literature hinted at the importance of parties in parliament doing what they pledge to do during elections. However, actually realising a pledge can be different for opposition and political parties. Opposition parties are only able to fulfil their pledges indirectly, compared to the direct influence governing parties have. Furthermore, alignment between pledges made by opposition parties with pledges made by governing parties also affects the likelihood of that pledge being fulfilled (Costello & Thomson, 2008). Therefore, to understand how the incentive to do as promised affects party behaviour, and thereby policy outputs, other literature seems more appropriate.

#### 2.1.1. Party Mandate Model

The party mandate model uses a different approach to understanding the link between promises made before the election and the pursuance of policies after the election. This model focuses on how a link is achieved between voters' preferences and the preferences of their representatives in parliament. A traditional view of this model argues that the winning party receives a mandate for government. In this view, one party is able to win a majority of the votes and may, therefore, enter government. Due to its majority, this party is seen as having received a mandate to rule and implement its pledges. In this view, when the winning party does indeed implement its commitments, there is a link between government and the will of the people (Louwerse, 2012).

Alternatively, the party mandate model can be treated as a parliamentary mandate, whereby the focus is more on whether parties adopt comparable positions before and after an election. This view focuses more on how politicians perform their representative role. This is an important question due to the prominent role of parliament in the political arena. Therefore, representatives in this arena must not only reflect the will of the people in their actions but must also take into account what people think and what their interests are. Furthermore, parliament is an essential

link in the chain of representation, which links public preferences with government action. The argument is made that by focusing on the parliamentary mandate “a more inclusive picture of mandate fulfilment” can be sketched, which takes into account mandate fulfilment of both cabinet parties and opposition parties (Louwerse, 2012, pg. 1251). This is important because, in a system of democratic political representation, voters should be able to expect representation according to the mandate of the party they voted for, despite that party not winning the election (Louwerse, 2012). Furthermore, pledges made by parties who do not enter government can also be fulfilled. This is especially the case for pledges made by opposition parties which are in agreement with pledges made by parties who enter the government (Costello & Thomson, 2008).

In the parliamentary party mandate model, the focus is on whether “parties talk about similar things before and after elections” (Louwerse, 2012, pg. 1258). A high degree of mandate fulfilment implies a strong correlation between a party’s standpoint before and after the election, whereas a low degree of mandate fulfilment points to a weak correlation between the standpoint before and after the election. Louwerse (2012), who used the parliamentary mandate approach, focused on parties’ parliamentary behaviour, which includes speeches and voting behaviour, rather than policy output. By focusing on behaviour rather than outputs, it is expected that mandate fulfilment is higher. This is linked to the fact that actually implementing pledged policies can be thwarted by external factors, whereas a party’s behaviour is its own choice (Louwerse, 2012). While the model does not directly focus on policy outputs by parties, it can provide insight into how political parties, through their own behaviour, affect the political system and thereby, indirectly, policy outputs.

## 2.2. Attention and Priority Shifts in Government

Changes in government priorities or shifts in government attention are also found in the literature as factors that affect policy outputs. Russo & Verzichelli (2016) point to these factors in the context of the logic of attention theory. According to this theory, political systems must deal with substantial levels of friction, which leads to a disproportionate handling of the many signals that enter this system. This manifests itself in two ways. The first is the so-called “cognitive limit” which refers to the fact that people have a limited capacity to process the stream of signals they receive. In the policy-making context, this results in a limited set of priorities in which attempts

can be made to change the status quo. The second manifestation refers to the intensity of the signals that enter the political system. When processing information that enters the political process, inputs which do not surpass a specific level of intensity do not receive priority and are therefore unable to lead to any change in policy outputs. A practical implication hereof is that change is generally only noticeable when the priorities of a government shift (Russo & Verzichelli, 2016). In terms of behaviour of cabinet parties, the logic of attention theory suggests that how governments act collectively is influenced by which priorities the cabinet sets. In order for change to take place, it is therefore necessary for new priorities to be set. Strictly following the theory, this implies that to realise change, a new cabinet must take office. This is the view held by theorists from non-cooperative game theory who focus on bargaining models. In these models, the assumption is that a change of the coalition agreement is needed to lead to a change of policies. According to these models, a change of the agreement is most likely to take place when a new government is formed (Goodhart, 2013).

In terms of how government priorities are set and how they change, Hübscher (2019) indicates that political parties are the link. Generally, this means that the position a cabinet takes in terms of policy outputs, is a good reflection of the ideological composition of parties in the cabinet. Traditional coalition formation models also suggest that the policy outputs of coalition governments are generally representative of the weighted average of the government parties' ideal points and a certain consensus that has been reached among the coalition partners. An implicit assumption of this literature is that members of a cabinet can influence policies, governmental priorities and the governmental agenda proportionally to their electoral strength (Hübscher, 2019).

Finally, changes in the governmental priorities within the governing agenda are most noticeable at the start of the term in office. The assumption is that parties have the freedom to push for their preferred policies at the start of the tenure, thereby exploiting possible advantages in terms of power or agenda setting. This is related to the fact that, by being elected, parties obtain a mandate and must then deliver on the promises made during the campaign. To satisfy their constituencies, parties will aim to turn essential features of their electoral platform into policy. This is likely to result in coalition partners implementing pet projects at the start of their legislative term, as a

signal that they are delivering on their promises (Hübscher, 2019). This is supported by Bevan and Greene (2018), who state that once parties take office, they pursue strategic or specifically emphasised issues in order to avoid a reputation of unaccountable action. Consequently, the largest differences in the governing agenda can be noticed immediately after a transition in power. This is the result of constant partisan-based revisions in the governing agenda, which is caused by the evolving characteristics and roles of parties in the process of governing. Furthermore, parties, as dynamic organisations, are likely to have fluid priorities and are likely to respond to changes in the political context (Bevan & Greene, 2018). Similarly, the “logic of attention” theory argues that change should take place when a new government with its own specific preferences takes power (Russo & Verzichelli, 2016). These findings seem to confirm the statements by Russo and Verzichelli (2016) that a new government is needed to lead to change. This adds to their conclusion by stating that this change, albeit only in the governing agenda and not necessarily in outputs, is most noticeable at the beginning of the legislative term. Finally, the literature seems to make the implication that it is not necessarily a change of government that leads to new priorities. Rather, the composition of the new government, taking into account the participating parties as well as their relative weight in the coalition, seems to be more decisive.

### 2.3. Ministerial and Portfolio Allocation

A different interpretation of influencing factors on government policy outputs can be found in portfolio allocation theories. According to these theories, ministers are agents of their party who draft and implement policies which are as close a representation as possible of the party’s platform and are not necessarily subject to negotiations which take place in the overall cabinet. Commitment to the party ideology by a minister is most strongly pronounced in social and welfare policies (Hübscher, 2019). The influence of a partisan minister can result in legislative outputs which diverge from the output that was expected from the cabinet. However, despite possible influence of parties and partisan ministers, the various checks and balances, such as the presence of junior ministers, in parliamentary democracies generally lead to coalition policy outcomes which do represent the policy preferences of the coalition as a whole (Hübscher, 2019).

In line with these theories, the ministerial discretion model assumes a high level of autonomy for each minister. With this autonomy, ministers are able to influence policy in areas which fall under the control of their department. This influence is done in line with the preference of the party (Bäck, Debus & Tosun, 2015). The ministerial discretion model further sees policy outcomes as the result of which preferences the party in charge of the relevant ministry has. Simply put, ministerial discretion rests on the assumption that policy making in the context of a coalition is the same as delegation to independent, autonomous ministers and their corresponding parties (Goodhart, 2013).


Alexiadou (2015) provides insight into three different types of ministers, namely loyalists, partisans and ideologues; and the corresponding ways in which they can affect policy outputs. Firstly, ministers can affect policy by acting in line with their party's wishes. Such ministers, referred to as loyalists, are loyal to their party leader and do not have their own ambitions for the policy agenda. Loyalists take on a managerial role rather than an entrepreneurial one in terms of policy. This is especially the case when these ministers are faced with other actors who have a powerful veto. The remaining two types of ministers are able to influence policy independently, and also have the ambitions to do so. Partisans belong to the leading ranks of the party and are seen as major actors within the party. The success of partisans is linked to the party's electoral success. This works as an incentive for partisans to develop policy that goes beyond the statements made in the coalition agreement. Ideologues are ministers with fixed policy ideas and are unmoved by debates or office perks. Such ministers see being in office as a medium for achieving their policy goals (Alexiadou, 2015).

The effects of ministerial allocation are not uncontested. Scholars argue that the ministerial discretion model is unrealistic. According to this argumentation, individual ministers or heads of department do not receive complete autonomy from the government. The argumentation given is that a being in charge of a particular portfolio gives the respective party powerful influence over policies made in the corresponding area, although this influence is not exclusive. Holding a portfolio is also seen as a constraint to the veto abilities of other parties in government. The so-called coalition compromise model further argues that coalition governments are inclined to make compromises which are agreed upon in the coalition agreement. Based on these

compromises, parties are expected to influence policy in line with the joint preferences of the coalition (Bäck, Debus & Tosun, 2015). This view is more in line with the traditional coalition formation models noted by Hübscher (2019).

## 2.4. Expectations

Figure 1. Expectations based on literature



Taking into account the literature summarised above, the following model is drawn up of the expectations for the research. The red box and corresponding line indicate the election which took place, after which the Cabinet Rutte III took office. The pink box ‘policy output’ represents the NPA. The set of green, blue and yellow boxes represent the three separate expectations about



what led to the NPA. These expectations are derived from the literature and are explained in more detail below.

#### 2.4.1. Expectation: mandate fulfilment

In line with Louwse (2012), the expectation is that by receiving votes, all parties will act in accordance with the mandate they receive from their voters. Thus, the expectation is that there will be a high level of mandate fulfilment. This implies that similar behaviour by all parties can be expected before and after the elections. The standpoint parties take before and after the elections is expected to affect the policy output because this influences which decisions are made in parliament. A party's position can affect the policy output by calling attention for certain issues, as well as through voting behaviour. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H1: The policy output after the election is affected by the degree of mandate fulfilment among the parties in parliament.*

#### 2.4.2. Expectation: attention shift

According to Russo and Verzichelli (2016), a change in government priority will take place when a new government takes office. The new priorities are regarded as an attention shift of the government. This attention shift is visible in the change of the coalition agreement which the government settles when it takes office (Goodhart, 2013). Hübscher (2019) and Bevan and Greene (2018) argue that the change of government priorities i.e. the attention shift, is most visible at the beginning of a new government's term in office. Hübscher (2019) further argues that political parties within the coalition can influence the government's priorities proportionally to their electoral strength.

This leads to the following expectation for the analysis:

*H2: When a new cabinet takes office, an attention shift will take place which will affect the policy output proportionally to the electoral strength of the parties participating in the new cabinet.*

### 2.4.3. Expectation: ministerial allocation

According to Hübscher (2019), ministers are agents of their political party. Therefore, once in charge of a ministry, they can be expected to pursue policies in that ministry that are as much in line with the party's preferences as possible. Bäck, Debus and Tosun (2015) point to the assumption that allocating a ministry to a minister can be seen as a delegation of that ministry to that minister and their party preferences. Alexiadou (2015) identifies three categories of ministers and how they can affect policy output: loyalists, partisans and ideologues. Combined, this leads to the following hypothesis:

*H3: The allocation of a minister to a portfolio will result in a policy output which is in line with the minister's party's preferences.*

## 2.5. Conceptualisation

Looking at the framework and expectations, there are several concepts which must be further conceptualised before continuing to the analysis. A mandate, which in this research is the parliamentary mandate studied by Louwse (2012), is defined as an authorisation by voters for parties to pursue a set of policies on behalf of the voters (Louwse, 2012).

An attention shift is conceptualised as a change in the composition of the cabinet which results in a shift of cabinet priorities. The composition of the cabinet refers to the parties in the cabinet as well as the electoral weight of these parties. The electoral weight is the number of seats in the Second Chamber a party has.

The cabinet is the collective term for ministers and junior ministers (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). The opposition is the collective of parties which do not participate in the cabinet. When referring to 'before the elections' the researcher is referring to the governing period of the Cabinet Rutte II, which was in office from 2012 to 2017. 'After the elections' refers to the governing period under Rutte III, which started in 2017.

Ministerial allocation refers to the allocation of a portfolio to a minister. In the Netherlands, junior ministers are also assigned specific portfolios. Therefore, ministerial allocation in this context is defined as the allocation of a portfolio to a minister or junior minister. The portfolio of a minister or junior minister is understood as the set of responsibilities assigned to the minister or junior minister.

### 3. Methods

#### 3.1. Operationalisation

This section will outline how important concepts will be operationalised in the research. The party mandate model in this research is taken to be the parliamentary mandate model, which focuses on the behaviour of all parties in the Second Chamber, not just governing parties. “Mandate fulfilment” will be operationalised by comparing the position of the coalition and opposition parties before and after the elections to see if there has been a change of position. In the case that the positions are not the same or similar before and after the elections, this will be regarded as a change of position. In this research, the concept “position of a political party” will be operationalised by combining the standpoint of the political party, the focus of the political party and the party’s wishes for the content of a prevention policy. The standpoint of the political party is the opinion of that party about smoking in general and about the NPA and other prevention policy in general. The focus of the political party is the group or groups of actors or other factors that are emphasised most in the argumentation of the political parties or that are given the most attention by the political parties. The party’s content preference for prevention policy refer to the party’s opinion about how the prevention policy should take form.

The more similarities that can be found in a party’s position before and after the elections, the higher the degree of party mandate fulfilment. Parties which show few similarities in their position before and after the election will have a low party mandate fulfilment. The categorisation of mandate fulfilment will be as follows:

- Very high: same standpoint, same focus, same content preference
- High: same standpoint, same focus, different content preference OR same standpoint, different focus, same content preference
- Medium: same standpoint, different focus and content preference
- Low: different standpoint, different focus, different content preference

The change of cabinet is operationalised in this context as a change of the composition of the cabinet before the elections and the composition of the cabinet after the elections of 2017. An attention shift is operationalised as the difference in priorities between the cabinet from before the elections and the cabinet after the elections.

The effects of ministerial allocation will be operationalised as the degree to which the policy output reflects the party background of the minister. The more the policy output is in line with the wishes of the responsible minister's party, the larger the effect of ministerial allocation. When the policy output is not or only slightly in line with the wishes of the responsible minister's party, the effect of ministerial allocation will be low. The actions of the (junior) minister as well as the final outcome are used as measures of the effect of ministerial allocation. By analysing the data, the (junior) ministers can also be categorised as loyalists, ideologues or partisans. The first category will be assigned in the case that the minister acts out of loyalty to his or her party, not out of their own personal ambitions. The category of 'partisan' will be assigned to ministers who can and want to influence policy individually and who belong to the leading ranks of the party. Finally, a (junior) minister will be assigned the category of ideologue when the (junior) minister has a fixed goal and uses his or her office to achieve this goal.

### 3.2. Data Collection

For this research, data has been collected to determine the standpoints and priorities of the political parties and the cabinet. Furthermore, data was collected to analyse the influence of the minister in charge of the relevant portfolio.

#### 3.2.1. Standpoints and Priorities

To investigate the mandate fulfilment of the political parties, data was collected in the form of the party manifestos of each party for the 2017 election. The manifestos were used because they provide a clear overview of what the party wants and does not want. Additionally, Second Chamber documents, namely consultation reports, voting outcomes and motions submitted by Second Chamber members, were collected to determine the party standpoints. These documents were collected for before and after the election. The Second Chamber documents were used because, combined with the election manifestos, a more elaborate understanding of the party's standpoint can be developed. This is because in the Second Chamber the politicians must represent their party's wishes, thereby trying to influence policy making.

The presence of an attention shift was determined using data from the same Second Chamber documents as for the political parties. This is possible because, in these documents, representatives of the cabinet, namely the minister or junior minister, defend or explain the cabinet's position. Furthermore, data was also collected from the coalition agreement for Cabinet Rutte II and the coalition agreement for the Cabinet Rutte III. This data was also used to determine the cabinet's standpoint.

Data to determine ministerial allocation was collected from newspaper articles interviews conducted. The interviews also provided data to determine an attention shift. Interviews were conducted with four members of the Second Chamber. Two of the respondents were Second Chamber members who belong to two of the coalition parties. The other two respondents were Second Chamber members who belong to opposition parties. A request for an interview was sent via e-mail to all party representatives for the prevention dossier. The interview questions, seven in total, were included in this first e-mail. Most members were unable to cooperate with the interview due to a full agenda. All four interviews were held by telephone. The interview consisted of the researcher asking the questions sent through the e-mail and, where necessary, asking follow-up questions for clarity. The interview questions can be found in Appendix 3. Most questions related to the process of developing the NPA. These questions were especially useful for determining the presence of an attention shift and of ministerial allocation. Interviews were deemed necessary to investigate the attention shift and the effect of ministerial allocation because the Second Chamber documents did not sufficiently provide data to analyse this. The interviews took approximately 10 to 15 minutes. With the consent of the respondents the interviews were recorded. Therefore, the interviews have all been anonymously processed in this thesis. The anonymous transcripts of the interviews can be found in Appendix 4. Due to technical issues, one of the interviews was not recorded. Therefore, this interview has not been transcribed literally, but based on the researcher's own memory of the interview.

### 3.2.2. Sources

Apart from the data collected from the interviews, all the data collected was collected from online sources. The Second Chamber documents were collected from the website Tweedekamer.nl. On this website, "preventie roken" (prevent smoking) was used as search term before the elections

and “Nationaal Preventieakkoord” (National Prevention Agreement) was used for after the elections. Using the website Parlement.com, the party manifestos were collected. Only the manifesto of 50Plus could not be accessed through this website. Therefore, a general web search was used to find that manifesto. Parlement.com was also used to access both coalition agreements. The data from the articles was collected from the websites of Trouw, Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad. To collect this data, the search terms “Nationaal Preventieakkoord” and “overheid roken” (government smoking) were used.

### 3.3. Research Design

For this research, the case study design is used. Case studies aim to reconstruct a particular case in detail (Flick, 2009). This is suitable for this research because it provides a relatively limited scope to investigate, which makes it possible to analyse the case in depth and to obtain a clear understanding of how the variables are connected to each other. A disadvantage of using a case study is that theoretical generalisation is not possible, since the focus of the study is so specific (Flick, 2009). Not being able to generalise to a wider population based on this research is a threat to external validity of the study. However, internal validity is threatened less in this research design, given the design is performed well (Dooley, 2009).

In order to answer the research question, data will be collected from before and after an interruption. In this case, the interruption is 2017 general election in the Netherlands. This is the interruption in this design because it is the expectation that the election led to changes in the political arena which could explain the development of the NPA. To determine whether this is the case, several hypotheses will be tested. By testing these hypotheses, it can be determined if the expected changes resulted in the development of the NPA.

The research design will be applied for the time frame starting at the beginning Cabinet Rutte II's tenure, and ending with the presentation of the National Prevention Agreement. Concretely, based on the availability of the documents, the time frame starts in February 2013 and ends in October 2018. In addition to this time frame, the coalition agreement 2012-2017 will be consulted to determine the cabinet's position during that cabinet period.

### 3.4. Case Selection

This research will be performed in the context of the Netherlands. Within this broad context, the case of Dutch national politics will be studied. The units of observation in this case are documents, namely Second Chamber documents, interview transcripts and newspaper articles, party manifestos and coalition agreements. The units of analysis are political actors in the political arena, namely the cabinet, Second Chamber members and (junior) ministers. Using these units will make it possible to make the necessary analyses about the expected changes after the elections.

The case and units have been selected using non-probability sampling. This means the methods for selecting the case and units were not based on a system whereby it was known what the chances of (non-)selection were. The choice for this case and these units was made based on a few considerations. Firstly, by focusing on units in the Netherlands, it is possible to analyse documents in a language that is easy to understand for the researcher. Furthermore, the documents are easily accessible. While it makes sense to use non-probability sampling in this research, the same disadvantage is present as with the case study, namely that generalisation to a larger population is not possible.



## 4. Results and Analysis

### 4.1. Data Analysis

This section will start by outlining how the analysis was performed and then continue to describe the setting of the context. Afterwards, the results per expectation will be presented, followed by the corresponding analysis.

#### 4.1.1. Coding scheme

To analyse the Second Chamber documents, coding was done in ATLAS.ti. The coding was a mixture between deductive and inductive coding. The deductive element of the coding took place before the data was coded in ATLAS.ti. The researcher made a list of what needed to be extracted from the data, based on the goal of the research, the relevant sub-question and the operationalisation. This led to three main things that the researcher wanted to know from the data. Firstly, the standpoints of the political parties and the cabinet needed to be determined. This formed the first general category, named “standpoint”. The second item on the list was “focus”. Possible foci found in the statements of the political parties belong to this category.- The third item related to the content of the NPA. This third general code, “content”, would be assigned to parts of the data which indicated what a party’s preference is for the content of prevention policy.

Using these general codes, the researcher searched through the data. While working, the researcher inductively created more specific codes which provide more detail about the general code which was assigned to that piece of text. The more specific codes were created for each party and the cabinet separately, whereas the general codes are the same for all parties and the cabinet. An example of how the coding system used is: “CDA before content: cooperation with private/social partners”. This code makes it clear for the researcher that the coded piece of text refers to the CDA, is from before the elections, is related to content and specifically says something about the CDA’s opinion regarding cooperation with private and/or social partners. The other codes have been developed in a similar way. During the coding, the general code ‘nuance’ was added. This general code indicated a nuance in a party statement, which referred to or elaborated on one of the other three general codes. Using this overview of codes, the researcher is quickly able to find the pieces of the data that are necessary and relevant for the analysis. A full list of the codes used can be found in Appendix 1.

Other, less complex data such as the newspaper articles and the interviews, were not specifically coded. These data are analysed by searching for relevant information. Due to the short length and straightforward nature of these documents, a coding scheme is not required for the analysis.

The analysis of party mandate fulfilment is done using the codes produced. Thereby, the researcher looks for the elements of party position as described in the operationalisation. For the attention shift, the coded and non-coded documents are used. Possible changes in priority will be determined by comparing coalition agreements as well as the statements made by representatives of the cabinet in the Second Chamber before and after the elections. The effect of ministerial allocation relies on the non-coded documents and is analysed by investigating the alignment of the (junior) minister's actions and the final output with the wishes of the (junior) minister's party.

#### 4.1.2. Setting

##### *Cabinet 2012 – 2017*

On September 12<sup>th</sup> 2012, the general elections in the Netherlands took place. The VVD became the biggest party, winning 41 seats of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber. The PvdA was the second biggest party, winning 38 seats in the Second Chamber. On the VVD's initiative, a cabinet was formed with the PvdA: Cabinet Rutte II. Mark Rutte, lead candidate of the VVD, became Prime Minister for the second time in a row. The cabinet officially took office on the 5<sup>th</sup> of November 2012. With a total of 79 seats in the Second Chamber, the cabinet had a small majority in parliament, namely 52,7%. In the First Chamber, the coalition did not have a majority and therefore required support from other parties (Parlement.com, n.d.). The parties which did not participate in the coalition were the opposition parties for the tenure of the coalition. An overview of these parties can be found in Table 1.

The Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (PHWS) was assigned to Edith Schippers, a politician for the VVD party and second candidate on the election list of the VVD. In the previous cabinet she was also Minister of PHWS. Minister Schippers is described as a “convinced liberal and defender of market forces in healthcare to increase personal freedom of choice” (Parlement.com, n.d., par. 1). Minister Schippers shared the responsibility for her

ministry with Junior Minister Martin van Rijn, from the PvdA party. Junior Minister Van Rijn had a history in civil service, among others as Director-General for Healthcare at the Ministry of PHWS (Parlement.com, n.d.). Within the cabinet, Junior Minister Van Rijn was responsible for the tobacco dossier (Willemsen, 2018).

*Cabinet 2017 – present<sup>1</sup>*

At the end of Cabinet Rutte II’s tenure, general elections were held, on March 15<sup>th</sup> 2017. Again, the VVD was the biggest party, winning 33 seats in parliament, eight seats less than the previous elections. The CDA and D66 came out second with 19 seats each. After failed negotiations to form a coalition with CDA, D66 and GroenLinks (14 seats), the VVD turned to the option of forming a coalition with the CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie (CU, 5 seats). This eventually was the composition of the Cabinet Rutte III, which took office on October 10<sup>th</sup> 2017. This coalition had a minimal majority in both the Second Chamber and the First Chamber, namely 50,6% in each chamber at the start of the tenure. After the elections for the First Chamber in 2019, the coalition only holds 42,6% of the seats in the First Chamber (Parlement.com, n.d.). The parties who do not participate in the coalition form the opposition. An overview can be found in Table 1.

The Ministry of PHWS experienced a change of leadership after the 2017 elections. Minister Schippers made way for the new minister: Hugo de Jonge. Minister de Jonge is from the CDA party and is one of the three vice prime-ministers of the cabinet. Politically, Minister de Jonge has a background as alderman in Rotterdam, among other functions. The position of Junior Minister was assigned to Paul Blokhuis from the CU. Politically, Junior Minister Blokhuis has experience as alderman in Apeldoorn. In the cabinet, prevention in healthcare is assigned to the portfolio of Junior Minister Blokhuis (Parlement.com, n.d.)

Table 1: Overview setting political arena 2012 - present

	<b>Before 2017 election</b>	<b>After 2017 election</b>
<b>Prime Minister</b>	Mark Rutte (VVD)	Mark Rutte (VVD)

<sup>1</sup> As of June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2019. The intended end of tenure for this cabinet is 2021.

<b>Coalition</b>	VVD (41 seats)	VVD (33 seats)
<b>Parties</b>	PvdA (38 seats)	CDA (19 seats) D66 (19 seats) CU (5 seats)
<b>Opposition</b>	PVV (15 seats)	PVV (20 seats)
<b>Parties</b>	SP (15 seats) CDA (13 seats) D66 (12 seats) ChristenUnie (5 seats) GroenLinks (4 seats) SGP (3 seats) Partij voor de Dieren (2 seats) 50Plus (2 seats)	GroenLinks (14 seats) SP (14 seats) PvdA (9 seats) Partij voor de Dieren (5 seats) 50Plus (4 seats) SGP (3 seats) DENK (3 seats) Forum voor Democratie (2 seats)
<b>Responsible for PHWS</b>	Minister Edith Schippers (VVD) Junior Minister Martin van Rijn (PvdA)	Minister Hugo de Jonge (CDA) Junior Minister Paul Blokhuis (CU)

#### 4.1.3. Process

This section will provide a short overview of the process leading up to the NPA. The overview is generated for the most part using an extensive overview from the Alliance for Smoke-Free Netherlands by Willemsen (2018), unless stated otherwise.

After first taking office in 2010, Minister Schippers announced a change of course in the tobacco control policy: less government (Willemsen, 2018). On the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 2011 she published the Health Report which summarised the national priorities for the health policy (Zadelhoff, 2011). Following this report, subsidies for the expertise centre Stivoro were stopped, methods to assist people to stop smoking were no longer reimbursed in the basic health insurance and smoking was allowed in small hospitality sector businesses. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November 2011 the establishment of the Alliance for Smoke-free Netherlands was made public in the newspaper Trouw. The alliance is a partnership of several different organisations who work to achieve more effective tobacco control policy, to reveal practices of the tobacco industry, to achieve higher excise tax on tobacco

products, better protection of youth against tobacco marketing and more smoke-free places. The alliance denies it was established out of dissatisfaction with the loosening of the tobacco control policies by Minister Schippers but is critical of the government policy regarding smoking (Trouw, 2011). In 2012, Cabinet Rutte II took office. Within a month of the new cabinet taking office, a majority of the Second Chamber demanded a break with Minister Schippers' policy from Junior Minister van Rijn, who was in charge of the tobacco policy portfolio in the new cabinet (NOS, 2012). Starting shortly after Cabinet Rutte II took office, this overview summarises the milestones in the tobacco control policy leading up to the NPA.

## **2012**

*November 23<sup>rd</sup>*

The Cabinet agrees to a proposal by Junior Minister Van Rijn to increase the minimum age for buying tobacco products from 16 to 18 years of age. The proposal was then sent to the Second Chamber (NU.nl, 2012). The increase of the minimum age was realised in 2014.

## **2013**

*February 27<sup>th</sup>*

The Cabinet decides to implement smoke-free hospitality sector per January 1<sup>st</sup> 2014.

*October 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>*

Second Chamber votes in favour of Junior Minister Van Rijn's proposal to increase the minimum age for buying tobacco products from 16 to 18 years of age. The VVD, PvdA, SP, CDA, ChristenUnie, GroenLinks, SGP, PvdD and 50Plus voted in favour of the proposal, amounting to 122 votes in favour. The D66 and PVV voted against the proposal, amounting to 27 votes against. 149 votes were cast in total (Tweede Kamer, 2013).

*October*

Presentation National Prevention Programme: "Alles is Gezondheid" (Everything is Health). The goal of the programme is to decrease the growth of the number of people with a chronic disease as well as to decrease the health differences between highly-educated people and low-educated people. The foci of the programme are alcohol, smoking, depression, obesity and more movement

(Rijksoverheid Archive, 2013). In terms of smoking, the focus is mostly on smoke-free schoolyards and on refining the social norm by emphasising that not smoking before turning 18 is normal, for example.

*November 29<sup>th</sup>*

Junior Minister Van Rijn announces the ambition to sharpen the rules concerning e-cigarettes.

**2014**

*January 1<sup>st</sup>*

Increase of minimum age for buying tobacco products from 16 to 18 takes effect.

*May 19<sup>th</sup>*

The Tobacco Product Directive (2014/40/EU) enters into force. This law is concerned with the “manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products” (European Commission, 2014, par. 1). The law would become applicable in 2016. Among other things, the law prohibits cigarettes with distinguishing flavours and requires 65% of the packaging of cigarettes to be covered with health warnings (European Commission, 2014).

*October 21<sup>st</sup>*

Junior Minister Van Rijn announces that all small cafés should immediately become smoke-free. This is done after the Supreme Court declared it unlawful that small cafés (one-man businesses smaller than 70 square meter) were exempted from the smoke-free hospitality sector law (Bouma, 2011).

*End 2014*

The Alliance for a Smoke-free Netherlands publishes a joint strategy for achieving a smoke-free generation.

## **2016**

*May 20<sup>th</sup>*

The Tobacco Product Directive becomes applicable in the Netherlands. This corresponds with the changing of the Tobacco Law to the Tobacco and Tobacco Products Law to accommodate changes that are determined in the directive regarding flavours, packaging, information provision and remote sales (Rijksoverheid, n.d.).

*November 15<sup>th</sup>*

A majority in the Second Chamber approves setting the deadline for a Point of Sales (PoS) display ban on December the 1<sup>st</sup>. This ban means tobacco products are not allowed to be brought to the attention of the consumer at the point of sales (Stivoro, 2012).

## **2017**

*January 24<sup>th</sup>*

The Second Chamber approves an amendment to the Tobacco and Tobacco Products Law to give the PoS display ban a legal foundation.

*October 10<sup>th</sup>*

Cabinet Rutte III presents its coalition agreement. In this agreement, the goal to achieve a smoke-free generation is stated. The goal to establish an NPA is also included in the coalition agreement (Rookvrije Generatie, 2017).

## **2018**

*February 16<sup>th</sup>*

Junior Minister Blokhuis submits a cabinet letter explaining his approach to developing the NPA. He explains the ambition to cooperate with health providers, insurance companies, municipalities and sport associations, among others. The junior minister held five round-table discussions with organisations who wanted to participate. During these discussions it was decided to focus on the themes smoking, obesity and excessive alcohol consumption. Junior Minister Blokhuis summarised four points which were agreed upon as the starting point for the agreement:

1. Strong ambitions for the long-term as and concrete goals and measures for 2020

2. Strengthening cooperation on national and local level across sectors
3. Go further than non-binding agreements
4. Work with effective existing instruments and approaches that can count on broad support

Together with the participants of the three foci, Junior Minister Blokhuis worked to further sharpen the ambitions, goals and measures stated in the National Prevention Agreement. The participants of the discussion groups were almost exclusively representatives of civil society organisations. Within the discussion groups, it was the participants who decided what the content of the NPA would be, not Junior Minister Blokhuis (Trouw, 2018).

*November 23<sup>d</sup>*

Presentation of National Prevention Agreement to the Second Chamber

## 4.2. Results

### 4.2.1. Party Mandate Fulfilment

The results will be presented according to the composition of the coalition and opposition before and after the elections. The positions of the coalition parties before the elections will be presented first, followed by the opposition parties before the elections. Then, the positions of the parties in the coalition and opposition after the election will be presented. The analysis of the mandate fulfilment will be at the end of the section.

For GL before the elections, PvdD before the elections and D66 after the elections data specifically referring to smoke prevention was not available. Therefore, statements were used about prevention in general. This is done based on the assumption that smoke prevention is part of prevention in general, as indicated by the Ministry under which the dossier falls.



#### 4.2.2. Party Standpoints 2012 – 2017

##### *Coalition*

##### *VVD*

##### *Standpoint*

Before the elections, the VVD is in favour of a prevention policy but is very critical about the content of such a policy<sup>2</sup>. However, the VVD believes the government does have an important role in the enforcement of tobacco control policies<sup>3</sup>. The VVD is critical about the government prescribing what a healthy life is<sup>4</sup>.

##### *Focus*

The VVD is a proponent of everyone being able to make their own choices. In the eyes of the VVD, “The government can facilitate a good information provision but, in the end, it cannot decide how someone lives his or her life.”(VVD, 2012). This ‘own choice’-argument does not count for youth. The VVD believes that in the case of youth, the government should take on a different role and protect those below the age of 18. According to the VVD, this is necessary because “free will” is less present for young people than for adults<sup>5</sup>. For this reason, the VVD is a proponent of a smoke-free generation<sup>6</sup>.

##### *Content*

The VVD is in favour of cooperation with social partners to tackle prevention together<sup>7</sup>. According to the VVD, cooperation with the actors who provide tobacco products is necessary and is one of the pillars of good policy, together with enforcement of existing rules<sup>8</sup>. Furthermore, the VVD is a proponent of expanding the scope of prevention from the field of healthcare, to that of learning and working<sup>9</sup>. The VVD is opposed to the implementation of measures that have not been proven to be effective or which are not necessary according to the

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<sup>2</sup> *AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02) 2013)*

<sup>3</sup> *(AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)*

<sup>4</sup> *Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01) 2014*

<sup>5</sup> *Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01) 2014*

<sup>6</sup> *(AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)*

<sup>7</sup> *(AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)*

<sup>8</sup> *(AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)*

<sup>9</sup> *(Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01), 2014)*

VVD, such as the confronting pictures on the cigarette packaging and the demand for uniform packaging<sup>10</sup>. The VVD believes the role of the government should be limited (VVD, 2012).

### *Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party, PvdA)*

#### Standpoint

The PvdA is against smoking and wants to make clear that tobacco is “not a normal product”. For the PvdA “public health should be the starting point.”<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the PvdA wants to work to reduce the number of people who start smoking and sees smoke-free schools as an important step to achieve this goal<sup>12</sup>.

#### Focus

The PvdA focuses on communicating about the risks of smoking and on removing cigarettes from the “sphere of the normal product”. On the one hand, the PvdA wants to ensure that legislation, such as the law which makes the hospitality industry smoke-free, focuses on the effects on non-smokers in general, not on specific groups. However, on the other hand, the PvdA is of the opinion that young people not starting smoking is the highest priority. This shows a clear focus on youth<sup>13</sup>.

#### Content

The PvdA is in favour of limiting the offer of tobacco products<sup>14;15</sup>. Linked to the focus on youth, the PvdA believes that having early intervention programmes will lead to societal and financial profit<sup>16</sup>. The PvdA is also a proponent of cooperation among different actors: “cooperation is needed with other governments, other Ministries, other societal actors and with companies and entrepreneurs”<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>11</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>12</sup> (Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01), 2014)

<sup>13</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>14</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>15</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>16</sup> (Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01), 2014)

<sup>17</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

## *Opposition*

### *CDA*

#### Standpoint

The CDA was against smoking and was of the opinion that smoking is “not normal” despite tobacco being a legal product<sup>18</sup>. The party states that “public health in the Netherlands would be much better if people were to smoke less”. This shows that the CDA is against smoking for health reasons. Steps taken by the CDA, together with the D66, to get prevention on the agenda show that smoke prevention is a high priority issue for the party. The CDA believes that having good health is, in the first place, the responsibility of the individual, not of the government<sup>19</sup>.

#### Focus

The CDA’s main focus is on youth. The CDA makes this clear by stating that it wants “extensive steps” to be taken to prevent young people from smoking<sup>20</sup>. This statement shows that it is a high priority for the party that young people do not start smoking and that extra effort is necessary to achieve this. Another focus group for the CDA is pregnant women who smoke during their pregnancy. According to the CDA, it is necessary to tackle this problem because “prevention can never start too soon”. This is so important for the CDA, that a plan was submitted to bring the issue to the attention of the cabinet<sup>21</sup>.

#### Content

The CDA is a proponent of government action in terms of setting up a framework to stimulate healthier behaviour: “Ultimately, is it not the case that in some areas the government can set framework conditions to allow people to live healthier lives?”. This statement seems contradictory to the demand for extensive steps by the government. Furthermore, the CDA is in favour of an approach that discourages people from smoking, rather than an approach whereby people are forced to stop smoking<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> (AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)

<sup>19</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>20</sup> (AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)

<sup>21</sup> (AO Preventief Gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 31/03), 2016)

<sup>22</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

## *ChristenUnie (CU)*

### Standpoint

The CU makes its standpoint about smoking very clear: “smoking is very bad for the public health”<sup>23</sup>. The CU’s position regarding the responsibility for a healthy life, is that this responsibility, first and foremost, lies with the individual. However, the CU also acknowledges that this affects society as well. Therefore, the CU is in favour of investing in prevention (ChristenUnie, 2017).

### Focus

The CU’s argumentation against smoking is very much focused on youth. This is reflected by the statement “...don’t want another generation to grow up addicted to smoking”. The party prioritises “a healthy future for our youth”. The CU is active in taking steps to keep children out of contact with smoke by submitting a motion to make school smoke-free<sup>24</sup>.

### Content

The CU has a target to have places where children are present made smoke-free (ChristenUnie, 2017). Furthermore, the CU seems eager to accept any measures that might help to prevent people from smoking. This is clear because the CU is in favour of banning flavours in cigarettes as well as adding pictures to cigarette packaging to make them less attractive, despite the effectiveness hereof still being a topic of debate at that point<sup>25</sup>. The CU is a proponent of setting concrete measures beforehand and fears that without concrete measures being set out (in the NPA), the goals will not be reached. Furthermore, the CU’s opinion is that the time of non-binding promises has passed<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>24</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>25</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>26</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

## D66

### Standpoint

The D66 is in favour of a clear tobacco control policy. For D66, the public health is most important, which is why the party wants to work in favour of tobacco control policies<sup>27</sup>. The statement “Apart from harm to health – which is the most important for me – this leads to economic damage”<sup>28</sup>, which was made about the increase of smokers, shows that D66 is not only opposed to smoking for health reasons but also takes account economic consequences

### Focus

D66’s main focus is public health. The party’s goal is to invest in prevention to avoid people getting sick (D66, 2017). This is in line with statements made by the D66 in the Second Chamber demanding “a more prominent place in our society” for prevention as well as the D66’s call (together with the CDA) for a prevention plan<sup>29</sup>. Information campaigns are also a point of focus for the D66 because the party believes these campaigns are necessary to stimulate people to stop smoking and to inform people about the consequences of smoking<sup>30</sup>.

### Content

D66 is in favour of forbidding certain products which make smoking more attractive, such as flavours in cigarettes<sup>31</sup>. The D66 also has the goal to have a smoke-free generation which will not experience the “great burden on our health” of smoking (D66, 2017). The D66 is in favour of working together with private partners to prevent smoking. This is made clear in the following statement: “D66 is a proponent of public-private partnerships, whereby the government and private sector work together to achieve a healthier the Netherlands.”<sup>32</sup>

## 50Plus

### Standpoint

50Plus is in favour of stimulating a healthy lifestyle (50Plus, 2017).

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<sup>27</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>28</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>29</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>30</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>31</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>32</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

Focus

N.A.

Content

N.A.

### *GroenLinks (GL)*

Standpoint

GL is in favour of taking measures to prevent smoking. The party's election manifesto states as a goal to invest more in prevention. Furthermore, the party is a proponent of the goal to have a smoke-free generation grow up. This is made clear by this description of the ideal situation to ensure smoke-prevention: "The government, together with social parties, is committed to ensuring that a smoke-free generation grows up." (GroenLinks, 2017).

Focus

The goal to have a smoke-free generation grow up implies a focus on youth for the party (GroenLinks, 2017) .

Content

GL is pleased with the cabinet's plans to have a combined approach to prevention which focuses on work, school and neighbourhood. This, together with the party's ideal situation, shows that GL is in favour of having several different actors involved in prevention<sup>33</sup>.

### *Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals, PvdD)*

Standpoint

The PvdD is in favour of prevention because it reduces the costs for healthcare in general and the PvdD sees prevention as the basis for good healthcare<sup>34</sup> (PvdD, 2017).

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<sup>33</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>34</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

Focus

N.A.

Content

The PvdD believes that the government should stimulate having a healthy lifestyle and should make efforts to ensure a healthy living environment (PvdD, 2017). The PvdD is in favour of concrete measures<sup>35</sup>.

*PVV*

Standpoint

The PVV is against smoking and does not want to see young people start smoking<sup>36</sup>. However, the PVV is not in favour of expanding the tobacco control policies. This is made clear by the statement "...my faction is not in favour of extending the tobacco control policy, because the information is in order."<sup>37</sup>

Focus

The PVV focuses on youth. The PVV questions the effectivity of the past and current prevention approach, as well as the approach to e-cigarettes. The PVV sees e-cigarettes as an alternative to stop smoking for addicted smokers<sup>38</sup>.

Content

The PVV doesn't think it is necessary to have more than information provision in the smoke prevention approach because the party believes the limits of what a parliamentary democracy can do about prevention are reached when the government provides information about how bad smoking is<sup>39</sup>. The PVV makes efforts to get the cabinet and other parties to choose for an approach that doesn't restrict e-cigarettes<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>36</sup> (AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)

<sup>37</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>38</sup> (AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)

<sup>39</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>40</sup> (AO Alcoholbeleid Tabaksbeleid (d.d. 15/02), 2017)

## *SGP*

### Standpoint

The SGP's opinion regarding prevention is that having a healthy life is first and foremost a responsibility for everyone individually. However, the party does believe that the government can play a role in this by discouraging unhealthy choices and stimulating healthy choices (SGP, 2017).

### Focus

The SGP has a focus on youth when it comes to smoke prevention but also takes the parent's position into account. This is made clear by the SGP's goal to educate more about the health risks of smoking by providing parents with a folder about the health risks related to smoking when a child turns twelve (SGP, 2017).

### Content

Furthermore, the SGP states that municipalities and insurance companies should work together with other stakeholders to invest in the health of everyone. This shows that the SGP is in favour of cooperation with private, and possibly social, partners to ensure effective prevention (SGP, 2017).

## *SP*

### Standpoint

The SP is against smoking and is looking for any possible way to reduce and prevent smoking. The SP is a proponent of having a strong government policy to discourage smoking. The SP believes that the government can influence people's behaviour. However, the SP does believe that everyone has the right to make their own choice<sup>41</sup>.

### Focus

The SP has a focus on youth. This is made clear by the call to protect youth from the "aggressive marketing" of the tobacco industry<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup>(AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>42</sup>(AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)



### *Content*

The SP believes the tobacco industry should not be involved in the process of reducing smoking because this might allow the industry to influence the decisions made. This is not desirable in the eyes of the SP because the tobacco industry is an “industry where a product is made that is evidently harmful for the public health.”<sup>43</sup> The SP is also in favour of investing more on primary prevention i.e. preventing people from starting smoking. The SP would be in favour of setting up a prevention fund for this goal<sup>44</sup>. The SP is also in favour of implementing smoke-free schools<sup>45</sup>.

#### 4.2.3. Party Standpoints 2017 – present

### *Coalition*

#### *VVD*

#### *Standpoint*

The VVD’s standpoint regarding smoke prevention is similar after the elections regarding own responsibility. The VVD still has prefers measures that entice people to make certain choices. For adults, the VVD argues that, regarding smoking, everyone has their own responsibility and should therefore be left with the freedom to make their own choices<sup>46</sup>.

#### *Focus*

The VVD focuses on youth because young people are not always in the situation where they can make their own choices, according to the VVD. The VVD is concerned for the effects of forbidding smoking areas. The party worries that by forbidding these spaces, more people than only those in the smoking areas will experience nuisance from smokers<sup>47</sup>.

### *Content*

Where measures other or more than enticing are implemented, the VVD argues that they should be directed at youth<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>44</sup> (Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01), 2014)

<sup>45</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>46</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>47</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>48</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

## *CDA*

### Standpoint

The CDA standpoint does not seem to have changed. The party is now part of the coalition and expresses its pride in the goals that have been set in the coalition agreement regarding smoking prevention. This shows that the party is in favour of the government taking action to prevent smoking. The CDA is a proponent of achieving the smoke-free generation<sup>49</sup>.

### Focus

The focus on pregnant women smoking is less pronounced compared to before the elections. The focus is now more on achieving a smoke-free generation. The CDA still has a focus on youth. After the elections, the focus of preventing young people from smoking is linked to the goal of achieving a smoke-free generation. This is visible in the following statement: “For a smoke-free generation, which we stand for, the effort of parents is necessary”<sup>50</sup>. This statement shows that the party wants to limit harmful effects and having a bad example for children, in order to achieve a smoke-free society.

### Content

N.A.

## *ChristenUnie*

### Standpoint

The CU has not changed its position. The party is still in favour of “seriously looking at everything that can help people get rid of their smoking addiction”. The CU is very pleased with the ambition to make schools smoke-free, in line with a motion submitted before the elections<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>50</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>51</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

## Focus

The CU is very positive about the goal to achieve a smoke-free generation and seems to eagerly include this goal into their focus<sup>52</sup>. About the Junior Minister, the party representative states “He really has convinced me how important it is that a smoke-free generation grows up.”<sup>53</sup> This new focus on the goal of reaching a smoke-free generation relates to the focus on smoke prevention among youth that the CU already had before the elections

## Content

The CU also seems positive about the role that private and social partners have in the development of the NPA. This is clear in the statement “The sector must be involved. I refute that this should only be commercial parties.” This shows that the party sees the necessity of commercial and non-commercial actors participating in the development of the NPA. Similarly to before the elections, the CU emphasises the importance of avoiding non-binding agreements and voluntary action from the sector<sup>54</sup>.

## D66

### Standpoint

The D66 is in favour of the NPA being introduced and has high expectations of the agreement. The party believes prevention is better than treatment<sup>55</sup>.

## Focus

The D66 is focused on ensuring that the message about healthy lifestyle also reaches hard to reach groups, such as people with a lower socio-economic status<sup>56</sup>.

## Content

The D66 is happy with the installation of a discussion group for smoking. This implies the party is open to cooperation with private and/or social actors. The party believes that not enough effort

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<sup>52</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>53</sup> (Begroting Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2018 (d.d. 12/12), 2017)

<sup>54</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>55</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>56</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

is put into tackling the causes of lifestyle related diseases. The D66 was co-submitter of a motion to ask the discussion group concerned with smoking to work on how information provision for parents and children can best be given form and thereby be included in the NPA. This motion was accepted<sup>57</sup>.

### *Opposition*

#### *PvdA*

##### Standpoint

The PvdA is still in favour of taking preventive measures against smoking. The PvdA is happy with the Junior Minister's efforts to develop a prevention agreement to tackle smoking and supports him in his efforts. Specifically, the PvdA is in favour of the plans to restrict the e-cigarette<sup>58</sup>.

##### Focus

For the PvdA, the priority of prevention policies should be on reaching certain groups: "...it should be about reaching those who need it the most."<sup>59</sup> The party does not specify which groups these are specifically. However, this statement implies that the party has a certain focus, possibly on people with a low socio-economic status.

##### Content

The PvdA is happy with the cabinet's decision to maintain a certain distance to the industry while developing the plans. However, the PvdA is also worried about the ability to develop plans that can be implemented without having some contact with the industry<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> (VAO Preventiebeleid / Alcohol- en tabaksbeleid / Infectiepreventie / Verslavingszorg/drugsbeleid (AO d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>58</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>59</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>60</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

## *50Plus*

### Standpoint

The party is still in favour of stimulating a healthy lifestyle and sees the lifestyle as the key in the discussion of prevention<sup>61</sup>.

### Focus

N.A.

### Content

50Plus' opinion is that non-binding promises should no longer be present in prevention<sup>62</sup>.

## *GroenLinks (GL)*

### Standpoint

GL is still against smoking. This is made clear by the statement “The cigarette is a silent killer.” GL believes that in the past effective measures have not been implemented often enough<sup>63</sup>.

### Focus

GL has a focus on youth in terms of smoke prevention. This is made clear by the opinion that it is important to ensure that children never start smoking and that a smoke-free generation grows up. GL also wants to prevent cigarettes from becoming “as normal as a pack of bubble-gum” for children<sup>64</sup>.

### Content

GL is also in favour of measures being taken to discourage smoking, such as an increase of excise duties on cigarettes. GL is a strong proponent of having concrete measures being implemented. In terms of cooperation with private partners, GL's position is twofold. On the one hand, the party is happy that the cabinet has plans to involve the private sector and social

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<sup>61</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>62</sup> (Schriftelijke antwoorden op vragen gesteld tijdens de eerste termijn van de begrotingsbehandeling van VWS op 12 december 2017, 2017)

<sup>63</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>64</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

partners. However, GL warns not to trust the industry to solve the problems. GL believes that to reach the goals, active control is required of the government. GL is a proponent of an information campaign being implemented to inform the public about the dangers of smoking. According to GL, this is necessary because knowledge about these risks is lower in the Netherlands than in other countries<sup>65</sup>.

### *Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals, PvdD)*

#### Standpoint

PvdD sees smoking as an addiction and the party is in favour of implementing measures to reach notable results regarding smoking<sup>66;67</sup>.

#### Focus

N.A.

#### Content

The PvdD wants the cabinet to choose for measures which have proven to be effective, such as reducing the number of locations where tobacco can be sold<sup>68</sup>. Furthermore, the PvdD is a proponent of better informing the public about the ingredients in cigarettes to confront addicted smokers with the contents of cigarettes. The PvdD is also in favour of the confronting images on the cigarette packaging<sup>69</sup>.

### *PVV*

#### Standpoint

The PVV has not changed its standpoint. The party is still against taking new measures to discourage smoking. According to the PVV, the debate about smoke prevention is always about “restricting the freedoms of others”<sup>70</sup>. This shows that the PVV is not in favour of expanding the

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<sup>65</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>66</sup> (Begroting Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2018 (d.d. 12/12), 2017)

<sup>67</sup> (VAO Preventiebeleid / Alcohol- en tabaksbeleid / Infectiepreventie / Verslavingszorg/drugsbeleid (AO d.d. 17/05). 2018)

<sup>68</sup> (Begroting Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2018 (d.d. 12/12), 2017)

<sup>69</sup> (VAO Preventiebeleid / Alcohol- en tabaksbeleid / Infectiepreventie / Verslavingszorg/drugsbeleid (AO d.d. 17/05). 2018)

<sup>70</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

tobacco control policies because these policies take away people's freedom to make their own choices.

#### Focus

The PVV's focus on the e-cigarette as an alternative to "real" cigarettes is still present after the elections and the party still tries to change the cabinet's view on e-cigarettes. A new focus that arises after the elections is on the role of bongs in the smoking ban. According to the PVV, the law is hypocrite because it does not forbid people to smoke bongs in shisha-lounges, despite bongs being a nuisance to others. For the PVV, this puts bongs in the same category as cigarettes and should therefore also be forbidden in the same way as smoking areas and smoking in cafés was forbidden<sup>71</sup>.

#### Content

The PVV is critical of the role of social and private partners in the development of the NPA. In reaction to the Junior Minister, who plans to refer the matter of bongs to the discussion group for smoking, the PVV made the following statement: "he should just send an amendment of the law to the Chamber"<sup>72</sup>. This implies that the PVV is not in favour of actors outside the parliament having too much influence on the goals set.

#### *SGP*

##### Standpoint

The SGP is happy with the initiative taken by the Junior Minister to develop a National Prevention Agreement. The SGP is in agreement with the cabinet's ambitions to put a lot of effort into prevention<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>71</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>72</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>73</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

## Focus

The party is in favour of a motion which requests that the government ask the discussion group responsible for smoking to investigate how information provision for parents and children can best take form and become part of the NPA<sup>74</sup>.

## Content

The SGP has its concerns regarding the status of the NPA. The party is not in favour of the outcome of the discussion groups, which will be included in the NPA, dictating the actions of the political arena, especially if the political arena specifically wants a certain outcome that is contradictory to the wishes of the discussion group<sup>75</sup>.

## *SP*

### Standpoint

The SP is still in favour of smoke prevention. The party is happy with the opening to tackle smoking<sup>76</sup>.

## Focus

The SP focuses on health differences and sees smoking as the biggest cause of these differences between rich and poor<sup>77</sup>.

## Content

The party is still a proponent of implementing a prevention fund. According to the SP, this fund should be paid for by the tobacco industry<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>74</sup> (Stemmingen moties Preventiebeleid / Alcohol- en tabaksbeleid / Infectiepreventie / Verslavingszorg/drugsbeleid, 2018)

<sup>75</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>76</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>77</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>78</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)



#### 4.2.4. Mandate fulfilment political parties

##### *VVD*

The VVD's standpoint regarding the preferred type of measures and the role of the government in preventing smoking is the same before and after the elections. Both before and after the elections the party focuses on youth, especially in the case of extra measures other than enticing people to make healthy choices. The VVD places a large emphasis on the own responsibility of individuals. This is the case before and after the elections. The VVD's opinion regarding the cooperation with social partners is not as clear after the elections as before. However, the party is in favour of the goal in the coalition agreement to set up a prevention agreement with several partners from the private sector. Therefore, it can be assumed that the VVD is still a proponent of this cooperation after the elections. The demand for effective measures is less present after the elections. All in all, the VVD falls under the category of high mandate fulfilment.

##### *PvdA*

The PvdA has a medium level of mandate fulfilment. Before the elections, the party has a focus on youth but after the elections it is unclear which groups the party focuses on. However, the PvdA is in favour of having a prevention agreement, which is in line with the standpoint before the elections that prevention and intervention are necessary.

##### *D66*

The D66's standpoint that the government should take steps to achieve smoke prevention is the same before and after the elections. The party's goal to invest in prevention and its opinion that information provision is important are unchanged. The party gains a new focus after the elections, namely people with a lower socio-economic status. The party is a proponent of cooperation with social and private partners before and after the elections. All in all, the D66 falls under the category of high mandate fulfilment.

##### *ChristenUnie*

The CU's standpoint has not changed after the elections. The party's focus has not shifted because they still focus on smoke prevention among youth. However, a new aspect has been added to this focus, namely the goal of a smoke-free generation. In terms of content, a change is

noticeable in the party's opinion about cooperation with the sector. Taking this into account, the CU can be categorised as having high mandate fulfilment.

#### *CDA*

The party's general standpoint has not changed after the election. However, the focus of the party seems to have weakened slightly in the case of smoking during pregnancy. The focus on youth is still present after the elections, although it is now also linked to the goal of achieving a smoke-free society. This puts the party in the high category of mandate fulfilment.

#### *50Plus*

50Plus has a high level of mandate fulfilment. This is because the party has the same standpoint before and after the elections.

#### *GroenLinks*

GL can be categorised as having very high mandate fulfilment. GL's standpoint does not change after the elections. Before the elections, the party has a clear focus on smoke prevention among youth, including the goal for a smoke-free generation to grow up. This goal is unchanged after the elections. In terms of the cooperation with private and social partners, it seems that GL's opinion has not necessarily changed, but has become more nuanced. After the elections, GL is more critical of the industry taking action.

#### *PvdD*

Before and after the elections, the PvdD is in favour of preventive measures being taken to tackle smoking. The party sees an important role for the cabinet in the attempts to reach this goal. The PvdD's party mandate fulfilment level is high.

#### *PVV*

The PVV's standpoint regarding the role of the government before and after the elections is the same. Before and after the elections, the PVV questions the cabinet's approach and makes efforts to convince the cabinet to change course in terms of the e-cigarette. An important difference between before and after the elections is that after the elections, the focus comes to lie heavily on

the role of bongos and shisha-lounges in the smoking ban for the hotel and catering industry. Taking all of this into account, the PVV falls under the category of medium mandate fulfilment.

### *SGP*

The SGP's standpoint regarding government action in the approach to smoke prevention is unchanged after the election. However, after the elections, the nuance of the SGP regarding the responsibility of the individual is no longer present. Furthermore, the SGP seems to still be in favour of the role of civil society in developing the goals. However, after the elections, the party seems more concerned about the responsibility civil society will have and what the consequences will be for the influence of the political arena. This nuance is not present before the elections. Therefore, the SGP falls under the category of high mandate fulfilment.

### *SP*

The SP has a high level of mandate fulfilment. The party is very critical towards the tobacco industry before and after the elections. The SP is also in favour of implementing a prevention fund. After the elections, the party adds the nuance that this fund should be paid for by the industry.

#### 4.2.5. Summary standpoint parties – Analysis

Considering the data described above, there are a few things that are striking. All parties are proponents of preventing smoking. However, many parties differ in the way they prefer to approach this prevention. These differences mostly refer to how much the government can interfere in trying to stimulate citizens to choose not to smoke or to stop smoking. Some parties prefer a more limited government role, whereas other parties see it as the government's duty to play a very active role in prevention. Despite these differences, all parties believe that it should remain a choice of the citizens whether or not they want to smoke.

In general, smoking is presented as a threat to public health and the discussion about prevention takes place in the context of healthcare. Occasionally, other arguments, such as financial arguments and arguments about personal freedom, are used in the discussion surrounding smoke prevention. Cooperation with social and/or private partners is also generally accepted by the

parties. However, some parties are more critical about this cooperation than others. Finally, a commonality for the political parties is a strong focus on youth in the discussion about smoke prevention. This is often linked to the different position of youth, compared to adults who are fully able to make their own choices.

*Reflecting on the Expectations*

Regarding the party mandate fulfilment, the following expectation was formulated:

*H1: The policy output after the election is affected by the degree of mandate fulfilment among the parties in parliament.*

Based on the results, there seems to be support for this expectation. The lowest degree of mandate fulfilment is medium, although most parties score a high degree of mandate fulfilment. This indicates that the parties generally have a similar position before and after the elections. Elements which are present before and after the elections can also be found in the NPA, the policy output. For example, cooperation with social and private actors as well as a clear focus on youth. This indicates a general correspondence between the wishes of the parties in the Second Chamber and the policy output. Furthermore, the coalition parties all have medium or high mandate fulfilment. This indicates that participating in the coalition does not drastically affect a party’s position in the Second Chamber.

An overview of the party standpoints can be found in the table below. ‘Pro’ in the table indicates that a party is in favour of something, whereas ‘con’ is used to indicate a party is against something.

Table 2: Overview party and cabinet standpoints

<b>Party</b>	<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>	<b>Mandate fulfilment</b>
<b>50Plus</b>	Stimulate healthy lifestyle	Stimulate healthy lifestyle No more loose promises	High

<p><b>CDA</b></p>	<p>Smoking is not normal</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on pregnant women</p> <p>Discourage smoking, don't force people</p> <p>Government action should be to set up framework conditions for health</p>	<p><b>Pro</b> government action to prevent smoking</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on smoke-free generation</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p>	<p>High</p>
<p><b>CU</b></p>	<p>Smoking is bad for the public health</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p><b>Pro</b> smoke-free schools</p> <p>Eager to accept any possible measure to stop smoking</p> <p>Individual responsibility, but the choice affects society</p> <p>Concrete measures are needed</p>	<p>Priority is smoke-free generation</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p><b>Pro</b> smoke-free schools</p> <p>Open to any possible measure to stop smoking</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation with private/social partners</p> <p>No loose agreements</p>	<p>High</p>

<p><b>D66</b></p>	<p><b>Pro</b> clear tobacco policy</p> <p>Information campaigns are important</p> <p>Limit elements which make tobacco products attractive</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on health and economic damage of smoking</p> <p>Invest in prevention</p> <p><b>Pro</b> smoke-free generation</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation with private partners</p>	<p><b>Pro</b> NPA</p> <p>Information provision is important</p> <p>Prevention is better than treatment</p> <p>Put more effort into tackling lifestyle related diseases</p>	<p>High</p>
<p><b>GroenLinks</b></p>	<p>Invest more in prevention</p> <p><b>Pro</b> smoke-free generation</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p><b>Pro</b> involvement of different actors</p>	<p><b>Pro</b> smoke-free generation</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p>Concrete measures necessary</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation with private partners, but weary of industry</p> <p>Active government control required</p>	<p>Very high</p>

<b>PvdA</b>	<p>Tobacco is not a normal product</p> <p>Limit access to tobacco products</p> <p>Youth is the highest priority</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation with various actors</p>	<p>Supports efforts to tackle smoking (NPA)</p> <p><u>Focus</u> prevention on those who need it</p>	Medium
<b>PvdD</b>	<p>Prevention reduces costs for healthcare</p> <p>Prevention is basis for good healthcare</p> <p>Government should stimulate healthy lifestyle</p>	<p>Smoking is an addiction</p> <p><b>Pro</b> using measures which have been proven effective</p> <p><b>Pro</b> better information provision about content tobacco products</p>	High
<b>PVV</b>	<p><b>Con</b> expanding tobacco control policies</p> <p>Sees e-cigarette as a way to stop smoking</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p>Government role should be limited to information provision</p> <p>Questions effectiveness of past policies</p>	<p><b>Con</b> expanding tobacco control policies</p> <p>Sees e-cigarette as a way to stop smoking</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on exclusion of bongs from tobacco law (hypocrite)</p> <p>Critical of role of private/social actors in drafting policy</p>	Medium

<b>SGP</b>	<p>Healthy life is an individual responsibility but government can play stimulating role</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation among actors</p>	<p>Information provision is important</p> <p><b>Pro</b> extensive efforts for prevention</p> <p>Weary of too much responsibility for discussion groups</p>	High
<b>SP</b>	<p>Set up prevention fund to finance more prevention efforts</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p>Open to any possible way to tackle smoking</p> <p>Do not involve industry</p> <p><b>Pro</b> strong government policy, but individual choice in the end</p>	<p><b>Pro</b> setting up prevention fund</p> <p>Smoking is the biggest cause of health differences between rich and poor</p> <p>Happy with steps to tackle smoking</p>	High
<b>VVD</b>	<p>Only use measures which are proven effective</p> <p>Own choice, own responsibility, youth are exception</p> <p>Limited role government</p> <p><b>Pro</b> cooperation with social partners</p>	<p>Prefer persuasion rather than coercion</p> <p><u>Focus</u> on youth</p> <p>People have the freedom to make their own choices</p>	High



### 4.3. Attention shift – Results

The cabinet position will be presented for before and after the election. Following this, additional factors which relate to the attention shift are presented. The section ends with an analysis of the results.

#### 4.3.1. Standpoint and priorities cabinet - Before

##### *Standpoint*

The cabinet was very clear about its standpoint regarding smoking: “Smoking is unhealthy. Tobacco is a harmful product which works addictively.”<sup>79</sup> The goal for the cabinet is to achieve a reduction of people who smoke<sup>80</sup>.

##### *Focus*

The cabinet has a focus on preventing smoking among youth. This is made very clear in the following statement: “The big goal of the tobacco control policies is to try to stimulate youth to stop smoking and, in any case, to prevent them from starting smoking”<sup>81</sup>. Other statements also show that the cabinet’s main focus in the context of prevention policy is on youth. Another important factor that the cabinet takes into account is the issue of the enforcement that is necessary for new or other measures to be implemented to prevent smoking<sup>82</sup>.

##### *Content*

In order to achieve a reduction of people who smoke, the cabinet seems prepared to regulate certain products, such as the flavoured cigarettes. However, the cabinet places a high value on the necessity for a scientific basis and scientific supporting evidence before measures can be taken, as can be seen from the following statement regarding the regulation of flavoured cigarettes: “I am in favour of this part of the directive being regulated, but let us do so on a scientific basis.”<sup>83</sup> This statement shows that having a scientific basis is an important condition for the cabinet to take action. The cabinet is in favour of including concrete measures as well as basing the goals

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<sup>79</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>80</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>81</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

<sup>82</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 30/05), 2013)

<sup>83</sup> (AO EU-Voorstel: Richtlijn Tabaksproducten COM (2012) 788 (AO 28/02), 2013)

that are set on an analysis of the current situation. The cabinet explains this as follows “...we asked the RIVM..., to create a sort of baseline. ... On the basis of that, I can indicate what we want to reach in this area.” The cabinet is also in favour of working with other partners in the sector, which is made clear by the statement “By setting up a joint working group and task force with healthcare professionals, municipalities and insurance companies”, which was made as a solution for the problem of pregnant women who smoke<sup>84</sup>.

#### 4.3.2. Standpoint and priorities cabinet – After

##### *Standpoint*

The cabinet’s standpoint is still that smoking is unhealthy. The cabinet sees tobacco as an extremely harmful product<sup>85</sup>. The cabinet also believes that the position of youth and adults is different when it comes to smoking, in terms of the level of responsibility for making their own choices. In relation to this, the cabinet worries about the bad example adults give who smoke in the presence of children. While the cabinet does think that adults have their own responsibility to make their own choices, the cabinet also admits that the choice to smoke also affects others, for example through the effects of passive smoking. On this matter the cabinet made the following statement: “We can say that it’s their own choice for adults but they cause harm to others.”<sup>86</sup> This shows that the cabinet is not only paying attention to the health and wellbeing of smokers but is also focusing on the health of other members of society who come into contact with smokers.

##### *Focus*

New foci are present after the elections. Firstly, a smoke-free generation has now become a goal, as stated in the coalition agreement. Taking steps in order to achieve a smoke-free generation is “a priority for this cabinet”<sup>87</sup>. Related to the goal of reaching a smoke-free generation, the cabinet largely focuses on prevention of smoking among youth. This is made clear by the statement “...the focus should be on youth”<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> (Conceptverslag van een notaoverleg over: Preventiebeleid (AO 27/01), 2014)

<sup>85</sup> (Begroting Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2018 (d.d. 14/12), 2017)

<sup>86</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>87</sup> (Begroting Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2018 (d.d. 14/12), 2017)

<sup>88</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

### *Content*

Because of the cabinet's opinion that it is the responsibility of the individual to make their own choices, the cabinet is not in favour of forbidding smoking. This is made very clear in the statement "We're not going to ban everything on the basis of people's own responsibility. We certainly do not want to do that. We are not going to ban everything, but we are going to ban some things."<sup>89</sup> The idea behind this standpoint is that it is more desirable to take measures that attract people to make healthier choices than to forbid unhealthy things. Despite this viewpoint, the cabinet is also willing to take advanced steps whereby the government is in charge. In taking these measures to attract society to make healthier choices, the role of societal partners is also very important. In this regard, the cabinet said: "...I am very much in favour of agreements that we can make in which social partners say that they take responsibility and take steps to entice people to make the right choices."<sup>90</sup> This shows that the cabinet would like to involve societal partners to achieve the goals.

#### 4.3.3. Inclusion in election manifesto

According to Respondent 2, including goals regarding smoking tobacco control policies makes it easier to include these goals in the coalition agreement when it is being negotiated (personal communication, June 12, 2019). The data supports this statement. Smoke prevention is not mentioned in the coalition agreement of the Cabinet Rutte II. However, the Second Chamber documents reveal statements that show that smoking is one of the priorities for the cabinet. In the parties' manifestos, the VVD states that "paternalistic government supervision of people's private lives is inappropriate and undesirable", but that the government does have the task to inform citizens (VVD, 2012, pg. 31). The PvdA does see more possibilities for government action, calling for effective prevention measures to be included in the core insurance package. The party sees effective tobacco control policies as a good way to make the country healthier and to limit the burden of disease (PvdA, 2012). However, concrete goals lack. The Cabinet Rutte III does include goals regarding smoke prevention in its coalition agreement. Similar goals can also be found in the election manifestos of the CU, CDA and D66. For example, these parties all state

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<sup>89</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

<sup>90</sup> (AO Preventief gezondheidsbeleid (d.d. 17/05), 2018)

achieving a smoke-free generation as a goal. This would suggest that a specific focus of certain parties in the coalition, can stimulate an attention shift of the cabinet as a whole.

Regarding smoking, sources state that for a long time already it was common knowledge that smoking is bad for the health. Therefore, the government did pay attention to this dossier (Respondent 3, personal communication, June 12, 2019).

#### 4.3.4. Effect of public opinion

Apart from the standpoint of the cabinet as a whole, the composition of the cabinet as well as the public opinion were identified as factors that also affect the priorities of the cabinet as a whole. The public opinion is changing regarding smoking. This is stated by three of the four respondents. Respondents 1 and 2 referred to the social discussion surrounding smoking and tobacco. According to these respondents, the trend in society is shifting towards the opinion that smoking should actually not be done and that people are more willing to hold each other accountable for their behaviour regarding smoking (Respondent 1, personal communication, May 31, 2019; Respondent 2, personal communication, June 11, 2019). Respondent 3 stated the following about the public opinion regarding smoking: "...what you see in society: that the support or the acceptance of smoking is becoming less and less". According to Respondent 3, this decrease of acceptance of smoking provides room to take more extensive steps than before in terms of smoke prevention (personal communication, June 12, 2019). Respondent 2 has the same opinion: "So in previous cabinets you won't see the steps we take in this cabinet, because there was less support from society I think, for these steps." (personal communication, June 12, 2019). Within Cabinet Rutte III, there is also more support for taking more extensive steps as part of the tobacco control policies than in previous cabinets. This results in the most important difference between Cabinet Rutte III and Cabinet Rutte II as identified by Respondent 3: "the preparedness to take different measures" (Respondent 3, personal communication, June 12, 2019).

Regarding the effect of the composition of the cabinet, the data is somewhat inconclusive about its effect on an attention shift. Part of the data suggests a division of the CU and CDA as advocates of more paternalism in the healthcare sector. These parties therefore ensured that prevention policy was included in the coalition agreement for Rutte III (Herderscheê, 2018).

Respondent 4, pointed to the VVD and D66 on the other side of the division as the liberal parties who are not in favour of more extensive measures (personal communication, June 19, 2019). However, other sources suggest a division of the VVD and CDA who are “not in favour of a firm approach to smoke prevention”, whereas the CU and D66 are (Respondent 1, personal communication, May 31, 2019). The data seems to suggest that, in any case, the CU is a proponent of more extensive measures and the VVD is not.

#### 4.3.5. Attention shift and electoral strength – Analysis

Taking into account the data summarised above, a few observations can be made. Firstly, the documents from the Second Chamber do not suggest a very drastic shift of attention by the cabinet. Based on these documents, the cabinet seems to have changed focus although the standpoint is the same before and after the elections. Both cabinets express in these documents that prevention is a high priority issue for them. However, the media documents and interview data paint a different picture. According to these documents, the cabinet’s approach to smoke prevention is very different from the previous cabinet. This is related to the ideological background of the coalition partners. Furthermore, the public opinion seems to have affected the cabinet’s approach to smoke prevention. Based on the results, it seems plausible that the Cabinet Rutte III was able to benefit from the change of public opinion over the years.

Despite inconclusive data regarding the effect of the presence of specific parties in the cabinet, it is certain that the cabinet as a whole, made agreements about what to put in the coalition agreement. The development of a prevention agreement and the goal of achieving the smoke-free society are part of these goals. These agreements formed the starting point for the NPA (Respondent 3, personal communication June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2019). Making these agreements was made easier by the change in public opinion, the support for a firmer approach of tobacco within the cabinet and the steps taken by the previous cabinet. Parties which were previously taken to be hesitant regarding tobacco control policies, such as the VVD, also now seem more prepared to take steps in this regard (Herderscheê, 2018). However, the NPA and the goals outlined in it, did not seem to appear out of the blue with the formation of a new cabinet. According to Respondent 4, the NPA is simply an extension of the policy from the previous years, with a few exceptions, such as the prohibition of smoking on school grounds (personal communication, June 19, 2019).

### *Reflecting on expectations*

Based on the theory summarised regarding an attention shift, the following expectation was formulated:

*H2: When a new cabinet takes office, an attention shift will take place which will affect the policy output proportionally to the electoral strength of the parties participating in the new cabinet.*

The results presented support this expectation. In terms of the explicit priorities set by the cabinet at the start of its tenure, a clear shift can be seen which focuses on the importance of prevention and the necessity of a prevention agreement. This addition is possibly related to the presence of the new coalition partners, CDA, D66 and CU. Taking into account that the CDA, D66 and CU have 43 seats together, compared to the 33 seats of the VVD, it seems plausible that their combined electoral strength gave them the advantage to be able to place a high priority on prevention in the coalition agreement. This led to the policy output in the form of the NPA. Furthermore, the results seem to be in line with the theory which suggests that a new cabinet is required to set new priorities and that these changes are most visible at the beginning of the new cabinet's tenure.

#### 4.4. Ministerial Allocation – Results

The data for ministerial allocation will be presented for before and after the elections.

##### 4.4.1. Before

According to the data, the predominance of the VVD did not result in much action in favour of prevention policy. The motto of Minister Schippers from the VVD party, who was minister of PHWS from 2010 to 2017, was that lifestyle is a choice (Herderscheê, 2018). In response to calls from health organisations for the government to effectively tackle smoking, among other issues, Minister Schippers' response was "No, no patronising" (Trouw, 2018, par. 1). Based on her liberal views, Minister Schippers believed that smoking is not an addiction but an individual choice which the government should not interfere with (Respondent 1, May 31, 2019; Kieskamp, 2018). During the formation of Cabinet Rutte II, Minister Schippers passed on the responsibility for the tobacco dossier to her Junior Minister, Martin van Rijn from the PvdA.

What Junior Minister van Rijn's position was is less explicit. On the one hand, the data suggests that he was not left with much room for manoeuvring under the control of the VVD (TabakNee, 2017). However, the data also suggests that Junior Minister Van Rijn did take steps regarding smoke prevention. Cabinet Rutte II was regarded as a more paternalistic cabinet in regards to smoke prevention compared to the previous cabinet. This different attitude was explained by the presence of the PvdA in the cabinet and Junior Minister van Rijn's "agreed" role of tightening the tobacco control policies (Besselink, 2014). Furthermore, sources suggest that his opinion regarding smoking is that preventing youth from starting to smoke will lead to the most benefit in terms of public health (Pauwels, 2016). This line of thought is in line with the ban passed of tobacco vending machines, which the junior minister saw as too easily accessible for youth (Hotse Smit, 2017). Junior Minister van Rijn also made the proposal to forbid decorations on the packaging of tobacco products in an attempt to make smoking less attractive for youth (Pauwels, 2016). Finally, he started the National Prevention Programme. However, this programme was seen as too permissive (Herderscheê, 2018).

#### 4.4.2. After

Mixed results can be found for the effects of ministerial allocation after the elections. On the one hand, there seems to be evidence of this effect. Two respondents, both from opposition parties, indicated that giving Junior Minister Blokhuis the responsibility for the tobacco policies made a difference in the approach adopted by the cabinet. According to Respondent 4, this difference arises from the fact that Junior Minister Blokhuis is from the CU, which, as a party, is in favour of taking extensive measures to tackle smoking (personal communication, June 19th, 2019). Respondent 1 mentions the fact that Junior Minister Blokhuis is in charge of the NPA as one of the most important differences in the approach of tobacco control policies between Cabinet Rutte III and Cabinet Rutte II. The difference is noticeable because the CU is a party which attaches a high priority to prevention (personal communication, May 31, 2019). This is also supported by data from the articles. One article refers to the effect of Junior Minister Blokhuis' personal convictions on how he tackles smoking: "he has declared war on smoking" (Trouw, 2018, par. 5). Junior Minister Blokhuis takes the standpoint that choosing for a healthy lifestyle isn't always a personal choice made by citizens but that social factors and influence from the industry play a

role as well (Trouw, 2018). Under his leadership on the prevention dossier, the government is seen as returning to a ‘censorship’ role for the lifestyle of citizens. Junior Minister Blokhuis is seen as the person responsible for making prevention of health problems a top priority on the political agenda (Herderscheê, 2018). In the NPA, measures are taken which go further than what the government has previously done (Respondent 3, personal communication, June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2019). Measures outlined in the NPA include an increase of the excise duty on tobacco products, although not as much as the CU would have hoped, as well as removing measures to help smokers stop smoking from the deductible of health insurance (Rijksoverheid, n.d.).

On the other hand, however, the data shows that Junior Minister Blokhuis was kept in check by other coalition partners. He stated himself that it is “good to admit that there is also a political reality” in relation to the content of the final document that he presented (Steenbergen & Kamsma, 2018, par. 5). This political reality refers to the fact that not all coalition partners were equally excited by Junior Minister Blokhuis’ plans. A first draft of the agreement was rejected by the VVD-faction (Kieskamp, 2018). The D66 and CU received the agreement positively, whereas the other members of the coalition, VVD and CDA, maintained that the government should not interfere too much in people’s personal lives (Trouw, 2018). In order to ensure a majority in the Second Chamber for the agreement, compromises had to be made on the content of the document (Kieskamp, 2018). Even before the NPA could be presented to the Second Chamber, it had to gain the approval of the coalition partners in the cabinet and of a few ministries. This was necessary to avoid the coalition parties having to distance themselves from the agreement once it was presented in the Second Chamber. For the CU, as a small party with five seats in the Second Chamber, this required making decisions about what their priorities were (Respondent 1, May 31, 2019).

#### 4.4.3. Analysis

In Cabinet Rutte II the effect of ministerial allocation is difficult to determine. This is related to the fact that the specific position of Junior Minister van Rijn is difficult to determine from the data collected. However, actions which were taken, such as the removal of decorations from the packaging of tobacco products and forbidding the tobacco vending machines, are in line with the PvdA’s goal of removing cigarettes from the sphere of normal products and limiting the access to



tobacco products. This would imply policy outputs which are in line with the wishes of the party. Furthermore, the data does not suggest that Junior Minister van Rijn was very entrepreneurial in his efforts to make tobacco control policies. This, combined with the correspondence of the output with his party's wishes, seem to indicate that Junior Minister van Rijn is a loyalist minister. Regarding autonomy, the data is also not very explicit. On the one hand, it is stated that Junior Minister van Rijn was given the freedom to take the reins in terms of tobacco policy, which would indicate a high level of autonomy. However, the data also seems to indicate a more prominent role for Minister Schippers regarding the tobacco control policies, which would indicate less autonomy for the junior minister. All in all, the effect of ministerial allocation in Junior Minister van Rijn's case is categorised as medium.

In the case of Junior Minister Blokhuis, the evidence is more solid. The data indicates that Junior Minister Blokhuis acted in line with his party's wishes by attempting to include as many different measures as possible in the NPA. The data also further indicates the importance of having Junior Minister Blokhuis in charge of prevention because that makes a big difference in how the cabinet approaches tobacco control policies. Furthermore, the CU was enthusiastic about the NPA and its content. However, the data also indicates that Junior Minister Blokhuis was not able to include all the measures he wanted to in the final version of the NPA. It is clear from the data that Junior Minister Blokhuis would have preferred to take more extensive measures in some areas. This leads to the conclusion that the output is in line with Junior Minister Blokhuis' party, although it could have been better still. Despite this, the correspondence with the party is regarded as high. In terms of autonomy, Junior Minister Blokhuis also falls into the category of medium. This is due to the fact that, despite his efforts leading to a new steps being taken, the other parties in the coalition did clearly block some of his proposals for the content of the NPA. This implies that, at the end of the day, Junior Minister Blokhuis did not have complete autonomy and had to take into account the wishes of the rest of the coalition parties. This leads to the conclusion that the effect of ministerial allocation is medium-high for Junior Minister Blokhuis. Finally, Junior Minister Blokhuis is categorised as a hybrid between an ideologue and a loyalist, although he is more characteristic of an ideologue. His actions are highly in line with what his party wants, which is characteristic of a loyalist. However, he also seems to have a fixed idea of what he would like to

see as a policy output, although this is not realised due to compromise in the cabinet, which is characteristic of an ideologue.

*Reflecting on expectations*

From the literature, the following expectation was formulated regarding ministerial allocation:

*H3: The allocation of a minister to a portfolio will result in a policy output which is in line with the minister's party's preferences.*

This expectation is partly supported by the results. The preference of the CU, Junior Minister Blokhuis' party, was indeed to take measures to achieve a smoke-free generation. These measures have been taken by developing the NPA. In this sense, the policy output is in line with its wishes. However, based on the description of the CU as a proponent of extensive measures and Junior Minister Blokhuis' personal will to go further than the goals stated in the NPA, it can be concluded that the compromises in the NPA mean the policy output, the NPA, is not as far-reaching as the party would have hoped.

## 5. Conclusion

This research aimed to investigate the role of political parties in the cabinet, Second Chamber and in ministerial allocation in determining the policy output which was the focus of the research: the NPA. To determine this role, the researcher tested three things, related to three sub-questions and three expectations. This was done in order to answer the main research question “How did political parties in the Dutch cabinet, parliament and ministerial positions affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement?”. Before answering this main question, an answer will be provided for the three sub-questions.

### 5.1. Sub-question 1

The first sub-question was “How did the positions of political parties in the Second Chamber affect the development of the National Prevention Agreement?”. To answer this question, the party mandate fulfilment was tested, according to the parliamentary model i.e. looking at all parties in the parliament, not only those who form the coalition. Based on the results of the mandate fulfilment tests, it seems that the parties had a lot of influence on the policy output because a lot of elements that are present in the NPA are in line with the general wishes of most parties in the Second Chamber. However, taking data from the tests of an attention shift and ministerial allocation into account, it becomes clear that not all political parties actually influenced the NPA. Therefore, it can be concluded that the wishes of the political parties provided a framework of a general direction of what is desirable according to the political arena. However, of all the actors in the political arena, the positions of the coalition partners seems to have exclusively affected the development of the NPA.

### 5.2. Sub-question 2

The second sub-question formulated was “To what extent can an attention shift and the role of political parties herein, be observed in the cabinet?”. The results show that an attention shift did take place. Based on the results it can be concluded that the presence of the CDA, D66 and CU in the Cabinet Rutte III led to the topic of smoke prevention and the goal of achieving a smoke-free generation being high priority issues. This was enhanced by a shift in public opinion, which also made it easier for the cabinet to focus on taking more extensive steps than previous cabinets.

However, the attention shift observed did not appear out of the blue. The data suggests that this attention shift is the continuation of a long process within the political arena and in the public. Therefore, it can be concluded that the attention shift is mostly observed in terms of measures outlined and concrete goals set, rather than that smoke prevention is only starting to receive attention from the government now.

### 5.3. Sub-question 3

The third and final sub-question for the research was “To what extent is political party influence noticeable in the allocation of ministerial portfolios?”. The actions of the (junior) ministers studied in this research highly reflect the standpoint of their parties. However, the party standpoint of the (junior) minister is not always reflected in the policy output. This is related to the fact that compromises must be made within the coalition to ensure that the entire coalition can accept the final output. Therefore, the party influence on ministerial allocation is less noticeable in the final output the junior minister presents.

### 5.4. Answering the research question

Taking this all into account, it can be concluded that party influence is noticeable in the NPA. Specifically, the cabinet parties were able to influence the content of the NPA during the development of the agreement. The attention shift caused by the formation of a new cabinet after the elections allowed the CDA, D66 and CU to set a starting point for the NPA which reflected their wishes. After that, the cabinet parties were able to provide intermediate input while the NPA was being developed, allowing them to influence the final output. Opposition parties were not explicitly given the opportunity to affect what is included in the NPA. Finally, political parties were not the only ones who affected the development of the NPA. Several civil society organisations were involved and were allowed to co-determine the final content of the agreement which was presented in 2018.

### 5.5. *Discussion*

Based on the data collected and the results this produced, conclusions were drawn in this research. However, there are weak and strong points which must be taken into account when reading the conclusions. Some of these points will be discussed below. Furthermore, reflecting on the current research and its strengths and weaknesses, this section also summarises recommendations for future research.

The current research was performed in the context of a ten week bachelor thesis. This short time-span did somewhat lead to constraints in the research. Because not very much time was available, it was necessary for the researcher to focus on a very specific topic. On the one hand, this allowed the researcher to develop a very detailed picture of how the NPA was developed. This is a strength of the research because it can provide basic insights into which factors mattered most for the development of this policy, in relation to political parties. However, this extensive detail also means that one must be careful with making generalisations based on this research. Furthermore, when translating elements of this research into new research, it is important to take into account possible differences in context. This is especially important because this research was performed within the specific context of the Netherlands and its political arena. This relates to the threat to external reliability mentioned in Chapter 3.3. Furthermore, another advantage of the detail provided in this research is that it provides transparency as to how the tobacco control policies in the Netherlands have developed and why. This is an important contribution to society's understanding of how a very topical subject like smoking is handled in the political arena. This is necessary for citizens to be able to hold their representatives accountable or to at least be aware of how and why voters' votes are (not) translated into practice.

Another issue that arises when taking into account the specific focus of this research, is that the conclusions drawn are based on a very narrow pool of data. For further research, a recommendation would be to study various policy areas and/or a longer time span. Studying more policy areas would be helpful in determining general patterns or, contrarily, important differences in how policy is influenced by political parties in different policy areas. The reason for studying a longer period of time is similar. By taking into account differences and similarities over time, conclusions can be drawn about possible contextual factors such as public opinion, which was identified in this study, and how they affect the behaviour of political parties. Looking at more policy areas and a longer time period would provide a more solid basis on which to draw conclusions. This is beneficial for the legitimacy and acceptance of the results as well as for keeping the scientific debate alive.

Looking at the results presented in this research, it becomes clear that the topic of smoke prevention is not the most divisive topic among political parties. Differences between parties are generally found in the preferred approach to achieve a reduction of smoking and the smoke-free generation. This means that the methods and operationalisations used in this research might not have been implemented in the most appropriate context. It would be intriguing to see what the results would be like if the same analysis was performed on a far more controversial and divisive policy area, such as climate policy or foreign relations. Looking at such policy areas might add to a better understanding of the mechanisms at play in the political process and the differences or similarities in how they are implemented in practice.

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# Appendix

## Appendix 1: Coding Scheme

<b>Party</b>	<b>Code</b>
<b>50 Plus</b>	50 PLUS after content: concrete goals
	50 PLUS after: standpoint
<b>Cabinet</b>	CABINET after content: concrete goals
	CABINET after content: cooperation with social/private partners
	CABINET after content: effective measures
	CABINET after content: EU rules
	CABINET after content: information campaign
	CABINET after content: persuasion rather than coercion
	CABINET after focus: SES group
	CABINET after focus: youth
	CABINET after nuance: adults vs. youth
	CABINET after nuance: integrated approach
	CABINET after nuance: responsibility of third parties
	CABINET after: standpoint
	CABINET before content: accountability
	CABINET before content: concrete goals
	CABINET before content: cooperation with social/private partners
	CABINET before content: formulate goals based on trends
	CABINET before content: persuasion rather than coercion
	CABINET before focus: pregnant women
	CABINET before focus: youth
	CABINET before nuance: adults vs. youth
CABINET before nuance: enforcement issue	
CABINET before nuance: scientific basis	
CABINET before: focus	
CABINET before: standpoint	
<b>CDA</b>	CDA after content: cooperation with private/social partners

	CDA after content: wide range of measures
	CDA after focus: youth
	CDA after: standpoint
	CDA before content: cooperation with private/social partners
	CDA before content: discouragement not coercion
	CDA before focus: youth
	CDA before nuance: own responsibility
	CDA before: smoke-free generation
	CDA before: standpoint
	CDA content before: peripheral action government
	CDA content: concrete goals
	CDA focus before: smoking during pregnancy
<b>ChristenUnie</b>	CU after content: cooperation with social/private actors
	CU after focus: youth
	CU after: standpoint
	CU before content: concrete goals and measures
	CU before focus: youth
	CU before nuance: own responsibility vs. societal benefits
	CU before: standpoint
<b>D66</b>	D66 after: standpoint
	D66 after focus: SES
	D66 before content: cooperation with private/social partners
	D66 before content: long term goals
	D66 before focus: information campaign
	D66 before: focus
	D66 before: standpoint
<b>GroenLinks</b>	GL after content: active role government
	GL after content: concrete measures
	GL after content: information campaign
	GL after focus: youth
	GL after: standpoint

	GL before content: integrated approach
	GL before: standpoint
<b>Partij van de Arbeid</b>	PVDA after content: cooperation with social/private partners
	PVDA after focus: vulnerable groups
	PVDA after standpoint
	PVDA before content
	PVDA before content: cooperation with private/social partners
	PVDA before content: offer of tobacco products
	PVDA before content: type of product
	PVDA before focus: pregnant women
	PVDA before focus: youth
	PVDA before standpoint
<b>Partij van de Dieren</b>	PVDD after standpoint
	PVDD before content: concrete measures/goals
	PVDD before content: role of government
	PVDD before standpoint
<b>PVV</b>	PVV after content: cooperation with social/private partners
	PVV after content: e-cigarette approach
	PVV after content: limited role government
	PVV after focus: e-cigarette approach
	PVV after focus: hypocrite law
	PVV after: standpoint
	PVV before content: different approach
	PVV before content: e-cigarette approach
	PVV before content: limited role government
	PVV before: standpoint
<b>SGP</b>	SGP before content: cooperation with private/social partners
	SGP before focus: youth
	SGP before: standpoint
<b>SP</b>	SP after focus: rich vs. poor
	SP after standpoint

SP before content: concrete measures

SP before content: role of cabinet

SP before content: role tobacco industry

SP before focus: youth

SP before standpoint

**VVD**

VVD after focus: effective implementation

VVD after focus: nuisance for others

VVD after focus: own responsibility

VVD after focus: youth

VVD after standpoint

VVD before content: change of approach

VVD before content: cooperation with social/private partners

VVD before content: efficient implementation

VVD before focus: role of government

VVD before focus: youth

VVD before standpoint

## Appendix 2: Participating actors smoking discussion group (*“thematafel roken”*)

J.C.M. Sap (Chariman)

Taskforce Rookvrije Start

Alliantie Nederland Rookvrij

Kinderboerderij Actief.nl

Nederlandse Unie van Speeltuin Organisaties / Jantje Beton

GGZ NL

Verslavingskunde Nederland

InEen/ Stichting Georganiseerde eerstelijnszorg

Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging

Samenwerkende Gezondheidsfondsen

Longalliantie

Wethouder Velsen

Zorgverzekeraars Nederland

KNVB

Ouders & Onderwijs

Boink

GGD GHOR Nederland



### Appendix 3: Interview Questions

1. Welke ontwikkelingen en factoren hebben geleid tot de focus op rookpreventie in het regeerakkoord?
2. Wat is het belangrijkste verschil in de aanpak van rookpreventie van dit kabinet t.o.v. eerdere kabinetten? Kunt u dat verschil verklaren?
3. In hoeverre hebben de partijstandpunten binnen het kabinet beïnvloed welke doelen er in het Nationaal Preventieakkoord gesteld zijn in het kader van het tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid?
4. In hoeverre zijn de gestelde doelen in het Nationaal Preventieakkoord op het gebied van roken beïnvloed door de wensen van de politieke partijen (zowel coalitie- als oppositiepartijen) in de Tweede Kamer?
5. Is er bij het bepalen van de te nemen maatregelen binnen het tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid in het Nationaal Preventieakkoord overleg geweest tussen de politieke partijen? Zo ja, hoe is dit verlopen en wat is de uitkomst ervan?
6. In hoeverre zijn standpunten van politieke partijen veranderd over het tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid tijdens het ontwikkelen van de doelen in het Nationaal Preventieakkoord? Kunt u deze veranderingen verklaren?
7. Wat is het standpunt van uw politieke partij over rookpreventie in het algemeen en over de gestelde maatregelen en doelen in het Nationaal Preventieakkoord in het bijzonder?