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Applying Foreign Policy Through the Feminist Lens

**How are the principles of liberal feminist foreign policy implemented
in the UNSCR 1325 and in Sweden's feminist foreign policy?**

BACHELOR THESIS

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Abstract

This research will take a look at a new concept of applying foreign policy which sets the focus on liberal feminist values of establishing gender equality by including women into existing frameworks of international organizations and institutions. With the main explorative research question of “*How are the principles of liberal feminist foreign policy implemented in the UNSCR 1325 and in Sweden’s feminist foreign policy?*”, this research is drawing a linkage between the theory of liberal feminist foreign policy (*philosophy*) and liberal feminist foreign policy in action (*policy* and *program*) by using the discursive institutionalism of ideas by Vivian A. Schmidt (2008). With the use of qualitative content analysis, the two-fold analysis will answer how the most influential *policy* (UNSCR 1325) and *program* (Sweden’s feminist foreign policy) of establishing gender equality by including women in foreign policy, have implemented the *philosophy* of applying liberal FFP and its five principles. Not only does this research aim to present a more radical concept of applying foreign policy, but to highlight that the mainstream ways of foreign policy are jeopardizing international gender equality and women’s human rights – an implementation of liberal feminist foreign policy has the potential of counteracting.

Keywords: feminist foreign policy; International Relations; liberal feminism; gender equality; women’s human rights; conflict and post-conflict; discursive institutionalism of ideas; UNSCR 1325; Swedish feminist foreign policy

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1 Introduction

“Representation of the world [...] is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.”

Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (1949)

“Roses are red, violets are blue, I love smashing the patriarchy with you.”

Sign at the Women’s March in London (2019)

Even though the two quotes are separated by 70 years, it seems that not much has changed within those 70 years. Today’s demands for tomorrow are the demands of yesterday: considering women in politics by applying a feminist lens on the political spheres. It might seem like a phenomenon of the late 2010s, but the “f-word” that dominates the current political agenda and is feared by many who are not willing to change their “malestream[ed]” (Youngs, 2004, p. 75) political systems, is not a modern fairytale. Due to the great successes of the three feminist movements, starting as early as in the 19th century, women can enjoy equal rights and opportunities in most countries of the world. It has opened the doors for a new group of actors in the public domain which are women. Women received the right to vote, to pick and choose their occupation, to become doctors and politicians, to file reports against sexual assault and much more, but most importantly – women have received the right to have a voice and be heard in the public.

For long, women have suffered political and societal exclusion due to the fact of simply being a woman which has caused an inequality of representation of women’s needs, demands and voices as politics was only available for men. A male political patriarchy was being established. Feminism recognizes the established male political patriarchy as “where power both in the home and in the public sphere lies with men” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2006 [2015]). Feminism stresses the importance of representation and inclusion of women in higher politics as feminism is “fundamentally rooted in an analysis of the global subordination of women [...] and is dedicated to its elimination” (Kinsella, 2017, p. 191). An exclusion or underrepresentation of women subsequently leads to the neglect of women issues within the domain of politics as political decisions become solely based on the truths of men.

Even though feminism has achieved great successes over the years, one door of the public sphere has still been kept relatively closed for women: the door to foreign policy. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment

of Women, the department of foreign affairs is only ranking on the 9th place with only 63 female foreign ministers out of 188 countries (IPU, 2019). Foreign policy draws a picture of being constrained by political patriarchy, and therefore being occupied by men. Feminists heavily criticize this mainstream approach of foreign policy and International Relations (IR) where women have been left out. Consequently, this has supported to create a gendered foreign policy which is defined as a “masculinist framing of politics” (Youngs, 2004, p. 76). By implication, this means that foreign policy is solely being created by and for a male as foreign policy only recognizes and respects men’s central experiences, concerns and ideas, and women become invisible. Therefore, feminists in foreign policy want to shake things up by tearing down the traditional and realist views on foreign policy and its existing male political patriarchy by adding “women as active players [...] of international politics” (Pettman, 1996, p. IX) in pursuing gender equality within the domain of foreign policy.

One step towards the direction of realizing the feminist aim of gender equality within foreign policy is the concept of the feminist foreign policy (FFP). FFP can be defined as a “multidimensional policy framework that aims to elevate women’s and marginalised groups’ experiences” (CFFP, n.d.) and “at the same time, this policy is embedded in the broader global efforts to promote gender equality in the international arena” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 323). Some view FFP as a radical policy change, but FFP is taking serious steps towards the “substantive representation whereby women’s political interests are integrated into policymaking and whereby outcomes matter” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). While women become actors of foreign policy which allows that women’s views, needs and demands are being considered and heard, it becomes “not only a matter of counting women but also of making women count” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). It is a foreign policy concept that strengthens all women around the world.

With the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on October 31, 2000, the agenda on “Women, Peace and Security” has set the international framework of applying a feminist lens on foreign policy. The UNSCR 1325 has been seen as a milestone for FFP as it “urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts” (OSAGI, n.d.). It is about the protection of women’s rights and the assurance of their equal participation in any peace processes (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). With the UNSCR 1325, the narrative of women during conflict has been changed. For the first time, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has recognized women as agents to narrate peace and security, whereas before they have been seen as victims of war with

the need for protection (ibid). Hereby, the UNSCR 1325 draws special attention to the different experiences of women and men in conflict and post-conflict situations due to the influence and impact of gender in foreign policy. Therefore, the four main pillars of the UNSCR 1325 call for women's role in conflict *prevention*, increased women's *participation* in peacebuilding, the *protection* of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict, and introducing a gender perspective into *relief and recovery* (DPPA, n.d.). Given this, the UNSCR 1325 and its principles are reflecting and highlighting the human dimension of foreign policy which can be found within the feminist criticism on traditional and realist views on IR which are merely state-centered. The UNSCR 1325 introduces a tangible shift in the making and doing of foreign policy towards applying a feminist lens. As a legally binding document to all signatory states, the UN member states have to implement the principles of the UNSCR 1325 into action through government-led National Action Plans (NAPs) or other forms of national strategies. So far, 79 countries have created NAPs (PeaceWomen, n.d.a).

The government of Sweden however is going even one step further. Sweden does not only have a self-appointed feminist government which puts gender equality at the center of all governmental activities and affairs, but moreover adopted an FFP strategy in 2014 which means “applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6). The application of a systematic gender equality approach allows Sweden to implement foreign policies that “change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11). Derived from Sweden's released handbook on its FFP in 2018, the Swedish FFP manifests three R's as its starting points to measure its foreign policy action: *rights*, *representation*, and *resources* based on the fourth R – the *reality* which women and girls have to face. Thereby, the policy of the UNSCR 1325 has had great impact on Sweden to construct and apply an FFP in order “to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11).

1.1 Relevance

This research is based on the impression that when it comes to the realm of international and foreign politics, the so-called “hard politics” concerning war and peace, men are occupying the leadership positions; it is creating a male representation of the world in form of a political patriarchy in foreign policy. The above-presented number of only having 63 female foreign ministers out of 188 countries shows that political patriarchy in foreign policy is still reality and poses a societal issue. Feminist scholars have criticized the exclusiveness of foreign policy for a long time. Instead of allowing women to be actors of peace, they have primarily been put into the role of war victims, denying their ability to be negotiating for their demands, needs and experiences. As research shows,

the likelihood of a peace agreement to last longer than 15 years, increases by 35% when women were the successful negotiators (UN Women, n.d.). With adopting the UNSCR 1325 and initiating the “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda, the foundation of a more gender-equal foreign policy has been set as it is the first UNSCR to recognize the criticism and demands of feminist scholars and activists working towards gender equality in foreign policy by institutionalizing FFP (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). As the first country to fully implement a strategy of FFP, Sweden shows how to apply the principles of FFP into their own national context of foreign policy. Its ideas and methods are examples for other countries to follow a feminist re-thinking and re-structuring of foreign policy. Therefore, it is worth to take a closer look at how the UNSCR 1325 and Sweden have implemented and realized the principles of FFP.

1.2 Research question

With the purpose to enrich the scientific discussion of feminist ideas in foreign policy, the research draws upon former findings by feminist scholars and thinkers that have set the framework of FFP. This research intends to take the discussion further by highlighting the implementation of FFP in the institutional context of the UNSCR 1325 and the national context of Sweden’s FFP. As both examples primarily focus on the liberal strategy of eliminating gender inequality and support the institutional inclusion of women in foreign policy, the framework and principles of FFP regarding this research will be based on Alwan and Weldon’s dimension of liberal FFP (2017). With the use of Vivian A. Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism of ideas (2008), this allows drawing a linkage between the theory of liberal FFP (as *philosophy*) and liberal FFP in action (as *policy* and *program*), by asking the overall research question of:

“How are the principles of liberal feminist foreign policy implemented in the UNSCR 1325 and in Sweden’s feminist foreign policy?”

To answer this research question, two sub-questions are formulated. The first sub-question of “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?*” focuses on the institutional implementation of liberal FFP within the UN SC. By answering this sub-question, it allows to understand how the principles of applying liberal FFP have been implemented into the policy of the UNSCR 1325. The second sub-question will focus on the national context of implementing liberal FFP by looking at the best-practice case of Sweden. By asking the question of “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?*”, it allows to understand how the principles of applying a liberal FFP have been implemented into the program of the Swedish FFP.

2 Theoretical framework

To answer the research question and its sub-questions, the theoretical framework will provide general knowledge on establishing foreign policy through the (liberal) feminist lens. Thereby, the theoretical framework is divided into two sections: feminism in foreign policy and the FFP, and the discursive institutionalism of ideas. By theorizing feminism in foreign policy and especially highlighting the IR theory of liberal feminism in foreign policy, the scene will be set to explain the concept of FFP and especially the liberal dimension of it. Moreover, the discursive institutionalism (DI) of ideas will be theorized. The DI will help to describe the institutionalization and therefore institutional change from ideas of a liberal FFP *philosophy* towards the *policy* of applying liberal FFP and *the* program of applying liberal FFP to draw a linkage between the theory of liberal FFP and liberal FFP in action.

2.1 Feminism in foreign policy and the concept of feminist foreign policy

The first section of the theoretical framework introduces the IR theory of feminism in foreign policy which evolves into the concept of FFP. To understand the concept of FFP and the principles of liberal FFP, a step back to the initial feminist criticism is required. Therefore, the section starts out by carefully examining the general feminist criticism of foreign policy stemming from the feminist theory of exclusion and subordination of women due to the concept of gender. When having explained the feminist criticism on IR and foreign policy, the liberal feminist IR theory will be highlighted due to its focus on institutional change to establish women's political and societal inclusion as well as gender equality in foreign policy. This section ends with the theorization of FFP and Alwan and Weldon's liberal FFP which will be used as the main principles within the analysis.

2.1.1 Feminism in foreign policy

The international theory of feminism in foreign policy has emerged within the mid-1980s as a theory of IR that evaluates the impacts of decisions of international politics on women for the first time in the history of IR (True, 2009). Hereby, feminist tendencies in foreign policy and IR (liberal, critical, postcolonial, and poststructural feminism) share the main common understanding that “feminism is fundamentally rooted in an analysis of the global subordination of women (in the prevailing IR theories) [...] and is dedicated to its elimination” (Kinsella, 2017, p. 191). It has inevitably led to the unequal representation of women's needs, demands and experiences in international politics. Feminism in foreign policy is recognizing the promotion of equality and justice for all women around the world, being aware of its complex intersectionality as “feminism is the political theory and practice that struggles to free all women” (Smith, 1998, p. 96). Feminism is often

afraid to be misunderstood as hatred towards men, but it actually is a re-thinking and re-structuring of power among men and women by demanding men's and women's equal share in representation and rights in international politics.

As the main root of women's global subordination, feminists of all tendencies recognize the concept and impact of *gender* in foreign policy as the point of analysis of women's political and social exclusion. Feminists argue that gender cannot be equated with the biological sex, but emphasize a strong distinction between them. As the biological sex is concerned with the biological differences men and women are being born with (genital and reproductive organs), gender is being explained as "the social institutionalization of sexual difference" (Okin, 1998, p. 116). This means that gender establishes social and cultural norms due to the biological differences between men and women. Those different norms, values and traits are being translated into norms, rules and attributes that are solely created by society and culture on what appears to be masculine and feminine. The feminist scholar J.A. Tickner outlines it as a "set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity" (1992, p. 7) which influence who gets what in foreign politics. When looking at the ascribed characteristics of a competent leader, attributes such as rationality, strength, courage and autonomy are being used (Kirby, 2017). But those attributes also seem to be used when describing masculinity. Since the gender roles are constructed as binary and complimentary, femininity will then be described with attributes such as emotional, weak, afraid and dependent (Harders, 2002). Those characteristics of gender have the power to ascribe norms to different political positions. The historian Joan Scott identifies gender as "a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (Tickner, 1992, p. 7). Hence, gender is not only the social distinction between men and women, but it also describes the power hierarchies in foreign policy. Tickner has described this scenario as a "celebration of male power" (1992, p. 6) which associates the institutionalization of male attributes in foreign policy as the glorification of the male gender overall. Subsequently, the norms of masculinity become appropriate and only measures for conflict solving and maintaining dominance (Alwan & Weldon, 2017).

Gender creates an unequal political and social hierarchy between men and women, resulting in a "hegemonic masculinity" (Tickner, 1992, p. 6) in foreign policy as described by R.W. Connell. With hegemonic masculinity, a framework of understanding is being delivered that any gender regime will have an ideal picture of masculinity which is dominant in a society's celebrated values and qualities of a man (Kirby, 2017, p. 273). It is a perversion of the stereotypical pictures of masculinity described as "a type of culturally dominant masculinity that he [Connell] distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities [...] while it does not correspond to the actual personality of the

majority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order” (Tickner, 1992, p. 6). Simply put, the patriarchal authority is obliged to the social expectations and constructed gender norms of masculinity such as rationality, strength, courage and autonomy. It creates a so-called “hyper-masculinity” (Fritzsche, 2011, p. 44) which all possible actors of foreign policy will be compared to. Even though most men will not and cannot live up to those masculine expectations, only women become the targets of questioning their competences in foreign policy and IR. Consequently, gender has the power to marginalize and ignore women’s needs, expectations and demands in foreign policy due to simple societal constructed characteristics. Hence, gender is the embodiment of power inequality in foreign policy and IR, resulting in a hegemonic masculinity which is “projected onto the behavior of states” (Tickner, 1992 p. 6). As states are the main actors in foreign policy and IR, the realm of international politics continues to be a gendered entity – describing the state as a male entity and leaving out women as actors of the state (Tickner, 2014, p. 76).

This picture of gender impacting the power relationships and hierarchy in foreign policy can be traced back to the prevailing and classic IR theories which demonstrate gender-blindness and the sexual-male foundation of fundamental assumptions in foreign policy respectively (Ruppert, 2000, p. 32). As priorly stated, the traditional mainstream IR theories such as realism do not only view the nation-state as the main actor of foreign policy, but also depict them as a gendered institution or entity. Going all the way back to the 17th century and to one of realism’s most influential scholars, Thomas Hobbes – his book *Leviathan* is considered as one of the most influential works of modern state philosophy and political theory of the *Hobbesian world* (Roß, 2002; Tickner, 2014). It is characterized by the world’s “state of war of every man against every man” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 104) with the need of a stable political system to establish peace and security (Roß, 2002). Hobbes’ idea was the one of a Leviathan depicting the image of a male sovereign who ensures peace and stability with the power and authority of using force. Not only is the sovereign being described as male, but also his people seem to be male (Kirby, 2017). It has adopted the belief of a male political entity (*the state*) which is excluding women as political objects. As “women were relegated to ancillary, privatized and apolitical roles that [...] centralized male control” (Kinsella, 2017, p. 195), a power asymmetry was being established that leaves women underrepresented in the public and political sphere as they were being assigned to the private sphere at home. As a consequence, the public and political spheres heavily exclude and oppress women and their experiences to be represented, and only consider male views. The scholar Gillian Youngs has described this as a “masculinist framing of politics” (Youngs, 2004, p. 76) which reveals that “the history of state formation and identity is therefore one of gendered [...] oppression” (Youngs, 2004, p. 81).

Therefore, the gendered oppression can be detected as early as in the 17th century as states are already built on the oppression of women. Since states remain the main actors within the realm of traditional and mainstream foreign policy and IR, women's oppression continues to go on as women's representation and experiences are being excluded from foreign policy – making women become invisible to and in foreign policy (Kinsella, 2017).

The feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe is asking the simple question of *Where are the women?* and summarizes the situation of women in foreign policy within four simple words. By asking this question, she is requesting “women as active players in and gender relations as constitutive of international politics” (Pettman, 1996, p. IX). As of women's current situation or role in foreign policy, they are being put in the role of the victim which illustrates the picture of women in need of somebody else's help. Women's experiences during conflict and war differ from men as women are more prone to experience sexual violence in armed conflict than men. As their experiences during conflict and demands after conflict differ from men, feminists argue to include women at the negotiating tables because otherwise their experiences and demands will be ignored (Kirby, 2017). The exclusion of women from foreign policy is a systematic avoidance of actually protecting and giving women's demands space within national and international security (Mordt, 2002, p. 62). To conclude with Tickner's words, “women have had little control over the conditions of their protection” (1992, p. 28) as it was controlled by men in foreign policy.

2.1.2 Liberal feminist International Relations theory

The liberal feminist dimension is one of the four conceptually distinct dimensions of feminist analysis and explanation of achieving and establishing gender equality in IR and foreign policy; it is a liberal strategy of eliminating gender inequality which supports the inclusion of women in foreign policy. To explain the liberal dimension of feminist analysis and explanation of IR and foreign policy, one needs to trace back to the general liberal theory of IR and foreign policy first.

The IR theory of liberalism questions the state as the main actor in foreign policy and rather views international organizations and institutions as the main actors of the international political stage (Owens, Baylis & Smith, 2017, p. 5). Thereby states still remain important players as they are the participating actors in international organizations and institutions. Liberals believe that the state cannot be viewed as one unitary actor as it is “made up of individuals and their collective, societal preferences and interests” (Owens et al., 2017, p. 5). This being the case, liberals proceed on the assumption that something such as a national interest does not exist as “it merely represents the result of whatever societal preferences [...] dominate the domestic decision-making process”

(Owens et al., 2017, p. 5). Driven by states' societal preferences, states establish international organizations and institutions which function primarily as a platform to exchange international cooperation among states. Therefore, international organizations and institutions allow states to govern their interdependent interests (ibid). Governing interdependent interests calls for governing arrangements which are compromised laws, agreed norms, international regimes and institutional rules (Owens et al., 2017, p. 5) defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). This implies that international organizations and institutions have the prevailing power in foreign policy to frame rules and expectations regarding a state's behavior.

Following the liberal IR theory, liberal feminists have revealed that international organizations and institutions are gendered constructions as they are dominated by men (True, 2009, p. 243). Considering the priorly explained IR theory of feminism, the gendered construction and dominance of men in international organizations and institutions do not only consequently lead to the underrepresentation of women in any of those international platforms, but moreover represents societal preferences of men. Therefore, liberal feminists are strong advocates of correcting gender inequality by increasing women's representation in positions of national and international governance (Kinsella, 2017). This does not only include the quantitative representation of women, but also their qualitative representation as their societal preferences, demands, needs, experiences or expectations become heard. Hence, the focus of liberal feminists lies in challenging the institutional structure of international organizations and institutions to bring more women in as it ultimately achieves the inclusion and representation of women in foreign policy and IR (Kinsella, 2017). Liberal feminism is often viewed as the second step of a three-part knowledge project which the IR professor V. Spike Peterson describes as "second, attempting to rectify the systematic exclusion of women by adding women to existing frameworks" (Tickner, 2014, p. XVII). To overcome the gendered barriers of international organizations and institutions in order to add women to the existing frameworks, liberal feminists demand law changes that would allow the access of women to all international organizations and institutions of international governance (Harders, 2002; Kinsella, 2017). This would not only increase women's participation, but set the foundation to achieve the long-term aim of establishing gender parity in international organizations and institutions as it corrects "the distribution of power between the sexes" (Kinsella, 2017, p. 196).

Liberal feminists believe that the institutional inclusion of women's societal preferences will inevitably decrease the likelihood of war and violence (Kinsella, 2017). To liberal feminists, gender

inequality and the subordination of women “is itself a form of violence” (Kinsella, 2017, p. 197). If the domestic index of a country shows a great inequality of any type between men and women, a state is more likely to apply force and violence inside and outside of their territorial boundaries. Many feminists argue that women are the peaceful counterpart compared to the militant and aggressive men, and therefore have a special relationship towards peace (Wasmuht, 2002; Steans, 2013). This is often reasoned with women’s maternity and mothering abilities (Steans, 2013). Mothering is described as a “core human activity which gives rise to a very different way of relating to other human beings and so understanding and actively forging human relationships” (Steans, 2013, p. 99) as well as “the *activity* of mothering [...] gives rise to a particular sensibility and understanding of relationships as connected” (Steans, 2013, p. 99). Mothering does not only mean being a mother to its own child, but moreover, mothering the human family and understanding their needs, demands and concerns by listening to them just as listening to a baby’s cry to understand what it wants or needs. Instead of applying force, women try to resolve conflicts by using methods of a peaceful manner which focus on conflict resolution and peacekeeping with methods of “mediation, negotiation and other forms of communication and dialogue to facilitate the resolution of social conflicts and bring about peaceful relationships between individuals and groups” (Steans, 2013, p. 101). The inclusion of women in international organizations and institutions would help to elevate their status from being oppressed to being included at the negotiations’ table and foster gender equality and peace in foreign policy and IR.

Liberal feminism is not only about just simply bringing women into international organizations and institutions; liberal feminism sees the greater picture of what women in foreign policy and what a female-orientated foreign policy can actually achieve. The institutional change of foreign policy remains one of the most important policy changes to achieve as “the fate of nations is tied to the status of women” (Kinsella, 2017, p. 197), because gender inequality raises the chance of conflict between states (Kinsella, 2017). Therefore, gender equality is not only influential for domestic policies, but moreover is influencing a state’s organization and course of foreign policy – affecting not only its own nation’s fate, but moreover the fate of the international arena. International organizations and institutions have the legitimate power to demand “formal equality in law” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 7) by setting norms, laws and principles to allow women’s participation in foreign policy which must be obeyed by the member states of the international organizations and institutions. Hence, international organizations and institutions play an important part in contributing to women’s participation in foreign policy, which does not only allow for women’s contribution of experiences, ideas and demands, but moreover fosters the development of gender equality in foreign policy and IR. Liberal feminism is a motor for institutional change to establish women’s

“representation in elected office and appointed positions of leadership” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 7) of foreign policy.

2.1.3 The concept of feminist foreign policy

To actively adopt the priorly established feminist and liberal feminist criticism of foreign policy and IR, the implementation of a policy framework of FFP is needed that engenders the possibilities of applying and pursuing gender-equitable foreign policy. The ideas of FFP have been argued as a radical policy change by many scholars as they challenge the mainstream and prevailing order of “international politics, state militaries, and government actors” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 1).

The FFP is being described as a “multidimensional policy framework that aims to elevate women’s and marginalised groups’ experiences” (CFFP, n.d.) as well as “a course of action towards those outside national boundaries that is guided by a commitment to gender equality [...] and that seeks to solve problems of male dominance, gender inequality” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 6). The addition of the word “feminist” reveals the theoretical orientation and active implementation of feminist values and gender equality throughout conducting foreign policy. Hereby, FFP outlines a more controversial political framework that renegotiates and challenges the “traditional elite-oriented foreign policy practices and discourses toward a policy framework that is guided by the normative and ethical principles” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 327) of feminism. FFP presents a more controversial political framework as it intends to renegotiate and challenge the prevailing power hierarchies and gendered institutions of foreign policy which benefit from the current state of inequality (ibid). It has been priorly addressed that gender inequality is an established issue caused by the traditional stereotypes of gender which determine a structure of power in foreign policy. Therefore, women have been oppressed or completely excluded from any policy making, or have been restricted to areas of “soft” governance such as family or education policy as those seem to correspond with feminine gender stereotypes (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 6). As a consequence, foreign policy becomes dictated by the values and norms of masculinity as they appear to be the appropriate measures for conflict solving and sustaining dominance (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). For this reason, the FFP is a policy framework to “challenge the dominant narratives of international political discourse and push for structural and hierarchical change” (CFFP, n.d.) by applying the values and principles of feminism to the domain of foreign policy and IR.

2.1.3.1 The principles of liberal FFP

The scholars Alwan and Weldon (2017) have addressed that the current literature on feminism in foreign policy does not provide a straightforward picture of what an FFP actually is and entails. Rather, the two scholars provide an overview of three different feminist dimensions to establish, apply and implement an FFP which is a liberal feminist, an anti-militarism and pacifist feminist, and a global intersectional feminist approach (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 6). Even though the three dimensions do overlap in certain motives and beliefs, they also contradict to high degrees with each other. Therefore, depending on which dimension a policymaker chooses to establish its FFP framework, the principles of that framework might not reflect the FFP of a different policymaker, but still is a concept of FFP. As this research primarily focuses on the liberal strategy of eliminating gender inequality and supports the inclusion of women into existing international organizations and institutions of foreign policy, the framework and principles of FFP regarding this research will be based on Alwan and Weldon's dimension of liberal FFP.

As priorly explained, liberal feminism is concerned with getting women into existing international organizations and institutions to increase female representation. Hereby, it is not only important to just simply have women added into international organizations and institutions, but also *which* positions women will occupy. As "having women in positions of power is critical not only in ensuring that diverse voices shape this critical area of policy" (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 8), FFP is taking serious steps towards the "substantive representation whereby women's political interests are integrated into policymaking and whereby outcomes matter" (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). Women are actively involved in shaping and implementing foreign policy which enables that their views are being considered, making it "not only a matter of counting women but also of making women count" (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). Therefore, the *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions* which are influential key positions such as foreign minister, defense minister, diplomats, etc., is one indicator of applying FFP in liberal terms.

A liberal feminist view on military and combat is not to abolish military in general, but rather to integrate women into those institutions (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 12). To allow women in combat is an indicator for gender equality as men and women are being viewed as equally suitable to serve in the military, and military is not restricting women on the set of permissible attributes of gender ascribed by society of men and women – men and masculinity as being the strong gender in comparison to women and femininity as being the weak gender. Therefore, the *inclusion of women in*

military and combat can be established as another principle of applying FFP in liberal terms (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 29).

As priorly explained, liberal feminists demand law changes that would allow the access of women into international organizations and institutions. This implies that liberal feminists “favor the promotion of women’s human rights, especially civil and political rights” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 13). Women are often victims of global subordination, meaning that states or other international actors violate women’s human rights. Consequently, it supports gender inequality in foreign policy. Therefore, the *promotion of women’s human rights* illustrates another principle of applying FFP in liberal terms.

Based on the phrase “practice what you preach”, applying FFP does not simply mean the promotion of women’s human rights, but moreover proving official commitment to gender equality and women’s rights (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). To prove commitment, states have to ratify international treaties or conventions. Therefore, the *official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality* is another indicator of applying FFP in liberal terms.

Applying FFP in liberal terms also means to not only apply women’s rights within a state’s own borders, but moreover to apply women’s rights to conflict or post-conflict situations abroad (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 19). To protect and to safeguard women’s rights in and after conflict, it becomes inevitable to apply gender throughout the period of conflict and post-conflict. The application of gender can be recognized through the support of “women’s involvement in the conflict resolution process, and involving women in stages in the implementation of international agreements [... as well as the] attention to women’s human rights in the post-conflict reconstruction period” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 19-20). An FFP in liberal terms is a strong advocate to include women at all levels of decision-making processes to ensure that the peace negotiations will acknowledge women’s experiences and demands for the post-conflict reconstruction of society. Therefore, the *application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict* is the last indicator for applying FFP in liberal terms.

The concept of FFP supports the feminist aim “to conceptualize a worldview from a feminine perspective and to formulate a feminist epistemology of international relations” (Tickner, 2014, p. 7), drawn from taken lessons by feminists and liberal feminists of foreign policy and IR. The feminist principles are to transform the mainstream and malestream construct of foreign policy to put gender equality and women’s rights at the core of applying foreign policy and IR.

2.2 The discursive institutionalism of ideas

In order to apply the principles of liberal FFP to foreign policy, liberal feminists have declared international organizations and institutions as the motor of change in foreign policy. International organizations and institutions have the power to formulate policies to enable a more gender-equal and consequently a more feminist outlook on foreign policy. In order to explain how principles of a liberal FFP actually become implemented into the wider context of international organizations and institutions as well as into national foreign policy agendas, a closer look will be granted towards Vivian A. Schmidt's theory and framework of the "newest new institutionalism" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303) discursive institutionalism. It gives "insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics while providing a more dynamic approach to institutional change than the older three new institutionalism [of rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism]" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303).

Hereby, Schmidt describes DI as "the explanatory power of ideas and discourse" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303) of policy change where "ideas and discourse [are being set] in institutional context" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). It is a framework of policy change that indicates a causal link between ideas and discourse which inevitably have the power and influence to engender institutional change. Schmidt points out that DI offers a "more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles [...] which tend to come from the institutionalist tradition(s) with which they engage" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). That means that the newest new established framework of DI turns to ideas and their discourse to explain change and the continuity of change within institutions that the other three forms of new institutionalism were unable to explain. Instead, the newest new institutionalism framework of DI is taking ideas and discourse seriously to answer the questions of "how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305), whereas the other forms of new institutionalism have ignored the influential role and transformative power of ideas and discourse to initiate political actions and institutional change.

As this research mainly focuses on how the principles of liberal FFP got translated and implemented into the context of foreign policy, a closer look will be granted on the explanatory and influential power of ideas only. To define what ideas actually are, one must look at the scholarly discussion at first. Here, the definition of an idea ranges from ideas being roadmaps or focal points to strategic constructions or frames of references (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). Schmidt differentiates ideas into the "three main levels of generality" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) as applied by other political scientists before. The three main levels of generality are *philosophies*, *policies* and *programs* (listed from

most abstract to least abstract). *Philosophies* form the foundation level for later established *policies* and *programs*. As the foundation, *philosophies* strengthen *policies* and *programs* with organizing ideas, values and principles of knowledge and society from the worldview they are representing (ibid). *Policies* form the first level which are proposed policy solutions by policymakers based on the applied and given *philosophy*. On the second level, *programs* are being used as “problem definitions that set the scope of possible solutions to the problems that policy ideas address” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). Therefore, *programs* offer a roadmap of problem-solving which has been indicated by the prior presented *policies*. *Programs* define issues, goals, norms, methods and instruments to be considered and applied when solving the presented problem of the *policy* (ibid). Moreover, ideas can be both from *cognitive* and *normative* nature (ibid). The *cognitive* nature of ideas is described as “what is and what to do” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) which are causal ideas as they provide guidelines for the political action and stating their logic and need to justify the policies and programs without attaching any values. On the other hand, the *normative* nature of ideas is described by “what is good or bad about what is [...] what one ought to do” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) by attaching values to the political action and therefore legitimizing policies with regard to their appropriateness. McCann outlines that *cognitive* ideas rather focus on solving the problems of the current situation in a value-free manner, whereas *normative* ideas shift their focus towards what is wrong about the current situations and why following a certain course of direction is better than the other in a value-laden manner (2014, p. 474). Figure 1 will provide an overview of the classification of ideas according to Schmidt’s theory of DI.




Figure 1. Overview of the classification of ideas according to Schmidt's theory of DI (2008).

When looking at the implementation of ideas to establish the implied policy change by Schmidt, the three levels of generality become direction-guiding. At first, the fundamental questioning in form of a *philosophy* is being presented. In case of this research, the liberal FFP and its feminist criticism of the current way of proceeding foreign policy and IR is being used as research’s

philosophy, the UNSCR 1325 as the *policy* and the Swedish FFP as the *program*. The liberal FFP supports the process of policy-formulating and program-building as it serves *normative* reasons why following a feminist worldview in foreign policy is more beneficial than sticking to the prevailing foreign policy methods. Even though the *philosophy* of the liberal FFP is the main *normative* foundation for the *policy* and the *program*, a *policy* can also function as a *normative* base for *cognitive* actions in *policy* and *program*.

2.3 Concluding remarks

The general feminist criticism on power and equality within foreign policy and IR can mainly be drawn from the social construct of gender as a societal construct with ascribed gender norms, therefore resulting in inequality between men and women; leaving women mainly out of the picture of foreign policy. As liberal feminists focus on changing institutions through the increase of women's participation and representation, laws are being demanded to "correct the distribution of power between the sexes" (Kinsella, 2017, p. 196). One way to get there is the implementation of a liberal FFP strategy which does not want to abolish the current international organizations and institutions (as other dimensions of feminism in foreign policy and IR or FFP pursue), it rather supports the inclusion of women into those international organizations and institutions by demanding law changes. The liberal dimension of FFP has the power to institutionalize the ideas of an FFP thinking with applying the longstanding feminist criticism on foreign policy.

Schmidt's theory of the DI of ideas supports the liberal feminist dimension of FFP as DI presents a theory to explain the institutionalization of ideas where the *philosophy* of liberal FFP can cause institutional change of institutions and actors of foreign policy. This institutional change can be observed by reference to the UNSCR 1325, an international *policy* of gender equality, women's rights and women's participation in conflict and post-conflict, as well as the Swedish FFP, a *program* that is "applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6). Both, the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP, are strongly orientated at women's inclusion into existing international organizations and institutions. This allows drawing a linkage between the theory of liberal FFP and liberal FFP in action as the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP have great potential to make the *philosophy* of liberal FFP come alive.

3 Methods

3.1 Research design

The aim of this research is to analyze the content of the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP as to how they have implemented and translated the principles of liberal FFP into their institutional and national contexts. Overall, a qualitative content analysis is being applied to answer the explorative research question and its two sub-questions. The approach of qualitative content analysis is the study of documented human behavior as to which any types of policy documents, books, speeches, social media posts and thereof count (Babbie, 2011). It is an appropriate method for the empirical study of a systematic and reasonable description of contextual and formal characteristics of messages (Flick, 2016). With the use of relevant theory, categories are being derived which will be applied to the contents of the analyzed documents. The qualitative content analysis is used to outline how the categories (principles) of liberal FFP as a *philosophy* have been implemented and translated into the institutional context of the UNSCR 1325 (*policy*) and the national context of the Swedish FFP (*program*). Hereby, the research design is using Schmidt's framework of DI of ideas (2008). It needs to be addressed that this research is only looking at the path from *philosophy* to *policy*, and from *philosophy* to *program* as the research wants to only analyze the implementation of the principles of FFP into the ideas of a *policy* and a *program*. Schmidt also suggests drawing a line from *philosophy* and *policy* to *program* – how the *program* has implemented the respective *policy* of liberal FFP – but due to the scale of this research it is not possible to do so.

In order to conduct a comprehensive research, a single-case study research design is being applied as only the most influential *policy* and *program* have been chosen to be analyzed. This offers a comprehensive analysis and illustration between the theory of feminism in foreign policy and its derived *philosophy* of liberal FFP, and the reality of its implementation into the two different contexts of institutional (*policy*) and national (*program*). Therefore, the main research question has been divided into two sub-questions. In order to analyze the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP in each sub-question, a coding scheme of applying liberal FFP will be used (Table 1, p. 20). As the UNSCR 1325 is the most influential *policy* of international women's inclusion and gender equality, and the Swedish FFP is the first foreign policy program to put women's inclusion and gender equality at the heart of foreign policy, the research considers the time period from 2000 until 2018.

As it was explained earlier, there is more than one way of applying foreign policy through the feminist lens: liberal feminist, anti-militarism and pacifist feminist, and global intersectional feminist (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 6). In his research it was chosen to use the liberal dimension of

FFP. The liberal dimension of FFP focuses on the inclusion of women into already existing international organizations and institutions or national foreign policies through law changes. Both, the *policy* and the *program* support this liberal feminist idea. Choosing a different dimension of applying FFP has the impact to change the analysis and might indicate that the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP do not apply FFP. Therefore, the selection of the dimension of liberal FFP is highly influential for the analysis and the conclusion of this research.

3.2 Case selection

In order to answer each sub-question, a single-case study design has been chosen to provide an in-depth understanding and analysis of the researched matter. Only the most influential case of institutional and national implementation of feminism in foreign policy has been chosen.

As the first part of the research's analysis intends to focus on the institutional implementation of applying the *philosophy* of liberal FFP and its principles in a *policy*, the UNSCR 1325 initiating the "Women, Peace and Security"-agenda on October 31, 2000, has been chosen. As the UNSCR 1325 is one of the leading resolutions of the realization of women's rights and women's equal representation in conflict, the UNSCR 1325 has been indicated as a milestone in establishing international gender equality through the actions of foreign policy. It is the most influential and suitable case to indicate the institutionalization of applying liberal FFP in a *policy*. It has to be mentioned that the UNSCR 1325 is not a policy per se, but rather a resolution of the UN SC. Its legality has been subject to many legal discussions whether states need to adopt any type of NAP or translate it directly into their legal foreign policy – or if there is a legal binding to the UNSCR 1325 at all. This research treats the UNSCR 1325 as a legally binding document. Being a resolution of the UN SC, Laura J. Shepherd argues that the UNSCR 1325 is binding upon all signed states of the UN Charter (2011). Hereby, she refers to the UN Charter Chapter V, Article 25 in which "the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" (UN, n.d.).

As for the second part of the analysis, a closer look will be granted at the national implementation of FFP. Hereby, the best-practice case of Sweden is being considered. Sweden has been known as the most progressive European country when it comes to applying a "feminist lens" on its national policies. This very strong feminist mindset allows low to almost no burdens for the Swedish government to implement the UNSCR 1325 directly into their foreign policy and highlighting it as one of their foreign policy foundations. In 2014, Sweden became the first country worldwide to launch an FFP strategy on a national level. Moreover, Sweden has released a handbook on how to realize

and implement the principles of FFP in 2018. The Swedish *program* of FFP shows what could potentially be achieved within the national implementation of FFP. One has to keep in mind that Sweden is an example of “easy implementation” whereas countries with a more conservative or traditional mindset might not allow the overall implementation of FFP into their national framework of foreign policy.

3.3 Data collection

The data collected for this research will derive from secondary data through an extensive literature review. To provide an appropriate theoretical framework, scientific literature on the IR theory of feminism will be conducted. This serves to explain the origin of feminist criticism and demands on foreign policy which will further be developed into the liberal concept of FFP.

Furthermore, the data to analyze the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 comes from the official resolution itself (S/RES/1325). The UNSCR 1325 has been published on October 31, 2000, and has been conceptualized by the five permanent members of the SC China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States as well as by the ten non-permanent members of the SC which were Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, the Netherlands, Tunisia and Ukraine during that time (UN, 2000). The four-pages long document has been published into the six official languages of the UN which are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish (OSAGI, n.d). This research is using the English version of the UNSCR 1325 and can be publicly accessed online (United Nations, 2000).

In order to analyze the Swedish *program* of its FFP, the research is using the official handbook of Sweden’s FFP which has been released by Sweden in October 2018. It has been conceptualized by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, and her two colleagues Ann Linde (Minister for Foreign Trade, with responsibility for Nordic affairs¹) and Isabella Lövin (Minister for Environment and Climate, and Deputy Prime Minister²) on behalf of the Government Offices of Sweden. The 112-pages long document has been published in English and can be publicly accessed online (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018).

¹ This is Linde’s current position in the Swedish Government. During the process of writing the handbook, she was Minister for EU Affairs and Trade (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 7).

² This is Lövin’s current position in the Swedish Government. During the process of writing the handbook, she was Minister for International Cooperation and Climate (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 7).

3.4 Operationalization and data analysis

To analyze the explanatory and influential power of ideas, a coding scheme constructed on the principles of liberal FFP by Alwan and Weldon (2017) is being used. The coding scheme will be based on their paper for the European Conference on Politics and Gender on “What is Feminist Foreign Policy? An Exploratory Evaluation of Foreign Policy in OECD Countries”. In order to identify the implementation of liberal FFP later on in the analysis of the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP, the five principles of liberal FFP represented in their paper have been adopted as the items of this study to operationalize liberal FFP (see Table 1). Therefore, the five principles of applying liberal FFP which are the *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions, inclusion of women in military and combat, promotion of women’s human rights, official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality* and *application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict* become the items³ of this research. They have been priorly explained within the theoretical framework. Moreover, each principle has been broken down into codes. The codes reflect the words which have been used by Alwan and Weldon to describe each principle; codes are basically keywords that help to identify how the principles of applying liberal FFP have been translated or narrated into the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP. The codes of the principles can be found in the appendix of this research (Table 1a, p. 48).

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Items</i>
Liberal feminist foreign policy	Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions
	Inclusion of women in military and combat
	Promotion of women’s human rights
	Official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality
	Application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict

Table 1. Coding scheme for the concept of liberal feminist foreign policy based on Alwan and Weldon (2017).

The analysis of the data will derive from answering the two sub-questions of “How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?” and “How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?”. By using the method of qualitative content analysis, attempts are being made to trace the links between the liberal FFP to the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP. With the help of the DI of ideas, a closer look will be granted on how the five principles of applying liberal FFP

³ For reasons of simplification, the research will stick with the word principles instead of items.

as a *philosophy* have been implemented within the four pillars (*prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery*) of the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the four Rs (*rights, representation, resources, and reality*) of the *program* of the Swedish FFP. As this is a very text-based research, the coding scheme (Table 1, p. 20) allows to interpret and analyze the contents of the data in order to indicate the implementation of the *philosophy* of the liberal FFP within the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP. This allows drawing a linkage between the theory of liberal FFP and liberal FFP in action.

4 Analysis

The analysis of the main research question “*How are the principles of liberal feminist foreign policy implemented in the UNSCR 1325 and in Sweden’s feminist foreign policy?*” will be two-fold by answering the two sub-questions. At first, the focus will be on the first sub-question by granting a closer look at the linkage from *philosophy* to *policy* by answering “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?*”. Before analyzing how the priorly discussed principles of liberal FFP (*philosophy*) have been translated and narrated into the institutional context of the UNSCR 1325 (*policy*), a short explanation of the UNSCR 1325 will be provided. As the second step of the analysis, the sub-question of “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?*” will be answered which takes a closer look at the linkage from *philosophy* to *program*. Also, a short explanation of the Swedish FFP will be provided beforehand.

4.1 From *philosophy* to *policy*

The first part of this analysis will provide an in-depth look at how the *philosophy* of liberal FFP has been implemented and translated into the institutional context by the presented *policy* of the UNSCR 1325. This part will answer the first sub-question of “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?*”.

4.1.1 What is the UNSCR 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”?

October 31, 2000, marks a historic day for women’s rights all over the world. On this day, the SC has unanimously adopted its UNSCR 1325 which has initiated the agenda on “Women, Peace and Security”. The UNSCR 1325 has been seen as a landmark document for the protection of women’s rights in conflict. It is “calling for women’s increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, as well as their protection during conflict” (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011, p. 489) as well as “urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts” (OSAGI, n.d.). With the promise to protect women’s rights and to assure their equal participation in peace processes, the SC wrote history. The UNSCR1325 is the first resolution to acknowledge the different issues raised by gender on women in conflict and post-conflict situations (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011). With the UNSCR 1325, the narrative of women has been changed. For the first time, the SC does no longer see women only as victims of war, but also as peace negotiators who deserve to be at the tables of peace building missions. Women become agents of peace as the resolution raises the importance of women’s experiences and stories during war conflict as well as the demands for peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (ibid). Moreover, the UNSCR 1325 draws special attention to the

protection of women from gendered and sexual violence used as a military weapon (Steans, 2013). The UNSCR 1325 is drawing a link between sex and security (Shepherd, 2011, p. 507).

Four main pillars structure the UNSCR 1325. The first pillar constitutes women's role in conflict *prevention* (DPPA, n.d.). Hereby, the attention especially lies in strengthening women's rights under national law by implementing international strategies or laws counteracting the violence against women and prosecuting any violations. Moreover, the first pillar shows support to local women peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes (USIP, n.d.). The second pillar calls for women's *participation* in peacebuilding processes (DPPA, n.d.). This pillar especially demands women's participation at all levels of institutional decision-making processes, peace negotiations, management and resolution of conflict, in peace operations as soldiers, police and civilians as well as Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (USIP, n.d.). The third pillar addresses the *protection* of women's rights during and after conflict (DPPA, n.d.). Thereby, special attention is being drawn to the protection of women and girls from any kind of sexual and gendered violence (USIP, n.d.). The last pillar concentrates on applying a gender perspective on *relief and recovery* due to women's specific needs (DPPA, n.d.). This means that any kind of relief and recovery measures during repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction have to carefully consider the needs and effects of and on women (ibid).

In accordance with Chapter V, Article 25 of the UN Charter "the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" (UN, n.d.), the UNSCR 1325 is a legally binding document to all signatory states of the UN Charter (Shepherd, 2011). At the time of writing this research on June 6, 2019, the UN Charter has been ratified by 193 countries (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2019). This means that the four pillars as well as all provisions and aims of the UNSCR 1325 need to be taken seriously and should be laid out into government-led NAPs or other forms of national strategies in 193 countries (USIP, n.d.). To indicate the growth of the UNSCR 1325 as an international strategy of pursuing gender equality through foreign policy, one must compare the numbers of active NAPs. Whereas in June 2011 only 16 NAPs have been enacted by governments, the number of countries which have implemented NAPs rose up to 79 as of January 2019 (Shepherd, 2011, p. 505; PeaceWomen, n.d.a).

4.1.2 How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?

The landmark resolution UNSCR 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security" is taking major steps towards opening the door of foreign policy for women and placing them right at the negotiation

table. As being a resolution from an international organization, the UNSCR 1325 has the influence to immensely impact and set the realm of foreign policy and IR. At the first look, it seems that the UNSCR 1325 with its four pillars of *prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery* is a *policy* that is following the criticism of liberal feminists and might even apply the *philosophy* of liberal FFP and its five principles. But how are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the UNSCR 1325?

4.1.2.1 *Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions*

The first principle of applying liberal FFP is implemented within the resolution's second pillar of *participation*. Throughout the resolution, the SC has been *reaffirming, recognizing, encouraging* and *urging* to include women in any processes, measures or operations of foreign policy and peace missions (United Nations, 2000, p. 1-3). In order to realize this, women have to be appointed as holders of executive key positions in foreign policy. Even though the resolution uses the vague term of “*urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2), the levels of decision-making can include influential key positions of governance such as presidency, ministerial positions of foreign and defense policy as well as diplomatic positions.

On a national level, the SC *urges* the UN member states to ensure increased participation of women (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). The word “ensure” suggests that this could be done by implementing certain laws, regulations or quotas that would guarantee the inclusion of women as legally binding. Such laws, regulation or quotas are instruments in many countries to ensure women's legal representation and inclusion in politics, economy and culture. To implement such laws, regulations or quotas to ensure women's presence in foreign policy executive positions, NAPs can provide a possible legal platform. As the implementation of a NAP is mandatory for all signatory member states of the UN, the pillar of *presence* and with that the liberal FFP principle of *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions* becomes institutionalized in a member state's political framework of foreign policy. Establishing and implementing a NAP for a higher *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions* accords with the liberal feminist dimension to demand law changes to correct the underrepresentation of women in national institutions of foreign policy.

But the resolution also points out that the Secretary-General of the UN is *encouraged* and *urged* to appoint more women within the UN's institutional level (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). Thereby the UNSCR 1325 refers to the Secretary-General's plan of action (A/59/587) to implement the resolution 48/106 on the improvement of women's status and situation within the UN Secretariat

which calls “to accord greater priority to the recruitment and promotion of women” (United Nations, 1994, p. 3). The strategic plan of the Secretary-General stipulates strict instructions to all departments, offices and organs of the Secretariat to reach the goal of achieving full gender parity within the Secretariat by the year 2000. The UNSCR 1325 is directly referring to the failure of realizing the Secretary-General’s goal, but is reinforcing its importance as a plan to support the inclusion of women within the UN Secretariat. Moreover, the UNSCR 1325 “urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives [...] and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). This does not only support women’s inclusion in higher UN departments, but also during foreign policy executive missions as the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can have the authority to represent the Secretary-General during conflict operations (bpb, 2011). The UNSCR 1325 also realizes the importance of institutional change of the UN with regard to increasing women’s *presence in foreign policy executive positions*. This accords with the liberal feminist dimension of overcoming existing gendered barriers to include more women into the existing frameworks of international organizations and institutions.

The UNSCR 1325 is strongly emphasizing the inclusion of women within the national, international and institutional levels of decision-making. Thereby, the SC acknowledges women as “a resource that should be included at all levels of peace planning and peace-making” (Gibbins, 2011, p. 5). Liberal feminists have argued that women are the peaceful counterpart compared to the militant and aggressive man. As research shows, the likelihood of a peace agreement to last longer than 15 years, increases by 35%, if women were the successful negotiators. Therefore, women have proven to be a crucial and important actor for peace (UN Women, n.d.). Women’s peaceful potential has also been *recognized* by the UNSCR 1325 as women’s “full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2) and should be institutionally guaranteed. Therefore, the UNSCR 1325 supports the legal inclusion of women into “hard” politics which undermines the gendered stereotypes and the established male dominance of leadership in foreign policy as the UNSCR 1325 recognizes the potential and competence of women in key positions of foreign policy. Moreover, this assures that the experiences, demands and needs of women are being represented in foreign policy executive positions.

4.1.2.2 *Inclusion of women in military and combat*

The second principle of applying liberal FFP is also implemented within the second pillar of *participation* of the UNSCR 1325. Again, by referring to the vague term of “urges Member States to ensure

increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2), increased representation of women can also be understood as to have more women within the military and combat of a member state. Military interventions and people in combat are first-hand operators of any nationally set and instructed foreign or defense policies, and therefore can be seen as national or regional mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict. Including more women into military increases gender equality within military and combat missions and promotes that women and men are equally suitable to serve. As the word “ensure” suggests, realizing gender equality within military and combat could be done in form of laws, regulations or quotas that would legally guarantee a stronger inclusion of women within military and combat. Just as priorly discussed, NAPs provide a possible legal platform to implement such laws, regulations or quotas. As the implementation of a NAP is mandatory for all signatory member states of the UN, the pillar of *presence* and with that, the liberal FFP principle of *inclusion of women in military and combat* becomes implemented within a member state.

But more clearly does the UNSCR 1325 “urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). Here, the SC especially calls out UN operations and interventions to be more gender-inclusive and integrate more women into their missions which is in accord with the liberal FFP principle of *inclusion of women in military and combat*.

Even though the UNSCR 1325 does only mention the increasing gender equality benefits by integrating more women into a member state’s military and combat as well as into the UN field-based operations to decrease the gendered stereotypical representation of a male soldier, a higher inclusion of women can also increase the likelihood to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner. As discussed within the theory of liberal feminism, women try to resolve conflicts by using methods of a peaceful manner such as mediation, negotiation and other forms of communications that can be transferred onto women in military and combat as well. The methods of peaceful conflict solution require high sensibility and understanding of human relationships. Not only are women more prone to be the victims of war, but also due to their ascribed mothering abilities, women find it easier to understand and relate to women’s needs, demands and experiences. Women in military and combat as well in UN field-based operations can, therefore, support the process of a peaceful conflict resolution on site.

4.1.2.3 *Promotion of women's human rights*

The third principle of applying liberal FFP focuses on women as victims of global subordination which means that women do not get to fully enjoy human rights. The third principle of applying liberal FFP is in strong favor of the *promotion of women's human rights* which does not only mean that women get to enjoy them, but also that all international actors will face a legal prosecution when violating women's human rights. The UNSCR 1325 makes several comments that "all parties to armed conflict [have] to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls" (United Nations, 2000, p. 3). This can especially be seen as the UNSCR 1325 "*emphasizes* the responsibility of States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for [...] war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls" (United Nations, 2000, p. 3). This part of the UNSCR 1325 has three dimensions to it. The SC realizes that women are victims of violence during armed conflict. This is a consequence as women in some parts of the world are denied from their full enjoyment of human rights. As women are being denied their access to human rights, it increases the possibility that women become easy targets and victims of violence during armed conflict. Especially sexual violence is hugely affecting women in armed conflict and is being used as a weapon. But as women are being oppressed and denied their human rights, they cannot enforce a legal prosecution as they have no legal rights in some parts of the world. The UNSCR 1325 has recognized this violation of women's human rights and by emphasizing the states' responsibilities to legally prosecute war crime offenders of any type, the UNSCR 1325 promotes the full enjoyment of women's human rights. The *promotion of women's human rights* can be considered within the first pillar of *prevention* (as the SC realizes that member states have to strengthen women's rights under national law) and the third pillar of *protection* as women's full enjoyment of human rights gives them legal protection from any kind of war crime.

4.1.2.4 *Official commitment to women's rights and gender equality*

As the UNSCR 1325 itself is the landmark resolution that has implemented the international "Women, Peace and Security"-agenda on the protection and application of women's rights and gender equality in conflict, the UNSCR 1325 is a leading policy of women's rights and gender equality within foreign policy. According to Chapter V, Art. 27 "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members" (UN, n.d.). That means that for a resolution to pass the UN SC, it needs nine or more positive votes and no vetoes within the UN SC. The UNSCR 1325 has been unanimously passed by the five permanent members of the SC which are China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States as well as by the ten non-permanent members of the SC which were Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Jamaica,

Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, the Netherlands, Tunisia and Ukraine during that time (UN, 2000). As adopted resolutions of the UN SC have to be accepted and carried out by the member states of the UN, all 193 countries that have ratified the UN Charter are legally bound to implement the UNSCR 1325 (UN, n.d.). In order to do so, the UNSCR 1325 shall be laid out into government-led NAPs or other forms of national or regional strategies that serve the implementation of the UNSCR 1325. As the UNSCR 1325 is one of the leading international policies towards women's human rights and gender equality to show *official commitment to women's and gender equality* in conflict.

But moreover, the UNSCR 1325 *recalls* prior signed and adopted resolutions (1261, 1265, 1296 and 1301) which were about children and civilians in armed conflict as well as “*recalling also* the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” (United Nations, 2000, p. 1) and makes further reference to the obligations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Additional Protocol of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979, the Optional Protocol of 1999, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols of 2000 as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (United Nations, 2000, p. 3). All of these higher international laws, treaties, conventions and resolutions are reflected within as well as respected and applied by the UNSCR 1325 to strengthen the *official commitment to women's rights and gender equality*.

4.1.2.5 Application of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict

The last principle of applying liberal FFP is especially reflected within the second pillar of *participation* and the fourth pillar of *relief and recovery* of the UNSCR 1325. The resolution repeatedly mentions the importance of not only including women at all levels of decision-making during peace processes, but moreover makes sure that women's human rights and a gender perspective are being applied during conflict situations, especially in post-conflict situations such as the reconstructing process of a society. The SC is “*recognizing* the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2) and also “*recognizing* the importance [...] for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations” (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). With the inclusion of a gender perspective into any peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution methods and post-conflict reconstruction, the SC acknowledges not only the special impacts conflict has on women, but moreover that their needs during those periods of conflict differ from men due to the gender component. Hereby, the UNSCR 1325 also acknowledges the importance to strengthen and include local women's peace initiatives in peace processes and furthermore their role within the

implementation mechanisms of peace agreements. Local women's peace initiatives act as guardians of the application of women's human rights as they are the first ones to notice when women's human rights are being violated.

The SC does not only recognize its own responsibilities during those processes, but also directly calls upon the UN member states, the Secretary-General and all actors of conflict to not only consider, but to ensure and guarantee women's special needs and involve them at all levels of decision-making processes to ensure that the peace negotiations will acknowledge women's experiences and demands within the post-conflict reconstruction of society. In order to apply this form of gender mainstreaming throughout all peace measures, the SC demands that the Secretary-General has to provide training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the special needs of women which have to be incorporated into member states' national training for military and civilian police personnel (United Nations, 2000, p. 2). Moreover, the SC "*calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective" (United Nations, 2000, p. 3) which includes the consideration of women's special needs, measures to support and include local women's peace initiatives, and measures that protect women's human rights during the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

Throughout the UNSCR 1325, the SC repeatedly marks the application and inclusion of gender within the *relief and recovery* measures such as repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction as important. With the application and inclusion of gender, the UNSCR 1325 acknowledges the special impacts gender has on women's situation and women's human rights. In order to protect and to safeguard women's human rights in conflict and post-conflict, the consideration to apply and include gender becomes inevitable. To safeguard the *application of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict*, women need to be involved at all stages of conflict and peace resolutions as well as during the period of the implementation of peace agreements which has been implemented within the pillar of *participation*.

4.1.3 Concluding remarks

Deriving from the conducted research and analysis, it becomes clear that the UNSCR 1325 is an international *policy* and framework for gender equality, women's rights and women's participation in conflict and post-conflict which has implemented all five principles of applying liberal FFP within its four pillars of *prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery*. It is safe to say that the UNSCR 1325 is a *policy* product of the *philosophy* of liberal FFP. The appendix of this research

provides an overview of the implementation of the principles of applying liberal FFP into the UNSCR 1325 (Table 2, p. 48-50).

As priorly mentioned, a *philosophy* forms the foundation and lays out ideas, values and principles that can later be applied in and strengthened by a *policy*. The example of liberal FFP as a *philosophy* of applying FFP and the UNSCR 1325 as its *policy* shows how a *policy* builds upon and uses the principles, ideas and values of a *philosophy*. Whereas the *philosophy* of applying liberal FFP provides the *normative* reasons why following a liberal FFP is more beneficial than other prevailing foreign policy methods or frameworks, the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 lays out more *cognitive* ideas how the ideas of liberal FFP are best to be realized by directly addressing and assigning different responsibilities to different actors such as the Secretary-General of the UN or the UN member states. But even though they are being directly addressed with what to do, some of the ideas can still be described as *normative*. For example, member states of the UN or actors of conflict are being asked to include a gender perspective into conflict resolution – but, the UNSCR 1325 does not provide a *cognitive* answer on how to do it. Therefore, some of the stated ideas of the UNSCR 1325 are up for personal interpretation of countries or actors of conflict to implement them.

4.2 From *philosophy* to *program*

The second part of this analysis will provide an in-depth look at how the *philosophy* of liberal FFP has been implemented and translated into the national context of Sweden's *program* of FFP. This part will answer the second sub-question of “*How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?*”.

4.2.1 What is the Swedish FFP?

In October 2014, Sweden became the first country worldwide to develop, apply and pursue an FFP strategy as its main political framework to conduct foreign policy. By implication this means that all Swedish foreign policy measures have to apply “a systematic gender equality perspective” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 9) to counteract and abolish the worldwide discrimination and systematic subordination of women in order to achieve gender equality worldwide. Hereby, the Swedish FFP does not only view gender equality as their main goal and objective, but moreover recognizes gender equality as a means to an end – gender equality is crucial for the development of peace and security. The Swedish FFP is described as a “working method” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11) which takes three Rs as its starting points to measure the Swedish foreign policy action by: *rights*, *representation*, and *resources* based on the fourth R of the *reality* which women

and girls face (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11). On the basis of women's current *reality*, the current Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, argues that "throughout the world, women are neglected in terms of resources, representation and rights" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11).

Sweden's three Rs build the transformative agenda "that aims to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 11). The first R of *rights* is understood to promote women's full enjoyment of human rights which also means to fight against all forms of violations of women's human rights. The second R of *representation* strives to promote women's participation and influence at all levels of any decision-making processes. Hereby, a focus has also been set to conduct dialogues with women representatives and civil society. The last R stands for *resources* that are fairly allocated to promote and implement gender equality and equal opportunities for all women to enjoy human rights (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 13). These three Rs are based on a fourth R which is the *reality* of the current situation of women worldwide. It is used as a reality check to see if any measures of the Swedish FFP actually contribute towards their end's goal of gender equality. Therefore, all adopted Swedish foreign policies must be measured by their contribution towards the fulfillment of the three Rs by a check on *reality*.

The implementation of the Swedish FFP is guided by the main goal of establishing gender equality and women's full enjoyment of human rights. But not only is the Swedish FFP guided by its four Rs, the Swedish Foreign Service has also formulated an action plan with six long-term external objectives in order to successfully achieve the goal of establishing gender equality and women's full enjoyment of human rights. As this action plan is renewed annually, it benefits from the *reality* check as the objectives reflect current problems and situations women are facing. The current six long-term external objectives contribute towards women's full enjoyment of human rights, women's freedom from physical, psychological and sexual violence, women's participation in preventing and resolving conflicts and post-conflict peacebuilding, women's political participation and influence in all areas of society, women's full enjoyment of economic rights and empowerment, and women's full enjoyment of sexual and reproductive health and rights (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 19). Even though those are individually set out objectives, together they are contributing towards the same goal of establishing gender equality worldwide. Moreover, the "objectives are also mutually reinforcing and are dependent on each other" (Government of Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 19), meaning that the achievement of one objective causes other objectives to be reached. The four Rs and the six long-term external objectives of the Swedish FFP do not only

outline and determine the policies of the three policy areas of the Swedish FFP which are foreign and security policy, development cooperation, and trade and promotion policy, but also all international organizations and institutions and countries that Sweden is practicing foreign policy with, will have to meet those standards. Sweden's FFP does not only determine how Sweden is going to act in the realm of foreign policy, but also with whom they are going to work together.

That Sweden is the first country to implement a concept of FFP, does not come as a surprise to many. Not only does Sweden have a long history with "its progressive gender equality policy featuring social reforms to strengthen women and girls at every stage of life and in all forums" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 16), Sweden also became the first government to declare itself as a "feminist" government in 2014. Sweden's definition of a feminist government is that gender equality becomes the central issue to all governmental affairs as well as it "ensures that a gender equality perspective is brought into policy-making [...] nationally and internationally" (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.a). This means that all members of the Swedish government have internalized and are following a feminist agenda throughout their political activities. As Sweden believes and is "committed to building a society in which girls and boys, women and men have the same power to shape society and their own lives, and live their lives to their full potential" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2019, p. 1), building a gender-equal society does not stop within Swedish borders, but goes beyond them. Sweden is convinced that global gender equality does not only create healthier and economic stronger societies, but also positively affects the sustainability of peace (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 7). Hence, it almost goes without saying that Sweden has implemented a foreign policy concept that has exactly institutionalized the Swedish feminist concept of governmental strive for gender equality. To share the knowledge and experiences that Sweden has accumulated with the implementation of its FFP, Sweden has released a handbook on its FFP in 2018. The handbook of Sweden's FFP realizes the phrase "sharing is caring" as the handbook provides to be a resource for other countries, international organizations and institutions or other forms of national and international forums that desire a feminist change of foreign policy.

4.2.2 How are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?

With the launch of the Swedish FFP, Sweden is taking major steps towards placing gender equality as the central issue of foreign policy. With the release of their handbook on the Swedish FFP, Sweden has a strong influence to impact the realm of foreign policy and IR. At the first look, it seems that the Swedish FFP with its four Rs of *rights*, *representation*, *resources* and *reality* is a *program* that is following the criticism of liberal feminists and might even apply the *philosophy* of liberal FFP and its five principles. But how are the principles of liberal FFP implemented in the Swedish FFP?

4.2.2.1 *Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions*

The first principle of applying liberal FFP has been implemented within the second R of *representation* that guides the actions and policies of the Swedish FFP. As priorly explained, the Swedish FFP understands *representation* as the promotion of women's participation and influence at all levels of any decision-making processes as well as seeking and including dialogues of women's rights representatives and civil society. As the Swedish FFP asks itself the important question "Are women represented where decisions that affect them are made – in parliament, on boards and in legal systems?" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6), the Swedish FFP has formulated answers to this question throughout the handbook of the Swedish FFP.

Just as the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325, the *program* of the Swedish FFP has recognized the importance of women's inclusion, representation and presence in foreign policy executive positions. Throughout the Swedish *program* of FFP, the inclusion, representation and presence of women in foreign policy executive positions is a common theme. Sweden is one of the 63 countries to have a female foreign minister. Ever since the Swedish election of the Social Democrat government in 2014, Margot Wallström became appointed as the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prior to that position, Wallström was the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict from 2010 to 2012. Even though women appointed in political positions do not necessarily assure the application and pursuit of a feminist political agenda, Wallström proves to be a living example of a woman in politics who is placing gender equality at the center of her political actions. She is the Swedish face of establishing gender equality, safeguarding women's rights and ensuring women's representation in conflict and post-conflict. It was Wallström who has re-thought and re-structured the Swedish foreign policy into a foreign policy that applies the feminist concerns by putting gender equality as the central issue. This is also in accordance with the liberal FFP. As priorly explained, "having women in positions of power is critical not only in ensuring that diverse voices shape this critical area of policy" (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 8), but also ensuring that through the "substantive representation [...] women's political interests are integrated into policymaking" (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). It does not matter, how many women are represented, but it matters that women occupy the right positions in foreign policy to actually contribute towards the change "of making women count" (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). Therefore, Wallström is a living example of a country's implementation of the first principle of applying liberal FFP as Sweden has appointed a woman into the highest foreign policy executive position.

4.2.2.2 *Inclusion of women in military and combat*

Since the Swedish FFP promotes the first principle of applying liberal FFP of *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions* and as the second R of the Swedish FFP “shall promote women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels and in all areas” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 13), it can be assumed that the Swedish FFP is also in support and favor of the *inclusion of women in military and combat*. But, throughout the handbook of the Swedish FFP, there is no reference towards women in military and combat. The Swedish FFP only mentions military in reference towards implementing a stronger integration of gender equality in any situation of military engagements (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 67). This means that all military actions, missions, engagements need to apply a systematic gender perspective. All of the Swedish military engagements need to promote and safeguard gender equality. Since the Swedish FFP repeatedly states its support of women’s representation in all areas of politics as well as acknowledges women’s role in conflict as peacemakers, the inclusion of women into the Swedish military and combat would actually support that. To find relevant information about the women’s situation in military and combat in Sweden, a look at the history of the Swedish Armed Forces provides an indication of means to support women’s inclusion here. Hereby, the year of 2018 is from central importance as it highlights the year that women gained the same formal and legal conscription as men to be enrolled for the military (Persson & Sundevall, 2019). The so-called “gender-neutral conscription” (Persson & Sundevall, 2019, p. 1) can be understood as to counteract the prevailing gender ascribed roles and characteristics that define women as not being equally suitable as men to serve in military and combat.

The decision to include the “gender-neutral conscription” of the Swedish Armed Forces within this part of this research (even though it is not being mentioned within the handbook of the Swedish FFP), provides an example that not only the Swedish military has to systematically apply a gender perspective on their military engagements abroad, but moreover apply gender and gender equality in the military formation domestically. The “gender-neutral conscription” is an example of Sweden’s implementation to support and apply the second liberal FFP principle of *inclusion of women in military and combat* which also means that the second R of *representation* does mean to demand a women’s participation and inclusion in military and combat positions. A higher inclusion of women in military and combat as well as a higher number of female military decision-makers does not only counteract the prevailing gendered stereotypes, but also supports a more peaceful conflict resolution as women tend to apply peaceful conflict resolution methods such as mediation, negotiation and other forms of communications with the parties of conflict. As priorly explained, due to

women's mothering abilities and women's greater risk of being war victims, women find it easier to understand and relate to women's needs, demands and experiences. Therefore, the inclusion of women within the Swedish Armed Forces can support the process of peaceful conflict resolution as well as it can increase the rate of gender equality within Sweden and its military and combat.

4.2.2.3 *Promotion of women's human rights*

As priorly explained, the third principle of applying liberal FFP focuses on women as victims of global subordination which means that women do not get to fully enjoy human rights. The third principle of applying liberal FFP is in strong favor of the *promotion of women's human rights* which does not only mean that women get to enjoy them, but also that all international actors will face a legal prosecution when violating women's human rights. By asking the question of "Do they have the same rights [...]?" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6), the Swedish FFP has recognized women's lack of full enjoyment of human rights. Not only does the Swedish FFP pose the question, but it also answers the question within the definition of their first R. The first R of *rights* promotes not only women's full enjoyment of human rights, but also fights against all forms of violations of women's human rights worldwide. Throughout its FFP, Sweden has acknowledged that women have been deprived of basic human rights such as the right to education, work, marriage, divorce and inheritance (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6). Hence, Sweden's first long-term external objective is women's full enjoyment of human rights which means that all Swedish foreign policy actions and measures on multilateral, bilateral, regional and EU level need to work towards the application of women's full enjoyment of human rights (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 20). The promotion of women's human rights through the external affairs of Sweden does not only benefit the international containment of women's oppression and subordination, but moreover promotes and ensures women's freedom from any sort of violence. As priorly explained, liberal feminists argue that the subordination of women "is itself a form of violence" (Kinsella, 2017, p. 197). By denying women their basic human rights, they have no guaranteed safety and security from any violence and become easy targets and victims of violence during armed conflict. Hereby, women are often at risk of sexual violence in armed conflict with sexual violence being used as a weapon against them and their family. As stated in the handbook of the Swedish FFP "Sweden attaches great importance to preventing and counteracting gender-based and sexual violence in conflict and in society generally" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 73). Due to the lack of women's human rights, women are powerless and cannot enforce a legal prosecution. The Swedish FFP has recognized this violation of women's human rights and treats sexual violence against women as a war crime which allows that "victims of crime have a right to redress, and perpetrators must be held accountable" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 23) which abolishes the

impunity of the offenders. This recognition allows women to gain legal power which means they will fully enjoy human rights. Moreover, the third R of *resources* supports the fair allocation of resources such as land, income and food as those basic needs are being often denied for women to enjoy freely (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 13). Therefore, the Swedish FFP supports the third principle of applying liberal FFP.

4.2.2.4 *Official commitment to women's rights and gender equality*

Throughout the Swedish FFP, Sweden is reflecting upon very different international treaties, conventions and frameworks. The handbook only names a selection of those international commitments Sweden (and therefore the Swedish FFP) have ratified to support and prove *official commitment to women's rights and gender equality*.

According to the handbook, the Swedish FFP is reflecting upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the declarations and action plans of the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action) and the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo with all their final and follow-up documents, the UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions within the “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the European Union (EU) action plan for gender equality and women's empowerment in EU's external relations 2016-2020 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 16). All of these higher international laws, treaties, conventions and resolutions are based on gender equality, women's rights and women's representation and are forms of *official commitment to women's rights and gender equality*.

Especially the UNSCR 1325 and its commitment to applying international gender equality by safeguarding women's representation in conflict and post-conflict, has highly influenced Sweden's *program* of FFP. Throughout the Swedish FFP, several references have been made to Sweden's strong commitment applying the UNSCR 1325 and its values and principles. Hereby, Sweden has recognized the potential of the UNSCR 1325 and made its implementation a priority for the Swedish FFP. Currently, Sweden has released its third NAP for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda for the years of 2016-2020 (PeaceWomen, n.d.b).

But Sweden does not only promote the implementation of international frameworks within its own foreign policy agenda. During Sweden's non-permanent membership of the UN SC in 2017-2018, Sweden has shown *official commitment to women's rights and gender equality* by making the UNSCR 1325

and its subsequent resolutions within the “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda a priority area for Sweden’s work in the UN SC (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.b, p. 4). Thereby, Sweden is re-enforcing the importance of the UNSCR 1325 as an international policy and framework that heavily contributes and promotes gender equality and women’s rights in the international arena of foreign policy. This concludes Sweden’s strong *official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality*.

4.2.2.5 *Application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict*

The last principle of applying liberal FFP means to apply a gender perspective within conflict and post-conflict to ensure and safeguard women’s rights as well as to include women at all levels of decision-making during peace processes. This can especially be found within the Swedish first R of *rights* and the second R of *representation*.

For Sweden, FFP stands for “applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6) and is repeatedly stating that Sweden is taking concrete measures and actions to support gender equality during the periods of conflict and post-conflict. Applying a gender perspective or to support gender equality during conflict and post-conflict means to strengthen women’s rights which are often at stake in conflict and post-conflict situations. As a consequence, women are denied their representation and participation in peace processes and conflict resolutions which negatively impacts women’s human rights in and post-conflict. To safeguard the application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict, women need to be involved at all stages of conflict and peace resolution as well as during the period of the implementation of peace agreements, so that women’s demands, needs and experiences become heard to prevent more conflicts. With the application of a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the Swedish FFP, Sweden has recognized the impacts of gender in conflict and post-conflict.

An example of “applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6) and of the *application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict* can be seen within Sweden’s export of military equipment. Due to the legislative change on April 15, 2018, Sweden is only allowed to export military equipment to democratic countries (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 73-74). Hereby, “Sweden [...] take[s] into account the risk of exported materials being used for – or facilitating – serious gender-based violence or serious violence against women” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 73). As priorly explained, the lack of women’s human rights during and post-conflict makes women easy targets and victims of any kind of armed and gendered violence. Therefore, the export of military weapons

to countries that violate women's full enjoyment of human rights increases the risk that those weapons are used against women. It is a form of gendered violence as weapons will stay within the possession of men and are used to exert power over and violence against women. This legislative change is a tremendous step towards the fulfillment of the Swedish first R of *rights* to "promote all women's and girls' full enjoyment of human rights, including by combating all forms of violence" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 13) and is an example how Sweden is implementing the last principle of applying a liberal FFP.

But Sweden also strengthens women's inclusion and representation in conflict and post-conflict as the *application of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict* demands. The second R of *representation* "promote[s] women's participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels [...] and shall seek dialogue with women representatives at all levels, including civil society" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 13). The Swedish FFP acknowledges women's peaceful potential by stating that "inclusive peace processes are the most sustainable" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 24). Hereby, "Inclusive peace processes offer opportunities for more possibilities in finding solutions, win better support and are more sustainable" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018 p. 25) and therefore "Women's involvement in peace processes and peacebuilding must increase" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 25). But to actually use women's peaceful potential and to increase their presence and participation in any sort of peace or resolution process, the Swedish FFP introduces the method of the Swedish Women's Mediation Network (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 65). Founded in 2015, the Swedish Women's Mediation Network is especially tackling women's clear under-representation in mediation and peace processes. With the network's goal "to promote peaceful conflict resolution and actively support women's meaningful participation in peacebuilding initiatives – before, during and after conflicts" (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 65), the network supports the inclusion of women on the local level, but also at the highest formal level. The network consists of women who all have longstanding experiences with peacebuilding, diplomacy and political processes, but come from different thematic backgrounds – from members of civil society groups to members of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Women's Mediation Network can be understood as a voice for women's demands, needs and experiences during conflict and post-conflict. As the Swedish Women's Mediation Network includes members and women of civil society groups, a close connection to real demands, needs and experiences will be ensured. To settle conflicts and to get women's demands, needs and experiences to be heard and implemented within a societal reconstruction, the peaceful method of mediation is being used. Mediation allows seeking dialogues between the parties of conflict, instead of using force and violence. Hereby, mediation is being used as a method to establish stability and

peace which counteracts the rule of the *Hobbesian world* which believes that stability will be reached through force. But moreover, the Swedish Women's Mediation Network is an example of women's peaceful potential as they prefer peaceful methods of conflict resolution. Therefore, also the fifth principle of applying liberal FFP has been implemented within the Swedish FFP.

4.2.3 Concluding remarks

Deriving from the conducted research and analysis, it becomes clear that the Swedish FFP is a national foreign policy *program* that puts establishing gender equality at the center of all governmental activities and affairs – nationally and internationally. Especially within its three Rs of *rights*, *representation* and *resources*, the Swedish FFP has implemented all five principles of applying liberal FFP. Even though the fourth R of *reality* has not been mentioned throughout the analysis of the Swedish FFP, it is still an important R to mention. As priorly explained, all adopted Swedish foreign policies must be measured by their contribution towards the fulfillment of the three Rs by a check on *reality*. To check on the *reality* of women first, acknowledges the individual situations women live in – but it cannot be identified as a principle of applying liberal FFP. The *reality* check is primarily being used to support formulating and implementing policies as a check on *reality* informs whether a policy is needed or not, or has achieved the promised result. But still, it is safe to say that the Swedish FFP is a *program* of the *philosophy* of liberal FFP. The appendix of this research provides an overview of the implementation of the principles of applying liberal FFP into the Swedish FFP (Table 3, p. 50-52).

The example of liberal FFP as a philosophy of applying FFP and the Swedish FFP as its *program* shows how a *program* builds upon and uses the principles, ideas and values of a *philosophy*. Whereas the *philosophy* of applying liberal FFP provides the *normative* reasons why following a liberal FFP is more beneficial than other prevailing foreign policy methods or frameworks, the *program* of the Swedish FFP translates those *normative* ideas into a *cognitive program* of applying the *philosophy* of liberal FFP. Hereby, the handbook of the Swedish FFP is an important source of the *cognitive* ideas of the Swedish FFP as it lays out and describes some of the Swedish actions, methods, engagements and successes of its FFP in detail. Many times, the Swedish FFP is addressing the *normative* ideas and frameworks of international policies of gender equality such as the UNSCR 1325 to provide a base for their *cognitive* action to achieve the given *normative* ideas.

5 Conclusion

The years of 2000 and 2014 mark important years for women's enjoyment of human rights in conflict and post-conflict, for international gender equality, for women's substantive representation and participation, for women's demands, needs and experiences to be heard – the years of 2000 and 2014 mark the beginning of applying foreign policy through the feminist lens.

This research was based on the impression that when it comes to the realm of international and foreign policies, men are occupying the leadership position and creating a male representation of the world in form of a political patriarchy in foreign policy. Throughout the theoretical framework of this research, one was able to see that especially the social construct of gender has influenced the way foreign policy is being applied and pursued. Gender is being described as the embodiment of power inequality in foreign policy that produces a hegemonic masculinity, a political patriarchy and a masculinist framing of politics. As priorly explained, gender is “the social institutionalization of sexual difference” (Okin, 1998, p. 116) which means that gender has the power and influence to ascribe socially constructed norms, traits and values that are associated with masculinity and femininity. Men are described as strong, rational and courageous whereas women seem emotional, weak and afraid. When looking at the description of a competent leader, one will find a strong similarity between the characteristics of masculinity and leadership. Therefore, to be a leader is often associated with fulfilling the masculine stereotypes, and even if men cannot and will not live up to those hyper-masculine standards, a woman will never. As a consequence, gender influences who gets what in foreign politics as it creates a power asymmetry between men and women. Hence, gender is the embodiment of power inequality in foreign policy and results in a hegemonic masculinity which is “projected onto the behavior of states” (Tickner, 1992 p. 6). As states are the main actors in traditional foreign policy and IR, the realm of international politics continues to be a gendered entity – describing the state as a male entity and leaving out women as actors of the state (Tickner, 2014, p. 76). The exclusion of women from foreign policy consequently leads to the neglect of women's needs, demands and experiences. The masculinist framing of politics results in that men only speak from their truth, only speak from their needs, demands and experiences – women become invisible in and to foreign policy.

Foreign policy as a male entity, it is still a picture that describes the situation of foreign policy of today. As stated earlier, only 63 out of 188 countries have a female foreign minister whereas one will find 109 women in ministerial positions of social affairs or 107 women in ministerial positions of family, children, youth, elderly or disabled (IPU, 2019). The door to women's participation and

representation in “hard politics” still seems relatively closed as women’s political representation is often restricted to areas of “soft politics” as the numbers reflect.

One step towards the direction of women’s inclusion and representation in foreign policy which is theoretically based upon the presented feminist criticism of foreign policy and IR, is the concept and strategy of FFP. Especially the liberal dimension of FFP promises to be a policy change that is taking serious steps towards the “substantive representation whereby women’s political interests are integrated into policymaking and whereby outcomes matter” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016, p. 328). The concept of liberal FFP supports and promotes the inclusion of women into existing frameworks of foreign policy and IR. Within the liberal theory of IR, states still remain important actors of foreign policy as they are the main members of international organizations and institutions. As international organizations and institutions become the new main actors of foreign policy, but states still remain their participating actors, it subsequently leads to international organizations and institutions becoming gendered constructions that are dominated by men and their masculinist framing of politics. Therefore, liberal feminists are strong advocates of correcting gender inequality by increasing women’s representation in positions of national and international governance (Kinsella, 2017). One way to pursue and achieve women’s representation and inclusion into existing frameworks of foreign policy is the liberal FFP explained by Alwan and Weldon (2017). Liberal FFP and its five principles set a *normative* foundation on what applying foreign policy through the (liberal) feminist lens entails. A liberal FFP promotes the *presence of women in foreign policy executive positions, inclusion of women in military and combat, promotion of women’s human rights, official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality, and application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict*. A liberal FFP does not only want women’s inclusion and representation, but it is also a strong advocate for the application and women’s full enjoyment of human rights at all stages. The ideal idea of liberal FFP is to create policy changes that require the legal implementation of exactly those principles.

The years of 2000 and 2014 mark influential and important years for the liberal FFP and its five principles. With the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 on October 31, 2000, the agenda on “Women, Peace and Security” has set the international framework of applying a feminist lens on foreign policy. It is an international *policy* of women’s inclusion in conflict and post-conflict situations, safeguarding women’s human rights and establishing gender equality. 14 years later, the Swedish government launched its own Swedish FFP *program*. It is a foreign policy *program* that is “applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018, p. 6) to promote and safeguard women’s *rights, representation and resources*. Both, the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP have implied legal

consequences for the realm of foreign policy. The UNSCR 1325 is a legally binding document to all signatory member states of the UN and needs to be implemented into government-led NAPs that influence the national strategies of foreign policy. Sweden has turned its whole foreign policy agenda upside down by designing it as feminist and placing the establishment of gender equality at the center of all foreign policy action. As the *policy* and the *program* are both strong advocates of liberal FFP, this research wanted to know how the principles of liberal FFP have been implemented into the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP.

As the analysis has shown, the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP have implemented the *philosophy* of applying liberal FFP to the point. Both acknowledge that women's representation in key foreign policy executive positions is crucial for women's needs, demands and experiences during and post-conflict – the substantive representation matters to make women count. Moreover, both have recognized women's peaceful potential to settle conflicts. This recognition makes women important actors for foreign policy executive positions, military and combat as well as during all levels of peace-making, resolution of a conflict and reconstruction of a society. Not only is women's representation needed to peacefully settle a conflict, but women's representation also guarantees and ensures that women's needs, demands and experiences are heard during conflict and post-conflict. This has also been acknowledged by the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP as both are applying women's rights in conflict and post-conflict. But moreover, the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP are also promoting the application of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict. Both have recognized that women are deprived of the full enjoyment of human rights. Consequently, they become easy targets and victims of especially sexual violence during armed conflict. Both want to combat sexual violence by promoting women's human rights and allowing the legal prosecution of war crime offenders. Throughout the *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP, several references have been made to official international treaties, conventions and frameworks of international gender equality, women's rights and women's representation.

The *policy* of the UNSCR 1325 and the *program* of the Swedish FFP have allowed drawing linkages between the theory of liberal FFP and liberal FFP in action. Thereby, the theory of DI has allowed to narrate the process of the *normative* ideas of the *philosophy* of applying liberal FFP being implemented into explicit *cognitive* ideas, strategies and methods within the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP. Even though the UNSCR 1325 is also considered to be a *normative* framework of FFP, it still directly addresses responsibilities to actors of foreign policy in a *cognitive* nature. Especially the Swedish FFP is strongly influenced by the *normative* framework of the UNSCR 1325. This would also

make an interesting point for further research. This research is only taking into account the path from *philosophy* to policy, and from *philosophy* to *program*. But since the handbook of the Swedish FFP repeatedly gives references to the UNSCR 1325, further research can be done on drawing a line from *philosophy* and *policy* to *program*.

This research provides two examples of each a *policy* and a *program* that has implemented and realized liberal FFP. Hereby, the UNSCR 1325 and the Swedish FFP have proven to be great possibilities to change the course of foreign policy towards applying foreign policy through the (liberal) feminist lens as both strongly advocate the importance and influence of women's inclusion into existing frameworks of foreign policy. The more NAPs of the UNSCR 1325 are being implemented, the more national foreign policies will put establishing gender equality, safeguarding women's rights and increasing their participation at the center of their foreign policy action. Moreover, the handbook of the Swedish FFP was written to be taken seriously by other countries and provide them with knowledge, expertise and examples of their successful stories of how to increase women's participation, safeguarding women's human rights and condemning gender inequality in a national *program* of foreign policy. But not only Sweden is demanding and implementing a more feminist direction of pursuing foreign policy – countries as Canada, Finland, Switzerland, Australia and, even recently, France also push for a more feminist approach of foreign policy and placing gender equality and a stronger implementation of the UNSCR 1325 right at the center of their national foreign policy agendas. To what extent those *programs* also apply the liberal dimension of FFP is a question for further research.

Nevertheless, a foreign policy with a liberal feminist lens of establishing gender equality by including women into existing frameworks of international organizations and institutions has great potential to make Simone de Beauvoir's quote become HIStory – and make foreign policy become HERstory.

6 References

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7 Appendix

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Items</i>	<i>Codes</i>
Liberal feminist foreign policy	Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions	Representation, participation, governance, decision-making power, leadership, proportion, diversity of voices and experiences, table, presidency, foreign minister, defense minister, diplomat, access
	Inclusion of women in military and combat	Participation, soldier, serving, peacekeeping, missions
	Promotion of women's human rights	Support, favor, aim, signature, against, reservations, civil and political rights, fundamental human rights
	Official commitment to women's rights and gender equality	CEDAW, UNSCR 1325, ICCPR, ICESCR, ratification, international rights, legally binding, institutionalized
	Application of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict	Peace negotiations, peace processes, gender equality in peace building, conflict resolution, reconstruction, inclusion, safeguarding, gender-mainstreaming, gender perspective

Table 1a. Coding scheme for the concept of liberal feminist foreign policy based on Alwan and Weldon (2017).

<i>Principles of liberal FFP</i>	<i>UNSCR 1325</i>
Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions	Member States shall ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention,

	<p>management, and resolution of conflict through possible laws, regulations or quotas through the NAPs (<i>presence</i>);</p> <p>Secretary-General of the UN shall appoint more women within the UN's institutional level and fulfill his plan of action (A/59/587) (<i>presence</i>)</p>
Inclusion of women in military and combat	<p>Member States shall ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict through possible laws, regulations or quotas through the NAPs (<i>presence</i>);</p> <p>Secretary-General of the UN shall include more women in the UN field-based operations as observers, civilian policy, human rights and humanitarian personnel (<i>presence</i>)</p>
Promotion of women's human rights	<p>Parties of armed conflict shall respect the fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women (<i>protection</i>);</p> <p>States shall prosecute offenders of war crime and (sexual) violence against women (<i>protection</i>);</p> <p>Recognition of women's human rights gives women legal power (<i>protection</i>)</p>
Official commitment to women's rights and gender equality	<p>The UNSCR 1325 itself is a leading official commitment to women's rights and gender equality;</p> <p>Recalls major official commitments to women's rights and gender equality (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Additional Protocol of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of</p>

	Discrimination against Women of 1979, the Optional Protocol of 1999, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols of 2000 as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)
Application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict	<p>Women shall be involved at all stages of conflict and peace resolutions as well as during the period of the implementation of peace agreements (<i>participation</i>);</p> <p>Peacekeeping operations shall mainstream a gender perspective and provide specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women in conflict situations (<i>relief and recovery</i>);</p> <p>Peace measures shall apply gender mainstreaming which shall be provided by the Secretary General of the UN in form of training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the special needs of women which have to be incorporated into member states’ national training for military and civilian police personnel (<i>relief and recovery</i>);</p> <p>Peace agreements shall adopt a gender perspective which includes the consideration of women’s special needs, measures to support and include local women’s peace initiatives, and measures to protect women’s human rights during the process of post-conflict reconstruction (<i>participation, relief and recovery</i>)</p>

Table 2. Overview of the implementation of the principles of applying liberal FFP into the UNSCR 1325.

<i>Principles of liberal FFP</i>	<i>Swedish FFP</i>
Presence of women in foreign policy executive positions	Promotes women’s participation and influence at all levels of any decision-making processes

	<p>and seeking and including dialogues of women’s rights representative and civil society (<i>representation</i>);</p> <p>Female Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, with a feminist agenda (<i>representation</i>)</p>
Inclusion of women in military and combat	<p>The Swedish FFP shall promote women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels and in all areas (<i>representation</i>);</p> <p>Military shall implement a stronger integration of gender equality in any situations of military engagements (<i>representation</i>);</p> <p>Implementation of the “gender-neutral conscription” within the Swedish Armed Forces (<i>representation</i>)</p>
Promotion of women’s human rights	<p>Promotion of women’s full enjoyment of human rights and combating all forms of violations of women’s human rights worldwide (<i>rights</i>);</p> <p>Long-term external objective of women’s full enjoyment of human rights and all Swedish foreign policy actions and measures on multi-lateral, bilateral, regional and EU level need to work towards the application of women’s full enjoyment of human rights (<i>rights</i>);</p> <p>Perpetrators of war crime and sexual violence must be held responsible and accountable (<i>rights</i>);</p> <p>Recognition of women’s human rights gives women legal power (<i>rights</i>)</p>
Official commitment to women’s rights and gender equality	<p>Recalls major official commitments to women’s rights and gender equality (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of</p>

	<p>Discrimination Against Women, the declarations and action plans of the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action) and the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo with all their final and follow-up documents, the UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions within the “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the EU action plan for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU’s external relations 2016-2020); The UNSCR 1325 and its agenda on “Women, Peace and Security”-agenda were a priority area for Sweden’s membership as a non-permanent member of the UN SC in 2017-2018</p>
<p>Application of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict</p>	<p>The application of a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda safeguards women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict and supports the inclusion of women at all stages of conflict, peace resolutions, and ensures that women’s needs, demands and experiences are included during societal reconstruction (<i>rights, representation</i>);</p> <p>Example of export of military equipment to only democratic countries to safeguards women’s rights and protect women from violence (<i>rights</i>);</p> <p>Example of Swedish Women’s Mediation Network to promote women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels and seek dialogue with women representatives at all levels, including civil society (<i>representation</i>)</p>

Table 3. Overview of the implementation of the principles of applying liberal FFP into the Swedish FFP.