

Unmasking Anticorruption Clichés

**How are clichés represented in the United Nations anti-corruption
discourse and are they mirrored by its member state Peru?**

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Abstract

This thesis will study how anti-corruption clichés in the form of the United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are present in the corruption discourse of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Peru.

As such, this thesis is exploring the underlying topic by the means of secondary data as in Peruvian media articles. The paper will employ a critical discourse analysis by making use of data in the time frame between 1962 and 2019. It includes current anti-corruption campaigns explicitly taking place in Peru and the role of the sustainable development goals within the latter. Moreover, the thesis introduces and discusses the question whether and if so to what extent United Nations agencies and global conventions dedicated to fighting corruption integrate the use of political clichés as a tool and how these have had an impact on its member states and their national corruption discourse. In order to pursue this question, this study will attempt to define the crucial link within the global and national discourse by analyzing recent scientific research in the field of public integrity, as well as taking a closer look at the use of linguistic expressions and how their influence is reflected in the shaping process of the discourse. All in all, this topic proves to be of current relevance considering that it depicts the ongoing struggle of developing countries to significantly lower corruption rates. Furthermore, the prevailing bribery scandals in connection with political corruption, as seen in Peru's latest presidential election, not only pose an undeniable obstacle for a country's sustainable development but also demonstrate the undeniable magnitude of the problem with regards to its extension through not only time but also place.

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1. Introduction

Corruption is a problem that is encountered by every country (Transparency International, 2018). Some deal with this issue to a higher degree and some to a lesser, but one characteristic, which all countries have in common, is that its negative effects always have the strongest impact on the most vulnerable groups of society, who therefore can least afford to cope with them (Sandage, 2015). These effects directly manifest themselves in depriving access to basic services and the illicit diversion of funds intended for developmental aid (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). On a larger scale, the aftermath, concerning issues related to corruption, become noticeable when looking at a country's economic performance, stability, and prosperity (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Therefore, it is of utmost importance to develop efficient strategies and implement realistic methods to counteract disparities in the field of public integrity. That being said, there already are countless initiatives on a global and national scale promoting promising development and progress through the eradication or significant reduction of corruption, one of the most popular being the 17 sustainability goals developed by the United Nations (United Nations, 2018). These goals are fabricated to resonate with everyone everywhere and operate by creating common targets and seemingly utopic ideals seeking to incentivize the accomplishment of a just society and satisfy the longing for security. Yet, despite this evident understanding of the problem and common agreeance on what ought to be done theoretically, in practice other than establishing these striking ambitions, in the author's opinion and experience not much more follows when it comes to carrying them out, especially in developing countries. Keeping this in mind, the objective of this research is to determine the extent to which international organizations, as the voices of the global anti-corruption discourse, inform national anti-corruption discourses and more precisely how the use of anti-corruption clichés in the global realm is mimicked and implemented in the national one of Peru. Additionally, this paper will be looking into the extent to which the use of clichés can affect the actual implementation of regulations and policies, thereby possibly hindering sustainable development. To do so, the following research question has been developed:

How do the United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development Goals inform Peru's current corruption discourse and the development of its new Anti-Corruption Commission?

Further sub questions will be: How are clichés placed in the discourses and what are the implications of their use? What role do these clichés play for sustainable development?

To begin with, analytical efforts done in the field of public integrity and corruption studies reveal that the main obstacle, when it comes to efficiently diminishing bad governance, appears to emerge in the early stage of introducing anti-corruption efforts to the areas in which they are needed (Heeks, 2011). This is heavily influenced by the discourse, in which the topics are discussed, and decisions are made. Therefore, making it desirable for governments to engage in anti-corruption initiatives is of utmost importance. Hence, an initiative is a particular stage in which the use of cliché-like statements and familiar expressions could alleviate the initial aversion to fundamental changes. However, the risks of this method should not be disregarded, since the higher likelihood of agreeing to rather vague ambitions might imply further vague executions. Here, the focus is redirected to the involvement of international organizations and external mediators, as to how their linguistic choices can steer the global corruption discourse into different directions and how these rhetoric tools partake in the implementation of anti-corruption measures in local communities. In this respect, the United Nations 17 Sustainability Goals will be used as a beacon for orientation. Hence, they are expressed in a rather compact format by compiling striking headlines yet are held subject to global recognition. This research is of an analytical kind, which aims to uncover the significance of global goals and how prevalent they are in the national realm.

Usually, the general means to go about a “solution elaboration process” is to seek out concrete targets in order to fragment or deconstruct the issue in a step by step improved reconstruction of the ideal case (Dostál, 2015). In fact, this would pose a suitable procedure to approach complex and multidimensional issues such as deficits in the field of public integrity. However, the field of politics is prone to the use of rather general striking headlines and ambitions, which often hold cliché characteristics, as the use of popular phrases is a tool to “either lull listeners into smiling submission or rouse them into a prefabricated condition of outrage” (Abley, 2018). The application of commonly known phrases and familiar expressions eases communication and assures a comprehensive format for the general public. Moreover, “making use of clichés leaves little to no room for being misunderstood and at the same time, they function as

a declaration of unity with the audience invoking an instantly recognized commonplace” (Hargraves, 2014). Nevertheless, as much as this might pose a rhetoric benefit for the person conveying a message, it can actually be detrimental for the people the message is directed towards. Vague modes of expression can be intended to disguise true intentions or presume that more initiative is put into action, when in reality no efforts are being made (Abley, 2018). Vague modes of expression portray a false optimism and mask the problematic reality in a veil of fictitious hope. Uncertainties and nebulous billboard-like statements do not provide the necessary information in order to be able to take action. Indeed, they can either slow down the process or completely discourage engaging in counteraction altogether, resulting in the first step of naming a target in also being the last step. These manners can be particularly detrimental when applied to policies within the anti-corruption discourse. Mundane idioms and commonly used phrases make us think inside the box rather than outside the box, they restrict our minds to familiar thinking patterns and limit our ability to find solutions, especially when it comes to problems that have existed for so long that only lateral thinking could possibly result in a solution.

Inevitably, contradictions, socio-political processes and the conception of human behavior become fundamental properties of corruption, which further complicates the process of acquiring “good quality data” to combat fraud and bribery (Transparency International, 2014). This problem is of primary concern for anti-corruption measurements. Hence, measuring corruption is at the core of the United Nations 17 Sustainability Goals, which ultimately aim to end all forms of poverty and achieve an environment of sustainable development on a global scale by 2030 (United Nations, 2018). Surprisingly, the commonly used term “sustainable development” which essentially implies “the ability to maintain a desired condition over time” (Fuller R. , 2010) is as well a controversial term itself. As a contested point of view depicts a fundamental contradiction among the two concepts, it captures development to be the opponent of sustainability thus, according to Fuller, “sustainable development” resulting in an oxymoron (Fuller R. , 2010).

Apart from the general specification problem regarding anti-corruption efforts, the concept of “corruption” itself is rather versatile and does not adhere to one single definition. However, according to the public opinion, there is an assertive perception of

corruption to be a “wrongful abuse of power” (Stephenson, 2014), yet according to it seems to persevere and infiltrate the daily lives of every member in society by destabilizing societal values, compromising the rule of law regardless and endangering sustainable economic development (Corruption Watch, 2019). In fact, the NGO Transparency International, which conducts the “Global Corruption Barometer”, the world’s largest survey on the direct personal experience of corruption, found out that despite being viewed so negatively, around one in four people have paid a bribe for public services (Transparency International, 2014). However, this could also be interpreted that engaging in corrupt behavior does not necessarily imply the approval of such, but rather that a certain degree of necessity concerning the importance of the service that one seeks to obtain, can essentially be the main motivation behind the bribe. Only further research on the motivation to engage in corruption could deliver a conclusive answer.

The obstacle given by the disparities regarding the definition of corruption can be seen among major players of the discourse. For instance, the World Bank defines it as [...] the abuse of public office for private gain (The World Bank Group), therefore excluding private sector corruption. Transparency International on the other hand, identifies corruption as [...] the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2018) thus including a non-epistemic value. From this perspective, one of the most important events for the field of public integrity, was the establishment of the United Nations ‘Convention against Corruption’ in 2003, which delivered global acceptance of anti-corruption standards, measurements and regulations among 186 countries, and till this day remains the only international, legally binding, anti-corruption instrument (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). The convention generated an effective framework to counteract the most prevalent forms of corruption in the public and private sectors, which is essential, since combating corruption ranks among the highest priorities of many national governments (LaSusa & Asmann, 2018). In addition to defining corruption as an

[...] insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies, which undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism

and other threats to human security to flourish (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004)

it also contains commonly agreed definitions of relevant terminology such as [...] public official, property confiscation therefore facilitating and homogenizing the necessary bases to concretize the application of anti-corruption measurements and efficiently tackle this phenomenon, which otherwise would be impossible to grasp. Likewise, it offers specific cases that accentuate its notions, such as bribery of public officials; influencing trading; abuse of functions; illicit enrichment; obstruction of justice (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, S. 17-29).

As exemplified by the diversion concerning the specific meaning of essential terminology such as *corruption, sustainability and development*, clichés conveniently simplify any differences by sweeping a general blueprint over these otherwise complex concepts. They attach an overall positive or negative connotation to a term in order to manipulate the listener's inclination towards the actual content that is presented (Abley, 2018). However, a major problem with this kind of application, as argued by experts, is that the [...] global agenda diverges from local understandings of corruption in developing and post-communist countries (Krastev, 2004). This could indeed result in misunderstandings about the targeted problems. As a consequence of the evolving uncertainties, on general terms, more emphasis is put on preventative policies rather than efforts to alleviate or compensate the damage that might have already taken place (GIZ, 2016). This specific approach thereby requires a higher involvement of civil society including non-governmental and community-based organizations for it to be carried out successfully (GIZ, 2016).

Moreover, as described by the United Nations press release “Combating Corruption to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017), “*Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty*. The much-wanted goal of “*good governance*” as mentioned in the United Nation’s Economic and Social Commission (Sheng) is based on eight main characteristics: [...] *participatory, consensus, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law*. Participation should enable men and women to make informed and organized decisions in the best interest of society. Moreover, consensus serves to determine the best interest of a

stakeholder and how this can be achieved sustainably. Next, accountability is a crucial component of good governance, the documentation of “who to blame” or hold responsible, decreases the possibility of illicit actions without consequence and therefore also diminishes the initial likelihood to act corruptly in the first place. Furthermore, transparency as in the accessibility of media and policy documents for those who will be affected by the governance practices. Moreover, responsiveness implies that the actions taken to serve the stakeholder are implemented within a reasonable timeframe. Effectiveness and efficiency provide a resourceful approach in regard to human, technological, financial, natural and environmental use when seeking favorable results. On the other hand, equity and inclusiveness provide “the value of society”. And finally, the rule of law that seeks to protect the stakeholder through an impartial regulatory body (GovernancePro, 2010). Despite all the listed assets of “good governance”, the term itself once again is prone to be attached to the clichés of unreachable good virtue and an idealistic “end state”.

But how can good governance, justice, equality and peace even become clichés in the first place, when indeed they pose fundamental principles in our society (Walkotten, 2016). How can the relevance of these principles which we are thought to maintain and cherish from a very young age, be reduced to only a staple answer in beauty pageants? After all, their importance has not ceased but rather their urgency or priority has. Perhaps these terms seem overused because indeed they are at the core of human ideals yet throughout the course of human history, they have remained unachieved. Though their completion is the ultimate goal, there remain opposing views when it comes to this. For instance, Laksiri Fernando confronts this thought in his article “Good Governance is not a Utopia” (Fernando, 2016). According to him, idealizing the concept of good governance creates too much distance between the current state and the aspired situation. Rather than doing so, one should focus on the degree in which good governance can be measured, which subsequently should take place in “relative achievements” meaning measured by the degree as oppose to in absolute terms. In order to do so, the scientific approach has to tame any utopian conception (Fernando, 2016). Moreover, he describes the construct of a hierarchy among the above-mentioned characteristics of good governance as follows. If “democratic participation” and “rule of law” are addressed first, their improvement will consequently result in further advancements in the “subordinate” benchmarks.

Therefore, a scientific deconstruction of the problem is a way of counteracting the otherwise emerging inefficiency, lethargy and indolence induced by the use of clichés.

Moving on, a different approach is taken by the 16th Annual Anti-Corruption Summit which is a conference supported by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), that emphasized the significance of preventive measures in its global declaration against corruption in 2016. It calls for exposing corruption, persecution and punishment of those who engage in it and full support for those who suffer from it (Anti-Corruption Summit, 2016). However, a major problem with this kind of application is that the implementation of preventative measures depends on and is put into action by the people who benefit the most from corruption. Hence, internationally-supported independent judicial missions come into play, in order to counteract the isolated power of corrupt national elites. Since local elites can often hide behind the induced lethargy brought through the use of political clichés. In this case, action has been taken by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which came forward with a Global Judicial Integrity Network in April 2018 to provide a platform for exactly this purpose (13th United Nations Congress, 2015). Despite its effort to counteract bad governance, many scholars point out that the biggest challenge remains being “the tension between domestic sovereignty and international obligations” (Webb, 2005, S. 228) thereby compromising the implementation of a monitoring mechanism. Along with this goes the imposition of the Western-centric model of norms and standards as universally valid ideals (Gebel, 2012) and their lack of a deeper understanding for general differences depending on cultural context. Though, the concept of “westernization/ western-centric views or imposed western standards” is often used as an excuse by corrupt elites to deny accountability for their actions (GIZ, 2016). In response to this, the alliance of integrity claims that “the fight against corruption is universal and not a western standard”, arguing with the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption by 170 countries, which subsequently implies that corruption is not to be tolerated on a global standard (GIZ, 2016). On the other side of the spectrum is the claim of “a culture of corruption” which is often used by outside instances to claim disproportionate rights or power over the struggling subject or even used by the affected people as an explanation for the remaining change that never took place. The Alliance of Integrity replies with the argument that the “structure is to blame and not the people”. They argue that values in terms of integrity are perceived equally in all countries. In this nationality or culture are

not to be held responsible for maintaining corruption but rather “the lack of accountability and transparency, a weak government or excessive concentration of power” should be blamed (GIZ, 2016). What ultimately remains unclear, is how international organizations and their fabricated discourses are present and the extent in which they inform, national corruption discourses as well as their use of clichés when doing so. Conversely, how national discourses utilize, distort or manipulate global discourses or statements, in order for them to be conveniently shaped according to their narratives. This indicates a need to understand the various perceptions of bad governance that exist among both parties, more specifically the United Nations and its member states and the role of anti-corruption clichés within them.

In order to find an answer for my research question, a qualitative approach was chosen in the form of discourse analysis. This approach takes the situational context of the social, political and cultural background of the case study into account. Moreover, metaphors, expressions and images which are exclusive to the case can be analyzed. The aim is to reveal the notions of consensus or disparities considering contrasting points of view on bad governance and anti-corruption measures while primarily focusing on the use of clichés by both parties. In order to do so, primary data will be collected through conducting expert interviews, with the purpose for their consultancy to express and emphasize crucial standpoints of the discourse. As well as the use of secondary data through the selection of an appropriate literature review in a public integrity journal. Ultimately, the data will be reduced to symbolic numeric representations with a coding program. The reduction will take place in order for the data to be more accessible, understandable and to make certain tendencies stand out more (Berg & Lune). After transforming the data into a more manageable medium the results will be compared to one another and be the subject of analysis.

An eligible case for this research question needed to accommodate certain conditions. For instance, the case has to be subject of a prolonged corruption problem, a member state of the United Nations, a democracy and provide a current significant anti-corruption discourse. Given, these would enable a relevant analysis and results concerning the use of anticorruption clichés in the dialogue between global and national instances. For this matter, Peru was chosen as the case. As exemplified by the case of the current Peruvian anti-corruption discourse and with an emphasis on multilateral cooperation, the latest four presidents, as well as many electoral

candidates, are being charged for being part of a major transnational corruption scandal. Former president and head of state Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was forced to resign in 2018 due to the evidence of illicit transactions in conjunction with the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht (Tegel, 2018). In addition to this, former president and leader of one of Peru's most influential political parties Alan Garcia who among other multiple presidential candidates was also revealed to be involved in the Odebrecht scandals, ended up committing suicide shortly after being convicted of this crime, further agitating the already turbulent political environment of the country. In light of these events, 94% of Peruvians stated that they perceive the level of corruption in their country to be either "high" or "very high" (Sonneland, 2018). This striking expression of undeniable skepticism and mistrust led to the vice president making it the utmost priority on his agenda to challenge corruption since he believes that *"corruption and the development of the country are mutually exclusive"* (Atilano, 2018); it also led to the emergence of the recent anti-corruption campaigns, students protests on the streets and the initiation of the first Peruvian anti-corruption commission (Cervantes, 2018). These turbulences enabled to shed more light on the corruption issues and catalyzed a new wave of anti-corruption debates. Never before has there been an outrage of this magnitude regarding the long-standing issue of corruption. Hence why the current president made it his priority to significantly reduce it. Though in order to communicate his intentions and actions to the public, as well as to international organizations, the use of clichés as a political tool might be convenient.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

In order to analyze the global discourse of corruption in the context of governance, a theoretical framework is needed. The theoretical approach used to conduct this analysis is based on secondary data from the field of public integrity. This discourse analysis looks at the social and cultural context in which the discourse is taking place, as well as the symbols and images that are included (Nordquist, 2019). Teun A. van Dijk who is regarded as the father of discourse analysis describes it as [...] *the study of real language use, by real speakers in real situations* (Dijk, 1985). Therefore, a closer look at language in terms of political speeches and slogans used in protest become very relevant assets for this research. Furthermore, two expert interviews in the field of global justice will be conducted as primary data and used as consultation to indicate important aspects or tendencies regarding the Peruvian and Western perspective on corruption. The focus of this paper will be on the conceptualization of corruption, the role of clichés in its discourse, the context of global governance and ultimately the relationship between externally imposed governance standards and whom the governance agenda is directed towards. In this case, more explicitly, the relationship between the United Nations and its member state Peru will be the subjects of analysis.

2.2 Clichés as a political tool

To begin with, it is important to define and explain the meaning and effect of clichés, in order to further understand their purpose and usage within the anti-corruption discourses. The term cliché is an onomatopoeic term which originates from 19th century France, where it mimicked the “click” sound that came about when cast ironing. This expression was used to describe the metal cast that held melted metal in order to mold “print” a stereotype (Ariel, 2019). Furthermore, [...] *this labor-saving device, when applied figuratively, is taken as implying laziness and lack of originality, readymade, template like means of expression* (Mackay, 2014). Referring to something as a cliché brings a negative connotation on style or structure, and the limited imagination of its creator (Mackay, 2014). The most common meaning of cliché is as an overused phrase, where generalization makes up the core part. Leyens in this sense projects stereotypes functioning as “maps of the world”, as they portray a broad spectrum of

general notions of common understanding (Leyens, 1994). Furthermore, Zijderfeld argues that clichés represent linguistic habits that enable to express unusual perceptions and thoughts through becoming mere conventions. Likewise, this repetitive use creates the risk of overpowering the essence and meaning of the phrase into oblivion and reducing it to a rather superficial slogan (Zijderfeld, 1979). Clichés in this sense often tend to be perceived as if they were drained of all meaning (Fuller R., 2010). On the other hand, Mackay argues that this definition should additionally state that [...] *although it thus fails positively to contribute meaning to social interactions and communication in the striking way initially intended, it does function socially, since it manages to stimulate behavior (cognition, emotion, volition, action), while it avoids reflection on meanings* (Mackay, 2014).

Moreover, there is the concept of “Doxa”. Doxa is a Greek word meaning common belief or popular opinion. According to Amossy, doxa, on the one hand, is “the very condition of intersubjectivity and thus the source of discursive efficacy, yet on the other hand, it can also be viewed as hindering true communication, relying as it does on generalizations and uncritical opinions passively absorbed and repeated” (Amossy, 2002). Furthermore, along with this theory, Orwell takes notice of a similar notion. He points out two main disadvantages to the use of clichés. Firstly, he states that when applied it is always “a consciously dishonest way, as politically expedient “euphemism” to obfuscate”. Secondly, it “anesthetizes a portion of one’s brain”, limiting our ability to judge language or express ourselves clearly. Therefore, when used in the political context, clichés often presume to be used in order to create the notion of “public anesthesia” (Orwell, 1962). When literal meaning and figurative sense drift apart and terms become overused to the point where we do not always understand the connotations with which they are received (Whitehead, 2018). A possible counterpart to this could be given by the concept of “dog-whistle-politics”. This concept refers to “the use of coded messages to reach certain targeted groups, without raising awareness to the rest of the public” (Abley, 2018). Here, the promotion of certain “national values” could be seen as an example, because only certain people within society might have an understanding of them whereas for instance migrants who have a different relationship to the country are excluded by this.

All in all, clichés grant their users a certain degree of liberty by covering up crucial points through their generality and thereby creating an easier path to presumable consensus.

2.3 The UN anti-corruption discourse

As mentioned above the use of clichés within politics is a common occurrence, this becomes more prevalent where contrasting opinions and perspectives collide. An example for such a scenario could be given within the United Nations, hence a multitude of fundamental topics are discussed among 193 member states. Thus, the discourse aims to find a commonplace and “unite the nations” which can lead to oversimplifications through the use of clichés which subsequently can lead to complications once passed down on to the national scope. In this regard, much of the current literature on the anti-corruption consensus pays particular attention to the economic development of less developed countries, which are perceived to be significantly more corrupt in comparison to industrialized states (Bukovansky, 2006). When corruption is weak and governments act ethically, the classical economic theory: economic growth as the engine for economic development, becomes more prevalent (Patton, 2014). Indeed, when taking a look at global rankings regarding a country’s level of corruption for instance “Corruption Rank” (Trading Economics, 2018) and the “World Economic Outlook” (International Monetary Fund, 2018), a correlation between low levels of corruption and high levels of economic prosperity can be derived. Therefore, the anti-corruption consensus indicates the reinforcement and extension of institutional foundations for a global market economy. It does this through the influence of “universal” norms and the concept of public good (Slaughter, 1997). Two yet again rather vague and overused phrases that allow for quite some leeway for interpretation while simultaneously provoking a positive inclination. However, associating the problem of corruption with the problem of underdevelopment (Bukovansky, 2006), implies a self-proclaimed higher status of moral agency therefore denying developing countries their capacity to determine the balance between public good and private interests. Consequently, the study of institutions and governance, such as key actors like: The United Nations (UN), The International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), the OECD and Transparency International (TI) became crucial to disclose the problem of bad governance as they are the main voices of the global corruption discourse and also the authors of the so-called “universal ideals”. Essentially, a discourse related to power where [...] the social cognitions of the powerful are both the source and the result of discursive (re)productions (Van Dijk, 1993, S. 259). Moving on, the influence and actions of the following entities will be looked at more closely.

For instance, given the discursive authority exercised by different global governance actors, the UN, in particular, it is expected that the UN discourse on corruption dominates national discourses. The United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in international Commercial Transactions points out the importance of „a stable and transparent environment for international commercial transactions, essential for the mobilization of investment, finance, technology and skills across national borders, to promote economic and social development and environmental protection“ (C.B.Rau, 2008). Therefore, development is formulated as a means of engaging in international commerce. Despite, these rationalist and technical approaches, moral undertones have become more present when it comes to seeking methods to achieve positive collective outcomes. The UN adopted a broader perspective in 2003 with its new Convention against Corruption, which further articulates the threat of corruption as “undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, S. 2). The use of language clearly goes beyond open markets and economic growth and presents moral incentives, which then lead to a more holistic picture of a fair and lawful society.

Moreover, the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials calls for the criminalization of bribery of foreign public officials to be established in domestic legislations and to oblige severe sanctions (Graycar, 2015). This shifts some accountability for anti-corruption efforts to the private sector. It clearly, redirects the attention from exclusively blaming public sector corruption to keeping both sectors under control. Furthermore, parties who used to allow tax-deductibility for bribes had to commit to ending such practices. Nevertheless, the enforcement by the member states regarding these frameworks resulted rather spars. Transparency International’s Progress Report 2018 showed that “only seven countries with 27% of the world’s exports actively enforce the convention, whereas eighteen countries with 21.6% of the world exports perform little to no enforcement (Transparency International, 2018, S. 12). The latter includes three of the strongest economies in the world predicted for 2019/2020: China, Japan and India (Focus Economics, 2018).” This clearly shows the power and influence of corruption and how disproportionate gains and benefits that are acquired illicitly can overthrow the desire to commit to ending corruption. In addition to this, a survey conducted by Transparency International along with their Bribe Payer’s Index of 2011 concluded that there are in fact no countries among the 28 strongest

economies that do not engage in bribery when doing business abroad. Indeed, The Netherlands and Switzerland share first place for being the least prone to bribery, but this only with a score of 8.8 out of 10 (10 being bribery free) (Transparency International, 2011). The evidence presented in this section suggests that there are still shortcomings in the formulation of the convention that allow negative lee room for the nation-states and that despite the wealth of a nation the willingness to bribe remains present. Therefore, the conditions regarding corruption within national politics and trade do not reflect the same condition regarding international trade. Particularly the formulation “foreign public official” which implies “any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise“ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004), is formulated as the core term within the regulating measures. However, this excludes influential individuals who simply do not longer “officially” hold office but still have access to partake in transactions. Also, the criminalization is focused on bribe soliciting (Graycar, 2015), and disregards consequences for bribe offering, which again grants room for corporations to act in order to acquire illegitimate benefits (Bukovansky, 2006).

Moving on, another actor in the global discourse of corruption is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Representative Christina Lagarde explained the IMF’s motivation as follows, *[...] when we act as advisors, we are trying to consolidate an economy and make sure that there is a fertile ground to install sustainable and inclusive growth. But the corroding effects of corruption can leave those efforts in vain. Therefore besides “environment” as a priority, corruption is number one when it comes to concerns among young people, accordingly we also prioritize it* (Transparency International, 2018). Here, Lagarde strategically includes stereotypically virtuous concepts such as touching on the topics of: sustainable, inclusive, growth, environment, corruption all while also addressing young people. Indeed, the IMF does so through its declaration of “Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth”, which “promotes good governance in all its aspects” (Lombardi & Woods, 2008). That is, “by ensuring the rule of law, improving efficiency and accountability of the public sector and tackling corruption, to create a framework in which economies can prosper” (Lombardi & Woods, 2008). In this case “good governance” is resumed to be a prosperous economy, which therefore implies a strong and active private sector, yet

the focus only lays on the public sector. This can be very problematic, as the European-wide business survey disclosed that more than a third of respondents would willingly “offer cash payments, gifts or hospitality in order to help their company’s growth” (Global Compact, 2010). Therefore, disregarding private sector corruption would fundamentally undermine the goals of the declaration. Furthermore, the mechanisms by which the IMF wants to promote “good governance” and “tackle corruption”, are rather ambitious, since they aspire to achieve this by means of consultations, surveillance via staff reports and public information notices (Lombardi & Woods, 2008). Whereas mentioned before by the UN, observability and transparent measurements pose a central challenge for anti-corruption efforts since, the people engaging in it try to keep it as hidden as possible, making it very hard to track.

In accordance with the IMF, the World Bank’s concern to counteract corruption is part of a wide governance agenda, which mainly has its focus on changing institutional incentives (O.Bangoura, 2013). However, it aims to achieve this via “conditional means” regarding bank-financed projects (The World Bank, 1997, S. 29). Corruption is therefore taken into account more precisely when it comes to “country lending considerations and assistance strategies” (O.Bangoura, 2013). This mechanism imposes conditionality which is attached to the loans that are granted by the World Bank. Inevitably, this type of externally imposed governance standards faces issues of implementation due to ethical endeavors as well as being less legitimate than internal standards from the affected country.

Finally, Transparency International is known as the most prominent non-governmental actor in the global anti-corruption discourse (Transparency International, 2018). And while TI works closely with the World Bank, its anti-corruption approach is totally different. The focus is set on the organization and encouragement of local communities since TI believes “that in order to be meaningful, the debate on corruption has to be held internally within the targeted community, for it to have a bigger impact and a lasting change” (Transparency International, 2006). As a result, TI avoids vague and possibly unworkable governance demands on developing country governments and societies and opts for a more “tailored” approach to consequently match the countries specific needs and capabilities to efficiently implement change.

It can be concluded that in terms of the global anti-corruption discourse a consensus regarding the elements that need to be taken into account to meet the concept of public good, is especially relevant. The theoretical approach of the discourse helps to address the research question, as it points out that bad governance cannot only take place in the public sector but also needs to be addressed in the private one. As further explained, the right assessment between, on the one hand, external supervision and on the other hand internal implementation, is crucial for prosperous and sustainable solutions. A successful anti-corruption design is therefore expected to suit the nation where it is applied, avoiding vague unfeasible guidelines that cannot be carried out realistically. Moreover, the Normative- and Sociological legitimacy rights regarding universally imposed guidelines ought to be navigated carefully. Hence, corrupt elites might use the language of democratic deficit and legitimacy as a pretext to avoid their accountability and being subject to anti-corruption measures. However, sometimes they pose a genuine complaint making it difficult to determine when it is legitimate and when it is an excuse. Furthermore, cultural relativism or anti-imperialism are additional mechanisms (in this case “Western-centrism”) for corrupt elites to avoid accountability for their own bad behavior. Moving on, the inclusion of both public and private sectors to generate strong foundations for a global market economy as well as fair and lawful societies is determining to achieve long-lasting improvements.

2.4 The Peruvian anti-corruption discourse

Moving on, it is important to take a closer look at the navigation of the national anti-corruption discourse, here Perú, where the following phrase emerges “corruption is like living with cancer if it is not eradicated one may never live in peace” (Ortiz, 2019). As mentioned above, the relationship between global and national corruption discourses is very complex and multifaceted. Concerning the chosen case, Peru’s turbulent political events urged for an active approach towards its existing anti-corruption mechanisms. Even though corruption in the public sector has been a well-known problem in not only Peru but Latin America, the efforts of combating it have remained rather weak until the Odebrecht scandal became public. As of today, the country’s four most recent presidents are being investigated for corruption allegations (Smith H. , 2019). However, there have been plenty of other reasons to tackle this issue with more perseverance. For instance, former president Alberto Fujimori ranked

in seventh place on “The World’s All-Time Most Corrupt Leaders” (2004) Forbes list, in addition to an alleged embezzled sum of \$600 million (Figaredo, 2018), he also carried out major human rights violations involving the command of death squads to execute targeted massacres. Despite all his accusations and charges, a third of Peruvians still support “Fujimorism” (Cespedes & Wade, Reuters, 2009). Moreover, Peru’s political identity has been marked by especially two parties. On the one hand, Alberto Fujimori’s party which was passed down to his daughter Keiko Fujimori (also incarcerated for partaking in Odebrecht transactions while running for president) and is, therefore, prevailing since the 90’s. And on the other hand, Alan Garcia’s Party “Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana” which served two legislature terms. His administration was marked by hyperinflation, corruption and guerilla violence (Smith H. , 2019), in addition to those traits Alan Garcia was yet another political figure involved in the Odebrecht scandal. Indeed, on April 17th, police officers proceeded to enter his residence to arrest him due to his bribery allegations, this was then followed by Garcia going to his office and shooting himself in the head while police were waiting downstairs to arrest him. That fatal outcome exemplifies the urgency and relevance of the anti-corruption discourse as well as the extensive network of illicit trade which was able to maintain itself involving some of the most influential public figures and representatives.

Taking past trials concerning high-level corruption delicts, committed by former presidents: Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan Garcia (2006-2011), Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2016-2018) into account, it appears as if incarceration is set equal to justice. Instead of investing more efforts into preventing corruption, the mentality of “at least they are in jail paying for their felonies” overpowers as a form of consolation or excuse. Despite the abundance of corruption scandals and the lack of adequate consequences, the rooted parties prevail, the leaders are mourned, and the general stagnant corruption stride persists. Much like a sense of acceptance of the cliché of “the simply bad nature of politicians”. Though, this might be the case due to the perceived distance to the field of politics and the lack of influence as an individual. According to political psychologist Guy Winch, there is the concept of “learned helplessness”. This psychological state implies the constructed feeling of loss of control over one’s environment. *“When we become convinced our actions will not have the impact we desire, we cease our efforts and become passive and helpless”* (Winch, 2010). In regard to the political impact of

this attitude a Rasmussen poll showed that “81% of the voting public believes politicians do not keep their campaign promises” and only “28% of likely voters think members of congress actually care about what they think” (Winch, 2010). This exemplifies the feeling of helplessness and disconnect when it comes to the citizen’s influence and accountability for shaping the system. Indeed, Samuel Rotta, the executive director of Transparency International’s Peruvian chapter “Proética”, commented on the issue of “distance” by referring to the devastating rising numbers of people identifying corruption as a national predicament, which rose from 29% in 2002 to 52% in 2017 (Ortiz, 2019). Rotta explains that this increase correlates with 89% of people who perceive corruption to directly obstruct their personal daily life. He welcomes these results as positive indicators as they represent more awareness among citizens, as well as a decrease in distance to the issue (Ortiz, 2019). Though a Newsweek poll shows that for instance “angry voters are no more likely to vote than non-angry voters” (Winch, 2010). In other words, even if people become more aware of the problem and how this might have a direct negative effect on their lives, their likelihood of actively engaging in counteraction does not necessarily increase due to their acknowledgment of a given issue.

Nevertheless, when active anti-corruption attempts arise, they are mostly obstructed by several instances. According to Figaredo, “attempts dedicated to tackling corruption are short-lived, frequently modified or replaced in response to new corruption scandals or changes of government” (Figaredo, 2018). It appears as if the abundance of problems poses an obstacle of such magnitude that tackling it becomes redundant or hopeless. Moreover, further presented anticorruption efforts were labeled as unrealistic by the government and their implementation was rejected for that reason (Pena-Mencillas, 2011). Inevitably, this ordeal can be held up through Peru’s democratic framework. Fernando Tuesta who was the former head of the “National Office of Electoral Processes” (ONPE) expressed criticism stating that “Peru’s institutional design is full of problems”. Indeed, the system allows for redistribution which primarily was set out to serve stability. However, in practice this structure reinforces the position of traditional well-established parties, hindering the access of new, dynamic initiatives to enter the political arena (Tegel, 2018). Moreover, the article “Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru” by Lewis Taylor states that these complex procedures ultimately are the key issue that facilitates fraudulent practices, which

translate from the political and administrative scope into further related fields and beyond (Taylor, 2000).

Despite the aforementioned obstacles, there remains one distinguished actor within Peru's Corruption discourse, namely the "High-Level Anticorruption Commission" (CAN). This state body was exclusively established to tackle corruption. CAN was ratified by the "Presidency of the Council of Ministers" (PCM) in 2010 and evolved to the point of being the most enduring anti-corruption initiative created by the PCM (Figaredo, 2018). It also created the National Anticorruption Plan which includes five main objectives: „articulate efforts, coordinate actions, and propose medium-to-long-range policies directed at preventing and combating corruption" (Lohmuller, 2016), alongside fifteen strategies and fifty-five actions. Despite all the achievements and progress created by this initiative, the public's perception remains on a rather negative tone. Media reports about outrageous political scandals and highly controversial and sensitive judicial decisions strongly influence the public's opinion. Indeed, newspaper sales rise by about 30% when the frontpage headline depicts negative news, this goes along with the approach "if it bleeds it leads" (Soroka, 2014). In this case, the reception for scandalous headlines and agitating slogans which confirm negative expectations towards the government, are stronger than positive achievements since these appear almost insignificant when looking at the long way to go to reach the ideal end state of "good governance". Here, the human psyche is more concerned with the potential consequence of negative information that outweighs any possible outcome of positive information (Soroka, 2014). Furthermore, CAN's anticorruption efforts mainly consist of improving the public sector. Implementations and changes within this realm target long-term changes that are intended to prevail. However, this is connected to long and slow processes which lack the satisfaction of immediate results, and therefore lack resonance within society, yet again leaving more room for the prevailing use of political clichés to maintain a certain status quo, distribute ideological notions and ultimately preserve corruption (Figaredo, 2018).

2.5 Conclusion

All in all, the key theoretical expectation and hypothesis of this thesis are made up of the following assumptions. When clichés are applied as political tools, they serve the purpose of creating a collective reaction among the listeners. Due to their oversimplifying nature clichés stimulate behavior while restricting reflection on meaning. Therefore, when applied in politics they are intended to cause so-called “public anesthesia”. The global discourse in this sense makes use of these vague expressions, hence organizations like the UN who seek to find consensus among various contrasting cultures and countries commonly phrase their statements in this mode. They conveniently make use of broad expressions and use undefined concepts such as “public good” or “universal norms”, so they don’t run the risk of being too controversial or inclined to an explicit opinion. In this respect, widely accepted expressions such as clichés can be seen as “maps of the world”. Consequently, vague expressions lead to vague executions when it comes to targeted countries. Indeed, the national corruption discourse endures the consequences of anti-corruption clichés in the form of “learned helplessness”, meaning that one simply has gotten used to the circumstances and given up any effort to change them. Anti-corruption efforts for this matter might be then labeled as useless, utopic or unrealistic, therefore leaving more room for corrupt elites to continue acting illicitly and simultaneously taming the public by transmitting a sense of powerlessness. Even if more people feel directly affected by the negative effects of corruption, not more is put into action. All in all, these theoretical assumptions form the basis for the following analysis.

3. Methods

3.1 Introduction

This research seeks to understand the relationship between the United Nations and its member states, in particular how the UN's corruption discourse is reflected in Peru's national corruption discourse.

In order to do so, a discourse analysis on corruption narratives appears to be the most adequate method for the following reasons. For instance, according to Fairclough (2012) "a discourse is a representation of social life" (Fairclough, 2012, S. 456). "It is a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world; including knowledge" (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Therefore, our knowledge of the world cannot be treated as objective truth but as products of our ways of categorizing the world (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). In this sense, this method could enable a better representation and constitution of the identities that essentially conduct these narratives. Furthermore, this qualitative research type applies a hermeneutic approach, which focuses on the interpretation of texts and linguistic tendencies such as the use of metaphors, images and expressions. This is particularly important, since language can be varied and manipulated to impose certain ideals or directions. Especially in an international environment, where mutual goals are targeted but cultural perspectives can differ, the risk of accidental or intentional "cultural translation issues" (Smith P. , Lecture 7, 2018) becomes more prominent. A discourse analysis for this matter will allow to uncover articulation insights and underlying meanings used in the United Nations' discourse and how it informs the Peruvian discourse. Moreover, the study of rhetoric choices made in policy documents, press releases and newspapers could point out possible obstacles between an envisioned optimal discursive relationship and its actual execution/implementation.

3.2 Case selection

To begin with, an adequate case study needs to be selected. In this respect, Peru's corruption discourse was chosen as the main focus for this research. Firstly, the Odebrecht scandal in 2017 (The Associated Press, 2019) does not only represent the high level and extent on which corruption takes place in Peru, but it showcases an international crime that the US Department of Justice refers to as "*the largest foreign bribery case in history*" (Pressly, 2018), since not only Peru's government took part in

illicit transaction with this construction company, but in fact 12 different nations have been exposed to have done the same misdoing (Pressly, 2018).

Moreover, it showcases the effect of such a mayor exposure on society. For instance, this uncovered case triggered protest among several societal instances. It particularly also stands out because corrupt behavior among Peruvian presidents seemed to have established itself as a norm, considering former heads of states such as Alberto Fujimori, Alan Garcia and Alejandro Toledo, which have all been accused and convicted for corrupt actions and the violation of human rights and are currently incarcerated or being searched for to incarcerate (Rosenfielf, 2018). Nevertheless, the motivation to improve the current situation is outstanding in comparison to earlier reactions. Vice president Martin Vizcarra has made an effort to assure that there will be active implementation on the legal corruption frame in regard to: “How judges are elected”, “transparency of political party financing”, “ending consecutive reelection of legislators”, “bringing back the senate” and “the establishment of an implemented anti-corruption commission” (Sonneland, 2018). On October 2017 the “Presidential Integrity Commission” (PIC) was introduced. According to Eduardo Vega Luna, who is the leader of the new commission, this new initiative does not intend to replace CAN but rather to serve as a “reinforcement” (Lohmuller, 2016). One of the main reforms is the “Declaración jurada de interés” which implies tracking and inspecting an official past trajectory in commercial business, accessory of participation and shareholding in directories. This strengthens overall transparency since it enables to better understand their decision making and ensures that it benefits the public interest and does not favor illegitimate incentives. Furthermore, this new initiative proposes greater control and monitoring of state suppliers and the limitation of parliamentary immunity, as well as enabling online access to public contracts. And while this might also have something to do with the societal turbulence caused by the incoming Venezuelan refugees (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018) and the desire for justice, this case poses an exceptional example of an occurrence that stimulated a new energized international discourse about corruption within a timeslot of 21 months, starting at Peru’s presidential elections on June 2016 and ending in the president’s forced reassignment in March 2018.

Furthermore, Peru has been an original member state of the United Nations since October 31st, 1945 (United Nations). This feature provides a good foundation to

measure the relationship and influence of both parties on each other. Moreover, it is the author's opinion that Peru offers an interesting case because it is an abundant country rich in natural resources, with direct access to the Pacific Ocean and located at the heart of South America. All these assets, if used responsibly, could lead to economic prosperity and a higher subsistence level. And since the 17 SDG's also target environmental sustainability, both discourses would suggest an overall fit in regard to their goals, resulting in an interesting contemporary case. Peru's potential properties in the form of abundant natural resources, provide a fertile foundation, which, if managed more strategically and carefully, could indeed lead to long term developmental improvements, therefore, providing an suitable case for this research.

3.3 Method of data collection

While a conceptualization might describe the meaning of "corruption", an operationalization elaborates linkages to things that are actually observable in order to explain the concept of corruption (Kolk, 2017). In this regard, both discourses, the global and the national one, will be linked to specific data, with the means of concretization. On the one hand, the data used to represent the global anti-corruption discourse and the respective possible use of anti-corruption clichés will be derived from the United Nations 17 Sustainability Goals, as these deliver information about common goals and implementations that should be suitable and agreed upon by all nations. Each prominent feature of the respective goal will be formulated in the form of a buzzword or keyword. Next, these "keywords", which stand for what each goal implies, will be scaled by their occurrence frequency in anti-corruption documents, this way, providing data insights into the relevance of each "global goal" within the national discourse. The national documents that will be examined to represent the Peruvian anti-corruption discourse will be: The original document of the anti-corruption initiative "High-Level Anticorruption Commission" as well as its extension by the new commission "Presidential Integrity Commission" and president Vizcarra's speech "Mensaje a la nación", where he introduces five new anti-corruption bills. These assets were regarded as the most suitable and relevant ones for this research because of their recentness and their direct legal impact on the Peruvian constitution. They represent concrete actions and the actual initiated policy regulations instead of just intentions or aspirations discussed in the discourse. Moreover, the results of this data

collection will be interpreted by looking at the similarity of used expressions as well as putting into perspective how Peru's anti-corruption discourse matches its corruption reality in order to determine the adoption and effects of clichés.

The employed theories consist of secondary data collected in the form of a longitudinal approach, showcasing the current scientific state-of-the-art in the field of public integrity including data from 1962 until 2019. These data will be collected through appropriate articles from public integrity journals such as "Assessing, Vulnerabilities to Corruption: Indicators and Benchmarks of Government Performance" by (Johnston, 2014), "The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse" by (Bukovansky, 2006) and "Cleaning Up Corruption: Peru's Example" by (Marichal, 2016). Additionally, official policy documents like "The United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery" (UNDOC, 2017), the World Bank's "Poverty Reduction and Economic Balance document" (The World Bank, 2017) and the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials" (OECD, 2011). Further data will be collected from articles in Peruvian newspapers. The focus will remain on "El Comercio Peru", "La Republica" and articles from "RPP Noticias" since these specialize in political, legal and economic affairs.

Finally, the case will be examined complimentary through a snapshot approach. The primary data will be assessed resulting from consultations, by conducting two expert interviews in the field of global justice. Firstly, Dr. Joseph Pozsgai (Pozsgai), whose scientific articles I have included, and who has been working on corruption tolerance and the political characteristics of national anti-corruption reforms for the past eight years and currently is engaged in the development of the Daily Corruption: News Feed & Data Base project in partnership with various NGOs in Latin America, as well as related research activities (Pozsgai, Joseph Pozsgai). And secondly consulting with Patrick Taylor Smith (2016), who specializes in Social and Political Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Environmental Ethics (especially climate change and intergenerational justice). Thus, providing access to the western perspective of the UN 17 sustainability goals, also since the environment portrays a crucial goal among the other 16.

The interviews will provide valuable insights and contribute to this study from the perspective of individuals who not only function within the system but also have

critically analyzed the ongoing notions of each anti-corruption discourse. In contrast to the other data sources, an interview brings in a more human local perspective while including an academical background of intensive research on the subject. In this regard, my intention behind the choice of these interviewees is to juxtapose both opinions, which presumably ultimately represent the core discourses of this thesis. Moreover, the interview is structured through a catalog containing ten thought-provoking questions, which gradually require more elaborate answers as the interview progresses.

In conclusion, combining different research methods such as, on the one hand inductive research through empirical studies and primary data in the form of expert interviews and on the other hand, deductive research through secondary data in the form of literature reviews of the public integrity journal, will lead to an overall data foundation which will be subject to the following method of analysis.

3.4 Method of data analysis

Furthermore, in order to operationalize the anti-corruption data, a coding scheme needs to be developed. The chosen method to analyze the collected data is a discourse analysis. A discourse analysis generally aims to „perceive and categorize various meaning-making processes, networks and practices from data“ (Koppa, 2010). This is done by constructing a structured coding scheme. Coding in the context of data analysis “represents the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualized and put back together in new ways” (Flick, 2009, p. 307). Moreover, the data will be divided into different units of meaning. The units of meaning are then coded by assigning them keywords, which express what they deal with. In order to break down and subsume these key words, they are then put into categories, making it possible to find an answer to the research question (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 103-104; 113-114).


The impact of the 17 sustainability goals will be measured by using the software “Atlas TI”. This tool allows to see how frequently a certain term has been used in the literature and therefore allows to determine the importance it represents for the content. In order to tackle the research question, I will be coding the first anti-corruption initiative “High-Level Anticorruption Commission” (Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, 2016) and the new commission “Presidential Integrity Commission” (Consejo Directivo del

Organismo Supervisor, 2016) as well as president Vizcarra's speech "Mensaje a la nación" (Vizcarra, 2019). The analysis of these policy documents will serve as an indicator for the degree to which the SDGs have gained relevance after the Odebrecht scandal or if the relation between the global and national discourse has remained the same in terms of its policy regulations, of course taking into consideration the influence of standardized phrases and their impact on the respective discourse.

For this matter, the coding scheme will be structured in accordance with the UN's development goals as follows: SDG(1) which is titled "no poverty" and targets the eradication of poverty for all people everywhere, will be fragmented into the keywords: poverty; job; income, SDG(2) which is titled "zero hunger" and targets to end hunger and ensure nutritious and sufficient food all year round, will be fragmented into the keywords: hunger; food; nutrition, SDG(3) which is titled "good health and well-being" and targets to reduce global maternal and infant mortality rates to less than 70 per 100,000 live births, will be fragmented into the keywords: health; well-being; mortality, SDG(4) which is titled "quality education" and targets to ensure quality and completion of primary and secondary education for boys and girls, will be fragmented into the keywords: education; school; literacy, SDG(5) which is titled "gender equality" and targets to end all forms of discrimination against women and girls everywhere will be fragmented into the keywords: gender; equality; women, SDG(6) which is titled "clean water and sanitation" and targets to ensure the access for everyone to safe and affordable drinking water, will be fragmented into the keywords: drinking; water; sanitation, SDG(7) which is titled "affordable and clean energy" and targets to ensure the access to affordable and reliable energy services, will be fragmented into the keywords: energy; electricity; sustainable, SDG(8) which is titled "decent work and economic growth" and targets at least 7% gross domestic product growth per year for the least developed countries, will be fragmented into the keywords: unemployment; economic growth; labor, SDG(9) which is titled "industry, innovation and infrastructure" and targets to ensure access to reliable and affordable infrastructure, will be fragmented into the keywords: infrastructure; innovation; industry, SDG(10) which is titled "reduced inequalities" and targets to sustain income growth for the bottom 40% of the population at a higher rate than the national average, will be fragmented into the keywords: inequality; equality; vulnerable; SDG(11) which is titled "sustainable cities and communities" and targets to ensure access to adequate and safe housing along

affordable basic services, will be fragmented into the keywords: safety; sustainable; inclusive, SDG(12) which is titled “responsible consumption and production” and targets to achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources, will be fragmented in into the keywords: consumption; production; resources, SDG(13) which is titled “climate action” and targets to integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning, will be fragmented into the keywords: climate; environment; pollution, SDG(14) which is titled “life without water” and targets to prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution in particular from land-based activities, will be fragmented into the keywords: ocean; marine; coastal, SDG(15) which is titled “life on land” and targets to ensure the conservation and restoration of terrestrial ecosystems in line with obligations under international agreements, will be fragmented into the keywords: protection; forest; wildlife, SDG(16) which is titled “peace, justice and strong institutions” and targets to promote the rule of law and ensure equal access to justice for all, will be fragmented into the keywords: peace; justice; violence, SDG(17) which is titled “partnerships for the goals” and targets to strengthen domestic resource mobilization through international support, will be fragmented into the keywords: cooperation; partnership; debt.

“Coding scheme”



Furthermore, keywords extracted from the interviews: abuse, trust, power and bribes, extractive, unfair, unjust, will be set into perspective with “the United Nation Convention Against Corruption” and “Presidential Integrity Commission”. As well as a linguistic fragmentation of the Peruvian president’s televised speech, that was held on the 29th of May 2019 (Vizcarra, 2019) will be included to emphasize parallels to the SDG targets. The original full-length speech, as well as its translation, can be found in the appendix.

3.5 Conclusion

All in all, the conducted research activities aim to uncover further information about rhetoric relevance and the transmission of expressions from the global scope to the national scope, through discourse. The scanning process will enable to uncover the prominent fields in which the adoption and adaption of the 17 SDG’s are taking place. Moreover, this will showcase the central SDG’s for the Peruvian anti-corruption discourse and once these have been detected one will be able to analyze the extent to what these goals are indeed being implemented, discussed or simply advertised. In conclusion, this will lead to finding an answer to the initial research question which ultimately intends to uncover the most influential and used anti-corruption clichés.

4. Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

Furthermore, the elaborated data should lead to express the relationship and impact of the United Nations on its member state Peru when it comes to corruption, especially concerning the use of anti-corruption clichés and their influence on the new emerging anti-corruption commission. Moreover, a critical look at aspects such as the respective view of both parties and the contextual understanding of bad governance, as well as the linguistic direction that can be observed on the according documents, will bring more light into the notions and dynamics that motivate anti-corruption efforts. The method that will be used to analyze the data is as explained in chapter two a discourse analysis since it allows the main focuses and topics to emerge within the research process. These dominant discourses show how reality has been socially constructed. Hence, a discourse is a set of statements which construct an object, in this case, bad governance. I will seek to use this method to examine the linguistic range in which corruption is understood and depict the links between it and different representations of the social world since language is conceived as a vehicle of action, where the action being studied is the representation of reality (Leege & Francis, 1974).

Moreover, this method tries to reveal how discourse serves other purposes and how such purposes are powers exercised through discourse. It will enable me to identify the effects that each discourse has on corruption and how they influence it. Finally, I will analyze the impact that both corruption discourses exercise on each other.

4.2 Comparison through systematical data alignment (data reduction)

Before uncovering the structure of domination, the documents need to be scanned in order to be able to work with them.

To begin with, I have started by running the Peruvian Anti-Corruption Commission's main policy documents through the coding program "Atlas TI". This step will enable to convert each sustainable goal into numeric representations of their relevance through measuring their frequency within the documents, thus clearly exhibiting the goals that have been more relevant for the commission and the goals that have not played a central role in it. In order to apply this method, I used the 17 sustainability goals as reference for central topics that have been currently discussed and manifested

themselves as crucial within the global corruption discourse. As mentioned above and shown by “Figure 1” (appendix) and “Figure 1.1” (appendix), each sustainable goal was subdivided into a few keywords that reflect the essence of what the particular goal implies. For instance, SDG 1 which is titled *“No poverty- end poverty in all its forms everywhere”* was fragmented into three keywords: poverty, job and income. By doing this each keyword and their frequency within the documents indicate the relevance that each topic was given in the commission. Atlas TI, therefore, determines the total amount of times that the individual codes were utilized. Finally, by accumulating the outcomes of the respective code groups together, a quantitative numerical representation of the keywords and ultimately the relation between the 17 SDG’s were put in a ranking table “Figure (2)” (below). Due to this, the hierarchy of represented SDG’s was constructed, which grants a visual representation of the topics that were prioritized and the ones that do not play a central role in the new Peruvian anticorruption commission concerning the policy documents of “the final national anti-corruption implementation plan” and the “presidential integrity commission”.

“Figure (2)”-Ranking:

1.	SDG1	105
2.	SDG16	67
3.	SDG12	43
4.	SDG8	38
5.	SDG3	29
6.	SDG6	26
7.	SDG11	17
8.	SDG9	9
9.	SDG4, SDG15	6
10.	SDG13	5
11.	SDG17	3
12.	SDG5, SDG7	2
13.	SDG10, SDG14	1
14.	SDG2	0

According to the calculations, only the upper half of the ranking seems to have relevant reflections within the documents. Out of these results, number 1 ranks considerably higher than the rest with close to a third of keyword strikes being assigned to solely SDG1. In contrast to this result, only the first four ranks managed achieved an overall representation over 10% considering that the total keyword count resulted in 351 detections. In other words, SDG1 which targets to “End poverty” is by far a major concern within the commission, showing 38 more frequency strikes, then the second-highest-ranking goal, which is equivalent to the result for the fourth placing SDG.

Nevertheless, SDG 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” which resulted in second place leads ahead of the other goals with the second greatest and most significant difference of 24 strikes while the remaining 15 goals only show an average strike gap of 3 keywords in between their frequency hierarchy.

Furthermore, SDG 16 specifically deals with related topics of corruption in the public and private sector as well as how to counteract it. Hence, it made sense to insert “Message to the Nation” (Vizcarra, 2019) a speech held on May 29th, 2019 by Peru’s president Vizcarra’s as a response to institutional political corruption and the initiation of a question of confidence towards the congress. This message concretely refers to new anti-corruption bills and goals of the current government, for this reason, it was fragmented and utilized to reflect SDG16 and stands out as a crucial source to represent the Peruvian discourse. In light of these results, the first two highest-ranking SDG’s are going to be the central contents representing the United Nation’s sustainability goals and therefore placeholders for the global anti-corruption discourse. These are than to be analyzed more closely and put into perspective with the corresponding national anti-corruption reforms to identify the extent of their resemblance and coherence. Because indeed, this outcome poses quite a contrast to the afore established theories. For instance, according to Fernando’s theory (Fernando, 2016), there is a hierarchy when it comes to the impact and importance of the eight characteristics of good governance. He went on to state that if democratic participation and respect for the rule of law are given, the subordinate assets that will lead to a state where good governance is conducted, will follow and consequently improve on their own. And indeed, if we take a look at the scanning results, the new anti-corruption commission does mainly focus on goals which address these issues, as lessening poverty would imply more access to participation and less criminality as well as strong institutions and justice would fortify the rule of law. Nevertheless, what is unexpected in this context is that the scanning results show SGD 4, which targets the topic of education, ranking quite low on 9th place, considering that education would be a crucial basis for Fernando’s 2 most important good governance characteristics and ultimately his efficacy theory to succeed.

4.3 SDG 1 “No Poverty”

4.3.1 Peru’s current poverty rate

To begin with, the commission states that poverty is the second biggest concern for Peruvian citizens after delinquency (Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, 2016, S. 143), corruption in this case, bridges both concerns by possibly being the cause and effect between the two. Furthermore, president Vizcarra emphasized that “corruption does not steal from those who own but from the most vulnerable who cannot complain” (Andina, 2018), therefore his approach to combating corruption has its focus on improving the circumstance for people who struggle to sustain themselves, since one out of five Peruvians is living in poverty (Krumholtz, 2018). Furthermore, studies conducted by the world bank show that people with fewer resources have to pay a higher amount of bribes (up to 14%) in relation to their salary in order to obtain basic services, as opposed to people with sufficient resources (1%) (Perez & Benavides, 2013). Poverty as such is a rather present issue that is easily perceived in society’s everyday life, therefore it makes sense that it ranked so high within the commission’s priorities. Moreover, the “VIII Encuesta de Percepciones de Corrupción” concluded that corruption indeed is regarded as the most prominent issue in regard to the country’s sustainable development. Nevertheless, the same questioner also resulted in more than half of Peruvians believing that within 5 years from now corruption in their country will increase and 82% believe that the government efforts are insufficient or not effective at all (Perez & Benavides, 2013). However, this rather pessimistic prognosis is not unfounded. As a result of the Odebrecht scandal and frequent discordances between legislative and executive powers, many investors retreated commerce with Peru. Due to this, Peru’s poverty rate rose in 2018 for the first time since 2001, adding 375,000 citizens living on less than 105\$ a month to already 6.9 million Peruvians living in poverty (Cespedes & Taj, 2018). And while the majority of people affected by poverty (44%) remain in the rural areas of the country, a considerable amount of people in the capital have been affected as well, rising Lima’s poverty rate by 2.3%.

In order to counteract this doom, the goal of decreasing corruption, since it poses a major obstacle for economic growth and the country’s overall development, has gained significantly more attention. The recent approval of Peru’s national policy addresses central themes that had been set aside and postponed for years, such as the management of integrated information, the promotion of fundamental values beginning

at the school stage, the promotion of a meritocratic career and the promotion of integrity in the contracting of works, goods and services. Especially the last two targets depict the issue of corruption and poverty in their domain.

Moreover, in contrast to the highest-ranking goal (SDG 1) in terms of its associated keyword's frequency in the commission, the lowest ranking goal with 0 representation ended up being SDG2 "Zero Hunger". According to the United Nations definition of poverty, hunger is a factor that is strongly linked to it.

[...] Fundamentally, poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to, not having the land on which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living, not having access to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, households and communities. It means susceptibility to violence, and it often implies living in marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water or sanitation (Economic and Social Council, 1998)

Other than the United Nations, the Peruvian commission seems to cover the problem of poverty by applying different criteria. While hunger, of course, remains a devastating consequence from poverty, the causes for it can indeed vary adding other origins besides corruption. As a matter of fact, up to 5.2 million Peruvians are vulnerable to food insecurity (Northrop, 2016), this can be due to several reasons such as natural catastrophes, international market fluctuations or limited purchasing power (Northrop, 2016). Unfortunately, Peru's natural diversity does not only bring benefits. Despite the rich flora and fauna that offers an abundance of nutritious foods that can hardly be found anywhere else in the world, the wide range of different microclimates inevitably is prone to a wide range of natural disasters. More importantly, agriculture is considered to be the primary source of income for rural households. Floods, droughts, landslides and frequent earthquakes are common occurrences in Peru that can damage or completely destroy agricultural crops, therefore not only prejudicing and endangering the livelihood of the farmers but also making foods less accessible on the local markets, since these are the primary places to buy groceries in rural regions. Moreover, climate phenomena like the reoccurring "El Niño" heatwave leads to declining fish stocks which are a substantial element for Peru. On the other hand, cold

waves in Andean regions also damage the crops and kill livestock. All of these aspects add to the overall malnutrition and hunger rate in rural areas, can manifest itself in up to 35% of children under the age of five being malnourished and 46% of children under the age of three anemic (Northrop, 2016).

Peru's current poverty situation embodies the concept of political clichés since it demonstrates how something that is permanently discussed and talked about can remain unchanged or worsen. During the last four mentioned presidencies (which all were involved in the Odebrecht scandal), the reduction of poverty has always been a central slogan of the several electoral campaigns. Yet no significant action was taken on part of the later on elected candidates. For instance, Alejandro Toledo's presidency promoted low prices for groceries on markets, especially taking pride in achieving to fix the retail price for 10 buns of bread for S./1 (0,26 €) and more work, he as the first indigenous president was a symbol of hope especially for the people of rural regions which are more vulnerable to poverty (Peru Posible, 2011). Moreover, Alan Garcia's campaign promoted working for the poor and towards reducing poverty (TeleSurTv, 2010). Additionally, Ollanta Humala also strived to promote a smaller income gap by promising a basic salary of S/.750 (198 €) and to lower the gas prices in half (Partido Nacionalista Peruano, 2016). Finally, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski focused on ensuring access to water and sanitation for all (PeruDecide, 2016). This goes hand in hand with the established theories of chapter two since the achievements are quite calculated and in the long term not sustainable, irrelevant for development and superficial. They provide instantaneous satisfaction and are immediately noticeable amongst citizens. In these cases, the reduction of poverty was used as mere propaganda in the form of slogans and deceiving superficial changes to impress society. This poses an example for the negative use of political clichés when they are intentionally used to create so-called "public anesthesia".

4.3.2 United Nations' take on poverty

The United Nations approaches the topic of poverty differently than individual national governments. For instance, when it comes to SDG 2 it predominantly tackles the topic of a general scarcity of resources and our current inefficient way of managing them. The UN seeks to promote a "new global food and agriculture system" that will be able to provide sufficient food security to sustain the growing population. Some focus is also set on climate and environmental protection, in a way that agriculture can be made

more efficient while also improve land and soil quality as well as being gentler in general. Further focus is put on

[...] doubling the income of small scale-food producers, in particular women and indigenous people (United Nations, 2018).

This might also thig in why SDG 5 and SDG 10 also ranked relatively low. Since not much of the commissions content is dedicated to precisely reducing inequalities when it comes to marginalized groups such as for example indigenous communities.

SDG1, on the other hand, has set to ensure equal rights and access to economic resources and basic services by the year 2030. Its goal is to eradicate poverty according to each country's particular national definition. The list of targets especially mentions providing vulnerable groups

[...] ownership and control over land and other forms of property (United Nations, 2018).

This domain is very susceptible to corrupt transactions as this problem manifests itself in Peru's extractive economy, property and land rights therefore are very fragile. This issue emerges when local authorities have the ability to manipulate the land governance systems in their country, with the means to benefit themselves. Subsequently, countries with rather weak governance structures are then targeted by national and international investors since the probability for illicit payments and disproportionately high benefits and ultimately a better and more profitable deal is given (Land Portal).

4.3.3 Coordinating notions between global and national discourses

Moving on to the coordinating dialogue between the global and national scopes., according to Transparency International's corruption barometer, when it came to "Incidents of bribes paid for land services" Peru was ranked in 110th place out of 180 participating countries. Indeed, this problem is evident due to large scale palm oil and cocoa plantations placed in sylvatic regions.

This specific issue is related to the social and environmental implications of ever-growing material consumption which the United Nations try to counteract by promoting *“doing more and better with less”*. Indeed, the drive to mindlessly seek fertile land has been catapulted through the rapid east Asian economic growth, which subsequently took place due to the large-scale production of material goods required by the West. Asia’s ability to provide large scale quantitative productions alongside unimaginably low prices, which can be derived from the different living standards and the currency conversion rate, could be transferred to the pressure of “keeping up” of other extractive economies in developing countries. Thus, clearly, this has the advantage of an enormous profit rate. Nevertheless, aside from that, unproportioned disadvantages come as a consequence. Low production costs generally imply low production standards. This means, fewer regulations when it comes to working standards. These kinds of extreme austerity methods manifest themselves as exploitation. Employees are exposed to a dangerous and abusive working environment including low-security measures, salary and rights. Furthermore, not only humans suffer from exploitation and injustice, but the process of production and material extraction also implies corrupting natural resources.

This can lead to irreversible damages of ecosystems concerning land, air and water pollution, sources crucial for the livelihood of vulnerable groups, especially in rural areas. For instance, according to the UN, only 0,5% of the planet’s water is accessible and drinkable. Nevertheless, water resources have been proven to be polluted at a way more rapid rate than natural filtration and purification can occur. This in combination with an overall excess use of potable water and misuse in inefficient agricultural methods (rice flooding), leaves about 1 billion people without access to clean water (United Nations, 2018). Moreover, despite renewable energy advances and energy efficiency gains, the overall energy consumption of OECD countries has been predicted to increase by 35% by the year 2020. Inevitably, the entire supply chain and cycle that is initiated by the consumer becomes a subject for concern.

Therefore, the UN proposes to essentially redefine this uncontrolled behavior when it comes to general global production and consumption. In order to do so, the focus is set on introducing [...] *resource and energy efficiency, sustainable infrastructure, and providing access to basic services, green and decent jobs and better quality of life.* (United Nations, 2018)

As a result, the use of coercion and deception in order to acquire large portions of fertile land from local people has devastating consequences for human rights as well as a negative environmental impact (United Nations on Business and Human Rights, 2017). The commission does in fact approach this topic in the fifth strategy from its second chapter, which deals with the recruitment whit in the public sector. Furthermore, out of the fifteen objectives number tree is the one that is closest related to the issue of land corruption. It points out the obstacle of non-transparent clauses, economic inconvenience and even secrets in contracts for disposition of land and assets (Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, 2016, S. 83). The corresponded policy that is responsible for regulations concerning land contracting is “Ley de Contrataciones del Estado Nr.30225”. It aims at maximizing the value of public resources, particularly taking into account their usefulness, price, performance potential, commercial conditions, maintenance and other applicable elements in accordance with the nature and dimensions of the hiring. Furthermore, it includes result-driven management and accountability when it comes to the procurement of goods and services where quality is prioritized over formalities and greater discretion is granted to the logistics operator. Likewise, it links the Annual Contracts Plan (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2019) with the management of the Institutional Operational Plan (Ministerio de la Producción, 2019) and therefore provides greater diversity in the selection, contracting and dispute resolution alternatives. Despite these official policies, when put into perspective, foreign illegal financing and bribes, in this case, the Odebrecht scandal, still show a major lack of control and transparency.

Moving on with the content of SDG 2, point 1.5 in the target list aspires to reduce the exposure of poor and vulnerable people to natural disasters by reducing their susceptibility to weather hazards and making their living situation more resilient and sustainable (United Nations, 2018). This tights in with the aforementioned issue that leads to hunger. Hence it might explain why hunger, as portrayed by the United Nations, is included but not in the center of focus exclusively. Hence, the origins of this issue are covered by SDG 1.

While SDG 1 tackles the overall premise, natural catastrophes remain to be a central factor for hunger. This approach concludes why the commission does not tackle hunger more concretely but rather approaches this issue by seeing poverty as an umbrella term for further underlying problems. In regard to the theoretical insights developed in chapter two, it becomes evident that the assumption of vague

expressions leading to vague executions is correct. This is exemplified by the United Nations way of expressing their idealistic picture of what should be guaranteed by their member states and how this should be elaborated. Though even when the necessary legal instruments are implemented on the national scope where everything has been subject to regulation and is available for reference this only poses theoretical columns which are not transferred into practicality, as policies, regulations and laws become annulled when located in an environment where corruption is present. Therefore, the expectation of increasing public integrity in a country with weak political institutions and highly eroded legislative, judicative and executive powers, becomes nothing more than an illusion.

4.4 SDG 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”

The second place in the ranking which showcases 67 frequency detections is covered by SDG 16 “peace, justice and strong institutions”. Essentially, this specific goal contains central guidance in term of reducing corruption. Overall, it highlights the need for concrete implementation objectives regarding bribery, money laundering, illicit transactions and weak institutions. At the same time, it also calls for a stronger dialogue and closer cooperation between the affected countries, especially in Latin America, Sub Saharan Africa and Asia, and institutions of global governance (United Nations, 2018).

As mentioned before, one of the main delicts of corruption is that it devaluates and completely disregards the rule of law. Corruption damages this crucial instrument which is the basis of a functioning society, a stable democracy, social justice as well as domestic peace (Kosmehl, 2016). The rule of law further supports the establishment of rule-based integrity of management as well as secured property rights for people and safeguards the economy from severe damage of law undermining actions.

According to the rule of law index conducted by the World Bank, Peru’s outcome resulted in - 0,5 (-2,5 weak; 2.5 strong), indicating a rather weak adherence and respect to obeying according to the rule of law. This *index [...] captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence* (Bank, 2017). The proper functioning of these assets is especially important for a country in which people only have limited access to information and quality legal services. An unstable system is

also more prone to fast-changing and unpredictable rules this has a further destabilizing effect.

Indeed, the current Peruvian president Martin Vizcarra sees himself battling the congress. Kuczinski's legislature had announced new and effective anticorruption implementations. Since said announcement, his election and his resignation, not much and certainly not enough has been set into action. The congress which is for the most part occupied by the opposition has not acted upon the president's demands to execute and actively engage in his referendum on anti-corruption reforms. The lack of determination shown by the Congress legislators becomes more noticeable in Vizcarra's televised speech where he criticized this stagnant behavior and goes into further detail on corrupt behavior within the congress.

The president's uncompromising and rigorous speech aired on the 5th of June on several national news channels. He began by pointing out that the anti-corruption reforms which are a central objective of his government simply do not seem to be taken seriously enough for them to be elaborated, adopted and carried out by the congress.

[...] Almost 40 days ago, we submitted these initiatives with the expectation of working and fighting together against this endemic (corruption) [...] However, in this period of time, the congress only elaborated a timetable, without understanding the urgency for a change (Vizcarra, 2019).

4.4.1 Chavarry Case

Closely related to the Odebrecht scandal, there has also been a hefty corruption debate named after Pedro Chavarry, the former attorney-general of the nation. When Chavarry ascended from his position of Supreme state prosecutor to the function as attorney-general of the nation on July 20th, 2018, the allegations against him concerning document forgery and other misdeeds had already been released. His questioning was progressing quickly and his integrity diminishing at the same pace, so much so that president Vizcarra made his opinion about Chavarry very clear when he did not attend to his induction ceremony. As a matter of fact, about two weeks prior to his rise, on July 7th 2018 audio recordings were discovered, to which president Vizcarra referred to as "*the audios of shame*" in his speech, where illicit favoring's and benefits were being discussed between Chavarry and counselors of the National

Council of Magistrates (Guido Aguila, Iván Noruega and Julio Gutiérrez), as well as president of the Superior Court (Walter Ríos) and president of the Second Transitory Chamber of the Supreme Court (César Hinostroza). Despite, all his charges and allegations he still managed to obtain access to the new position. This position granted Chavarry the power to intervene in the legal processes that were being carried out by other judges and state prosecutors. He who works closely with the “fujimorian party” which also makes up 73 seats out of 130 in the congress, made an active effort to stop the investigations against Keiko Fujimori (daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori and leader of the fujimorian party “fuerza popular” (popular force). He went on to dismiss the prosecutors of the Odebrecht case Rafael Vela and Jose Domingo Pérez, since Keiko had been deeply involved in illicit transactions with the construction firm. Consequently, due to public pressure and demands in form of demonstrations, Attorney General Chavarry was forced to ratify the above-mentioned prosecutors as members of the elected team of the public ministry responsible for investigating the Odebrecht case. But despite the restitution, two of the five supreme prosecutors, who constitute the highest instance of the nation’s prosecution, issued a statement calling for the resignation of Chavarry. Considering that these are all independent instances, the responsibility for the Chavarry’s case than laid by the congress, which worked in his favor due to his close relationship with the strongest represented party. Ultimately, the congress decided to archive his case and stop further investigations. He then withdrew from his position on January 8th, 2019, but due to the halt in his investigations was able to remain in his prior position as Supreme state prosecutor (Comercio, 2019).

This is a prime example of dysfunctional political institutions and corruption’s power to erode the integrity of government structures. The specific Chavarry incident was the central case that catalyzed Vizcarra’s speech in which he demanded an issue of confidence against the Congress. This constitutional mechanism enables the executive powers to consult the congress on a subject it deems appropriate and questions if it still has the “confidence” to continue governing. This can only be initiated by the president of the council of ministers. If the issue is denied by the congress, the president can then move on to entirely dissolve the congress and start new elections which then might lead to a more balanced congress composition (Taj & Aquino, 2019). Vizcarra opened his speech by referring to the congress’s behavior as

[...] a pitiful series of events and decisions and a blatant shield, he then further expresses his indignation by labeling the congress actions as [...] a boycott of the anti-corruption struggle (Vizcarra, 2019).

4.4.2 United Nations take on Dysfunctional Government Institutions

The disparities and growing tension between the executive and legislative sectors are visible and contributing to the overall instability and uncertainty of the Peruvian economy. The importance of well-functioning institutions with collective values is clearly emphasized within the UN discourse. The most relevant targets of SDG 16 are the following:

[...] 16.3 promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access for all; 16.4 Significantly reduce illicit financial flows, strengthen the recovery and return stolen assets; 16.5 substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms; 16.6 develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels; 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels (United Nations, 2018).

Indeed, the SDG targets of stronger institutions show to be directly connected to development this is supported by the article “The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development” by (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). They emphasize that poverty cannot be tackled in isolation from economic growth. And that economic growth is a reflection of well-functioning and strong economic institution which then again these can only exist under the pre given condition of well-functioning symbiotic relationship to the responsible political institutions.

In addition to this backing, the conducted expert consultation also revealed a focus on institutional integrity and performance as the key turning point for a country’s efficient development. According to one of the expert interviews, the new institutionalist view was expressed as a crucial school of thought to effectively counteract corruption and achieve goal 16. To begin with, new institutionalism in this sense removes the economic perspective on institutions as the primary focus, but rather redirects the

attention to the sociological influence of institutions as well as the context from which these institutions emerge (Ishiyama & Breuning, 2014). One question of the expert consultation dealt with how to estimate a percental distribution of responsibility between government and society when it comes to shifting corrupt behavior. The consultation with the expert affirmed that the government should indeed have a greater than have percentage responsibility in order to counteract corruption. Essentially, society should not be treated monolithically, but rather elites should be considered to have different obligations. So instead of making a division between government and society, the expert suggested viewing a national composition in terms of three groups: government, elites and non-elites. This classification into three branches would allow for more accurate and effective measurements. Hence, the focus would not be on petty corruption involving a poor individual in the slum but rather on institutions and the people who can shape those institutions (Interview, 2019). The follow-up interview question intended to find out which variation of corruption was more prominent concerning: “grand corruption, “petty corruption” and “political corruption”. Despite all, the experts still identified “petty corruption” which by definition refers to

[...] everyday abuse of entrusted power by low and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens in e.g. places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other public service agencies (Alvarez, 2015).

as the issue on which greater attention should be focused because eradicating this would generate “real” development. As oppose to

[...] grand corruption which are [...] acts committed at high levels of the government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good (Alvarez, 2015).

Hence, irrespective of the fact that this is a violation against the rule of law and should not take place, for extremely vulnerable countries this can be useful to open up their

markets for international trade, therefore still maintaining some sort of beneficial effect (Interview, 2019).

Moving on, Vizcarra's speech can certainly be understood as evidence for severe high-level "political corruption". This specific kind of violation refers to

[...] a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision-makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth (Alvarez, 2015).

He showcases the uncovered delicts and strategic manipulation that were illicitly executed by the congress.

[...] A parliamentary majority once again continues to turn its back on its citizens and damage Peru. From the day I assumed the leadership of this government I was clear about the institutional instability that Peru is going through. [...] we witnessed the way in which a network of corruption and privileges was articulated through the powers of the state, infecting the system of administration of justice. [...] We know that the congress of the republic has gotten us to be used to unacceptable maneuvers, shielding those who could have committed acts of corruption, freeing them from being trialed and detained, clearly evidencing a pact of impunity. (Vizcarra, 2019)

This section yet again puts emphasis on the extent of outrage and indignation on part of the new government. Which ultimately lead to the determined decision by the new president to initiate a significant and concise effort to lessen corruption. Though it also shows that even initiatives put into action by the president himself can be obstructed due to the current structure of the Peruvian political system, in which the opposition is granted disproportionate protection and power. In this sense, considering the theoretical insights developed in chapter two, even when the concept of "learned helplessness" is set aside and action is put forward, as Vizcarra named 2019 the year of the combat against corruption and impunity (Sputnik, 2019), the process of reducing corruption remains at the mercy of the current structure of the political system.

4.4.3 Vizcarra's anti-corruption reforms and action taken in response to the scandals

After expressing his disappointment and disapproval about the congress's behavior, the speech turns to the high-level commission and new judicial reforms that will be implemented as

[...] the first steps of the great change (Vizcarra, 2019).

The president distinctively mentioned that his government

[...] seeks to recover the institutions of the country (Vizcarra, 2019),

clearly emphasizing the importance of them. This goes hand in hand with SDG 16. Furthermore, he referred to the series of negative events as

[...] putting stones in the road, building a system of impunity and holding Peru back from development (Vizcarra, 2019),

here making the connection between defective institutions, decaying structures and broken public integrity and the resulting implications for the country's sustainable and efficient development. Here, he again points out how determined he is to master

[...] the challenge of cleaning and modernizing Perú, that [...] the fights against corruption will remain the main flag and that every committed citizen should [...] put Perú first (Vizcarra, 2019).

In this respect, five concrete bills were declared.

[...] Regarding the state policies of institutional strengthening and the fight against corruption, which are both manifested in the approval and the scope of five bills presented that: parliamentary immunity does not turn into impunity, that convicted persons cannot be candidates, that any citizen can participate in the selection of candidates of political organizations through internal primary elections, eliminate the preferential vote and that the population is the one that defines it, guarantee

the political participation of women with parity and alternation and prohibit the use of dirty money in the electoral campaigns. (Vizcarra, 2019)

When comparing the five bills with the five central targets of SDG 16, certain similarities definitely become visible, aside from the overall notion of law-abiding behavior and the significant reduction of bribery and corruption. For instance, the first bill reflects target 16.6 which aspires to make institutions and functioning members more accountable, transparent and responsible. The implementations target to counteract the structure of loopholes that until now has allowed candidates can maintain their position despite charges and criminal records. It proposes to modify the impediments for any position that is subject to popular elections and indicates that individuals who have been convicted for an intentional crime with a sentence greater than four years, are excluded from any form of involvement and cannot apply to further types of electoral processes (Proyecto de Ley Nr.4190/2018-PE, 2019). Furthermore, the majority of the following bills essentially concern target 16.7 about responsiveness and inclusiveness within participatory and representative decision making. To begin with, one of the bills promotes internal democracy and citizen participation in the selection of candidates in political groupings. It aims for this through the proposition for internal elections to become mandatory (Proyecto de Ley Nr.4187/2018-PE, 2019). In order to promote the accountability of political groupings during campaigns, administrative, criminal and political sanctions are introduced in the case of attempts on breaching rules. Though this proposal has not shown any progress in the commission of justice and human rights. In addition to this, another proposal which remains stagnant implies the modification of organic laws of elections in the national electoral system. More specifically, this proposal intends to get rid of the preferential vote for parliamentary listings and gender parity in the formation of said lists (Proyecto de Ley Nr. 4186/2018-PE, 2019). The preferential vote is an option that is given to a citizen that is about to vote, it grants the choice to pick one or two preferred candidates to enter the congress or Andean Parliament (Becerra, 2019). Disposing of this alternative will make the number of congressmen elected from a party proportional to the percentage obtained by the presidential candidate. Generally speaking, the parties are encouraged to present the most experienced, competent and suitable individuals at the top of their list.

Otherwise, according to the Minister of justice Marisol Pérez Tello

[...] if the preferential vote is not eliminated, we will not be able to count with serious and democratic politicians (Castro, 2019).

This additional vote has been criticized for encouraging unfair competition among the candidates because the wealthiest running candidates with the most resources are then able to have “better” more elaborate campaigns and gifts to influence the public, which drives away from the actual message of the party. Moreover, oftentimes the voting criteria can be as low as voting for the most attractive candidate, as the 1995 case shows where Susana Díaz, a former famous exotic dancer won as the single most voted candidate of the “Independent Agrarian Movement”, without any kind of academic formation for this position (Cruz, 2017). President Vizcarra, therefore, urges to eliminate this option and promote elections that are less prone to populist notions. Finally, the fifth and last bill proposes a constitutional change in which the responsibility for lifting parliamentary immunity is carried out by a body other than the congress, to avoid cases like the one mentioned in the speech where

[...] the congress substantially modified the bicameral project in order to secure in a hidden and tricky way the relation of congressmen. They quickly filed up the bill that the supreme court defines as lifting of parliamentary immunity. A law that, if enforced, would have prevented the flight of congressmen sentenced for corruption offenses, as we have seen lately (Vizcarra, 2019).

All in all, the new reforms and proposals seem to closely mimic the United nations targets, although the topics remain “general ideals” which apply to most countries and therefore are not especially innovative or tailored for only specific countries. The measures that are being put into action were all triggered by grant current corruptions scandals and

[...] the indignation and the public outcry expressed on the streets, it was honest journalists and committed media, it was you who did help to make visible the evils that we suffer from (Vizcarra, 2019).

This appears to never have been taken as seriously and counteracted with such rigorousness and the same amount of determination as the current government's agenda.

In the case that the congress would have dismissed a no-confidence vote, this would have enabled Vizcarra to completely dissolve the congress. And as he is determined to fight corruption at any cost and improve the situation in the long term, his threats to do so are to be taken seriously. He continues to say,

[...] We hope history does not repeat itself after a year when this congress refused to renew its confidence in the cabinet (Vizcarra, 2019).

As a result, after Vizcarra's speech, the opposition called for an assembly of the Board of Spokespersons. They argued in their defense, that the proposed reforms are simply of less urgency than other matters which are crucial, therefore remaining in denial towards the allegations. Furthermore, legislators claimed that the democratic order ought to be respected and that rising gasoline prices, as well as certain basic foods, are further up in the hierarchy of things that need to be tackled. Nevertheless, they gave in to the issue of confidence and approved their compliance. This shows a sense of opportunism and the irregular pace in which things can be adjusted when they are inconvenient.

One final interesting SDG 16 target is

[...] 16.8 broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance (United Nations, 2018).

Indeed, closer contact and a stronger dialogue between countries and international institutions have proven to be an important feature when it comes to efficient and effective anti-corruption measures. In this respect, Peru and the United Nations have expanded their dialogue by establishing the "Action for SDGs: Civil Society takes the Lead! Peru and the Agenda 2030 Ambassadors". This is a new youth group which is promoted by the "Millennials Movement", "the World We Want Platform" and "the UN Inter-Agency for Youth Development". This program is tailored to educate young people about the SDGs and how to participate in the process of implementation at the

country level. It further promotes to ease participation in Civil Society Organizations and to engage in citizen monitoring for the 2030 Agenda (Sustainable Development Goals Action Campaign, 2017). Besides, the survey “My World 2030” also enables to directly share the voices and opinions of the Peruvian population with the United Nations global leaders through this program, also using social media to promote its notoriety e.g. #Act4SDGs. Members expressed that the interaction and community of people with similar ideals had a validating effect on their movement. As well as making them realize the impact of every change no matter how small it is, the cumulative effect still adds up to a great contribution towards achieving the SDG goals by 2030. Moreover, positive results of this initiative have been the inclusion of 16 regions in Perú as well as the alliance with 162 “citizen ambassadors” and 57 actions. This program specifically references its orientation at SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) (Sustainable Development Goals Action Campaign, 2017).

In conclusion, SDG 16 which as described by the UN, promotes

[...] peaceful and inclusive societies, as they pave the way for the provision of access to justice for all and for building effective, accountable institutions at all levels (United Nations, 2018),

seems to be well represented in regard to its central premise, which to a greater extent has been incremented in the current Peruvian anti-corruption discourse and more concretely in the new anti-corruption reforms of the commission. Though while it might be formulated as an aspiration and necessary goal to achieve, its realistic completion remains at a great distance. Like mentioned above, despite the seemingly same aspirations and ideals aligning in the policy documents of the commission. The aspirations are restricted to align in theory but in practical terms, they remain hypothetical scenarios.

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the acquired data show that among the 17 SDGs, SDG 1 “no poverty” and SDG 16 “peace, justice and strong institutions” pose the most relevant amongst all UN targets for the commission. The topic of poverty in the national realm is an issue that has been discussed in every government. Its proximity and noticeability amongst citizens lead to the leader’s inclination to quick fixes rather than sustainable long-term improvements. This results in the poverty rate remaining unchanged or in this case even worsening. One cause for this could be that the significant reduction of poverty is simply a political tool in the form of a cliché. It creates a collective reaction amongst listeners when presented in campaigns, just like it foments approval being placed at the top of all SDGs, between the UN member states. Here again, the theoretical assumption of vague expression lead to vague executions becomes relevant because the eradication of poverty as described and defined by the UN represents a blueprint to which all member states can orientate themselves, though when looked at more closely this “orientation” is so general that it ultimately does not provide more information than the rough idea that already exists but has yet to be successfully executed. Moving on, the Chavarry case alongside the Odebrecht scandal both triggered protests amongst citizens. This result was quite unexpected in light of the assumption that people who talk more angrily about the government indeed are not more eager to act upon it. Yet while this applied for the former years, it was not the case for PPK’s presidency. Although in spite of this, the Chavarry case displayed the flawed political system that is structured in a way where it preserves disproportionate power relations. Finally, even when the legal framework is provided and the necessary policies are given, the achievement of higher public integrity remains a theoretical concept which does not correspond with the reality of the countries who have had to experience being corrupted.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Answer to the research question

The findings of this thesis suggest the following. All in all, the reforms and norms implemented by the Peruvian government coincide with the United Nations ideal. To no surprise, the overall accordance is mainly derived from the similar titles as well as repeatedly honoring initiatives that aim for the usual common goals amongst the member states, such as exemplified by the most prominent SDGs “no poverty and justice”. However, these similarities diverge when it comes to the actual implementation, progress and status of the aspired anti-corruption measures. Thus, the discourse persists as being one-sided and upholding the status quo since it is filled with ideological notions, ultimately serving to preserve corruption rather than counteract it. This outcome is to some extent pre-determined by Peru being a member state and therefore already sharing similar ideals and notions towards the universal norms. Moreover, the general character of the SDGs is formulated in a manner that applies to many countries and really leaves no legitimate reason to be against them. Nevertheless, disparities still remain. For instance, environmental protection is a central concept throughout the SDGs. And this is especially an important point for countries that mainly finance themselves through the exploitation of natural resources. Though looking back at the results of the analysis in chapter four, it appears to be clear that environmental protection is not prioritized by the Peruvian government. In the case of Peru not only the export of goods such as fruits, metals and minerals but also tourism is closely intertwined with fragile natural ecosystems. However, the connection between pollution, more mindful treatment of the environment and societal development and better quality of life does not seem to have happened yet (World, 2017). This becomes especially visible when looking at sylvatic regions also in Peru. Not only are national parks and reserves in Peru disregarded, causing detrimental implications for indigenous communities, but also the hunt for endangered species and their commercialization on black markets as either pets, ritualistic medicine or food, exemplifies the disconnect for respecting nature. And while for instance hunting and selling exotic species is illegal and punishable by law, there hasn't been one single case in which someone has been incarcerated or seriously punished for doing so, despite the obvious existence of these popular markets (World, 2017). The only curve that implies some improvement can be seen through the contract laws regarding international as well as national contracts of land ownership and guidelines of

production and cleanliness when winning resources. Aside from general implementations one overwhelming suggestion by various scientists (Alvarez, Joseph Pozsgai, 2018) was that the issue of corruption is caught in somewhat of a paradox because the people that have the power to eradicate it are also the people keeping it alive and gaining profit from it. Therefore, one has to „convince them “and make it desirable for them to act with integrity in their position. For this reason, it might be useful to implement business strategies that not only benefit the country economically but that are developed in a way which takes into account indirect benefits as well. This way more benefits are implemented and camouflaged as the pure economic reform. Furthermore, the Peruvian ant-corruption commission showed to mainly focus on political and grant corruption. All reforms and implementation remain within this realm. But corruption by lower-ranking officials (policeman) which directly affect society, bribes in order to obtain basic services and other forms of street-level corruption are not considered in the equation. However, this suggests a top-down approach, which goes hand in hand as the most efficient way to counteract the general issue of corruption in a developing country. Though, it also implied that the closest level corruption to the citizens is not being addressed on a higher level. This means that a certain distance remains which serves as a buffer for public agitations going along with the concepts mentioned in chapter two, regarding “learned helplessness” and “public anesthesia” induced through political clichés. Moreover, these results also reflect the expert interviews, since they prioritized fundamental changes of the system which could only be made by influential high-ranking individuals rather than civilians, therefore blaming and making the government and the Elites responsible for change and lifting some wait from the general public. However, this does not take away from the outstanding effect of the street protests and student revolts that emphasized the outrage of people and put more pressure on the government to be determined about the changes. Another essential aspect of this case is the exceptional situation of the current leader and government, this is the distinction that ought to determine the new, vital and disciplined longing for change. Vizcarra’s position as replacement for his unwanted forerunner, grants him a different starting point. Also, him not actually running for president might have an effect on his relationship with the position, making him feel more fortunate and appreciative for his newly acquired position and this acting as a motivator to perform better than the people before him. The certain amount of pressure to perform well, alongside the direct comparison to his failed forerunner might

be the perfect combination for Vizcarra to abstain from the reoccurring misbehavior of the former presidents and actually try to achieve substantial change for once. I strongly agree with the experts in this regard of a peculiar situation which might actually be the key point for his success and resonance in society. Indeed 70% of Peruvians think that Vizcarra's presidency will be different from the others on a positive note. And his emphasis on anti-corruption motives only seems to make him more popular among the public. This might reversibly have the Pygmalion effect which is a psychological phenomenon that implies that high expectations ultimately can lead to higher performance. Especially because the bar is so low, this might be additional motivation to actually do a good job. Nevertheless, it should not be disregarded that these aspirational fundamental changes will take a long time until they are adequate and realistically feasible to function in Peru, and without a doubt, this process will outgrow Vizcarra's 5-year presidency thereby being at the hands of future candidates to be held up.

5.2 Limitations of the research

Moving on, the limitations of this research should be considered when making use of its developed insights and results. After narrowing down the documents with the strongest correlations only two out of seventeen Sustainable Development goals were analyzed. This process disregards further influence and effects of other SDGs as well as possible reasons for why they might not be included. Furthermore, the documents that were used to process the keywords, only assume a representative role for each side of the discourse, regardless of this representative sample, it excludes other policy documents from influential members and voices of the global and national anti-corruption discourses. Besides, the coding program ATLAS. TI does not take into consideration the different meaning, weight or use of words, it simply detects the literal words and adds up its frequency. This can lead to inaccurate results. Moreover, the turbulences and counteractions towards the current corruption scandals are at a peak. In order to include all information and come to a more integral result, the further development of Peru's political activities should be observed, especially because the aspired changes will have to take place over a longer period of time for them to be fully adopted and functioning. This way one could determine if the "new" regulations are taking effect or if they were just clichés being regurgitated once more.

5.3 Implications for policy and governance

Finally, in regard to the practical implications of this research's resulting insights, I would recommend for norms to be more binding without taking away sovereignty from the country in question or replicating some neo-colonial notion. It might be helpful for countries with similar issues, environments, history and current problems to meet and try to find mutual solutions that could work for one another. Also setting more concrete goals within a legal framework, while keeping their achievement realistic while desisting from the excessive use of vague expressions and false instant promises would help. If we consider statistics which show the countries that are the furthest in achieving the 17 SDGs, the first 20 ranks ranging from 74%-84% completion, are occupied by: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Iceland, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Czech Republic, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Japan, Singapore, Australia (Willige, 2017). All of these countries are highly developed, have very strong economies and do not recur to the export of natural resources. However, it is left to say that when looking at actual active development even these countries have not achieved outstanding results. Their high ranking is for the most part due to pre-given circumstances such as a stable economy, lower corruption rankings, a social security system and other aspects that contribute to their overall status of high development. Indeed, 16 out of the countries listed above do also belong to the top 20 most developed countries in the world (United Nations Development Programme, 2017). This indicates that even here not much effort is put into action in order to improve and get even closer to achieving the goals. Therefore, an overall resonance with the member states is lacking. Achieving the goals should be incentivized with more than "just" good virtue and happy future generations. The goals need to represent some graspable benefit for both parties, on the one hand, for the ones that are already on good terms within sustainability and therefore could develop even better and more efficient strategies and on the other hand for the ones that would directly and drastically benefit from a more sustainable system. Moreover, I think that Western countries should be stricter among one another. As mentioned above not even the strongest economies can display a corruption-free environment and none of them even manage to reach the highest decimal of the scale. In addition to this, there are even countries (Japan, India, China) left that do not partake in treaties to counteract corruption, and the strongest corrupt activities of these countries remain international trade with extractive economies (Focus Economics, 2018). This can no

longer be accepted and should be taken just as seriously as the issues within more extreme environments. If wealthier countries cannot lead by example, they cannot expect weaker economies to rise out of their misery on their own, since global wealth and poverty are strongly connected, and industrial countries simply have an undeniable responsibility to act with integrity in light of their “privileged” situation. Though this reinforces the assumption that the power structures and the suffering countries are all subject to an intended system that is held up and actively maintained by its benefitters.

Appendix

Figure (1)




Figure (1.1)

Word	Length	Count	Percent
Agua (water)	4	5	1,08%
Amazonas (amazon)	8	6	1,30%
Ambiente (environment)	8	4	0,87%
Bienestar (well-being)	9	1	0,22%
Clima (climate)	5	1	0,22%
Colegio (school)	7	1	0,22%
Costa (coast)	5	1	0,22%
Desarrollo (development)	10	104	22,56%
Desempleo (unemployment)	9	2	0,43%
Deudas (debt)	6	2	0,43%
Deuda (debt)	5	1	0,22%
Económico (economic)	9	1	0,22%
Emplear (hire)	7	2	0,43%
Empleo (job)	6	3	0,65%
Energía (energy)	7	1	0,22%
Escuela (school)	7	5	1,08%
Igualdad (equality)	8	1	0,22%
Incluso (inclusive)	7	5	1,08%
Industria (industry)	9	1	0,22%
Infraestructura (infrastructure)	15	7	1,52%
Ingreso (income)	7	7	1,52%
Ingresos (income)	8	8	1,74%
Justicia (justice)	8	65	14,10%
Labor (labor)	5	35	7,59%
Mujer (woman)	5	1	0,22%
Paz (peace)	3	1	0,22%
Potable (potable)	7	2	0,43%
Recursos (resources)	8	43	9,33%
Salud (health)	5	28	6,07%
Saneamiento (sanitation)	11	15	3,25%
Sanidad (sanitation)	7	1	0,22%
Seguridad (safety)	9	11	2,39%
Sostenible (sustainable)	10	1	0,22%
Tomar (drinking)	5	3	0,65%
Trabajar (work)	7	1	0,22%
Trabaja (work)	8	4	0,87%
Trabajo (work)	7	80	17,35%
Violencia (violence)	9	1	0,22%

Direct Transcript of Original Speech (Spanish) “Mensaje a la Nación”
(Vizcarra, 2019)

“En la serie de eventos y decisiones que el congreso de la republica viene lastimosa mente protagonizando. El día de ayer en la comisión peramente del congreso hemos observado un descarado blindaje pese a todo los indicios que exigían iniciar una investigación en los fueros correspondientes de acuerdo con lo que determine la justicia. La mayoría congresal decidió archivar las denuncias constitucionales contra el seno pedro chavar. Comparto con ustedes la indignación en relación con estos hechos. Ante semejante boicot a la lucha anticorrupción n el gobierno y la ciudadanía no Podemos ser ajenos y no manifestar la profunda preocupación que esto nos causa. Una mayoría parlamentaria una vez mas sigue dándole la espalda a los ciudadanos y haciéndole daño al Perú. Desde el día que asumí la conducción de este gobierno tuve en claro la inestabilidad institucional que atraviesa el Perú. Ese día invita a todos a poner al Perú primero. Y a emprender de manera firme la lucha contra la corrupción. Muestra adicional de la relevancia para nuestro gobierno, es que mediante decreto supremo establecimos la lucha contra la corrupción como uno de los ejes centrales de nuestra gestión. Haciendo la una política de estado. Luego vinieron os audios de la vergüenza y fuimos testigos del modo en que se articulaba una red de corrupción y privilegios que atravesaba los poderes del estado, infectando al Sistema de administración de justicia. Ante este hecho constituimos una comisión de alto nivel de reforma de justiciar y presentamos una serie de proyectos que se convirtieron en los primeros pasos del gran cambio. Sabemos que el congreso de la republica nos tiene acostumbrados a maniobras inaceptables, para blindar a quienes podían haber cometido actos de corrupción librándolos de ser juzgados y detenidos, evidenciando un pacto de impunidad. Esto es inaceptable. Y la ciudadanía lo a expresado de manera contundente en múltiples oportunidades. Sin embargo, parece que hay algunos (Congress) que no quieren entender este mensaje, que quieren seguir protegiendo a los corruptos, se resisten a cualquier reforma por una cuestión de supervivencia. Como quedo plasmado en un chat que fuimos testigo hace algunos meses. Por eso siguen poniendo piedras en el camino, construyendo un Sistema de impunidad y habiendo todo lo que pueden para que el Perú avance. Lo afirme hace tiempo y lo repito hoy, esta firme decisión de corregir y cambiar el Sistema político y judicial afecta intereses de grandes grupos que son protegidos por políticos inescrupulosos. Corruptos y corruptores defienden sus intereses a costa de los peruanos. La lucha contra la corrupción es y será nuestra principal bandera, reafirmo mi compromiso a defenderla. El desafío de limpiar y modernizar el Perú requiere de mas transformaciones. Por lo que conformamos hace meses una comisión de alto nivel de reforma política destinada a generar propuestas para consolidar la democracia en el Perú. En el proceso de discusión para poder ser presentados, el congreso modifiko sustancialmente el proyecto de bicameralidad con el fin de aprobar de manera oculta y tramposa la relación de congresistas. La ciudadanía fue contundente en el repudio a esa maniobra. ...Ante las propuestas presentadas reaccionaron quienes conforman esa enorme maquina de impender y de blindar. Rápidamente archivaron el proyecto de que la corte suprema define levantamiento de la inmunidad parlamentaria. Ley que, de estar vigente, hubiese impedido la fuga de congresistas sentenciados por delitos de corrupción. como hemos visto últimamente. En resumen, usando diferentes estrategias están tergiversando la reforma política con el fin de protegerse, de brindar impunidad y de impender que la ciudadanía participe de manera plena. No podemos permitir esto, es claro que no es el ejecutivo el que pecha el congreso como quieren instalar algunos malintencionados. Es esa mayoría congresal que perjudica a todos lo peruanos para defender a unos pocos. Quieren seguir traicionando a la ciudadanía, favoreciendo los privilegios y la corrupción a costa del futuro de todos. No vamos a permitir que otra vez con triquiñuelas impidan la reformas que el país necesita. Basta de blindajes, basta de usar la ley para proteger la corrupción. Los representantes del legislativo fueron elegidos para representar a todos lo peruanos, en lugar de ser protector del estatus quo y de esquemas corruptos. En esta lucha iremos hasta las ultimas consecuencias porque el Perú así lo merece, por ello poniendo como testigo a todos lo peruanos, respetando el Sistema democrático, y en estricto cumplimiento de las facultades que la constitución política del Perú me confiere el gobierno a decidido presenta cuestión de confianza al congreso de la republica. Respecto de las políticas de estado de fortalecimiento institucional y lucha contra la corrupción, que se manifiestan en la aprobación sin vulnerar y la escancia de cinco proyectos de ley presentados, que la inmunidad parlamentaria no se convierta en impunidad, que las personas condenadas no puedan ser candidatos, que cualquier ciudadano y ciudadana pueda participar en las selección de candidatos de las organizaciones políticas a través de elecciones primarias internas, eliminar el voto preferencial y

que sea la población la que lo defina e esa primera selección, garantizar la participación política de la mujeres con paridad y alternancia. Prohibir el uso de dinero sucio en las campanas electorales. Así mismo exhortó a los congresistas para que reconsideren el archive de las denuncias constitucionales contra el ex fiscal de la nación. Buscamos recuperar a las instituciones de nuestro país. No permitiremos que la lucha contra la corrupción sea papeleada por unos pocos que lo único que pretenden es proteger sus intereses. Por el contrario, es una lucha que debe de unir a todos los peruanos comprometidos por el país. No vamos a retroceder ni un solo paso para sacar Adelante las reformas tan necesarias para el país. Fueron la indignación y el clamor ciudadano manifestado en las calles, fueron los honestos periodistas y medios de comunicación comprometidos, fueron ustedes quienes no ayudaron a visibilizar los males que padecemos. Sin ustedes hoy probablemente el Perú no seria consiente de la existencia de las mafias que tomaron control de os poderes del estado y que tanto daño nos causaron. Ustedes son los protagonistas de los mas importantes cambios que esta impulsando este gobierno. Por eso hago u llamado a la ciudadanía, para que una vez mas nos pongamos de pie y juntos avancemos en las reformas que el país necesita. No permitamos que triunfe la impunidad. Témenos un enorme desafio, el e construir las bases del Perú del bicentenario.” (Vizcarra, 2019)

Translation of Speech „Mensaje a la Nación“ „Message to the nation“ (spanish to english)
(Vizcarra, 2019)

"In the series of events and decisions that the congress of the republic comes pitifully leading, we have been able to observe a blatant shield despite all the indications that required to start an investigation in the corresponding jurisdiction in accordance with what justice determines." The congressional majority decided to file the constitutional complaints against the Pedro Chavarry case. I share with you the indignation in relation to these facts. In the face of such a boycott of the anti-corruption struggle, the government and citizens cannot be bystanders and not express the deep concern that this causes us. A parliamentary majority once again continues to turn its back on its citizens and damage Peru. From the day I assumed the leadership of this government I was clear about the institutional instability that Peru is going through. That day invites everyone to put Peru first. And to undertake firmly the fight against corruption. Another sign of the relevance for our government is that by means of a supreme decree we established the fight against corruption as one of the central axes of our management. Making a state policy. Then came the audios of shame and we witnessed the way in which a network of corruption and privileges was articulated through the powers of the state, infecting the system of administration of justice. Given this fact, we set up a high-level commission to reform justiciar and we presented a series of projects that became the first steps of the great change. We know that the congress of the republic has gotten us to be used to unacceptable maneuvers, shielding those who could have committed acts of corruption, freeing them from being trialed and detained, clearly evidencing a pact of impunity. This is unacceptable. And the citizens have expressed it forcefully on multiple occasions. However, it seems that there are some (Congress) who do not want to understand this message, who want to continue protecting the corrupt, resist any reform for the sake of survival. That is why they continue to put stones in the road, building a system of impunity and holding Peru back from development. I affirmed it a long time ago and I repeat it today, this firm decision to correct and change the political and judicial system affects the interests of large groups that are protected by unscrupulous politicians. Corrupt and corrupters defend their interests at the expense of Peruvian citizens. The fight against corruption is and will be our main flag, I reaffirm my commitment to defend it. The challenge of cleaning and modernizing Peru requires more transformations. For what we formed months ago a commission of high level of political reform aimed at generating proposals to consolidate democracy in Peru. In the discussion process to be presented, the congress substantially modified the bicameral project in order to secure in a hidden and tricky way the relation of congressmen. They quickly filed up the bill that the supreme court defines as lifting of parliamentary immunity. A law that, if enforced, would have prevented the flight of congressmen sentenced for corruption offenses, as we have seen lately. In short, congress legislators have been using different strategies and distorting political reform in order to protect themselves, to provide impunity and to impede the full participation of citizens. It is

that congressional majority that hurts all Peruvians in order to defend a few. They want to continue to betray the citizens, favoring privileges and corruption at the expense of everyone's future. No more armoring, enough of using the law to protect corruption. Representatives of the legislature were elected to represent all Peruvians, and not for protecting the status quo and corrupt schemes. In this fight we will go to the last consequences because Peru deserves it, for that reason, as a witness to all Peruvians, respecting the democratic system, and in strict compliance with the faculties that the political constitution of Peru gives me, the government decidedly presents an issue of confidence to the congress of the republic. Regarding the state policies of institutional strengthening and the fight against corruption, which are both manifested in the approval and the scope of five bills presented that: parliamentary immunity does not turn into impunity, that convicted persons cannot be candidates, that any citizen can participate in the selection of candidates of political organizations through internal primary elections, eliminate the preferential vote and that the population is the one that defines it, guarantee the political participation of women with parity and alternation and prohibit the use of dirty money in the electoral campaigns. He also exhorted the congressmen to reconsider the file of the constitutional denunciations against the former prosecutor of the nation. We seek to recover the institutions of our country. We will not allow the fight against corruption to be papered by a few who only intend to protect their interests. On the contrary, it is a struggle that must unite all Peruvians that are deeply committed to the country. We are not going to back down even one step to take forward the reforms that are so necessary for the country. It was the indignation and the public outcry expressed on the streets, it was honest journalists and committed media, it was you who did help to make visible the evils that we suffer from. Without you today probably Peru would not be aware of the existence of the mafias that took control of the powers of the state and that caused so much damage to us. You are the protagonists of the most important changes that this government is promoting. That is why I call out to the citizens, so that once again we stand up and together, we advance in the reforms that the country needs. Let's not allow impunity to triumph. We have accepted a huge challenge, to build the bases of Peru of the bicentennial.” (Vizcarra, 2019)

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