The European Union and its Neighbours: Border Conflicts and Security Policy

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Abstract

The enlargement of the EU has shifted its territorial boundaries significantly in the last three decades. This research is devoted to the border regions of the EU, and their meaning to EU policy. More specifically, it deals with the threats that border conflicts pose to EU security and how these conflicts have impacted EU security policy. Besides this dimension, the research analyzes the public perception of these threats and their relationship to support of EU security policy. The EU toolkit for the prevention and resolution of conflict is largely based on Europeanization. This research offers a different perspective on Europeanization through EU policy, by looking at the developments from the perspective of border conflicts. The analysis is primarily based on four case studies: Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo and Egypt. The analysis offers an answer to the question: How have border conflicts impacted EU security policy and citizens' perception of EU security. By doing so, it fills a gap in the academic literature about the relationship between the EU and its neighbours.

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1.1   Introduction

The gradual enlargement of the EU has brought the political entity to consist of 28 member states, promising high levels of cooperation on many fields. The political landscape of Europe comes with the potential of combating challenges for the continent more effectively. One of those challenges is security. The issue of safety and security has many dimensions and perspectives including economic safety, social safety, defence strategy, and cyber security. The twenty eight states of the EU have gone through several processes to maintain peace, and guarantee the realization of common norms and values throughout EU existence. Perhaps one of the most ambitious EU policies in the domain of safety is the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP). The development of the EU as a security agent in international politics has taken great steps since the launch of CSDP in 1999. Twenty years ago, the EU made a revolutionary step towards maintaining security in and outside Europe, by enhancing the cooperation and decision-making on security between member states. An important motivator for the foundation of a European Community and later the European Union was to guarantee mutual security, mostly by preventing conflict on the continent. This union has played a key role for the maintenance of prosperity, welfare, and stability. And yet, security threats to the EU surface regularly in many forms.

The states of Europe are increasingly confronted with international and regional conflicts (Stetter et al, 2004) that influence the state of affairs politically, economically, and socially. The end of the cold war brought relative interstate stability between the big powers of Europe, but security threats have emerged nonetheless. Regions that have posed security threats to the EU in contemporary history include the Baltic states of Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caspian sea, and Northern-Africa (Kartsonaki,2015). Border conflicts for the EU pose both academic and practical problems. The main problem is that the evolution of European polity has arguably been a positive force against security threats from border regions (Stetter et al, 2004), but violent threats and instability still form in border regions nonetheless (Barbe, 2004). The academic problem that surfaces in the literature is whether or not European integration leads to peace (Stetter et al, 2004), and the effect of the EU in the role of international conflict manager or in other words security actor (Kartsonaki, 2015). Practically speaking, the evolution of EU security policy does not only affect social science, but also public life (Scott, 2016). Conflicts on the border of the EU pose a threat to European security and need an appropriate response to ensure the well-being of European citizens and the functioning of states they live in. According to Scott, the messy geopolitical situation of Europe as a result of shifting borders does not only lead to security threats, but also to internal issues such as inequality and exclusion (Scott, 2016).

So, the problem is that European integration and the reconfiguration of EU borders have opened new border regions that pose security threats in the form of violent conflict. On top of that, the EU has failed to respond to these threats with policy and action to guarantee peace and stability (Grevi, 2009). And thus, the relationship between EU policy and border conflicts remains an important subject for research. The next section will provide an overview of what research has been conducted on border conflicts and EU policy.

1.2 Academic debate

The academic literature that is related to the subject of this research is diverse in the sense that they reflect different motivations and perspectives of research. As will be described in this section, various scientific disciplines are interested in border conflicts to the EU. The first form in which the subject returns is through case-specific studies to either understand the development of security threats or research the relationship between a conflict and the involvement of the EU (Kartsonaki, 2015). These studies generally come from the field of conflict studies. Examples of this are studies on the conflicts in Egypt and Ukraine by Mitzcavitch (2014) and Izhak (2016) respectively. Other contributions from this field are interested in conceptualization and theorization of conflict. An example of work from this field is *European Security Identities* by Waever (1996). The insights of the field of conflict studies can help us understand what is going on and why, but have less to offer when it comes to the relationship between conflicts and policy. As will become clear later, it is not in the scope of this research to deal with causality, but theorizations like that of Wever can explain the meaning of developments in border conflicts for EU security.Specifically Waever's conceptualization of what EU security actually is can assist in understanding relevant developments (Waever, 1996).

A different level of research that is related to the problem is the involvement of the EU in violent conflict within and beyond European borders. A popular focus of research related to this is the capability of the EU to be a successful international security actor. Insights from these debates suggest that the CSDP of the EU clearly shows an "ambition to contribute to world peace" (Kuzio, 2003), and analyzes the effect of action that is related to this ambition. Researchers have monitored and tried to explain the impact of EU action in the domain of international and European security (Grevi 2009). Only recently have researchers started to systematically analyze the EU as a conflict manager (Kartsonaki, 2015). This perspective on border conflicts is motivated by trying to understand the meaning of the EU for international security, but also to understand the actual effect of EU security policy. Some work on the outcome of EU policy is rather critical, and can contribute to the improvement of EU policy targeting the

neighbours of Europe (Grevi, 2009; Whitman and Wolf, 2010). The third direction that some researchers have taken is to look at the relationship between the EU and its neighbours by analyzing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Thus, relevant ideas from these contributions are based on analysis of the relationship between the EU and ENP states. A good example of these researches is presented by Gawrich (2010), dealing with the relationship between the EU and Ukraine, and the outcome of that relationship. These studies are related to the previous perspective that looks at the role of the EU, but more specifically through their neighborhood policy. An example of studies that analyze and criticise EU policy in this regard is *The ENP, Security and Strategy in the Context of the European Security Strategy* by Sven Biscop (2008). Although, this is an example that emphasises the aspect of security whereas there are plenty of researches that look at the ENP without the scope of security. These researches are not relevant for this research however.

The final aspect of the academic debate that has a totally different perspective is research into the concept of Europeanization. Generally, the literature on this concept is interested in explaining the reasons behind the process and outcome of Europeanization (Exadaktylos, 2009). Part of this is understanding the evolution of European polity through the use of the concept (Olsen, 2002). In order to do this, most academics regard Europeanization as a two way process, analyzing the interaction between the EU and (future) member states (Borzel, 2002). The relevance of Europeanization for the problem at hand stems from the realization that at least one form of Europeanization, the shift of external territorial boundaries (Olsen, 2002), has changed the formation of the EU and its neighbours significantly. So, there is literature available in different levels of analysis. We have case-specific research, research on the EU's role in international security, The EU's role for the European neighbourhood and the process of Europeanization as a concept to explain the development of EU policy regarding borders.

In conclusion, this section has shown a sample of four streams of research that are closely connected to the problem. However, all these studies are primarily focussed at the effect or role that the EU has had. What is missing, is a perspective that looks at the development of EU policy from the standpoint of border conflicts. The literary review has shown that systematic analysis of EU as a conflict manager has only started in 2015 with the work of Kartsonaki and Wolf (2015). Their broad approach to the problem naturally demands further research in this manner. However, this type of research has not been conducted from the perspective of the conflicts itself. To truly understand the evolution on European polity, it is relevant to get an insight into what the effect of border conflicts has been on European policy. Besides that, the work of Scott (2016) stresses how academic and public questions are

intertwined when considering border issues. This research is inspired by these insights from the academic literature review. The structure of this research will be laid out in the next section.

1.3 Research Questions

The goal of this research is to explore the relationship between border conflicts and EU policy from the perspective of violent conflicts, as this is a gap in the academic literature. The literature review demonstrates the diversity of aspects and dimensions that are related to the problem that has been identified. EU policy is only partially able to influence security and stability positively, in which the effect of violent conflict in border regions on EU policy is unclear. To contribute to the academic literature that is related to this problem, some insights from the previous sections lead to the main question of this research. Firstly, the impact of the EU on border conflicts has gotten attention in the academic literature but lacks insights about the impact of border conflicts on EU security policy. For instance, this is demonstrated in the work of Kartsonaki and Wolf (2015) who demonstrate the gap in academic literature of systematic analysis of the outcome of EU security policy. Secondly, literature about the relationship between the EU and ENP countries treats the relationship as a one way street. There is evidence that suggests that integration and strong cooperation between the EU and neighbours promotes peace (Stetter et al, 2004), but there is no available literature on the impact of neighbours on this theory. Thirdly, there are some insights in the Europeanization debate about how EU policy has evolved over time (Olsen, 2002; Borzel, 2002), but this debate also lacks the perspective of neighbouring states in which violent conflict has erupted. And lastly, the concept of European security is ambivalent because it is debatable to what European security and threats to European security refer. In this case, it is especially relevant to determine the different dimensions that are relevant to research since the problem has both scientific and public aspects. The connectivity of public expressions and EU policy is relevant for this case because the determination of borders is an abstract idea, but also generates real life challenges on a daily basis (Scott, 2016).

And so, the main research question is: How have border conflicts impacted EU security policy and citizens' perception of EU security? This research attempts to find an answer to this question within a certain setting to limit the scope. Firstly, with regard to time. The starting point of this research is the end of the cold war. The reason for this is mainly that the EU as composed today, started to form because of that event. Another part of this argument is that the greatest enlargements of the EU considering member states had yet to come. Secondly, with regard to subjects of analysis. This research focuses on three aspects of EU security that are already part of the main question: the conflicts itself,

the security policy of the EU, and the perceived security by EU citizens. There are many more possible aspects and perspectives but based on the academic literature these seems to be the most pressing,.These aspects are represented in that order by the chapters, and the analysis will be shaped by the following three sub-questions.

The first sub-question is: Which conflicts on the border of the EU are likely to have had an impact on EU security between 1989 and 2019? This subquestion is necessary because broad substantial analysis is part of the scientific gap. So, in order to say something meaningful about the impact of border conflicts on the evolution of EU policy. Besides that, conflicts first have to be identified before the main question can be analysed. So, the answer to this question is an important part of the answer to the main question but also suits the demands of the scientific gap. The second sub question is: What policy did the EU have regarding border conflicts between 1989 and 2019? The analysis of EU policy towards border conflicts that shall be identified within the first sub-question can shape the research into this sub-question. This sub-question is relevant because the impact of border conflicts on EU policy can be measured by looking at EU security policy. The third sub-question is: How did EU citizens perceive the threat of border conflicts to EU security between 1989 and 2019? This is relevant because the problem seems to connect academic and public problems. Besides that, public opinion has influenced the evolution of EU security policy. This means that the perception of EU citizens of border conflicts has at least influenced the development of EU security policy indirectly. So, the answers to these three sub-questions can answer the main question and are relevant because they combine different aspects of the academic and public problem that is the subject of this research.

1.4   Theoretical framework

This section provides the theoretical framework that will be used to carry out the analysis. It serves as the theoretical foundation that is the scope through which the analysis is carried out. Because of the complexity of the problem and all the different aspects that are intertwined, multiple theories and concepts are necessary. The main overarching theory through which the development of the EU and its characteristics can be understood as became clear through literature review is Europeanization. The reason why this concept is chosen is because all of the five meanings of europeanization that are mentioned by Olsen (2002) are applicable to this research. As will be discussed in-depth below, it combines the development of the EU geo-politically with the development of EU policy. This relationship shapes the security threats that are the subject of this research. Besides that, the explanatory value of Europeanization for the development of EU policy will be a helpful analytical tool for the research design

because a part of the europeanization literature is concerned with the evolution of EU policy. Although there is not one definition of europeanization that is commonly agreed to, there have been multiple attempts by authors to make the theory useful for analysis. So, the concept of Europeanization covers multiple aspects of the problem and the research question as it is a way of understanding the evolution of EU policy.

In terms of method and design of this research, the theoretical basis is provided within *Research Design in European Studies: the Case of Europeanization* (Exadaktylos 2009). The importance of this article is its critical stance towards the use of Europeanization and its application in research design. The authors essentially summarize and review studies that are built upon the concept of Europeanization, in which they mention multiple methodologies. One of the methodologies to measure Europeanization is a bottom-up approach that regards Europeanization as a process rather than an outcome (Exadaktylos 2009). This way of thinking about Europeanization seems to fit the development of EU security policy, and the process that has led to that outcome. The bottom-up approach is to look at policy, politics, and systems at a given point in time, and thereafter tracking process and possible turning points in the system (Exadaktylos, 2009). This method is appealing for this research because it allows the exploration of all dimensions of the problem at hand.

Furthermore, Olsen has identified five kinds of phenomena that can be referred to as Europeanization in *The Many Faces of Europeanization* (Olsen, 2002). He argues that Europeanization refers to: Changes in external territorial boundaries, the development of institutions and governance at the European level, central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond European territory, and a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe (Olsen, 2002). The idea is that these phenomena are closely linked to some form of change in the political landscape of Europe. Olsen argues that the processes that lead to Europeanization differ per phenomenon (Olsen, 2002). This research aims to find out what the impact of border conflicts has been on European security and can answer this question by applying the concept of Europeanization. The hypothesis is that border conflicts have influenced the territorial boundaries, and institutions and governance on a European level in the form of ENP and CSDP. Furthermore, certain policies can be explained through the lens of Europeanization which makes drawing a connection between policy and events possible.

The meaning of European security is debated in the academic literature, and requires a positioning or definition. Wever (1996) argues that European security is not about securing the state or sovereignty, but rather about " a European idea" to legitimate security action. This insight is based on

the theory that security is a self-referential business in which threats are not objective matters but ways of framing to handle issues (Wever, 1996). So, European security is a frame based on the idea that security anywhere in Europe impacts the security of any European. This idea about EU security supports the venue of this research because it eliminates the importance of material aspects, and emphasises the role perceptions play in acknowledging or even creating threats. Another theoretical issue that is related to this is the definition of conflict. Firstly, conflict is not inherently violent (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). An example of non-violent conflict that may still be relevant to European security is collective political action in the form of demonstrations. This distinction had to be made because it partially determines the selection of cases. Furthermore, there are three types of conflict. Namely: interstate (conflicts between states), extrastate (conflict between a state and an external actor outside state borders) and intrastate conflicts (internal) (Sarkees 2003). The conflicts that seem to fit in the category of inter- and extrastate conflict can then be separated once again based on two constructs: civil war and insurgency. Civil war is classified as conflict between two organizations that both have a claim on authority and legitimacy, whereas an insurgency challenges the authority without possessing those attributes (O'Neill 2005). Furthermore, the work of O'Neill (2005) can help to categorize insurgencies with his seven classifications that are made based on the nature of insurgencies. Also, the nature of internal conflicts can be used to categorize cases based on identified structures by Brown (1996) that form possible causes for conflict.

1.5 Method

In general, this research is based on the ideas presented by Exadaktylos (2009). He proposed the possibility of bottom-up research to track the process of Europeanization instead of treating it as an outcome. With this in mind, a starting point is necessary to measure development. This starting point is 1989 as discussed above. Then, this research will consist of structured analysis from 1989 to date (2019). Because the problem tackled in this research is based on borders, the chosen time frame will be divided into periods based on the borders of the EU. So, after 1989 any enlargement of the EU indicates a new period. This leads to the use of five periods consequently: 1989-1995, 1995-2004, 2004-2007, 2007-2013, 2013-2018. The second chapter will identify border conflicts in those periods and use the theoretical framework to find the most relevant cases. After that, secondary literature can assist in analyzing those cases for the sake of understanding the conflicts. The third chapter uses those same periods to track the development of EU security policy and the impact of the cases that were identified in the second chapter. This will be based on official EU legal framework documents and policy

documents. These include the Treaty of the European Union, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Security Strategy, and the European Union Global Strategy. And thirdly, the final sub question will be answered by looking at Eurobarometer data between 1989 and 2018 to find out how EU citizens perceived security threats in all five periods.

Thereafter, the conclusion will use the answers to the sub-questions to answer the main question. This will be done by looking at the answers per aspect, but also by looking at the time periods in general. This means that the insights can be looked at per aspect throughout all periods, but also per period throughout all aspects. And lastly, the conclusion will discuss the meaning of this research for future research and policy that is connected to this subject.

2. Border Conflicts to the EU

Which conflicts on the border of the EU are likely to have had an effect on safety within the EU between 1989 and 2019? This chapter will deal with conflicts on the border of the EU that have occurred in the chosen time frame, to map out their importance to EU security. The first part of this chapter will be an exploration of all the conflicts in the bordering regions of the EU in the last three decades. After that, all of the events will be clustered for the sake of analyzing their relevance to EU safety. The last part of this chapter will deal with the case studies that are selected based on the first section. The exploration of all border conflicts of the EU will be lead by EU enlargement processes as this is the most determining factor in choosing the cases.

2.1 Background

The definition of conflicts that are relevant to this research is based on two dimensions that will be dealt with in this section. The first dimension is a combination of geographical and political factors that leads to a fluent concept of the EU border. The time frame that was chosen for this research does not align with the current composition of the EU, but is more closely related to the end of the cold war (1991) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Since then, the EU has expanded with 16 members, which effectively means the borders of the EU have shifted four times. The relevance of this development can not be underestimated because it determines what are border conflicts to the EU. The second dimension would be the nature of the conflict. This dimension can be understood in multiple ways, but for the scope of this research it is a categorization of conflicts under intrastate, interstate and extrastate conflict. This approach is useful because the type of conflict will determine the impact of the conflict beyond the national or regional level.

2.1.1 Conflicts between 1989-1995

This time period includes the ending of the cold war, and the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The composition of the EU was still relatively small and Spain and Portugal were the latest states to join the EU. The amount of European states that were not part of the EU was still significant. The meaning of this is that most of Central- and Eastern-Europe could still be considered a border region of the EU. Because of that, it is inclined that possible conflicts in these states are considered for the analysis. Furthermore, EU neighbours that should be considered are on the Northern coast of Africa and states that border the Black sea. Although, it is expected that conflicts that erupted in the Caspian region are

less influential in this period due to its relative distance to the closest member state, Greece.

1986: EEC-12
Spain and Portugal

Table 2.1 consists of four shows the time, location, and the main actors of the border conflicts that took place in the first period of this research. Most of these conflicts have a connection to independence wars, or civil wars resulting from a shift of national power. An abundance of these conflicts had an ethnic character that lead to separation and re-definition of borders. This period of "independence" wars is generally understood as the result of the outcome of the cold war, whereas multiple researchers have proven the impact of ethnicity on these, usually violent, conflicts.

Table 2.1			
Conflict	**Year(s)**	**Location**	**Main Actors**
Second Sudanese civil war	1983-2005	Southern Sudan	Central Sudanese government - SPLA
Romanian revolution	1989	Romania	Socialist republic of Romania - National Salvation Front
Lithuanian border crisis	1990-1991	Lithuania	Lithuania - Soviet Union

Tuareg Rebellion	1990-1995	Niger and Mali	Niger/Mali - Multiple Tuareg groups
January events	1991	Lithuania	Lithuania - Soviet Union
The Barricades	1991	Latvia	Latvia - Soviet Union
Ten Day War of Slovenia	1991	Slovenia	Slovenia - Yugoslavia
Georgian War against South Ossetia	1991-1992	Georgia	Georgia - South Ossetia
Georgian Civil War	1991-1993	Georgia	Georgia - South Ossetia - Abkhazia
Croatian War of Independence	1991-1995	Croatia	Croatia - Yugoslavia
Terrorism in egypt	1992-2000	Egypt	Al-Gama'a al-islamiyya
Algerian civil war	1992-2002	Algeria	Algeria - Islamic insurgents
Transnistria War	1992	Transnistria	Transnistria - Moldova
War in Abkhazia	1992-1993	Abkhazia	Abkhazia - Georgia
Bosnian War	1992-1995	Bosnia - Herzegovina	Bosnia herzegovina - Serbia
Russian constitutional crisis	1993	Russia	Russian president - Russian parliament
Chechen war 1	1994-1996	Chechnya	Chechen republic - Russian Federation

2.1.2 Conflicts between 1995- 2004

This time period does not seem to contain a big change in the composition of the EU. Even though only three states joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Sweden, Finland), negotiations between the EU and other "new" states as a result of the conflict in the first time period were going on continuously. The new political situation does not directly impact the borders of the EU, except for the fact that the Baltic-states may have become more relevant and the Yugoslav region gets a little bit closer as well.

Table 2.2 shows the time, location, and the main actors in border conflicts in this period to give an impression of the conflicts that took place in the second period of this research. In this period we see that the hot zones for conflict are very similar to the first period namely the caucasus region and former Yugoslavia.

Table 2.2			
Conflict	**Year(s)**	**Location**	**Main Actors**
Cyprus missile crisis	1997-1998	Cyprus	Cyprus-Turkey
Albanian civil war	1997	Albania	Rebels-Government of Albania
Kosovo War	1998-1999	Kosovo	Kosovo - Yugoslavia
Six Day War of Abkhazia	1998	Abkhazia	Abkhazia - Georgia
Chechen War 2	1999-2009	Dagestan/Chechnya	Chechnya-Russia
Insurgency in presevo valley	1999-2001	Yugoslavia	UCPMB - Yugoslavia

Kodori crisis	2001	Abkhazia	Abkhazia-Georgia
Black Spring	2001-2002	Algeria	Kabyle-Armenia
Insurgency in Macedonia	2001	Macedonia	Albanian NLA - Macedonia
Insurgency in the Maghreb	2002	Maghreb region	Maghreb countries and allies - Islamist militants
War in Darfur	2003	Sudan	Rebel groups- Sudan

2.1.3 Conflicts between 2004-2007

This period consists of a grand expansion of the EU territory by adding ten member states after almost a decade of negotiations with most of them. Some of these member states were mentioned as a border conflict in the previous period such as the Baltic states and Cyprus. But from 2004 onwards the situation changed greatly by introducing a unification of Western- and Eastern Europe. Before, these regions had posed as violent threats themselves. The period between this enlargement and the next one is relatively short and only has 4 conflicts that arose around the continent. Table 2.3 shows the continuous unrest in georgia throughout all periods has carried on once again. The civil war in Chad had multiple actors involved including the EU member-state France. However, compared to other periods considering the distance between the subjects and the EU one could argue that this period has very little relevance to the overall safety and security of the EU.

Table 2.3			
Conflict	**Year(s)**	**Location**	**Main Actors**
Crisis of Adjarra	2004	Georgia	Adjarra- Georgia
South Ossetia Skirmishes	2004	Georgia	Ossetia- Georgia
Kodori crisis	2006	Georgia	Abkhazia - Georgia
Civil War in Chad	2005-2010	Chad	Rebels - Chad

2.1.4 Conflicts between 2007-2013

Context wise, the fourth period could be seen as a further development of the unification between Western- and Eastern-Europe. The inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria as member states brings the events around the black sea more relevance to EU safety. Furthermore, the gap between Russia and the EU gets innemently smaller. Table 2.4 shows the conflicts that took place between 2007-2013 which are dominated by events connected to the Arab spring. The continuation of unrest in the caucasus region is an interesting case because the developments in previous periods seem to explode in 2008.

Table 2.4			

Conflict	Year(s)	Location	Main actors
War in ingushetia	2007	Ingushetia	Caucasus emirate-Russia
Tuareg rebellion	2007-2009	Niger/Mali	Tuareg Rebels - Niger/Mali
Mardakert Skirmishes	2008	Mardakert	Azerbaijan- Nagorno-Karabakh
Russian-Georgian War	2008	Georgia	Russia/Abkhazia/South- Ossetia - Georgia
Insurgency in North-Caucasus	2009-2017	Russia	Caucasus Emirate/ISIL-Russia
Sudanese Nomadic conflicts	2009	Darfur and South Sudan	Nomadic tribes
Tunisian Revolution	2010-2011	Tunisia	Tunisia- Civil resistance
Sudan SPLM-N conflict	2011	Sudan	Sudan-SRF
Egyptian crisis	2011-2014	Egypt	Egypt - Civil resistance
Libyan crisis	2011-present	Libya	Libya - Civil resistance
Protests in Sudan	2011-2013	Sudan	Sudan - Civil resistance
Northern Mali conflict	2012- present	Mali	Mali - MNLA

2.1.5 Conflicts between 2013 - 2018

This final period consists of the finalization of the EU member state composition as we know it right now. The addition of Croatia brings the EU to 28 member states and multiple very different border regions. As will become visible in Table 2.5, three of these regions became active when speaking of conflicts in the last 5 years. The Eastern-border region, the Eastern side of the Black sea and the remaining non-EU yugoslav states.

Table 2.5			
Conflict	**Year(s)**	**Location**	**Main Actors**
Ukrainian Crisis	2013-present	Ukraine	Ukraine-Russia
Kumanovo Clashes	2015	North Macedonia	North-Macedonia-NLA
Nagorno-karabakh Clashes	2016	Nagorno-Karabakh	Nagorno-Karabakh-Azerbaijan
Gyunnyut Clashes	2018	Azerbaijan	Armenia-Azerbaijan

2.2 The nature of conflicts on the border of the EU

The previous section is mostly an inventorisation of conflicts that have emerged throughout the chosen time period. Now, the goal of this section is to understand the character of those conflicts. To cluster the events into useable constructs, this research will first take a step back from the first dimension to determine the salience for the EU (geography and politics), and solely look at groupings based on

theoretical concepts. Firstly, the conflicts will be divided under interstate (conflicts between states), extrastate (Conflict between a state and an external actor outside state borders) and intrastate (internal conflict) conflicts (Sarkees 2003). Secondly, the conflicts that seem to fit in the category of inter- and extrastate conflict will be separated once again based on two concepts: civil war and insurgency. In which case a civil war is classified as conflict between two organizations that both have a claim on authority and legitimacy, whereas an insurgency challenges the authority without possessing those attributes (O'Neill 2005). Furthermore, the chapter of O'Neill can help to categorize insurgencies with his seven classifications. And lastly, this section will make an attempt to categorize the other internal conflicts by using the underlying causes of Brown (1996) and using this theory to find the most pressing issue that determines the nature of the conflict.

2.2.1 Intrastate, Interstate, Extrastate.

When we look at table 2.6, the 50 cases have been divided over their presumed character of conflict. This division is based on the concept of the different types of conflict. The conceptualization is surrounded around the idea that the types of actors and the location of the conflict matter. In this line of thinking intrastate conflicts are conflicts between two states. Interstate conflicts are defined as conflicts within one state either between the government and another organisation, or between two non-state organizations. Extrastate conflicts are those conflicts in which a state is involved outside their official borders. So, The categorization in this table is based on the main actors involved and the location of the conflict. This categorization of the cases leads to a set of 5 insights regarding violent conflict in the border regions of the EU in the last three decenia.

Firstly, most conflicts on the border of the EU since 1989 seem to be interstate conflicts. Generally, violent conflict has developed to be more interstate than intrastate since the end of the cold war. Some historians find reasons for this development in decolonisation, others in the general will of people to pursue peace for the greater good. Initially this is based on the assumption that collective violent action is not rational. However, this idea would not lend any analytical value for these 50 cases because interstate conflict can be just as devastating for societies. Almost one third of the interstate conflicts have taken place in Georgia which is significant compared to the amount of cases we take into account. This leads us to the second insight that the region seems to be connected to the type of conflicts that arise. This is related to the uniqueness of conflicts, and the fact that every case is completely different because of contextual factors like structural, political, economical, social and cultural (Brown 1996). Thirdly, intrastate conflicts on the border of the EU had an abundance of current EU member states as main actors. Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Croatia have all

joined the EU within a relatively short time of being independant or reconstructing the state in the aftermath of violent conflicts. It is clear that these conflicts have been very influential in shaping the political landscape of Europe.

This brings us to the fourth insight derived from this categorization. As mentioned in the first insight about the amount of interstate conflicts compared to intrastate conflicts it is argued that this is connected to the time frame you are considering. For our cases there is clearly a difference per period as well. This is partially due to the development of the Arab Spring, leading to an increase of interstate conflict. The same goes for the increase of intrastate conflict, fueled by the disappearance of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. So, because the context of regions matters to the kind of conflict that emerges, so can the period in which a conflict emerged say something about the nature of it. And finally, Extrastate conflicts are visibly less apparent than the other types of conflict. Even Though this may say something about the sampling of the cases, I would argue that this also has to do with the regions we have selected for this research. Namely, there are surely extrastate conflicts that are relevant to the EU (think of Syria and Iraq), but they do not seem to fit our subject of research because of the setting.

Table 2.6		
Intrastate	**Interstate**	**Extrastate**
Romanian revolution (1989), Lithuanian border posts (1990-1991), January Events (1991), Barricades (1991), Ten Day War Slovenia (1991), Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995), Bosnian War (1992-1995), Cyprus missile crisis (1997-1998), Kosovo War (1998-1999), Insurgency in Presevo Valley (1999-2001), Mardakert Skirmishes (2008), Russian-Georgian War (2008), Ukranian crisis (since 2013), Nagorno-Karabakh Clashes (2016), Gyunnyut Clashes (2018),	Second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), Tuareg Rebellion (1990-1995), Georgian War (1991-1992), Georgian civil war (1991-1993), Transnistria War (1992), Terrorism in Egypt (1992-2000), Algerian Civil War (1992-2002), War in Abkhazia (1992-1993), Russian Constitutional Crisis (1993), Chechen War 1 (1994-1996), Albanian Civil War (1997), Six Day War of Abkhazia (1998), Kodori crisis Georgia (2001), Black Spring (2001-2002), Insurgency in Macedonia (2001), War in Darfur (2003), Unrest in Kosovo (2004-2013), Georgia Adjarra Crisis (2004), Georgia South-Ossetia Skirmishes (2004)	Second Chechen War (1999-2009), Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002) Insurgency in the Northern-Caucasus (2009-2017)

	Civil War in Chad (2005-2010)	
	Kodori Crisis Georgia (2006)	
	War in Ingushetia (2007)	
	Tuareg Rebellion (2007-2009)	
	Sudanese Nomadic conflicts (2009)	
	Tunisian revolution (2010-2011)	
	Sudan SPLM-N conflict (2001)	
	Egyptian Crisis (2011-2014)	
	Libyan Crisis (since 2011)	
	Protest in Sudan (2011-2013)	
	Northern Mali Conflict (since 2012)	

2.2.2 Civil War and Insurgency

Because the outcome of the first categorization has shown a great amount of interstate conflict this section will divide that category in essentially three different selections. Based on the selection of cases sofar, we can already make a distinction between civil war and insurgency. In essence an insurgency can be defined as a struggle between a non ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non ruling group uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (O'Neill 2005). Civil war on the other hand can be considered a struggle between two legitimate organisations with conflicting claims that results in the continuation of this struggle through violent collective action. The hardship in categorizing the conflicts under one of the two types of interstate or extrastate insurgencies/civil wars is that it can largely depend on a matter of perspective. Sometimes a legitimate organization can lose their battle even before it becomes a violent conflict because framing politics have named them insurgents. Furthermore, separatist insurgencies may seem illegitimate when they are not recognized by the international community, but others may get that endorsement. This illustrates the fluency of the concept. Table 2.7 categorizes the applicable cases of interstate conflict either by insurgency or civil war depending on the parties involved and the perceived legitimacy and authority of the main actors.

Table 2.7	
Insurgency	**Civil War**

Tuareg Rebellion (1990-1995),	Second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005),
Georgian War (1991-1992),	Georgian Civil War (1991-1993),
Transnistria War (1992),	Algerian Civil War (1992-2002),
Terrorism in Egypt (1992-2000),	Chechen War 1 (1994-1995),
War in Abkhazia (1992-1993),	Albanian Civil War (1997),
Six Day War in Abkhazia (1998),	War in Darfur (2003),
Kodori Crisis in Georgia (2001),	Unrest in Kosovo (2004-2013),
Black Spring (2001-2002),	Civil War in Chad (2005-2010),
Insurgency in Macedonia (2001),	Sudanese Nomadic Conflicts (2009),
Georgia Adjarra Crisis (2004),	Sudan SPLM-N Conflict (2011),
Kodori Crisis Georgia (2006)	Protest in Sudan (2011-2013),
War in Ingushetia (2007),	Northern Mali Conflict (since 2012).
Tuareg Rebellion (2007-2009),	
Tunisian Revolution (2010-2011)	
Egyptian Crisis (2011-2014),	
Libyan Crisis (since 2011).	

An insurgency, is an organisation rather than a form of conflict itself. However, the involvement of an insurgency characterizes the conflict. O'Neill has identified 7 types of insurgencies that give an even deeper insight into the nature of conflicts, and further categorizes the conflicts. The seven categories are: Anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist,secessionist, reformist and preservationist (O'Neill, 2005)

Table 2.8						
Anarchist	Egalitarian	Traditionalist	Pluralist	Secessionist	Reformist	Preservatio-nist
		Transnistria war (1992)	Tunisian revolution (2010-2011), Egyptian Crisis (2011-2014), Libyan Crisis (since 2011.	Tuareg Rebellion (1990-1995), Georgian war (1991-1992), Transnistria War (1992), War in Abkhazia (1992-1993), Six Day War of Abkhazia (1998),	Black Spring (2001-2002)	

				Kodori Crisis Georgia (2001), Insurgency in Macedonia (2001), Georgia Adjarra Crisis (2004), Kodori Crisis Georgia (2006), War in Ingushetia (2007), Tuareg Rebellion (2007-2009)		

Most of the insurgencies in our sample are secessionist organisations. These organisations renounce the political structure they are officially part of and desire to become independent or change the political structure they fall under. Due to the inclusion of Georgia in our sample this is also the largest group of insurgencies. The pluralist insurgencies primarily demand a change of the political system for the good of individual freedom and compromise. These values usually lead to a democratization of a state. All three of the pluralist insurgencies are connected to the arab spring.

2.3 The most relevant conflicts to EU security according to the data

The selection of cases in the previous section has taken a broad perception towards the European Neighborhood, to identify any relevant conflict regardless of their objective distance from the EU.The selection of case studies to use for further analysis is based on the outcome of the previous section, but may also be a functional choice. This means that because of the scope of this paper it is relevant to limit the selection of cases which does not mean that other cases are not likely to have impacted EU security policy. For example, This research will focus on one out of three pluralist insurgencies that was connected to the Arab spring because the analysis of all three is not feasible.

The data presented in the previous section leads to a couple of important insights about border conflicts. Firstly, one set of conflicts is connected to current EU member states and therefore has a high impact on EU security. Although, for this research it seems out of place to recap the balkan wars and the development of Eastern-Europe because this role in security of Europe is obvious. We can expect the history and culture of member states to have a direct impact on EU security policy at this time. It is not

necessarily in the scope of this paper to research these conflicts because the result of those past border conflicts is evident. Because most of the states in which intrastate conflicts erupted since 1989 are now part of the EU, the analysis of those cases loses relevance for this research. And yet, the second insight from the data is that the intrastate conflicts that remain, will be relevant to this research because of its expected impact. Where two states conflict with each other we can expect it to force a reaction of the international community. Two cases that remain in the group of intrastate conflict are Kosovo and Ukraine.

Thirdly, the identified extrastate conflicts are not salient for EU security because they are simply unrelated to the border of the EU. These conflicts are relevant for the bordering states, but not so much for EU security. Fourthly, secessionist insurgencies is the largest group of conflicts within the category of interstate conflict. However, these conflicts also lacks relevance to this research because secessionism is a form of conflict that is unlikely to impact security overseas . However, the case of Georgia has controversily been a focus for the EU because of its positioning. The caucasus region has proven to be an important neighbour to the EU and may therefore have had an impact on security and policy. Furthermore, the real reason to include Georgia as a case study comes from the data itself since Georgia is the most recurring conflict in the chosen time frame. Fifthly, the nature of insurgencies that is relevant to the EU security are pluralist insurgencies. This is for two reasons. Firstly, pluralist insurgencies generally promote western norms and values that are likely to be noticeable at least for the EU. Secondly, the results of these insurgencies have impacted the EU economically and one would therefore expect a far reaching influence of these conflicts. The cases that remain are Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. Picking one of these cases will serve the cause of understanding the impact of this type of conflict and its region. Because of its recency and the scope of this research the case of Egypt will be taken into account at the expense of the other 2. In summary, there are four cases that are likely to have influenced EU security, or can serve as an example for other conflicts that have the same nature, region or relevance: Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia, and Egypt. The next sections will shortly explain what these cases are about, who are the main actors in the conflict, and what the impact of the conflict has been for EU security according to literary review. While doing this, the analysis will be limited by excluding policy implications, which will be dealt with in chapter three.

2.4 Ukraine

2.4.1 What is the Ukrainian Crisis?

The Ukrainian Crisis is primarily referred to as the events connected to the Ukrainian struggle over choosing between closer ties to the EU or Russia. Most of the violence that resulted from the political conflict took place in Eastern-Ukraine, while other violence took place in Kiev following initial peaceful protests. Fundamentally there are four developments that are part of the Ukrainian crisis from 2014 onwards. Protests in kiev, presidential change, the Crimea unrest and the MH17 shutdown. Putin warned Ukraine for being on the brink of a civil war to erupt between pro-russian and pro-european citizens (CNN, 2017). The conflict has seen interference of many international actors trying to resolve the conflict while protecting the Ukrainian people (BBC, 2014). The most direct influence of the EU on this conflict is without a doubt the trade deal between the EU and Ukraine that started the political controversy that citizens did not agree with in the first place. The threat of this trade deal to "Russian interests" has polarized the country. The then active president decided to back out of the EU agreement and develop a new agreement with Russia instead, including the relief of debt and discount on gas prices (CNN, 2017). The tension within this border region of the EU as a result of an internal struggle of loyalty has led to the most violent day in Kiev, a decrease of welfare in Eastern-Ukraine, and high amounts of civilian casualties in general.

2.4.2 Which actors are involved?

The first phase of this conflict revolves around president Yanukovyc's government which is dominantly pro-Russian and backs out of a promising EU trade deal. Because of this development that is part of the issue over which violent conflict breaks out, the EU and Russia are also influential actors. Russia gets more involved after the Russian parliament agrees on military intervention in Crimea. The direct involvement of Russian troops leads to the creation of a new group to play a role in this conflict, which are the pro-Russian rebels. While Russia is directly involved in the separatist development in Crimea, pro-Russian ukrainians seize the opportunity to occupy government buildings all across Eastern-Europe (CNN, 2017). The removal of Yanukovych in 2014 leads to a new presidency under Petro Poroshenko. Attempts to resolve the conflict to prevent further harm drew in more international actors like the EU member states, the US and the UN, to pressure the main parties (Ukraine and Russia) to work out a peace agreement starting with a cease fire.

2.4.3 Outcome and impact

There are multiple reasons why this border conflict has an impact on EU security. Firstly, the conflict influences Ukraine's prospects as an EU member or even partner. Ukraine is part of the ENP and Eastern-Europe Partnership program, but the territorial disturbances and recent security threats have set Ukraine further away from membership status (Matsaberidze, 2018). Contradictory, the Ukrainian crisis has eventually led to a ratification of the so longed for trade deal. Even though it is not always clear, Ukraine clearly wants further integration and possibly EU membership in the future (Larrabee, 2004; Gawrich, 2010). Obviously, further integration of Ukraine into Europe would enhance the possibilities to control security and guarantee a higher level of safety on the continent. The difficulty that has been observed by other authors on the conflict for Ukraine is finding the balance between EU and Russian relationships. As we have seen in the short descriptive part of the conflict, the division of loyalties in Ukraine was at the core of collective political action in Kiev, but also led to the uprising of rebels in the east. The diversified system of Ukraine in which both Russian and EU relationships are valued, has lead to unpreferable violent confrontations and a frozen conflict that is not beneficial for Ukraine and the EU (Izhak, 2016).

This leads us to the second insight which is about the relationship between the Ukrainian crisis and Russian-EU relationships. As important as Russia is to Ukraine, it is even more important to the EU when considering the impact of the conflict on EU safety. Namely, Russia is one of the focus areas of the CFDP (Kuzio, 2003). Although the real reasons behind Russian intervention in Crimea are debatable, it is clear that it has to do with the enlargement of EU/US influence towards its border (Matsaberidze, 2015). Whether it is ethnic Russian interest, buffer territory or guarding Russian influence against Western norms and values, it all leads to the same insight that Russia benefits from disruption and instability between the EU and Russia (Matsaberidze,2015). The case of the Ukrainian crisis has shown the incapability of the EU and NATO to create security in their neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it has confirmed the unpleasant idea for the EU that Russia somehow has a veto on security issues in neighbouring regions (Matsaberidze, 2015). This proof of the actual status of security on the border of the EU is one of the greater challenges for NATO and the EU. And for Ukraine, as much as they may wish to be independent from Russia it will be key to the development of their economy and political system to maintain a healthy relationship with Russia (Larrabee, 2004).

Thirdly, an aspect that is connected to the previous insights about how this conflict influenced EU security is the fact that the promotion of European norms and values through the ENP and partnership programmes did not help Ukraine against Russian aggression (Matsaberidze, 2015). ALthough, Ukraine is a prime example of a motivated EU neighbour to stimulate integration and

cooperation (Gawrich, 2010). So what this can mean for EU security is that EU partners and neighbours

are more careful with choosing their loyalty out of fear. For instance for Ukraine, it was shown that a

lack of EU interest in cooperating with them lead them to work together with Russia by canceling the EU

trade deal and figuring out a completely different deal with Putin. This behaviour is threatening to the

EU because it is harder to promote safety and other cooperation with states that do not share the same

norms and values that are at the core of Europeanization.

The fourth issue is connected to the reason behind the ENP of the EU. One important aspect of

ENP is justice and home affairs (JHA), targeting border security and migration (Gawrich, 2010). With a

contested " buffer state" as Ukraine that has a diversified system of relations, the EU might lose its grip

on JHA through the ENP. But more directly the conflict in Ukraine poses a direct threat to the EU border

if it expands from Eastern Ukraine to the west. Additionally, a frozen conflict in a border state is a direct

threat to EU security and may last for decades as is visible in the case of Georgia. The final aspect of this

conflict that influences EU security is the fact that this was the first military confrontation on the

European continent since the Balkan wars (Matsaberidze, 2015). The negative outcome of those

confrontations has somehow brought together the EU states on the development of a common security

strategy, and has unfortunately shown its necessity once again. Military conflicts are definitely

undesirable for regional security and development, but also for the neighbouring EU.

2.5 Kosovo

2.5.1 What is the conflict in Kosovo?

The conflict in kosovo is closely connected to the disassembly of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars. Kosovo

was absorbed in the Yugoslav federation in 1946 but was granted autonomous rights in the yugoslav

constitution of 1974 (BBC,2018). As a result of efforts made by Milosevic to maintain a yugoslav

structured state, discontent grows in Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Kosovo. Political leaders of Kosovo

declare independence in 1990, but this declaration is suppressed by Serbia and their forces. The

declaration of independence in 1990 is a key moment that has lead to violence throughout the last

decennia between Kosovo Albanians and ethnic Serbs. Most of the violence takes place later, when the

Kosovo Liberation Army clashes with Serbian forces. The persistence of Milosevic eventually leads to

NATO intervention (NATO, 1999). Despite NATO efforts, including air strikes on Serbia, to aid Kosovo in

reaching a workable situation for both parties initiatives to set Kosovo on the path of independence are

not accepted by Serbia for years. The declaration of independence in 2008 has not been able to stop

political, social and violent unrest in Kosovo. The attempts of international actors to maintain peace and assist the formation of an effective government have not settled the dust yet.

2.5.2 Which actors are involved?

The main actors are ethnic Serbs and Ethnic Kosovo-Albanians that are now represented by their governments. As has become clear from the first section, the actual actors have changed from being Yugoslav to Serbian, from autonomous region to independent state. However, the groups that clash with each other remain the same. Serbia has been largely lead by Milosevic, whereas during the most intense fighting in 1999 the KLA was the most important actor to act on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians. International actors that have influenced the development of the conflict include NATO and the UN Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (Kfor).

2.5.3 Outcome and Impact

One of the aspects of this border conflict that is recurrent in the literature about the kosovo crisis is the capability of the EU to perform as an international security actor. It is argued to be the EU's first experience that shows their military capability (Latawski, 2003). Even though NATO was generally thought of as the transnational organisation to engage in security issues, the Kosovo crisis showed a glimpse of what role the EU could play in the security dimension. Kosovo became the case that somehow worked as a testing ground for EU security activities (Latawski, 2003). EULEX is the biggest foreign mission for the EU and in a way serves as an example of what the EU is capable of. This dimension of the conflict is not directly connected to the internal security of the EU, but does reflect the aspiration to contribute to international security which will eventually contribute to internal safety (Latawski, 2003).

Secondly, the case of kosovo is commonly thought of as the dealbreaker for ESDP developments politically. It is not irrational to think that the context of Kosovo ultimately lead to the development of EU level security initiatives. Regardless, the literature seems to be critical of the impact that the conflict had on the development of ESDP. Most researches point out the value that kosovo had for proponents of ESDP to persuade and enforce the initiative, but that the events did not lead to its development directly (Latawski 2003). What makes this case so interesting for EU's conflict resolution capabilities and instruments is that the placement and character of the conflict may have impacted EU security and they way in which instruments are set up. This is because of two reasons that are the third and fourth insight from this case study.

The third insight is that the case reshaped the focus of the international community completely (Greicevci, 2001). The renewed focus on the Western-Balkan countries came from the conflict in Kosovo especially after the 1998-1999 events, but lead to an awareness of the status of the region after the Balkan wars. Especially with the possible inclusion of many new European states in the EU in the near future. As we know now, 5 years later a huge EU enlargement took place and it was unsure whether or not the crisis in Kosovo could form a security threat to the (future) EU. This contextual insight shows that the conflict impacted EU decision-making far beyond the security dimension. The fourth insight is a similar effect. The nature of the conflict showed that ethical issues in Europe were still an issue that needed to be addressed. The issue of diversity leading to conflict is a threat to the existence of a cooperative Europe. But also, it was a challenge to EU security initiatives to act in ethical issues because of the moral dilemma to pick sides. A similar challenge has been seen in the decision making of NATO in the Kosovo conflict (Greicevci, 2011)

2.6 Georgia

2.6.1 What is the conflict in Georgia?

The conflict in Georgia has mainly erupted because of two separatist movements in the Abkhazia and South-Ossetia region. The second aspect of this conflict is the involvement of Russia and their backing of the separatist movements. This positioning of Russia has lead to the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. Georgia has had a lot of violent activity since their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. While the independence was supported by a large part of the Georgian population, it only took 1 year until separatist forces in abkhazia fought with Georgian government troops. The fighting ends after a cease-fire and peacekeeping forces become active in Georgia. However, the cease fire of 1994 was followed by unrest all the way up to Russian intervention in 2008. Abkhazia remained a violent region, Georgia has had difficulty with dealing with terrorist activity in the caucasus, and South-Ossetia seems to follow Abkhazia in pursuing separatism (BBC, 2012). The resolvement of the Russian intervention has led to an improvement of the relationship between Georgia and Russia, and the officialization of Georgian territory including the independence of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia under Russian protection.

2.6.2 Which actors are involved?

The main actor is the Georgian government conflicting with the separatist forces of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. As stated in the previous section, Russia has influenced the development of these conflicts and

eventually engaged in military intervention to confront the Georgian government violently. Also, the UN has been involved as an international actor to monitor the cease fire between Georgia and Abkhazia.

2.6.3 Outcome and impact

The EU has stated that the Southern Caucasus is an important region for them even though the distance (Whitman, 2010). It is important to note that the EU believes that the Southern caucasus can pose problems for Europe even with its location. There are multiple reasons for the EU to believe that the Southern Caucasus can play an important role in European security. Not only can it pose problems for the continent, it can also greatly improve the security of Europe if the right efforts are made. One example is that good relations can contribute to Europeanization of the black sea region, and help in the EU's position compared to Russia. Another aspect that has been mentioned in the literature is energy safety. The fact that the Southern Caucasus is a possible pathway to the Caspian Sea region can not be underestimated as a strategic advantage because of its energy supply through oil and gas.

The second insight is that Georgia has expressed great interest and belief in the European way (Mkrtchyan, 2009). This in combination with the previous aspects makes the case of Georgia of great importance for EU security, not so much because it threatens it but rather that it enhances it. It is therefore positive to see that Georgia is open to the EU and can play a role in the maintenance of mutual security (Pardo Sierra, 2011). And yet, Georgia was not able to rely on the EU considering the conflict in 2008 including Russia (Pardo Sierra, 2011). This brings us to the third insight that the Georgian conflict is much like Kosovo a challenge for the EU as a security actor to prove their value in promoting peace (Whitman and Wolf). Although the EU was unable to protect Georgia against a Russian intervention, it assisted the state greatly in dealing with the internal development and challenges of the country. Their role in the development of peaceful rebuilding between the violent separatist regions and Georgia and parallel institutional and economic development showed that EU approaches to conflict resolution had advantages for both parties (Whitman, 2010).

The last aspect is similar to the conflict in Ukraine since Russia was an active violent actor in both cases. The case impacted EU security because it was a Russian reaction to EU decision-making and development. Russia's intervention combatted pro-western sentiment and reaffirmed the idea that EU neighbours have contested influence (Matsaberidze, 2015). Not only can these neighbours form a threat to European security, it also affirms the threat that Russia is to the EU and how Russia is still in charge in the security dimension when it comes to hard power.

2.7 Egypt

2.7.1 What is the conflict in Egypt?

The conflict in Egypt is mainly linked to the Arab spring that lead to progressive political changes in the arab world. The conflict essentially consists of three phases of violence and collective action. The first phase is marked by the reign and fall of president Mubarak. The presidency of mubarak started off with a restriction on freedom of citizens and contained violent events such as terrorist attacks by gama'a al-islamiyya. Public government demonstrations erupt in 2011 targeting the restrictive political sphere and freedom of citizens. The end of Mubarak leads to an army lead government which holds elections and the people vote for islamic groups that have moved to the front in the fall of Mubarak. President Morsi becomes president on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather quickly, we can see that this presidency ends because it was named a terrorist group and led to the death of Morsi. Morsi is followed by a new president Sisi who's presidential career until now has been characterized by Egypts struggle with IS violence.

2.7.2 Which actors are involved?

This conflict is mainly about the Egyptian people rising up against their government. Both Mubarak and Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood were contested politically by the citizens. As a result of the rise of IS and their activity in Egypt, they became the new initiator of violence after both Mubarak and Morsi had failed to maintain the power in Egypt. The three phases of conflict since the eruption of protest known as the Arab spring all have different actors that sparked civil uprisings. As Egypt is trying to recover from the unrest, IS has maintained a violent aspect of Egypt until today.

2.7.3 Outcome and impact

The main development in the Egyptian conflict since 2011 has been the political and reform that led to democratic elections eventually. The previous interactions between the EU and Egypt were in the form of economic partnership. The goal of this relationship for the EU may have primarily been economic growth, but went hand in hand with policy reform (Galal, 1996)). We see very similar signs in the other cases in which the EU tried to build and maintain relationships regardless of the conflicts that arose. The fact that the EU and Egypt had a partnership in place points to the understanding that egypt is art of the security outline of the EU.

However, a second insight may change our perception of the impact of the conflict. It is argued that the ENP and partnership program was unable to prevent the security threats egypt posed not only during the Arab spring, but also previously. Namely, the EP had expressed concerns about Egypts democracy and human rights violations that were going along with that. Even though the EU generally disregarded these concerns, within a year the people of Egypt participated in a massive revolution (Comelli, 2010). The ineffectiveness of the EU to maintain security and positively influence their neighbours seems recurrent, and is frightful to EU security. The second point is that the real threat of the MENA region to the EU is islamist empowerment and undemocratic development (Lazarou, 2013). Undemocratic neighbours are a possible threat to the EU, and the egyptian uprising has proven just so. The fact that Egypt responded to the EP's concerns with canceling any form of communication shows the inability of the EU to control their neighbours, and therefore inability to effectively prevent security threats from becoming real.

The difficulty for the EU politically in this case only extended when the military of Egypt intervened to put Morsi out of office. Some EU countries argued that the military intervention is undemocratic again, showing the continuous threat of Egypt as a neighbouring country. And yet, it can be said that the military simply carried out the will of the people to allow for new democratic elections recently (Mitzcavitch, 2014). The historic relationship between the EU and Egypt suggests that there is great potential of cooperation, especially since the political system has changed so much in the last 8 years. In a sense, the fundamental aim of the EU's security strategy is the promotion of democracy and peace which were eventually achieved in Egypt. And still, we ought to be critical about the role that the EU has played in that process. The outcome may be a positive one, but it could just as well have been very negative for EU security. We can only speculate about what the EU could have done to prevent that threat.

2.8 Conclusion

Based on the identification of border conflicts and the categorization of these subjects based on secondary literature we can answer the first subquestion: Which conflicts on the border of the EU are likely to have had an effect on safety within the EU? The first section of this chapter used a sample of conflicts based on geography to map the extensive presence of violent conflict on the borders of Europe. Since the borders of the EU have shifted over time, the chapter took a very broad concept of border conflicts as a sample to analyze their salience for the EU. Now, the real question is which one of these conflicts are most relevant for the EU security strategy and policy. Based on this chapter it is safe to say that quite a large group of conflicts is not relevant for this research based on a couple of aspects.

Regardless, all of the conflicts that were taken in the sample may in one way or another have influenced EU security. In fact, one of the reasons to disregard certain cases is because it was clear that these cases had influenced EU security directly. The most clear examples are currently EU member states such as Romania,Lithuania, Croatia and Latvia. Other conflicts were ruled out of the case selection because of the nature of the conflict. It became clear through the case studies that a common reason for conflicts to be interesting to EU security is because of the EU's aspiration to be an international security actor. If that perspective would have been the departure for research, cases such as South Sudan would have more analytical value. Taken the perspective of what the border of the EU is today and how conflicts fit in the current threats to the EU Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo and Egypt seemed likely to have influenced not only EU security but also decision-making in the field of security.

The case studies lead to insights about how these border conflicts impact EU security. It is interesting that all four selected cases are part of the ENP and are recognised as promising partners. To some extent this may lead to EU enlargement but for instance the case of Ukraine and Georgia has shown that the violent conflicts are disrupting that prospect. In most cases the EU has recognized publicly that these events are problematic for Europe, and there is high priority to stabilize these regions. The spread of cases over the border of the EU (East, Balkan, MENA, South Caucasus) shows that border conflicts are not only relevant because of their positioning. Secondly, the nature of the conflict does not determine the impact of the conflict. Although the nature of the conflict and actors involved do shape the way in which the conflict impacts the EU, all cases have a completely different situation.

The cases have shown as suggested before that border conflicts do impact EU security, and this chapter has demonstrated per case how they have impacted security. An undeniable insight is that these conflicts have played a role in EU policy, which will be the focus of chapter three. Some cases have shown the reality of multi-level and multi-dimensional impact that border conflicts have on the EU. The plurality of aspects of security shows the way in which these conflicts can threaten safety, crime,, economic development, stability, and more. The cases represent threats on a higher level. For instance, Georgia and Ukraine have shown the challenge of Russia to the EU. But also, Egypt has shown the hardship in promoting norms and values to create stable democratic neighbours. Kosovo has shown the contemporary challenge of mixed ethnicities in Europe, and Georgia has shown the European struggle for energy safety. These trends of security threats shine through the border conflicts and at the same time are not limited to them. The structural occurrence of conflict since 1990 (more than 50) on the border of the EU shows that there is a long way to go before EU security is guaranteed.

As this chapter has described and explained the impact of border conflicts on EU security it becomes interesting to research this impact from the perspective of the EU instead. The way in which these conflicts influenced the EU internally will add a whole new set of insights. This is the function of the next two chapters. The four conflicts that have impacted EU safety are Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia and Egypt. Now it is vital to research how these have impacted public opinion and EU policy.

European security policy regarding border conflicts

3. EU policy on border conflicts

This chapter will answer the question: what policy does the EU have on border conflicts? This question is slightly restricted by the insights of the previous chapter as it will primarily look at the four cases to answer that question. The chapter is structured per period and will be followed by a conclusion. Per period relevant documents to EU security policy are identified and analyzed to find the impact of Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia and Egypt on these policies. Furthermore, each period will be analyzed with the background of the theoretical framework per section. The idea behind this method is to identify turning points and see if these are related to the four cases.

3.1 Security policy of 1989-1995

This period consists of important changes for European security. The main agreements, treaties, and declarations that form the security domain in this period are the Modified Brussels Treaty (1954), The Maastricht Treaty (1992) and The Petersberg Tasks (1992). The importance of the Modified Brussels Treaty is because it is exemplary for the way in which European states started to co-operate in the field of security in a legally binding way. Besides creating this basic WEU basis for co-operation in the security domain, the MBT paved the way to international military action to promote peace and positive European integration and development. The amended Treaty shows the signatories' intention to combat aggression beyond European borders, and promote peace (WEU, 1956). Although the modified Brussels Treaty was signed long before this period, the WEU treaty is the basis for EU security co-operation and the changes that took place in this period.

Especially the Petersberg Tasks (WEU, 1992) was a WEU declaration to extend and specify the scope of the objectives stated in the modified Brussels Treaty. In the context of the balkan wars in the early 90's the Petersberg Tasks extended the application of WEU military units from general security to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, crisis management, and peacekeeping (WEU,1992). This is one of the developments in the legal framework that seems to be connected to border conflicts and how to deal with these issues. Especially but not exclusively because of the violent conflict on the European continent, the WEU was granted more competence to allow EU security efforts independent from NATO. In the meanwhile, the Treaty of Maastricht reshaped the EU completely. The interesting aspect of the Treaty of Maastricht for this research is the " second Pillar". This second pillar is the definition and implementation of the CFSP, closely connected to the creation of ESDP and later CSDP (European Parliament, 2018). The Maastricht Treaty stated the objectives of the CFSP as a protection of

the Union, its member states , and international peace (European Parliament, 2018). But more importantly: "A common foreign and security policy is hereby established." (European Parliament, 2018).

None of our chosen cases occurred in this period, but the exploration of the legal background at the very least shows how the context of violent conflict on the European continent went hand in hand with the development of more effective legal measures to deal with the security threats. It also shows EU willingness to contribute to peace beyond her borders. It is no coincidence that both the WEU changes and the Maastricht Treaty opened to active EU engagement in the security domain beyond their borders, especially during the Balkan Wars. If we consider the faces of Europeanization by Olsen we can see three developments in this period that could be called Europeanization. The Petersberg tasks and the Maastricht Treaty basically change the rules of the game completely. Although the MBT served as a fundament for cooperation in the domain of security, this period shows a development of institutions at the EU level, central penetration of national governance, and the political project aiming at the unification of Europe (Olsen, 2002). This turning point seems to have been influenced by the yugoslavic conflict. So, even though none of the four case studies take place in this period it seems as like border conflicts had led to the Europeanization of security policy. Especially the expansion that was part of the Petersberg tasks shows interest of the Union for playing an active role behind its borders.

3.2 Security Policy of 1995-2004

This period has 5 major documents for analysis. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), The Saint Malo Declaration (1998), The Cologne Council Declaration (1999), The 15th Anniversary summit of NATO (1999), and the Berlin Plus Agreement (2002). These additions to the legal framework each had a major impact on EU security by reshaping security policy. Firstly, The Treaty of Amsterdam improved the efficiency and profile of the CFSP, which is a more general development of EU security (Bindi, 2010). However, it also shows more recognition for security threats on the border of the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg Tasks in EU legislation and arguably acknowledges the importance of border regions stability. The goals of the CFSP also show an increased interest in security in a broader sense than the defence of EU territory. Namely, to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, including security threats on external borders (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1997). The treaty also speaks of bringing together those states with the Central and Eastern European states linked to the Union (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1997). Now, at that time the states referred

to in the Treaty currently have membership-status. And yet, the Amsterdam Treaty puts the willingness of the EU to contribute to the resolution and reconstruction of external conflicts into EU legislation. With the context of conflicts that resulted from the fall of the Soviet Union, it is clear that border conflicts of the EU partially lead to the amendment of provisions in the Treaty, to give the EU the possibility to act according to the strengthening of the Union in all ways.

Although the Amsterdam Treaty made way for international security activities by the EU, it was not until the Franco-Britain Saint-Malo declaration (1998) that those intentions started to be implemented. The declaration was directed to make a " reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam (France and the United Kingdom, 1998), and in other words give the EU the capability to " play its full role on the international stage (France and the United Kingdom, 1998). The outcome of this would later influence the EU's role in the Kosovo conflict, and arguably our other four cases as well. Closely connected to the Saint-Malo declaration was the third legal document in this time period, The Cologne Council Declaration (1999). In Cologne, the Council accepted the declaration of Saint-Malo and transferred its content into this EU wide declaration. Ensuring the possibility of military action, if so desired by the member states (European Council, 1999). As was argued in the previous chapter, this was indirectly influenced by the Kosovo conflict as it empowered the demands stated in the Saint-malo declaration. To some extent, the turmoil in the Balkans in the 90s opened the door for these changes.

The next development in this period is a set of co-operation agreements between the EU and NATO. As a result of the previous agreements and Treaty amendments it became obvious that the relationship between NATO and the EU needed a clear fundament. While the 15th and 16th Summits of NATO were important as recognition for the EU developments, the Berlin Plus agreement (2002) finalized the formal relationship between the EU and NATO in the security domain. The agreement ensured "that crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing" (NATO, 2002). The reason of this agreement is also visible in the text, as it acknowledges the different nature and goals of both organisations, but also the possibilities in terms of capacity that a co-operation could offer. This insight may be connected to the mutual involvement in the Kosovo crisis, but also with the previous unrest connected to the dissolvement of Yugoslavia.

In summary, this period adopted the Petersberg tasks into EU legislation and some member-states pressured the other states to act on these provisions. Furthermore, a cooperative structure between the EU and NATO was established. What we see here is after Kosovo, the Cologne Council Declaration was adopted. The Kosovo crisis made it possible for proponents of EU security policy to speed up the further development of the EDSP. And through that, the border conflict contributed to the

central penetration of national governance as a form of Europeanization (Olsen, 2002). This period is fairly consistent with the previous period when it comes to the development of EU security policy. The EU mainly worked out the fundament that was built between 1989 and 1995. This development was partially made possible by the events in the Balkan that reassured the possibility of violent conflict on the European continent.

3.3 Security Policy of 2004-2007

This period is sequential to the biggest enlargement in EU history in 2004. Furthermore it marked the implementation of the ENP action plans for two of our cases: Georgia and Ukraine. The most important policy document in this period however is the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003) that was adopted in december 2003. Just to make a clear distinction between the two documents: The ESS was adopted at the end of 2003, but in 2009 there was a report about the developments and implementation of the ESS. The 2009 document shows more about how ESS policy goals were realized between 2003 and 2008.In total there are five aspects of both the ESS and the report of 2009 that show the role of border countries for EU security. The first aspect is resource security. The ESS report of 2009 mentions the necessity for the EU to diversify and secure resource sources and transit routes (Commission of the European Union, 2003). In the light of this aspect of EU security the ESS mentions the Eastern partnership, The Caucasus region, and africa specifically. Not only does it mention these objectives, but the ESS also states that it will support this through promoting good governance and maintenance of the rule of law in relevant countries. So, for this aspect of EU security our cases are extremely relevant.

The second aspect of the ESS is connected to the first insight. Namely, it mentions the importance of stability on EU borders (Council of the European Union, 2009). The acknowledgement that "it is in our interest that border countries are well governed" shows that EU policy makers are aware of the impact that instability on the borders has on safeguarding EU interests. The ESS indicates that the two main tools for guaranteeing this desired stability on the border are enlargement and partnerships (Council of the European union, 2009). The third aspect that is relevant to our research is the description of the EULEX Kosovo mission. Although it is somewhat hidden in the text, the ESS mentions EULEX as the largest EDSP mission to date, as a large contribution to stability on the European continent (Council of the European Union, 2009). And so, the interaction between the EU and the Kosovo crisis is extremely relevant in measuring the capability of the EU to contribute to the

development of international security, and to maintain EU security more specifically. The fourth aspect has a very similar relationship to our research. The case of Georgia is mentioned specifically to illustrate the way in which the EU leads conflict resolution and monitoring during the 2008 war uncil of the European Union, 2009). And so, as expected, these two cases prove to be important to EU security policy. In a way these two cases are premiers of the EU stepping up as an international security actor, to not only promote EU interests but also contribute to international peace. These aspects have shown how the ESS integrated border conflicts to the East (including the Caucasus), but it also contains a perspective on the southern border of the EU. This fifth aspect is the stabilization of the Middle-East and Mediteranian (Council to the European Union, 2009e). Although these is no mention in the ESS of egypt specifically, the stability of the region is to be supported by the EU through partnership such as was discussed in the East with Ukraine. One reason for Egypt not making it into the ESS is the fact that the Arab Spring only happened after the publication of the ESS in 2009. Actually, the absence of Egypt in the ESS may speak for the hypotheses that border conflicts impact EU security, as without conflict the border countries are simply under the radar of EU security policy.

The second policy document in this period that plays a role in shaping EU security is the Action Plan for Georgia (2006) as part of the ENP. Four aspects of this action plan are specifically relevant within the scope of this research. Other aspects of security such as combating organized crime that are part of the AP for Georgia are not completely irrelevant, but are not related to our scope. The same goes for the AP's of Egypt and Ukraine in other sections of this research. The first aspect of the AP that is connected to our case studies is the issue of South Ossetia (Georgia AP, source). In the light of this issue the EU states in the AP to contribute to conflict settlement, resolution, and monitoring. The second aspect is very similar but concerns the Abkhazia region. Just like the EU aims to support the stabilization of Georgia by assisting the government with the internal conflict with South-Ossetia, the EU envisioned to do with Abkhazia (EEAS, 2006). These two aspects of the action plan fall under the desire to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus in order to stabilize the region.

However, the goals that are mentioned in the AP considering co-operation in the security dimension are not limited to internal frozen conflicts in Georgia. The AP also expresses the ambition to include Georgia in ESDP activities (EEAS, 2006). The priority that is mentioned in the AP suggests the ability of the EU to invite Georgia to participate when desired. So, it is not so much a rule about the cooperation, but an ambition expressed by both parties to shape the partnership in the future if initiated by the EU. The final aspect of the AP also represents a benefit of the AP for the EU. In this case it is about energy safety. In this light the AP mainly speaks of Georgia's role as a transit country between

the Caspian Sea and the EU (EEAS, 2006). Similar to the ESS, Georgia seems to be an important factor in EU energy security. So, from the perspective of security the AP for EU-Georgia co-operation seems to be based on resolving internal struggles for Georgia, and a stable ally in the Caucasus region for the EU.

The third document in this period is the Action Plan for Ukraine (2005) in the ENP. There are three tasks in the agreement that are relevant. The first task is to combat international security threats (EEAS, 2004). This is very similar to the desire expressed in the Georgia AP, in which a cooperation on EDSP is integrated. The agreement with Ukraine states the mutual aim to: "Further strengthen convergence on regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis management" (EEAS, 2004). This agreement asks both parties to align political positioning concerning security issues, but also to build capacity of security forces. The Agreement helps the EU to have yet another bound ally when necessary. But this also leads to the second aspect of the AP, which is the conflict prevention and crisis management. Namely, this is not solely meant as support from Ukraine if necessary, but it also means a cooperation to prevent and manage conflict locally. This is relevant because as we know now the Ukrainian crisis will erupt nine years later.

The final aspect that is worth mentioning knowing the future violent conflict in Ukraine is the desire of the AP to combat trafficking of armaments and ammunition (EEAS, 2004). Primarily because of the location of Ukraine it is a priority of the EU to assist Ukraine in controlling the Ukranian export of WMD related materials and products, bio-safety threats, and conventional weapons and ammunition (EEAS, 2004). The availability of these products in Ukraine poses a direct threat to EU security, because it can arm groups with violent intentions in Europe or on the border. This aspect about the stockpiles of weapons and ammunition may have contributed to the possibility of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, when rebels violently stood up against the government in the East of Ukraine.

In conclusion, this period shows a part of the implementation of EU security policy. What these policies (ESS and ENP) have shown is that border regions are a major priority for the EU because they realise the important role EU neighbours play in guaranteeing the safety of the Union. Ukraine, Kosovo, and Georgia are all priorities to the EU in this period. Interestingly enough Ukraine and Georgia were considered important neighbours for security even before the Ukrainian crisis and the Georgian war. This leads to the insight that Border States have impacted EU security policy, and that violent conflict is likely to do so even more. In fact, we have seen the importance of Kosovo in this period once again. The main reason for its impact is that EULEX is considered proof for the EU's capability as an international security actor. Besides that, EULEX is actively trying to stabilize the European continent. The developments in this period have shown that enlargement and partnership have changed EU policy

rigorously. The biggest enlargement changed the external territorial boundaries, making renewed policy necessary. This form of Europeanization has clearly shifted EU priorities, as visible through the ENP. Furthermore, the ENP and ESS show the ambition to unify Europe, as a form of Europeanization (Olsen, 2002). The main turning point in this period is that the EU started to play a more active role internationally, including the stabilization of border states. One aspect of ESS is the stabilization of border regions to protect European interests. This form of policy was new in this period, especially because the EU borders shifted so far. This development falls under the exportation of forms of political organization and governance that are unique to the European continent (Olsen, 2002).

3.4 Security policy of 2007-2013

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, amending the TEU and TFEU. In general, the treaty changed the EU security framework by introducing the solidarity and assistance clauses (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2007). Besides that addition to the EU legal framework, the Treaty incorporates all CSDP/EDSP developments into the TFEU. This development is a general improvement of the EU security legal framework, which functions as a fundamental to the EU security policy. The new clauses portray a more binding set of rules when it comes to the domain of security in the EU. Furthermore, it expands the petersberg tasks (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2007). The treaty itself states that the Union's action in the international scene is guided by their norms and values. Derived from that, the union shall assist, and cooperate with any country or organisations that share those norms and values when facing man- or nonman made disasters (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2007). So, The treaty of Lisbon includes important changes for internal security, but even more consolidates the aspirations of the union to contribute to international welfare and peace.

The second document in this period that plays a role in shaping EU security is the Action Plan for Egypt (2007) as part of the ENP. The first aspect of this AP that is relevant to this research is similar to the aspects we have found in the Ukraine and Georgia AP's. It concerns the stability of the country and region. Not only does the Egypt AP mention the will to contribute to stability in Egypt, it even goes further in mentioning the historical importance of Egypt to contribute to stability of the Middle-East as a whole (EEAS, 2006). The AP shows a desire to lead to intensified security as one factor of many fields of cooperation between Egypt and the EU. Egypt supposedly has the potential to be a key player in creating peace and stability in the Arab world. With this perception of the bordering country, it amplifies the impact of the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. The second aspect is also very similar to the other AP's as

this agreement also tasks the cooperation with peacekeeping and fighting the distribution of armaments and WMD materials in the region (EEAS, 2006). This can be seen as part of a larger agreement on the cooperation of Egypt and the EU on EDSP activities, much like the other agreements under the ENP again.

And then there are two other aspects of the AP that are connected to the case of Egypt as described in the previous chapter. Although these are only indirectly connected to the security domain it is worth mentioning because of the nature of the conflict. The AP for Egypt as ENP partner states for instance to strengthen human rights protection in Egypt, including freedom of speech and press freedom (EEAS, 2006). Another part of this priority in the ANP is freedom of association, which will prove to play a major role in the Egyptian revolution in the coming years. Furthermore, one priority of the Egypt AP is border management cooperation (EEAS, 2006). This also is connected to a challenge in the future that is connected to one of the priorities in the Egypt AP because of the migration crisis that develops because of instability in the Middle-East. This example shows the major impact that instability can have on EU security. Part of the agreements on border management is a more integrated cooperation between Egypt and FRONTEX (EEAS, 2006).

In summary, confirms the ideas that are represented in the ESS. The Lisbon Treaty basically adopts ideas such as EU norms and values that were so important in the ESS. In this sense, it can truly be seen as an update of the TEU to align it with the development of EU security policy. Also, this period consisted of the adaptation of the Egyptian AP within the ENP. This period began with that adaptation, and ended with the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. The issue here is that the Egyptian AP stressed the value of Egypt as a stabilizer in the MENA region. And then, the tensions in Egypt exploded in 2011, destabilizing the country completely. Eventually, the revolution led to democratization and a convergence of norms and values between Egypt and the EU. However, these do not seem connected to the ENP, especially because we have seen in the previous chapter that the EU endorsed the situation in Egypt before the revolution even though it was not in line with their standards. So, we see the intention of the EU to create a similar development with Egypt as with the other cases through the AP, but failing to stabilize the country. The developments seem to be forms of Europeanization, but were in fact overthrown in 2011 when Egyptian citizens turned the table completely. Besides the ENP, we do not directly see any impact of the Egyptian revolution on EU security policy.

3.5 Security policy of 2013-2018

The European Union Global Strategy (2016) replaces the ESS that was adopted in 2003. This document is interesting since all our four case studies have already happened. So, the EUGS is the final stage that EU security policy has reached until now. After the EUGS no significant border conflicts have erupted yet. That is why the future has to confirm whether or not the EUGS is effective from that perspective. The real question for now however is how border conflicts have impacted this policy. First of all, the principles guiding external action of the EU reflect an open security policy. Unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership (EEAS, 2016). The description of these principles show that the EU wishes to work together with relevant actors and contribute as much as possible to maintain peace. These principles are also visible in previous EU external action. For instance, the strategy itself uses the case of Georgia as an example for putting these principles into reality (EEAS, 2016). Secondly, the general note that is made at the beginning of the EUGS is that " we cannot pull up the drawbridge" (EEAS, 2016). This seems to be criticism against protectionist right wing movements in European politics. Unrelated to that however it is the stance that the EU takes towards violent conflict beyond its borders. The policy is basically stating that threats abroad our threats to the EU as well, and deserve full devotion from the CSDP.

The regions to the East and South are a clear priority in EU security policy. Part of this priority are four main concepts that are supposed to guide EU action. The first concept is resilience (EEAS, 2016). The EUGS clearly build upon the ESS of 2003 concerning the neighbouring countries to the EU. The EUGS mentions the ongoing necessity to be surrounded by partners that share the same values and assist in statebuilding. As we have seen in the previous ESS and again in the EUGS one large section of the policy documents is always devoted to the EU neighbours. When speaking of the chosen case studies, Georgia and Ukraine always return as examples for the Eastern region. Connected to this visible importance of border regions to the EU is the more general insight of the EUGS that " when violent conflict erupts our shared vital interests are threatened" (EEAS, 2016). The consequence of this for the EU security policy is that when this happens, the EU will engage in peacebuilding to foster human security.

The second aspect of this priority is enlargement. The EUGS states that enlargement is a tool to include new partners and stabilize neighbouring countries (EEAS,2016). This idea has been part of the ESS as well. As an addition to enlargement policy, the ENP functions as a similar tool with countries that do not have candidate status. This is the third aspect that is mentioned considering the East and South: neighbours. The EUGS treats these neighbours as partners but also projects for the EU to change and support (EEAS, 2016). The final aspect is a very popular problem nowadays. Migration is a priority for the EU when looking at the Southern border states, but mostly targeted at Libya and Syria

Other priorities that surface in the EUGS are: Security of our Union, Security and Defence, Counter Terrorism, Energy Security, Cyber Security, and Strategic Communication (EEAS, 2016). These priorities seem to flow logically from the other documents that were used in previous sections. Especially energy security seems to have gained more priority in the overall EU security policies, and Georgia returns in that context repeatedly. Also, Georgia and Ukraine recur in the priority of security and defence targeting Russia as a clear threat. Egypt plays a role in the priority of counter terrorism especially with the Egypt AP in ENP in the back of our head in which Egypt is perceived as a stabilizing factor in the Middle-East. Kosovo does not really play a role in the EUGS, but that does not take away the value that is assigned to the EULEX mission and what it represents.

The final aspect of the EUGS that speaks for the importance of border countries to EU security policy is the emphasis on partnerships. In the section of principles, priorities, and neighbours the value of partnerships keeps returning (EEAS, 2016). The idea that is put forward by the EU continuously is that it cannot take action on its own. The EU needs to work together with partners. And yet, it is not only a necessity it is also a desire. For instance, the EU clearly realizes that cooperation will lead to desirable outcomes in the domain of conflict management and peacebuilding. The other policy documents that showed this attitude were the AP's as part of the ENP. And now, 13th of june 2019 a new report on EUGS was released (EEAS, 2019) reflecting on the implementation of the EUGS. The report basically concludes that fruitful partnerships have been established and extended the ENP partnerships. Especially the Ukranian partnership has obviously proved the hardship in achieving these because it served as a cause for the crisis in 2014.

3.6 Conclusion

What policy does the EU have on border conflicts? An analysis of the five periods has shown the general development of EU security policy, from the perspective of our four case studies. The first period consists of expansions in the field of EU security cooperation, in the light of the Yugoslavia dissolution. Then, the second period showed how the Kosovo crisis played a role in manifesting an EDSP, and the implementation of this policy. The third period showed how the shifting of borders led to more intense partnerships through the ENP and how those influenced EU security as a priority aspect. The fourth period basically consisted of an update of the Treaty to be in line with policy again. And the final period showed where all these developments throughout the last 4 decades led to an all inclusive EU security policy. The overall conclusion is that border regions are of high priority to the EU, and violent conflicts in these regions have thus impacted EU security policy. Actually, the involvement of the EU in Georgia and

Kosovo supposedly show the success of the EU as an international security actor. This alone has changed EU security policy, and especially the support of member-states.

We have seen multiple developments that can be named Europeanization. Although Europeanization is often considered to be a one way force from the EU, the development of the EU security policy has seen how border regions have influenced europeanization too. Border conflicts have the capability to change EU policy and impact EU security definitely. Most border conflicts were turning points in the development of the EU policy. The only exception seems to be egypt. Although the EUGS and ESS mention the MENA region, Egypt seems to be left out mostly. The case that the policy usually refers to is either Libya or Syria to have impacted the policy. And yet, we have seen that Egypt is part of the ENP which consists of agreements about security as well. So, EU policy on border conflict is mainly prevention. The occurrence of violent conflict on the border does not show a standardized response by the EU. Actually, All four cases have a different form of EU involvement. This suggests that border conflicts are important to the EU and they try to prevent them through the ENP and ESS/EUGS, but that resolution depends completely on the context and other actors involved. The EUGS even stresses the necessity of partnerships in conflict resolution. Unfortunately, the cases show that the Action Plans were unable to prevent conflict from breaking out. This happened in spite of the source of conflict being mentioned in the AP's specifically. The Georgia AP mentions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, The Egypt AP mentions human rights violations and unstable democracy, and the Ukraine AP mentions the availability of armaments and pro-Russian sentiment in Crimea.

So, even though the EU has been aware of the issues that made violent conflict possible, they were unable to prevent it. This meant the development of direct threats to EU security and interests. This may explain why border conflicts have been such a high priority in EU security policy. We have established the understanding in the introduction that the impact of the EU on border conflicts is well known, but this analysis shows that it is not a one way street. The development of EU security policy has been a specification of the problem of border regions and what the role of the EU will be in these cases.

4. Public perception of EU Security

This chapter aims to answer the question: how do EU citizens perceive the threats of border conflicts to the EU? The main tool to find information in a systematic way is the Eurobarometer. To some extent, the general information about how citizens feel about security will be the basis of this chapter as this has been reported throughout all the periods of this research. In some cases we may find data that is more directly related to border conflicts. Firstly, the data collected will be presented per period in line with the previous chapters. Most Eurobarometers have measured the same questions to be able to show a trend. For the sake of analysis the outcomes are divided over three subjects: the role of the EU in security issues, support for EU security policy, and perception of border regions.

4.1 Public opinion between 1989-1995

This period has Eurobarometer 32 until 42 to measure public opinion about a wide array of subjects related to the EU. The sections under 4.1 are based on those measurements.

4.1.1 The role of the EU in security issues.

In this period the form of EU security was still uncertain. And so, the question of what the role of the EU should be was very important, as policy makers realized that public support was vital for the success of cooperation on security and defence on a European level. In general, the outcome of the ten Eurobarometers in this period suggest that the majority of Europeans was supportive of an active EU when it came to defense and security. This is visible in questions about the necessity of common defence (European commission, 1989; idem, 1991a; idem, 1991b; idem 1992a, idem, 1993b). The overall conclusion of these results is that the Union should take more responsibility in security crises (European Commission, 1993b), and that the public approves of the security efforts of the EU (European Comission, 1990b). Support for a common foreign and security, and a defence and security policy of the EU ranges from 60 to 75 percent in this period (European Commission, 1991b; idem, 1993b). So, there was widespread support for the policy of the EU and the role of the EU as conflict manager and provider of security on the continent.

Closely related to this was the question about which institution should be the main actor in security policy in Europe. As we know 75% of the respondents wanted the EU to take this responsibility (European Commission, 1993a; idem, 1993b). But, Europeans were also very favorable about NATO and the UN at that time (European Commission, 1989). However, the majority felt like the EU (European

Community at that time) should be the most important actor in defence issues. This may explain the development of that time. For instance, wide spread support for the security aspect of the Treaty of Maastricht was visible in EB36 and EB37 (European Commission 1991b; idem, 1992a). And yet, the EB's of this period also suggest that respondents supported EU decision-making on certain issues, but to keep their hands of issues that "were closer to home" (European Commission, 1994a; idem, 1994b). So, most Europeans were in favour of an active EU when it came to security issues, but to not micromanage the everyday life within member-states. This nuance is important because it actually shows the uniqueness of massive support for EU defense action, whereas the majority of Europeans was sceptical about EU activeness in a general sense.

And lastly, there was a set of questions throughout this period about the role of the EU in resolving border conflicts. More specifically, the questions were about the fall of yugoslavia. The data suggests a very divided opinion about the effectiveness of EU action in this case (European Commission, 1991b). There was almost as much unfavourable as favourable positions towards whether the efforts of the EU had changed the outcome of the conflict. Another conflict that is visible in the Eurobarometers in this period is the gulf war. The conclusion of the Eurobarometer 35 suggests that the gulf war made citizens realize the need for a common security policy on EU level (European Commission, 1991a). This positive impact of the gulf war may also be related to the success of EU actions. Regardless, the responses to the questions show how conflicts can influence civic support. So, the role of the EU was not so much appreciated in the yugoslavic crisis.

4.1.2 Support of EU policy on security

This section uses the EB data on support of EU policy on security. Some insights are closely related to the previous section. For instance, the questions about the role of the EU also implied the support of EU citizens. Especially after the Gulf war the Eurobaramoter showed that citizens support shared security policy in Europe (European Commission, 1990b). Furthermore, the data shows that citizens thought the security policy should be a high priority for the EU (European Commission, 1992b). Consequently, the Treaty of Maastricht and its implications for EU security was welcomed by citizens with 70% being in favour of the EC being responsible for common security and defense (European Commission, 1991b). In addition, citizens showed interest in this kind of policy as soon as possible (European Commission, 1992b; Idem, 1994b). And thus, the general message here is that the public was in favour of the direction the EC was taking regarding security policy, and supported the adoption of such a policy as soon as possible. The EB reports themselves linked this to conflicts such as yugoslavia, stating that these

gave European citizens the realization that EU security policy was necessary, and could be effective in combating violent conflict in Europe and abroad (European Commission, 1993b).

4.1.3 Attitude towards border conflicts

Although none of our cases studies took place in this period, there is some data in the Eurobarometers in this period that is relevant to understand public opinion on border regions and conflicts that took place. This can give us an insight about how European citizens perceived threats abroad for their own security. The first insight is that in spite of violent conflict in Central and Eastern-Europe, citizens were in favour of European integration. In this period, 64 (European Commission, 1993b) up to 70 (European Commission, 1989) percent of respondents felt that these regions should be more integrated to better deal with crises that had recently occurred. This suggests that citizens were open to cooperate with border regions, but also saw the resolution of crises in these regions as a priority. And thus, we can argue that these occurrences of violent conflicts were perceived as threats to EU security. This also explains the widespread support of citizens for EU security policy.

Furthermore, EU citizens had a favourable opinion towards the Soviet Union (European Commission, 1989). This suggests that the wish of EU citizens to integrate these regions was not only based on fear of crises, but also based on the belief that cooperation would be fruitful for both parties. Namely, trust in Central and Eastern-European countries was considerate in this period (European Commission, 1990a). Besides that, The case of yugoslavia shows that European citizens valued self-determination and democracy of the " new" states over the integrity of Yugoslavia (European Commission, 1990a). So, the citizens supported the outcome of the conflict regardless of the destruction and violence connected to it.

4.1.4 Citizens' perception

In conclusion, EU citizens were very positive about EU security policy. This is expressed through citizens' approval of the role the EU took, their support for a common security policy, and their content with how the EC dealt with border conflicts. The combination of international crises such as the gulf war and regional conflicts such as yugoslavia lead to public support of EU security policy. Citizens were invested in border regions, as EU citizens had positive opinions about Central and Eastern-Europe. With regards to Europeanization we see some developments. First of all, there is broad public support for the development of EU level governance. This suggests that both the central penetration of national

governance and the development of EU level institutions is supported by citizens when it comes to security (Olsen). Furthermore, the collection of data on citizens' opinion about Central and Eastern-Europe will lead to the shift of external territorial boundaries of the EU (Olsen). Also, the public supports the unification of Europe in this period (Olsen, 2002). So, we can see that europeanization as a process is supported in all its forms by citizens as a means to guarantee security. The events in the EU neighbourhood in this period assisted citizens in the perception that common security and defense was necessary to promote the interests of the member states.

4.2 Public opinion between 1995-2004

This period includes Eurobarometers 43 up to 60 as data for analysis. The sections underneath are only based on these measurements

4.2.1 EU's role in security

The Eurobarometers in this period also asked respondents to express their perception on the role of the EU related to security. Firstly, throughout this period a majority of citizens (9 out of 10) believed peace and security in Europe should be prioritized by the EU (European Commission, 2000b; idem 2003b). This shows that citizens desire the EU to be responsible for security in Europe. Secondly, the data suggests that citizens want the EU to be responsible for security beyond European borders as well. Respondents believe that the EU has a positive impact on international peace (European Commission, 2003a), and should have a greater say on the international stage (European Commission, 2003a). Moreover, the EU was by far the preferred option to be in charge of a European defence policy (European Commission, 2003a). A final interesting find about the role of the EU is that the role of the EU in the world is seen far more positively than that of the US (European Commission, 2003b). So, the public opinion on the role of the EU is positive in this period. A majority is in favor of the EU being in charge of European defence, including international activity. In addition, most citizens prefer the EU over other actors such as NATO and the US.

4.2.2 Support for EU security policy

In general, this period shows high support for common foreign policy, and common foreign defence policy of the EU. A majority of citizens supports both throughout the entire period (European Commission, 1996a; Idem, 1997b; Idem, 1998b; Idem, 2000a; Idem, 2000b; Idem, 2001a; Idem, 2001b;

Idem, 2002b; Idem, 2002c; Idem, 2003a). However, there are three things that stand out in Eurobarometers 43 until 60 about the support for EU security policy. Firstly, the research found that generally support for EU policy has a strong correlation with how respondents feel about the EU in general (European Commission, 1999a). So, citizens that think favourably about the EU also support EU security policy. The same goes for opponents of the EU. Although this is a very logical relationship, it provides some context for the following two outstanding results.

The second thing that stands out is that right after the Kosovo crisis, which is one of our four cases, support for CFSP and CSDP dropped (European Commission, 1999b). The phrasing in the Eurobarometer suggests that the drop in support was unexpected. In later Eurobarometers the support for EU policy goes up again. Thirdly, 9/11 seems to have influenced citizens' support for EU security policy (European Commission, 2002b). In general, the Eurobarometers recorded a more fearful attitude of citizens after 9/11. More respondents are afraid of violent conflict than before, and there was also an increase in citizens who prioritize peace in Europe (European Commission, 2002b). And so it seems like the occurrence of violent conflict diminishes public support for EU security policy in this period.

4.2.3 Attitude towards border regions/conflicts

The previous section already discussed the impact of the Kosovo war on public opinion about EU security policy. Apparently, the development of the crisis led citizens to be less favorable (European Commission, 2000a). This suggests that citizens were not content with the actions of the EU that flow from that policy. It is difficult to say on which aspect of the crisis this decrease is based. The remarkable thing about the data is that countries that are relatively close to the conflict are less supportive of the EU policy than countries that are more distanced (European Commission, 2000a). We know that public opinion is impacted by the border conflict, but not necessarily why. Another aspect about border regions in this period that is relevant is the enlargement. We know that the end of this period marks the biggest enlargement of the EU. The Eurobarometer shows that fifty percent of EU citizens are supportive of this enlargement (European Commission, 2003b). This shows a very divided public opinion about this enlargement. And so, the attitudes of EU citizens towards those neighbours is not significantly positive or negative.

4.2.4 Citizens' perception

Overall, this period shows a very positive public opinion about EU security policy again. However, the Kosovo crisis led to a decrease of support. Citizens considered peace and stability of the European continent as a top priority for the EU. This indicates that citizens were more afraid of external threats. This was even more clearly visible after 9/11. But, the kosovo conflict was clearly perceived as a threat that was not dealt with accordingly, as support of EU policy decreased in that year. Also in this period we see how public opinion helps the process of Europeanization in all its forms. Although Kosovo has led to some doubt amongst citizens about the effectiveness of EU policy, citizens are still behind the development of EU level security policy and action. Even though not all the citizens are sure about the enlargement of 2004, a majority still supports it.

4.3 Public opinion between 2004-2007

This section is based on the data from Eurobarometers 61 to 66. Furthermore it uses Eurobarometers special 266 about the EU 's role in freedom, justice, and security policy.

4.3.1 The role of the EU

This period shows the perception of EU25 citizens. The first Eurobarometers after the enlargement make a distinction between the new member states and EU15. But, public opinion does not divert significantly between those two groups considering security. The majority of both groups agree on the role the EU should take concerning security. EU citizens had a positive view about the role of the EU (European Commission, 2004a; Idem, 2004b; Idem, 2005a; Idem, 2006a; Idem, 2006b). In line with the last period, citizens perceive the EU more positively than the US (European Commission, 2005b). The majority of EU citizens agreed that the EU states should have a common position, guarantee human rights, have a rapid military reaction force (European Commission, 2004a), and contribute to international peace (European Commission, 2006a). In addition to this, most citizens desire a more active role of the EU in the pursuit of goals in the domain of justice, freedom, and security (European Commission, 2007c). The conclusion of the Eurobarometer special is that citizens perceive the role that the EU has taken in the field of security as legitimate (European Commission, 2007c). So, there is a convergence of public opinion between the old and new member states in this period. The majority of all member states agreed that the EU should have a leading role when it comes to decision-making in the domain of security. It is even clear that citizens expect more of the EU, and support EU interference with international crises.

4.3.2 Support for EU security policy

Overall, the support of citizens for security policy remains strong throughout this period (European Commission, 2004b; Idem, 2005a). Unlike support for CFSP changing quite a bit, support for a common defense policy is still high. The data suggest that citizens still prioritize security over a lot of other issues, and that the majority has a positive view on EU actions (European Commission, 2005a).

4.3.3 Attitude towards border countries and conflict

As mentioned before, there was a high convergence of views in the EU25 (European Commission, 2004a). Furthermore, there is no data in the Eurobarometers that shows anything about public opinion about border conflicts. However, this was also expected. None of the case studies that we expected to have impacted EU security policy took place in this period. What does stand out is that the new member states, from which a couple were border conflict countries before, are accepted with open arms by the old member states. This supports the notion that EU citizens are concerned with their neighbours and the resolution of violent conflict.

4.3.4 Citizens' perception

This period has confirmed the insights from the previous periods, namely that EU citizens had positive views towards Central and Eastern-European states. This manifested as the greatest enlargement in EU history, and great similarity in public opinion between EU15 and the NMS group. Both groups agreed that the EU should have a strong military capability and international action when necessary. Support for EU policy is still heavily supported in this period. The enlargement of the EU was welcomed by the previous EU15 citizens, and shows how the majority is supportive of a more active and enlarged union. Citizens feel like the EU benefits them in the field of security, and that Europeanization is a positive development through changing borders, unifying the continent, and having more EU level governance (Olsen, 2002).

4.4 Public opinion between 2007-2013

The information that is used in this section is derived from Eurobarometer 67 up till Eurobarometer 78. Furthermore, it includes Eurobarometer special 290 about the role of the EU in freedom, justice and security policy.

4.4.1 The role of the EU

The Eurobarometer 67 shows that security has lost priority for citizens (European Commission, 2007a). This means that they did not choose any subjects related to security when asked which subjects deserve the most attention. The Eurobarometers in this period show that citizens are more concerned with economic factors, which may be related to the crisis. This does not mean however that citizens did not care about security. For instance, the Georgian war of 2008 was part of the Eurobarometers in this period. Some of the results will be discussed in the third section of this period. But, what is interesting for the role of the EU is that the results of the Eurobarometer show that citizens believed that the EU played a main role in resolving the conflict (European Commission, 2007b). And yet, a lot of respondents did not have an opinion about the outcome of the conflict. This may indicate that citizens are happy with the way the EU deals with border conflicts, but is not invested enough in them to see them as a threat. This could have to do with distance, because we saw different results connected to terrorism, and Kosovo.

4.4.2 Support for EU security policy

On average, Europeans support the EU security policy in this period (European Commission, 2007a; Idem, 2011a). About 75 percent of citizens stand behind the EU security policy. Support did not change during the Georgian conflict. There is also no indication that public opinion about the EU security policy changed during the Egyptian revolution.

4.4.3 Attitude towards border countries and conflict

Before we jump into the standard Eurobarometers to see what results we can find to answer the subquestion, some results from Eurobarometer special 290 should be discussed. Namely, the Eurobarometer shows that 70 percent of Europeans believe that more decision-making should happen at EU-level on policies about external borders (European Commission, 2008b). This is relevant because it indicates that Europeans are not completely happy with the policies that are in place. At this moment, the ENP action plans were only kicking off. This means that Europeans may have been unaware that these policies existed or were being adopted. Yet, it shows their interest in controlling and securing external borders.

There is a lack of information about the public opinion on the case of Egypt in the Eurobarometer. However, public opinion about the Georgian war has been researched in EB 70. Eurobarometer 70 shows that 80 percent of Europeans knows about the Georgian conflict (European Commission, 2008b). And yet, this does not specifically mean that they feel threatened by the event. However, one in three Europeans did not only hear about the conflict by knew exactly what it was about (European Commission, 2008b). What we do know is that three out of five people thought the conflict would affect the security of energy in the EU (European Commission, 2008b). So that is the aspect of the conflict that citizens saw as a threat to their own security. As mentioned before, Europeans saw the role the EU played but were generally unable to express an opinion about this fact (European Commission, 2008b).

4.4.4 Citizens' perception

In summary, public opinion is still very consistent with the previous periods. Support for EU policy is high. The data suggests that citizens were less concerned with security issues or did not perceive any events as threats. But, some data shows that most Europeans knew about the Georgian war and what it was about. Furthermore, citizens were happy with the role the EU played even though they had no clear opinion about the outcome of the conflict. The EurobarometerSpecial shows that citizens expect more from the EU as a security actor. The combination of these findings suggests that citizens are simply content with how the EU deals with security threats, and has faith in their ability to generate a positive outcome with regards to European interests. Citizens were clearly worried about the outcome of border conflicts such as Georgia, and were glad the EU cooperated in its resolution. For example, citizens were concerned with what the conflict would mean for energy security. This period shows the real impact of the 2004 enlargement. Just as EU15 was concerned with non EU states in Europe, so is EU27 with the current neighbours. Citizens are content with the development of the EU and how they interact with neighbouring regions. From the perspective of security, citizens seem to support EU efforts to export forms of political organisation and governance to for instance Georgia. This can be seen as Europeanization according to Olsen (Olsen, 2002).

4.5 Public opinion between 2013-2018

This section uses the information from Eurobarometer 79 up till Eurobarometer 90. Furthermore it uses Eurobarometer special 432 and 464 about Europeans' attitude to security.

4.5.1 The role of the EU

The Eurobarometer has changed quite a bit recently, meaning that the same information about public opinion is not available. But, regarding how citizens feel about the role the EU plays when it comes to security we can catch a glimpse of that public opinion in the EBS 432 and EBS 464. Namely, 79 percent of citizens agreed in 2015 (European Commission, 2015c) that the EU was a secure place to live in. In 2017 that changed slightly, when citizens agreed that their immediate city and neighbourhood were secure. However, Europeans were less convinced that the EU was a secure place to live in (European Commission, 2017c). Although we can not really say were this change comes from, it seems as if overall citizens felt secure in their daily lives. Feeling secure in the EU does not directly say anything about how satisfied citizens are with the role of the EU when it comes to security. But it does give us a sense of how secure Europeans felt at the time.

4.5.2 Support for EU security policy

As has been the trend in previous periods as well, Europeans support the EU security policy (European Commission, 2013a; Idem, 2014a). The support for the CSDP still ranges between 70 and 80% in the Eurobarometers in this period. The Eurobarometer report 81 even suggests itself that support for EU security policy has been overwhelming and very stable throughout time.

4.5.3 Attitude towards border countries and conflict

There is no specific data about the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. Yet, EBS 432 shows us something about the security threats that were felt by Europeans in this period. Namely, " The proportion of Europeans who see terrorism and religious ectremism as the main challenges to EU security has increased considerably since 2011" (European Commission, 2015c). Even Though the previous period did not so any data related to the case in Egypt, this insight might be. 2011 marked the beginning of the Arab spring, in which Egypt is one of the most important cases. The fact that conflicts connected to the Arab spring, or the Middle-East in general have increased the fear of terrorism and religious extremism is not unlikely. The EBS 432 also states that: "extremist ideologies, war and political instability outside the EU are seen as the most likely sources of threats to EU security" (European Commission, 2015c). These results support the hypothesis that border conflicts are perceived as threats to EU security.

4.5.4 Citizens' perception

This period has less data to support claims about public opinion when it comes to security. However, it is still clear that a majority of citizens support EU policy. No data was found about how citizens perceived the Ukrainian crisis. The Eurobarometer data shows that citizens are afraid of what is going on in the Middle-East, and what these developments may mean for their own security. This suggests that at least partially the developments in Egypt are also seen as a threat to the EU. We also see that citizens become less confident about how secure the EU is to live in over time. In a way this data suggests that Citizens are more afraid of events that happen in states that are not European. This means that states that have not been subject to Europeanization are perceived to be more threatening. But still, instability and war outside the EU is seen as threats to security just as much as extremist ideologies. So, citizens seem to be a lot more fearful in this period than before about external threats. Although this is not directly linked to the case of Egypt and Ukraine, it surely implies that those violent conflicts are perceived threats to security, and worry citizens. In that context, EU citizens feel less and less secure. This may be a reason for remaining high support for EU security policy.

4.6 Conclusion

How did the public perceive the threats of border conflicts to the EU? First of all, the Eurobarometers have shown how concerned EU citizens have been through time about developments in border regions. This includes fear about the threats that Kosovo and Georgia could pose for EU security. The analysis of all periods has shown stable support for EU security policy which is closely connected to what citizens want the EU to be. A majority of citizens has supported the idea of an active EU when it comes to the security of Europe. What stands out however is that the implementation of policy seems to be disappointing to EU citizens. Every case of violent conflict that is visible in the Eurobarometers shows a slight decrease of support or inability to judge the outcome. So, Citizens want the EU to be responsible for security and therefore support a common security and defense policy. Also, citizens see the threat that border conflicts pose to the EU. And then the final step would be to confirm that citizens support EU action in the field of security. However, the data does not support this.

In terms of Europeanization, EU citizens have supported the development of the EU from the perspective of security. Public opinion has been in favour of unification and cooperation with Central and Eastern-Europe. The shift of territorial boundaries was supported by a majority as well. Furthermore, a steady majority has supported EU level security policy and institutions throughout all

periods. With this, to some extent citizens also approved of central penetration of national security governance. Besides that, support for EU international interference, CFSP, and CSDP shows that the exportation of forms of organisation, governance, norms and values is desired. Overall, the positivity of public opinion on EU security aspects is astonishing. This is likely to have impacted the development of EU security policy a lot. Namely, policy makers have been fully aware of the importance of public support to make CSDP possible.

5 Conclusion

Before we can answer the main question posed in the introduction of this research there will be three sections that deal with the answers that were found on the subquestions. After that, one section will combine the insights from all three chapters about Europeanization. Then, a section will look at the five periods separately from the chapters. Thereafter the main question will be answered

5.1 Answers to the sub questions

Which conflicts on the border of the EU are likely to have had an impact on EU security between 1989 and 2019? The analysis of conflicts on the border of the EU per period led to the identification of four cases that based on their nature, location, and relevance are likely to have impacted EU security policy. These cases are: Kosovo, Georgia, Egypt, and Ukraine. The changes of external boundaries and the enlargement of the EU have no influence on the status of these countries as border regions. The cases are well spread out, which means that positioning is not the only reason these conflicts pose a threat to the EU.   The EU has recognized publicly that these events are problematic for Europe, and there is a high priority to stabilize these regions. The case studies have shown that these border conflicts influence the EU in many ways such as safety, crime, economic development, stability, and more. In general, the cases represented different security threats that play out in border regions such as Russia, undemocratic systems, ethnic clashes, and energy safety. These totally different violent conflicts threaten EU security in various ways.

What policy did the EU have regarding border conflicts between 1989 and 2019? An analysis of the five periods has shown the general development of EU security policy, from the perspective of our

four case studies. There is no more specific policy for border countries than the ENP. Besides that, Kosovo has specific policy as well because of EULEX. In general, EU security policy has developed towards a more active role of the EU in international security throughout the last three decades. Within this gradual change of EU security policy we see that border regions have been a priority, some more specific than others, in all of the most important documents regarding security policy. EU policy on border conflict is mainly prevention. The occurrence of violent conflict on the border does not show a standardized response by the EU. Actually, All four cases have a different form of EU involvement. This suggests that border conflicts are important to the EU and they try to prevent them through the ENP and ESS/EUGS, but that resolution depends completely on the context and other actors involved. The four cases seem to have had an impact on EU policy in various ways. Some examples are that Kosovo led to the adaptation of a CSDP, EULEX is used as an example to prove the success of CSDP, ESS and EUGS mention Eastern-Europe and MENA as high priority regions, and many more that were discussed in the chapters. Also, the timing of developments seems to be based on the political climate that resulted from violent conflict including those in border regions.

How did EU citizens perceive the threat of border conflicts to EU security between 1989 and 2019? Chapter 4 has shown how concerned EU citizens are with the events in border regions. More specifically, it became obvious that citizens saw the events of Kosovo and Georgia as a direct threat to EU security. The data also suggested that there has been stable support for EU security policy, although border conflicts changed this support in some cases. So, EU citizens care about the events itself but also change their opinion about EU security policy based on the outcome of border conflicts that they perceive as potentially threatening. The chapter has shown how border conflicts have influenced citizens' expectations of EU action as well.

5.2 Europeanization and border conflicts

Europeanization has returned in all three chapters in multiple ways. This was also expected because of the scientific problem that this research has dealt with. Furthermore, the different phenomena that we call Europeanization as described in the literature also made this outcome likely. The first chapter mainly showed how the process of changing external territorial boundaries mutually influenced border conflict. In one way, the changing boundaries led to new partnerships and cooperation between the EU and non-EU states. On the other hand, to some extent the shift of boundaries took place because of violent conflict. Most European countries that had declared independence shortly after 1989 joined the EU. Chapter 3 has shown how enlargement and partnerships are the main tools of the EU to stabilize

interest regions. Chapter 4 has shown how the public supports enlargement and cooperation with border regions throughout time. All these aspects have contributed to the process of Europeanization in this meaning of the concept.

This leads us to the second form of Europeanization that has been identified in the chapters. The exportation of political organisation and governance that is unique to Europe. The EU has special policy on all four cases that includes this development in multiple ways. Most importantly, chapter three has shown that the EU desires to stabilize these regions regardless of violent conflict. The occurrence of conflict has mainly amplified the understanding that action in these regions is necessary. This was also confirmed in chapter 4, when citizens seemed to express their concern that border conflict indicated the need for more international activity of the EU.

The third process that is called Europeanization is the project aiming at the unification of Europe. Just as border conflicts impacted the exportation of political organisation, they impacted the unification of Europe. The chapters have shown how especially the case of yugoslavia enhanced the desire of EU citizens to include more states into the Union. Chapter 2 has dealt with this process of enlargement more specifically. Besides that, border conflicts have motivated decision and policy-makers to create more cooperation on a supra-national level, and to unify states in combating conflict. This was also seen as the fourth meaning of Europeanization, the development of EU-level governance. The analysis of EU security policy from the perspective of border conflicts has shown how nation states transferred the responsibility of security to the EU gradually. So, border conflicts have also contributed to that process in the dimension of security.

5.3 The five periods of enlargement

The period of 1989 to 1995 was the first period in the analysis. Most border conflicts in this period were independence wars in Europe. The impact of these events is visible through the changes in policy and the public opinion. The policy changes shown in chapter 3 gave the EU more options in dealing with international conflicts, initially with the Petersberg Tasks. The expansion of security action was demanded and supported by the public. A majority of citizens was in favour of more international action of the EU and further European integration. None of the four cases studies took place in this period, but the combination of insights from the chapters show that border conflicts contributed to the development of EU security cooperation, with full support of the public as they saw the threat of warfare on the European continent.

The period of 1995 to 2004 did have one of our case studies in it. The conflicts in this period are mainly a continuation of instability in the Balkans. One of those conflicts took place in Kosovo. Kosovo became the most ambitious CSDP missions after the policy was implemented. The analysis has shown how Kosovo contributed to the realization of the Amsterdam treaty, so that the intentions of the Union about cooperation on security became reality. This period still showed high support of EU citizens for EU policy, although they seemed less pleased with the outcome of the Kosovo conflict. A majority saw peace and stability in Europe as the highest priority for the EU and demanded more activity in that field. This period can somehow be seen as the outcome of the previous period, where Kosovo played the main role in turning words to action. Besides that, the security issues in Europe at this time showed that there was a demand to clarify the relationship between NATO and the EU. As both actors were involved in multiple conflicts and EU citizens showed preference for the EU as main security actor, the Berlin Plus agreement settled this relationship legally.

The period of 2004 to 2007 had none of our cases in it. Regardless, a couple of events in Georgia would later prove to escalate into the Georgian war in 2008. Also, the ESS became active which is a very important policy document for this research. The strategy confirms EU interest in conflict prevention and resolution in neighbouring regions. Besides that, most of the ENP action plans for our cases were adopted in this period. The policy on border regions shows that the EU prioritizes conflict prevention throughout collaboration with these regions. Public opinion in this period showed high convergence between the EU15 and the 10 new member states. Both in the perception of threats and believe about what the role of the EU should be.

2007 to 2013 was characterized by conflict in Northern-Africa and the Southern-Caucasus. Two of the case studies are from this period and from those regions. Egypt as one of the countries that was connected to the Arab spring, and Georgia because of its conflict with Russia. The policy developments in this period where again more of a continuation of previously expressed intentions. For instance, the Lisbon treaty expanded the Petersberg Tasks and Egypt adopted their own AP within the ENP. These action plans proved unable to prevent conflict in Georgia and Egypt in this period. Although citizens supported EU security policy in this period, citizens expressed their concerns about the threat Georgia posed to EU security. Although citizens saw the threat of Georgia, there was no clear majority in favor or against the role the EU had played. The EU itself sees Georgia as an example of how the EU can be a successful international security actor, but the public does not clearly support this claim.

The period of 2013 to 2018 was the final analytical period to this research. Although this period is very recent, it has been valuable to take it into account for this research. The main reason for this is

the release of the EUGS as the newest EU security policy. The period has had significantly less border conflicts compared to other periods, but includes the case of Ukraine. However, the public seems to be more concerned about the developments in the Middle-East for their own security. Nonetheless, the EUGS emphasises the threat of unstable border regions as a continuation of the ESS.

5.4 The impact of border conflicts on EU security policy and citizens' perception of EU security

How have border conflicts impacted EU security policy and citizens' perception of EU security? The exploration of border conflicts, EU security policy, and public opinion has given multiple insights that are part of the answer to this question. The results of this research have shown that border conflicts pose a threat to EU security that is acknowledged by policy and public opinion. How these conflicts have impacted EU policy and citizens' perception of EU security is visible through five ways. Firstly, border conflicts have influenced the development of the EU as an international security actor. As the research conducted has shown, the occurrence of violent conflict in combination with the instability of border regions led to the understanding that more cooperation of security was necessary on an EU level. In turn, this realization led to the creation of CFSP and CSDP. But more specifically, the case of Kosovo indirectly led to the implementation of this policy. Also, the occurrence of border conflicts generated public support for more international security activities of the EU. So, border conflicts have been one of the causes for the EU to become an international security actor. Secondly, The nature of border conflicts to the EU is very diverse. Even the relatively small collection of four cases studies compared to the total amount of border conflicts in our scope show the uniqueness of all border conflicts. These conflicts all have a different context, which leads to different types of security threats. The logical conclusion of this is that every case will have a different kind of impact on policy and the public.

Thirdly, Europeanization is a tool for the EU to prevent conflict. But also, border conflicts have contributed to several processes that fall under Europeanization. The data about border conflicts, public opinion, and EU security policy support this. We have seen border conflicts fulfill multiple roles in these developments. The conflicts can serve as : A motivation to change or develop policy, A testing ground for new policy or action, examples to prove EU effectiveness, and factors to sway public opinion about EU policy and integration. Fourthly, the European Neighbourhood Policy particularly aims at stabilizing partners which may in turn stabilize border regions. However, the ENP was unable to prevent violent conflict in three out of three cases that are ENP partners (Egypt, Georgia, Ukraine). And so, the ENP was not sufficient in the field of security. This explains partially why these regions are still a high priority within the EUGS. Not only because the border regions pose a threat to EU security, but also because

border conflicts are still relevant challenges for EU security policy. And finally, public perceptions of border conflicts do not only see the potential threat of these to EU security but also support EU action and policy throughout the last decades. The role of border conflicts in this support has been examined and seems to impact the general perception of EU citizens of how safe the EU actually is.

In conclusion, border conflicts have impacted EU policy and EU public opinion by shaping the EU as an international security actor, posing a variety of security challenges to the EU, facilitating and shaping Europeanization, challenging the outcome of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and determining public support of EU policy and security action. The many forms in which border conflicts have impacted multiple aspects of EU security that this research has identified is a valuable perspective to add to the academic literature on the EU as a security actor, conflict studies, Europeanization, and the ENP. It has been confirmed that it is not only valuable to look at these phenomena from the perspective of the EU, but that this new perspective on EU security can help to create a better understanding of the history and future of EU security.

5.5 Where to go from here?

This research has started to fill the scientific gap about border conflicts to the EU that existed in many related fields of research. This means that those debates can benefit from this perspective by building on the general ideas that are presented in this research. Beyond that, some aspects of the problem were touched by this research but not dealt with extensively because of the scope of this research. These aspects may add new insights that can further our understanding of the problem. And essentially that is the whole point of research in this area, because with a better understanding of what is going on we can create better tools to deal with the problem in the future. Eventually, this may lead to the reduction of security threats that border regions pose to the EU. One example of such an aspect is the effect of the political climate on the way that border conflicts impact EU policy. It was even suggested in the data that the political climate may influence how receptive policy makers and decision makers are to the threats of conlift abroad. This is in line with Wever's (Wever, 1996) understanding of what security threats actually are. He suggested that security threats are made up frames rather than objective matters. And so,future research would have to confirm that the framing of border conflicts is related to the political climate.

Just like this research offers answers that could benefit the academic debates , and generates new venues for future research, does it offer questions for EU policy.Some outcomes of the analysis have implications for policy. The first thing is that three cases showed that the security agreements in

the action plans did not offer enough assistance to prevent violent conflict. This means that new measures or adaptations have to be found to change this in the future . Furthermore, public support for EU security policy has been high for the last three decades.However, the outcome of that policy is often questioned after the occurence of a big border conflict . This suggests that more investment is required in the implementation of the policy. Therefore it is extremely welcome that the EU releases updates on the EUGS yearly. Hopefully this improvement will lead to the insurance of implementation. And finally, our neighbours have been of high priority to EU security policy. This means that more attention should be given to improve policy implementation of this priority. Europeanization is not enough to prevent conflict. The highest probability to decrease instability has proven to be EU enlargement. Further integration of neighbours can be a tool that is more functional than cooperation.

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