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Organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands

A research into the social conditions that
explain the presence of different phases
of organized criminal hemp cultivation


Master thesis

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Abstract

Organized crime is an upcoming phenomenon in the Netherlands. For several years, society and authorities were convinced that this phenomenon only was present at the south of the Netherlands and in the big western cities. However, it turns out that organized crime found its way to the east of the Netherlands. In this research, one specific type of organized crime is discussed: organized criminal hemp cultivation. The leading research question of this research is: Which social conditions explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands? Theoretical variables from the social disorganization theory are used to explain the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. These factors are a low socioeconomic status (SES), ethnic heterogeneity, high residential stability, fear of crime, informal social control and formal control. Besides these directly influencing factors, three intervening variables are added. These variables are local friendship networks, supervising teenage peer groups and participation in local voluntary or formal organizations. The variable of organized criminal hemp cultivation is split up into different specific core phases: the preparing phase, the growing phase, the fabricating phase and the selling phase. Other phases in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation are money laundering, transport and storage and facilitating.

In the case of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands, it turned out that organized criminal fraud, human trafficking and organized drug crimes all are present. However, the type of organized crime that is recognized the most in this region is organized criminal hemp cultivation. All the different phases of this process are recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Almost all of the factors of the social disorganization theory are found in the east of the Netherlands and these are influencing the different phases. Only the factor of residential instability is not recognized. Two out of three intervening variables are recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Local friendship networks is intervening after a high residential stability and after informal social control. The factor of supervising teenage peer groups is intervening behind informal social control. Besides the factors of the social disorganization theory, there are three new factors found. Two these factors are specifically for the case of the east of the Netherlands: the geographic location and naivety among citizens. The third new factor that is found is supply and demand of hemp. This factor is recognized in the east of the Netherlands, but not specific for this region.

Pre-face

In front of you, you will find the thesis "*Organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands: a research into the social conditions that explain the presence of different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation*" This thesis was written as a final exercise of my Master Public Administration at the University of Twente.

The start of this thesis was in February 2019 and this period was marked with finding a subject. A few months later, the subject was found, but an explicit research direction must be found. This direction was found in the explanation of social conditions that explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. It was interesting to me, because I live in the east of the Netherlands and I wanted to know more about crime in this region. It was really interesting to hear the stories on organized crime in the east of the Netherlands, because I was not aware that this criminal world in the east of the Netherlands is this big.

Writing this master thesis was not possible without the help and support of some people. I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Guus Meershoek first. He supervised me with much effort, helped me with to find an interesting subject and to structure the research during different feedback moments. I also want to thank dr. Ringo Ossewaarde for his feedback. Together, they helped me finding a balance between the theoretical and practical aspect of this research. At last, I would thank the six respondents who gave me more knowledge about the organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. All the six interviews were comfortable conversations and all the respondents provided interesting information about their own experiences.

I hope you will enjoy reading my thesis.

Stan Geurtse,

Albergen, February 2020

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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction on organized crime

November 2018, four men were found dead in a house in Enschede, a big city in the east of the Netherlands. They died because of firearm violence and the police concluded that these men were connected to drug crimes and a criminal organization (Van Dinther & De Graaf, 2018). As this news article indicates, organized crime is present in the east of the Netherlands. Violent, deathly criminal actions are often present in the regions of the western big cities in the Netherlands, like Amsterdam and Rotterdam. However, this violent action in Enschede indicates that this organized crime is also present in the east of the Netherlands.

Characteristics of organized crime are that it can reorganize fast and is often elusive. These organizations are not hierarchical anymore, but are organized in networks throughout the whole country. Criminals are communicating better and are working together more often (Erasmus Academie, 2019). It becomes more challenging for the police to track these organized networks down and dismantle the whole organization. The example of the four dead men is directly connected to organized drug crime in the east of the Netherlands, but also other types of organized crime occur in east of the Netherlands. For example, in Enschede, the event boulevard 'Go Planet' was sold, but after the boulevard was sold, it turned out valuation fraud was committed by an organized group (RTV Oost, 2019a). Thus, organized fraud is also present in the east of the Netherlands. From these first examples, it becomes clear that organized drug crimes and organized fraud is present in the east of the Netherlands. To define organized crime, a definition of Klerks (2000) can be adopted. The definition is: "Crime that is primary focused on money or power, planned committing punishable crimes that singly or together have serious consequences for society, committed by a partnership of at least three persons during a longer time and by a division of labor, making use of violence, extortion, bribery, scamming, cheating or intimidation." Presumably, there are more examples of organized crime in east of the Netherlands and these examples will be used during this research.

Anyway, organized crime groups are getting opportunities to operate and perform their crimes. Causes of crimes can be found in the motives of the criminal. These motives can be economic or immaterial. But, not only motivations cause crime. Also, situational, societal structures. The administrative environment, societal environment and business environment create opportunities for organized crime to operate and perform crimes (Te Pest, Nieuwdorp, Smeets, Van Wijnen, 2012).

Organized crime has its impact on the safety and confidence of society and politics. Criminals are polluting waters by dumping waste of drug-production, they are threatening or abusing people for sex-crimes or they are destroying society by producing and distributing cheap drugs which can be obtained everywhere. A neighbor is cultivating hemp on its attic and a fire is starting. People are not feeling safe in their own neighborhood because of different criminal groups who are dominating and ruling the place (Politie, n.d.). So, these are some examples of the impact organized crime can have on society, and that this is problematic. The types, impact and causes of organized crime are important in beating organized crime. The safety authorities, like the police, local governments and safety experts, are focusing on creating a safe environment for the people and society. However, organized crime will adapt and evolve, so new forms, causes and impacts of organized crime will occur.

In the east of the Netherlands, the police is aiming at beating organized crime. In the future, classic crimes like burglaries are reducing. Nowadays, beating 'high impact crimes' becomes prioritized. The

police tries to beat organized crime by receiving more budget and train new police officers (Politie, 2019).

The theme of this thesis is defined as ‘the social conditions that explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation’. The setting of this research is the east of the Netherlands, during the time period 2015-2019. This thesis will contribute to the current state of art on organized crime by viewing the different factors that stimulate this crime and specifically organized criminal hemp cultivation. Previous research about organized crime, organized criminal hemp cultivation in the Netherlands is done. Yet, this research is focused on organized criminal hemp cultivation and the factors that stimulate it in one specific region: the east of the Netherlands. This combination makes this thesis unique, because there is no current research found consisting these specific elements.

1.2 Research questions

The goal of this research is to describe the probable presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands and to discover the social conditions that explain this presence. Therefore, the following research question is created:

How can the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands be interpreted in terms of social conditions that stimulate this phenomenon?

This question is leading the research. A theoretical framework is built as fundament and theoretical insights about social conditions that explain presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation are described and discussed. With this fundament, empirical research can be done and theoretical concepts are tested in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands.

To answer the central research question, the following sub-questions are created:

1. How can organized criminal hemp cultivation be defined?
2. What theoretical social conditions explain organized criminal hemp cultivation?
3. What types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands?
4. Which factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?

The first sub-question is a theoretical question. This question is created to get theoretical insights on the concept of organized crime and the concept of organized criminal hemp cultivation. The focus of this research is on organized criminal hemp cultivation, so this concept will be explained and discussed extensively. To explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation that is explained by the first sub-question, the second sub-question is created. With the help of this question, theoretical social conditions will be described and discussed. When this question is answered, it becomes clear what theoretical variables explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation. The third sub-question is an empirical question. This question is created to get insights about organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Building forward on the first sub-question, this third sub-question is created to find empirical evidence of the existence of organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, the answer of the first sub-question is the fundament of this empirical research. When the third question is answered, a clear overview of types or organized crime in the east of the Netherlands is provided. Besides this overview, an in-depth empirical analysis on organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is given. The last sub-question

is also an empirical question. The purpose of this question is to examine if theoretical social conditions recognized by the second sub-question can be found in the case of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands. This question builds forward on the third sub-question, because the goal of this question is to explain the phenomenon that recognized by the third sub-question. This question also builds forward the second sub-question, because it will be tested if the theoretical social conditions are recognized in the east of the Netherlands. When this question is answered, it becomes clear which factors and to what extent these factors explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands.

Together, the four sub-questions answer the central research question. The first and third sub-question provide theoretical and empirical insights on organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The second and fourth sub-question provide theoretical and empirical insights on the social conditions that explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Altogether, with these insights, the central research question can be answered.

1.3 Relevance

This research is aiming at both scientific and societal relevance. It adds new insights to scientific knowledge and can contribute to understanding society.

Scientific relevance

In scientific literature, different authors are attempting to explain the presence of (organized) crime. These explanations can vary from economic to sociological. Moreover, explanations of authors differ, because of the different types of crime they try to explain. For example, Machin and Meghir (2004) try to explain the rise of crime rates by analyzing economic incentives. Besides economic explanative models, sociological theories are used to explain the presence, decrease or increase of crime. For example, Kleemans and De Poot (2008) explain the involvement of offenders in organized crime in the Netherlands by using the social opportunity structure. Another sociological theory that is often used to explain crime is the social disorganization theory from Shaw and McKay (2010). These authors state that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility lead to the disruption of a community, that this will lead to an increase in (organized) crime.

In this thesis, the social perspective will be used to explain the presence of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands. One specific type of organized crime will be explained: organized criminal hemp cultivations. This study fills the gap in the previous research on the social disorganization theory, because one specific type of crime is viewed from this perspective: organized criminal hemp cultivation.. This research is also relevant, because it will contribute to the expansion of the social disorganization theory by looking beyond neighborhoods. Therefore, the theory will be tested in a region instead of a neighborhood. The unique combination of theory, the specific type of crime and one specific region will be a contribution to the science. New insights discovered in this region can contribute to an expansion of the social disorganization theory.

Societal relevance

This research is societal relevant, because organized crime is a problem to society (Boerman et al., 2012). A consequence of crime is the reduce of safety in society and safety is important for the functioning of a society. Conditions that explain the presence of organized crime can be caused by parts of society or individuals. This research can provide new insights for different organizations in the east of the Netherlands. The police, municipalities, federations representing societal groups or enforcement and surveillance companies are concerned with the results of this research. New insights and recommendations can help these authorities in beating organized crime. The results of this research can be used by different organizations or authorities to increase their knowledge of organized crime and become aware of factors that explain the presence or existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation. When authorities are aware of factors or conditions, they can take direct, targeted measures. With these measures, the east of the Netherlands becomes a little safer.

1.4 Research approach

In the first part of this study, the concept of organized criminal hemp cultivation will be set out into different phases. With the social disorganization theory, factors that explain the presence of crime are created. At the end of the theoretical chapter, it will be viewed which factors explain which phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation. The focus in the empirical part is on the concept of organized criminal hemp cultivation the east of the Netherlands and factors that stimulate this. Empirical, qualitative data will be retrieved in two different ways. First, the third sub-question will be answered and a desk research will be done by collecting and analyzing news articles, retrieved from local newspapers that provide news about organized crime in the east of the Netherlands. By analyzing the content of the articles, it becomes clear which types of organized crime are present in the east of the Netherlands. After a general view on organized crime, one specific type of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands will be analyzed: organized criminal hemp cultivation. Data from news articles will be supplemented with data from interviews and it will be tested if different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation are recognized in the east of the Netherlands. The second method of qualitative data collection are semi-structured interviews. Data retrieved by interviews will be transcribed and the method of analysis is a content analysis. By this content analysis, the fourth sub-question will be answered. The goal is to interview six different respondents, all with knowledge and experiences on organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands.

1.5 Reading guide

In the following chapter, the theoretical framework is presented. This chapter will describe the concept of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Also, different variables of the social disorganization theory are described. In the third chapter, the methodological aspects of this study are described. The fourth chapter presents the results of both the media analysis and interviews. In this chapter, the image about the organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands will be created. In the fifth chapter, the results of testing the social disorganization theory on organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands will be presented. It will be tested if the theoretical variables are influencing different phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. In chapter six, this study will be concluded. In the seventh and last chapter the results are discussed by analyzing the limitations. Also, some practical recommendations are done.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a theoretical framework will be created by answering the first sub-question: how can organized criminal hemp cultivation be defined? In the first paragraph of this chapter, the concept of organized crime will be described. In the second paragraph, the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation will be discussed. In the third paragraph, the social disorganization theory will be described and discussed. This discussion will answer the second sub-question: what theoretical social conditions explain organized criminal hemp cultivation? The social disorganization theory is used to find social conditions that might explain the presence of the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation.

2.2 Organized crime: definition and characteristics

In this study, the phenomenon of organized criminal hemp cultivation will be explained. To get a clear image of this concept, in this paragraph the concept of organized crime is described. Also, different types of criminal organizations are described briefly.

Organized crime is a problem that arises during the 1990s. Originally, a limited number of nations were affected by this problem. Nowadays, organized crime is a problem all over the world (Paoli, 2002). According to Paoli (2002), the concept of organized crime is an ambiguous concept. This author argues that two notions are incorporated: "The provision of illegal goods and services and a criminal organization, understood as a large-scale collectivity primarily engaged in illegal activities with a well-defined collective identity and subdivision of work among its members" (Paoli, 2002, p. 52). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2002) adopts a definition of criminal organizations by arguing that organized crime has to meet five conditions. These conditions are: specialization in enterprise, a durable hierarchical structure, employing systemic violence and corruption, obtaining abnormally high rates of return relative to other criminal organizations and extending activities to legal economy.

The UNODC has created five different typologies with all different characteristics of organized crime groups are described. The first typology of a criminal organization is the organization with a standard hierarchy. This is the most common type of organized crime. Basic characteristics are: a single leader, defined hierarchy, a strong system of internal discipline, known by a specific name, strong social or ethnic identity, violence and a clear influence over a defined territory (UNODC, 2002). The second type of a criminal organization is the organization with a regional hierarchy. A main characteristic of this type is that despite the hierarchical structure, there are autonomous regional crime charters under the control of the group. The level of autonomy varies and in some cases a 'franchise model' is used, where crime groups pay money to use the name of a well-known criminal group. (UNODC, 2002). An example of this kind of criminal group is the outlaw motorcycle gang. The third type of a criminal organization is the organization with a clustered hierarchy. A clustered hierarchy organization consists of a number of criminal groups, with one governing or oversight body. Different groups inside the cluster are relative autonomous and have a diversity of structures (UNODC, 2002). The fourth type of a criminal organization is the organization with a core group. The core group has a limited number of individuals, surrounded by a loose network that can be used from time to time, depending on the criminal activity. The core groups have no social identity or name. Activities are

internally distributed among the members in the core group (UNODC, 2002). The fifth type of a criminal organization is the criminal network. This type describes the activities of key individuals, who are take part in criminal projects. These projects are done, together with allies. However, they are not seen as members of a criminal organization by themselves or by an outsider. The success factor of criminal networks is determined by the individual characteristics and skills of the persons who operate in the network (UNODC, 2002).

2.3 Organized criminal hemp cultivation

In this paragraph, the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation will be specified.

According to Jansen (2012, p. 9), organized criminal hemp cultivation is “the total business process around large scale organized production, distribution and trafficking of in the Netherlands cultivated hemp.” Organized criminal hemp cultivation is not only about cultivation or growing of hemp itself, but this concept contains all phases of a logistic process. The standard process of organized criminal hemp cultivation consists of four phases: preparing the cultivation, growing hemp, fabricating hemp to a final product and sales of this product. Four other, non-chronological, phases are present during the whole process of organized criminal hemp cultivation: facilitating, storage, domestic transport and money laundering (Jansen, 2012). The whole process is pictured in figure 6. Besides the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation, a small description of types of offenders dealing with hemp cultivation is given.




Figure 1. The logistic process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Retrieved from Jansen, F., 2012 (<https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content/assets/politie/algemeen/nationaal-dreigingsbeeld-2012/cba-georganiseerde-hennepteelt-2012.pdf>). Copyright 2012, KLPD.

Preparing phase

First, grow of hemp has to be prepared. Different steps have to be taken to set up a hemp cultivation. According to Jansen (2012), the phase of preparing a hemp cultivation can be set out into five different phases. The first phase is arranging a propitiate location. Much space and people are needed to set up a hemp cultivation. False pay slips are used for people working at a cultivation and money is paid to people who offer the organization a place to grow their hemp. Examples of locations where hemp cultivations can be set up are industrial premises, houses, farms, or underground locations (Jansen, 2012). During the second phase in preparing, cultivation equipment has to be ordered. Via different websites, organized criminal hemp groups can easily order equipment (Jansen, 2012). Third, cultivation places have to be built and electricity must be manipulated. Helping assistants and facilitators with specific knowledge of electricity or water supplies are needed. Most of the time, locations have to be secured and criminal organizations invest much money in it (Jansen, 2012). The fourth phase of the preparing process is supplying cuttings and these cuttings can be bought illegally at grow shops. With cuttings, grow of hemp can start (Jansen, 2012). The fifth and last phase of the growing process is getting rid of trash. During the preparing phase, much trash is made and this has to be dumped. In some cases, trash is offered to grow shops or used as a blend in a final product. Also, trash is used to create hash, by mixing it with ice and water. Thus, it is seen that hemp trash can be recycled (Jansen, 2012).

Growing phase

After preparations, growing of the hemp plants starts. This phase takes eight till ten weeks, depending on the quality and professionalism of a cultivation. The growing phase is a risky period, because energy suppliers can detect a high use of electricity, neighbors can discover the hemp cultivation by seeing suspect behavior and report it to the police, or the police detects the cultivation on its own by using their technical resources. During this phase, members of the criminal organization are monitoring the process continuously, to check if the process is going well (Jansen, 2012).

Fabricating phase

After the growing phase, hemp can be harvest, cut and sold. Harvesting and cutting often happens at the same location where hemp has grown, but cutting hemp can also be done at other locations. Much people are needed to cut the hemp. Normally, this are persons from the social network of a criminal organizations. There are some professional cut organizations, specialized in cutting hemp. Criminal organizations can also make use of citizens who can help in cutting hemp. Citizens are approached and in exchange for high amounts money they will help. After cutting, hemp must be dried and aggravated. Drying and aggravating can be done by the same organization that cultivated and cut hemp. However, sometimes it is done by other criminals or criminal organizations that are specialized in selling hemp (Jansen, 2012).

Sales phase

There are three ways to sale hemp. It can be sold to coffeeshops, to other criminal organizations in the Netherlands or to foreign criminal organizations. In the Netherlands, there is much brokering and different criminal organizations are trading batches of hemp, fabricated or not. (Jansen, 2012). The most important group of buyers of hemp in the Netherlands are coffeeshops. Besides coffeeshops, hemp is nationally sold via illegal selling points. For example it is sold at homes, in cafes and via mobile sellers, like hemp-taxies and street dealers (Jansen, 2012).

Results of different Dutch police investigations show that big batches of hemp are exported to abroad. Seizures of Dutch hemp by French and British police agencies support this assumption. Export of hemp to abroad needs an organized structure. Streams of money to abroad and well-arranged contacts between criminals are very important. Also, money streams back to the Netherlands need to be organized and protected, because crime organizations do not want money being tracked by authorities (Jansen, 2012). Countries where Dutch hemp is distributed to are Great Brittan, Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries. Trade routes that are used are normal traffic routes, like the road and the sea. Hemp is loaded on a truck at locations where more trucks are driving on and off, so the trucks loaded with hemp do not stand out. Sometimes regular, legal transport companies are used to transport hemp. In these cases, the driver is often not aware hemp is loaded on his truck. It is also possible that criminal organizations use their own created transport companies to cover hemp transport. In this case, criminals set up a transport company for legal products, but actually hemp is transported. Various products are used to cover batches of hemp. Some examples of covers are sport bags, flowers or table decorations (Jansen, 2012). At last, Dutch criminal organizations also trade in gear to set up a hemp cultivation. Foreign hemp cultivators buy materials from criminal organizations in the Netherlands to set up their own hemp cultivation (Jansen, 2012).

Facilitating, domestic transport, storage and money laundering

Facilitating, domestic transport, storage and money laundering are activities that take place during the whole process of hemp cultivation. These phases are not chronological, like the four core phases. There are organizations that are only focused on facilitating hemp cultivation, like investors or entrepreneurs who facilitate in grow locations (Jansen, 2012). Domestic transport is a complex process. Cuttings must be brought to grow locations and final products must be transported to buyers. To do this transports, persons are needed. Between these transports, hemp is stored at different locations. From these locations, hemp will be transported to the next location. There are criminal organizations specialized in this storage, but there are also organizations that arrange this on their own. Examples of storage locations are vans, houses, barns or industrial buildings. Batches of hemp are hidden behind second walls or in holes (Jansen, 2012). Almost every criminal organization that is dealing with criminal hemp cultivation is laundering money. Money is laundered, because illegal money cannot be spent on the legal market. The phase of money laundering consists of different steps. Firstly, money earned with hemp sales is ending up with the seller. Secondly, the earnings must be invested in or spent on luxury goods. These luxury goods are for example expensive parties, houses, companies or cars. False paperwork or cash pay strips are used to cover up illegal money streams. When goods, houses or companies are sold at the legal market, illegal money is laundered and can be spent legally (Jansen, 2012). In this study, the phases of facilitating and domestic transport are included into other core phases. The phases of storage and money laundering will not be further explained during the empirical research.

Offenders

Most of the offenders of organized criminal hemp cultivations are Dutch, but also criminals from Turkey or African countries are dealing with these crimes. Dutch families from trailer camps and members of motorcycle gangs are most outstanding offenders of organized criminal hemp cultivations. Criminals aiming at protecting their illegal activities by installing cameras, mobile alarms and armed guards. Violence is present around organized criminal hemp cultivations. Mostly, violence

situations arise during ripping or during conflicts between criminal organizations. However, not every organization is using violence (Boerman et al., 2012).

2.3 The Social disorganization theory

In this research, the social disorganization theory is used to find social conditions that explain the existence of crime. According to Sampson & Groves (1989, p. 777), “social disorganization refers to the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls”. Sociological authors Shaw and McKay (1942) created the fundament of the social disorganization theory and these authors state that the theory focuses on an ecological distribution of crime and delinquency. In their research, they found several social structural characteristics that influence delinquency rates in urban areas in Chicago. These characteristics are specified as a low economic status, a high ethnic heterogeneity and a high residential instability. Shaw and McKay (1942) argue that these main variables cause the social disorganization of a community, and when a community is disorganized, crime will increase. Thus, the social disorganization theory links crime directly to characteristics of a community in a neighborhood. Therefore, this community is unable to realize common goals and solve existing problems (Kubrin & Weizer, 2003). The theory focuses on the relationship between neighborhood structure, social control and crime. The social disorganization of a community is measured in terms of the cohesion between formal and informal social networks and by collective supervision of a community towards local problems. This is similar to the systemic model, studied by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), where a local community is viewed as a complex system of friendship and kinship social networks and formal and informal socialization in family life. These are all on-going socialization processes. Concluded from empirical research, a location of a community does not weaken bonds of kinship and friendship, size and density of communities has no influence on the substitution for primary and informal contacts and an increased size and density of a population does not weaken local community sentiments (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). The systemic model and social disorganization theory share their assumption about structural barriers that impede the development of formal and informal ties between members of a community. Therefore, common problems will not be solved (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

Exogenous variables

As mentioned, there are three core variables in the social disorganization theory that influence disorganization of a community or society: the low socioeconomic status, a high ethnic heterogeneity and a high residential mobility (Shaw & McKay, 1942). In this paragraph, these variables will be described and discussed separately.

The first exogenous variable is the socioeconomic status (SES). There have been no consistency on what the SES status represents, but in this research it is seen as a concept that represents class or social status. It represents an access to financial capital (or material resources), human capital (nonmaterial resources like education) and social capital (resources achieved through social connections). This directly affects the well-being of a human (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). In their study to effects of the SES on crime rates in Romania, Lobont et al. (2017) describe two possible explanations about influence of the SES on crime rates. First, an economic crisis presses much weight on social environments of people and social segregations will occur. This social segregation puts pressure on offence factors and this will increase criminal behavior. Besides crises and social segregation, unemployment is a problem in terms of the SES (Lobont et al., 2017). Factors like

alcohol consumption, abuse of substances, income inequality and drug dependence can be caused by unemployment. Unemployment is a factor that indicates a low SES. A low SES will lead to social disorganization, that will lead to an increase in crime. Moreover, all of the factors caused by unemployment can independently be connected to an increase of crime, so crime rates will rise because of a rise in unemployment rates (Lobont et al., 2017). Other theories have discovered a connection between a low SES and the involvement of persons in delinquent behavior. For instance, the strain theory and the rational choice theory link low economic resources directly to delinquency and crime. The strain theory suggests that poor youth do not have means to achieve social and economic goals. The rational choice theory states that youths with a low SES have not much to gain, so they choose to commit crimes to increase quality of life and future prospects (Rekker et al., 2015). These theories are in contrast with the social disorganization theory. The social disorganization theory states that the relation between the SES and delinquency is mediated by quality of neighborhoods and that these neighborhoods facilitate crime due to the lack of social capital and collective supervision (Rekker et al., 2015). However, the theories can be linked by mediation between economic status and crime, not taking into account the context of the SES. In contrast to studies on the SES mentioned here, social organization of a population can still be maintained in nonmetropolitan communities, despite a low level of socioeconomic resources. Because the level of social integration and residential stability in nonmetropolitan areas is high, communities will not be disorganized. Integration and stability become a community resource, that compensate the lack of socioeconomic resources (Barnett & Mencken, 2002). Altogether, the SES of a class is influencing crime in a specific neighborhood, because a low social class needs capital to improve the quality of life. To receive this capital, crimes are committed.

Ethnic and racial heterogeneity in neighborhoods is the second exogenous variable that influences the social disorganization of a community, that will lead to an increase in crime. According to Blau and Blau (1982), ethnic heterogeneity leads to crime when economic inequality is experienced by members of an ethnic minority group. This follows from economic inequality, consolidated distinctions in statuses emerge. And leads to ethnic and class differences, that leads to group conflicts. Blau and Blau (1982) propose that conflicts within ethnic groups will result in aggression driven by hostile impulses, and this will end up into criminal violence. Hostile impulses are influenced by inequalities experienced by ethnic minority groups. This undermines social integration of communities and increases levels of social disorganization in minority communities. Moreover, this will create hostility between a minority and majority of a community. In summary, hostile impulses of minority groups in communities lead to social disorganization, that will lead to more crime. According to Altheimer (2008), ethnic heterogeneity increases crime, because ethnic heterogeneity will lead to competing values between different ethnic groups. Together with a low SES and a high residential instability of the minority group, institutions that are important for establishing and maintaining informal social control become weak. If these institutions fail and there is a lack of social control, a community becomes social disorganized and crime will increase (Altheimer, 2008). Early Chicago School sociologists state that different immigrant groups within one community would weaken social control, because of communication barriers and differences in language and culture. However, Martinez, Rosenfeld and Mares (2008) find in their study about social disorganization, drug market activity and neighborhood violent crime no evidence on the influence of ethnic heterogeneity on drug market activity and neighborhood violent crime. Thus, ethnic heterogeneity is not always a predictor for social disorganization and crime.

High residential instability in a neighborhood is the third exogenous variable that positively influences social disorganization and crime. A neighborhood with low residential mobility is related to community attachment and involvement. This leads to a formation of social networks, community cohesion and informal social control. Therefore, social expectations, common values and informal sanctions are created and transmitted through informal ties within a community. Residents develop a structure within a community, a neighborhood is supervised and community incivilities are addressed collectively. If strong social ties, a vast group of residents and a stable neighborhood is present, a community is not social disorganized and crime rates are increasing. If the opposite is present and social networks are disrupted, disorder will occur and crime increases (Lyndsa, Boggess & Hipp, 2010). An assimilation of new people into social networks of local communities is a temporal process and a barrier to a development of social ties and friendships (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Thus, with high residential instability and new residents in a neighborhood, social ties will not develop and social disorganization will occur. This can lead to an increase in crime. Lydsa et al. (2010) also mention negative relations between residential instability, social disorganization and crime. It can be possible that residential stability is present in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, these residents are not able to move from this area because of their financial status. This means that these residents do not live there because of the cohesion, but because of their low financial status. There is no other option for them to move and live elsewhere. In these cases, not a lack of social cohesion, but a lack of financial means causes social disorganization and crime. Thus, it is important to take into account the context of residential (in)stability.

Other variables in the social disorganization theory

Originally, only the exogenous variables exist in the social disorganization theory. Later, intervening dimensions were added. These intervening dimensions are described in the next section. Besides the exogenous and intervening dimensions, recent studies added some more variables to social disorganization. Added variables that will be described and discussed here are: fear of crime, informal social control and formal control.

Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, & Liu (2001) studied the social disorganization theory and extended it with some variables. For this research, their added variable 'fear of crime' among citizens in a neighborhood will be described and used. The authors focused on two components of fear of crime: the extent to which crime and disorder affects fear of crime and the influence of fear on neighborhood cohesion. Fear of crime modifies the ecological conditions of a neighborhood and this affects and reduces neighborhood cohesion. This leads to disorder and more crime. Also, social cohesion decreases disorder, which increases fear and this will decrease cohesion again (Markowitz et al., 2001). The crime cause crime hypothesis proposes that street crime increases fear and this will lead to an avoidance of these streets by the public (Bellair, 2002). Because of this avoidance, streets become empty and informal surveillance is absent. A lack of informal surveillance will increase street crimes. Woldoff (2006) mentions in his article the reciprocal causal effects or of crime, so called feedback loops. This indicates that characteristics of neighborhoods interfere with social networks and this causes crime. Crime can feed back in the model because fear can cause crime again. Six rationales are explaining the nonrecursive model of social organization and fear of crime. Firstly, fear causes social and physical withdrawal from community life. Fear of crime is resulting from a breakdown in social controls and this causes an increase in crime. This fear causes the withdrawal from community participation among citizens (Woldoff, 2006). Secondly, fear causes weakening of

informal social controls. Supervision of a community through active observation of local activities is important for a reduce of crime rates. Thus, a community is controlling the residents, but with fear of crime, a community is not able to exercise control. It reduces the willingness to intervene or witness crimes (Woldoff, 2006). Thirdly, fear of crime can cause a withdrawal in local organizational life and mobilization. In the social disorganization theory, the organization of a community makes residents solve their own problems, due to participating in local clubs or other formal groups. Fear of crime decreases the number of participants in local organizations. When residents experience fear, the incentive to participate in local organizations and to spend time and energy on organizing the neighborhood is gone. Thus, the community organizational aspect is not present when residents experience fear. The neighborhood will be social disorganized (Woldoff, 2006). Fourthly, fear causes deteriorating business conditions. In the social disorganization model, this is seen as instability. It is possible that owners of business are afraid of crime and will relocate. This creates absence of business and is attractive for illegal businesses to settle. Fear of crime affects the community structure in terms of stability and social climate that creates social networks (Woldoff, 2006). Fifthly, fear of crime causes importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance. This factor of crime is a short feedback loop that stimulates crime again. Because disorder causes fear and frightened residents withdraw from public spaces, social control is decreased and crime will increase (Woldoff, 2006). Lastly, fear causes dramatic changes in population composition. This means that fear of crime affects population composition and turnovers (Woldoff, 2006). Altogether, fear is a factor that increases crime, because residents are afraid of criminals and due to feedback loops. A lack of fundamental conditions for social organization will occur. This lack of conditions causes more social disorganization, more crime and more fear again.

Another variable that influences the social disorganization and increase in crime is the extent to informal social control is executed by a community. Informal social control is defined as “the control that consists of the spectrum of actions taken by citizens to signal unacceptable behavior” (Groff, 2015). This variable is often seen as a mediating variable between the exogenous structural conditions: the socioeconomic status, residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity. The assumption of informal social control is that this is the only effective means of maintaining public order by residents taking responsibility for each other (Silver & Miller, 2004). In this research, the variable of informal social control is not seen as a mediating variable, but as an individual, directly influencing variable. Examples of informal control are prevention of criminal behavior by informal surveillance on the streets and intervening when problems occur. Residents can question suspicious persons about their behavior, correct misbehavior or inform parents about the misbehavior of their children (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Bellair (1997) mentions that interaction among neighbors is important to maintain informal social control. People who know each other are more willing to reach interpersonal agreements. This is stimulated by the fact that people involved in these agreements are personally acquainted. If persons remain strangers, their willingness to participate in the agreements is less likely. Thus, social interaction and local networks are important factors in maintaining informal social control. Informal social control will reduce social disorganization within a community and this will lead to less crime.

Besides informal social control, that is exercised through networks and community groups, there is formal control. Formal control is exercised by official authorities and the aim of these authorities is maintain order and enforce legal and regulatory codes. The difference with informal social control is the level of exercising. Informal control is exercised within neighborhoods, while formal control often

is exercised by institutions outside a neighborhood. Another difference is that informal control is more aiming at the prevention of crime, while formal control often takes place after the crime has happened (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). There are two reasons that make formal control important to the social disorganization theory: (1) it directly influences crime and disorder and (2) the influence on the informal social control of residents. The first reason indicates that the amount and quality of police activity in a neighborhood significantly affects the decrease in crime rates. In disadvantaged neighborhoods, the police is less able to perform their services, because police officers respond poorly to crime victims. Moreover, studies argue that the police see residents of high-crime communities as “deserving victims”, because their lifestyle invites victimization. In these neighborhoods, formal control is not affecting a decrease in crime rates (Kubrin & Weizer, 2003). The level of vigorously enforcing the law by the police is also an important factor on how formal control influences crime and disorder. If the police acts aggressive in cities or neighborhoods, this directly affects the crime rates. Thus, when the police acts more aggressive, crime rates increase (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). The second reason why formal control is important, is the influence of it on informal social control. Formal control enhances residents capacity to fight crime and disorder. This means that residents perform in community policing. In community policing, the police and community work together in crime fighting (Kubrin & Weizer, 2003). The second link between informal and formal control is the responsiveness and effectiveness of the police in a neighborhood. In neighborhoods with low levels of responsiveness and effectiveness, residents are less likely to participate in community policing. The last link between formal and informal control is that residents will take the law into their own hands, when they experience absence and unwillingness of the police to deal with local community problems. Then, local residents will act against crime without the help of the police (Kubrin & Weizer, 2003). Altogether, high formal control will directly decrease disorganization and crime. It will indirectly influence informal social control, that leads to less disorganization and less crime. If formal control is absent, a community will be social disorganized and crime rates increase.

Intervening dimensions

Sampson and Groves (1989) developed, besides the other variables or dimensions, three intervening dimensions within the social disorganization theory. These dimensions are: informal local friendship networks, supervising teenage peer groups and the rate of participation in local voluntary or formal organizations. Here, these intervening dimensions will be described and discussed.

The first intervening dimension of the social organization of a community is the amount of informal local friendship networks within a community. Local social networks are the foundation of human ecological communities. When local friendship ties are formed, a community is more capable to recognize strangers and create guardianship behavior against victimization and crime. When friendship ties are strong and wide, informal social control of communities will improve and social disorganization and crime will increase (Sampson & Groves, 1989). In the research of Bellair (1997), the author questions the connection between the frequency of interaction among neighbors and community social control and cohesion. There are two reasons mentioned that infrequent social interaction is important in building networks within a community. First, it does not matter if neighbors are close friends or not, because infrequent interaction may signal a broader web of affiliations among neighborhood residents. Infrequent and frequent interaction among neighborhood residents are both important in the development of informal social control (Bellair, 1997). The second reason is that ‘weak ties’ in neighborhood networks are providing communication

linkages across local cliques. These weak tie relations are less strong, less emotionally intense and less time consuming. Infrequent social interaction is connected to weak ties and if weak ties are absent, communities remain partitioned and disorganized. This will influence crime rates (Bellair, 1997). Although studies had shown that local friendship networks have a positive effect on social organization of neighborhoods, some studies show that effects of local social ties are different in certain types of neighborhoods. For example, in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods where friendships do not cross racial lines, informal control following from social networks is restricted. Also, studies show that anonymity within a neighborhood negatively influences informal social control in neighborhoods. Due to anonymity, residents victimize their neighbors because they are not in the same social network. This will lead to social disorganization, that will lead to more crime (Warner & Rountree, 1997). Altogether, this intervening dimension of local friendship networks is mostly intervening after the exogenous variables 'ethnic heterogeneity' and 'high residential stability' and 'informal social control', because these variables are about the lack of social ties and the lack of informal social control performed by these friendship networks.

The second intervening dimension in the social disorganization theory is the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer groups (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Because crime is in many cases a group phenomenon, controlling group mechanisms is important in preventing communities for delinquency. In social disorganized communities with an extensive number of street-corner youth groups, there is a higher rate of adult crime. Especially, when younger adults still have ties to youth gangs. Hence, there is no clear dividing line between gangs of youths and criminal groups of younger and older adults (Sampson & Groves, 1989). According to Shaw and McKay (1942), most gangs developed from unsupervised and spontaneous play groups. Thus, it is important to control these groups before they turn into a gang and perform group-related delinquency. Peer groups can play a specific role in crime. When teenagers are spending time in groups whose members are committing crimes like drawing graffiti or breaking windows, teenagers learn that crime is common. These teenagers will develop different opinions about crime and will not be aware of consequences of committing crimes. Peer-group crimes are risk-related, so these crimes often exist when levels of surveillance and formal or informal social control are low (Riley, 1987). Examples of group-related controls are the supervision of leisure-time youth activities and intervening in street-corner gatherings. Altogether, it turns out that higher rates of delinquency are experienced when communities are unable to check street-corner teenage groups by informal social control (Sampson & Groves, 1989). This intervening dimension is an intervention after the factor of formal control and after the factor of social control and organized criminal hemp cultivation. This factor is placed here, because the lack of control causes existence of criminal teenage peer groups.

The third and last intervening dimension that influences the social disorganization of a community is the rate of participation of citizens in formal and voluntary organizations. Sampson and Groves (1989) argue that community organizations are the embodiment of local community solidarity and institutional instability. Not participating in formal or voluntary institutions is a structural factor of social disorganization. When ties between a community and local voluntary institutions are weak, a community is unable to defend local interests. Moreover, a weak community base causes a weak social control regarding youth. Thus, this suggests that high levels of voluntary organizational participation indicates organization within a community, which leads to a decrease in crime. If the opposite condition is present, it will lead to disorganization and an increase in crime (Sun, Triplett & Gainey, 2004). When strong and viable institutions are absent in social disorganized communities,

mechanisms to control crime will be weak. Furthermore, if connecting local institutions, broadening political institutions and economic institutions are absent, common values are not encouraged. Socialization to conformity is undermined and indirect social control is weakened. These local institutions also provide activities that structure time of individuals. During these activities residents can supervise and control of each other, because they are together. Thus, when voluntary institutions are few in number, there is less societal control. Without informal social control, a community becomes social disorganized and crime rates increase (Peterson, Krivo & Harris, 2000). Sampson and Groves (1989) argue that there is a relation between the SES and participation in formal and voluntary organizations. Neighborhoods where the SES is low have a weaker organizational base than a community with a higher SES. Thus, the SES influences participation in voluntary organizations and influences the social disorganization. On its turn, social disorganization increases crime rates. In opposite of these arguments, some researches indicate that a community is not social disorganized, although voluntary participation in stable neighborhoods is low. In neighborhoods with high stability, participation in organizations is not necessary. It turned out that lack of participation in these neighborhoods does not cause social disorganization. Thus, it is not influencing crime rates (Sun et al., 2004). Communities with crime problems will participate more in community policing activities, so the level of participation is high. When there are no crime problems in a neighborhood, level of participation is low. Thus, crime problems are also influencing participation rates of a community (Skogan, 1989). This intervening variable is set between the SES and social disorganization, because communities with a low SES participate less in formal and voluntary organizations, which leads to more social disorganization and more crime. Furthermore, this variable can influence informal social control, because the lack of voluntary organizational participation leads to less social control.

2.4 Conceptual framework

To get a clear image of the different theoretical social conditions that influence organized criminal hemp cultivation, a conceptual framework is created. For every phase that is discussed in the second paragraph, a different scheme is created. This scheme pictures which social conditions explain a certain phase of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation.




Figure 2: The preparing phase




Figure 3: The growing phase




Figure 4: The fabricating phase




Figure 5: The sales phase

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter answers the following sub-questions: how can organized criminal hemp cultivation be defined; and what factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation? In this research, one specific type of crime will be analyzed: organized criminal hemp cultivation. It becomes clear that organized criminal hemp cultivation consists different phases: preparing, growing, fabricating, sales, money laundering, storing and transporting. To explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation, the social disorganization theory is used. Different variables in the social disorganization are described in this chapter. The following variables are fundamental in the social disorganization theory: a low socioeconomic status of individuals, ethnic heterogeneity in communities, a high residential instability in a neighborhood. Different authors mention intervening dimensions in the social disorganization theory: informal local friendship networks, the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer groups and participation of residents in formal and voluntary organizations. These variables intervene before or behind the fundamental variables. More recent studies added some new variables to the social disorganization theory. New variables discussed in this thesis are: fear of crime, informal and formal control. Thus, within the social disorganization theory, different factors can be found that stimulate crime.

The assumption is that all the different variables of the social disorganization theory can be found in case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. However, the extent to the variables will be found will differ. Expected is that the SES, and a lack of informal and formal control are strong social conditions that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation. It is expected that the SES influences the preparing, fabricating and sales phase. Expected is that the factor of ethnic heterogeneity is influencing the preparing and sales phases in the process. It is expected that a high residential stability positively influences the grow phase and sales phase. The assumption of the fear of crime factor is that it is related to the grow and fabricating process. An assumption about the lack of formal and informal social control is that these factors both influence all the different phases in the process organized criminal hemp cultivation. Although the intervening dimensions can be present, the assumption is that local friendship networks, supervising teenage peer groups and the rate of participation in local voluntary organizations are harder to find, because these dimensions do not have a direct relation with social disorganization and crime. However, it is expected that some positive relations between these factors and existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands can be found. Expectations of all the variables are pictured in the conceptual framework.

3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the methodology of this research is explained. The goal of this research is finding the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands and finding an explanation for this presence. The methodology determines the direction in order to get knowledge about answering the research question. This chapter contains the research design, case selection, method of data collection and method of data analysis.

3.2 Research design

In this study, a qualitative research is chosen as research method. The aim is to look at the 'why' and 'how' and an in-depth research about context of a specific subject is done (Vennix, 2011). In the second chapter the first sub-question is answered. This question is: how can organized criminal hemp cultivation be defined? In this chapter, the phenomenon of criminal organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands will be described. Also, the second sub-question is answered. This question is: what theoretical social conditions explain organized criminal hemp cultivation? In the second part of the second chapter, theoretical social conditions that explain the existence of this type of crime is described and discussed. Important factors are described first, by studying scientific literature. Relevant variables that are found in the literature study will be tested by doing empirical research. This empirical research follows from the third and fourth sub-question. The third sub-question is: what types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands? The fourth sub-question is: which factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?

Collection of data in a qualitative research is open and flexible. An added value is the in-depth information the respondents could give about their own experiences. The chosen research design within this qualitative research is a case study. This case study helps with answering the two empirical sub-questions: the third and fourth question. A case study is an intensive study to one or some research objects and can be distinguished in a single case study or a multiple case study (Yin, 2003). The case in this study is about factors that explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. There is one unit of analysis: organized criminal hemp cultivation. Altogether, this case study is a single, holistic case study (Yin, 2003). In contrast to other qualitative research designs, only some specific situations are examined deeply. This will result in an extensive description of one specific case. This study had an exploring and explanatory design. In the theoretical literature review, factors that influence crime were explored. In the empirical part, the phenomenon of organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands was explored first. Here, the third sub-question were answered. The second part of the empirical chapter is explanatory, because it is attempted to find if the theoretical social conditions explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. This part of the chapter answered the fourth sub-question.

3.3 Case selection

As mentioned, the research strategy of this study is a single case study. The research method used is a desk research, in the form of a media-analysis. Another research method used is a field research, in the form of in-depth interviews. A process of shaping and rethinking was gone through, before a specific case was selected. In the first place, the idea was to examine the phenomenon of organized crime in general. This was not achievable, because of different aspects. First, organized crime cannot

be examined in general, because this range is too wide. It had to be specified to a certain place or location. Thus, organized crime was specified to the east of the Netherlands. Secondly, the concept of organized crime is a wide ranged concept. Many types of crime can be placed under this concept, so the concept had to be limited to one specific type. A little orientation on organized crime in the east of the Netherlands was done and it became clear that most of the police arrestments on organized crime in the east of the Netherlands were about organized criminal hemp cultivation. Moreover, most of the news articles were about this specific type of organized crime. Thus, because most information on this type of organized crime could be found, organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is chosen as case.

Looking far back into the past is not desirable, because organized criminal hemp cultivation is a dynamic phenomenon and changes over time continuously (Jansen, 2012). Therefore, a time-range is set. Data retrieved from the media-analysis ranged from 2016 till 2019. Data retrieved from interviews is about recent years, also 2016 till 2019. The case is also chosen because the east of the Netherlands is covered by one police district and governmental organizations and police organizations in this region are working integral to fight organized crime.

In the east of the Netherlands covers the police district of the province of Gelderland and Overijssel. In this study, the east of the Netherlands is limited to the province of Overijssel, because only organized criminal hemp cultivation of this region will be analyzed. In the process of selecting the case, it is viewed which type of organized crime was registered mostly. According to the statistics of CBS (2019), in the east of the Netherlands, money laundering was registered 35 times over the year 2018. Human trafficking was registered 40 times over the year 2018, hard drug crimes were registered 260 times over the year 2018 and soft drug crimes were registered 370 times over the year 2018. These statistics made clear that soft drug crimes are the most registered type of organized crime. According to the Dutch opium law, hemp are soft drugs (Maxius, n.d.). Therefore, organized criminal hemp cultivations are covered by soft drug crimes. The statistics show that soft drug crimes is the type of organized crime that is mostly present in the east of the Netherlands, so this type will be analyzed.

Altogether, the case that is selected to analyze is organized criminal hemp cultivation. This phenomenon will be analyzed in the east of the Netherlands, so this is the setting of the research.

3.4 Method of data collection

To answer the third sub-question 'what types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands?', a desk research is done by analyzing local news articles. The aim of this desk research is to get a clear image about organized crime in the east of the Netherlands. To achieve this goal, news articles were collected from different local news sites. Reported facts by independent journalists were used to get information about types of organized crime recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Because journalists are aiming to be independent, these media sources are reliable. If this method of data collection will be repeated, same results will be shown. However, it is possible that over time, new articles are added and not the same data is collected. This will lower the reliability of this research. Eighteen articles from local newspapers and news websites were retrieved and a case of organized crime was described. These media sources were written by different journalists and not influenced by the researcher. The selection of articles was during May 2019. There were some criteria to select news articles:

- The article was from a local news site in the east of the Netherlands: RTV Oost or Tubantia.
- The articles were written in the last five years. Thus, from 2014 till 2019.
- The articles contained content about **organized** crime and this must be explicitly mentioned.

Different terms were used to find relevant articles. These terms were Dutch terms, because the news sites were Dutch. The following terms were used to find relevant articles: 'organized crime', 'undermining', 'hemp cultivations', 'human trafficking', 'organized fraud' and 'drug trade'. A limitation during this data collection was that some articles from Tubantia were premium and these articles could not be retrieved. However, a sufficient amount of articles were not shielded. Around 50 articles have been read, but most of them were not meeting the criteria. Only 19 articles were selected for analysis. Subjects of these articles differ, but all articles were about organized crime in the east of the Netherlands.

The last part of the second sub-question, about organized criminal hemp cultivations, is also answered by collected interview data. Respondents are questioned about organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. The third sub-question, 'which explanatory factors of organized criminal hemp cultivation are recognized in the east of the Netherlands?', is answered by collecting new data. This data is collected by doing semi-structured interviews. This method was chosen, because we were looking for the point of view of different respondents on experiences about factors that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Respondents could share their own experiences from the field, and because of the semi-structured setting, these experiences are not biased. Respondents can answer the questions free from any other interpretation and the internal validity is guaranteed. The interviewer could ask further when necessary, a clear image about the subject could be created and more in depth-information was retrieved. Most important subjects and questions were set before the interview, but during the session the interviewer could deviate from questions or subjects. This was depending on the information the respondent told. The aim of the interviews was to find if social conditions that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation were recognized by the respondents. If the conditions were recognized, they were present in the east of the Netherlands. Furthermore, the aim was to examine which factors were present, to what extent they were present and which part of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation they were influencing. Different respondents could provide information from their own experience about variables and different phases in the process of criminal hemp cultivation. Before the interviews, questions were created. These questions were based on the most important theoretical concepts, summarized in the conceptual frameworks in chapter two. By using theoretical concepts, concept validity is guaranteed. Concepts and questions were put together in interview guides, seen in appendix A. During the interview, this guide was used as a guideline, but the researcher could deviate from the questions. Because different respondents with different backgrounds were interviewed, some questions were adjusted or deleted. During every interview, almost the same questions were used and this positively influences the stability of the measurement and guarantees the reliability. The other interview guides are also seen in Appendix A.

At the beginning of an interview, the goal of this research was explained to respondents. All the interviews were recorded after approval and they were held in a quiet place. Recordings were not interrupted and this positively influences the reliability of the research. After collected information was used, recordings were deleted to guarantee the privacy of respondents. All the interviews lasted

around 45 till 60 minutes and were held in July, August and September 2019. Totally, six respondents were interviewed. All of these respondents were professionally dealing with organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, reliable empirical data about the subject could be collected. Because respondents were working with sensitive information about crime, no names were mentioned and respondents stay anonymous all time. Three of the respondents were working at a municipality in the east of the Netherlands. One of these three is also working at the local safety region. Two of the respondents who are working at a municipality are working at a city municipality and one of them is working at a countryside municipality. This guarantees the representation of different types of municipalities in the east of the Netherlands and will be positive to the generalizability. All respondents were dealing with safety policies in their municipality, so they all had sufficient knowledge about the subject. The other three respondents were working at investigation and prevention organizations. These respondents could provide information directly from experiences in the field of policing. All these respondents had different experiences with organized criminal hemp cultivation at different places in the east of the Netherlands. Moreover, three out of six respondents had an overarching position in crime fighting organizations. These respondents could provide information about the whole region and thus, cover the whole east of the Netherlands. However, they could not provide detailed information and experiences about every single part of the east of the Netherlands. This negatively influences the generalizability of this study. After the last interview a sufficient amount of data was collected, because every respondent was mentioning different relevant factors. They all had experiences around the topic and during every interview, they mentioned information about relevant variables or factors. Respondents mentioned the same information, but also complemented each other. There was contact for another interview with a respondent from the prosecution office in the east of the Netherlands, because it was interesting for the research get information from the point of view of a prosecutor who was dealing with organized criminal hemp cultivation. However, at some point there was no response, so this interview did not took place.

In selecting respondents, some criteria were used:

- Respondents were working within the area of public safety and security.
- Respondents were dealing with organized crime in the east of the Netherlands.

The first three respondents were approached by e-mail. An e-mail with a request to interview someone with knowledge about organized criminal hemp cultivation was sent to general mail addresses and these e-mails ended up in the mailbox of the right persons who made contact for an appointment. In these e-mails the goal of the research was described, a request to interview someone with knowledge about the subject was made and different subjects which would be questioned were summed up. The fourth respondent was approached because of the teacher, since he knew some people at the municipality. The fourth respondent introduced the fifth respondent and the sixth respondent was collected because of personal acquaintance. An e-mail with information about the interview was sent to the last three respondents, so these respondents also knew what was expected. The overview of the different respondents is seen in Appendix C. Because respondents would like to stay anonymous, names of respondents are changed in the letter R, complemented with a number.

The research could be more internal valid if respondents from other point of views were interviewed. For example, offenders of organized criminal hemp cultivation could be interviewed, because they

have insights from sides of criminal organizations on criminal hemp cultivation. However, it is not achievable to interview a criminal. Another limitation is the coverage of the region. Not the whole region that is set in this research was covered by respondents. Most of the respondents were operating in one specific municipality or city and provided information about these specific locations. However, three respondents who have an overarching position were covering the region more. Thus, some cities or municipalities in the east of the Netherlands are covered deeply. The whole region is covered more generally.

3.5 Method of data analysis

The method of analysis in this study was a content analysis. This method analyzes the content of communication (Vennix, 2011). Communication materials in this study are available as texts and transcribed interviews. The goal of this method is to make information in text or transcripts less complex, by filtering. When this is done, the structure of meaning is reconstructed (Vennix, 2011). In this study, texts from news articles and transcriptions from interviews will be filtered. News articles will be filtered to relevant information of organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation. Transcriptions of the interviews will be filtered to relevant information on phases in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Also, transcriptions will be filtered to social conditions or factors that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivations, according to respondents.

The third sub-question, what types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands was answered by analyzing news articles. After selection of news articles, every single article was read. Then, the specific type of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands recognized in the articles was described. Articles will be sorted by type of organized crime and the different types will be described separately. The last type of organized crime described is organized criminal hemp cultivation. This type was analyzed by retrieving information from the news articles and from the interview transcriptions. This was analyzed by seeking if different phases of the process were recognized by respondents in the east of the Netherlands. Also, different cases of organized criminal hemp cultivation mentioned in the news articles will be connected to the phases that are recognized in the east of the Netherlands.

Tools that were used to do a content analysis were coding with the program Atlas.ti. Recorded interview data was transcribed with this program. Different relevant codes were created to make data more clear and to find specific quotations easier. To guarantee the reliability of the coding method, the researcher coded the data a second time. First, the whole transcription was read and open codes were added to important lines. Then, open codes were compared and added to an overarching code. Some open codes were added to more than one overarching code. In this phase, different code groups were created. These code groups were based on the theoretical concepts. In Appendix B, the code scheme is viewed.

With help of different codes, content of the transcriptions can be analyzed more easily. The transcription data was analyzed to answer the last sub-question: which factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands? This question is answered in the fifth results chapter. In this chapter, it is tested if variables are recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Also, causal relations between the variables and organized criminal hemp cultivation were tested and analyzed. At the end of the analysis, it became clear which factors are influencing organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Moreover, it is tested which phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is influenced by which factor. One factor can

influence more than one phase. Causal relations between factors described in the theoretical chapter and organized criminal hemp cultivations were found, but also new factors were found.

3.6 Conclusion

During this study, different research activities were done. In the second chapter, theoretical literature was studied and theoretical concepts were created as a fundament to empirical research. A single, holistic case study is used to find empirical evidence of theoretical concepts, by using different data collection methods. The first method of data collection is a desk research, in the form of a media analysis. Here, empirical evidence of the existence on different types of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands is found. A second method of data collection is a field research, in the form of semi-structured interviews. This method is used to find empirical evidence on the existence of factors that stimulate the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The method of data-analysis used in this study is the content analysis. In the fourth chapter, data from the media analysis and data retrieved by interviews will be filtered, connected and analyzed. In this chapter, the third sub-question will be answered. Different examples about organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands will be connected to specific phases in the total process. In the fifth chapter, the interview data is analyzed by testing if theoretical factors are present and influencing the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. In this chapter, the fourth sub-question will be answered.

4. Results on organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivations

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the third sub-question is answered. The questions follows: what types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands? First, a general view on organized crime in the east of the Netherlands will be sketched from relevant news articles. After the general view, organized crime is specified to organized criminal hemp cultivations. These results are retrieved from news article data about this subject and the data from interviews and will be connected to the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivations.

4.2 Results

Different types of organized crime are present in the east of the Netherlands. A general example about organized crime was mentioned in an article of the Tubantia (2017). In this article it becomes clear that organized criminal motorcycle gangs attempted to use different pubs in the east of the Netherlands to perform their crimes. This was discovered by the police, so motorcycle gangs could not use the pubs anymore.

A first type of organized crime that is recognized in the east of the Netherlands is organized fraud. For example, healthcare fraud by malicious providers of healthcare. Healthcare providers are mostly committing fraud by declaring fake healthcare budgets at insurance companies. These budgets are not spend on healthcare, but on criminal activities. Moreover, it is mentioned that researchers discovered members of outlaw motorcycle gangs who were involved in this fraud. It turns out that outlaw motorcycle gangs are connected to organized crime (RTV Oost, 2018). Another type of organized criminal fraud in the east of the Netherlands is bankruptcy fraud. Two persons in the east of the Netherlands were convicted because of bankruptcy fraud. They advised entrepreneurs how to bankrupt their company the best way and how entrepreneurs could benefit from this. 14 companies were helped by convicted persons. One of these persons earned 422.000 euros with bankruptcy fraud (Kuitert, 2019b).

A second type of organized crime recognized in the east of the Netherlands is human trafficking. It becomes clear that this type is present, because during actions against organized crime in March 2019, many illegal workers were discovered. These workers were illegally trafficked to the Netherlands (Lindeman, 2019). In an article of the Tubantia (2014), it is mentioned that mayors and safety institutions in the east of the Netherlands are striving for better trained civil servants, so they can detect signs of human trafficking. They must be trained to detect signs, because it became clear that this type of organized crime is also present in the east of the Netherlands. Specifically, illegal and forced prostitution are the types of organized crime mentioned in this article. The regional safety organization emphasizes that civil servants have an important role in discovering illegal prostitution. They have to be alert during registrations of new people, so they can discover signs of human trafficking. In another article about human trafficking. Kuitert (2019a) mentions in an article the problem of lover boys, forced prostitution, labor exploitation, and other types of criminal exploitation. Around 230 victims of human trafficking should be present in the east of the Netherlands, according to nationwide numbers. However, only around 50 victims were actually revealed. Half of the 50 cases were marked as forced prostitution. Kuitert (2019a) also mentions the exploitation of illegal workers in nail studios. Another example of human trafficking crimes in the east of the Netherlands can be found in Enschede. Here, there are signs of a group of 40 people that are causing inconvenience at the Wilminkplein. According to the author, this group is connected to

organized crime dealing with the recruitment of girls for sex practices. This can be connected to organized human trafficking (Kruise, 2015). Altogether, different authors from local news providers mention human trafficking as a type of organized crime that is present in the east of the Netherlands.

Yet, two types of organized crime that are present in the east of the Netherlands are described: organized criminal fraud and organized human trafficking. A third type of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands is more present: organized drug crimes. Kuitert, Weinreder and Brok (2019) mention the case of cross-border organized crime in the east of the Netherlands. The Dutch financial police did seven arrestments in February 2019, where all the suspects were connected to drug crimes and fraud. Houses in Enschede, Almelo and Losser and business premises in Almelo, Enschede and Overdinkel were searched. At the same time, there were criminals arrested by the police in Germany. Police investigation made clear that a criminal organization was distributing drugs, and several suspects were arrested. This criminal organization operated via internet by selling drugs on the darknet, payed with crypto coins. Arrested suspects were cooperating with Dutch persons who packed drugs in the Netherlands and transport it to German mailboxes. Thus, it becomes clear that a cross-border criminal organization was active in drug production and selling in the east of the Netherlands. In an article, Kuitert and Lindeman (2017) mention an example about organized drug crimes at the biggest football stadium in the east of the Netherlands. The police of Enschede did a raid in the football stadium of FC Twente, during a match. The raid was focused on hard core fans of the football club. During the police action, an uncontrolled access to the stadium was found where weapons and drugs were be smuggled in. Moreover, the organized criminal outlaw motorcycle gang Satudarah was connected with this smuggle. The police discovered that during football matches, drug dealers were operating and selling drugs inside the stadium. During the raid, 11,94 gram of cocaine and some weapons were found, all connected to organized crime (Kuitert & Lindeman, 2017). Meerbeek (2019) mentions an example of the big 'godfather' in organized drug crime in the east of the Netherlands. This godfather, called Simo D., was arrested, but played an important role in organized drug crimes in the east of the Netherlands. Profits earned with this criminal drug crimes were invested in real estates, to launder money. Drugs were traded with German buyers, and a German undercover police action discovered some of the members of a criminal organization during a drug trade in a hotel in Twente. For several years, Simo D. was in prison, but when he was released he expanded his criminal operations and contacts. Drugs were distributed via darknet and contacts with criminals from other parts of the Netherlands were arranged. A partner of Simio D. was arrested with lots of drugs in his car in Germany and he told the German police that the drugs were from Simo. Therefore, Simio D. was arrested. After this arrest, several murder attacks on the partner were arranged by Simo, while he was in prison. Also, Simo is still operating from prison. His imperium of drug production and distribution is still continuing. However, the police hacked encrypted text messages between the members and in 2018 the police arrested several members of the criminal organization around Simo. Simo is nowadays in a German prison, because of drug distribution. After his release he will be convicted for membership of a criminal organization in the Netherlands (Meerbeek, 2019). The story of Simo D. is an example of an arrestment of a leader of a criminal drug organization in the east of the Netherlands.

Organized criminal hemp cultivation

The fourth type of organized crime in the east of the Netherlands is one specific type of drug crime: organized criminal hemp cultivation. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the process of

organized criminal hemp cultivation has different phases. Four phases are chronological: preparing, growing, fabricating and sales. Around these phases are other, non-chronological phases: facilitating, storage and transport and money laundering (Jansen, 2012). The first phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation is the preparing phase. Multiple respondents mention that during the preparation phase vulnerable people in the east of the Netherlands are approached by crime groups. These people are needed to help in hemp cultivation or to transport hemp. Examples of vulnerable people mentioned by respondents are youth, asylum seekers, poor people and social disadvantaged people. Respondent R5 mentions that “boys from 15 or 16 years old are approached to cut hemp, because this earns more money than working at the Albert Heijn”. Also, during the search to get a location to set up a hemp cultivation, criminal organizations approach vulnerable persons to use their houses or other buildings. In finding places in the east of the Netherlands to set up hemp cultivations, criminals are very creative. Hemp cultivations are set up indoors and outdoors. Indoor cultivations are set up in big factory properties, underground, in big barns, empty properties at industrial areas or in small toilet rooms in houses. Also, an example about a box-in-box space was mentioned by respondent R3. In the middle of a big property, a wall was placed. Behind this wall was a hidden room and there, a hemp cultivation was found. Most of the time, hemp cultivations are discovered in houses. Cultivations are discovered in both rental or owner-occupied houses. Next step in the preparation process is collecting gear to set up a hemp cultivation. According to respondents, gear that was specifically found in cases in the east of the Netherlands are carbon filters, snake houses, lamps, transformers and isolation material. This gear can be bought at so called smart shops and most of them are placed in Enschede. After a appropriate location is found and gear is bought, cuttings will be supplied. According to respondents, special cultivations in the east of the Netherlands where cuttings are grown can provide these cuttings. These cultivations are so-called ‘grow shops’. Though, these types of cultivations are less discovered than regular hemp cultivations, because cutting cultivations are less detectable by heat measurements. Also, grow shops are located beyond the border of Germany.

The second phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation is the growing phase. Not much is mentioned about this phase by respondents. According to respondent R6, it only becomes clear that most of the hemp cultivations are discovered during this phase, because the police can do heat measurements. If high temperatures are measured in houses, it can be possible that a hemp cultivation is set up. The police will investigate it.

When hemp is fully grown, it must be cut and fabricated. This is the third phase in the process of hemp cultivation. During this phase, different respondents mentioned that criminals use their own network or they approach local youth in the east of the Netherlands to help. These criminals offered high amounts of money to youth. Also rewards like new scooters are offered.

The last phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation is the phase where a final product of hemp is sold. Trade in hemp by the criminal organizations in the east of the Netherlands varies. Respondent R1 mentioned that the volume of sales of hemp in the east of the Netherlands is estimated around 500 million a year. According to different respondents, 20% of hemp cultivated in the Netherlands remains in the Netherlands. The other 80% is exported. However, authorities cannot get a clear image of sales around hemp, because it is traded at the illegal market. Only domestic sales of hemp by coffeeshops is clear, because this is registered. However, a coffeeshop in the east of the Netherlands can sell hemp, but it officially is not allowed buy it. Respondent R5 mentioned that there

are clear agreements with coffeeshops and the police and government in the east of the Netherlands. Coffeeshops in this region are conform to agreements, so it is expected that there is not much illegality. Respondents mentioned some other places in the east of the Netherlands where hemp is sold. For example, smartshops. R6 mentioned: "At the moment, we are also investigating a smartshop, that is not only selling normal or electronic cigarettes". This respondent indicates that the police is investigating a smartshop where they think hemp is sold illegally. Other locations in the east of the Netherlands from where hemp is sold are cars, homes, a square in Enschede, on streets and at train stations. In the theory chapter is mentioned that roads and seas are normally used as traffic routes. The train route recognized in the east of the Netherlands is a new kind of route used to transport hemp. Some of the locations are interesting in the analysis of stimulating social conditions to organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. This will be discussed in the next chapter. Another part of the phase of selling hemp is export from the east of the Netherlands to other countries. Respondents R1, R4 and R5 mentioned that criminal organizations from Germany are trading with criminal organizations from the Netherlands. Different respondents mentioned that 80% of Dutch hemp is exported, but it is not clear where this hemp is going to after it left the Netherlands.

Besides the four basic chronological phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation, there are some other, non-chronological phases. Facilitating is one of these phases and takes place during the whole process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. In this chapter, facilitating is mostly analyzed in case of preparing the construction of a hemp cultivation. In the east of the Netherlands, criminal organizations that run a big hemp cultivation make use of 50 till 60 facilitators. Examples of facilitators are building companies, installers, cutters, pickers, dryers, logistic specialist and sellers. Moreover, facilitators are needed in providing properties. Therefore, farmers or other vulnerable people are used. Another aspect of facilitating that is recognized in the east of the Netherlands is the naïve or 'ignorant' facilitator. An example of an ignorant facilitator, mentioned by respondent R3, is a seller at a construction store who sells gear to set up a hemp cultivation to a customer. The seller is not aware that organized criminal hemp cultivation is facilitated. Respondent R1 mentioned an example about civil servants at the municipality who are providing a permit to a criminal. Civil servants are not aware that criminal activities are facilitated by providing a permit, so are an ignorant facilitator. To prevent from ignorant facilitating, there are some new laws in local governance. These laws prevent from facilitating by a civil servant and municipality. At last, respondent R6 mentioned an example of facilitators. Professionals, such as electricians and plumbers, are used to set up a hemp cultivation. These facilitators are aware of the fact that they facilitate criminals, so this cannot be categorized as 'ignorant facilitator'.

Money laundering is the last phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation that is recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Respondent R3 mentioned that money laundering is very important to criminals, because this is a way criminals can spend or invest illegally earned money. Moreover, every individual has to prove how they earned their money. Criminals often cannot prove where their illegally earned money is from, so they have to find a way to make illegal money legal. By laundering money, criminals create a legal sham income. Money laundering is recognized in the east of the Netherlands. All respondents mentioned different examples of money laundering in this region. Mostly, money is invested in luxury goods. For example, criminals invest in cars or in properties. Cars are bought and payed cash for double prices. These cars are sold again. Another way to launder money is investing in shops. Wedding shops, phone stores, gyms, beauty salons or

hairdresser's are examples of stores in the east of the Netherlands where criminals invest their money in to launder it. These shops are used by criminals to make illegal money legal. This is done by manipulating financial administrations and paperwork. Criminal organizations are also investing money in catering industry. Respondent R3 mentioned an example in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands: a café is bought, rebuilt and sold. By creating different constructions and with help of accountants or financial experts, the property is bought. After a property is reconstructed, it is sold on the legal market and money is laundered. The same respondent mentioned that criminals bought a café and never opened it. However, every night much beer is sold, according to the administration. New beer must be bought at a supplier and the supplier makes an official invoice. Criminals can report this money and invoice to the tax authorities and money is laundered.

In the theoretical framework, different types of criminal organizations are mentioned. In the east of the Netherlands, organized criminal hemp cultivation is usually set up by criminal organizations with much members. In some cases in this region, a small group of people is cultivating hemp. However, this is not connected to organized crime. Criminals from the Netherlands or other countries, like Syria, Turkey or Spain are connected to organized hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. Respondents mention that so called 'big guys', the leaders, are mostly not arrested. These 'big guys' often stay abroad and they do not take any risk. Other people are put in the front to perform criminal activities. Moreover, 'big guys' have no legal possessions on their name, so they are not traceable. Persons who are arrested when a hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is discovered are persons who are executing criminal tasks, in order to criminal organizations. Examples are street dealers or vulnerable people who were recruited by criminals. In most cases, these people are only used to execute criminal tasks, like facilitating a room. They do not have any clue about criminal organizations or its members. The structure of criminal organizations who commit crimes around organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands differ. Respondent R1 mentions that there is some hierarchical structure seen in arrested criminal groups. These organizations have members who perform executive tasks in the field and above them there is are many leading members. Thus, there is some hierarchy seen. However, these separate criminal organizations are also working together, so there is some networking. Respondent R5 mentions that the police discovered that one criminal was member of many organizations. Respondent R4 mentions that there are some clusters discovered in Enschede: organizations who perform their crimes in the region, but their network is nationwide. This network collaboration can also indicate a core organization. Almost all criminal organizations in the east of the Netherlands are not only dealing with hemp cultivation, but they are performing other crimes.

In news articles, there are different examples recognized of the phases in organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. A first article is about the arrestment of six people in different places in the east of the Netherlands, all connected to one criminal hemp organization. This makes clear that organized criminal hemp cultivation is present in this region (RTV Oost, 2019b). Another example concerning organized criminal hemp cultivations is about a man from a small village in the east of the Netherlands and the rental of his industrial building. Te Bogt (2018) mentions in an article that criminals did an attempt to rent this building to set up a hemp cultivation, even though the owner wrote in his advertisement that the building is not available to drug production. It became clear that many farmers in the east of the Netherlands were approached by criminals, but these farmers do not know if criminals are the same or from the same criminal organizations. Although

farmers are alert, an example about a discovered hemp cultivation in a farmers barn is mentioned in the articles. Despite alertness, the farmer was not aware of it. The nature of the problem is the attraction of high amounts of money that are offered. The problem is, once you are helping criminals, it is not easy to get rid of them (Te Bogt, 2018). Cellarius (2019) mentions in an article that criminals see business parks more and more as an ideal area for secret occasions. The author wrote down a story of a director of a company who wants to rent out a part of his business premises. An estate agent made an offer and rented the premises from the director. It turned out that the agent was part of a criminal organization and a hemp cultivation was set up in this building. The police could not do anything, because of the danger of treatment. However, after a few months, the police did a raid and the criminals were arrested. According to Lindeman (2019), during the week against organized crime in March 2019, several hemp cultivations were dismantled and 37 kilos of saleable hemp was occupied, together with illegal money. Also, in one of the most safe municipalities in the Netherlands a hemp cultivation was discovered (Van den Berg, 2019). Criminal organizations are trying to operate from terrains outside the city where they are relative anonymous and are operating from the rural areas. However, organized criminal hemp cultivations are also present in the cities in the east of the Netherlands. In September 2018, the police searched several houses and arrest thirteen people in an action against a drug distribution gang in a neighborhood in Almelo. Hemp, weapons and bank accounts were taken into custody. The action was against a criminal organization, consisting of ten persons who lived in this specific neighborhood in Almelo. The neighborhood was not save anymore, because of the presence of this criminal organization. This is one of the reasons the police and other authorities took action (Lindeman, 2018). Criminal organizations are smart, when it is about misleading citizens. This becomes clear about an example mentioned in an article of Dilling (2019). A criminal organization rented a house from a man in the east of the Netherlands and misled the owner by falsifying payment slips and introducing a persons with fake identities. When the house was rent, criminals set up a hemp cultivation. At some time the owner did not trust it anymore, went out to look and discovered the hemp cultivation in his house. The owner reported it to the police and the police arrested the criminal organization. The last example about organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands mentioned in the news articles is about different raids in two cities in the east of the Netherlands. Here, the police arrested a Turkish-Dutch drug gang. This gang was renting a café and used it as a cover. Inside, a hemp cultivation was set up. At the same time the Turkish-Dutch person was arrested, some other members from the same criminal organization were arrested. This organization was using different business premises, like the café, to operate. Moreover, this organization was selling hemp to criminal organizations from other countries (Lindeman, 2017b).

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, the third sub-question is answered: what types of organized crime, especially organized criminal hemp cultivation, are reported in the east of the Netherlands? Types of organized crime that are recognized in the different articles are: organized criminal fraud, human trafficking, organized drug crimes and organized criminal hemp cultivations. This last type can be split up into different phases, mentioned in the theoretical chapter. The first phase of preparing is recognized by the examples about criminal organizations that approach citizens, like owners of buildings or farmers, to use their buildings to set up a hemp cultivation. The phase of facilitating is also recognized here. The second phase about the growing process is recognized in the east of the Netherlands, because it is mentioned that different hemp cultivation were discovered during the

grow-process. The third phase of fabricating hemp into a final product is not specifically recognized in the analysis of the news articles and interview data. Only the approach to local youth by criminals to cut hemp is mentioned. The fourth and last phase of selling hemp is present in the east of the Netherlands by examples of selling hemp on the streets, at train stations or from cars. Around all these phases, the phase of money laundering is present in the east of the Netherlands. Some examples of money laundering in the east of the Netherlands are: investing money in real estate or in expensive cars. Finally, results show that different types of criminal organizations with members from different nationalities are performing hemp cultivation crimes in the east of the Netherlands.

5. Results on explanatory conditions

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the fourth sub-question is answered: which factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands? Explanatory factors are set up in the theoretical chapter, by analyzing the social disorganization theory. The social disorganization theory mentions different variables that influence crime. These variables are: socio-economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, high residential mobility, local friendship networks, supervise and control teenage peer groups, participation in formal and voluntary organizations, fear of crime, formal and informal control and are measured in the case of the east of the Netherlands. Also, there are some new factors found. Finally, the factors will be linked to the different phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation.

5.2 Exogenous variables in the east of the Netherlands

First, results on the explaining exogenous variables are described. These variables are: the socioeconomic status, ethnic heterogeneity and a high residential stability.

Socioeconomic Status

In the east of the Netherlands, socio-economic status is an important factor that stimulates organized criminal hemp cultivation. Different examples on poverty are recognized. Respondent R5 mentions that 'if poverty remains, organized criminal hemp cultivation remains.' Respondent R2 calls this 'silent poverty'. Weak persons in society are approached by criminals, because they are sensitive to financial incentives. These people are often social disadvantaged. All respondents mention the financial or socio-economic status as a factor that stimulates organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The group of people with a low socio-economic status is easily to persuade by criminals when a high amount of money is offered. Examples of groups with a low socio-economic in the east of the Netherlands that came forward during the interviews are farmers, entrepreneurs, welfare mothers. Moreover, another example on the socio-economic status is the high financial benefits earned by criminals.

The east of the Netherlands is an area with farmers and countryside. It is not going well with the financial status of farmers in the Netherlands. Respondents mentioned different examples on this problem. The earnings from milk or potatoes are lowering year by year and big companies in the Netherlands buy meat, milk or vegetables from farmers from abroad. Thereby, farms have been in possession of the same families for generations. Nowadays, farmers get financial problems and might lose their farms. All the money they earned over years is invested in their farms. Barns at farms become empty, because farmers quit their farming business. It is financially attractive to react to offers from criminals to set up a hemp cultivation in these empty barns instead of putting trailers in it for fewer money. Criminals approach these farmers by putting flyers in mailboxes of farmers with offers: "can we use your barn to set up a hemp cultivation?". Farmers are ashamed of these financial problems and seek new possibilities to earn money. In some cases, farmers accept the offer. Farmers are seen as a weak socio-economic group. Criminals see these weaknesses and make use of it. On the other hand, it can be possible that farmers are not aware that they facilitate criminal activities. Respondent R2 mentioned that farmers were approached by criminals who do not tell why they need to rent a barn or lie about it. These criminals rent a barn from a farmer and set up a hemp cultivation. In most cases, farmers are not aware of it. Altogether, a financial incentive to farmers is a

socioeconomic factor that explains the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands.

Besides farmers, respondents mentioned the example of entrepreneurs, who are in weak financial positions. They can be sensitive to criminal offers. At old business parks in the east of the Netherlands, properties become empty because of unattractiveness and oldness. Comparable to example of farmers, empty properties are rented out to criminal organizations who offer a high amount of money. Criminal organizations can set up a hemp cultivation in these properties and the entrepreneur is facilitating organized criminal hemp cultivation. Here, the factor of financial incentive is important.

The so called 'welfare mother' is an example of a weak and vulnerable person in society. This example is mentioned by respondents multiple times. This term points to single women with kids, who barely have any money and lives on benefits. As a matter of fact, respondents use this term to refer to all persons in a financial and social weak positions. Thus, this term is referring to individual persons or families who have a low socio-economic status. 'Welfare mothers' are never going on holiday or their kids cannot go on a school trip, because they cannot afford it. Criminals approach these mothers while they are requesting a benefit at social services, or criminals notice that these mothers have barely any money to spend while they are shopping. Criminals know exactly who is in financial trouble, mentions respondent R2. High amounts of money are offered to vulnerable people, if they are willing to let criminals into their houses to set up a hemp cultivation. Furthermore, criminals tell that there is no risk, because welfare mothers barely do not have to deal with the hemp cultivation. When welfare mothers say "yes", they are providing a room. Sometimes they have to water the hemp plants. Respondent R2 mentions that when the police discovers a hemp cultivation in a house of a welfare mother, this person will be arrested because criminals are not present at locations of the hemp cultivation. In these cases, only facilitators and no members of criminal organizations are arrested.

The SES can also be viewed from the perspective of criminal organizations. High amounts of money are involved in organized criminal hemp cultivation and criminals earn much money with it. Thus, this is another financial factor that stimulates organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Respondent R5 mentions that with thousand hemp plants, €100.000 euros is earned. Hemp businesses in the east of the Netherlands is turning over 500 million a year, according to Respondent R1. This respondent also suggests that the total yearly drug turnover in the east of the Netherlands is "more than all the big companies in this region turn over all together, during one year". Especially criminal leaders earn much money. They drive expensive cars and buy expensive houses. This indicates that much money is earned by organized criminal hemp cultivation and the SES of members of a criminal organizations is well.

The theoretical assumption was that the SES was influencing all phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Results show that the factor of SES is influencing different phases in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. It is influencing the preparing, growing and fabricating phase, because vulnerable people are approached during the preparing phase. Their houses, barns or properties are used during the growing phase and the people themselves are helping with cutting hemp. The SES from perspective of criminal organizations is mostly influencing the selling phase and is also influenced by the selling phase. By selling hemp,

criminals receive incomes. With these incomes, they become wealthy. Therefore, their SES will increase.

Ethnic heterogeneity

In the causal relation between ethnic heterogeneity and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands, asylum seekers are important. In the social disorganization theory, ethnic heterogeneity causes crime when economic inequality is experienced by members of an ethnic minority group. This aspect of ethnic heterogeneity mentioned in the social disorganization theory is applicable on the case of asylum seekers in the east of the Netherlands. Asylum seekers experience economic inequalities and because of these inequalities, asylum seekers are sensitive to offers from criminal organizations. Different respondents, like respondent R5 and R4, confirmed this assumption by mentioning examples about arrestments of asylum seekers in cases of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Asylum seekers come over from conflict areas and have no money or belongings. The problem is that they are social and economic disadvantaged towards Dutch people. However, they want to start a new life in the Netherlands. Therefore, money is needed. Criminals approach asylum seekers at asylum center and offer them a high amount of money in return for work. In these cases, work means facilitating criminal activities. Respondents mention that asylum seekers facilitate in rooms and help with cutting or selling hemp. In some cases, they are not aware that they are executing criminal activities, because criminal organizations tell them it is legal. However, respondent R6 calls this naïve and suggests that asylum seekers are always aware of what they are doing. Economic disadvantages of an ethnic minority is also seen in the city of Enschede. Respondent R6 mentioned that drug criminals from Morocco or The Antilles are active with drug dealing and selling hemp in the center of the city. These groups are from another ethnicity, are economic disadvantaged and want to earn money. Thus, they sell hemp on the streets.

It was expected by theoretical implications that the factor of ethnic heterogeneity was influencing the preparing and sales phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation. In the case of the east of the Netherlands, it turned out that this factor influences the phase of preparing, growing and sales. Asylum seekers are approached during the preparing of setting up a hemp cultivation, let hemp grow in their rooms or houses and ethnic groups sell hemp on the streets.

High Residential instability

According to the social disorganization theory, a high residential stability will lead to less crime. Therefore, strong social ties, social cohesion and social control are important. A few respondents mention that crimes around organized hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands are more present in neighborhoods with more rental houses, a low social cohesion and a low social status. In these neighborhoods, "the moral is lower than in other neighborhoods", mentions respondent R1. This indicates that residents of rental houses move more often, so there is residential instability. Also, in flats in certain neighborhoods in Enschede, there is a low social cohesion because residents live anonymously. This can be a consequence of residential stability, so it is possible that a low social cohesion is caused by a high residential instability. However, respondents do not mention explicitly that there is residential instability that explains the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivations in the Netherlands. Indication is that the causal relation of anonymity and weak social ties in these neighborhoods are caused by a high residential stability. However, it cannot be confirmed. The theoretical assumption was that a low residential stability is influencing the growing

selling phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation. It turned out that this factor is not explicitly present in the east of the Netherlands, so it is assumed that it is not influencing any phase of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in this region.

5.3 Remaining variables and new variables

In this part, remaining variables 'fear of crime', 'informal control' and 'formal control' are described in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands.

Fear of crime

Fear of crime is a variable in the social disorganization theory that can be approached differently. In this case fear is about fear of criminals by citizens. This fear leads to more disorganization and crime. Respondent R3 mentions that "if normal people once are cooperating with criminal organizations, they hardly can get rid of them." Respondent R1 says "you only can say no to criminals one time, and that is the first time". This indicates that once a person is helping criminals, he never can get rid of criminals. In this case, crime will be maintained. In different interviews, respondents mention that fear of crime or criminal organizations who are executing crimes around organized hemp cultivations is present in the east of the Netherlands. In neighborhoods in cities in the east of the Netherlands where a hemp cultivation is set up and neighbors are aware of it, it can be possible that neighbors do not report it to authorities. Local residents are afraid of powerful, intimidating criminal organizations and consequences if they report a hemp cultivation. Sometimes, whole neighborhoods are involved in the organization around a hemp cultivation. Another example of fear mentioned by respondents in the case of the east of the Netherlands is that if a hemp cultivation in a house is discovered by the police, in almost all cases the resident of that house tells the police that the hemp cultivation is set up by himself. This person is telling this, because he is afraid of the criminal organization. Organizations made clear that if a hemp cultivation is discovered, residents should not mention or betray the organization. Otherwise, they will come after the resident and this has big negative consequences for the life of a facilitating person. Criminals create and maintain fear, because they do not want to get linked to discovered hemp cultivations.

Fear of criminals in the east of the Netherlands is also described by respondent R1 and R3 as fear of intimidation in daily life. Criminals infiltrate in neighborhoods by sponsoring local football clubs with money from a vague company. Moreover, criminals give away drinks in football cafés and become member of the board of football clubs. Hence, criminals infiltrates more and more in football clubs. After a while, criminals need a permit to set up an illegal company related to crime. Members of criminal organization go to the local municipality and intimidate the mayor and the mayor becomes afraid of criminals and their organizations. Also, it can be possible that children of civil servants who have to give out the permit play football at a football club the criminals are supporting. Therefore, criminals are intimidating civil servants by mentioning the kids. Thus, this type of fear of crime is based on intimidating by members of criminal organizations. It can be linked to fear of crime in the social disorganization theory, because criminals make residents solve their problems by spreading fear.

The theoretical assumption on the factor of fear was that it influences the growing and fabricating phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. In the case of the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands, fear of crime is present and is mostly influencing the preparing and growing phase of the process. During the preparing of the hemp cultivations, criminals

create fear and intimidate citizens to use them as facilitator. During the preparing and growing phase, neighborhoods remain silent to the authorities, because they are afraid of the criminal organizations.

Informal social control

The lack of informal social control is a factor in the social disorganization theory that results from all the other variables. It influences directly the social disorganization and increase of crime.

Respondents mention that in the east of the Netherlands, there are areas with little social control where more hemp cultivations are discovered. For example, at old business parks. Here, vacancy rates become high, because companies move to modern parks or old companies cease to exist. Over time, there is less movement and less people are present at these parks. Criminals like to operate in anonymity, so a hemp cultivations are set up here. Thus, according to respondent R1, at business parks where is less social control, there are more hemp cultivations discovered.

There is a difference between outlying areas and inhabited areas of a city or village regarding the number of discovered hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. Respondents mention that in outlying areas, there are relatively less cultivations *discovered* than at inhabited areas. In inhabited areas there is more informal social control more people can suspect something and report it. Thus, chances that hemp cultivations are discovered here are high. According to respondent R2, to set up a hemp cultivation, much transport movement is necessary and criminals do not want to stand out. In inhabited areas, more people can see movements. Moreover, they can be suspicious about these movements and report it. In outlying areas, there is less social control, so less people see it. Criminals can operate more anonymous in these areas and will set up a hemp cultivation here, instead of in inhabited areas. Because there is much outlying area in the east of the Netherlands, this is specific to this region.

More hemp cultivations discovered than in small villages than in cities in the east of the Netherlands. Respondent R2 argues that social control in villages is higher than in cities. Here, there is less anonymity and criminals like to operate anonymous. However, respondent R4 mentions that in densely populated parts of cities more hemp cultivations are reported by alert neighbors. Thus, in densely populated areas, social control is higher. Criminals do not like social control and will not set up a hemp cultivation in these areas. In areas with a low density of populations, there is less informal social control. Here, anonymity is higher and more hemp cultivations are set up. On the other hand, anonymity in cities can be counterproductive, because people do not know each other. According to respondents, the willingness to report in neighborhoods in the east of the Netherlands is high. Respondent R3 mentions that if criminals have set up a hemp cultivation in a house, the neighbor is willing to report this, because the neighbor do not know this other person. Moreover, in densely populated neighborhoods chances that someone sees illegal business of criminals are higher. Then, numbers of reported illegal activities become higher. The opposite is present in small villages in the east of the Netherlands. Here, there is a so called 'closed culture.' In these villages social control is high, but sometimes this effect is counterproductive. People are not willing to report organized criminal hemp cultivations, because they do not want to report a well-known neighbor. If the neighbor has financial problems and earns money with criminal activities, like a facilitating in organized criminal hemp cultivations, neighbors are not reporting this. In villages with strong social ties, neighbors are aware of financial problems of other neighbors and accept that these persons are cooperating in criminal activities to earn some extra money. Moreover, it is seen as betrayal if a

neighbor reports its other neighbor to the police. A common rule in those communities is: do not talk to the police. According to respondent R3, people in villages have the following mindset: "if my neighbor is not bothering me with criminal activities, he can go on. His financial status is already difficult." Local residents around houses where a hemp cultivation is set up are not interfering in this, because neighbors say it is not their business. However, if it is bothering them because of a bad smell or loss of electricity, neighbors are more willing to report. Respondent R4 argues that residents have to report hemp cultivations instead of ignoring it. Then, it becomes harder for criminals to find a location to set up a hemp cultivation.

Altogether, the willingness to report is an important factor in context of informal social control that determines if criminals can operate in neighborhood. The expectation from the theory was that informal social control influences every phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. It turned out that informal social control in the east of the Netherlands influences the preparing, growing and fabricating phase in this process, because if the willingness to report or a lack of informal social control is present, hemp cultivations are not discovered by the authorities and these phases can continue. Respondents did not mention the connection between informal control and the selling phase of the organized criminal hemp cultivation, so this causal relation is not recognized in the east of the Netherlands. However, it is likely that this relation is present.

Formal control

Formal control in the social disorganization theory is control exercised by official authorities, like the government or the police. Moreover, this is exercised outside neighborhoods. According to different respondents, outlying areas in the east of the Netherlands in combination with a lack of formal control performed by the police, are a stimulating factor. Together, these factors stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivations being set up and maintained. In cities in the east of the Netherlands, executing of formal control has a limited effect on the selling phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivations. Respondent R6 mentions the example of spots where drugs are dealt. At these spots cameras are installed, so formal control is executed. However, dealers are selling hemp at these locations crime is still present. Another problem of formal control in the east of the Netherlands is a deficit of police officers. Respondents R5 and R6 emphasize this problem. Without efforts of police officers, organized crime groups can perform crimes around hemp cultivations without being interrupted by the police. The police in the east of the Netherlands cannot set up actions against organized crime on their own, and nowadays they need help of municipalities, civil servants and other professional authorities. Thus, the lack of formal control in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands can be seen as deficits in police officers. Without sufficient numbers of police officers, there is less formal control. This leads to more disorganization and crimes around organized criminal hemp cultivations.

An indirect type of formal control is the policy of the government in the Netherlands. This is also applying to the east of the Netherlands. A policy is a type of formal control that determines laws in the country and is a control of an official authority. Respondents mention different examples of government policies that stimulate conservation of organized criminal hemp cultivation. The first example is the drug toleration policy the Dutch government is applying. Because the government determined that coffeeshops are legal, hemp can be bought all over the Netherlands. Influxes of hemp to coffeeshops are not visible to the authorities, so illegally cultivated hemp can be sold to coffeeshops. Coffeeshops sell this hemp. This is a way criminal organizations can continue with their

activities. Another aspect of the toleration policy that was suggested by respondents is that hemp can be bought by every adult in a coffeeshop. Persons smoke at streets and nobody think it is a problem. Respondent R6 argues: “because of the toleration policy, the organized criminal world around hemp cultivations is maintained”. Offers of hemp are big, prices decline and because of the low prices, demand becomes high.

The second example of lack of formal control by the government mentioned by respondents are the low penalties the government maintains. Respondent R1 argues that “the Dutch politics are responsible for the maintenance of drug crimes and they have to look at it a different way.” In the Netherlands, penalties on hemp cultivation or dealing hemp are not high. Criminals weight up the risk against profits of all the hemp cultivations they have or had and take the risk being arrested. Because of low penalties, they are released from prison after a short period and continue in organized criminal hemp cultivation. Moreover, in convincing facilitators, criminals mention low penalties as an argument to persuade the facilitator that the amount of money they can earn is worth the risk. Criminals who are arrested in the east of the Netherlands sit out their time in prison and start up new hemp cultivations after being released.

As final example about lack of formal control in the east of the Netherlands, respondents mention the lack of cooperation between companies and official authorities. In discovering hemp cultivations, the police can cooperate with organizations like electricity companies, housing associations and tax authorities. Respondents are divided about successes in these collaborations. Respondent R3 mentions that in the east of the Netherlands, cooperating partners are united and fighting against organized criminal hemp cultivation together. Respondent R5 is mentioning this too. This respondent is arguing that degrees of cooperation can be better, because police cannot fight this crime on its own. Thus, if institutions are cooperating more closely, they work more efficiently in fighting organized criminal hemp cultivation. In this situation, formal control in the east of the Netherlands is increases. More formal control will lead to less crime and organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands.

Altogether, lack of formal control in the east of the Netherlands is present in different varieties and stimulates all the phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. This was the assumption in the theoretical framework. A deficit of police officers influences all phases, because police officers are executors of formal control. The Dutch drug toleration policy is influencing the selling phase, because demands to drugs in the country are high and sales will increase by this. Low penalties for drug crimes is influencing all phases, because criminals operating in the whole process of organized criminal hemp cultivation take the risk. A lack of cooperation between companies influences the preparing and growing phase, because during these phases, companies can discover a hemp cultivation and report it to the police.

5.4 Intervening factors in the east of the Netherlands

In the theoretical chapter, three intervening factors that influence factors that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation are mentioned. These factors are: local friendship ties, supervising teenage groups and participation in voluntary organizations.

Local friendship networks

The theoretical concept ‘local friendship ties in a neighborhood’ is about social ties and social control in a neighborhood. Because of a lack of local friendship ties, there is less social control. This will lead

to social disorganization and an increase in crime. In the case of the east of the Netherlands, Respondents mention that in different neighborhoods with less social contacts, more hemp cultivations were discovered. This indicates that neighborhoods with less social contacts and social ties, are social disorganized. This will lead to more crime. Respondent R5 mentions a specific example about certain flats in Enschede, where residents live very anonymous. In these flats, more than an average number of hemp cultivations are discovered. This anonymity means less social ties, that indicates less local friendship ties. The lack of friendship ties in these neighborhoods leads to more social disorganization and more criminal hemp cultivations. The theoretical expectation was that the variable of local friendship networks was intervening after a high residential instability, after the factor of ethnic heterogeneity and after a lack of informal social control. In the case of the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands the factor is only recognized after informal social control, because the lack of friendship ties leads to anonymity. This anonymity leads to less social control in a neighborhood.

Supervising teenage peer groups

Another intervening dimension in the social disorganization theory is the supervision of teenage peer groups. A lack of supervision of teenage peer groups is a consequence of poor control. Poor control leads to more social disorganization, that leads to more crime. In the east of the Netherlands, there are some connections with youth and organized criminal hemp cultivations, according to different respondents. First, youth is sensitive to financial incentives from criminal organizations. In daily life, young people earn a few money at their side job in, for instance, supermarkets. However, they want to spend lots of money on stuff like a new scooter or new clothes. Criminals approach young people at schools or at other public areas, asking them to work as a cutter or as a courier of hemp. High amounts of money are offered to them. According to the social disorganization theory, youth is vulnerable at places where there is no supervision from parents or other adults. Moreover, they not directly oversee consequences of the offer. Young people will earn high amounts of money when performing criminal tasks. With this money, they can buy luxury goods and will receive. Young people will accept criminal offers and get involved in organized criminal hemp cultivations. On their turn, criminal organizations have recruited new workers. It is seen here, that the lack of supervision of parents and lack of informal social control stimulates youth to accept the offer. Moreover, the financial incentive is important. The theoretical assumption was that the factor of supervising teenage peer groups was intervening before informal social control and after formal control. In the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands, the factor is intervening before informal social control, because of the lack of supervision by parents youths are vulnerable. Examples of lack of formal control performed by the authorities like the police are not mentioned in the case of criminal teenagers in the east of the Netherlands, so there is no indication that this factor is intervening between formal control and organized criminal hemp cultivation. The financial incentive is important in recruiting young people. Youth with a low SES are vulnerable to criminals. This factor can be placed after the SES variable.

Participation in formal and voluntary organizations

According to the social disorganization theory, a low participation of residents in formal or voluntary organizations will lead to more social disorganization, that will lead to more crime. In the interview data, not much is mentioned about participation. In the case of the east of the Netherlands, only Respondent R3 mentions that criminals are often persons who are not motivated to participate in

regular social circuits and get a normal job. These persons deviate from social norms, are not social controlled by formal or voluntary organizations and choose to operate in organized criminal hemp cultivation. Because of a lack of control, social disorganization will increase. The theoretical assumption on the factor of participation in organizations was that it was intervening after the SES and after informal social control. However, respondents did not provide sufficient information to confirm this relation, and thus, the assumption.

5.5 New found factors

During the analysis of the data, some new factors that influence organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands are found. These factors are described here.

Geographic location

The east of the Netherlands is close to the border of Germany. Around 70% of hemp cultivated in the Netherlands is exported most hemp is exported to Germany. This export and demand of German buyers is a factor that explains the maintenance of organized criminal hemp cultivation. This is specific for the east of the Netherlands. Different respondents mentioned this factor as an important stimulating factor to organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. Because of the Schengen contract, that states that borders within the European Union (EU) are open and the movement of goods and people is free, buyers of hemp from many countries in the EU come to the east of the Netherlands to buy hemp. This varies from individual buyers to big criminal organizations who buy big batches of hemp. Buyers easily cross the border in the east of the Netherlands with cars or trains. Train stations in the east of the Netherlands close to the German border are, according to respondent R3, known as 'drug stations', because of a high amount of drug buyers from Germany. The geographic location of the east of the Netherlands is also important in gaining cuttings to start a hemp cultivation. Respondent R6 mentioned that many grow shops are located just beyond the German border. The combination of high demands of German buyers and the geographical location at the border to Germany stimulate criminals to set up hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands. From this location, it is easier to connect with German buyers and ways to the border are short.

The geographic location of the east of the Netherlands stimulates the selling phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation, because high demands from German buyers makes it attractive to criminal organizations to set up a hemp cultivation close to the border. From here hemp will be sold to these buyers. Moreover, it is attractive to set up a hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands close to the border, because of the preparing of it. Grow shops that deliver cuttings are located just beyond the border in Germany.

Supply and demand

When there is demand for hemp, there are suppliers who deliver hemp. Market economics of trade in hemp is a factor that explains the maintenance of organized criminal hemp cultivations, because criminals will supply demands of people who want to use hemp. Respondents mention that this applies not only to the east of the Netherlands, all regions in the Netherlands. According to respondent R4, the market of selling hemp is a well-earning market, because there is always demand from users. As mentioned, demands of German buyers are high in the east of the Netherlands. Also, demands during nightlife in the east of the Netherlands are high, so street dealers respond to these demands. Thus, supplies and demands are a stimulating factor of organized criminal hemp cultivation

in the east of the Netherlands. Suppliers respond to demands and if this demand gets greater, suppliers will buy more hemp from hemp growing organizations.

The factor of supply and demand and market economics mostly influence the selling phase of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. However, without demands from suppliers, the whole process of criminal hemp cultivation is not needed anymore. So, this factor is indirectly influencing every phase in the process.

Naivety among citizens

Mentioned by different respondents, people in the east of the Netherlands are naïve towards organized hemp criminal cultivation. Respondent R1 suggests that people in this region often think that this type of crime is not existing there. People are not alert on it and do not notice that a hemp cultivation is or can be set up in their neighborhood. People are naïve and think this only happens in other parts of the country and not in the east of the Netherlands. Also, naivety is present at coworkers of, for instance, electricity or construction shops. Respondent R1 mentioned the following example: “when criminals buy materials that can be used to set up a hemp cultivation, these materials are usually not bought by one person in such amounts. The person selling these materials should be aware that this is not common. However, because of the naivety and the a of awareness, criminals can buy this stuff while nobody notices. They can set up a hemp cultivation and the organized criminal hemp cultivation maintains.” This naivety is part of the culture among the citizens in the east of the Netherlands and is a factor that stimulates the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivations, specific for this region. It influences the preparing and growing phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation, because criminals can operate freely during these phases and nobody notices.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the fourth sub-question, is answered: which factors explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands? All different variables are tested in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The process of organized criminal hemp cultivation is set out into four different phases and for each phase it is tested if factors from the social disorganization theory explain the presence of the phase. The results show that every variable of the social disorganization theory is influencing the preparing phase, except the residential instability factor. The factor of residential instability was not recognized as an explaining factor of the existence of the process organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Also, the factors geographic location, naivety and supply and demand are new recognized factors that stimulate the preparing phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. For the growing phase, the empirical results show that almost all variables from the social disorganization theory explain the presence of this phase. Only the factor of residential instability is not recognized. From the new recognized factors, the geographic location is not explaining the presence of the growing phase in organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The results on the fabricating phase show that only the low socioeconomic status, formal control and informal social control explain the existence of this phase in organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. From the new found factors, only supply and demand explain the presence of the fabricating phase. The results show that the socioeconomic status is influencing the sales phase, but this phase is also influencing the socioeconomic status. Two more explaining variables from the social disorganization theory are explaining the sales phase in the

east of the Netherlands: ethnic heterogeneity and formal control. From the new found factors, the geographic location and supply and demand are explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivation.

On the intervening variables, results show that the local friendship network variable is only influencing the factor of informal social control. The intervening variable of supervising teenage peer groups is influencing the low socioeconomic status and informal social control. The intervening variable of participation in local voluntary organizations is not recognized in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The results are pictured in figure six till nine. The three factors pictured in the bottom of the schemes are new found factors.




Figure 6: Results preparing phase




Figure 7: Results growing phase




Figure 8: Results fabricating phase




Figure 9: Results sales phase

6. Conclusion

Organized crime in the east of the Netherlands is a social problem. According to this research, it can be concluded that this problem is not only existing in the southern provinces or in the big cities in the west of the Netherlands, but also is present in the eastern regions. Moreover, the size of this social problem is growing. To conclude this research, an answer to the general research question is given. This question is: how can the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands be interpreted in terms of social conditions that stimulate this phenomenon?

To answer this question, it must be viewed to which extent different variables or social conditions that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands are present. These social conditions explain different chronological phases in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation: the preparing phase, the growing phase, the fabricating phase and the selling phase.

Social conditions that explain organized criminal hemp cultivations were found by using the social disorganization theory. Social conditions that were recognized in the east of the Netherlands are: a low socioeconomic status, ethnic heterogeneity, fear of crime, informal social control, formal control, the geographic location, naivety and supply and demand. The factor of high residential instability was not recognized in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, with a high residential instability, the number of organized criminal hemp cultivations in the east of the Netherlands will not grow. The low socioeconomic status, supply and demand and formal control variables explain every phase of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. It can be stated that these factors explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands the most. Thus, when the socioeconomic status of people in the east of the Netherlands is low, the phenomenon of organized criminal hemp cultivation is more present. This applies also to the variables of formal control and supply and demand. The ethnic heterogeneity and the informal control variables both explain three out of four phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. These variables explain this phenomenon to a certain extent. Informal social control mostly explains the first part of the process and does not explain sales of hemp. Thus, when this condition is present, hemp can be grown and fabricated. However, the lack of informal social control does not influence sales of hemp. In the east of the Netherlands, ethnic heterogeneity does not explain the fabricating phase. Fear of crime, naivety and the geographic location all explain organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands to a minimal extent. Both naivety and fear of crime only explain the beginning of the process, because these factors only explain the first two chronological phases. Thus, these variables are important to set up a hemp cultivation and grow hemp. The geographic location of the east of the Netherlands is mostly important in the beginning and at the end of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Thus, this variable influences the set-up of a hemp cultivation and sales of hemp.

Besides the core variables, two out of three intervening variables were recognized: local friendship networks and supervising teenage peer groups. The intervening variable of participation in local voluntary organizations is not recognized. Thus, this variable is not a social condition that explains relations of between the main variables and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The variable of supervising teenage peer groups is recognized as intervening variable in the positive relation between a low socioeconomic status and every phase of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Moreover, this intervening variable is recognized between the relation of informal social control and the preparing, growing and fabricating phase. In

sum, the intervening variable of supervising teenage peer groups is to a large extent important in the relation between the socioeconomic status and informal control variables and organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. The last intervening variable, the local friendship network variable, is recognized in the relation between informal control and the preparing, growing and fabricating phase in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, this intervening variable is to a certain extent an important social condition that stimulates organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands.

Altogether, there are different social conditions recognized in the east of the Netherlands that stimulate the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivations. Organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is mostly present because of a low socioeconomic status, the factor of supply and demand and the lack of formal control. A high ethnic heterogeneity, the geographic location of the eastern Netherlands, fear of crime, the lack of informal social control and naivety among citizens all are important social conditions that explain the presence of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands to a certain extent.

7. Discussion

7.1 Scientific implications

This research contributes to the scientific relevance on crime, because one specific type of organized crime is described and analyzed extensively in one specific setting: organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. More insights on social conditions that explain the existence of organized criminal hemp cultivations are recognized. Results of this study contribute to the theoretical insights of the social disorganization theory from Shaw and Mckay (1942) and Kubrin and Weizer (2003). These authors describe the relation between neighborhood structure, social control, social cohesion, social disorganization and crime. The existence of crime in neighborhoods is explained in terms of social disorganization. In this study, variables of the social disorganization theory are used, but not to explain social disorganization and crime in a neighborhood, but in a whole region: the east of the Netherlands. Furthermore, the concept of crime in this study is specified to organized criminal hemp cultivation, mentioned by Jansen et al. (2012). Factors of the social disorganization theory are used to test different phases in the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. New insights about the existence of the different phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation are developed by studying the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, this study does not agree on the concept of crime adopted by Shaw and Mckay (1942) or Kubrin and Weizer (2003), but it adopts its own concept of crime: organized criminal hemp cultivation, substantiated by Jansen et al. (2012). Organized criminal hemp cultivation is described extensively and as completely as possible, by splitting the concept up into different phases. All the phases are described separately. In the social disorganization theory, concept of crime is limited. In this research, the focus is on one specific concept of crime and this concept is described extensively. Thus, the addition of this research to the current state of art is the combination of social disorganization, organized criminal hemp cultivation and one specific region.

Jansen et al., (2012) mention in their book different phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. In the results of this study on organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands, it becomes clear that all phases of this process are present. Different news articles on this subject and experiences of the different respondents show this. The phase of growing and fabricating hemp is not described in the news articles as detailed as expected, but this does not indicate that these phases are less present in the east of the Netherlands. Because of the information of respondents, it becomes more clear that these phases are actually present.

Different variables within the social disorganization theory are described by using several implications from different authors. The theoretical implication on the SES that is used in this study is the implication from Lobont et al. (2017). This author mentions unemployment and income inequality as an important factor that influences the effect on the SES and in this research, unemployment among farmers or income inequality among 'welfare mothers' are important factors. The assumption of Barnett & Mencken (2002), about the maintenance of social organization within nonmetropolitan communities, despite a low level of socioeconomic resources is agreed upon during this study. Both in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan communities, there is organized criminal hemp cultivation. The general assumption on the influence of the SES on organized criminal hemp cultivation was that it was influencing all the phases of this process and in the results of this study, this assumption is confirmed. However, influence of the selling phase on the SES can be discussed, because the influence of this factor is mostly vice versa: the selling phase is influencing the SES of the criminals. Thus, in this case, the selling phase is the influencing factor on the SES.

The theoretical assumption on the ethnic heterogeneity factor is that it influences the preparing and sales phase, because ethnic minority groups seek to restore their income inequality by performing crimes (Blau & Blau, 1982). Results confirm this, but also the growing phase is influenced by this factor. It turned out that members of ethnic heterogeneity minorities also rent out their houses or rooms to criminals and here, hemp cultivations are set up. It turned out that a high residential instability is not a factor that stimulates organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. In the social disorganization theory, it is an important factor to explain the remaining of crime and it was expected that this factor influences the grow and sales phase of the process. However, during the empirical research, it turned out that this factor was not present in the east of the Netherlands. It can be possible that this factor is present, but respondents did not mention this factor is present. Only one respondent mentions some implications that can indicate the relation between residential instability and organized criminal hemp cultivation. However it is not mentioned explicitly.

The factor of informal social control was expected to influence every phase of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. However results show that the phase of sales in the east of the Netherlands is not influenced by this factor. It still can be possible that the phase of sales is influenced by this factor, but there is no evidence found. For example, at places with high informal social control, criminals do not sell hemp. Criminals like to operate secretly and anonymous. Thus, it can be possible that at places in the east of the Netherlands without informal control, hemp is sold. One theoretical insight on the factor of social control is that it can be added to the intervening variables developed by Sampson & Weizer (2003). However, in this research, this factor is not seen as an intervening factor, but as an individual factor that directly influences the phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, the factor of informal social control is expanded from an intervening variable to an individual influencing variable.

The study of Markowitz et al. (2001) on fear of crime is agreed on during this research and finally is extended. Crime cause crime hypothesis from Bellair (2002), where street crime increases fear that will lead to an avoidance of the streets by the public and will lead to more crime is not found specifically during this research. However, the feedback loop of fear mentioned by Woldoff (2006) is recognized in the east of the Netherlands: citizens who are working with criminals are afraid of them and because of this fear, criminals have power over these citizens. Citizens remain silent and not report crimes to the police. Here, organized crime continues. The theoretical implication on fear and the avoidance of streets in neighborhoods is not recognized in the east of the Netherlands. In this case, it is mostly about fear of individuals who are caught up in the web of organized crime and not about fear of criminals who are terrorizing whole neighborhoods. In cities and villages in other parts of the Netherlands there are criminal groups who run whole neighborhoods, so it can be possible that this implication on fear of crime is present in there. However, in the east of the Netherlands these types of neighborhoods are not mentioned by the respondents. Only an article about a police action in a city mentions a high density of crime in one neighborhood.

Sampson and Groves (1989) developed three intervening variables to intervene between the exogenous variables. In this research, the intervening variables are not only added before or after the exogenous variables of the social disorganization theory. These variables are also added to the fear and control variables. Sampson and Groves (1989) did not mention the informal social control as a separate variable, so the theoretical assumption on the three intervening variables, informal social

control and the phases in organized criminal hemp cultivation were based on implications. In this study, it is shown that intervening variables 'supervising teenage peer groups' and 'local friendship networks' are intervening in the relation before and between informal social and organized criminal hemp cultivations. The expectation that the factor 'participation in organizations' was intervening between informal social control and organized criminal hemp cultivation is not confirmed by the empirical results. In the empirical part of this study, the intervening variable 'local friendship networks' is not recognized as an intervening variable between the factor 'high residential instability' and the factor 'ethnic heterogeneity'. If residential instability was recognized in the east of the Netherlands, it could be possible that the intervening variable was present also. Hence, if a high residential instability is present, weak social ties are present. Weak social ties are more or less equal to friendship networks. At last, the intervening variable 'supervising teenage peer groups' was expected in the relation between formal control and the phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation. However, no relation to organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is shown. This can be explained by the indication that mostly parents supervise their teenagers, instead of formal authorities.

7.2 Practical implications and recommendations

This research can contribute to finding a solution in the combat against organized crime. Several implications for policy makers and police agencies can be made, in solving this problem.

First, police agencies have to focus on outlying areas in combating organized crime. In these areas, there is less social control. Together with the factor of farmers operating in outlying areas, these areas are vulnerable to criminal influences. Moreover, there is naivety among the citizens. Police agencies and municipalities should bring companies, organizations and residents who are operating and living in outlying areas together and make them aware of the problem of organized crime. If all different partners are aware of the problem, more can be seen and reported to the police. If more suspicious behavior is reported, police organizations has some starting points in controlling outlying areas.

Secondly, policy makers should focus on raising punishments on organized crime. Currently, punishments are relatively low. The national government should adopt laws and policies, where clear, higher punishments are described. If punishments are high, it is possible that criminals and facilitators are more afraid to be caught and consider multiple times about their criminal act before they execute it. Moreover, benefits do not equivoise financial profits anymore.

Thirdly, border controls in the east of the Netherlands can be reintroduced partly, to solve the problem of drug trade to Germany. Moreover, it can partly solve the problem of the grow shops that are settled just beyond the border. The police can introduce multiple big controls during the year, to scare criminals who trade in drugs. Also, during controls, cars can be searched and batches of drugs and gear for drug production can be found. Controls can frustrate the criminals in their work.

Lastly, the Dutch police should focus on recruiting more personal. From the results, it becomes clear that the police is aware of the problem of organized crime and organized criminal hemp cultivation, but there are not enough police officers to beat this problem. More police officers can be recruited by promoting education to become a police officer, focusing on recruiting people from other disciplines and paying more salary.

7.3 Limitations and recommendations for further research

This research knows several limitations and some of these limitations can result in recommendations for further research.

A first limitation is that the empirical results not focus on all the phases of organized criminal hemp cultivation. Mainly, focus in the results is on the four core phases of this process: preparing, growing, fabricating and sales. Also, the focus is on facilitating, because the term of facilitators was mentioned often by the respondents and facilitators are an important link in the whole process of organized criminal hemp cultivation. The phase of storage and transport is not mentioned specifically by respondents, so it is not mentioned in the results chapter. In future research, focus can be on this phase and a more clear image of these phases can be created. The phase of money laundering is mentioned by respondents and in the results chapter. However, there is no link made between this phase and factors that influence organized criminal hemp cultivation. Future research can focus on the phenomenon of money laundering in organized criminal hemp cultivation, because much can be told and investigated around this subject. For example, research can focus on factors that influence money laundering.

Another limitation in this research is the operating area of different respondents. Four out of six of the respondents are operating in one specific area in the east of the Netherlands. Two of them are operating in an overarching position, so these respondents do not know details of specific areas in the east of the Netherlands. Thus, coverage of the whole region is not fully guaranteed. The east of the Netherlands is a big region, with different municipalities and cities. Organized crime can differ in every city and municipality. Another limitation concerning respondents is that only respondents from official authorities are interviewed. To get a clear image of organized crime in specific neighborhoods, residents can be questioned also. Moreover, to get a total image of organized crime, stories of criminals can be taken into account. This story can be collected by, for example, interviewing public prosecutors.

The last limitation of this research is a lack of focus on societal consequences of organized crime. In the theoretical chapter, a small part is about organized criminal hemp cultivation and the consequences of it to society. Because the main focus in this research is on social conditions that stimulate organized criminal hemp cultivation, consequences to society of this type of crime are more or less ignored. A recommendation to future researchers is that focus can be made on consequences to society, because there are many far-reaching consequences to be recognized.

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Appendix A: Interview guides

Different interview guides are used. The first interview guide is used at the first and third and interview. The second interview guide is used at the sixth interview and the third interview guide is used at the second, fourth and fifth interview. Only in the first interview guide the formalities are presented. These formalities were left out in the other two interview guides.

First interview guide

Introduction

- Thank you for being present
 - Introduction about the subject
 - Asking for permission to record the conversation
1. Can you tell me what the common goal of this organization is?
 2. Can you tell me what your function within this organization is?
 3. Can you tell me how you get in touch with organized criminal hemp cultivation? From your own experiences as an authority?
 4. Can you tell me what the goal of this organization is, concerning the fight against organized criminal hemp cultivation?

Organized criminal hemp cultivation

5. Can you tell me, from your experiences, something about locations where organized criminal hemp cultivation takes place?
6. Can you tell me what the consequences of organized criminal hemp cultivation are for society?

Offenders

7. To what extent do you have knowledge about criminal organizations, concerning organized criminal hemp cultivation?
 - a. Where are they from?
 - b. Are they only performing hemp crimes, or also other crimes?
 - c. What is the structure of the organizations?
 - d. How many members does these organizations usually have?
 - e. Are there multiple organizations?
 - f. If yes, are these organizations cooperating?
8. Can you tell me something about the way of operating of these criminal organizations?
 - a. Who are they reaching to?
 - b. How are these people reached?
 - c. To what extent are they operating anonymously?
9. According to your experiences,, is there a difference between criminal organizations operating in rural or city areas?

Factors

10. What is your experience on the types of owners of premises who rent out their buildings to criminals?

11. Can you describe what convinces this owners to rent out their premises or barns and let it used by criminals to set up a hemp cultivation?
12. Can you mention some examples of locations where more than often hemp cultivations were discovered?
 - a. What is, from your experience, an explanation of this?
 - i. Financial, moral, ethnic, mobility?
13. Is there a relative difference in the number of discovered hemp cultivations in cities or small villages? If yes, can you explain this?
 - a. Are there some notable exceptions? Can you explain this?
 - b. Within cities or villages, is there a difference between neighborhoods?
 - c. Is there a difference in the outlying area and the densely populated area?
14. To what extent do you have, from your experience as authority, have knowledge about trade around hemp?
 - a. What are the hot-spots?
 - b. Why at these places?
15. To what extent do you have knowledge about money laundering around organized criminal hemp cultivation?
 - a. If yes, do you have knowledge about the methods of money laundering?
16. What are, to your opinion and experiences, more factors that influence the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?

End

- Do you have any additions?
- Do I miss any information to this subject, in your opinion?
- Thank you for the attention.
- I will send you the results, if the thesis is finished.

Second interview guide

This interview guide is used during the interview with the police officer.

Introduction

- Thank you for being present
 - Introduction about the subject
 - Asking for permission to record the conversation
1. Can you tell me what your function at the police is?
 - a. Which functions did you exercise in the past?

Organized criminal hemp cultivations

2. Can you tell me what the goal of the police is in the case of organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?
3. What is the goal of the police in the east of the Netherlands during the investigation around organized criminal hemp cultivations?
 - a. And what is the goal during the handling of the offenders?

4. Can you tell me from your experience as a police officer, in what cases you had to deal with organized criminal hemp cultivations?
 - a. Can you mention examples of your experiences?
5. Can you tell me what the goal of the police in the east of the Netherlands is, concerning organized criminal hemp cultivation?

Factors

6. From your experiences, what can you tell about locations where hemp cultivations are found?
 - a. At what locations?
 - b. Specific locations?
 - c. Why these locations?
 - d. Are there any outstanding locations?
 - i. If yes, what is the explanation?
7. Are there any neighborhoods where more than an average number of hemp cultivations are found?
 - a. If yes, what is the explanation?
8. Is there any difference in the number of discovered hemp cultivations in rural areas or in cities?
 - a. If yes, what is the explanation?
9. If a hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands is discovered, what kind of premises are this? Rental, business, owner-occupied houses, barns?
 - a. What is the explanation, why these locations?
10. If it is about rental houses, are the owners of these houses aware that a hemp cultivation is set up in their houses?
 - a. Or are they otherwise not aware of this?

Offenders

11. To what extent do you have knowledge about criminal organizations, concerning organized criminal hemp cultivation?
 - a. Where are they from?
 - b. Are they only performing hemp crimes, or also other crimes?
 - c. What is the structure of the organizations?
 - d. How many members does these organizations usually have?
 - e. Are there multiple organizations?
 - f. If yes, are these organizations cooperating?
12. Can you tell me something about the way of operating of these criminal organizations?
 - a. Who are they reaching to?
 - b. How are these people reached?
 - c. To what extent are they operating anonymously?
13. To continue on this, what types of persons are the caught or arrested offenders?

Trade/dealing of hemp

14. From your experiences as an authority, what is your knowledge about the trade and dealing around hemp?
 - a. At what locations does this take place?
 - b. What is your explanation that this trade or deals take place at these locations?
15. From your experiences as a beat officer in the city of Enschede, could you tell something about the hemp dealing/drug dealing during nightlife in this city?
16. If it turns out that this takes place, what is, according to your knowledge about this subject, the explanation that this dealing can survive?

End

17. What are, to your opinion and experiences, more factors that influence the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?
 - Do you have any additions?
 - Do I miss any information to this subject, in your opinion?
 - Thank you for the attention.
 - I will send you the results, if the thesis is finished.

Third interview guide

This interview guide is used by the interviews with the respondents from the municipalities.

Introduction

- Thank you for being present
 - Introduction about the subject
 - Asking for permission to record the conversation
1. Can you tell me what your function within this municipality is?
 2. Can you tell me how you get in touch with organized criminal hemp cultivation? From your own experiences as an authority?
 3. Can you tell me what the goal of the municipality is, concerning the fight against organized criminal hemp cultivation?

Organized criminal hemp cultivation

4. From your knowledge or experiences, what can you tell about locations where hemp cultivations are found?
 - a. At what locations?
 - b. Specific locations?
 - c. Why these locations?
 - d. Are there any outstanding locations?
 - i. If yes, what is the explanation?
5. Can you tell me what the consequences of organized criminal hemp cultivation are for the society?

Offenders

6. To what extent do you have knowledge about criminal organizations, concerning organized criminal hemp cultivation?
 - a. Where are they from?
 - b. Are they only performing hemp crimes, or also other crimes?
 - c. What is the structure of the organizations?
 - d. How many members does these organizations usually have?
 - e. Are there multiple organizations?
 - f. If yes, are these organizations cooperating?
7. Can you tell me something about the way of operating of these criminal organizations?
 - g. Who are they reaching to?
 - h. How are these people reached?
 - i. To what extent are they operating anonymously?
8. According to your experiences,, is there a difference between criminal organizations operating in rural or city areas?

Factors

9. Can you tell me something about organized criminal hemp cultivations that are discovered in the outlying areas? At which locations?
 - a. How are these cultivations set up?
 - b. What is the explanation that these cultivations are set up et these specific locations?
10. I understood that hemp cultivations are also discovered in small villages. Can you tell something about this?
 - c. How are these cultivations set up?
 - d. What is the explanation that these cultivations are set up et these specific locations?
11. Is there a relative difference in the number of discovered hemp cultivations in cities or small villages? If yes, can you explain this?
 - e. Are there some notable exceptions? Can you explain this?
 - f. Within cities or villages, is there a difference between neighborhoods?
 - g. Is there a difference in the outlaying area and the densely populated area?
12. Can you explain, from your own experiences, why in less hemp cultivations are discovered in your municipality than in municipalities of big cities?
13. To what extent do you have, from your experience as authority, have knowledge about trade around hemp?
 - h. What are the hot-spots?
 - i. Why at these places?
14. To what extent do you have knowledge about money laundering around organized criminal hemp cultivation?
 - j. If yes, do you have knowledge about the methods of money laundering?
15. What are, from your experiences, more factors that influence the organized criminal hemp cultivation in the east of the Netherlands?

End

- Do you have any additions?
- Do I miss any information to this subject, in your opinion?
- Thank you for the attention.
- I will send you the results, if the thesis is finished.

Appendix B: Overview retrieved news articles

Title	Source	Date published	Date retrieved
'Erin geluid' door criminelen op 't Lochter	Tubantia	April 17, 2019	May 9, 2019
Landhuis te goeder trouw verhuurd, maar drugsbende sloopt compleet interieur	RTV Oost	May 8, 2019	May 14, 2019
Het zit diep op het plein	Tubantia	October 30, 2015	May 9, 2019
'Ook in Twente is het topje van de ijsberg in mensenhandel zichtbaar'	Tubantia	February 9, 2019	May 14, 2019
Eis: jarenlange celstraf voor faillissementsfraude in Twente	Tubantia	April 5, 2019	May 14, 2019
Onafhankelijk onderzoek naar actie bij FC Twente – PSV.	Tubantia	May 3, 2017	May 9, 2019
Zeven aanhoudingen bij invallen FIOD in Twente	Tubantia	February 1, 2019	May 11, 2019
5 Signalen van criminaliteit die hebben geleid tot sluiten vak-P	Tubantia	April 21, 2017	May 9, 2019
Twente maakt vuist tegen ondermijnende misdaad	Tubantia	March 26, 2019	May 9, 2019
Turkse drugsbende opgerold in Twente	Tubantia	June 29, 2017	May 9, 2019
Grote politieactie Almelo: 13 arrestaties rond georganiseerde drugsbende	Tubantia	September 4, 2018	May 9, 2019
Twentse 'godfather' Simo D. is "door en door verrot".	RTV Oost	April 19, 2019	May 14, 2019
Twents offensief om zorgfraude hard aan te pakken	RTV Oost	July 6, 2018	May 14, 2019

Arrestatie en twee auto's in beslag genomen bij onderzoek hennepteelt in Enschede.	RTV Oost	May 7, 2019	May 9, 2019
'Mogen we uw bedrijfshal huren?'	Tubantia	November 24, 2018	May 9, 2019
Vuist tegen dwang tot prostitutie in Twente	Tubantia	March 25, 2014	May 9, 2019
Gemeente waarschuwt horeca voor motorclubs.	Tubantia	February 9, 2017	May 12, 2019
Hoe mengt onderwereld zich in Tubbergse bovenwereld	Tubantia	April 23, 2019	May 9, 2019

Appendix C: Respondents

Respondent	Function	Date
R1	Manager crime prevention organization	Interviewed on July 11 th
R2	Safety officer at a small village municipality	Interviewed on July 15 th
R3	Safety officer at a city municipality and at the a public safety organization	Interviewed on August 20 th
R4	Safety officer at a city municipality	Interviewed on August 28 th
R5	Hemp coordinator	Interviewed on September 19 th
R6	Local beat-officers of a big city	Interviewed on September 23 rd

Appendix D: Code scheme

In this scheme, the different codes are published. First, the open codes were created by reading the transcriptions. These codes are words or small phrases. After the open coding, the open codes were put in different axial codes. A general axial code was created and more open codes could be put in this axial code. Most of the axial codes are inspired by an open code. Moreover, the axial codes are inspired by the theoretical concepts, mentioned in the theoretical chapter. Some open codes could be put in more than one axial code, because there was some overlap. The left column shows the theoretical concept the code was inspired on. Some axial codes were found during the interview, so these codes were not inspired by a theoretical concept, so 'none' is written down here.

Theoretical concept	Axial code	Open Codes
Fear	Fear	Fear, threatening, intimidation, not speaking, stuck in the criminal world
Socioeconomic status	Farming sector	Farming sector, farmer, empty barns
Supervision	Business parks	Business parks
Social control, residential instability, socioeconomic status	Inhabited areas	Inhabited areas, densely populated, villages, flats, city
Supervision	Outlying areas	Outlying areas, empty barns
Formal control, informal social control	Control	Control, social control, supervision
Organized criminal hemp cultivation	Offenders	Number of offenders, anonymity, foreign organizations, cluster organizations, big guys, low fruit, under the radar, organizations and other offences, risk calculating offenders, cooperating criminal organizations, structure of criminal organizations, stuck in criminal world
Phases of the process of organized criminal hemp cultivation	Facilitator	Facilitator, cutters, unconsciously
Socioeconomic status	Financial	Poverty, hemp turn over eastern Netherlands, financial, in need of money, turn over, benefit, much money earned
None	Border region	foreign dealers, export, geographic, border region, foreign trade
Supervision	Trade	Domestic trade, bride fashion shops, foreign dealers, coffeeshops, dealing from cars, dealing from houses, deal spot, foreign trade, street

		dealers, smartshops, demand and supply, Wilmink square
Organized criminal hemp cultivation	Cultivations	Found, inside cultivation, box-in-box, outside cultivation, growshops, materials, mother plant, professionals, rooms for cultivation, cuttings, operation, dismantling a cultivation
Ethnic heterogeneity	Vulnerable people	Asylum seeker, youth, vulnerable people
None	Societal acceptance	Tolerance policy, societal acceptance, political responsibility
Consequences	Societal effects	Consequence to fire, violence, trade within companies, costs for the society, unfairness, disruption society, shallow consequences, killing the society, debts, payments, flooding
Residential instability, supervision	Willingness to report	Closed culture, willingness to report
None	Naivety	Naivety, ignorance
Consequences	Undermining	Undermining
Supervision	Government	Regulation as an instrument, political responsibility, trust in the government, toleration policy, low punishments,
Supervision	Police effort	Staff shortage, police effort
Supervision	Prevention	Awareness, business model, frustration model, Quality mark safe outlying area
Socioeconomic status	Social	Welfare mother, low social class, less social neighborhoods, not motivated to operate in the normal circuit, social cohesion, social pressure, social housing, social problems
Money laundering	Money laundering	Bride shops, foreign offenders, investing in cars, investing abroad, investing in the catering industry, investing in sports, investing in real estate, shady constructions, beauty shops, phone stores, money laundering, money laundering companies
Residential instability	House	Cheap rental, rental houses, owner-occupied houses, house, private rental