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Analysing countermeasures against fault injection attacks on FPGA based cryptographic implementations

Haarman, T.R. (2020) Analysing countermeasures against fault injection attacks on FPGA based cryptographic implementations.

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Abstract:Nowadays, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are used for a very diverse range of applications, many of which are security-critical. As is often the case with security-critical systems, there are adversaries that develop ways to acquire the protected information from the system. And while the adversaries come up with increasingly advanced methods for succeeding in this, the countermeasures that are developed against them have to match or stay ahead of those attacks. On hardware, it’s possible for an adversary to perform a Fault Injection Attack (FIA) which could present faulty cipher texts at the output. With these faulty cipher texts, it’s possible to decrypt the original key by executing a Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). In this work, the aim is to analyse a state of the art countermeasure that combines protection against both fault injection and side channel attacks. First, methods to perform a successful FIA on the countermeasure are examined in a software implementation of an encryption algorithm protected with ParTi. When a method is developed, a modified version of the EDA toolkit DAVOS is used to perform multiple schemed FIAs on the hardware implementation. It is presented how the secret key can be extracted, and the rate of successful fault injections is determined.
Item Type:Essay (Bachelor)
Faculty:EEMCS: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
Subject:53 electrotechnology, 54 computer science
Programme:Electrical Engineering BSc (56953)
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/essays/81592
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