



BACHELOR THESIS

# **Blame Avoidance, Belief Systems, and Institutional Design:**

Explaining why German Federal Ministries fail to adopt  
policy changes to address the climate crisis

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## **Abstract**

In 2019, the Federal government of Germany adopted its so far most comprehensive but still highly controversial “Climate Package” in order to present its answer to climate change. The package encloses regulations, incentives as well as emission targets while it is criticized for being too late, imprecise and insufficient. Hence, this thesis ought to outline the role of administration in policymaking and aims to answer the question of *why responsible Federal Ministries in Germany resist important policy changes, such as crucial commitments regarding the climate crisis*. Research on this matter is important as we are heading straight towards a climate emergency with unclear consequences making the topic highly relevant and urgent.

Therefore, an explorative single case study design with qualitative content analysis was conducted while examining interviews and additional statements of the responsible Federal Ministries in Germany. Whereas previous research focuses on economic motivated factors, this thesis proposes alternative explanations including the role of bureaucrats when it comes to policy failure. The evidence reveals a belief system-based refusal to coordinate which is made possible because of the institutional design’s inadequacy while political actors use the resulting leeway to exercise blame avoidance. Thus, I propose corresponding structural reforms concerning institutional arrangements.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
BKAmt	Federal Chancellery
BMEL	Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture
BMF	Federal Ministry of Finance
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community
BMU	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
BMVi	Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
BMWi	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
UBA	Federal Environment Agency

## 1. Introduction

We are heading straight towards a climate crisis with unclear outcomes (Steffen et al. 2018). When it comes to climate change, humans have already left the safe area of action which poses an increased risk of intolerable ecological, economic, and social consequences (BMU 2020b). Against this backdrop, the current political approach is not yet able to counteract urgent challenges. Neo-liberal economic systems harm the natural foundations of life and undermine future generations' well-being as the resource consumption and profit maximization are increasing steadily. Extensive deforestation, factory farming, overuse of non-renewable raw materials, or similar human interventions in ecosystems represent striking examples of these actions (UBA 2019). Moreover, climate change exacerbates growing global inequality: Resource-rich nations make a substantial contribution to the advancing climate crisis as 20 percent of the world's population exhaust 80 percent of the resources without taking the appropriate responsibility (BUND 2020) while more impoverished countries, in particular, are the first to feel the impacts contributing to social conflict (UBA 2018).

All this could lead the Earth to enter a new geological epoch: the 'Anthropocene.' Leaving the stable state of the 'Holocene' might jeopardize sustainable development if the foundations of a healthy ecosystem are lacking (BMU 2020b). As can be seen in the 'Burning Embers' diagram (A. 1), even with a warming of 2 degrees compared to the pre-industrial level - which was set as the upper limit by international climate policy - there are risks in terms of ecosystems, extreme weather changes and an increase in unfair distribution. Therefore, such agreements are criticized as being insufficient, so that many experts are pushing for compliance with the 1.5-degree target (UNFCCC 2020) – since in structures as complex as the climate system, the unpredictability of global warming's consequences increases as the natural state moves away when e.g., reaching tipping points (Klimafakten 2020).

Many necessary actions are already known but still have not been realized yet. Hence, scientists claim that we are not facing a problem of knowledge, but rather one of implementation (Puppim de Oliveira 2009). This implementation gap is the focus of this present work.

In 2019, the Federal government of Germany adopted its so far most comprehensive but still highly controversial "Climate Package" in order to present its answer to climate change. Despite overwhelming agreement in the scientific community that we are in the midst of a climate crisis, and even though several effective mechanisms have already been developed, Germany's climate policy still falls short of expectations (Stiftung 2° 2019), subjecting it to great criticism. In this respect, Germany's (in)actions can be considered policy failure. This raises the question of **"why do responsible Federal Ministries in Germany resist important**

**policy changes, such as crucial commitments regarding the climate crisis?”** Further issues to be addressed include whether the Federal Ministry of the Environment is solely responsible for the reluctance, and if not, whether blame avoidance can explain this implementation gap. To what extent do the conflicting beliefs among the Ministries affect the coordination and influence policy success? What role does the institutional design play for adoption?

Answering these questions is important as they deal with a highly relevant and timely topic. If the 1.5-degree target is not met, irreparable damage, and chain reactions in the ecosystem cannot be excluded. We have an increasingly smaller ‘budget’ of emissions that we might consume and, thus, cannot wait any longer with a radical change to existing patterns of production and consumption. Moreover, insight into the resistance of public administration to instituting crucial changes needs to be better understood in order to fill this research gap.

The literature on policy design as well as failure and decision-making examines how choices by high-level decisionmakers shape policy outcomes. In it, politicians’ failure to make and meet their climate commitments has been attributed to political motivations and economic power structures. To begin, **blame avoidance** theory suggests that politicians and bureaucrats prefer to avoid blame for unpopular decisions over gaining credit for their performance or maximizing net social welfare. More specifically, politicians who are interested in reelection try to avoid voters’ “negativity bias”. Thus, they adjust their behavior accordingly using strategies that influence policymaking. Such situations often occur with negative-sum games and make sensitive policies more challenging to implement (Weaver 1986). In other words, policymakers tend to be risk-averse (Hood 2002) which leads them to deny problems or downplay situations with uncertain outcomes such as climate change. Doing nothing while maintaining the status quo is thus preferred over political choices that might be subject to criticism (Hood 2002).

Moreover, policymakers avoid not only decisions hurtful for their voters but also those that lobby agencies could perceive negatively. In Germany, the Coal Lobby has long been very powerful and influential as well as supported by conservative governments. Several communities rely on the coal industry which is still seen as a domestic energy source employing over 120 000 workers. This complicates the “Energiewende”. Instead of profound changes to current production patterns, the coal phase-out resulted in political paradoxes and discrepancies (Renn & Marshall 2016).

Further Barriers may include political transformation processes that can be observed regarding the party landscape in Germany which is, among other things, a result of the AfD’s entry into the Bundestag, the break-in of the ‘Volksparteien’ as well as the upward trend of ‘Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen’. The role of individual people or special circumstances concerning

political instability might be considered as well. Both the ongoing coalition crisis between the SPD and CDU/CSU as well as constant rumors of new elections might further affect the implementation of climate policies (Börnsen 2019).

However, there are alternative explanations that may fill the gap in current knowledge on how Ministries contribute to policy failure on climate change. More specifically, successful implementation depends not only on political will but also on the **institutional design** and how different **belief systems** shape bureaucratic behavior and coordination. Therefore, we may be able to explain bureaucratic reluctance by identifying the role that Ministries play in politics and policymaking. Therefore, I performed a case study design consisting of a qualitative content analysis of Ministry interviews and further statements by officials. I employ these methods to examine how blame avoidance, belief systems, and institutional design shape bureaucratic behavior and public administration procedures.

## 2. Background

In 2009, several international scientists led by Johan Rockström from the Stockholm Resilience Center published the specialist article ‘A safe operating space for humanity’ in which they formulated ‘planetary boundaries’ for nine central natural systems and processes (BMU 2020b). As shown in A.2, the ozone loss in the stratosphere and the use of freshwater are still in a safe area of action - just like the oceans’ acidification while the limit has almost been reached. Humans have already left this safe scope regarding the land system as well as climate change so that there is an increased risk of severe consequences. This risk is even very high for the biogeochemical floss with phosphorus and nitrogen, as well as genetic diversity, which has an impact on the biosphere integrity since, in these areas, the zone of uncertainty has been greatly exceeded (Stockholm University 2015).

Together with the decline in biodiversity, climate change is of particular importance. According to science, these developments alone could already lead the Earth to reach such a dangerous threshold that it consequently enters the Anthropocene (BMU 2020b) – as these two areas are causing more than 50 percent of all other interacting forces combined. Hence, the destabilization should be viewed with particular caution (PIK 2019) while these findings propose a “two-level hierarchy” with climate change and the biosphere integrity acting as “core planet boundaries” (Steffen et al. 2015).

The climate system is very complex so that continuous changes in the framework conditions can have serious consequences. There are numerous positive feedbacks - processes that reinforce themselves, which can lead to sudden and drastic climate changes, especially in

vulnerable regions. When reaching such ‘tipping points’, the damage usually is irreversible, even if the cause of the problem is fixed. Possible trigger mechanisms in the climate system include the collapse of the Western Antarctica ice sheet or the dehydration of the Amazon rainforest (Klimafakten 2020). Accordingly, changes in different areas of our Earth system can mutually affect each other. Exceeding the planetary boundaries in one area will increase human-made pressure on other processes. However, this also means that measures to improve a planetary resilience will positively affect the additional planetary boundaries (PIK 2019).

### IPCC Reports

In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established due to the importance, complexity, and uncertainties related to climate change. Since then, international scientists review and evaluate the latest scientific knowledge while summarizing their results in regular Assessment and Special Reports. Those concern ecological facts, estimations of future risks and impacts, options regarding adaptation and mitigation including technical, social, cultural, institutional, and economic considerations (UBA 2014). This way, the IPCC offers all relevant actors a scientific foundation for their (political) decisions and, hence, supports them in developing climate policies that effectively tackle anthropogenic changes in the climate system (IPCC 2013). According to the IPCC, the climate warms up primarily as a result of the release of greenhouse gases - in particular CO<sub>2</sub> - generated by human interventions concerning energy production, transport, industry, agriculture, and changes in land use. By the end of this century, all emission scenarios and simulations taken together indicate a temperature increase compared to pre-industrial conditions ranging from 0.9 to 5.4 degrees while such a rise in temperature may only be limited to 0.9 to 2.3 degrees if a very ambitious climate protection policy was adopted. In this context, political governance and coordination in every sector and national governments play a crucial role (IPCC 2014).

### Germany’s Climate Plan

In the long term, Germany aims to become largely greenhouse gas neutral while the ‘Climate Action Plan 2050’ provides corresponding guidelines and determines greenhouse gas reductions compared to 1990 of at least 40 percent by 2020, 55 percent by 2030 and 80 to 95 percent by 2050. Therefore, in 2016, the Federal government of Germany adopted its ‘climate roadmap’ with the participation of business, science, and society including the Federal states as well as municipalities. It is further a result of deliberations between the relevant Federal



Ministries and contains sector goals concerning energy supply, building, transport, industry and economy, agriculture as well as forestry.

In accordance with the Paris Agreement and the 1,5-degree target, Germany's Climate Plan supplies orientation for future strategies and guidelines for monitoring and is followed by a program of measures to ensure compliance with the set climate goals. It promotes developments towards innovation and sustainability, transformation processes as well as reductions in emissions. Hence, decisionmakers aim to provide increased renewable sources, the coal phase-out, new standards for building and housing, alternatives to cars, electromobility, new fertilizer regulations as well as changes in the tax and subsidy system. The climate plan's review and update follow the five-year cycle of regular assessment of the contributions to the Paris Agreement (Bundesregierung 2020).

### German policymaking as policy failure

The current inadequacy of country-level climate policy action can be considered policy failure as governments seem unable to design and implement strategies that meet the set climate targets. I will use McConnell's (2015, p.230) definition of policy failure as the basis for this investigation which states that:

„A policy fails, even if it is successful in some minimal respects, if it does not fundamentally achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent.”

He argues that in such circumstances, failures prevail achievements while the policy presents a political liability and understand it as “art and craft” involving value judgments, ambiguity, and a complex environment (McConnell 2015, p.230).

One example of policy failure on climate change, which is the focus of this study, is Germany. Below, I discuss the German case in more detail.

In 2019 after protests by movements like ‘Fridays for Future’ or ‘Extinction Rebellion,’ the German government adopted its so far most substantial but still highly contentious ‘climate package.’ It includes measures such as regulations, incentives, funding as well as investment programs that aim to reduce Germany's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (BMU 2020a) – which in 2017 amounted 9.73 tons per capita, hence, more than two times of the global average making up 2.21% of the annual share respecting worldwide emissions. In terms of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (90.57bn tons), only Russia, China, and the USA produced more (Ritchie & Roser

2019). Compared to similarly resource-rich G7 states like France or the UK, Germany performs worse in all sectors regarding electricity consumption, oil and especially coal electricity as well as energy use per capita (Factfish 2020). Therefore, it can be assumed that Germany needs to adopt significant policy changes but resists to do so.

Based on the three key elements of McConnell's definition, I will demonstrate below that German climate policy can be interpreted as failure.

To begin, it is stated that "even if it is successful in some minimal respects" (McConnell 2015, p.230) a policy may fail. With the introduction of sector goals and a monitoring framework of carbon pricing, the first steps have been taken in the direction of bolder and more stringent climate policy (Stiftung 2° 2019). Further objectives involve the restructuring of mobility as well as heating systems, renewable energy sources, increased efficiency within the industry, and the organic farming expansions. Germany wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, while its government is the first in the world to establish legally binding targets in terms of annual decreases in greenhouse emissions (BMU 2019a) – which in 2019 decreased by 6.3 percent points (54 million tons) to 805 million tons. However, respecting the problematic building and transport sector, the emissions increased compared to 2018 as Germany is currently one of the bottom lights in Europe respecting investment in rail transport and still heavily relies on fossil fuels (BMU 2020a)

This leads to the next element of McConnell's (2015, p. 230) definition explaining that policy fails "if it does not fundamentally achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve." According to experts, German climate targets will not be accomplished but missed by 168 - 187 million tons in 2030 while it has already emitted 355 million tons CO<sub>2</sub> more than agreed on for the period between 2010 and 2017. Therefore, it will achieve the goal of reducing its emissions by 40 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 at least five years too late (Greenpeace 2019). Among other things, there is no clear long-term GHG reduction target for 2050 and the CO<sub>2</sub> entry price is significantly too low for both means of transports as well as building. In other words, there will be no steering effect in these sectors. Overall, the selective individual measures are not coordinated into a consistent procedure and there are no binding guidelines nor a courageous, systematic realignment of the funding as well as organizational structures. Many indicators neither have a clear objective nor a firm commitment since the government often relies on voluntary action. The commuter allowance is also not reasonable in terms of climate policy since it does not create an incentive for climate-friendly mobility. The Federal government's decision gives little hope that the 65% target with regard to renewable energies will be achieved

as the distance control makes the expansion of onshore wind energy considerably more difficult and impairs investment security in wind power projects (Stiftung 2° 2019).

The third element of policy failure indicates that “opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent” (McConnell 2015, p. 230) which can be recognized clearly in the case of Germany since many criticize the measures taken as too late, imprecise as well as insufficient so that it falls significantly short of expectations. It is argued that too little impetus is being given, especially to initiate a far-reaching rethinking (Stiftung 2° 2019). Hence, there is dissatisfaction and disappointment about the climate package among the media, the population as well as science (and as the analysis will show) among the BMU itself.

Policies can fail on different levels, being either a program, political, or process issue. The most apparent and best-studied field is the program-related failure which may occur when implementation runs against the objectives, if the set targets are not achieved, losses prevail marginal successor for the target groups, valued criteria are not fulfilled, attracting undesired media and overall criticism (McConnell 2015) – all of which apply to the German case. The same is true in respect of political failure being characterized by losses regarding electoral prospects, political benefits, support as well as reputation and compromised direction of government (McConnell 2015) since the coalition of CDU and SPD loses approval while the AFD and “Bündnis/90 die Grünen” win voters (Tagesschau 2019a).

This trend relates to the coalition crisis including constant rumors of new elections, controversies and divergent positions between the parties (Zaremba 2019) being part of process failure which concerns the ability to design favored policy goals and instruments, legitimacy, a functional coalition, and support for the process (McConnell 2015). According to Howlett, those failures may arise within the policy cycle from agenda-setting, over policy formulation, decision-making, implementation and, evaluation concerning human-resources, competences, institutional design, and capacity. Those involve the formulation of unrealistic goals and programs, limits of control and organization, ineffective implementation as well as the lack of resources (Howlett 2012).

Howlett introduces six dimensions of policy failure which shape its variation. Those distinct parameters enclose the extent, duration, visibility, avoidability, intentionality, and intensity. He further argues that in developed states like Germany, policy failures are generally considered “as unintentional in nature” (Howlett 2012, p.544) as they are rather a consequence of political goodwill that turned out wrong than of governments illegitimate or criminal behavior. The second key element which is outlined as standing over the other dimensions is avoidability which serves as a motivation to lower the risk of failing. Extent and duration can be assigned

to the magnitude while intensity and visibility are related to the salience of policy failure which may be either high or low. By this, Howlett determines four different types of accidental as well as avoidable failures (major, focused, diffuse, minor) and defines climate change as a major policy failure as it is rated very high on all dimensions (Howlett 2012). This stresses again the urgent need to take action.

### German Climate Cabinet

A Federal Ministry in Germany is the highest Federal administrative authority assigned to a Minister responsible for a specific area of the state and, therefore, also part of the government. The Ministry represents the interface of political management and the execution of public administration (Schubert & Klein 2018) including the legal framework's preparation (BMU 2019b).

In March 2019, the Federal Government set up the 'Climate Protection' cabinet committee which should ensure that the highest political decision-making level will work together regarding the arrangement as well as implementation towards the achievement of agreed climate targets. According to the Federal Government, such a cabinet will make decisions more directly and, therefore, faster while finding common solutions instead of independently developing measures for the departments.

The Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) operates as the chair while her deputy is Federal Minister of Finance Olaf Scholz (BMF, SPD) and the Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Svenja Schulze (BMU, SPD) functions as the commissioned chairwoman. Further members are the Federal Minister of the Interior, Building and Community, Horst Seehofer (BMI, CSU); Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy, Peter Altmaier (BMW, CDU); Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture, Julia Klöckner (BMEL, CDU); Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Andreas Scheuer (BMVI, CSU); Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery, Helge Braun (BKAm, CDU) as well as the Head of the Federal Government's Press and Information Office, Steffen Seibert (Bundesregierung 2019). Though the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, CSU), headed by Gerd Müller, is not part of the Climate Cabinet, it negotiates internationally with emerging and developing countries on sustainable as well as climate-friendly solutions and, hence, needs to be considered as well.

The Climate Cabinet met four times between April 10 and September 20. At the last meeting, it decided on the climate package which includes a bundle of measures including the

Climate Protection Law, funding programs, new requirements, a monitoring system, a carbon price of 10 euros from 2021 onwards, an increase in the commuter allowance, a reduction in the electricity price and VAT on train tickets as well as further individual provisions concerning the sectors of buildings, transport, agriculture, forestry, industry, energy, and waste management (Bundesregierung 2019).

### Public Opinion on Climate Change

Several studies clearly show that Germans take climate change seriously and expect politicians to be more committed and rethink their priorities, making it a democratic mandate.

According to a survey in the 'DeutschlandTrend' for the ARD magazine, 86 percent of the respondents perceive humans as an influence on the climate (Tagesschau 2019b) while 81 percent also recognize a great need for action (Rueter 2019) and classify climate change as a very serious issue. In this regard, the number of those who identify climate change as the “single most serious problem” has more than doubled compared to 2017 and now amounts 30 percent (European Commission 2019).

Accordingly, a vast majority of citizens call for a fundamental change in climate and environmental protection policies while favoring an accelerated expansion of renewable energies as well as a transformation in transport and agricultural politics (Rueter 2019). In this light, 89 percent of an EU survey agree that governments should set clear targets to increase the share of renewable energies by 2030 (European Commission 2019). According to the latest ‘Environmental Awareness Study’ by the BMU and the UBA, 92 percent of the population welcomes the expansion of solar and wind power and agrees to the exit from nuclear energy (79 percent). In addition, over 80 percent state that they feel that the German government is not committed sufficiently to protecting the climate and preserving the environment. The ‘ARD Germany Trend’ survey shows that only 14 percent of Germans consider the exit date in relation to the coal phase-out to be too early whereas around half rate it as too late (Rueter 2019).

90 percent of the BMU / UBA study declare that they regard the soil pollution as very problematic and 69 percent criticize the high emissions coming from agriculture. In order to achieve the climate goals, over 90 percent of the respondents favor increased controls as well as harsher penalties for environmental laws’ violations, higher environmental requirements, and stricter rules concerning animal husbandry. Hence, 82 percent approve increased taxes and tariffs on environmentally harmful products and encourage more substantial financial support for organic agriculture (Rueter 2019).

85 percent of the Germans believe that climate change cannot be stopped without lifestyle restrictions and are, therefore, willing to contribute to climate protection. According to a Forsa survey, 57 percent of the citizens support a general speed limit on highways and a YouGov questionnaire demonstrates that 74 percent would refrain from short-haul flights while 56 percent would accept car-free city centers (Rueter 2019).

### **3. Theory**

#### Determinants of Policy failure

Policy failure has three different forms related to politics, program, and process (McConnell 2015). Even though most research has focused on policy failure as a program issue since missed targets and objectives are most evident to non-compliance, I argue that climate policies primarily fail in their process. In this regard, bureaucracy seems unable to develop an idea via agenda-setting, formulation, decision-making towards implementation due to blame avoidance, conflicting belief systems, and inappropriate institutional design.

#### Blame Avoidance

In the article “the politics of blame avoidance”, Kent Weaver (1986) illustrates that politicians and bureaucrats are more interested in avoiding blame for unpopular decisions than gaining credit for popular actions or maximizing net social welfare. This motivation is argued to be a consequence of voters’ “negativity bias” which indicates a tendency in elections to make the decision dependent on losses rather than on earnings. He explains his assumptions with results from other studies stating that parties lose more seats in times of regression than they gain back in economic recovery. Besides, he demonstrates that people are more likely to vote if they disagree with a party’s position and program compared to if they are in favor of it. He supports his findings with examples from critical topics such as gun control, drugs or abortion opponents.

Furthermore, Weaver acknowledges that there might be other factors influencing policymaker’s behavior when making decisions such as personal characteristics including risk-aversion, own ideas about what ‘good’ policies represents or preferences for credit-claiming. He also states that multi-party systems and zero-sum games are rather attached to claiming credit whereas two-party systems and negative-sum games tend to be affected by blame-avoidance. Therefore, the perception of costs as well as benefits “to constituency of policy choice” (Weaver 1986, p.378) play important roles while fiscal stress, party decline, and the media constitute additional impacts. Weaver’s blame avoidance theory suggests that, since

there is a great interest in reelection, politicians adjust their behavior accordingly using strategies whereby he establishes eight of them affecting policy outcomes.

In this regard, his analysis shows that blame avoidance leads to significant policy consequences as well as impacts respecting decision-making choices and the reflection of alternatives. Thus, it may shape judgments by reducing discretions in three different ways: When policymakers assess the probability for blame high and at the same time the probability for credit low, they might seek discretion-reduction which Weaver compares to one of the strategies he established being “passing the buck” (p. 393) – meaning delegating the decision to others. He further argues that when wanting to uphold discretion but being pressured to oppose it, this equalizes the strategy of “jump on the bandwagon” (p.393). Moreover, policymakers prefer to reduce discretion in a situation in which they either have to choose between supporting or rejecting beneficial policies (‘stop me before I kill again’, p. 393). Additional strategies include agenda limitation by not taking decisions concerning sensitive topics into account, reshaping the issue, using financial resources to uphold the status quo, finding a scapegoat and, thus blaming other actors, diffusing losses in order to keep the personal impact as small as possible or supporting popular alternatives that influence policymaking.

Blame avoidance also helps to understand interest group dynamics, the limitation of claiming credit for agreements, and the reluctance in terms of policy changes due to the asymmetry between the perception of costs on the one side and benefits on the other side. Hence, information might be biased and lack full transparency while politicians tend to be vague in their expressions. Besides, governments might be skeptical of ‘maximizing net social welfare’ (Weaver 1986, p.395) as this includes the danger of losses for particular interests which, in turn, might trigger blame. In this respect, Hood (2002) characterizes politicians as risk-averse and further introduces three basic approaches to handle blame being either presentational - also ‘impression management’ – policy or agency strategies. This way, decisionmakers may select specific arguments, policy perspectives, and institutional provisions that facilitate their position to reduce or avoid blame.

Howlett (2012, p. 395) connects policy failure to blame avoidance and accordingly designs a general “two-stage model of decision-making” determining which forms of a dilemma as well as conditions facilitate policy innovations and which do not. He further applies this model addressing political (in)actions considering blame-avoidance to climate politics and, thus, performs diagnostic research to better understand and explain the phenomena of frequent negativity and rareness respecting innovative policies. Howlett also assumes the impact of ‘negativity bias’, resulting in minimizing responsibility as well as blame in terms of failure and,

hence, maintaining the status-quo by avoiding action. He uses existing studies to show that innovations are rather rare and defines them as “changes to existing policy practices (...) which often result in new outcomes” (Howlett 2014, p.396) while he takes additional influential factors into account (governing resources, positive or negative changes, adaption or mitigation, cognitive limitations, contesting interests, structural considerations, or lobbying).

Howlett characterizes innovations as risky and uses the theory of the six policy failure dimensions enclosing extent, duration, visibility, avoidability, intensity, and intentionality (outlined in the section above) to demonstrate that events with greater visibility and scope demand further action involving innovations by the government. At the same time, this applies to issues with great perceived avoidability, and intensity. Developing the two-stage model, he examines the extent to which a problem is severe (visibility, scope) and subsequently, to what extent blame is avoidable (intensity, intentionality) while applying it to climate change.

Howlett’s model points out that the current inadequacy of climate policy is a result of blame avoidance as governments fail to design and implement innovative strategies that generate “positive new substantive efforts” (Howlett 2012, p. 401). He argues that climate change – when being framed accordingly - rates low both on visibility as well as on intentionality, making it possible for governments interested in avoiding blame to follow strategies regarding problem denial as well as downplaying while emphasizing its unavailability and uncertain predictions. These represent a negative process orientation including de-composition or attacking the authenticity, trustworthiness, or legitimacy of those who demand a more ambitious as well as courageous approach. In this regard, inaction, reluctance concerning profound transformations are preferred and, if necessary, due to extensive or visible challenges, minimal adjustments or symbolic responses are enacted. Since the responsibility respecting the climate crisis’ adverse consequences, in general, are not associated with governments, those have leeway in terms of their reaction. This may be limited having few, no, or negative impacts as policymakers are often constrained due to their short-term horizons and incrementalism. Hence, by establishing a comprehensive picture of the “micro-behavioral roots” (Howlett 2014, p.401) in terms of decision-making within the public policy field involving blame-avoiding strategies, the theory helps to better understand political framing of climate change and the tendency to rarity of corresponding innovations.

Therefore, I expect to detect such behaviors commonly associated with blame avoidance when analyzing statements by Ministries in charge of German climate politics. Climate change and its possible consequences represent an area of uncertainty and insecurity, which creates leeway regarding how to tackle this issue that the actors will try to take advantage of. Since



decisionmakers tend to be risk-averse inaction and, hence, maintaining the status quo is often preferred over political choices that could generate criticism which complicates far-reaching transformation processes. Hence, this thesis' first Proposition is that Ministers are motivated by blame avoidance (Proposition 1).

### Belief Systems & ACF

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) outlines that belief systems are decisive when it comes to the dynamics concerning policy learning as well as policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). According to this theory, beliefs are organized within a certain hierarchy ranging from 'secondary beliefs' over 'policy beliefs' to 'deep core beliefs' that affect the stability, composition, interactions, discussions, and strategies of coalitions.

To start with, 'deep core beliefs' represent general principles enclosing normative ideas, fundamental worldviews, and perceptions that form personal opinions regarding primary values, moral concepts, and institutional, social, cultural, and governance preferences. Thus, such beliefs determine – among other things - individual's judgments concerning what justice or equality entail and can be applied to all policy areas while they are extremely withstanding to change (Jenkin-Smith et al. 2014).

In this respect, 'policy core beliefs' are less universal and constitute attitudes towards basic approaches, strategies as well as procedures in order to realize the deep core ideas. Besides, they are applicable to all policy areas and function as the decisive factor regarding whether actors recognize an issue as a problem or a public concern that needs to be addressed. Policy core beliefs further define how decisionmakers perceive the issue's necessity and the possibility of being solved and affect corresponding preferences concerning political measures as well as instruments. They influence an individual's choices and positions respecting policy goals, welfare distributions, target groups, balances of power, structures, and their alignment in case of policy conflicts. Hence, policy core beliefs determine e.g., whether political actors support economic growth or climate protection (Jenkin-Smith et al. 2014). In this regard, conservative parties or politicians wish to preserve the existing order while favoring traditions and promoting values like security, identity as well as continuity. In Germany, the Union of CDU and CSU further sustains liberal economic attitudes towards solidarity and freedom by rejecting restrictions and prohibitions - whereas more progressive parties like the SPD pursue a transformation of established orders regarding social dependencies, power relationships, or capitalism (Schubert & Klein 2018). Policy core beliefs are more likely to change than deep core beliefs but still resistant to it (Jenkin-Smith et al. 2014).

The ACF identifies ‘secondary beliefs’ as most concrete as well as sensitive to alteration or shift. They describe preferred means, resources, facts, ideas as well as information needed for the implementation of policy core beliefs. Thus, secondary beliefs concern the judgments of the suitability, reasonability, and efficiency of political instruments. In this sense, some politicians might favor specific climate actions whereas others have doubts about the success (Jenkin-Smith et al. 2014).

The theory argues that actors who share belief systems and corresponding priorities join forces by forming advocate coalitions. In this context, individuals want to enforce their beliefs and, hence, adapt their behavior, actions as well as strategies to this goal. Incompatible belief systems with other coalitions create dynamics that shape their coordination and cooperation which – in turn – influences policymaking as well as policy change. Regarding climate change, belief systems determine its problem extent and its relevance to the coalitions and, thus, affect the choice of necessary measures in order to address it. Some may assess global warming not as anthropogenic and, therefore, propose no action at all. Others might prefer voluntary instruments as well as incentives while certain actors take the climate crises with its consequences very seriously and, thus, advocate regulations and strict targets. When evaluating new information, individual biases and motivations play an essential role respecting whether those facts fit in the personal philosophy or are rejected. Actors can change their beliefs due to influencing events including new experiences or knowledge that collide with the worldview and making it not tenable anymore (Jenkin-Smith et al. 2014).

Thus, I expect to find different views among the Ministries regarding how to deal with climate change in Germany which I further assume to be reflected in the distinct priorities of the individual actors. In this context, I suppose that the Union-led departments show a rather conservative viewpoint including the preference for incremental steps and a refusal of regulative interventions whereas I expect the BMU under the SPD to be more progressive as well as ambitious. I propose that failure to align belief systems influences the dynamics of those coalitions including their overall interactions, discussions, strategies, and hence, their ability to conclude agreements regarding policy change. This, in turn, might impede the decision-making process of new policies. Therefore, the second Proposition is that the belief systems are important for shaping policy perspectives among the Ministers (Proposition 2).

### Institutional Design

Complex issues such as climate change collide with traditional bureaucratic routines and structures as such policies require a multi-actor perspective and cross-sector interventions

involving particularly the coordination among diverse Ministries (Meadowcroft 2011). In that regard, even though the Federal Ministry of Environment might be proactive in its vision of ambitious actions, it is likely to be constrained by other departments. Those conflicting principles and power dynamics could result in avoiding difficult discussions, questions of responsibility, and rivalry, which might delay or impede political procedures. Such dominant ‘bureaucratic mentality’, comprising red tape and strict hierarchies, inhibits innovative approaches while facilitating inefficient implementation (Howlett 2012) and hence relates to “persistent patterns of failure” (Howlett et al. 2015, p.215).

Thus, to ensure the effective enforcement of climate politics, profound reforms of current institutions as well as administrative practices and governance capacities are necessary while incremental improvements must be replaced with preventive interventions and political orientation towards reflexivity. However, up to now, there has been little research on concepts to institutionalize climate policy in the political-administrative system (Meadowcroft 2011). Additional limitations in this respect include the policy actors’ constrained capacity, the lack of knowledge as well as other resources for bureaucratic entities, the no longer appropriate design of policy processes, uncertainty and associated ‘principal-agent problems’ (Howlett et al. 2015) that shape countries’ response to crisis and hence require more profound understanding. In this respect, Pressman’s and Wildavsky’s describe policy failure related to bureaucratic reluctance as “highly complex politico-administrative phenomena resistant to change” (Howlett et al. 2015, p.211). Therefore, Howlett argues that overcoming such constraints needs “deeper policy learning linked to institutional and policy process design” (2012, p. 547).

Institutions are defined as by humans constructed “constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991, p.97). According to Bo Rothstein (1998, p. 124), institutions represent “the rules of the game” – including formal regulations like formalized provisions as well as informal agreements such as routines, practices, accordance, habits, social norms, or organizational culture. They influence power relations, overall approaches as well as policy outcomes by bringing actors together and “regulating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and decision processes” (Levi 1990 derived from Rothstein 1998, p. 124f.) Hence, institutions determine and specify the coordination and cooperation among stakeholders while being intended to address ‘collective action problems’ (Rothstein 1998, p. 134). According to that, Weaver and Rockman (1993) state that institutions affect the decision- and policymaking capabilities. They are often described as ‘enduring entities’ as actors usually are not interested in reforming them and only do so when the political institutions are no longer able to deal with urgent challenges resulting from a new situation. If institutions change, it is argued that the

concerned actors tend to adjust their strategies but still adhere to their preferences (Rothstein 1998, p. 130ff.)

In this light, Elinor Ostrom (1993, p.1907) proposes that institutional design plays a vital role in policymaking as appropriate procedures and organizations affect governance outcomes including corresponding framework characteristics concerning “physical, economic, social and cultural” issues. According to her, developing and shaping institutions represent a continuous process within “an uncertain environment”. She further establishes eight design principles that she defines as attributes facilitating the constitution of successful achievements with regard to obtaining the performance of duties as well as to the long-term compliance with rules and regulations. Since Ostrom developed these guidelines for irrigation systems, I will refer below to the design principles which can be applied in relation to the institutions relevant to German climate politics:

First of all, she demonstrates that ‘clearly defines boundaries’ are important to control users’ access and rights. In terms of national climate policies, this directive can be interpreted as explicit responsibilities, meaning that each Ministry is accountable for the emission reductions within the own sector. Applied to the Climate Cabinet, the principle of ‘proportional Equivalence between benefits and costs’ means that those departments having to reduce the most emissions must make the most effort towards this goal. The guideline respecting ‘Collective-choice arrangements’ represents the need to follow the regulations and structural arrangements “ex-post when strong temptations are present” (Ostrom 1993, p. 1908). In relation to the coalition between the Union and the SPD, this would require the Ministries to support and work together instead of prioritizing their own party when making decisions and, thus, complicating to reach agreements. Moreover, ‘Monitoring’ represents an essential prerequisite for climate politics in the sense that undesirable developments as well as target shortfalls can be determined and handled, increasing accountability. In this respect, Ostrom recognizes ‘graduated sanctions’ as a key instrument regarding deterrence in order to counteract violations of rules and free-rider problems. If the Ministries fail to achieve their goals, they should be held responsible by paying fees concerning e.g., compensating additional costs for the purchase of carbon certificates from their budget. Ostrom explains that those actors involved must be sure that exemplary behavior is rewarded while mistakes are punished in order for them to abide by the rules. Another design principle of a “Resolution mechanism” concerns the fact that actors can interpret the existing rules differently in their favor. In order to solve arising conflicts, there should be a way to discuss them properly.

Concerning this matter, I expect to discover violations of design principles in the German case regarding at least clear responsibilities, proportionality of costs and benefits, monitoring as well as sanctioning mechanisms. I further suggest that those disregards allow actors to exercise blame avoidance and enforce their belief systems which, in turn, affects the policy success concerning climate politics. Therefore, the third Proposition is that the current institutional design is not adequate to manage blame avoidance behavior and colliding belief systems among the Ministries (Proposition 3).

#### **4. Aims & Objectives**

Therefore, the aim of this research is to critically assess the sources of policymakers' reluctance concerning important policy changes and necessary commitments in order to combat the climate crisis. Further issues to be addressed comprise whether the Federal Ministry in the Environment is solely responsible for the reluctance, and if not, whether blame avoidance can explain this implementation gap between verbal commitments and actions taken. Besides, the implications of colliding belief systems resulting in a lack of coordination among the Ministries, affecting policy success are studied while the role of institutional design allowing such behavior is examined.

Corresponding objectives include conducting a qualitative content analysis of Ministry interviews as well as additional statements while creating categories of potential reasons to reveal which obstacles hinder the implementation of ambitious German climate policy. My thesis intends to contribute to a more comprehensive theory that fills part of the research gap concerning the role of bureaucrats in politics. I started my investigation with desk research of policy papers, (scientific) recommendations, Ministry websites, academic articles, and theories. I collected further data by analyzing interviews and statements of the Federal Ministries of the Climate Cabinet and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development to either confirm, reject, or expand my expectations. Data was coded using descriptive coding. Finally, the analysis classifies possible causes of policymakers' restraint and hence constructs a comprehensive understanding of policy failure regarding climate change actions including recommendations on solving those barriers.

#### **5. Research Design & Methods**

To study this question, I applied a qualitative case study design and focused on Germany which I selected as it represents a deviant as well as "negative but possible case" (Blatter & Haverland 2014, 104). Germany has the expertise including necessary resources to enforce an ambitious

climate policy and to play a pioneering role in combating climate change. However, its government seems not to be brave enough to use its full potential while also introducing rather unpopular but crucial methods. This raises the question of why German policymakers resist such necessary commitments. Thus, studying Germany may reveal causal factors leading to bureaucratic reluctance which are also applicable to other cases (Patton 1990). Besides, the current processes regarding the Climate Protection Law represent another reason for my interest in the German case as the country is the first in the world to introduce legally binding targets in terms of annual decreases in emissions. Therefore, I chose the Federal Ministries in the Climate Cabinet as well as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development as my sample. At the same time, I hope to get a more in-depth insight into administrative processes when investigating the central institutions that coordinate the German climate policies.

I studied this case using a qualitative content analysis approach. During my first desk research, I applied a combination of systematic search and the snowball method to gather secondary data which I used as a basis to conceptualize my theoretical constructs. As a further step, I collected the data for my content analysis while the sources used are primarily interviews directly retrieved from the Ministry websites. However, in some instances, it was necessary to operate with interviews or quotes from newspaper articles or publications by news agencies, while I only took the verbal expressions into account without considering the authors' interpretations. I collected and analyzed 54 documents in total: sixteen by the BMU (thirteen by Svenja Schulze, one by the State Secretary Jochen Flasbarth and two by the Head of the Department for the Climate Protection Policy Berthold Goeke), eleven by the BMWi (Altmaier), nine by the BMVi (Scheuer), seven by the BMZ (Müller), six by the BMEL (Klöckner), three by the BMI (Seehofer) and two by the BMF (Scholz). Those are primarily interviews but also include citations from articles, speeches as well as press statements.

I operationalized the concepts using the codebook that I prepared (see Appendix A10) while conclusions were drawn from the content analysis's coding results. In this regard, I created categories using literature concerning possible reasons for reluctance and subsequently applied these when coding the interviews and statements. I worked with descriptive coding, meaning summarizing the primary message of a section and subsequently looking for patterns to categorize them (Saldana 2015) while utilizing the software Atlas.ti.

In this process, I further combined individual codes concerning barriers such as 'lack of responsibility/accountability/control mechanism' into the category of 'Institutional Design.' The same applies to 'blaming others', 'emphasizing own efforts', 'downplaying of own

impact', and 'needs to be solved internationally', which I have summarized under 'Blame Avoidance'. The 'Belief Systems' category includes the codes regarding 'disagreement', 'lack of coordination /cooperation", 'no burden on consumers/farmers/economy/car industry', 'risk of job losses', 'no limitations/regulations' and 'wanting more'. Some of these codes can also apply to several categories since these partly influence each other and are interrelated. Furthermore, I coded different kinds of policy failures, actor roles as well as additional minor concepts and subsequently interpreted the results while discussing what they mean in relation to my research question and how they relate to the current state of the art.

Using a qualitative research design provides further insights when processing a complex question that cannot be answered with a simple description of a situation. It also has the advantage of exploring an approaches' depth and developing or enhancing theories (Röbken & Wetzel 2016, 13ff.). Since my thesis deals with a rather sensitive as well as a specialist topic that is not well understood yet, a qualitative approach is appropriate to explain and identify the factors and motivations that shape policymakers' responses in times of crisis. However, qualitative generated data is more open to personal bias and judgment than quantitative designs. Thus, care must be taken when it comes to the data analysis as well as to the interpretation of findings and statements (Röbken & Wetzel 2016). In order to avoid this risk as much as possible and to increase both the validity and reliability, I used different sources and compared their results to ensure that the same conclusions were drawn independently of one another. Moreover, I reviewed alternative explanations - both in terms of the literature considered as well as my derivation. Especially when analyzing interviews, not only the own preconceptions but also the respondents' bias has to be reflected and widely avoided. E.g., interviewees might leave things out, try to distract from the actual topic, or present themselves in a way they want to be perceived which necessitates a deeper assessment of underlying motivations (Legard et al. 2013).

In this context, I would like to briefly address the possible limitations of my thesis. The issue of bureaucratic reluctance in times of crisis is highly complex that both the length of this investigation and the time spent might not have been sufficient to explore all significant factors contributing to the outcome. I had to rely on publicly accessible data, which might have led to an incomplete data set. Moreover, because of confidential reasons, I could not interview relevant actors myself but had to work with online available statements. Hence, I could not ask the questions that I originally developed for my thesis, and accordingly, I had to look for the information I was hoping for (as a result of my survey) in the interviews conducted by others. Besides, due to the scope of this thesis, I was not able to consider all relevant actors – including

additional Ministries or states and governments, organizations, companies as well as lobbying agencies - which will need further scientific investigation having sufficient resources.

## **6. Analysis**

The interviews reveal interconnections between the individual departments showing that the Federal Ministry of the Environment (led by the SPD) is not solely responsible for Germany's climate policy. Every Minister acknowledges the urgent need for action in relation to the climate crisis. Among other things, Peter Altmaier (CDU) states that he believes that climate protection is the greatest global challenge and that Germany must take its climate goals seriously while continuing to play a leading role in this respect (Interview 1). Similarly, Julia Klöckner (CDU) confirms that everyone has to adjust to the consequences of a changing climate. Hence, she encourages an ambitious environmental and climate protection, whereby she will ensure that the agricultural sector fulfills its duties (Interview 3). According to Andreas Scheuer (CSU), climate protection is a top priority while he claims that each sector must contribute to the climate goals (Interview 1). Gerd Müller (CSU) defines climate protection as "the question of human survival" (Interview 3) and Horst Seehofer (CSU) advocates an ecological social market economy (Interview 1). Indeed, all of the Ministries also agree to shared responsibility. According to Klöckner, every member of the Climate Cabinet partially represents a Climate Minister as all their departments contribute to Germany's emissions and, therefore, the reductions have to be applied within these areas to counteract climate change (Interview 3). Altmaier confirms that the whole government needs to do more to protect the climate (Statement 2) and Scheuer emphasizes the obligation for the coalition (Interview 7). The Ministry of Finance is involved, thus, all proposals are checked for cost as well as efficiency so that on this basis, it can be decided how to finance climate protection (Statement 2). In light of these verbal commitments to addressing climate change, how can the observed implementation gap between aspiration and practice be explained?

This thesis explains the implementation gap in terms of three theoretically derived factors: Blame avoidance (Proposition 1), belief systems (Proposition 2), and institutional design (Proposition 3). The climate crisis represents a politically sensitive issue as the actual consequences cannot be predicted with certainty. Public opinions on how Germany should take action mainly centers on the question of how much the economy can be expected to slow down to accommodate the environment or whether the individual sectors bear the same responsibility. Thus, the risk of wrong decisions cannot be excluded and offers much scope for decision-makers. Those want to avoid blame and use the leeway accordingly by pinning responsibility on others concerning misjudgments or erroneous developments and justifying themselves for



their actions. The Ministers further emphasize their personal priorities, strategies as well as core, policy, and secondary beliefs. If these belief systems differ among the actors involved, they influence the coalitions' dynamics including their coordination and organization. While small discrepancies facilitate democratic functioning, deep disagreements will hinder the implementation of policies. Therefore, the institutions must be designed in a way that political decisions can still be made while clear responsibilities, accountability, transparency, monitoring, and control mechanisms represent prerequisites.

In support of Proposition 1, the interviews reflect that blame avoidance represents one of the contributing reasons as the Union Ministries reject their responsibility while showing behaviors being commonly associated with corresponding strategies in order to please the voters and their target groups (see Tables A4, A5 in the Appendix). Svenja Schulze repeatedly claims that the other Ministries have not yet fulfilled their responsibilities while they stress the importance of effective climate policy in their speeches - though do not keep these promises as she indicates that they may claim to be “in favor but duck away” (Interview 5) later on. According to Schulze, the Union must stop explaining what cannot be implemented and start making alternative proposals (Interview 3). Her claims are reflected in how the other Ministries leverage a presentation – using spin, timing, and distraction- and agency – attributing blame to other actors – strategies (Hood 2007). Julia Klöckner argues that she submitted a ten-point plan as well as additional programs very early on which will ensure that her Ministry's goals are met and further assigns obligations to the citizens by using their consumer behavior (Interview 5). Hence, she claims that her Ministry should be held less accountable and that the responsibilities towards the agriculture are exaggerated and unfair, demonstrating behavior of deemphasizing the personal impact as well as blaming others. Andreas Scheuer claims that he is not one of the brakemen when it comes to German climate policy – since he has approved many grants and investments totaling several million euros. Moreover, his department develops a legislative package regarding electromobility, however, the Federal Ministry of Justice slows him down since it still has to submit a law regulating private-sector electric mobility infrastructure (Interview 6). In addition, some measuring stations for exhaust gases were set up incorrectly, and he describes local governments failure to act as “scandalous” (Interview 9). Scheuer also depicts Svenja Schulze as a “problem maker” instead of a “problem solver” (Interview 9) and accuses the organization ‘Environmental Action Germany’ to act as another barrier by pursuing strategies to harm citizens and jobs (Interview 8).

Typical of blame avoidance, Ministries also use policy strategies (Hood 2007), that is, they refer to measures as well as programs which have already been taken and emphasize that their

Ministry has, therefore, achieved a lot in terms of emissions reductions and improvements. They also combine this with agency strategies: attributing responsibility to other departments or states that – they claim - still have some catching up to do. For example, the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy expresses certainty that the goals regarding electricity, economy, and industry can be achieved in any case (Statement 5) while being critical of the BMU's lack of “clarity on species and nature conservation legislation” by accusing it of blocking and, thus, damaging the energy transition and its acceptance (Statement 1). Peter Altmaier also sees “considerable backlogs” in terms of emissions in the buildings and transport sectors (Statement 5). Although he admits his agency's responsibility for the slow expansion concerning the power lines, he redirects blame from here towards the previous Ministers. Those did not manage to change this slowdown whereas he “made it a top priority” and, hence, passed a network expansion acceleration law while adopting an action plan. Therefore, the “accusation (...) is correct and justified, but of course, concerns everyone who was responsible for it” before him (Interview 2). Altmaier further claims that Germany will have the “most modern as well as developed power grids in Europe” (Interview 2) shortly providing high technology and digitalization as Germany already has the highest share of renewable energies, whereby he underlines the impact of China imitating ten times more CO<sub>2</sub> than Germany.

Like Altmaier Gerd Müller, the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, claims that climate protection cannot be decided in Germany but must be solved internationally together with Africa as well as additional emerging and developing countries such as Brazil or Indonesia. For him, an energy transition, as well as an ecological turn of traffic and construction technologies within a global context, represent decisive factors – without these, the national debate in Germany may be “nice for excitement but irrelevant” for the world's climate (Interview 1). By this, Müller clearly plays down Germany's role in international climate policy. At a domestic level, Julia Klöckner complains that farmers are “wrongly held responsible for everything” (Interview 1), with her sector causing only seven percent of Germany's total carbon emissions while those decreased “by 20 percent between 1990 and 2018” (Interview 2). In contrast, the other areas of traffic, energy, and industry are significantly higher with their greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, she claims to be the least responsible in comparison (Interview 3). With regard to the CO<sub>2</sub> pricing, Horst Seehofer explains that he is already having discussions with citizens referring to exploding rental prices and missing apartments in the metropolitan areas. He does not want to get an “additional debate” about higher rental costs due to the CO<sub>2</sub> price and, therefore, cannot represent such a

decision (Interview 1), which suggests that he wants to avoid voter criticism and accusations. Scholz describes this mechanism as politics in which the actors do not have the courage “to do the right things because [they] are too scared about the possible reactions” (Interview 1).

In summary, the evidence shows that the Union Ministries are actively engaged in blame avoidance as all accuse other departments and (partially) other countries as well as organizations to block or hinder the procedures, implementation, and execution of climate policies. Weaver (1986) calls this strategy ‘finding a scapegoat.’ The CDU/CSU Ministers further try to avoid unpopular decisions including limitations, regulations, or prohibitions (‘Agenda limitation’) while supporting popular alternative solutions such as monetary incentives or voluntary actions (‘Jump on the Bandwagon’). By downplaying the own influence and promoting the taken measures, they redefine the subject and, moreover, provide financial resources in the form of investment programs and funding to delay blame-generating situations (‘Throw Good Money After Bad’). This behavior hinders the implementation of ambitious climate policy as the applied strategies complicate the political decision-making process and cooperation among the departments.

The content analysis also provides support for Proposition 2 that belief systems are important for shaping policy perspectives (see Tables A6, A7). While dissents among political actors will always be present and are furthermore beneficial for a functioning democracy, conflicting core beliefs and political priorities, are harmful in terms of implementing policies, if the structures do not facilitate cooperating by enabling blame avoiding strategies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

The German party landscape represents the standard right-left-continuum while the current coalition consists of the SPD as a center-left party and the CDU/CSU showing center-right attitudes. Those disparate party-positions are reflected in their different belief systems. Thus, the Union-lead Ministries advocate a conservative and liberal approach whereas the BMU presents itself more willing to impose regulatory law as well as profound changes. In this regard, the interviews reveal three different kinds of disagreements among the Ministries liable for climate policy. First, there are divergent opinions about how to tackle climate change and accordingly on how much of a priority it is compared to other policy areas. The departments further disagree on who should be responsible – meaning whether climate change should be treated as a domestic policy or as a foreign policy and thirdly, there are different understandings concerning which Ministry should be in charge. On this matter, the Union-led departments are only willing to do as much for climate protection as possible without negatively affecting their sectors or target groups. Hence, they may favor emission reductions but not if it means hurting

the economy, automobile industry, housing market, or farmers. Besides, they argue for an international orientation and a reorganization of duties. The BMU opposes that position as it stresses Germany's historical responsibility due to the industrialization and its high per capita emissions while demanding more commitment.

According to the interviewees of the BMU, the Ministries in the Climate Cabinet are not able to cope with their responsibility as e. g. Jochen Flasbarth argues that the other departments are not committed sufficiently to their interventions as well as emission reductions and, hence, should develop "proper climate policies" (Interview 11). Svenja Schulze supports this claim by stating that "unfortunately, the CDU and CSU's willingness to take really effective measures has so far not been very pronounced" (Interview BMU 4). Among other things, many opposed sector targets while she further stresses that she will no longer tolerate the politics of "keep it up" and calls on the Union to stop the "competition to say no" to all BMU suggestions. Schulze often emphasizes that her Ministry wanted to achieve more but was restrained by the Union as she e.g., states when proposing a socially fair CO<sub>2</sub> price in one of her speeches, it sparked a great outcry from CDU/CSU. Subsequently, the SPD started the negotiations with the Union demanding a starting price of 35 euros per ton. In the course of this, she explains that the parties were "only able to agree on ten euros due to the resistance of the CSU" (Interview 1).

More specifically, Schulze criticizes Altmaier's behavior and position towards distance regulations concerning wind turbines as she claims that he started the discussion too late and then debated for so long that uncertainty as well as delays resulted which she describes as "a fiasco". Hence, she fears that the distance regulations could impede the 65 percent target with regard to renewable energies and therefore calls on Altmaier to "provide a clear framework very quickly" while "it would be nice if everyone in the Union finally understands that" (Interview 9). The Ministries further disagree on reports regarding the distance regulations (Statement 7) as well as on the carbon price as Altmaier describes that Schulze's proposal will "burden many without reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions sustainably" (Statement 2). The Minister approves that the climate has to be protected though he emphasizes that Germany must also maintain its economic strength in Europe (Interview 2) while preventing job losses. He, moreover, indicates that rushing ahead with the draft Climate Protection Law "may serve the own profiling" but certainly "does not serve the cause" (Statement 6). With regard to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and the authorization of pesticides that contain glyphosate, Schulze criticizes Julia Klöckner's decision to approve a plant protection without her consent which "of course annoys" her (Interview 4). Based on this, Klöckner's impression is that the BMU uses the subject for "emotional debates and solo attempts (Interview 5). According to her, it is not

helpful to question regulated responsibilities as such politics do not work out solutions but stir up opinion against decisions and incite people (Interview 5). The Federal Environmental Ministry further demands a biodiversity compensation whereas the BMEL, on the other hand, rejects such a regulation as the Ministry regards it as “problematic under constitutional law” (Interview 4) and compares it to an expropriation.

In addition, Svenja Schulze and Andreas Scheuer argue about suitable measures reducing emissions in the transport sector. While Schulze advocates a speed limit and hardware upgrades for diesel vehicles, Scheuer clearly positions himself against it as he declares that he will not accept any kind of prohibitions, limitations, or incising of mobility costs (Interview 6) – even if a majority of the Germans supports a speed limit. Besides, the automotive industry is the “leading industry in Germany on which hundreds of thousands of jobs” as well as other sectors “depend directly and indirectly” (Interview 5). Therefore, he warns of taking the problem up because it might cause economic damage as well as job loss. From him, measures such as regulations and tax increases represent politics of demonizing and paternalism that will not achieve anything and, hence, he cannot tolerate (Interview 1 & 6). Concerning this matter, Schulze explains that climate protection represents a “great opportunity for the transport sector” (Interview 4) as it may strengthen the companies and benefit the quality of life in cities. Scheuer further declares that he will no longer allow Schulze to express herself every day “without having the necessary knowledge” (Interview 9) as, for him, it is a shame that Schulze talks down the good compromise which the coalition negotiated. While he wants the coalition “to work successfully”, Scheuer cannot recognize “this interest in everyone” (Interview 9). Horst Seehofer supports Scheuer’s point of view and explains that he cannot accept a high CO<sub>2</sub> price since, for him, affordable housing costs are in addition to climate protection “an equivalent goal” and therefore, he will only support “measures that ensure both” (Interview 1&2).

The Union-led ministries are clearly opposed to regulations and limitations, with the BMU emphasizing the importance of regulatory law as a supplement. Comments from the interviews support this finding as e.g., Julia Klöckner perceives climate change as too complex for legal regulations (Interview 3). According to Peter Altmaier, Schulze’s Climate Protection Law has initially been “no solution” as “administrative measures cannot reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions” (Statement 9). Andreas Scheuer expresses himself most critically by stating that he does not accept “rigid annual targets for every department” and that, for him, this approach represents “eco-planned-economy”. In general, the priorities seem to differ widely. CDU and CSU Ministers prefer a more restrained approach whereas Schulze claims to be only satisfied if “CO<sub>2</sub> emissions decrease significantly, and Germany is clearly on the way to complying with the

Paris agreement” (Interview 7). In this regard, Peter Altmaier prefers cautious steps and then, if necessary, follow up with additional instruments. He does also find no benefit in setting increasingly ambitious goals (Statement 5). Horst Seehofer recommends smooth transitions in order not to overwhelm the citizens (Interview 1) and Julia Klöckner considers carbon taxation useless (Interview 5). Hence, the interviews propose that the BMU assesses the risk of climate change greater, whereas the Union relies on voluntariness and incentives– which underlines the different belief systems of the responsible actors.

In contrast to the BMU, the Union ministries believe that climate change should be dealt with globally as a foreign policy. Referring to this, the Union emphasizes Africa’s role and the implications by emerging as well as developing countries concerning climate policies and, hence, positions itself against a domestic approach. Jochen Flasbarth, however, explains that even though some may play down the two percent amount of Germany’s share respecting worldwide emissions, he rates that as very high since “our per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are higher than in most countries in the world” (Interview 11) and furthermore, Germany has contributed a lot to global warming because of its industrial past. He is supported by Berthold Goeke, the head of the climate department in the BMU, who also clarifies that while only accounting for one percent of the global population, Germany already produces twice as much regarding greenhouse gas emissions and further declares that we, thus, must fulfill our “moral responsibility” (Interview 12).

Another disagreement among the departments concerns the distribution of responsibilities within the Climate Cabinet. The BMU declares that they may outline what would be necessary in order to achieve the climate goals, but the Ministers of the concerned sectors are responsible for corresponding sections including the development and implementation of effective measures as they know their own department the best (Interview 8). On the other hand, the other Ministers perceive and, hence, assess their impact and responsibility differently.

To sum up, the Interviews clearly show various disagreements as well as lack of appreciation and understanding among the Climate Cabinet Ministries which create obstacles in terms of coordination and cooperation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Concerning this matter, the Union-led Ministries favor climate-related measures as long as those do not hurt their target groups as well as sectors while preferring an international approach and arguing about the distribution of competences with the BMU. The different belief systems are so far apart that mutual consent is becoming increasingly difficult and, hence, negatively impacts the overall coalition dynamics. Therefore Proposition 2 is supported.

Statements by the Federal Ministry of the Environment further show that the current mismatch of the institutional design indeed makes it possible for the political actors to exercise blame avoidance while enforcing their preferred course. Institutional design shapes the actions, decisions as well the behavior of political actors and, hence, represents a decisive factor for policy success (Alexander 2006, Ansell and Gash 2008). In this regard, Elinor Ostrom (1993) defines eight design principles that enhance the performance of tasks while obtaining compliance with the organization's rules and structures. Those include clear responsibilities, equitable distribution of costs and benefits, a monitoring system involving graduated sanctions and resolution mechanisms. In order for an institution to function correctly, all principles have to be respected. Concerning this matter, the interviews reveal violations of at least four prerequisites that underline the structural deficit regarding German climate politics and, hence, support the third Proposition of an inadequate institutional design (see Tables A8, A9).

The BMU declares that each Minister is in charge of the climate-related measures to reduce greenhouse gas production in his or her own area and must, therefore, take responsibility. Although the Environmental Ministry can make suggestions and notify other departments of undesirable developments, action in each individual area lies with the respective authorities of traffic, agriculture, building, and economy (Interview 9). To solve these institutional shortcomings, the BMU worked out the Climate Protection Law while the negotiations around make it clear that advice given by the BMU to the other Ministries was mostly ignored, maintaining the status quo. Those claims are reflected in the design principles' disregards, leading to the breaching of essential rules regarding proper cooperation (Ostrom 1993). In one interview (11), Jochen Flasbarth explains that the department sent the draft law to the Chancellery in February 2019, though the Chancellery did not forward it to the other Ministries. Therefore, the BMU independently submitted the draft to the interdepartmental coordination after a few months, as according to him, the withholding of legislative initiatives "has its limits at some point". This approach, in turn, received criticism from CDU/CSU-led Ministries, showing, on the one hand, that the Union wanted to prevent the Climate Protection Law and, on the other hand, that the BMU is frustrated by this behavior. According to Svenja Schulze, her driver role is not effortless but is "part of the job as Environmental Minister" (Interview 7) - indicating again the impact of colliding belief systems whose adverse effects concerning climate politics are not compensated due to inappropriate structures.

Jochen Flasbarth (Interview 11) further explains that the law is supposed to reform the underlying architecture of climate protection in Germany while the most crucial point in this context is, that they "finally ensure that those who are responsible for certain policy areas" are

also committed to carrying out climate protection measures in these areas - otherwise they would have to pay fines from their own budget. This way, the BMU hopes to put additional pressure on climate-related action (Goeke Interview 16). Hence, the design principle by Elinor Ostrom (1993) of clear responsibilities has not been met and moreover, the BMU has not been able to supervise and measure other departments' performance indicating further violations of the guidelines respecting monitoring as well as graduated sanctioning. As demonstrated in the context of belief systems, Flasbarth (Interview 11) states that the problem is that the Union Ministries are "not doing enough" while the BMU neither has the tools to observe how exactly they are performing nor to make them do more. According to him, the reason for the delays in climate protection is that the Federal Environmental Ministers have always been "too weak" with their previous options "compared to cabinet colleagues who do not take climate protection seriously." The BMU "cannot actively force" other departments to implement efficient measures (Interview 11). Hence, rules are needed to stop this kind of irresponsibility within certain policy areas. In this respect, the Climate Protection Law is intended to transform the keystones of German climate policy while this mechanism of inaction has been going in the wrong direction for many years. Jochen Flasbarth argues that the CDU / CSU is fighting the law so much since there will be consequences for the first time if the emissions savings are not achieved. His claims reflect violations of Ostrom's design rules as the BMU has not been able to enforce the reduction of emissions or punish the other Ministries even if they noticed a non-achievement of the climate goals. In other words, the BMU lacks the power to get other departments to act as needed. Flasbarth further states that politics must be structurally able to deliver good results while the Union Ministers have to change their way of thinking. Thus, he assesses the current structures not as adequate to tackle climate change and attests the conflicting belief systems with the CDU/CSU that impede the decision-making process.

Referring to this, Svenja Schulze explains that contrary to some claims, the law is not about "new power for the Ministry of the Environment", but about "more commitment - for this and for all next governments" (Parliament Speech)– which emphasizes the position that this lack of clear responsibility is a more in-depth structural problem which needs to be addressed in the long term. Therefore, the numbers respecting the emissions should be presented transparently and discussed together every year in order to finally ensure that Germany will achieve its climate goals in 2030 (Interview 12). Hence, the Climate Protection Law defines fixed savings targets, which are checked by the Expert Council, and if those are missed, the Minister responsible must act immediately by presenting a program with additional measures- making it clearly and bindingly regulated (Interview 9). These statements stress the previous shortcoming



of benchmarking and the inability to impose penalties or sanctions, therefore revealing disregards of the design guidelines (Ostrom 1993).

The new legal obligation involving direct responsibility for the sector goals represents, for Schulze, a “huge step forward” and a central setting of the course (Interview 12). Climate protection, thus, becomes a responsibility of the entire government (Interview 9), counteracting the missing commitment to the individual departments. Until now, it has been unclear to the departments what their sector goals are and how much emissions they have to reduce which is why the BMU underlines the need to “regulate the allocation of responsibilities in the individual sectors to the ministries” (Goetze Interview 16). This lack of clear competences and obligations is reflected in Ostrom’s design rule regarding ‘proportional Equivalence between benefits and costs’ (1993). It is further reflected in, for example, Klöckner’s claims to be only responsible for seven percent of Germany’s emissions while she holds other departments to be more accountable (Interview 3). Hence, the current institutional organization does not offer sufficient disclosure concerning the principle of proportionality.

Accordingly, the evidence reveals a belief system-based refusal to coordinate which is made possible because of the institutional design's inadequacy. In this regard, the interviews demonstrate a lack of clear responsibility, accountability as well as transparency in the past. There has been no effective monitoring system that records which areas are on the right track and which sectors still require improvement. Moreover, the institutions are missing a control mechanism including corresponding consequences in order to counter blame avoidance while the vague distribution of proportionality further impedes the successful climate policy implementation. In order for an institution to be successful and viable, all eight design rules by Ostrom need to be met - while already four are being violated in this case. This, in turn, allows actors to behave in ‘bad faith’ by avoiding blame, passing the buck, and thus, they are able to be primarily motivated by their belief systems than by their commitment to climate change. Even though the CDU/CSU Ministers are verbally committing, they are not committing in actions, demonstrating a clear case of bureaucratic reluctance that could not be possible if the institutions hold them to their promises. Hence, *all three Propositions are supported by the evidence.*

## **7. Conclusion & Outlook**

Climate change is real. There is no reason to doubt anthropogenic global warming. Science further argues that humanity is increasingly crossing the planetary boundaries, thereby endangering the sustainable use of raw materials as well as manageable emissions (BMU 2020b). The IPCC (2014) confirms in its Assessment Reports the rising risks in terms of

ecological as well as social impacts and, at the same time, shows possible strategies and measures for the individual sectors and national governments. Germany's public is demanding a profound change in climate politics while requesting more action (Rueter 2019). Nevertheless, the German Federal government is subject to great criticism as it continually misses its climate goals. Neither the convened Climate Cabinet nor its Climate Package achieved the desired results (Stiftung 2° 2019), although all officials recognize the urgency. In this respect, Germany's (in)actions can be considered policy failure - showing an implementation gap between verbal commitments and practice which presents the focus of this study. This raised the question of why responsible Federal Ministries resist important policy changes, such as crucial commitments regarding the climate crisis.

The content analysis revealed a belief system-based refusal to cooperate which is enabled by the inadequacy of the institutional design while the actors use the resulting leeway to exercise blame avoidance. The evidence further demonstrates that the BMU cannot be held solely responsible for the political shortcoming since there are interdependencies between the Climate Cabinet departments. Accordingly, the agriculture, economy, building, and traffic sectors are accountable for taking the necessary measures to reduce emissions in their areas. However, the Union Ministers' statements clearly illustrate the active practice of blame avoidance by using corresponding strategies and, hence, accusing other stakeholders and downplaying the personal impact. The CDU/CSU Ministers are more motivated by their belief systems than by their commitment to climate change. In other words, they favor climate policies as long as those do not impose negative consequences for their target groups or sectors. Further disagreements with the BMU include whether climate change should be treated as domestic or foreign policy and the distribution of competences within the Climate Cabinet. Those colliding belief systems harm the ability to implement ambitious measures.

The main finding of this research is that the current institutional design is not working as several design rules by Ostrom are violated, while the good thing concerning this mismatch is that institutional arrangements can be changed. Even though institutions are considered 'enduring entities', since political decision-makers are mostly not interested in reforms due to their persistent belief systems, it has happened before that conservative governments have taken progressive stances – e.g., when Merkel co-opted the green's nuclear plan after Fukushima (Staudenmaier 2017). Hence, if the public demanded more transparency, benchmarks, strengthened rules as well as accountability by politics, and asked for more power to be given to the BMU, those claims could detain the bureaucratic restraint and, thus, terminate policy failure. The Union Ministers are motivated by their belief systems because the current structures

enable such behavior commonly associated with blame avoidance as they do not have to face any severe consequences. However, if the institutional design was sufficiently strong to contain this misconduct, then actors would have no choice but to abide by the new rules.

In this light, citizens could organize protests inspired by ‘Fridays for Future’ and hence, need to be mobilized and vote green. In other words, if public pressure is high enough and the further stakeholders show that they care about climate change, politicians will reform the institutions accordingly, so that hopefully not another event like Fukushima is necessary for a profound transformation.

The analysis showed that the individual concepts respecting blame avoidance, belief systems, and institutional design are partially interrelated since certain citations applied to more than one indicator. At the same time, these are not the only theoretical foundations suitable for this thesis. The decision-making theory that I chose is blame avoidance, but it comes with its own problems – as sometimes, I detected certain behaviors that this model was not able to explain. Although it is not in the scope of this thesis, perhaps different kinds of models such as ‘rational choice’, ‘incrementalism’, or ‘bounded rationality’ would have been able to elucidate these research results further. However, that does not take away from the fact that in a point theorizing blame avoidance, I was able to uncover some of the actors’ motivations which contributes to a more comprehensive picture of bureaucratic reluctance.

While the content analysis could already reveal some of the reasons why German Federal Ministries fail to adopt policy changes to address the climate crisis, there may be additional relevant factors that require future research. The Climate Cabinet’s outcomes represent a sensitive as well as highly relevant and timely issue. Therefore, I suggest posing the same question again as soon as the whole process of the elaborated measures and planned actions has been completed and, hence, the political sensitivity as well as topicality has decreased. In this context, I propose interviewing all Ministers involved including the respective heads of responsible departments within the government and additional implicated actors. Regarding the discrepancy respecting the institutional design, it may also be instructive to consult former Federal Environmental Ministers to demonstrate deeper explanations concerning this deficient mechanism. Scientific research into the climate crisis’s dangers and possible measures is fundamental but it is at least as necessary to investigate how to address the restraints and bureaucratic reluctance that this study revealed. Therefore, I recommend conducting further examinations and cross-border studies dealing with decision-making as well as governance processes and institutional arrangements regarding climate policy.

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
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## Appendix

Figure A1.



Retrieved from:

[https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SPM.10\\_rev3-01.png](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SPM.10_rev3-01.png)



Figure A2.



Retrieved from:  
<https://stockholmuniiversity.app.box.com/s/avnyhh4xzshxb19j82hn5mf3hxyuvqj0>

### A3. List of consulted interviews and statements from the Federal Ministries for the content analysis

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#### *BMEL*

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#### *BMF*

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#### *BMI*

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**Table A4.***Indicators for Blame Avoidance*

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Original quotations in German

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

„Nein, das ist genau das, was ich wollte, dass alle die, die Verantwortung tragen für diesen Bereich, jetzt auch an einen Tisch kommen und gemeinsam diese Verantwortung wahrnehmen und nicht immer das Spiel machen, sonntags sagen, sie sind dafür, aber montags sich wegducken“ (Interview 5)

„Der Koalitionsvertrag muss eingehalten werden. Allein mit den Sonntagsreden von CDU und CSU schaffen wir das nicht. Und für mich ist klar: Wir brauchen in diesem Jahr das Klimaschutzgesetz.“ (Interview 3)

„CDU und CSU sagen immer nur, was alles nicht geht. Die machen keine Alternativvorschläge. Beispiel Klimaschutzgesetz: Das habe ich vor zwei Wochen in die Ressortabstimmung gegeben.“ (Interview 3)

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**Peter Altmaier (BMW)**

„Wir brauchen vor allem mehr Klarheit beim Arten- und Naturschutzrecht bezüglich des hierfür federführenden Umweltministeriums. Blockaden schaden hier der Energiewende und ihrer Akzeptanz.“ (Statement 1)

„Doch diese zieren sich jetzt mit vorgeschobenen Argumenten und spielen Mikado – nach dem Motto: wer sich zuerst bewegt und seinen eigenen Interessengruppen Veränderungen zumutet, hat verloren.“ (Statement 1)

„Ja also, wir haben uns verständigt, dass wir die 2030er Ziele auf jeden Fall erreichen wollen. Also 55% CO<sub>2</sub> Minderung und ich bin mir ziemlich sicher, dass wir diese Ziele im Bereich der Strom Wirtschaft und im Bereich der Industrie auf jeden Fall erreichen werden. Da sind wir auf zielfahrt. Trotzdem werden wir das sehr genau verfolgen und begleiten. In den Bereichen Gebäude und Verkehr haben wir noch erheblichen Nachholbedarf“ (Statement 5)

„Der Vorwurf, dass der Ausbau der Stromleitungen nur schleppend vorankommt, ist richtig und berechtigt, aber der richte sich natürlich ein alle, die vor mir dafür verantwortlich waren und es seit vielen Jahren ist nicht geschafft haben, dies zu ändern. Ich habe das zur Chefsache gemacht. Wir haben ein Netzausbau Beschleunigungsgesetz im Parlament verabschiedet. Wir haben mit den Bundesländern einen gemeinsamen Aktionsplan verabschiedet. Wir werden diese Probleme der Reihe nachlösen und ich bin überzeugt, dass wir in 6 oder 7 Jahren von heute das modernste und bestausgebaute Stromnetze in ganz Europa haben. Wir haben den höchsten Anteil an erneuerbaren Energien, die sind sehr volatil. Das stellt große Anforderungen an die Integrationsfähigkeit der Stromnetze. Das verlangt Hochtechnologie, das verlangt Digitalisierung.“ (Interview 2)

„China imitiert etwa zehnmal so viel CO<sub>2</sub> wie Deutschland und das macht deutlich, dass wir eben auch mit China darüber reden müssen, welches die richtigen Schritte sind.“ (Interview 2)

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**Gerd Müller (BMZ)**

„Auch für die Klimabeschlüsse des G-7-Gipfels spielt Afrika eine wichtige Rolle. Der Anteil der Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer am Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen ist heute schon höher als der Anteil der Industrieländer – und er steigt rasant an. Das Zwei-Grad-Ziel erreichen wir nur, wenn Afrika bei der Energiegewinnung nicht der „Schwarze Kontinent“ bleibt, der auf Kohle setzt, sondern sich zum „Grünen Kontinent“ entwickelt, der erneuerbaren Energien nutzt. Wir werden jedenfalls zum Aufbau „grüner“ Energiestrukturen nach Kräften beitragen. Afrika bietet für die Nutzung von Sonnen-, Wasser-, Geothermie- und Windenergien ideale Voraussetzungen.“ (Interview 4)

„Wir müssen es schaffen, dass Afrika mit unserer Technik ein grüner Kontinent der erneuerbaren Energie wird und kein schwarzer der Kohle. Entscheidend ist eine globale Energiewende und eine Wende bei Verkehrs- und Bautechnologien. Sonst ist die Klimadebatte in Deutschland zwar schön für Aufregung, aber irrelevant für das Weltklima.“ (Interview 1)

„Die globalen Treibhausgasemissionen sind auf einem Rekordhoch, und sie steigen weiter. Die reichsten zehn Prozent der Welt sind für 50 Prozent der CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen verantwortlich. Auch Schwellenländer wie China und Indonesien belasten das Klima erheblich.“ (Interview 3)

„Die Bevölkerung Afrikas und Indiens wird in den nächsten 30 Jahren auf vier Milliarden Menschen anwachsen. Hunderte Millionen Afrikaner haben aber bislang noch gar keinen Strom. Wenn zukünftig jeder Haushalt einen Stromanschluss auf der Basis von Kohle bekommt, müssten 1.000 neue Kohlekraftwerke gebaut werden. Das hält der Planet nicht aus. Anstatt mit Kohle müssen die Entwicklungsländer ihren Energiehunger mit Erneuerbaren Energien stillen.“ (Interview 3)

„Das Bundesentwicklungsministerium wird bis 2020 klimaneutral sein. Jede Tonne CO<sub>2</sub>, die wir dann verbrauchen, kompensieren wir, etwa durch Aufforstung in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern. Wir sind damit Vorreiter in der Bundesregierung, die anstrebt bis 2030 klimaneutral zu werden.“ (Interview 3)

„Ich bin verantwortlich für 90 Prozent der deutschen öffentlichen Klimaschutzinvestitionen im Ausland. Unser Ministerium war vor Kurzem außerdem Gastgeber der Konferenz für den Green Climate Fund, der Zusagen über fast zehn Milliarden Dollar für den internationalen Klimaschutz eingesammelt hat. Deutschland alleine gibt eine Milliarde Dollar, ein wichtiges Zeichen der internationalen Solidarität.“ (Interview 5)

„Wenn die Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer diesen Lebensstil übernehmen, den wir ihnen vormachen, dann bräuchten wir drei Planeten. Gleichzeitig treten jedes Jahr 80 Millionen Menschen neu auf unsere Erde, brauchen Wasser und Nahrung – das ist vor allem eine Herausforderung für Afrika.“ (Interview 4)

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**Julia Klöckner (BMEL)**

„In Deutschland trägt die Landwirtschaft mit sieben Prozent zu den CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen bei. Kurzum: Emissionen wurden und werden weiter reduziert. Damit leisten wir unseren Beitrag zur Erreichung der Minderungsziele.“ (Interview 1)

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„Die jährlichen Emissionen aus der Landwirtschaft sind zwischen 1990 und 2018 um 20 Prozent gesunken, der Viehbestand nimmt in Deutschland ab.“ (Interview 2)

„Die Landwirtschaft hat sieben Prozent des gesamten Kohlendioxid-Ausstoßes in Deutschland zu verantworten, andere Branchen - Verkehr, Industrie, Energie - liegen weit darüber. Und anders als diese Branchen hat die Land- und Forstwirtschaft effektive Kohlendioxid-Senker, die Böden und den Wald und muss nicht automatisch aus Steuererhöhungen kommen, sondern kann durch Schwerpunktsetzungen erreicht werden.“ (Interview 2)

„Landwirte werden zu Unrecht für alles Mögliche verantwortlich gemacht.“ (Interview 1)

„Die Tierbestände entwickeln sich bereits jetzt rückläufig. Bei Schweinen gab es in den Jahren 2017 und 2018 einen Rückgang um mehr als vier Prozent. Die Zahl der Rinder ist im gleichen Zeitraum etwa um drei Prozent gesunken.“ (Interview 2)

„Weltweit gibt es massive Missstände. Da werden Antibiotika zu Vorbeugung eingesetzt oder damit die Tiere schneller wachsen. Das ist zurecht in Deutschland verboten. Im Rahmen der G20-Agrarministertreffen habe ich das mehrfach – in Argentinien und in Japan – angesprochen. In Deutschland sind wir mit unserer Minimierungsstrategie erfolgreich. Insgesamt ist der Einsatz von Antibiotika in der Tiermast um über 30 Prozent zurückgegangen.“ (Interview 3)

„Die Ursachen des Insektenrückgangs sind vielfältig und komplex, sie betreffen bei weitem nicht nur die Landwirtschaft! Der Schutz und der Erhalt von Artenvielfalt und Biodiversität ist eine Aufgabe, die uns alle angeht, die wir nur gemeinsam bewältigen können. Es geht um Fragen der Siedlungsentwicklung, die Versiegelung von immer mehr Flächen insgesamt, die Verkehrsinfrastruktur, aber auch um den Steingarten vor der Haustür. Jeder kann einen Beitrag leisten, das Thema betrifft bei weitem nicht nur den ländlichen Raum.“ (Interview 2)

„Für mein Ressort habe ich im Klimakabinett sehr früh einen Zehn-Punkte-Plan vorgelegt mit Maßnahmen, die der Agrarbereich zusätzlich für den Klimaschutz leisten kann.“ (Interview 2)

„Es stehen etwa 83 Millionen jährlich bereit, um die Landwirte beim praktischen Insektenschutz zu unterstützen und gegebenenfalls notwendige Einschränkungen abzumildern.“ (Interview 1)

„Mein Ministerium hat einen Zehn-Punkte-Plan entwickelt, den wir umsetzen werden. Damit erreichen wir unser Einsparziel für die Branche von bis zu 14 Millionen Tonnen bis 2030. Übrigens auch ohne eine CO<sub>2</sub>-Steuer, die die Umweltministerin vorgeschlagen hatte und jetzt wohl auch nicht mehr weiterverfolgt. Diese Steuer ist unnötig.“ (Interview 5)

„Wir setzen zudem auf eine stärkere Investitionsförderung in der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Agrarstruktur und Küstenschutz, um Investitionen in Lagerstätten, Maschinen und Geräte zu fördern, die die Emissionen bei Lagerung und Ausbringung von Wirtschaftsdünger reduzieren.“ (Interview 4)

„Und die Digitalisierung treiben wir voran, nehmen dafür viel Geld in die Hand. Sie trägt bei zur Attraktivität der Grünen Berufe und zur Arbeitserleichterung. Der Beruf des Landwirts ist anstrengend und fordernd, Arbeitskräfte für die Landwirtschaft sind sehr schwer zu finden,

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und besonders die junge Generation hat gewisse Ansprüche an eine sogenannte Work-Life-Balance. Die Digitalisierung kann gerade kleinen Höfen helfen, ihre Arbeit zu machen.“ (Interview 1)

„Auf den ersten Blick mag das attraktiv klingen, doch kann die Mehrwertsteuer nicht zweckgebunden eingesetzt werden. Wichtig und richtig ist aber, die Debatte zu führen, was uns bessere Bedingungen für die Nutztiere wert sind. Politisch will ich mehr Einsatz für Tierwohl mit unserem staatlichen Tierwohlkennzeichen belohnen. Einem Positivkennzeichen, das dem Verbraucher beim Einkauf auf den ersten Blick klare Orientierung gibt, wo mehr für das Wohlbefinden des Tieres getan wurde, und warum das Produkt entsprechend mehr kostet.“ (Interview 1)

„Die neue Düngerverordnung, unsere Nutztierstrategie sowie die Einführung unseres staatlichen Tierwohlkennzeichens werden zudem zu einem weiteren Rückgang der Bestände führen. Mehr Tierwohl kostet Geld, das auch beim Bauern ankommen muss. Das heißt, auch der Verbraucher ist hier gefragt.“ (Interview 2)

„Darum geht es. Als Verbraucher müssen wir uns vor Augen führen, dass Bauern nicht in erster Linie Landschaftsgärtner sind, sondern das erzeugen, was wir zum Leben brauchen. Und deshalb darf es nicht sein, dass Bauern, die jeden Tag dafür hart arbeiten, als Tierquäler und Umweltsünder diffamiert werden. Im Übrigen von Verbrauchern, die im Supermarkt nur nach dem schönsten Apfel, dem perfekten Salatkopf greifen.“ (Interview 1)

„Auch der Verbraucher an der Ladenkasse hat es in der Hand, welche Wirtschaftsweise er mit seinem Konsum und seinem Geldschein unterstützt.“ (Interview 2)

„Wenn der Verbraucher sonntags und auch in zahlreichen Umfragen einen höheren Tierwohlstandard einfordert, muss er montags bis samstags auch bereit sein, so einzukaufen.“ (Interview 4)

„Ich habe zehn Klimaschutzmaßnahmen vorgelegt, die wir nun umsetzen wollen. Aber auch die Branche selbst sieht sich in der Pflicht, hat ein ureigenes Interesse an sicheren, auskömmlichen Ernten. Denn sie ist vor allem auch Opfer des Klimawandels und spürt früh die schmerzhaften Folgen. Das ist vielen Verbrauchern vielleicht gar nicht bewusst, weil die Regale voll sind, auch wenn Felder leer bleiben.“ (Interview 3)

„Wichtig ist, die Ergebnisse des Berichts richtig einzuordnen, denn er bezieht sich auf die weltweite Situation. So trägt die Landwirtschaft global gesehen zu rund einem Viertel der Emissionen bei, in Deutschland sind es aber sieben Prozent. Die Bereiche Energie, Industrie oder Verkehr liegen weit darüber. Jeder Ressortminister, der bei uns im Klimakabinett sitzt, ist daher ein Stück weit Klimaminister.“ (Interview 3)

„Kein anderes Ressort hat solch einen Lösungsschlüssel wie meines: den Wald. Bereits jetzt leisten der Wald und dessen Bewirtschaftung einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Klimaschutz. Denn wenn es den Wald nicht gäbe, hätten wir mit 14 Prozent mehr CO<sub>2</sub>-Ausstoß in Deutschland zu kämpfen. Einfach gesagt: Die Verwendung von Holz aus nachhaltiger Waldbewirtschaftung ist aktiver Klimaschutz. Bauholz oder Möbel speichern noch jahrzehntelang CO<sub>2</sub>.“ (Interview 5)

“Was genau meinen denn jene, die danach rufen: Eine Wende zurück in alte Zeiten? Wir brauchen den Blick nach vorne und keine Agrarwende zurück. So auch bei den Klimazielen.“

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Meine Vorschläge im Bereich der Land- und Forstwirtschaft für das Klimaschutzprogramm wurden aufgegriffen. Die Branchen werden wir bei der Umsetzung unterstützen.“  
(Interview 1)

„Ich habe das BVL mit mehr Personal ausgestattet und die Arbeitsstrukturen verbessert. So konnten wir die im BVL-Bereich liegenden Verfristungen vollständig abbauen. Die Verfristungen, die es jetzt noch gibt, produziert das Umweltbundesamt. Das gehört zum Geschäftsbereich des BMU.“ (Interview 4)

„Ach wissen Sie, die Umwelthilfe betreibt damit ein Geschäftsmodell und legt Wert auf Stimmungsmache. Aber mir geht es um die Faktenlage. Die Düngeverordnung ist überarbeitet worden und wird Wirkung entfalten. Die Klage richtet sich gegen einen alten Sachstand, deswegen bin ich entspannt.“ (Interview 5)

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### **Horst Seehofer (BMI)**

„Das alles ist ja außerhalb der Diskussion. Es geht um die CO<sub>2</sub>-Bepreisung und da muss ich jetzt sagen - ist nicht nur meine Meinung sondern war sehr stark die Meinung der ganzen CSU, der 4 Leute die da verhandelt haben: der Markus Söder, der Alexander Dobrindt der Andi Scheuer und ich, wir waren der Meinung, dass man die Bepreisung machen soll, aber das man sanft einsteigen soll und allmählich erhöhen soll. Genauso ist es gekommen und zwar deshalb. Schauen Sie, ich bin Wohnungsbau Minister. Wenn wir jetzt das Heizöl zum Start massiv verteuert hätten, dann hätte ich zu dieser ganzen Mieten Diskussion, die wir ohnehin schon haben... in den Ballungsräumen Höhe der Miete, explodierende Miete, keine Wohnungen... nochmal eine Diskussion bekommen: Jetzt in dieser Lage verteuert die Politik die Mieten, die Mietnebenkosten, weil natürlich des umgelegt worden wäre auf die Mieter und das konnte ich auf keinen Fall vertreten. Der Andreas Scheuer konnte auf keinen Fall vertreten, dass zum Beispiel in Bayern für die Pendler, die aufs Auto angewiesen sind... nicht überall ist der wunderbare Nahverkehr wie im Großraum München. So im ländlichen Raum sind Pendler auf das Auto angewiesen. So konnte er unmöglich hinnehmen, dass plötzlich das Benzin um 12 Cent teurer wird und deshalb haben wir gesagt, wir wollen die Ökologie sozialverträglich erreichen, sanft starten im Jahr 2021- 3 Cent und dann allmählich nach oben über 5 Jahre, damit sich die Leute drauf einstellen können, auch umstellen könne durch... ja durch Sanierung des Hauses, durch weniger Heizölverbrauch, durch Austauschen der Heizanlage. Da muss man den Menschen ihre Zeit geben.“ (Interview 1)

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### **Andreas Scheuer (BMVi)**

„Das ist Quatsch! Ich werde zum Beispiel jetzt ein Elektromobilitäts-Gesetespaket vorlegen, an dem sich alle Ressorts beteiligen können. Ich mache Klimaschutz konkret. Das Justizministerium muss endlich ein Wohnungseigentumsgesetz vorlegen, wo die Ladestationen im privaten Bereich geregelt werden. Das muss schneller gehen.“  
(Interview 6)

„Ich stehe zu den Zielen aus dem Koalitionsvertrag, der konkrete Klimaschutzziele für den Verkehrsbereich festlegt. Ich weiß aber, dass es auch noch andere Sektoren gibt, die ihren Beitrag leisten müssen.“ (Interview 7)

„Das Urteil für das Fahrverbot in Aachen beruht auf falschen Annahmen. Eine Messstation steht zu nah an einer Kreuzung. Sie ist rechtswidrig aufgestellt. Dagegen muss man jetzt vorgehen. Die Verkehrsminister von Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen und Hessen

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wollen die Standorte ihrer Messstationen aber nicht überprüfen lassen. Das ist geradezu skandalös. Alle Landesverkehrsminister bekommen deshalb noch einmal Post von mir. Man kann nicht einerseits mit dem Finger auf den Bundesverkehrsminister zeigen, wenn es um drohende Fahrverbote geht, sich aber gleichzeitig dagegen wehren, die Messstationen überprüfen zu lassen. Da wird Verantwortung abgeschoben. Ich erlebe Ähnliches auch bei der Bundesumweltministerin.“ (Interview 9)

„Ich finde es schade, dass die Koalition gemeinsam etwas aushandelt und dass der gute Kompromiss, den die Kollegin mit ausgehandelt hat, von ihr anschließend bei jeder Gelegenheit zerrissen wird. Ich will, dass diese Koalition erfolgreich arbeitet. Dieses Interesse kann ich aber nicht bei allen erkennen. Frau Schulze ist hier eher Problemmacherin als Problemlöserin.“ (Interview 9)

„Ich nenne keine Namen, aber die Deutsche Umwelthilfe und andere verfolgen diese Strategie zum Schaden der Bürger und der Arbeitsplätze.“ (Interview 8)

„Das Fahrrad ist eine gute Alternative. Übrigens: Ich will den Fahrradverkehr stärker fördern. Wir brauchen mehr Radschnellwege. Für den Ausbau stellen wir in diesem und im nächsten Jahr jeweils weitere 25 Millionen Euro zur Verfügung.“ (Interview 2)

„Ich bin über die Etatplanung ganz und gar nicht sauer. Wir haben so viel Geld für Infrastrukturinvestitionen bei Verkehr und Digitalisierung wie nie zuvor – rund 60 Milliarden Euro bis 2021. Beim Breitband-Ausbau haben wir mit derzeit 4,4 Milliarden Euro das größte Zukunftsprogramm in ganz Europa. Ich werde jetzt Druck machen, damit das Geld auch vor Ort verbaut wird. Hier müssen die Verfahren vereinfacht werden mit unserer neuen Förderrichtlinie.“ (Interview 2)

„Zwei Gegenbeispiele: Wir stecken allein rund zwei Milliarden Euro Steuergeld in das Sofortprogramm und das Konzept „Saubere Luft“ für Städte, in denen die Grenzwerte überschritten sind. Und wir haben seit 2009 alternative Antriebstechnologien mit 5,2 Milliarden Euro gefördert.“ (Interview 8)

„Wir wollen die Gigabit-Gesellschaft. Dafür stellen wir den Gemeinden Milliarden zur Verfügung. Das Geld liegt auf dem Tisch, es muss nun endlich abfließen.“ (Interview 2)

„Wir werden auch die Chancen der Digitalisierung nutzen. Wir investieren 500 Millionen Euro in schlaue Verkehrsmanagement-Systeme, in Parkraumbewirtschaftung und vieles mehr. Da verbinden wir mobil mit digital.“ (Interview 4)

„Die Schadstoffbelastung in unseren Städten ist in den vergangenen Jahren um 70 Prozent zurückgegangen. Der Kraftstoffverbrauch der Fahrzeuge ist um 40 bis 50 Prozent gesunken. Außerdem haben wir mit dem „Sofortprogramm Saubere Luft“ ein schlagkräftiges Maßnahmenpaket aufgesetzt.“ (Interview 3)

„In den vergangenen Jahren ist die Schadstoffbelastung in den Innenstädten um 70 Prozent reduziert worden. Mein Vorgänger Alexander Dobrindt ist in höchster Konsequenz gegen die Abgasmanipulationen vorgegangen.“ (Interview 9)

„Um auf diesem Weg weiterzugehen und die Bahn noch attraktiver zu machen, brauchen wir auch im Fernverkehr der Bahn die Absenkung der Mehrwertsteuer auf Tickets von 19 auf 7

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Prozent. Damit entlasten wir die Bahnfahrer im Fernverkehr um sage und schreibe bis zu 400 Millionen Euro pro Jahr.“ (Interview 6)

„Wir haben auf der Strecke Berlin-München eine Verdoppelung der Fahrgastzahlen. Wir haben auf dieser Strecke schon 30 Prozent der Passagiere vom Inlandsflug zum Umstieg auf die Schiene bekommen. Zwischen Hamburg und Berlin fliegt quasi niemand mehr, weil die Bahnverbindung attraktiv ist.“ (Interview 6)

„Im März lag die Pünktlichkeit im Fernverkehr der Bahn bei 78,4 Prozent. Das sind fast drei Prozentpunkte besser als im Vorjahr.“ (Interview 6)

„Na ja, das ist eine sehr knappe Mehrheit von 51 zu 47 Prozent. Die deutschen Autobahnen zählen zu den sichersten Straßen auf der ganzen Welt. Warum sollte man ein System verändern, das sich über Jahrzehnte bewährt hat?“ (Interview 7)

„Ein Tempolimit auf unseren Autobahnen würde den gesamten CO<sub>2</sub>- Ausstoß in Deutschland um weniger als 0,5 Prozent senken. Deutsche Autobahnen sind die sichersten Straßen weltweit. Bereits 30 Prozent unserer Autobahn-Kilometer, nämlich 7640, haben ein Tempolimit. 18.150 Kilometer haben kein Tempolimit. Das System der Richtgeschwindigkeit funktioniert und hat sich bewährt.“ (Interview 8)

„Wir haben unsere Hausaufgaben in Rekordzeit gemacht. Die technischen Vorschriften für die Hardware-Nachrüstung liegen vor. Jetzt müssen die Nachrüst-Firmen liefern. Ich gehe davon aus, dass es im Sommer so weit sein wird.“ (Interview 7)

„Das ist genau die Sorge, die ich habe. Im politischen Berlin ergötzen sich alle an Diskussionen, die oft nichts mit der Lebenswirklichkeit der Menschen außerhalb der Hauptstadt zu tun haben. Die Bürger sind darüber echt verärgert – und stehen auf. Sie wollen, dass wir das Klima schützen und die Luft reinhalten, allerdings nicht mit Fahrverboten, Geschwindigkeitsbeschränkungen oder Steuererhöhungen. Die Bürger wollen in Freiheit leben.“ (Interview 7)

„Die Bürger sind schockiert davon, dass diskutiert wird, ob man ihnen das Auto wegnimmt oder zumindest stark entwertet. Aber es gibt eben Kräfte in diesem Land, die wollen erst den Diesel zerstören und dann den Benziner.“ (Interview 8)

„Ich hätte Ideen, die die Leute verärgern, gleich weggelassen. Nächste Woche diskutiere ich darüber mit den Arbeitsgruppenleitern und dem Chef der Plattform, Professor Kagermann. Ziel ist es, die Arbeitsweise zu überdenken und zu positiven Ergebnissen zu kommen - anstatt alte, abgelehnte und unrealistische Forderungen wie das Tempolimit wieder aufzuwärmen.“ (Interview 8)

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**Table A5.***Indicators for Blame Avoidance*

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Selected quotations in English

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

“This is exactly what I wanted: all those who are responsible for this area to come to a table and take on this responsibility together and not always play the game: On Sunday they are in favor but duck away on Monday.” (Interview 5)

“The CDU & CSU just say what is not possible. They don't make any alternative suggestions.” (Interview 3)

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**Peter Altmaier (BMWi)**

“Above all, we need more clarity on species and nature conservation legislation from the Environmental Ministry responsible for this. Blockages damage the energy transition and its acceptance here.” (Statement 1)

“Yes, we have agreed that we definitely want to achieve the 2030 goals. So, 55% CO<sub>2</sub> reduction and I am pretty sure that we will definitely achieve these goals in the area of electricity economy and in the area of industry (...) In the areas of buildings and transport we still have considerable backlog.” (Statement 5)

“The accusation that the expansion of the power lines is progressing slowly is correct and justified, but of course concerns everyone who was responsible for it before me and who has not accomplished to change it for many years. I made it a top priority. We have passed a network expansion acceleration law in parliament. We have adopted a joint action plan with the federal states (...) I am convinced that in 6 or 7 years from now we will have the most modern and well-developed power grids in Europe.” (Interview 2)

“China imitates about ten times as much CO<sub>2</sub> as Germany and that makes it clear that we also have to talk to China about which are the right steps.” (Interview 2)

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**Gerd Müller (BMZ)**

“We have to make Africa with our technology a green continent of renewable energy and not a black one of coal. What is crucial is a global energy turnaround and a turnaround in transport and construction technologies. Otherwise, the climate debate in Germany is nice for excitement, but irrelevant for the global climate.” (Interview 1)

“Global greenhouse gas emissions are at a record high and continue to rise. The wealthiest ten percent of the world are responsible for 50 percent of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Emerging markets like China and Indonesia are also having a significant impact on the climate.” (Interview 3)

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**Julia Klöckner (BMEL)**

“Farmers are wrongly held responsible for everything.” (Interview 1)

“Annual emissions from agriculture fell by 20 percent between 1990 and 2018, and livestock in Germany is decreasing.” (Interview 2)

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“Agriculture is responsible for seven percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions in Germany, other sectors - traffic, industry, energy - are far above that. And unlike these industries, agriculture and forestry have effective carbon dioxide-reducers, the soil and the forest.” (Interview 2)

“The causes of the insect decline are varied and complex, they by far do not only affect agriculture.” (Interview 2)

“For my department, I submitted a ten-point plan very early on in the climate cabinet with measures that the agricultural sector can take to protect the climate.” (Interview 2)

“As consumers, we have to bear in mind that farmers are not primarily landscape gardeners but produce what we need to live. And that is why it must not be that farmers who work hard every day are defamed as animal torturers and environmental offenders.” (Interview 1)

“The consumer at the checkout also has control over the type of economy he supports with his consumption and money.” (Interview 2)

“The industry itself sees its duty and has a vested interest in reliable, adequate harvests. Since it is above all a victim of climate change and feels the painful consequences early on.” (Interview 3)

“I have equipped the BVL with more staff and improved the work structures. In this way, we were able to completely reduce the time limits in the BVL area. The Federal Environment Agency produces current delays in time. That is part of the business area of the BMU.” (Interview 4)

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### **Horst Seehofer (BMI)**

“Look, I'm the Minister for Housing. If we had made the heating oil massively more expensive then I would have had an additional discussion about this whole rent issue that we already have ... in the metropolitan areas, the rent, exploding rent, no apartments ... Now in this situation, politics increases the rents, the ancillary costs, because of course that would have been passed on to the tenants and I could not represent that in any case.” (Interview 1)

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### **Andreas Scheuer (BMVi)**

“That's nonsense! For example, I will now present an electromobility legislative package (...). I do climate protection specifically. The Ministry of Justice must finally submit an apartment ownership law, which regulates the charging stations in the private sector. It has to be faster.” (After being called a brakeman; Interview 6)

“The verdict for the driving ban in Aachen is based on wrong assumptions. A measuring station is too close to an intersection. It is set up illegally. One has to take action. The transport ministers of Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen and Hesse do not want to have the locations of their measuring stations checked. This is downright scandalous.” (Interview 9)

“Ms. Schulze is more of a problem maker than a problem solver.” (Interview 9)

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“Deutsche Umwelthilfe and others pursue this strategy to the detriment of citizens and jobs.” (Interview 8)

“We have more money for infrastructure investments in transport and digitization than ever before - around 60 billion euros by 2021. With broadband expansion, we currently have the largest future program in Europe with 4.4 billion euros.” (Interview 2)

“The pollution in our cities has decreased by 70 percent in the past few years. The vehicle's fuel consumption has dropped by 40 to 50 percent.” (Interview 3)

“Citizens are really upset about it - and stand up. They want us to protect the climate and keep the air clean, but not with driving bans, speed restrictions or tax increases. The citizens want to live in freedom.” (Interview 7)

“Citizens are shocked that there is a discussion about whether to take the car away from them (...). But there are forces in this country who want to destroy the diesel first and then the gasoline engine.” (Interview 8)

“I would have left out ideas that annoy people (...). The aim is to rethink the way of working and come to positive results - instead of warming up old, rejected and unrealistic demands such as the speed limit.” (Interview 8)

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**Table A6.***Indicators for conflicting Belief Systems*

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Original quotations in German

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

„Die SPD ist mit der Forderung nach einem höheren CO<sub>2</sub>-Preis in die Verhandlungen mit der Union gestartet. In deren Verlauf haben wir uns wegen des Widerstandes der CSU nur auf zehn Euro einigen können. Aber der von mir favorisierte Startpreis lag bei 35 Euro je Tonne.“ (Interview 1)

„Na ja, ich habe ja einen anderen Preis vorgeschlagen. Und der neue, der jetzt vorliegt, ist an dem Modell, was ich vorgeschlagen habe, sehr nahe dran. Ich hatte 35 Euro vorgeschlagen und jetzt sind wir bei 25. Da ist, glaube ich, vollkommen klar, dass die Sozialdemokratie da mehr wollte, dass wir nach vorne gehen wollten.“ (Interview 2)

„Als ich vor knapp einem Jahr in meiner Humboldt-Rede einen sozial fairen CO<sub>2</sub>-Preis als ein mögliches Instrument für den Klimaschutz vorschlug, gab es noch einen Riesenaufschrei.“ (Interview 1)

„Als ich das vor knapp über einem Jahr gesagt habe, dass so was kommen muss, gab es noch einen riesen Aufschrei und die Mehrheit war dagegen.“ (Interview 2)

„Druck gibt es von allen Seiten. Ich kann mich noch gut erinnern, als ich mich letztes Jahr als erste und einzige in der Regierung für einen CO<sub>2</sub>-Preis ausgesprochen habe. Damals gab es einen ziemlichen Aufschrei.“ (Interview 7)

„Bis letzte Woche gab es noch laute Stimmen innerhalb der Koalition, die jede Art von CO<sub>2</sub>-Bepreisung abgelehnt haben.“ (Interview 7)

„Meine Ministerkollegen aus der Union sollen endlich sagen, was sie davon halten. Wenn sie bessere Ideen haben, dann bin ich offen dafür. Wir brauchen jetzt einen Wettbewerb der Ideen und nicht mehr diesen Wettbewerb im Nein-Sagen.“ (Interview 3)

„Als ich im Frühjahr das Klimaschutzgesetz vorlegte, hieß es: ‚Das ist Planwirtschaft, das kommt auf gar keinen Fall.‘ Und ein CO<sub>2</sub>-Preis eigne sich für akademische Diskurse, nicht aber für praktische Politik.“ (Interview 1)

„Auch ich hätte mir sehr gewünscht, dass Wirtschaftsminister Altmaier die Verhandlungen mit den Energieunternehmen früher aufgenommen hätte.“ (Interview 1)

„Wir streiten uns ganz konkret über die Abstandsregelungen. Das ist ja auch öffentlich bekannt. Mir ist ganz, ganz wichtig und der SPD ist wichtig, dass über die Abstandsregelungen nicht verhindert wird, dass wir das 65-Prozent-Ziel erreichen, und darüber müssen wir noch reden, wie wir das genau hinbekommen.“ (Interview 2)

„Ich bin mit dem, was bisher vorliegt nicht zufrieden. Wir haben uns auf 1000 Meter Abstand geeinigt. Wir müssen jetzt aber die Details klären, weil das Ziel ist vollkommen klar: In 2030 wollen wir 65% Energie aus erneuerbaren Energien, aus Wind und Sonne haben. Dazu trägt das, was bisher vorliegt noch nicht ausreichend bei.“ (Interview 10)

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„Es ist ein Fiasko, dass der Windkraftausbau so stark ins Stocken geraten ist. Das Problem sind nicht nur Anwohnerklagen. Umfragen zeigen, dass die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung hinter dem Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien steht. Wegen der vielen Diskussionen ist die Verunsicherung der Investoren groß. Wirtschaftsminister Peter Altmaier muss deshalb ganz schnell für klare Rahmenbedingungen sorgen. Dass er so lange diskutiert hat, hat zur Verunsicherung beigetragen und viel Zeit gekostet. Das geht so nicht weiter.“ (Interview 9)

„Deutschland braucht den Ausbau der Erneuerbaren und keine neuen Blockaden. Das Land braucht mehr Windkraft an Land und auf dem Meer und keine Bannmeilen. Wir haben uns in der Koalition geeinigt, den Ausbau der Windkraft zu beschleunigen. Die Wende schaffen wir aber nur, wenn wir dafür den notwendigen Raum schaffen. Es wäre schön, wenn das auch in der Union endlich alle begreifen.“ (Interview 9)

„Ich kann es jedenfalls nicht verantworten, hier noch mehr Zeit zu verlieren.“ (Statement 1)

„Ich kann nicht länger auf die Befindlichkeiten der Union Rücksicht nehmen.“ (Statement 1)

„Das ist die derzeitige Situation. Und die Weichen stehen bisher auf ‚Weiter-so‘. Das darf so nicht bleiben. Für mich ist ein ‚Weiter-so‘ keine Option.“ (Parliaments Speech)

„Leider ist auf Seiten von CDU und CSU die Bereitschaft, wirklich effektive Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, bislang nicht sehr ausgeprägt. Im Bereich Verkehr, der für knapp 20 Prozent der Treibhausgasemissionen verantwortlich ist, passiert viel zu wenig, der Ausstoß steigt eher noch. Die Autos werden zwar etwas effizienter, gleichzeitig werden sie immer größer und leistungsstärker. Verkehrsminister Andreas Scheuer wird da liefern müssen. Klimaschutz ist eine große Chance für den Verkehrssektor, weil er unsere Unternehmen fitter macht und auch gut für die Lebensqualität in den Städten sein kann.“ (Interview 4)

„Ja, aber so geht das nicht. Wir haben eine klare Regelung im Koalitionsvertrag. Wir wollen aus Glyphosat aussteigen. Wir haben klar gesagt, dass wir das nicht irgendwann wollen, sondern in dieser Legislaturperiode und wir müssen jetzt die nächsten Schritte dafür gehen. Ja, sie hat ohne die Zustimmung von meiner Seite, von meinen Behörden, normalerweise machen wir das gemeinsam, sie hat ohne die Zustimmung meiner Behörden da eine Genehmigung ausgesprochen. Das geht nicht.“ (Interview 5)

„Ja, natürlich ärgert mich das. Das geht auch so nicht. Wir müssen etwas für den Insektenschutz tun. Ich habe ein Aktionsprogramm ja vorgelegt. Wir haben erst Eckpunkte und jetzt habe ich ein Aktionsprogramm vorgelegt. Es muss doch alle beunruhigen, was da passiert.“ (Interview 5)

„Deshalb habe ich die Förderung neuer Projekte aus meinem Haus auf Eis gelegt. Es gibt ein weiteres Programm, den Amazonasfonds, wo bisher vor allem Norwegen eingezahlt hat, aber auch Deutschland, über das Entwicklungsministerium. Norwegen hat seine Mittel jetzt ebenfalls auf Eis gelegt. Kann man in dieser Lage weiter deutsches Steuergeld in den Amazonasfonds stecken? Über diese Frage will ich mit dem Entwicklungsminister sprechen.“ (Interview 6)

„Sie wissen, dass die SPD für ein Tempolimit ist.“ (Interview 5)

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**Jochen Flasbarth (BMU)**

„Sehen Sie, das ist interessant, weil das Argument, dass das Klimaschutzgesetz keine Maßnahmen hat, da sind Sie ganz in der Übereinstimmung mit den CDU-Ministern, mit denen wir uns die ganze Zeit darüber streiten.“ (Interview 11)

„Das Gesetz - und deshalb wird es ja auch so sehr bekämpft - ist nämlich genau andersrum. Es ist erstmals so, dass es Konsequenzen gibt...“ (Interview 11)

„Ja gut, da habe ich aber eine Antwort drauf: Dann sollen sie ordentlichen Klimaschutz machen. Dann brauchen sie auch nichts zu zahlen.“ (Interview 11)

„Der Entwurf des Gesetzes liegt dort seit Februar. Das sind die Regeln, die wir uns gegeben haben, dass wir das Kanzleramt nicht von den Ministerien aus mit Gesetzesinitiativen überraschen, sondern die sollen das vorher kriegen und dann geht es in die Ressortabstimmung. So, und das hat aber irgendwann auch mal seine Grenze und deshalb haben wir es in die Ressortabstimmung gegeben.“ (Interview 11)

„Ich sage nur, dass die Schäden, die im Augenblick auftauchen, weit überwiegend außerhalb unseres Landes stattfinden und das war ein großes Missverständnis. Ich finde das zutiefst unanständig, weil wir natürlich Teil - sogar ein gewichtiger Teil - dieser Probleme sind. Manchmal sagen ja Leute - nicht die Fridays for Future... die ändern, dass wir ja nur für 2% der Emissionen weltweit verantwortlich sind (...) was unglaublich viel ist und vor allem, weil unser pro Kopf CO<sub>2</sub> Ausstoß höher ist als in den allermeisten Ländern der Welt. Und vor allem weil es die Industrieländer - wie auch Deutschland - sind, die in der Vergangenheit sehr viel dazu beigetragen haben.“ (Interview 11)

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**Berthold Goeke (BMU)**

„Denn, das will ich an der Stelle auch nochmal sagen, es wird häufig argumentiert, Deutschland habe nur 2% Anteil an Emissionen. Da kann man erstmal drauf antworten, aber wir haben auch nur ein Prozent der Weltbevölkerung. Also haben wir schon das Doppelte ja. Der zweite Punkt ist, wir haben natürlich durch unsere erfolgreiche industrielle Entwicklung ganz massiv dazu beigetragen, dass wir jetzt so viel Treibhausgas in der Atmosphäre haben und der entscheidende Punkt ist, wir müssen einerseits der Welt zeigen, dass wir unsere moralische Verantwortung wahrnehmen und gleichzeitig auch die Technologien entwickeln, damit andere davon profitieren können.“ (Interview 12)

„Also, ich erlaube mir an dieser Stelle auch mal ein Zitat von Goethe zu verwenden: Es genügt nicht zu wissen, man muss auch anwenden. Es genügt nicht zu wollen, man muss auch tun. Das betrifft zum einen die Politik, ja. Die sich auch dann dazu durchringen muss, eine Transformation ja, eine Veränderung ja voranzubringen, die auch erstmal den Menschen etwas abverlangt.“ (Interview 12)

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**Peter Altmaier (BMW)**

„Wir müssen als Regierung mehr tun beim Klimaschutz. Mit diesem Vorschlag schaffen wir das aber nicht: Weil er viele belastet, ohne den CO<sub>2</sub>-Ausstoß nachhaltig zu reduzieren.“ (Statement 2)

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„Für mich ist wichtig, dass wir keine Arbeitsplätze verlieren und dass die ländlichen Räume nicht benachteiligt werden.“ (Statement 2)

„Deutschland muss dafür weiterhin eine Führungsrolle einnehmen. Unsere Klimaschutzpolitik darf aber keine Arbeitsplätze gefährden oder dazu führen, dass sie ins Ausland verlagert werden - dorthin, wo Umweltstandards niedriger sind als bei uns. Das wäre industriepolitisch falsch und klimapolitisch verheerend.“ (Interview 1)

„Wir müssen das Klima schützen. Wir wollen aber auch unsere wirtschaftliche Stärke in Europa weiter bewahren.“ (Interview 2)

„Klimaschutz wird dann nur funktionieren, wenn unser Wohlstand dadurch nicht gefährdet wird.“ (Statement 9)

„Ja. Wir sollten im Grundgesetz festschreiben, dass die Beiträge für alle Sozialversicherungen insgesamt nicht über 40 Prozent steigen dürfen. Ähnlich wie wir auch eine Schuldenbremse in der Verfassung haben. Dann können sich Unternehmer darauf verlassen, dass die Sozialabgaben für sie bezahlbar bleiben, wenn sie neue Arbeitsplätze schaffen. Die Erfahrung lehrt, wenn die Sozialabgaben länger über 40 Prozent steigen, stellt sich der Effekt ein, dass die Zahl der Arbeitsplätze sinkt und unter dem Strich weniger Geld in die Sozialkassen fließt. Das müssen wir vermeiden.“ (Interview 1)

„Wir müssen klug vorgehen und nicht polarisieren und ideologisieren.“ (Statement 9)

„Das Ganze ist ja eine neue Erfahrung und ich persönlich bin immer der Auffassung, dass es besser ist mit vorsichtigen Schritten zu gehen und dann gegebenenfalls ähm äh zusätzliche Programme oder Maßnahmen zu ergreifen als das Kind mit dem Bade auszuschütten.“ (Statement 5)

„Ich glaube nicht, dass es sinnvoll ist, über Einzelmaßnahmen zu diskutieren.“ (Statement 3)

„Kein einzelner Minister ist im Stande durch administrative Maßnahmen den CO<sub>2</sub>-Ausstoß zu reduzieren.“ (Statement 9)

„Klimaschutz geht uns alle an und deshalb müssen wir darüber gemeinsam reden. Wenn man mit Gesetzentwürfen vorprescht, dann dient das vielleicht der eigenen Profilierung, aber es dient jeden Fall nicht der Sache.“ (Statement 6)

„Die Umweltministerin hat einzelne Vorschläge auf den Tisch gelegt. Die sind in einigen Bereichen vielleicht mehr und den anderen weniger zielführend. Darüber diskutieren wir, aber das tun wir zunächst innerhalb der Bundesregierung.“ (Statement 8)

„Mich beunruhigt die Inflation der Ausgabewünsche der SPD enorm.“ (Interview 1)

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### **Gerd Müller (BMZ)**

„Der Klimaschutz entscheidet sich in Afrika und in den Schwellenländern. Afrika und Indien werden in 30 Jahren auf vier Milliarden Menschen anwachsen. Wenn künftig jeder Haushalt eine Steckdose auf der Basis von Kohle bekommt, müssten 1000 Kohlekraftwerke gebaut werden. Das hält der Planet nicht aus.“ (Interview 1)

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„In Afrika wird in den nächsten zehn Jahren so viel gebaut wie in Europa in den vergangenen 100 Jahren. Wenn das auf der Basis von Zement und Stahl passiert, dann führt das zu einem Vielfachen an Emissionen, die wir überhaupt nicht durch Einsparungen in den Industrieländern kompensieren können. Wir brauchen andere Baumaterialien, angepasste Verkehrstechnologien und vieles mehr.“ (Interview 1)

„Die Zukunft unseres Klimas entscheidet sich dabei maßgeblich in China, Indien und Afrika: Die Bevölkerung Afrikas und Indiens wird in den nächsten 30 Jahren auf vier Milliarden Menschen anwachsen. Hunderte Millionen Afrikaner haben aber bislang noch gar keinen Strom. Wenn zukünftig jeder Haushalt einen Stromanschluss auf der Basis von Kohle bekommt, müssten 1.000 neue Kohlekraftwerke gebaut werden. Das hält unser Planet nicht aus. Anstatt mit Kohle müssen die Entwicklungsländer ihren Energiehunger mit erneuerbaren Energien stillen. Um das zu schaffen, brauchen wir neue Impulse.“ (Interview 2)

„Wir werden das Klima nicht in Deutschland retten. Wir müssen international denken und handeln – und so Vorreiter sein. Klimapolitik heißt, in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer investieren. Afrika, Brasilien, Indien und China: Der Klimaschutz entscheidet sich maßgeblich dort.“ (Interview 3)

„Um das Zwei-Grad-Ziel zu erreichen, müssen verbindliche Reduktionsziele für einzelne Staaten verhandelt werden. Dabei sind Industriestaaten, Schwellenländer und Entwicklungsländer gefordert. Eine wichtige Frage ist dabei, wie der zukünftige Energiebedarf gedeckt wird und ein Ausbau regenerativer Energien gefördert werden kann. Deutschland spielt hier mit der Energiewende und innovativen Technologien international eine Vorreiterrolle.“ (Interview 5)

„Was übrigbleibt, wird mit Projekten in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern kompensiert, vor allem durch den Aufbau erneuerbarer Energien und den Schutz und die Aufforstung von Wäldern. Denn dort sind Klimaschutzmaßnahmen besonders wirksam. Wir werden die Klimaziele nie erreichen, wenn Afrika und Indien ihren Energiehunger auf Basis von Kohle und Öl stillen. Vor allem Afrika muss zum grünen Kontinent der erneuerbaren Energien werden. Dafür brauchen wir zusätzliche Klimamittel, unter anderem für ein Technologieförderprogramm für erneuerbare Energien in Afrika. Wir werden das Klima nicht allein in Deutschland retten können.“ (Interview 6)

„Denn wenn der afrikanische Kontinent... jeder Haushalt Zugang zu elektrischem Strom bekommt, was wird den Afrikaner nicht zu werden können und diese auf der Basis von Kohle passiert, heißt das 1000 Kohlekraftwerke allein in Afrika und deshalb wird jedem deutlich, das wir daheim ambitioniert vorangehen müssen, aber den internationalen Aspekt nicht aus dem Auge verlieren dürfen. Und da ist der Entwicklungsminister gefordert in der internationalen Kooperation mit Afrika, den Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern.“ (Interview 7)

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### **Julia Klöckner (BMEL)**

„Eine pauschale 20 Prozentige Minusdüngung ist problematisch. Deshalb verhandeln wir intensiv mit dem federführenden Bundesumweltministerium und suchen nach fachlich sinnvollen Maßnahmen, die eher praktikabel sind.“ (Interview 4)

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„Das BMU fordert einen sogenannten Biodiversitätsausgleich. Derjenige, der Pflanzenschutzmittel einsetzt, soll zum Ausgleich 10 Prozent seiner Flächen aus der Produktion nehmen oder eingeschränkt bewirtschaften. Das ist verfassungsrechtlich problematisch und käme einer Enteignung gleich. Deshalb lehnen wir das ab. Das Bundesinnen- und das Bundesjustizministerium teilen unsere Haltung. Ich setze darauf, dass wir hier bald zu einer Einigung kommen, sonst kommen wir mit der Minderungsstrategie nicht weiter. Das kann auch nicht im Interesse des BMU sein.“ (Interview 4)

„Übrigens auch ohne eine CO<sub>2</sub>-Steuer, die die Umweltministerin vorgeschlagen hatte und jetzt wohl auch nicht mehr weiterverfolgt. Diese Steuer ist unnötig.“ (Interview 5)

„Mein Vorschlag liegt seit April auf dem Tisch. Und mein Eindruck ist, dass das Thema gerne für emotionale Debatten und Alleingänge herangezogen und genutzt wird. Dabei sind Kollegin Schulze und ich uns einig, was das Ziel angeht: Eine möglichst rasche Reduzierung und Überflüssigmachen der Nutzung von Glyphosat.“ (Interview 5)

„Wir brauchen eine Politik, die Lösungen erarbeitet und nicht eine, die Stimmung macht und die Leute aufhetzt.“ (Interview 5)

„Denn im Ziel sind wir uns mit dem BMU einig: der Minderung des Glyphosateinsatzes. Dabei hilft es auch nicht in der Sache, bereits geregelte Zuständigkeiten wieder einmal in Frage zu stellen.“ (Interview 6)

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### **Horst Seehofer (BMI)**

„Das alles ist ja außerhalb der Diskussion. Es geht um die CO<sub>2</sub>-Bepreisung und da muss ich jetzt sagen - ist nicht nur meine Meinung sondern war sehr stark die Meinung der ganzen CSU, der 4 Leute die da verhandelt haben: der Markus Söder, der Alexander Dobrindt der Andi Scheuer und ich, wir waren der Meinung, dass man die Bepreisung machen soll, aber das man sanft einsteigen soll und allmählich erhöhen soll.“ (Interview 1)

„Eins ist klar: Wohnen muss bezahlbar bleiben. Das ist für mich neben dem Klimaschutz ein gleichwertiges Ziel. Ich werde mich deshalb nur für solche Maßnahmen einsetzen, die beides sicherstellen.“ (Statement 1)

„Ich halte das nicht für zweckmäßig.“ (In Bezug auf Klimaschutzgesetz; Statement 1)

„Ich habe viel Verständnis für den Green Deal und stimme ihm auch zu. Aber die gemeinsame europäische Asylpolitik ist für die Zukunft Europas mindestens von gleicher Bedeutung.“ (Statement 2)

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### **Andreas Scheuer (BMVi)**

„Die ersten Pläne von Frau Schulze für ein Klimaschutzgesetz kann ich nicht akzeptieren. Dafür kann es keine Zustimmung der Union geben. Ich bin gegen starre Jahresvorgaben für jedes Ressort zur Reduzierung von Emissionen. Das ist Ökoplanwirtschaft.“ (Interview 1)

„Es gibt rechtliche, finanzielle und technische Bedenken gegen Hardware-Nachrüstungen. Die darf man nicht einfach ausblenden. Bei niedrigen Temperaturen fällt die Schadstoffreduktion überschaubar aus. Hinzu kommen Leistungsverlust und höherer Kraftstoffverbrauch. Die Kosten belaufen sich auf mehr als 5000 Euro pro Fahrzeug. Das

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Geld würden wir in alte Fahrzeuge investieren, nicht in neue Technik. Besser wären attraktivere Umstiegsprämien der Hersteller. Darüber sprechen wir mit der Industrie.“ (Interview 2)

„Kollegin Schulze sieht die Sache einfach anders, ebenso wie ihr Ministerium. Wir tauschen uns weiter aus. Aber man muss auch mal die Kirche im Dorf lassen. Unser Maßnahmenpaket für saubere Luft hat ein Volumen von einer Milliarde Euro. Da geht es um schadstoffarme Stadtbusse, intelligente Verkehrsleitsysteme, Elektrofahrzeuge und Digitalisierung. Immer wieder Hardware-Updates zu fordern, löst bei den Verbrauchern Panik aus.“ (Interview 2)

„Das ärgert mich! Mit solchen Parolen werden Verbraucher nur in Panik versetzt und verunsichert. Handwerksmeister, die mit Dieselfahrzeugen unterwegs sind oder finanziell schwächer Gestellte mit älteren Autos können sich nicht einfach einen Neuwagen leisten. Sie würden erheblich benachteiligt.“ (Interview 3)

„Sie (Schulze) behauptet, es sei kein Problem, dass ab 2019 Hardware-Nachrüstungen beginnen könnten. Tatsache ist: Bei Nachrüstungen gibt es riesige technische und rechtliche Fragen. Wir machen jetzt sehr zügig die Vorschrift, dann erst werden die Produkte entwickelt. Ich werde nicht mehr zulassen, dass man sich jeden Tag äußert – ohne die dafür nötigen Kenntnisse zu haben.“ (Interview 9)

„Ich habe meine Kenntnisse auf Basis von technischem Know-how, das ich hier im Ministerium habe. Das haben andere in der Form nicht. Genau das werde ich entsprechend klarstellen.“ (Interview 9)

„Ich finde es schade, dass die Koalition gemeinsam etwas aushandelt und dass der gute Kompromiss, den die Kollegin mit ausgehandelt hat, von ihr anschließend bei jeder Gelegenheit zerrissen wird. Ich will, dass diese Koalition erfolgreich arbeitet. Dieses Interesse kann ich aber nicht bei allen erkennen. Frau Schulze ist hier eher Problemmacherin als Problemlöserin.“ (Interview 9)

„Die Zukunft der Mobilität liegt nicht in Einschränkungen – und ein generelles Tempolimit ist eine Einschränkung. Auch zum Klimaschutz würde Tempo 130 auf Autobahnen nur geringfügig beitragen.“ (Interview 7)

„Ein Tempolimit auf unseren Autobahnen würde den gesamten CO<sub>2</sub>- Ausstoß in Deutschland um weniger als 0,5 Prozent senken. Deutsche Autobahnen sind die sichersten Straßen weltweit. Bereits 30 Prozent unserer Autobahn-Kilometer, nämlich 7640, haben ein Tempolimit. 18.150 Kilometer haben kein Tempolimit. Das System der Richtgeschwindigkeit funktioniert und hat sich bewährt.“ (Interview 8)

„Solche Aussagen lassen mich mit dem Kopf schütteln. Mit Botschaften der Reglementierung und der Bevormundung werden wir niemanden mitnehmen können. Ich will die Menschen von neuen Möglichkeiten der Mobilität begeistern, sie überzeugen. In anderen Ländern wird ganz anders über Mobilität diskutiert: Da höre ich nichts von Einschränkungen oder Verboten.“ (Interview 1)

„Ich will weniger Verkehr, aber mehr Mobilität. Was ich nicht will, sind Verbote, Einschränkungen und zusätzliche finanzielle Belastungen für Autofahrer.“ (Interview 1)

„Made in Germany steht für Qualität, Seriosität und Verlässlichkeit. Dieses für uns wichtige Image hat durch Fehlverhalten und Manipulationen krasse Kratzer bekommen. Mein

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Eindruck ist aber, dass jetzt alle sehr bemüht sind, für Klarheit und Wahrheit zu sorgen. Die Autoindustrie ist eine Leitindustrie für Deutschland. Da geht es um Zukunft und um Hunderttausende Jobs. Das bedeutet Verantwortung. Diese Erkenntnis setzt sich in den Chefetagen der Konzerne mehr und mehr durch.“ (Interview 2)

„Aber wir wissen auch, dass die Automobilindustrie die Leitindustrie in Deutschland ist, von der direkt und indirekt viele hunderttausende an Arbeitsplätzen abhängen. Von ihr sind auch weitere Branchen abhängig, wie die Logistik, der Maschinenbau, die Forschung und Entwicklung. Deshalb dürfen wir das Thema nicht derart zerreden, das zum wirtschaftlichen Schaden führt und Arbeitsplätze in Gefahr bringt.“ (Interview 5)

„Wichtig ist für mich dabei, dass wir als große Automobilnation federführend bleiben. Und das ist schwer genug. Die Konkurrenz in Fernost und den USA schläft nicht.“ (Interview 3)

„Ich bin sowohl gegen Fahrverbote als auch gegen die Blaue Plakette. Und mein Ministerium hat rechtliche, technische und finanzielle Bedenken gegen die Dieselumrüstung. Auch bei diesem Thema wird wieder Panik geschürt. Was soll sich denn eine alleinerziehende Mutter in München-Schwabing mit ihrem älteren Dieselfahrzeug denken? Dass ihr das Auto weggenommen wird, wenn sie nicht umrüstet? Jede Nachrüstregelung würde wieder zu den ersten zwei Themen führen: Man müsste die Fahrzeuge kennzeichnen und aussperren, die nicht nachgerüstet wurden. Und das will ich nicht.“ (Interview 4)

„Wir brauchen überzeugende, zukunfts-gerichtete Angebote, keine Verbote. Es gibt jede Menge Potenzial für die Verbindung von Klimaschutz und Mobilität, ohne dass man gleich den großen Hammer herausholen muss. Das müssen wir nutzen.“ (Interview 1)

„Fahrverbote sind eben nicht verhältnismäßig, wenn Maßnahmen ergriffen worden sind, die absehbar zu einer Unterschreitung des Grenzwerts führen werden.“ (Interview 1)

„Das Ziel heißt: keine generellen Fahrverbote. Wir wollen über ein Bündel an Maßnahmen erreichen, dass die Grenzwerte eingehalten werden.“ (Interview 5)

„Die Blaue Plakette ist der Einstieg in Fahrverbote. Allein eine Plakette auf der Windschutzscheibe reicht nicht, um die Grenzwerte in den Städten einzuhalten. Da ist kein Anreizsystem dahinter.“ (Interview 5)

„Das ist der Weg, den ich gehen will - anstelle von Verboten, Tempolimits oder dem Verteuern von Mobilität. Verbieten, Verteuern und Verteufeln ist der falsche Weg!“ (Interview 6)

„Totaler Quatsch! Saubere Luft und gute Mobilität gehören für mich zusammen, aber eben vernünftig und technisch machbar. Klar ist: Fahrverbote schränken den Alltag ein und machen die Bürger zornig.“ (Interview 8)

„Ich bin gegen Verbote und Einschränkungen, ich bin für Anreize.“ (Interview 9)

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**Table A7.***Indicators for conflicting Belief Systems*

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Selected quotations in English

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

“The SPD started negotiations with the Union with the demand for a higher CO2 price. In the course of this we were only able to agree on ten euros because of the resistance of the CSU. But the starting price I favored was 35 euros per ton.” (Interview 1)

“There is pressure from all sides. I can still remember when I was the first and only one in the government to vote for a CO2 price last year. Back then there was quite an outcry.” (Interview 7)

“When I presented the Climate Protection Law in spring, everybody said: This is planned economy, this will never be realized. Climate change targets for each sector were considered impossible by many in the Union.” (Interview 1)

“We (her and Peter Altmaier) are arguing very specifically about the distance regulations. That is also known to the public. It is very, very important to me and the SPD that the distance regulations do not prevent us from reaching the 65 percent target.” (Interview 2)

“It is a fiasco that the expansion of wind power has stalled so much. (...) Minister of Economics Peter Altmaier must therefore quickly ensure clear framework conditions. The fact that he had been debating for so long contributed to the uncertainty and cost a lot of time. That cannot go on like this.” (Interview 9)

“Germany needs the expansion of renewables and no new blockades (...) We agreed in the coalition to accelerate the expansion of wind power. However, we can only turn the tide if we create the necessary space. It would be nice if everyone in the Union finally understood that.” (Interview 9)

“My fellow ministers from the Union should finally say what they think of it. If they have better ideas, I'm open to them. We now need a competition of ideas and no longer this competition of saying no.” (Interview 3)

“The course has so far been on 'keep it up'. It can't stay that way. For me, 'keep going' is not an option.” (Parliaments Speech)

“Unfortunately, the willingness of the CDU and CSU to take really effective measures has so far not been very pronounced. Far too little happens in the transport sector, which is responsible for almost 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions (...) Transport Minister Andreas Scheuer will have to deliver. Climate protection is a great opportunity for the transport sector because it makes our companies fitter and can also be good for the quality of life in cities.” (Interview 4)

“We have a clear regulation in the coalition agreement. We want to get out of glyphosate. We have clearly said that we do not want this at some point, but in this legislative period (...). Yes, she (Julia Klöckner) (...) has given a permit without the consent of my authorities (...) of course that annoys me. That doesn't work either. We have to do something about insect protection (...) It must worry everyone what is happening there.” (Interview 5)

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**Jochen Flasbarth (BMU)**

“But it is not a question of wanting to prevent anything that the Minister of Transport or the Minister of Economy intends to do. Our problem is the other way around, that they are not doing enough.” (Interview 11)

“Then they should do proper climate protection. Then they don’t have to pay anything.” (Interview 11)

“There are already major damages to the climate damage in the world(...). I find that profoundly indecent, because of course we are part - even an important part - of these problems. Sometimes people say (...) that we are only responsible for 2% of emissions worldwide (...) which is an unbelievable amount and above all because our per capita CO2 emissions are higher than in most countries in the world. And because it is the industrialized countries - like Germany - that have contributed a lot in the past.” (Interview 11)

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**Berthold Goeke (BMU)**

“It is often argued that Germany only has a 2% share of emissions. One can answer first, that we only have one percent of the world's population. So, we already contribute double. The second point is, of course, through our successful industrial development, we have made a huge contribution to the fact that we now have so much greenhouse gas in the atmosphere and the crucial point is that we have to show the world that we are fulfilling our moral responsibility and at the same time develop the technologies, so, others can benefit from them.” (Interview 12)

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**Peter Altmaier (BMWi)**

“As a government, we have to do more about climate protection. But we cannot do this with this proposal: Because it harms many people without sustainably reducing CO2 emissions.” (Statement 2)

“It is important to me that we do not lose any jobs and that rural areas are not disadvantaged.” (Statement 2)

“We have to protect the climate. But we also want to continue to maintain our economic strength in Europe.” (Interview 2)

“Germany must continue to play a leading role in this. However, our climate protection policy must not endanger jobs or lead to them being relocated abroad...” (Interview 1)

“Climate protection will only work if it does not jeopardize our prosperity.” (Statement 9)

“Personally, I believe that it is better to take careful steps and then take additional programs or measures if necessary than to throw the child out with the bathwater.” (Statement 5)

“Climate protection concerns us all and that's why we have to talk about it together. If one goes ahead with bills, it may serve to raise the own profile, but it definitely doesn't help.” (Statement 6)

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**Gerd Müller (BMZ)**

"We will not save the climate in Germany. We have to think and act internationally - and thus be a pioneer. Climate policy means investing in developing and emerging countries. Africa, Brazil, India and China: climate protection is a crucial decision there." (Interview 3)

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**Julia Klöckner (BMEL)**

"The BMU calls for a so-called biodiversity compensation. Those who use pesticides should take 10 percent of their land out of production or farm it restrictedly to compensate. This is problematic under constitutional law and would amount to expropriation. We reject that." (Interview 4)

"This will enable us to achieve our savings target for the industry of up to 14 million tons by 2030. Incidentally, even without a CO2 tax, which the Environmental Minister had proposed and will probably no longer pursue now. This tax is unnecessary." (Interview 5)

"My proposal has been on the table since April. And my impression is that the topic is often used for emotional debates and solo attempts. Colleague Schulze and I agree on the goal: to reduce the use of glyphosate as quickly as possible and make it superfluous." (Interview 5)

"We need a policy that works out solutions and not one that creates mood and incites people." (Interview 5)

"We are in agreement with the BMU on the goal: to reduce the use of glyphosate. It does not help in the matter to question the already regulated responsibilities again." (Interview 6)

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**Horst Seehofer (BMI)**

"All of this is outside the discussion. It's about the CO2 pricing and I have to say now - is not just my opinion but was very strong the opinion of the whole CSU, (...) we were of the opinion that the pricing should be done, but that you should start gently and gradually increase." (Interview 1)

"One thing is clear: living must remain affordable. In addition to climate protection, this is an equivalent goal for me. I will therefore only work for measures that ensure both." (Statement 1)

"I have a lot of understanding for the Green Deal and I also agree with it (...). But the common European asylum policy is at least of equal importance..." (Statement 2)

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**Andreas Scheuer (BMVi)**

"I cannot accept Ms. Schulze's first plans for a climate protection law. There can be no Union approval for this. I am against rigid annual targets for every department to reduce emissions. That is eco-planned economy." (Interview 1)

"There are legal, financial, and technical concerns about hardware upgrades. One cannot just hide them." (Interview 2)

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“Ms. Schulze simply sees things differently, as does her Ministry. We continue to exchange ideas. But that is going too far. Our package of measures for clean air has a volume of one billion euros. It's all about low-pollution city buses, intelligent traffic control systems, electric vehicles and digitization. Demanding hardware updates again and again triggers panic among consumers.” (Interview 2)

“That annoys me! Such slogans only panic and unsettle consumers. Master craftsmen who are traveling with diesel vehicles or those who are financially weaker with older cars cannot simply afford a new car. They would be significantly disadvantaged.” (Interview 3)

“She (Schulze) claims that it is not a problem that hardware retrofits can begin in 2019. The fact is: there are huge technical and legal questions about retrofitting (...). I will no longer allow her comment every day - without having the necessary knowledge.” (Interview 9)

“Well, that's a very slim majority of 51 to 47 percent (which is for a speed limit). The German motorways are among the safest roads in the world. Why should you change a system that has proven itself over decades?” (Interview 7)

“The future of mobility does not consist in limitations - and a general speed limit is a limitation. Tempo 130 on motorways would also make only a minor contribution to climate protection.” (Interview 7)

“But we also know that the automotive industry is the leading industry in Germany, on which hundreds of thousands of jobs depend directly and indirectly. Other sectors are also dependent on it, such as logistics, mechanical engineering, research and development. That is why we must not talk about the subject in such a way that it leads to economic damage and puts jobs at risk. Germany will continue to combine clean air and good mobility with highly developed products and make it an export hit.” (Interview 5)

“I want less traffic, but more mobility. What I don't want are prohibitions, restrictions and additional financial burdens for drivers.” (Interview 1)

“Such statements make me shake my head. We won't be able to take anyone along with messages about regulation and paternalism.” (about people abolishing cars; Interview 1)

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**Table A8.***Indicators for inappropriate Institutional Design*

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Original quotations in German

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

„Aber wir haben wichtige Grundlagen gelegt, die unter anderem die Art, wie Regierungen in Zukunft Klimaschutzpolitik machen werden, grundlegend verändern. Nach dem Klimaschutzgesetz wird nun jedes Jahr überprüft, ob wir auf dem richtigen Pfad sind. Fachminister, in deren Zuständigkeitsbereich die Ziele verfehlt werden, sind nun gesetzlich verpflichtet nachzusteuern und Sofortprogramme vorzulegen. Früher war es doch so: Die Umweltministerin musste allen auf den Zehen stehen, damit sie etwas tun. Jetzt ist für alle Ressorts klar, welches Ziel sie haben und wie viel CO<sub>2</sub> im jeweiligen Bereich eingespart werden muss. Sie sind verantwortlich.“ (Interview 7)

„Naja, das Neue ist, dass das jetzt eine Verantwortung der gesamten Regierung ist. Früher war dazu für die Umweltministerin zuständig, die musste immer allen auf den Füßen stehen und sagen, jetzt mach doch endlich was. Ja weil das Handeln nicht ja im Verkehrsministerium, im Bauministerium. Jetzt sind alle unmittelbar verantwortlich jeweils für ihren Bereich für den Klimaschutz und das ist was komplett Neues, das gab es bisher so nicht und deswegen ist das auch gar nicht so einfach umzusetzen, weil jetzt jeder liefern muss - jeder einzelne Minister. Also es wird deutlich verbindlicher. Klimaschutz ist jetzt Gesetz.“ (Interview 8)

„Wichtig ist mir, dass es nicht nur einmal Thema Klimaschutz, sondern jedes Jahr. Jedes Jahr werden transparent die Zahlen vorgelegt, jedes Jahr werden wir jetzt wieder darüber diskutieren und es ist jetzt endlich sichergestellt, dass wir die Ziele in 2030 auch wirklich erreichen.“ (Interview 10)

„Warum ist denn so wenig passiert bei Verkehr, Energie, Gebäuden oder Landwirtschaft? Ich sage: Weil die Verbindlichkeit für die einzelnen Bereiche fehlte.“ (Interview 4)

„Olaf Scholz ist der Finanzminister. Er ist nicht der Verkehrsminister, er ist nicht der für Gebäude zuständige Minister und deswegen müssen die Vorschläge aus den Ressorts dafür kommen. Niemand bekommt vom Finanzminister Geld einfach so, sondern man muss schon begründen, wofür, und das ist genau der Punkt, weshalb wir jetzt ein Klimaschutzgesetz brauchen. Es muss vollkommen klar sein, wer ist zuständig. Der Finanzminister ist nicht zuständig dafür, Konzepte für den Verkehrssektor vorzulegen. Das ist der Verkehrsminister.“ (Interview 5)

„Die gesetzliche Verbindlichkeit im Klimaschutzgesetz mit der klaren Ressortverantwortung für die Sektorziele des Klimaschutzes ist ein Riesenfortschritt.“ (Interview 7)

„Ich gehe davon aus und bin auch sehr froh darüber, weil damit bekommt Klimaschutz jetzt endlich verbindliche Regeln.“ (Interview 8)

„Das ist ganz klar vorgesehen für jeden einzelnen Bereich, also für den Verkehr, für die Gebäude gibt es feste Einsparziele und diese Ziele werden von Experten im Expertenrat überprüft, ob das wirklich eingehalten wird und wenn nicht, dann muss der zuständige Minister oder die Ministerin sofort handeln. Die muss ein Programm vorlegen, wie die Ziele

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denn dann noch erreicht werden können. Also, es ist ganz klar und verbindlich geregelt.“ (Interview 8)

„Klimaschutz wird jetzt endlich gesetzlich verankert. Es ist für jeden Bereich vollkommen klar wieviel CO2 jetzt noch ausgestoßen werden darf.“ (Interview 10)

„Es geht hierbei auch nicht um neue Macht für das Umweltministerium. Es geht um mehr Verbindlichkeit – für diese und für alle nächste Regierungen.“ (Parliaments Speech)

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### **Jochen Flasbarth (BMU)**

„Das soll davon getrennt gemacht werden, sondern das Klimaschutzgesetz soll die Grundarchitektur, also die die Grundpfeiler des Klimaschutzes in Deutschland neu aufstellen und das Wichtigste dabei ist, dass wir endlich dafür sorgen, dass diejenigen, die Verantwortung für bestimmte Politikbereiche tragen, auch in diesen Bereichen Klimaschutzmaßnahmen verbindlich vornehmen müssen und wenn sie es nicht tun, dann auch die negativen Folgen – nämlich Strafzahlungen tragen müssen. Das ist die Grundstruktur.“ (Interview 11)

„Wenn ich zurückblicke auf die Zeit, ist der Grund warum wir im Klimaschutz nicht schnell genug vorangekommen sind, dass Umweltminister von dem, was sie an Möglichkeiten haben, immer zu schwach sind im Vergleich zu Kabinettkollegen, die den Klimaschutz nicht ernst nehmen. Und das wollen wir mit dem Gesetz ändern und dann kommen auch die Maßnahmen, denn wenn ein Verkehrsminister oder Wirtschaftsminister, eine Landwirtschaftsministerin keine Maßnahmen vornehmen. dann werden sie es zu spüren bekommen.“ (Interview 11)

„Es geht aber auch gar nicht darum, dass wir irgendetwas verhindern wollen, was der Verkehrsminister oder Wirtschaftsminister vorhat. Unser Problem ist doch genau umgekehrt, dass sie nicht genug tun und das können wir nicht aktiv herbeizwingen und deshalb brauchen wir Regeln, mit denen Verantwortungslosigkeit in bestimmten Politik Bereichen eben nicht mehr für den jeweiligen Minister - ich spreche jetzt gar nicht über aktuelle. Das ist ja ein Mechanismus, den wir über viele Jahre haben wollen und wir müssen es zusammenbringen, dass diejenigen, die Verantwortung tragen... haben sie dann auch nutzen für den Klimaschutz und wenn sie es nicht tun, dass sie zu spüren bekommen.“ (Interview 11)

„Ich kann nur sagen, wir haben mit den Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern des Ministeriums, die alle genauso wie ich wahnsinnig darunter leiden, dass wir so eine schlechte Klima Bilanz haben... wir haben etwas auf den Tisch gelegt, von dem wir glauben, dass damit strukturell Deutschland seine Klimaschutzziele einhalten kann, weil dann die Ministerium zu den konkreten Maßnahmen, die von den beiden Kolleginnen eingefordert worden sind, dann auch kommen müssen. Im Augenblick ist es so, dass wir eine Ressort Abstimmung eingeleitet haben, die vom Kanzleramt nicht gewünscht war und dass die Inhalte des Klimaschutzgesetzes auch derzeit noch von Teilen der Bundesregierung abgelehnt werden.“ (Interview 11)

„Das tue ich und es ist genau Ergebnis dieser Analyse, warum ist es eigentlich so, dass Umweltministerin und Umweltminister in den letzten sogar 20 Jahren nicht erfolgreich genug gewesen sind? Weil das ist ja keine neuere Entwicklung, sondern seit 20 Jahren reicht in keinem einzigen Jahr die jährliche Minderung aus, um unsere Klimaschutzziele wirklich zu erreichen. Mit Ausnahme der Wirtschaftskrise, der Finanzkrise 2009, 2010. Das hat aber

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nichts mit Umweltpolitik zu tun, sondern einfach was mit Gaunern, die die Weltfinanzmärkte durcheinandergebracht haben. So, und deshalb haben wir überlegt: Wie kann man eine ein Gesetz so konzipieren, dass es nicht nur 4,5,6 sinnvolle Maßnahmen hat, sondern dass es strukturell die Politik in die Lage versetzt, gute Ergebnisse zu liefern.“ (Interview 11)

„Das Gesetz - und deshalb wird es ja auch so sehr bekämpft - ist nämlich genau andersrum. Es ist erstmals so, dass es Konsequenzen gibt...“ (Interview 11)

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### **Berthold Goeke (BMU)**

„Da war ich ein bisschen erschrocken nach dem Motto: wenn du als Bundesbeamter ein bisschen in der Situation bist, jetzt ein Gesetz gemacht, das wird schon laufen. Ist aber nicht so und kann man auch keinem vorwerfen. Wir brauchen die Strukturen und die Strukturen werden nur dann geschaffen, wenn der Vollzug auch sozusagen entsprechend einfach gemacht werden kann. Also, Ordnungsrecht kann nur seine Wirkung entfalten, wenn es auch konsequent vollzogen wird.“ (Speech Klima Salon)

„Es wird aber darüber hinaus eine Debatte darüber geben, wer trägt denn eigentlich auch in der Bundesregierung die Verantwortung dafür, wenn wir unsere Minderungsverpflichtung insgesamt nicht erfüllen. Und Frau Schulze hat das ja auch mehrfach angekündigt, wir denken gerade oder bearbeiten ein Klimaschutzgesetz - das habe ich jetzt als zusätzliches Vorhaben nicht angeführt. Ein Klimaschutzgesetz, wo wir gerade auch die Zuordnung der Verantwortlichkeiten in den einzelnen Sektoren zu den Ministerien regeln wollen. Das heißt, wenn wir im Baubereich, im Gebäudebereich nicht die Minderungsziele erreichen und das Geld kostet, dann soll das nach unserer Vorstellung der Haushalt, der Ministerien zahlen, die für dieses Gesetz zuständig sind. Im Verkehrsrecht der Verkehrsminister, im Baubereich der Wirtschaftsminister und der Innenminister. Also, sind sozusagen Debatten, die wir führen werden und von denen wir uns auch noch zusätzlichen Druck auf das tatsächliche Handeln versprechen.“ (Speech Klima Salon)

„Was mir aber zeigt, dass eben diejenigen, die sozusagen Geld für Investitionen bereitstellen, dass diejenigen erkennen, dass sich offenbar auch die Rahmenbedingungen verändern werden für Wirtschaften und das zeigt eben auch, dass das, was jetzt von der Politik von verschiedenen Ländern, von der Europäischen Union, von Deutschland, von anderen hier vorgebracht wird, dass das als eine Veränderung auch der Märkte gesehen wird, worauf man sich einstellen muss und dass eben Investitionen in fossile Energieträger keine Zukunft haben. Und man von dort aus sein entsprechendes Anlageverhalten verändern muss.“ (Interview 12)

„Also, wir können Klimaschutz nicht nur zum Erfolg führen mit gutem Willen und edlem Herzen, sondern es müssen auch die finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen dafür da sein, dass es sich, dass diese Investition auch lohnen.“ (Interview 12)

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**Table A9.***Indicators for inappropriate Institutional Design*

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Selected quotations in English

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**Svenja Schulze (BMU)**

“We have laid important foundations that, among other things, fundamentally change the way governments will implement climate protection policies in the future. According to the climate protection law, it will now be checked every year whether we are on the right path. Ministers in whose area of responsibility the objectives are not met are now legally obliged to readjust and submit immediate programs. It used to be that way: The Environmental Minister had to be on everyone's toes to do something. It is now clear to all departments what their goal is and how much CO2 has to be saved in the respective area. They are responsible.” (Interview 7)

“Action lies in the Ministry of Transport, in the Ministry of Building. Now everyone is directly responsible for their area when it comes to climate protection and that is something completely new (...) So, it becomes much more binding. Climate protection is now law.” (Interview 8)

“It is important to me that the issue of climate protection is not just topic once, but every year. The figures are presented transparently every year, we will now discuss them again every year and it is now finally ensured that we will really achieve the targets in 2030.” (Interview 10)

“Why has so little happened to traffic, energy, buildings or agriculture? I say: Because there was no commitment for the individual areas.” (Interview 4)

“The legal obligation in the Climate Protection Law with the clear responsibility for the sector goals of climate protection is a huge step forward.” (Interview 7)

“This is not about new power for the Ministry of the Environment. It's about more commitment - for this and for all next governments.” (Parliaments Speech)

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**Jochen Flasbarth (BMU)**

“The climate protection is intended to reorganize the basic architecture, i.e. the cornerstones of climate protection in Germany and the most important thing is that we finally ensure that those who are responsible for certain policy areas, also must take binding measures in these areas to protect the climate and if they do not so, then also have to bear the negative consequences - namely fines.” (Interview 11)

“When I look back at the time, the reason why we have not progressed quickly enough in climate protection is that Environmental ministers are always too weak in terms of the opportunities they have compared to cabinet colleagues who do not take climate protection seriously.” (Interview 11)

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“But it is not a question of wanting to prevent anything that the Minister of Transport or the Minister of Economy intends to do. Our problem is the other way around, that they are not doing enough, and we cannot actively force them to do so, and therefore, we need rules with which irresponsibility in certain policy areas is no longer (possible) with the respective minister - I am not talking about current ones. That is a mechanism that we have had for many years and we have to manage that those who are responsible will use it for climate protection and if they do not, they will feel it.” (Interview 11)

“We have put something on the table that we believe will structurally help Germany meet its climate protection goals because then the Ministries will have to develop the specific measures that the two colleagues have requested.” (Interview 11)

“It is precisely the result of this analysis, why is it that the Environment Ministers have not been successful enough in the past 20 years? Because this is not a recent development, but for 20 years the annual reduction in no single year has been enough to really achieve our climate protection goals (...) So, and that's why we considered: How can we draft a law in a ways that it not only has 4,5,6 sensible measures, but that it structurally enables politicians to deliver good results.” (Interview 11)

“The law - and that's why it is fought so hard - is the other way around. It is the first time that there are consequences...” (Interview 11)

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### **Berthold Goeke (BMU)**

“We need the structures and the structures will only be created if the implementation can be made correspondingly simple, so to speak. So, regulatory law can only be effective if it is consistently enforced.” (Speech Klima Salon)

“There will be a debate about who is actually responsible in the Federal government if we do not meet our overall reduction commitment. (...) We are currently (...) working on a climate protection law (...) where we also want to regulate the allocation of responsibilities in the individual sectors to the ministries. That means that if we do not achieve the reduction targets in the building sector and it costs money, then in our opinion, the budget of the ministries that are responsible for this law, should pay (...). So, there are debates that we will have and from which we hope to put additional pressure on our actions.” (Speech Klima Salon)

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### A10. Codebook for Bachelor Thesis

Research Question: Why do responsible Federal Ministries in Germany resist important policy changes, such as crucial commitments regarding the climate crisis?

**Administrative reluctance:** a catch-all code for all administrative reluctance - situations in which Federal Ministries resist important policy changes regarding the climate crisis

**Policy failure:** a catch-all code for all policy failures

**Climate package:** a catch-all code for all policies and regulations regarding the climate package

**Types of failures:** these are codes that describe the types of failures that arise in the context of the German climate policy.

Code	When to use
Miss the target	Code generally not achieving goals
Opposition	Code opposition/ criticism is great and/or support is virtually non-existent
Program failure	Code implementation runs against the objectives, the set targets are not achieved, losses for the target groups, valued criteria are not fulfilled
Political failure	Code losses regarding electoral prospects, political benefits, support, reputation and compromised direction of government
Process failure	Code inability to design favored policy goals and instruments or to form legitimacy, a functional coalition and support for the process, limits of control and organization, ineffective decision-making and implementation

**Roles:** these are codes which describe what different actors' responsibilities and duties are with respect to climate policies.

Code	When to use
Role (Ministry)	Duties and responsibilities of the German federal ministries vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (Bureaucrats)	Duties and responsibilities of German bureaucrats/ civil servants vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis

Role (Climate Cabinet)	Duties and responsibilities of the Climate Cabinet vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMU)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMVi)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of Transport vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMI)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of the Interior vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMW i)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of Economics vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMEL)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry for of Agriculture vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis
Role (BMF)	Duties and responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of Finance vis-a-vis policy changes and commitments regarding the climate crisis

**Barriers:** these are codes which describe what the core barriers are

Code	When to use
Barrier (uncertainty)	Consequences of climate crisis are uncertain
Barrier (prevention)	Preventive measures are difficult to implement as positive effects are not always visible
Barrier (institutional design)	The current institutional design and structures are not appropriate to deal with the climate crisis
Barrier (lack of clear responsibilities)	There is a lack of clear responsibilities among key actors
Barrier (lack of accountability)	There is a lack of accountability among key actor when it comes to missed targets/ policy failure
Barrier (lack of control mechanism)	There is no control mechanism for achieving the goals (including monitoring and sanctioning)

Barrier (administrative routines)	Current administrative routines hinder an efficient dealing with the climate crisis
Barrier <b>(Belief systems)</b>	There are colliding belief systems among key actors
Barrier (coordination)	There is a lack of coordination among key actors
Barrier (cooperation)	There is a lack of cooperation among key actors
Barrier (disagreement)	Key actors cannot agree on important policies
Barrier (no limitations/regulations)	Key actors resist measures that include limitations or regulations in any form
Barrier (no burden on consumers)	Key actors resist measures that put a burden on consumers in any form (e.g. financial)
Barrier (no burden on car industry)	Key actors resist measures that put a burden on the industry in any form (e.g. financial)
Barrier (no burden on economy)	Key actors resist measures that put a burden on the economy in any form (e.g. financial)
Barrier (no burden on farmers)	Key actors resist measures that put a burden on farmers in any form (e.g. financial)
Barrier (risk of job losses)	Key actors resist measures that might risk job losses
Barrier (needs to be solved internationally)	Key actors think that the issue needs to be solved internationally instead of nationally as a domestic policy
Barrier <b>(Blame avoidance)</b>	Key actors actively exercise blame avoidance and/or use corresponding strategies

**Behavior:** these are codes which describe the behavior of key actors


Blaming others	Key actors blame others for undesirable developments
Downplaying of own impact	Key actors play their impact down regarding undesirable developments
Emphasizing own efforts	Key actors emphasize their own efforts regarding taken measures
Wanting more	Key actors want more than what has been achieved so far
Willing to compromise	Key actors are willing to compromise

## Declaration of Authorship

I hereby certify that the thesis I am submitting is entirely my own original work except where otherwise indicated. I am aware of the University's regulations concerning plagiarism, including those regulations concerning disciplinary actions that may result from plagiarism. Any use of the works of any other author, in any form, is properly acknowledged at their point of use.

Name: Celine Strufe

Date of Submission: 01.07.2020

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. Strufe', is written above a solid horizontal line.

Signature