



**European Committee
of the Regions**

Political Interest vs. Regional Interest in the European Committee of the Regions

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Abstract

When it was created in 1994, no political group existed in the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). From the third plenary session onwards, the formation of political groups started (Farrows & McCarthy, 1997). In July 1995, there were four political groups within the CoR. In 2013 the ECR Group was integrated into the CoR, additionally. In 2020 the Green Group was integrated into the CoR and has not been discussed in academic literature so far. This thesis deals especially with these additional integrated political groups in the CoR and addresses the research question: *“To what extent are the final opinions of plenary sessions of the European Committee of the Regions dominated by political groups?”* To answer this question, the amended opinions of plenary sessions of the CoR are evaluated. Overall, this analysis contributes to the literature on the CoR by discussing the domination of political groups in EU policymaking and by analyzing the decision-making in the CoR. The presented research problem is of social relevance, as it discusses EU-Citizens adequate representation at EU level.

List of Abbreviations

Commission	European Commission
CoR	European Committee of the Regions
EA	European Alliance
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
EC Treaty	Treaty establishing the European Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
ELDR	European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
PES	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
RE	Renew Europe

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1 Introduction

“Together, we must make our Committee the bridge between Europe and its citizens.”
(Tzitzikostas, CoR President, 2020, p.2)

The CoR was set up to give a voice to the European cities and regions and to make them heard by the European Parliament (EP), the Council and the European Commission (Commission). Originally, its main task was to ensure representation of the individual interests of the diverse regions united in the European Union (EU). Since then, the CoR has been granted consultative status and has no means of enforcing its preferences beyond the power of its arguments (Neshkova, 2010). One of the desires expressed by the regions in the planning phase of regional representation was that the CoR should act as a consultative body (Schönlau, 2017). As a means of representing the interests of the regions, it can therefore hardly increase in importance (Sturm, 2006), especially as its opinions are not binding for the Council and the Commission. Even though the core idea of the CoR was to have an official representation for the regions only, there are national party and country meetings as well as the formation of European political groups taking place within the CoR (European Committee of the Regions, 2020c). Hence, the members of the CoR are divided according to political parties, a division that is becoming increasingly important. Given the increasing politicization of EU affairs, the political groups in the CoR also have increasing influence on the internal organization of work, which is reflected in the decision to change seating arrangements reflecting the political affiliation of the CoR members, in contrast to the former alphabetical seating order (Christiansen & Lintner, 2004). Having said that, the question arises as to whether there is a clash between political interests and the interests of the specific regions to be represented. This leads to the following research question:

“To what extent are the final opinions of plenary sessions of the European Committee of the Regions dominated by political groups?”

This thesis will focus on two events in the CoR: the 11th of April 2013 when the political ECR Group was integrated into the CoR (ECR Group in the Committee of the Regions, 2020), and the 11th of February 2020 when a Green Group was formed in the CoR (Schulz, 2020). Thus, in 2020 there are altogether six political groups: the ECR Group, the Green Group, the European Alliance Group (EA), the European People’s Party Group (EPP), the European Liberal Democrat Reform

Party Group (ELDR; now called Renew Europe), and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Group (PES) (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003).

Previously, the members of the Green Group were spread among the different political groups of the CoR or had been independent. This was because the formation of a new group in the CoR required at least 18 members from six different countries (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014). The Greens managed to bring together 20 members in the CoR in February 2020, since regional parliamentary elections changed the number of green representatives in the CoR. Ultimately, the creation of a green group was realized (Schulz, 2020).

To analyse the domination of political groups on drafting opinions in the CoR, this thesis begins by presenting a body of knowledge about the CoR, its societal relevance and ambivalent nature. This is followed by an explanation of the applied research design. The analysis part of this thesis is divided into three steps focusing on the plenary sessions in 2005, 2012/2013 and 2019/2020. The results of the analysis are then compared and discussed to assess to what extent the political groups are influencing the CoR's opinions. Finally, the conclusion summarizes relevant findings, answers the research question, and gives suggestions for further studies.

2 Theoretical Framework

In order to address the objective of this thesis, relevant literature will be used to introduce the topic and the associated scientific relevance. It will follow a body of knowledge about the origin and design of the CoR. To conclude the framework, the democratization and representation in the CoR in regard to its ambivalent nature is going to be discussed.

2.1 Relevant literature and scientific relevance

In his article Christiansen (1996) assesses activities of the CoR one year after its creation. He focuses on expectations and demands that were expressed at the outset, and on the representative, advisory, and symbolic functions the new body could perform. Christiansen (1996) compares the CoR with its forerunner, the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities, created by the Commission in 1988, which had members appointed by pan-European associations of local and regional authorities. He found that its deliberations turned out to be frequently divided along the following division lines: (1) left versus right party politics; (2) local versus regional representatives; (3) executive regionalism versus deliberative regionalism; (4) urban/industrial regions versus rural regions; and (5) northern versus southern regions. Therefore, he expected similar division lines for the CoR and drew up an analysis based on this theory. He found a recognition of political party affiliations of committee members. So, for example, christian-democrat and socialist members of the CoR met in a party caucus before plenary sessions. This therefore constituted an attempt to use established party-political procedures. However, he concluded that they failed to become significant due to a lack of cohesion of the political groups. This was reflected by the formulation of opinions, where it was difficult to find disagreements generated by left-right differences among regions. To sum up, in this early period of the CoR, Christiansen (1996) did not find political party affiliation to dominate sectional interests so as to influence the outcome of voting in the committee (Christiansen, 1996).

After the research by Christiansen (1996), Hönnige & Kaiser (2003) further investigated cleavages with regard to nations, parties, and territories, which had previously been mentioned by Christiansen (1996) but not investigated yet (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). They found that 75% of the dominant proportion of amendments were introduced in the plenary sessions by national

delegations; 20% were proposed by members who belonged simultaneously to a national delegation and a political group; 5% were introduced by members belonging to a political group; and only 0.3% were proposed by members belonging to a territorial group. *“The main collective actors in the Committee of the Regions are therefore national delegations, with the political groups in second place.”* (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003, p. 16).

By conducting interviews, Hönnige and Kaiser (2003) found that the political groups in the CoR tried to enforce party discipline in order to ensure the group's cohesion in political matters. They thereby tried to influence voting behaviour by discussing the decision-making behaviour and recommending how to vote. Party discipline developed in a spontaneous process and increased in all four groups even though - with the creation of the CoR - a non-partisan working method based on national delegations was pursued. Indeed, in the first years of the CoR, nobody expected that parties would ever play a role in this new EU institution representing the regions (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). This approach was reflected by the alphabetical order of seats. Party discipline developed in all four political groups, namely in the groups of the EA, the EPP, the ELDR (today RE), and the PES.

At the time of the research carried out by Hönnige and Kaiser (2003), there were the above-mentioned four political groups in the CoR. There are a few publications focusing on cleavages in the CoR. From which the most known are articles by Hönnige and Kaiser (2003), Christiansen (1996) and Hooghe and Marks (1996). Unfortunately, this research is already outdated and does not consider recent developments in the CoR. However, there is no research on the situation in the CoR after the inclusion of two additional political groups. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the influence of political groups has increased over the last years due to the integration of two new political groups into the CoR.

By questioning this, the current thesis contributes to the academic discussion in several ways. Firstly, to the academic discussion about the influence of political groups in EU policymaking. Secondly, decision-making in the CoR. And thirdly, to the academic relevance of multilevel governance in the EU.

2.2 Origin of the CoR

In order to get to the bottom of the central research question of this thesis, one has to look back at the origins of the CoR.

In 1987, the Single European Act came into force with the aim to remove barriers and increase harmonization and competitiveness among its member countries. Since then, regional governments have been involved in implementing the increasingly complex EU legislation more often. Therefore, the regional governments have demanded more information on policymaking at European level. As a response, the Commission proposed the idea of a separate committee for regions. This was widely seen as an attempt to bypass the Member States and create a "Europe of the regions" which would ultimately give more influence to sub- and supranational levels of governance at the expense of national levels. Hence, Member States with strong regional governments pushed for a strong CoR, whereas Member States with regional governments characterised by a weak power were rather sceptical about the whole idea or tried to propose a regional dimension in the existing European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) (Schönlau, 2017). To fill the gap between the regional governments and the EU, and to make the EU's political decision-making process more democratic, the CoR was implemented within the Maastricht treaty in 1993 (Neshkova, 2010).

In accordance with the Council Decision 2014/930/EU, the Committee of the Regions was created as an EU body that consists of 329 members and an equal number of alternates. "The members and alternates shall be representatives of regional and local bodies. They shall hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or shall be politically accountable to an elected assembly. They may not be bound by any mandatory instructions and shall be completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the Union." (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014, p.1).

Officially, representatives and alternates are appointed by the Council on a proposal from the Federal Government (Sturm, 2006). As a subsidiary body, the CoR, like the EESC, is part of the Community legislative procedure. The EC Treaty - establishing the European Community - stipulates in which cases the CoR must be heard by the Council and the European Commission. The CoR may be consulted by the Council, the Commission and the EP, when these institutions

draft legislation on local and regional government issues such as health, education, employment, social policy, economic and social cohesion, transport, energy and climate change (European Union, 2020). Additionally, the CoR may issue its own opinions when it considers that regional interests are involved in proceedings (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016).

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the CoR can also be heard by the EP, so that the CoR and the EP exercise control over the Council and the Commission (Sturm, 2006). The Treaty of Amsterdam was not the only reform that contributed to broadening the scope of mandatory consultation and increasing the administrative autonomy of the CoR (Degen, 1998).

Moreover, the Treaty of Nice (2003) further increased the Committee of Regions' representativeness. It reformed that the members of the CoR must be politically accountable to a regional authority, to ensure that members of the CoR represent the preferences of their electorate on a regional basis. This approach was reinforced by the fact that members of the CoR also represent a level of government that is close to citizens, so that social ties make politicians also emotionally accountable (Neshkova, 2010).

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) further strengthened the role of the CoR. Since then, the CoR must be consulted at all stages of the EU legislative process. If the CoR considers that its rights or local, regional and national governments have been neglected, with the Lisbon Treaty gives it the right to bring EU legislation before the European Court of Justice (European Committee of the Regions, 2020).

2.3 Design of the CoR

Plenary sessions are at the heart of the CoR. In the CoR plenary sessions, CoR members (or their alternates) from regions and cities from all 27 EU countries meet five times in a year averagely in order to vote on opinions, reports and resolutions (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). The plenary also adopts the CoR's political program at the beginning of each term. Members, vice-presidents and the president of the CoR Bureau are also elected during plenary sessions. In addition, CoR revenues and expenditures are also approved and, if necessary, the rules of procedure are amended and adopted.

Another important point in each plenary session is the appointment of rapporteurs. To this end, the CoR commission in question appoints one of its members as rapporteur, who drafts an opinion on a legislative proposal. This particular opinion will then be voted on at the next CoR plenary session.

With the help of the CoR's political work, the influence of regional and local authorities in Europe on the EU legislative procedure aims to be strengthened (European Committee of the Regions, 2020d). This is because the Commission hears the CoR at the earliest possible stage in the European legislative process, in policy areas directly affecting local and regional authorities. As an additional instrument, the CoR can also express an own-initiative opinion on a specific policy topic (European Committee of the Regions, 2020d).

In general, the democratic process of the CoR's political work can be described in three steps: First, the CoR President assigns a dossier to the relevant commission. In a second step, a CoR member is appointed as rapporteur. This rapporteur drafts an opinion and submits it to the members of the relevant commission for discussion, amendment, and adoption. The draft of this opinion is presented and discussed at the next plenary session. In a third and final step, the opinion will be sent to the EU institutions in the event of a successful adoption by the CoR members within the plenary session (European Committee of the Regions, 2020d).

After the opinion has been successfully adopted by a simple majority, it will be sent to the Council and the EP to guarantee the democratic process and the representation of the cities and regions in the bureaucratic procedure in the EU (European Committee of the Regions, 2020e).

As soon as the legislative process has sufficiently advanced, the impact of the adopted opinions on the legislative process will be measured. This is done with an annual impact report from the CoR, which analyses the political impact of the CoR's opinions on the Commission, the EP and the Council. Moreover, the CoR press office monitors the media impact of the opinions, as around 150 CoR events annually help to improve the impact of CoR opinions and resolutions on the EU legislative process.

As an example, the most current impact report of 2018/2019 shows that 78 opinions were adopted by the CoR in 2018. This reflects support of the CoR for the EP and the Commission in legislation, political challenges, and cross-cutting issues (European Committee of the Regions, 2019). The report also emphasizes the Committee's close link to the overall political agenda of the EU in 2018. Furthermore, the participation of Presidents of European institutions, commissioners and ministers of the national government in CoR plenary sessions is evaluated, which underlines the CoR's influence in the legislative process (European Committee of the Regions, 2019). Overall a rather positive impact is reported.

2.4 Legitimacy and societal relevance of the CoR

The CoR's impact on the legislative process is closely related to the representativity and contribution of democratic processes at EU level, as the CoR represents the regional level in the political system of the EU. This subchapter discusses how the CoR improves the representativeness and legitimacy of the EU as a whole. The legitimacy of this body in relation to the research question is very important, as this thesis is motivated by the relevance of the adequate representation of society by the CoR.

Filling the lack of legitimacy

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty merits closer consideration, since it lays down that the functioning of the EU shall follow a representative democracy. Representative democracy in the EU is designed to be twofold. On the one hand, the "citizens" of the EU are represented directly by the EP, and on the other hand, the EU "Member States" are represented in the Council by their heads of state and in the Council of Ministers by their government representatives (Cooper, 2013).

The legitimacy of democratic governance is characterized by representativeness. For the justification of political decisions, reference is made to the representative character, which considers whether the institutions and persons involved consider the decision to be lawful. The electoral context contributing to adequate representation is weak on EU level because EP elections are second-order national elections, since candidates from national and not EU factions are voted

on (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). One of the main approaches in the academic debate on the weakness of party-voter ties in the EU is internal dissent in European parties, as they are often portrayed as having internal divisions on European issues. This is due to a disparity between the dividing lines in the national context that led to parties' establishment and the new dividing lines on European issues. The lack of an electoral link in the EU is generally seen as an important cause of legitimacy problems (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). With regard to the EU, its democratic deficit is a common catchphrase that says that the EU's political work is not sufficiently democratically legitimized (Pollak, 2007).

A lack of legitimacy results from the asymmetry of the inputs and outputs in political processes. Regarding the CoR, there is, on one hand, a non-transparent nature of regional policy, in which important inputs are represented by administrators in a multilevel environment. On the other hand, there is the political nature of outputs such as financial transfers, economic development and structural funds that particularly affect regions. The CoR filled this lack of legitimacy by providing an advisory space that shows the general public that in particular, regional politics are dealt with by politicians of the specific regions and not by anonymous bureaucrats. It can be expected that regular and public meetings of elected regional representatives, who will advise the subject, will fill part of the legitimacy shortfall (Christiansen, 1996). Legitimacy is achieved by all actors involved through publicly documented cooperation. If there is anything to criticize, Commission officials and members of the Council Working Group can contact the CoR's regional representatives who have been consulted on specific issues. The regional representatives can argue against their local citizens about controversial measures from "distant Brussels" that they have done their best in Brussels for their local interests (Christiansen, 1996).

The CoR can make a significant contribution to legitimacy by improving the effectiveness of European policies. How far the CoR contributes to added legitimacy and the common good is the subject of the next paragraph.

Added legitimacy for Europe's regions

The creation of an arena for regional participation in EU policy must be seen as an important innovation, precisely because much of EU policy is not transparent. The crucial added value of the CoR is the additional legitimacy that its creation offers to both voters and those consulted (Christiansen, 1996). The CoR acts as a territorial representative for the Council and the EP in addition to their national and supranational orientation at third level (Christiansen, 1996). As a foundational thought behind the creation of the CoR was the idea of strengthening the link between EU citizens and the EU institutions by having representatives for regional and local governments, close to the citizens. The aim was for citizens to be represented by politicians in Brussels that they somehow know (Christiansen, 1996). In addition, CoR members can present themselves as natural guardians of the principle of subsidiarity, as they represent the levels of authority closest to the people.

In summary, the CoR is more than just a representative of the interests of the Member States. The role of the committee goes beyond the representation of political interests or the making of political recommendations. The CoR's role is also to strengthen the legitimacy of the actors involved. In this way the CoR simultaneously improves the legitimacy of the political process of the EU itself. The CoR thus also has a symbolic political impact on the institutional structure of the EU (Christiansen, 1996). So, the CoR acts in the interest of society as a whole and is thus of high societal relevance. However, to guarantee adequate representation of Europe's regions, regional interest representation is required, not political group interest representation. Hence, the aim of the members of the CoR should be to represent their region in order to safeguard subsidiarity democratically and not to follow the interest and the guidelines of the political group they belong to. Therefore, the research problem is of high social relevance for EU Citizens, as it is about their adequate representation at EU level. How far political groups have an influence on an ambivalent representation in the CoR will be discussed in the following section.

2.5 Political groups contributing to an ambivalent institution

Within the CoR, not only regional interest plays a role as originally intended, but also political interest represented by political groups. This ambivalence of political group interest domination in the body of the CoR that is supposed to support regional interest in the EU will be discussed in this chapter. First, political affiliations in the Commission and Council will be examined in order to investigate whether there are similar political affiliations as in the CoR and the EP. Secondly, the party structure of the EP will be examined, because the political groups in the CoR were formed on the model of the party structure in the EP. Then the rules of procedure of the CoR, with regard to political groups, are discussed in order to point to the ambivalent nature of the CoR.

Political affiliations in the Commission and the Council

The Council consists of representatives of national governments, so the link with national parties is obvious. Apart from occasional independent ministers, the representatives of these governments are mostly elected as national party members. Some studies on voting behaviour within the Council have shown that voting is mostly based on North-South cleavages (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). There is also evidence that policy-making is influenced by sectoral interests, with ministers deviating from general or governmental positions on a subject (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). Further research has shown that only a small part of the left-right cleavages agenda can be assigned, since there is rarely a dominant number of leaders from a certain party family with consistent views in the Council (Tallberg & Johansson, 2008).

Research has also provided evidence that national party affiliation plays a role in the selection of the commission, despite the fact that the contracts contain the notion of independent commissioners (Döring, 2007; Thomson, 2008; Wonka, 2007). Thus, the CoR is not the only ambivalent EU-institution regarding the impact of political groups.

However, there is no transnational party leadership structure or transnational party control of the agenda neither in the Commission nor in the Council. The Presidency of the Council can steer the legislative agenda in the Council, but it cannot keep initiatives off the ground. The situation is similar in the Commission, where the President of the Commission can influence the work but does not control the majority of votes in the College (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008).

Overall, the studies on voting behavior in the Council and the Commission confirm that party affiliations play a role in both institutions, whereby party politics are less visible in the Commission. These findings reinforce the assumption that political groups also play a role in the CoR.

Political groups in the EP

The EP has a leadership made up of transnational party groups. The President's office and the 14 Vice Presidents are divided between the transnational party groups according to their political strength. In the EP, loyalty to the transnational party plays a role in the distribution of reports and committee memberships. However, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are torn between their loyalty to the national party, which is important for their future careers, and the transnational party group, which can be critical to their political goals. The few studies available indicate a partisan effect in lowering the transaction costs of negotiations, which leads to a faster resolution of the legislative process (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). In terms of political power, it is more likely that a politician can shape politics as a MEP. This is due to the way the EP works. MEPs are more independent in their work as politicians than their national counterparts, as the Commission in the EP does not have a majority in its national parliaments compared to national governments (Hix, 2008). Some studies find that the leaders of transnational party groups are able to discipline their members for voting errors, while others emphasize the importance of national party delegations for the discipline of MEPs (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008).

In general, the empirical literature shows that although parties play a role in the EP, they are not always the dominant actors (Hix, 2008; Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008). The established policy restrictions partly explain, on the one hand, why national parties have come together to form groups in the EP and, on the other hand, why the powers to set the agenda have been delegated to the leaders of these. This could also explain the approximation of partisans in the CoR (Hix, 2008).

Political groups in the CoR

The partisans and political groups work in the CoR as follows. Each CoR member can select a political group in the CoR it can affiliate to. According to Rule 9 in the CoR's Rules of Procedure, at least 18 CoR members (or alternates) are required to form a political group, at least half of which must represent a fifth of the Member States. A member (or alternate) may not belong to more than one political group. When the number of members for a political group falls below the required number of 18 members, the political group is disbanded. In addition, the political groups and their offices can meet and hold extraordinary meetings before or during the plenary sessions. These far-reaching rights create ample room for political groups to influence their members politically. However, if a CoR member decides not to join a political group, they will only receive administrative support from the CoR (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014). In accordance with Rule 9 point 7, detailed regulations are then determined by the Presidium on the proposal of the Secretary General. This shows that it is already assumed that CoR members will join a political group in order to reduce the administrative burden by handing it over to the political groups. Nonetheless, the European parties behind the political groups gain influence by holding meetings with their members, where they refer to the political guidelines of their mother parties. This assumption is supported by the respective official websites of half of the political groups, namely EPP, PES and RENEW, as they draw a close link to the political programs of their respective mother organizations.

The EPP Group's aim is to increase the influence and efficiency of the CoR through its contacts with the other EU institutions. Therefore, the EPP party, the family of the political centre-right, to which the EPP Group belongs, is a major contact point. On its official website, the EPP Group states that the EPP party counts on its Groups in the EP and the CoR to promote and defend its values (EPP Group In The European Committee Of The Regions, 2020). This reflects the tight link in the work between the EPP Group and its mother organization.

Also, the RENEW Group draws a close link to its mother organization ALDE, as it aims to ensure the representation of liberal objectives in the political positions of the CoR. In order to achieve these liberal goals and contribute to a liberal EU, the RENEW Group describes acting with its

liberal family of the associated European group ALDE (Renew Europe. - Committee of the Regions, 2020).

The PES Group presents itself as a collective striving for a progressive European vision characterized by solidarity, and territorial and social cohesion. With its work in the CoR, the PES Group aims to achieve its political priorities, which cover a wide range of policy areas (PES Group in the European Committee of the Regions, 2020). The extent to which the political priorities are influenced by the political program of the mother party of the PES Group is not apparent. However, a partnership between the PES Group and the associated party S&D is recorded on the website of the PES Group and therefore suggests a collaboration between the two organizations.

This stands partially in contrast to Rule 7 of the CoR's Rule of Procedure about National delegations and political groups, which emphasizes that: "National delegations and political groups shall contribute in a balanced way to the organisation of the Committee's work." (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014, p.42). How far the political groups contribution in the CoR is overbalanced will be analysed in the further course of this work.

3 Research design

To answer the research question, relevant literature and *ex-post* evaluation research is combined. The *ex-post* evaluation analysis is based upon official amendment sheets from the CoR, reflecting twelve past plenary sessions. As the analysis is based on official documents, the occurrence of bias is rather low in comparison to other research methods, such as the conduction of interviews and surveys.

The voting behaviour of a politician is hard to predict because it can depend on different issues. A Rapporteur in the CoR can vote as a delegate, a trustee, a partisan, a politico and according to regional, national, or political group interest. This thesis is objectively analysing the majority formation but cannot consider changes in individual voting behaviour. Therefore, the occurrence of factional amendments will be analysed since they are presupposing a decision in favour of an amendment by the members of the CoR because they need to be handed in before the plenary sessions and not as an *ad hoc* reaction.

Furthermore, it is necessary to mention that there are on average five plenary sessions per year (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003) with a very fluctuant member base in the CoR due to the dependence of members on regional and national elections based on different electoral cycles. Therefore, changing members are in the nature of the CoR. However, this fact will not weaken the results of this analysis because the existence of political groups remains.

The topics of presented opinions in the CoR vary from plenary session to plenary session. For example, the opinions can be very specific and only of importance to insular regions and sometimes they refer to global interests, such as the latest UN decisions. Therefore, some plenary sessions include more opinions with a global or European focus, whereas other plenary sessions are characterised by a majority of regional interest opinions and hence impact the amendment structure. To overcome incoherence and to obtain valid results, the analysis will be based on four plenary sessions for each of the two integration steps and for the plenary sessions in 2005. The decision to focus on four plenary sessions for each integration step will be explained more thoroughly in the next paragraph. The variety of policy fields to be discussed in the CoR can lead to dissent among the political groups. For example, when opinions are discussed in a plenary session on an issue which is in the interest of all political groups, there may be a tendency to have

fewer amendments from political groups than when more controversial opinions are adopted. Since there is no evidence for this assumption, a subdivision in the evaluation considering the topic of the amendments will not be considered, as it is believed that the average amounts investigated will outweigh this distortion.

The *ex-post* evaluation considers all opinions from the 59th, 60th, 61st and 62nd plenary sessions in 2005, all opinions from the 98th, 99th, 100th and 101st from 2013, as well as all opinions from the 136th, 137th, 138th and 139th plenary sessions from 2020. The Green Group joined the CoR only recently and only two plenary sessions with their presence have taken place since then. These two sessions will therefore be used for the analysis. Two further plenary sessions occurred before the integration of the Green Group and will therefore also be analysed to ensure a fair comparison. Following the same reasoning, four further plenary sessions to be compared have been chosen for the ECR group. The oldest recordings of plenary sessions in the CoR are publicly available for 2005. For this reason, this year was chosen to evaluate the early plenary sessions. The amendments of the opinions are at the heart of the analysis, as the decision-making process is problematic when conducting research in the CoR, since the minutes of the CoR meetings do not report on the distribution of votes among the CoR members. Instead, the amendments on opinions entail information about the member of the CoR or the political group that signed and supported the amendment. Therefore, evaluation of the submitted amendments is used in this thesis, as was done in other relevant academic research about the CoR (Hönige & Kaiser, 2003; Neshkova, 2010). The number of evaluated amendments varies from no amendment at all, to up to 196 amendments, thus a simple count of categories would dramatically distort results. Therefore, the percentage for the number of amendments is calculated. The proportion of the submitted amendments is presented by political groups and groups of individuals. “Amendments from a political group” refers to amendments submitted by one or more political groups. “Amendments from a Group of individuals” refers to a group of members of the CoR who together support an amendment albeit they share rural, urban, national, southern or northern interests. This thesis focuses primarily on the impact of political groups. Thus, urban, national and other cleavages are not of interest for this research. All opinions which were not amended were left aside, since in these cases neither political group interest, nor regional interest can be counted. Finally, the *ex-post* evaluation process of the amendments of CoR opinions is comprised of three steps. Firstly, it will be counted how many amendments per opinion from the above-mentioned plenary sessions in the CoR were

submitted by political groups or groups of individuals. Secondly, it will be reviewed whether the number of submitted amendments from political groups differ from the number of submitted amendments from groups of individuals. With this second step, the first sub-question will be answered:

Q1: *To what extent do the political groups in the CoR submit more amendments than individual members in the CoR?*

Addressing the first sub-question aims at obtaining a first insight into the degree of domination of submitted amendments from political groups in the CoR.

Thirdly, it will be analysed what extent the number of amendments from political groups and individual groups varies before and after each integration of a new political group. This is aimed at understanding whether the dominance of submitted amendments by political groups in the CoR increased with additional political groups in the CoR. Following this approach, the second sub-question will be answered:

Q2: *To what extent has the amount of amendments increased with the increase of political groups in the CoR?*

The sub-questions will be answered in the analysis, which is divided into three steps as follows. Firstly, it will be analysed how political affiliations worked in the early lifetime of the CoR, precisely in the years from 1992-2005. In a second step, the number of submitted amendments of the 98th and 99th plenary session, before the integration of the ECR Group, will be compared with those of the 100th and 101st plenary sessions in the CoR, with the presence of the ECR Group. In a third step, the amount of submitted amendments of the 136th and 137th CoR plenary sessions, before the integration of the Green Group, will be compared with the 138th and 139th CoR plenary sessions, with the presence of the Green Group.

4 Analyses

In the following paragraphs the amendments of opinions of the plenary sessions in the CoR will be analysed carefully in order to answer the sub-question of the research question. Firstly, the political affiliations in the early lifetime of the CoR from 1992 to 2005 will be evaluated and analysed. Secondly, the plenary sessions before and after the integration of the ECR Group will be analysed. Thirdly, the latest development in the CoR – the integration of the Green Group into the CoR – will be evaluated and analysed. Finally, discussion of the results of the analysis provides possible explanations for unexpected results.

4.1 Political affiliations in the early lifetime of the CoR

This chapter provides an analysis on how political affiliations have worked in the past by presenting results of former literature from 1992 to 2003 and an *ex-post* evaluation of four plenary sessions from 2005 in order to contribute to answering the first sub-question.

With the establishment of the CoR in 1992, there was a tendency to promote a non-partisan way of working (Christiansen, 1996). However, in 1996, the members of the EPP and PES held internal party meetings before the plenary sessions of the CoR. Thus, political party affiliations had developed already in 1996 (Christiansen, 1996). Spontaneously but steadily, the first parties began to develop from the first plenary sessions onwards (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). The three political groups PES, EPP and ELDR developed as a reflection of the composition of the respective political parties in the EP. Furthermore, the EA group was founded as a partnership between the European Free Alliance / Greens and the Union for Europe of the Nations. In this context, parties which are considered at national level in terms of their left-right divide came together at European level to form a "grand coalition" of European Socialists and the European People's Party. The political groups worked together in the CoR as their original parties had in the EP. There were nine politically independent members in the CoR in 1999. Thus, for the first 5 years of existence, the CoR developed from an intended non-partisan body to a body with four political groups on one side and nine independent members on the other side.

This development was reflected in debates on reforms of the CoR's rules of procedure considering political groups in the CoR: Members from federal Germany advocated strengthening the political

groups, while members from smaller, unitary states took the leading role in favouring the non-party mode (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). Finally, in 2000 changes were made to the CoR's Rules of Procedure (CdR 112000) acknowledging the existence of political groups in the CoR.

In 2003 political groups met on average for 20 hours per year and all four political groups had a detailed political program (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). However, the factions lacked cohesion and therefore did not become significant in the plenary sessions and for the political process (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). It can thus be determined that the results of the votes in the chamber could not be influenced by political affiliations. This assumption is supported by the fact that 20% of the dominant proportion of amendments were introduced in the plenary by members who belong simultaneously to a national delegation and a political group and 5% were introduced by members belonging to a political group in 2003 (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003). Hence, the main collective actors in the CoR have been primarily national delegations and secondly political groups (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003).

Interviewees in previous studies confirmed the assumed differences between political groups in terms of cohesion in relation to political positions and the heterogeneity of the composition. However, they reported that political groups in the CoR are trying to strengthen the group's cohesion in political matters by enforcing party discipline in the way of recommending decision-making behaviour. A similar pattern was evaluated for national delegations as well, which could explain the high influence of national delegations in the first place and political groups influence in the second place at this time (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003).

Evaluating the first ten years of existence of the CoR with a focus on political party affiliations, it can be summarized that political groups had little influence through amendments on the preparation of opinions. This is confirmed by the *ex-post* evaluation of the plenary sessions in 2005 as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1

Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals in the CoR in 2005

	59 th plenary session	60 th plenary session	61 st plenary session	62 nd plenary session	Total in 2005
Amendments from political groups	1.6	0	0	0	0.6
Amendments from groups of individuals	98.4	100	100	100	99.4

Table 1: *Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals in the CoR in 2005 (Compiled by the Author).*

In numbers, the share of submitted amendments in 2005 by political groups was 0.6% in comparison to 99.4% of submitted amendments by groups of Individuals. In the course of the 60th, 61st and 62nd plenary sessions, with a share of 0%, no amendments were submitted by political groups. The only exception is the 59th plenary session, in which political groups submitted a small proportion of 1.6% of all amendments. Based on these findings, the first sub-question ‘*To what extent do the political groups in the CoR submit more amendments than individual members in the CoR?*’ can be answered. To sum up, there is a big difference in the distribution of amendments tabled by political groups and groups of individuals, in that political groups, with the exception of the 59th plenary session, did not submit any amendments. Hence, the degree of interest domination of political groups in the CoR was insignificant in 2005.

4.2 Analyses of the interest domination of the ECR Group 2012/2013

The analyses of the integration of the ECR Group 2012/2013 firstly, evaluates the 98th, 99th, 100th and 101st plenary sessions. Secondly, the impact of the ECR Group as an additional political group in the CoR will be examined by comparing the amount of amendments from political groups before and after the integration of the ECR Group. For the first step of the analysis, Table 2.1 provides an overview of the proportion of submitted amendments in 2012/2013:

Table 2					
<i>Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and individuals in the CoR in 2012/2013</i>					
	98 th plenary session	99 th plenary session	100 th plenary session	101 st plenary session	Total in 2012/2013
Amendments from political groups	5.3	16.6	7.3	0.8	8.0
Amendments from groups of individuals	94.7	83.4	92.7	99.2	92.0

Table 2: *Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals in the CoR in 2012/2013 (Compiled by the Author).*

Table 2 shows that the values for the submitted amendments for the 98th and 100th plenary meetings are within the range of the average values for 2012/2013. During the 98th plenary session, 5.3% of the amendments were tabled by political groups and 94.7% of the amendments came from a group of individuals. In the course of the 100th plenary session, 7.3% of the amendments were handed in by political groups and 92.7% by a group of individuals. In 2012/2013, an average of 8% of amendments came from political groups and 92% from a group of individuals.

An exception can be found for the 99th and 101st plenary sessions. The 99th plenary session had a high percentage of political group amendments with 16.6%. Whereas the 101st plenary session only records 0.8% of amendments submitted by political groups.

Having analysed this, the first sub-question considering the difference in the proportion of amendments between the political groups and groups of Individuals can be answered: Less than a tenth of the submitted amendments in 2012/2013 came from political groups. Hence, political groups have not submitted more amendments than individual members of the CoR.

Next it will be analysed to what extent the number of amendments from political groups and individual groups differ before and after the integration of the ECR Group as an additional political group in the CoR. The ECR Group was integrated during the 100th plenary session. Therefore, a turning point between the 99th and 100th plenary sessions is expected. A comparison between the 98th and 99th plenary sessions with the 100th and 101st plenary sessions is visualized in Table 3:

Table 3

Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals before and after the integration of the ECR Group

	98 th & 99 th plenary sessions without the ECR Group	100 th & 101 st plenary sessions with the ECR Group
Amendments from political groups	22.0	4.0
Amendments from groups of individuals	78.0	96.0

Table 3: *Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals before and after the integration of the ECR Group (Compiled by the Author).*

As reflected in Table 3, an increase in amendments from political groups cannot be identified when comparing the proportion of amendments before the integration of the ECR Group (22%) with those after the integration of the ECR Group (4%). Since political groups submitted in the 98th and 99th plenary sessions 22% of all amendments and 4% within the 100th and 101st plenary session there is even an identifiable decrease in submission of amendments after the integration of the ECR Group. With an aim to understand whether the influence of factional interest in the CoR increased with an additional political group in the CoR, the second sub-question can be answered, by summarizing that the amount of amended opinions did not increase with an additional political group in the CoR in 2012/2013.

4.3 Analyses of the interest domination of the Green Group 2019/2020

This chapter evaluates the 136th, 137th, 138th and 139th plenary sessions and draws an analysis on the interest domination of political groups in 2019/2020. In addition, the interest domination of the integrated Green Group in the CoR will be assessed. Initially, Table 4 provides a first overview of the proportion of submitted amendments in the CoR in 2019/2020:

Table 4					
<i>Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals in the CoR in 2019/2020</i>					
	136 th plenary session	137 th plenary session	138 th plenary session	139 th plenary session	Total in 2019/2020
Amendments from political groups	18.9	25.2	38.1	24.5	25
Amendments from groups of individuals	81.1	74.8	61.9	75.5	75

Table 4: *Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals in the CoR in 2019/2020 (Compiled by the Author).*

The values presented in the Table 4 above show that the 138th plenary session entailed the highest contribution of amendments from political groups in 2019/2020 with 38.1%. Whereas the 136th plenary session had the lowest number of submitted amendments by political groups with 18.9%. In order to obtain a first insight into the degree of interest domination of political groups in the CoR it can be evaluated that on average 25% of amendments in the CoR in 2019/2020 were handed in by political groups. Regarding the first sub-question it should be underlined that one quarter of the amendments comes from a political group, or in other words, every fourth amendment is submitted by a political group. This shows that political groups by no means submit more amendments than groups of individuals, but that a significant proportion of the amendments were submitted by political groups within the 136th, 137th, 138th and 139th plenary sessions.

In the following section the impact of the integration of the Green Group will be analysed. The Green Group was integrated for the first time into the CoR within the 138th plenary session. Therefore, the expected turning point lies between the 137th and 138th plenary sessions and the beginning of an increase in amendments by political groups can be assumed for the 138th plenary session. Before the turning point, the 136th and 137th plenary sessions took place. Therefore Table 5 visualizes the proportion of submitted amendments on the one hand for the 136th and 137th plenary sessions and for the 138th and 139th plenary session, on the other hand, as follows.

Table 5

Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals before and after the integration of the Green Group

	136 th & 137 th plenary sessions without the Green Group	138 th & 139 th plenary sessions with the Green Group
Amendments from political groups	22.0	29.0
Amendments from groups of individuals	78.0	71.0

Table 5: *Proportion of amendments in % by political groups and groups of individuals before and after the integration of the Green Group (Compiled by the Author).*

Table 5 shows that on the one hand the proportion of amended opinions by political groups of the 136th and 137th plenary sessions reaches a share of 22%. On the other hand, the 138th and 139th plenary sessions with the Green Group integrated reach a proportion of 29%. Hence, there was an increase of submitted amendments by political groups after the turning point when the integration of the Green Group in 2019/2020 took place. Following this it can be said that the influence of factional interest in the CoR increased with an additional political group in the CoR in 2019/2020.

4.4 Discussion

This discussion provides possible explanations for contrary and unexpected results from the analyses. Thereby, it aims at answering the two sub-questions as part of a broader picture. The discussion follows the same order as the analysis, starting from the year 2005, then 2012/2013 and finally 2019/2020. The results answering the first sub-question are presented in a first paragraph and the results answering the second sub-question are presented in a second paragraph.

***Q1:** To what extent do the political groups in the CoR submit more amendments than individual members in the CoR?*

For 2005 a big difference in the distribution of submitted amendments by political groups and groups of individuals could be identified. However, these political groups did not submit any amendments except for the 59th plenary session. Hence, political groups did not make considerable use of participating in drafting opinions in the CoR in 2005. As considered by Hönnige and Kaiser (2003) a possible explanation can be drawn on the finding that political groups had not been able to become significant actors in plenary sessions, due to meetings that took an average 20 hours a year. Following this, it might be that a lack in meetings as well as lacking engagement by political groups in the plenary sessions might have influenced the submission of amendments by political groups in 2005 as well. However, this explanation contradicts the published political programs of the political groups that by then had existed already for some time indicating that political groups aimed at establishing further political intentions in the CoR (Hönnige & Kaiser, 2003).

In 2012/2013 the degree of interest domination of political groups grew in comparison to 2005, to the extent that less than a tenth of the submitted amendments were handed in by political groups in plenary sessions (Table 2). Even though political groups submitted on average more amendments than in 2005, they did not submit more amendments than groups of individuals in the CoR. This shows that the amendments tabled by political groups had increased since 2005. However, groups of individuals remain the dominant actors behind the final opinions.

Within the evaluation of 2019/2020 it was found that the amount of submitted amendments by political groups increased in comparison to the evaluation of 2012/2013 and 2005. Even though political groups did not submit more amendments than groups of individuals in 2019/2020, a proportion of 25% of the amendments were submitted by political groups. This means that on

average every fourth amendment in 2019/2020 came from a political group. In contrast in 2012/2013, every tenth amendment was handed in by a political group. This shows that the number of amendments submitted by political groups has more than doubled since 2012/2013. This development indicates that political groups are becoming noteworthy actors in the CoR. The analysed development indicates that the amount of submitted amendments by political groups could further increase in the next years in accordance with increase of the number of political groups. If so, then this development might lead to such an increase in amendments tabled by political groups, that half of all amendments could soon be submitted by political groups. Of course, this statement requires scientific support with further evaluations of the upcoming plenary sessions to discover where this trend is heading.

To return to the first sub-question which raises the question: *To what extent do the political groups in the CoR submit more amendments than individual members in the CoR?* It can be answered by concluding that political groups in the CoR do not submit more amendments than individual groups.

Q2: To what extent has the amount of amendments increased with the increase of political groups in the CoR?

Regarding the second sub-question, the results of the 99th and 101st plenary sessions within the year of 2012/2013 require closer consideration. The 99th plenary session had a high percentage of political group amendments with 16.6%. Whereas the 101st plenary session only records 0.8% of amendments submitted by political groups (Table 3). Hence, over time there is a decrease in submitted amendments by identifiable political groups, whilst the ECR group was integrated into the CoR. It could well be that the integration of the ECR group did not have a considerable impact on the amount of submitted amendments by political groups as they might not have had an established organization during their first plenary sessions. This approach was presented by Hönnige and Kaiser (2003) for the organizational structures of the CoR's political groups for the years prior to 2003. The first political groups in the CoR were unable to establish an influential internal organization with meetings that lasted an average of 20 hours a year. This could also explain why the amount of submitted amendments by political groups decreased, even though the number of political groups increased with the integration of the ECR group in the CoR. However,

this assumption needs to be validated by further research. Another possible explanation could be the variety of policy fields to be discussed in the CoR and how much dissent there is among the political groups (s. Chapter 3). For example, when opinions are discussed in a plenary session on an issue which is in the interest of all political groups, there may be a tendency to have fewer amendments from political groups than when more controversial opinions are adopted. Since there is no evidence for this, an approval for this assumption by further research is needed as well.

In contrast to the decrease in submitted amendments by political groups after the integration of the ECR Group, an increase in submitted amendments by political groups took place after the integration of the Green Group in 2020. The simplified organizational structure of political groups, through digitization and today's growing digital communication, can be an explanation for a faster and better establishment of the Green Group in 2020 compared to the ECR Group in 2013. This hypothesis also requires validation. Moreover, a thorough analysis of the further development of the Green Group within the CoR is necessary, as this thesis could only review two plenary sessions with the Green Group present after its establishment.

To answer the second sub-question about to what extent the amount of amendments increased with the increase of the political groups in the CoR, it can be summarized that in the years since the establishment of the CoR the proportion of amendments introduced by political groups in the CoR has increased, as has the number of political groups. However, a direct increase in the submitted amendments after the integration steps was only noticeable with the integration of the Green Group.

All in all, the sub-questions have helped to identify that the political groups in the CoR do not submit more amendments than individual groups. In addition, it was found that the extent to which political groups submit amendments has increased in recent years. This reflects that political groups become increasingly active in the CoR. These findings are in line with the role of political groups in the Council, in the Commission and the EP. For example, some studies have noted a party-political alignment of the voting behaviour of governments in the Council and referred to the selection of Commissioners for party-political reasons (chapter 2.5). The empirical literature about political groups in the EP shows that parties play a role in the EP but not as the dominant actors (chapter 2.5), as it is the case in the CoR according to the results of this thesis.

5 Conclusion

In summary, the major findings of this thesis were regarding the first sub-question that in the first ten years of existence of the CoR, political groups did not play a significant role (Table 1). In 2012/2013 the degree of participating in amending opinions by political groups in the CoR was higher (Table 2). Political groups submitted on average below ten percent of all amendments, hence, groups of individuals remained the dominant actors in designing opinions in the CoR in 2012/2013. After 25 years of existence of the CoR, the submission of amendments by political groups has increased: in 2019/2020 every fourth amendment was submitted by a political group. Regarding the second sub-question, it can be summarized that within the plenary sessions of 2012/2013 the amount of amended opinions did not increase with an additional political group in the CoR (Table 3). In contrast to 2019/2020 it was found that the number of submitted amendments by political groups after the integration of the Green Group increased (Table 5). Hence, the amending of opinions by political groups increased with an additional political group in the CoR in 2019/2020.

Based on these findings, the answer to the research question *“To what extent are the final opinions of plenary sessions of the European Committee of the Regions dominated by political groups?”* is that the extent to which final opinions are dominated by political groups has increased since the existence of the CoR, but not in so far as political groups are the dominant forces behind the opinions.

The importance of these findings must be taken into account, as this development challenges the adequate representation of society by the CoR (chapter 2.4). Of course, regions are primarily represented by political authorities following political visions, but in the EU, political groups are a reproduction of the political factions of the EP (chapter 2.5). These consist of a mixture of European-wide political perspectives which are combined in one party. The idea of developing a partisan working mode in the EP might be a good solution but might also be difficult to apply for the CoR, as this body was built to represent the diversity of its regions. This is one reason why Rule 7 of the CoR’s Rule of Procedure about National delegations and political groups, emphasizes that political groups shall follow a balanced contribution in the CoR (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014). Future research is encouraged to monitor this development, possible

violations of the rules and violations regarding legitimate representation of EU regions and their citizens. Moreover, it was found that an impact of political party alignment was identified by studies on the Council, the Commission, and the EP as well. In line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission is regarded as an institution with independent commissioners, but studies show that national party affiliation plays a role in the selection of the commissioners (chapter 2.5). Hence, further research is required to spot in how far violations of the treaties are at stake in the Commission.

The results of this research open new insights into the internal development in the CoR, leading to new questions that require closer investigation. A total of three main limitations have been identified which raise questions for further research. Firstly, the development of the participation of political groups in plenary sessions in the CoR would need to be considered over a longer period of time to confirm the results of this analysis. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate all amendments that have been submitted since 2005. A long-term analysis of the amendments is necessary to achieve a complete picture and to confirm the presumed developments resulting from this study. Secondly, the integration of the ECR Group did not make a huge difference for the overall proportion of amendments of political groups within its first plenary sessions, as it may not have established a solid organisation at that time. This assumption is based on the results of the study by Hönnige and Kaiser (2003). However, this assumption needs further investigation to confirm it, as the time invested by political groups in internal meetings may have changed over the years. Thus, the question arises as to how much time political groups in the CoR meet on average a year. Thirdly, another possible factor influencing the internal organization of political groups in the CoR could be today's digital media. Hence, further research might address to what extent today's media and digitalization improve internal organization - may it be for political groups or organizations in general.

I conscientiously accept that the results are not final due to these limitations. Aside from these restrictions, this study is scientifically strong as it observes recent changes, questions them, and gives a first insight to stimulate further studies.

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CDR148-2005_REV2_AM1-_AM21_AM
CDR150-2005_REV2_AM1-7_AM
CDR151-2005_REV1_AM1-_AM20_AM
CDR152-2005_REV1_AM1-_AM30_AM
CDR1528-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-4
CDR1529-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-7
CDR1652-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-22
CDR1672-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP
CDR1684-2012_00_00_TRA_PAC AMP(1-10)
CDR1685-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-2
CDR1749-2012_00_00_TRA_PAC
CDR1750-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-14
CDR1778-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-18
CDR2025-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP (1-7)
CDR2027-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-25
CDR2064-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-34
CDR2077-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-11
CDR209-2005_REV1_AM1-3___AM
CDR213-2005_REV1_AM1-_AM11_AM
CDR2182-2012_00_00_TRA_AM 1-67
CDR220-2004_REV3_AM1-_AM13_AM
CDR2203-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-13
CDR2210-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-10
CDR221-2004_REV3_AM1-_AM17_AM
CDR2214-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP Ams. 1-33
CDR2232-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-24
CDR2244-2012_00_00_TRA_PAC
CDR225-2005_REV1_AM1-_AM24_AM
CDR2255-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-13
CDR23-2005_REV2_AM1-_AM11_AM
CDR232-2004_REV3_AM1-_AM76_AM

CDR233-2004_REV3_AM1-_AM43_AM
CDR233-2004_REV3_AM32_BIS_AM
CDR2392-2012_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-42
CDR240-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-5
CDR242-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-21
CDR2494-2012_00_00_TRA_PRES AMS 1-15
CDR250-2005_AM1-_AM28_AM
CDR253-2004_REV1_AM1-5_AM
CDR2562-2012_00_00_TRA_PRES AMS 1-16
CDR26-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP Ams. 1-11
CDR272-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-3
CDR280-2004_AM_REV2_AM1-4_AM
CDR329-2004_REV2_AM1-_AM24_AM
CDR337-2004_REV2_AM1-_AM18_AM
CDR338-2004_REV2_AM1-7_AM
CDR339-2004_REV1_CORR1_AM1-_AM11_AM
CDR485-2004_REV1_AM12+_AM13_AM
CDR495-2004_REV2_AM1 à_AM27_AM
CDR496-2004_REV2_AM1 à_AM17_AM
CDR497-2004_REV2_AM1 à_AM11_AM
CDR499-2004_REV2_AM1à8_AM
CDR509-2004_REV1_AM1-_AM12_AM
CDR591-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP 1-37
CDR593-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP – AM 1-34
CDR77-2005_REV1_AM1 à_AM22_AM
CDR789-2013_00_00_TRA_AMP
CDR82-2005_REV1_AM1 à_AM38_AM
CDR84-2005_REV1_AM1-_AM18_AM
COR-2018-06337-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-8
COR-2019-00145-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-8
COR-2019-00617-00-01-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-26

COR-2019-00618-00-01-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-45
COR-2019-00644-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-5
COR-2019-00645-00-00-AMP-TRA
COR-2019-00826-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-28
COR-2019-00896-00-00-AMP-TRA
COR-2019-00965-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-23
COR-2019-00974-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-23
COR-2019-01053-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-15
COR-2019-01136-00-01-AMP-TRA AM 1-10
COR-2019-01804-00-01-AMP-TRA AM 1-33
COR-2019-01897-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams.1-2
COR-2019-01939-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-16
COR-2019-01951-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-5
COR-2019-02041-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-6
COR-2019-02043-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-13
COR-2019-02655-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-30
COR-2019-02727-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-6
COR-2019-02974-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-30
COR-2019-03195-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1
COR-2019-03332-00-02-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-18
COR-2019-03686-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-8
COR-2019-03729-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-20
COR-2019-03730-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-15
COR-2019-03731-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-21
COR-2019-03856-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-3
COR-2019-03887-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-26
COR-2019-04351-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-41
COR-2019-04645-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-3
COR-2019-04646-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1
COR-2019-04970-00-01-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-12
COR-2019-05751-00-00-AMP-TRA AM 1-4

COR-2020-00136-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-20

COR-2020-00140-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-6

COR-2020-00192-00-00-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-21

COR-2020-01923-00-01-AMP-TRA Ams. 1-196