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The AfD electorate in Germany: Analysing different drivers in determining AfD votes in the German federal election 2017

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University of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands
Behavioural Management and Social sciences
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Germany
Institut für Politikwissenschaft

First supervisor: Franziska Eckardt MSc
Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oliver Treib

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Abstract

The founding of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) in 2013 and their just barely missed entry into the German parliament surprised the German political landscape. Just four years later during the election in 2017 the AfD, as first populist right-wing party after 1945, made it into the German parliament with 12,5% of the votes. There was uncertainty among political observers on how the AfD managed to build such a large electorate in such a short period of time. Therefore, the present research paper is focusing on the importance of populist attitudes in relation to other drivers, in determining AfD votes in the German federal election in 2017. By conducting a binary logistic regression analysis based on the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) dataset from 2017 it will be analyzed if there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable “voting the AfD” and the three independent variables “populist attitudes”, “Euroscepticism” and “xenophobia”. In the data analysis it becomes apparent that all drivers have an influence on determining AfD votes, however not populist attitudes are the biggest driver, but xenophobic attitudes are. This underlines the assumption, that the electorate of the AfD is not a short-term phenomenon, but a development, rooted in specific ideological, social and political conceptions.

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1. Introduction

The new populist right-wing party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD; Alternative for Germany) was founded in February 2013. Just half a year later, the party just barely missed the entry into the German parliament. Four years later, the AfD got enough votes during the federal elections to enter the German parliament in 2017. Germany is therefore one of the latest countries in Europe where a populist party could establish itself within the party landscape after 1945.

The support for populist parties has grown across Europe, especially for populist radical right-wing parties. The characteristics of populist radical right-wing parties and how they are defined has always been in the focus of the political science discourse. Also, the classification of the AfD within the political spectrum has always been reason for discussion (Schmitt-Beck, van Deth, Staudt, 2017).

Several studies deal with the definition of populist radical right-wing parties and how they are characterized. Mudde (2007) defines populist radical right-wing parties along three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Mudde’s definition is one of the most recognized ones within the political sciences. However, some studies go beyond that definition and focus the definitions especially on the critical attitude of populist radical right-wing parties towards the European Union (EU) (Rooduijn, 2015; Pirro, 2013). Even though a lot of research is done in that academic field, there is no clear and universally recognized definition of populist radical right-wing parties. The state of knowledge regarding the AfD as populist radical right-wing party and its electorate is more complex. While the focus of the AfD at the beginning was mainly on a critical attitude towards the EU and its dealing with the crisis of the monetary union, it shifted towards a party with clearly right-wing attitudes. This shift has been recognised in the scientific discussion. Recent research highlights that the AfD can be characterized as xenophobic, Eurosceptic and with populist attitudes (Decker, 2018; Lewandowsky, 2014; Häusler, 2016). There is also research on the electorate of the AfD but mainly focussed on the importance of the socio-economic circumstances (Hambauer, Mays, 2017). Niedermayer and Hofrichter (2016) are speaking of a new right-wing conception of social justice and Schmitt-Beck (2014) mentions both, the importance of the criticism of the EU and the right-wing attitudes as crucial aspects for the definition.

Less studies are looking at the question, whether populist attitudes of the voters are the trigger for actually voting for a populist party or if other drivers regarding the political attitudes of the party are responsible for success of the populist party. What are the attitudes of AfD-voters and why are people voting the party? Are they driven by a shared incentive and are they voting the AfD for the same reason? Existing literature comes to the conclusion that populist right-wing parties

can mainly be characterized by their populist programmatic appeal but also by eurosceptic positions, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim programs (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2014). However, it is less clear, what relative role populism has in explaining electoral choices for populist right-wing parties. Therefore, this paper will focus on the three characteristics of populist right-wing parties: Populist attitudes, euroscepticism and xenophobia. As previous research already emphasized the importance of Euroscepticism and xenophobia in determining AfD votes but not the importance of populist attitudes in determining AfD votes, these drivers will be compared and contrasted (Schmitt-Beck, 2014).

In order to fill this research gap in the literature, this study focusses on the analysis of the AfD in Germany and its voters' attitudes. The following explanatory research question will be addressed in this study:

How important are populist attitudes in relation to other drivers, like Euroscepticism and xenophobia, in determining AfD votes in the German federal election 2017?

In order to answer this question the following sub questions can be formulated:

- To what extent do AfD voters show a populist, eurosceptic and xenophobic attitude in the German federal election 2017?
- Do AfD voters show a more populist attitude than a eurosceptic or xenophobic attitude?

These questions will be answered in the course of this study, to make the research question more tangible. As the AfD in Germany is a rather new case regarding populism within Europe and no other right-wing populist party has been as successful in the history of the German federal Republic after 1945, there is little knowledge about the characteristics of the AfD electorate. Specifically, how important populist attitudes are in determining votes. By analysing and studying the AfD electorate and its characteristics it is easier to assess the success of the party. The support for populist parties is spreading throughout Europe and it possesses a challenge for the EU, its member states and might become a democratic threat (Kaltwasser, 2011). That is why it is important to focus on the attitudes of AfD voters to make their preferences and ideas more assessable.

The study will first give an overview on already existing literature regarding the definition and characteristics of populist radical right-wing parties. It will be discussed how the AfD fits into that category and what is already known about the AfD voting behaviour. Based on the theory discussed, three hypotheses will be formulated. In order to answer these questions a quantitative binary logistic regression analysis will be conducted, based on the data retrieved from the German

Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2017. The statistical output will be analysed and referred to the previously described theory. In a last step, all findings will be summarized, and the research question will be discussed.

2. Theory

When talking about the AfD and its increasing popularity, the concept of populism and especially radical right-wing populism need to be discussed and defined. In the following paragraph a definition of *radical right-wing populism* will be given, followed by the classification of the AfD within that spectrum. In this context the three characteristics of populist radical right-wing parties covered in this paper, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism and xenophobia, will be specified. For a better understanding, a short description of the historical background and development of the AfD is outlined. Finally, based on the theory presented here, several hypotheses are formulated.

2.1 Definition radical right-wing populism

There are many different definitions of populism, that focus on what exactly constitutes (radical) right-wing populism and where the differences to left-wing populism become apparent. One explanation why so many different definitions are being discussed is that a phenomenon that goes under many different names is defined in many different ways. This is mostly caused by the populist radical right parties itself, as they are not identifying themselves as a populist or even populist radical right party (Mudde, 2007). The lack of clearance on one single definition, will not be resolved in this paper. Several most commonly used definitions will be presented and will form the foundation of the classification of the AfD into that spectrum.

Cas Mudde (2007) differentiates between a “minimum definition” and a “maximum definition”. “Minimum definition” means, that the group of right-wing populists is defined on the basis of very few features that all members share. The aim is to describe the core features of the ideologies of the discussed parties. The first feature is nationalism. Nationalism is defined as “a political doctrine that strives for congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state”. As nationalism might be too broad, especially in the destruction between moderate and radical nationalists, the second feature nativism can help to give more clearance. Nativism is here defined as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007). This highlights the combination of xenophobia and nationalism brought together under the term of nativism.

The “maximum definition” wants to find the greatest possible number of similarities and looks for the “greatest common denominator”. Mudde names three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. As already explained above, nativism includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It is focused on the native group, the nation. Non-native elements, like persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening the nation-state. Non-native persons could be immigrants or people of another race (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). The second feature that defines authoritarianism is “the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde, 2007). The last core feature “populism” may sound like a political style but is here defined as an ideological feature: “Populism is understood as a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2007).

Going beyond the definition of Mudde, Rooduijn (2015) addresses the critical position of populist radical right parties towards the European unification. Euroscepticism fits with their nativist and populist outlook. It combines the aversion towards immigrants from other European countries and the “bureaucratic EU elites”. Pirro (2013) expands the aspect of Eurocriticism among populist radical right parties even further using several parties as example. He differentiates between the pre-accession and post-accession phase. Before accessing the EU populist radical right parties were clearly positioned against the EU and rejected the idea of a European unification. Many parties moderated their positions against the EU over time and support the general idea of European integration but are sceptical about the current and future development of the EU. Especially when looking at eastern European countries, many considered the EU as an opportunity. Nevertheless, almost all populist radical right parties are rejecting the idea of a federal state of the EU and are concerned, that it will be harder to preserve the national identities. It has to be differentiated between Euro-reject and Eurosceptic party positions. Populist radical right parties are not entirely rejecting the idea of the EU, but do criticize it in various ways, especially when looking at the national sovereignty of the member states (Pirro, 2013).

Zaslove (2009) criticizes the clear and too narrow definition of populist radical right parties and questions the necessity of such a definition. Furthermore, he queries that Mudde does not consider the economic aspect and that economic policies and issues are not core issues of populist radical right parties. Zaslove urges not to disregard the economic platform of populist radical right parties nor the link between economic grievances and support for populist radical right parties (Zaslove, 2009).

As shown above, it is very difficult to find one exact definition of populist radical right parties that covers all relevant aspects and all parties. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that there are

several aspects and features that characterize populist radical right parties. Based on that, it is analysed if the AfD counts among these parties and in which respect these characteristics are expressed.

2.2 AfD

The AfD, founded in 2013, is one of the newest of its kind in Europe. While in other countries populist radical right-wing parties are part of the established political landscape, like the “Front National” in France, the establishment of the AfD within the German party landscape was a rather new phenomenon. The party was founded in February 2013 with Bernd Lucke, Frauke Petry and Konrad Adam as first party chairman/women, focusing on the Euro crisis and the related grants paid to the financially weak countries (Decker, 2018). In 2014, the party could achieve first electoral successes in the European elections and in regional elections in eastern Germany. The political agenda changed more and more from mainly focusing on economic issues to topics regarding immigration policies and migration criticism. Latest when the more moderate wing of the party split off, the party became increasingly radical. The refugee crisis in 2015 triggered the success and the nationwide elections in 2017 brought the AfD into parliament. In the following section, the programmatic of the AfD will be classified, and the question, what makes them a populist radical right party and what driver makes voters actually vote them, will be discussed.

2.2.1. What makes the AfD a populist radical right party?

The AfD has been described as populist right wing Eurosceptic party by the mainstream media and other parties (Arzheimer, 2015). If the description of a populist right-wing party applies to the AfD and if the three factors, which will be identified, are the reason for the success of the party and the reason why people are actually voting the AfD will be discussed theoretically in this section.

The AfD itself is rejecting the label of a populist right wing party. After the European elections in 2017 they stated clearly, they will join the conservative parliament group (mostly made up of British Tory's) and did not want to be brought into context with the explicit European right-wing populist parties like the French “Front National” or Italy's “Lega Nord” (Decker, 2016).

Populist

The populist character of the party gets already visible at the parties' name. The "Alternative" points out the "anti-establishment-attitude" and refusal to other long-established parties (Decker, 2016). In several comments of AfD politicians they are explicitly speaking of the "real" people, which is showing the populist stance of the party, in opposite to their rather moderate election manifestos, where a typical populist language has been avoided. Even though the election manifestos do not contain the differentiation between "the elite" and "the people" and is also not oversimplifying or emotionalizing the party can still be considered as populist (Arzheimer, 2015). One indicator is, that the AfD also demands more direct democratic participation oriented on the "Swiss model", which is characteristic for European populist right wing parties (Decker, 2016). Decker (2016) refers the populist characteristics of the AfD as rather subtle. Another indicator is, that through competition logic (Wettbewerbslogik) fear is being stirred up and the devaluation of the others is made possible. The AfD classifies itself as champion of the "silent majority" (Lewandowsky, 2014). The anti-establishment disposition which sees itself as the voice of the common people gets visible in an article of the party magazine "AfD Kompakt": "The demands of the Alternative für Deutschland go right to the hearts of two-thirds of German people. Nevertheless, the established parties continue to ignore people's worries and prefer to punish countries such as Switzerland, which give their people a voice with referendums, with sanctions. This is an intolerable situation for all concerned!" (AfD Kompakt, 2/2014, p.4). The AfD speaks of "the people" ("das Volk") as ethnic cultural homogenous unit and at the same time excludes population groups defined as ethnically and culturally different (Häusler, Röser, Scholten, 2016). When talking about the populist tendencies, it is also important to mention the concept of the so-called *old parties*. They are claiming that all already existing parties, independently if they belong to the right- or left-wing spectrum, do not differ in any way and all pursue the same goals. Häusler (2016) in this context mentions the populist principle of the "common man". This refers again to the differentiation between "the people" and "the elite". The "common man" or the "common sense" is focussed on the approach of not analysing what specifically is going wrong but on changing the political situation based on broader ideological goals. The main motto "courage of truth" ("Mut zur Wahrheit") reflects this as the "common sense" should be transferred into politics and the leading elite should be disempowered. The opinion of the "common man" serves as criterion for political decisions (Häusler, 2016).

Eurosceptic

The occurring feature of Euroscepticism or the rejection of the current idea of the EU is expressed by the founding idea of the AfD. As they founded as a mainly anti-EU party who rejects the politics of the monetary union and its economic rescue operations, Euroscepticism can be identified as a crucial part of their founding idea. The AfD rejects the idea of the monetary union and a federal European state (Arzheimer, 2015). Arzheimer (2015) describes the AfD as a rather soft Eurosceptic party, as they are still committed to the EU as such and pursues the idea of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Lewandowsky (2014) describes the EU criticism two-fold. The first aspect is of economical nature and lines up against the European Monetary Union. The AfD states that Germany does not need the Euro and that the Euro harms other countries (AfD election program 2013). Regarding the financial crisis, they call for the interests of the German taxpayers, who, in their logic, pays the German governments bailout policy and demands a “haircut” for indebted states. They favour a restoration of national currencies or a creation of smaller and more stable currency unions (Lewandowsky, 2014).

The second aspect deals with the criticism of the EU institutions and their elites. Here, the Euroscepticism and anti-establishment criticism merges. The AfD calls for a renationalization of the European decision-making structures, which means the repatriation of European competences to the member states. The sovereignty of the states should preserve and insists on the right national parliaments to decide over budgetary issues. They strictly reject the striving for a transfer union or a centralized European state. Brussels is seen as political elite with overzealous politicians, well-organized lobbies and out-of-touch bureaucrats (Lewandowsky, 2014). To sum up, the Eurosceptic alignment of the AfD was in the beginning their main topic and is still one of the most important attitudes. They can be characterized as a Eurosceptic party with concrete demands how the EU should change and how to adapt them.

Xenophobic

Another feature which is associated with populist right-wing parties is xenophobia, or as Mudde (2007) names it, *nativism*. As already described, the success of the AfD in the federal elections 2017 was mainly a result of the so-called refugee crisis. The AfD takes a clear stance against the idea of a multicultural society in their “Grundsatzprogramm” (policy statement) they demand a “Leitkultur anstatt Multikulturalismus” (guiding cultures instead of multiculturalism) (Häusler et al., 2016). They do not recognize the multiculturalism as a reality, but as an ideology. They criticize that this “ideology” would endanger the social peace and the existence of the nation as cultural unity. The state and the civil society must defend the German cultural identity as

“Leitkultur” (leading culture) (AfD Grundsatzprogramm, 2016). Defining Germany as “cultural unity” denies cultural diversity and is directed against minorities (Häusler et al., 2016). Also, the recurring connection between the AfD and PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes; in English: Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) shows a strong right-wing sentiment (Häusler, 2016). The occurring anti-Islam attitude plays an increasingly important role within the party and its identification. At the latest since the change of leadership in 2015 the AfD reinforced its political anti-Muslim course (Häusler et al., 2016). The secession of the economic liberal wing of the party, mainly represented by Bernd Lucke, promoted the party’s shift to the right and towards an anti-immigration-party (Häusler, 2016). The party internal “patriotische Plattform” (patriotic platform) lobbies for a political orientation that identifies the Islam as central opponent and allies the party with the Pegida-protests. Statements of AfD politicians where the Islam is being rejected are based on the fundamental separation between “own” and “foreign”. The defence of the “own” shows the rejection of immigration based on racist ideas (Häusler et al., 2016). Accordingly, also the freedom of religion is being rejected. Due to different statements, this would only serve as a vehicle for a multicultural transformation (Häusler et al., 2016). It is important to mention here, that these are statements by Hans-Thomas Tillschneider and do not necessarily represent the whole political spectrum within the AfD. Nevertheless, it pictures the xenophobic and anti-muslim attitude of the AfD. In their manifesto from 2016, they talk about the “expansion and ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country” which endangers the state, the society and its values (AfD, 2016, p. 48). Through concrete actions like the ban of the headscarf in public service and restrictive regulations for the construction and operations of mosques, the party wants to take action against that. The immigration policy should solely base on the integration capacity and on the needs of the national economy (Decker, 2018). This illustrates the clearly xenophobic and anti-Muslim attitude of the AfD. Even though the party started as an economic liberal anti-EU party, they developed into a populist radical right-wing party.

2.3. What do we know about AfD voters?

To get a better idea of why people are voting the AfD, the following abstract will give an overview on the current state of knowledge about populist voting behaviour, especially of the AfD voter.

If we are looking at the first federal election in 2013 in which the AfD participated, the **main focus was the European monetary crisis**. The main electoral group that supported the AfD were people who were dissatisfied with the current federal government, how they dealt with the euro crisis and the associated subsidies for over-indebted EU member states. This group were mainly early

decision makers and a consequence of a political party gap right to the CDU within the party landscape. Another electoral group were the later decision makers. The EU crisis certainly was a reason for them to vote the AfD but also the immigration sceptical position had a relevant impact (Schmitt-Beck, 2014), even though the immigration topic was thematized in an economical manner, like tolerating immigration just on the bases of considerations of the benefits. Nevertheless, many voters saw them as a suitable option to show the general rejection against multicultural immigration policy. The AfD presented a new attractive option within the political landscape in Germany (Schmitt-Beck, 2014). In the scientific study of Schmitt-Beck, van Deth and Staudt (2017) analysed the voting behaviour of AfD voters in Baden Württemberg. The strongest explanatory factor they found was the **general dissatisfaction** with the performance of the government in federal and state level. Another important factor they identified was a right-wing ideological identification. Especially an ethnocentric worldview emerges as source for the support of the AfD (Schmitt-Beck et al., 2017). While nearly all voters have an immigration- and euro-critical attitude, a group of strong supporters identify themselves with a more and more right-wing opinion.

In general, the electorate of the AfD is differentiated between passionate voters and unattached voters with anti-establishment attitudes and protest voters (Bieber, Roßteutscher, Scherer, 2018). Also, Hambauer and Mays (2017) analysed the electorate as right-wing and sceptical about the current refugee policy.

As well, the group of protest voters within the AfD should be examined in this context. Dissatisfied voters of other parties have several options to proceed. One option is to vote another party to oppose towards the own party and its policy contents (Bieber et al., 2018). Mostly the protest vote refers to a specific topic which, in the opinion of this group of people, was dealt with in a completely wrong way by the previously preferred party. Through voting another party, in this case the AfD, they want to effectuate that the previously preferred party changes their policies. In this logic the voters do not vote for the party with which they have the most overlaps regarding specific political questions. They choose a more radical party to encourage the actually preferred party to change their politics into the preferred direction (Bieber et al., 2018). Bieber et al. (2018) analysed in their study that the great success of the AfD is based on uncommitted voters and protest voters, which turned their backs on the established parties as a consequence of the so called immigration crisis. In opposite to that Schwarzbözl, Fatke (2016) argue, that the AfD cannot be seen exclusively as protest party. The AfD electorate represents a structural political potential which has utter homogeneous positions on topics like the European integration or immigration and that the ideological position is of great importance for the vote of the party.

Also, regarding the socio-structural characteristics previous literature has come to certain conclusions. The gender-specific distribution within the AfD electorate differs in comparison to other party voters. Especially men vote the AfD and hereby confirm the reputation of populist right-wing parties to be primarily male dominated (Pickel, 2019). Whereas regarding the age distribution the AfD electorate does show little differences to other parties. Workers and unemployed people do not show a particularly strong tendency to vote the AfD. Likewise, educational differences are not of great importance in determining AfD votes (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2017). Furthermore, the AfD was much more attractive for people from the newly formed German states (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia). Another interesting aspect is that most of the AfD electorate describes themselves as highly interested in politics and do not perceive political questions as complicated to understand (Hambauer, Mays, 2017). The development of the general as well as the own economic situation sees the AfD electorate as quite more pessimistic than the electorate of other parties.

To sum up the current state of knowledge, it can be said that there is not just one answer when talking about the motive of the AfD electorate. It is a multi-causal explanation and many different influences have an impact on the decision to vote the AfD. Generally, it can be said that a political ideological right-wing attitude increases the chance of voting the AfD (Pickel, 2019). Nevertheless, it is still unclear to what extent populist attitudes have influence on the voting decision in relation to other drivers that are characteristic for populist radical right-wing parties.

2.3 Hypotheses

Looking at the theory of the classification of the AfD as populist radical right party and the existing literature of populist voting behaviour, several assumptions can be made. Three features that are characteristic for the AfD have emerged: populist attitudes, Euroscepticism and xenophobia. To find out if these attitudes also determine AfD voters and how important populist attitudes in relation to other drivers are, these three hypotheses are formulated:

H1: People who have populist attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD.

H2: People with Eurosceptic attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD.

H3: People with xenophobic attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD.

In the following paragraph the research methodology will explain how the hypotheses will be discussed, why Germany and the AfD were selected as a study case and on which data the analyses will be based.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

To answer the hypotheses listed above and therefore the research question, a quantitative logistic regression analyses will be conducted. For that, the existing dataset German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) from 2017 is being used. Even though, the study is called *longitudinal*, this research will just focus on the by-election cross section. This means, that there is no comparison between various points, in this case before and after the election. The observation will just be conducted at one single point in time, in particular the by-election cross section from 2017. The year 2017 is chosen due to the first significant electoral success of the AfD in Germany. It was the first Germany-wide election, where they got elected in the parliament and therefore became truly relevant for German politics.

For the purpose of this research, a quantitative case analysis is most suitable. A quantitative binary logistic regression analysis wants to indicate cause and effect relationship between variables. Conducting a quantitative rather than qualitative research, makes it possible to perform an analysis with a high number of cases. This makes it possible to better apply the attitudes of populist voters to the whole electorate of the AfD in Germany.

A deficit of quantitative, large sample sizes is the non-existent possibility for individuals to give detailed answers. By reason of prescribed survey questions, participants might give answers that are not accurate, but they find most likely applicable. Moreover, participants might understand questions differently or give answer with different ulterior motives. Notwithstanding there might be some difficulties by using a quantitative regression analyses, the advantages prevail. For the purpose of this study, it is the best option to get a broad overview of the attitudes of AfD voters. The main objective of this research is to test, whether there is a relation between the dependent variable, people who voted the AfD, and the independent variables. While analysing already existing literature about populist radical right-wing parties and populist attitudes, three concepts that are characteristic for these parties have emerged: populist attitudes, Euroscepticism and xenophobia. These characteristics will serve as independent variables for the analyses.

3.2 Cases and Data Selection

As mentioned above, the focus of this study will lay on the AfD in Germany. The “Alternative für Deutschland” is a right-wing populist party, founded in 2013 as a reaction to the crisis of the European monetary union. It is the first party that was able to establish itself as a populist right wing party in Germany after World War II. This is why the AfD is a unique and new phenomenon

within the political landscape of Germany and a relevant point of interest for current political research. The thematic priority of the party shifted from an economical focus in the beginning, to a more and more nationalist right-wing programmatic. This includes typical characteristics, like anti-establishment attitudes, demands for more direct democracy, clearly racist attitudes against refugees and foreigners and a traditional family picture. The AfD fulfils typical right-wing populist positions and serves therefore as a good case selection when talking about right-wing populist attitudes. Furthermore, the AfD is one of the last new emerged right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, which makes them a rather less studied phenomenon. This also speaks in favour of a one case study, in contrast to a cross-national study, to firstly intensely study and understand the AfD positions and its voters' attitudes, to thereafter compare these outcomes to other European populist right-wing parties.

3.3 German Longitudinal Election Study

To get as much attitudes and opinions from as many AfD voters for the quantitative data analyses as possible, the existing dataset German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) from 2017 is being used. It is the largest nation-wide electoral study in Germany. It observes and analyses political attitudes and behaviour of eligible voters. The by-election cross section includes 2.112 conducted interviews with randomly selected individuals. The population for the cross-sectional survey are individuals with German citizenship, being older than 16 years at the moment of the German federal election 2017. Through computer assisted personal interviews, voters and non-voters are asked about several different thematic areas. In the next section, the relevant and chosen thematic areas are going to be explained in more detail. Based on the thematic classification of the questions in the GLES, the relevant questions are selected that apply thematically to the variables in this study.

3.4 Operationalization

3.4.1 Dependent variable

Based on the in section 3.3 explained GLES and the theoretical findings, one dependent and three independent variables have been identified. The dependent variable, people who voted the AfD in the German parliamentary elections in 2017, is pulled out from the 19th sequence of the study. The variable q19bb (see Appendix 8.1) is chosen, which asks for the interviewees *second vote* in the parliamentary elections. The *second vote* decides on the majority shareholdings in parliament, specifically how many seats each party holds in the parliament. With the second vote, voters do

not decide on a direct candidate of a party, but for a party as whole (Korte, 2009). Most of the researcher are speaking of the second vote as the more important one, as it is deciding on the composition of the parliament (Korte, 2013). As this study is researching on the AfD electorate, the second vote is more suitable. The decision on the first vote is also influenced by the performance of the direct candidate and not only the party itself. For the purpose of the binary logistic regression analysis, the dependent variable has been coded. The voter's decision if they voted the AfD has been coded into 1=AfD and 0=other party, as just the people who voted the AfD are relevant for the purpose of this research. It is important to not include non-voters into the group of other party voters, as this would falsify the final outcome.

3.4.2 Independent variables

For the independent variables various items has been recoded to make them comparable. Not all questions are asked in the same manner. This is why the answer scale between 1-agree entirely and 5-reject entirely has been adapted. It must be standardized that a person that is populist, Eurosceptic or xenophobic is identified with a high number of the scale. To give a more valid and representative picture, an index out of several sub question was built. For the independent variable "populist attitude" eleven sub questions were derived from the question q85 regarding Populism and Efficacy (see appendix 8.2.1). For the independent variable "xenophobia" five sub questions were derived from the question q8 regarding attitudes towards out-groups (see appendix 8.2.3). To make sure that an index can be built out of several sub questions it was tested through a factor analysis if there is one underlying factor for all included sub questions. Afterwards the indices have been built by pulling together the relevant sub question. The third independent variable "Euroscepticism" is covered by the question q66j if the respondent is supporting or rejecting a further European unification (see appendix 8.2.2). Before conducting the binary logistic regression analyses, all three independent variables have been normalized to make them comparable. This means that values that are measured on different scales are being adjusted and rescaled to make all variables look the same.


3.4.3 Control variables

The control variables gender, age and school-leaving qualification has been included to eliminate other effects on the model. Control variables are factors that might influence the outcome. As a consequence, not the selected variables would be responsible for the outcome of the data analysis, but the control variables. To prevent this, the three control variables were chosen. To exclude the

eventuality that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is caused by other not included variables, control variables were included. For this study possible other factors that might be responsible for voting the AfD, are gender, age and school leaving qualification. As already explained in the theory section, these sociodemographic factors might have an influence on determining AfD votes, this is why they were included in the data analysis.

4. Analysis

In the by-election cross section of 2017, 162 of the 2112 respondents indicated that they have voted the AfD. That is a 9,6% percent share in the second votes. When looking at the percent share of AfD voters to the relevant questions, certain tendencies and attitudes can be identified. 1,5 % of AfD voters rather do not have populist attitudes. Whereas 63,2% rather are populist and 35,3% are undecided. 30,8% of the AfD voters said, that they totally reject or rather disagree that the European unification should be pushed forward, which means that they are rather eurosceptic. Whereas 38,5% of the AfD voters would rather agree with a further unification of the EU and 30,8% are undecided. Regarding xenophobic attitudes not even 1% of the AfD voters would rather not agree with xenophobic attitudes and are therefore rather not xenophobic. Whereas 73% would rather agree with xenophobic attitudes, which means they are rather xenophobic and 26,4% are undecided. These values show that the majority of the AfD electorate have xenophobic and populist attitudes, while there is no such clear tendency visible regarding the criticism towards the EU.



4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis

To answer the hypotheses listed in part 2.3 a binary logistic regression was conducted. Based on the theory, three factors were extracted that are significant for populist radical right-wing parties, like the AfD.

The first factor to focus on is the independent variable “Populist attitudes” to measure, whether people who have populist attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD (Hypothesis 1). As explained in the operationalization, this variable is based on an index, built out of eleven questions that are relevant when analysing populist attitudes. When looking at B and the *Odds Ratio* of populist attitudes, it gets clear that the likelihood to vote the AfD increases for people with populist attitudes. The value for B is positive and the *Odds Ratio* are above 1, which indicates a bigger likelihood to vote the AfD. The likelihood of voting the AfD is about 99% higher for someone with an extreme populist attitudes than for someone with non-populist attitudes. Also, the confidence interval for *Odds ratio* are both above 1, which indicates that there is a significant positive effect for the factor “populist attitudes”.

The second independent variable “Euroscepticism” measures, whether people who have eurosceptic attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD (Hypothesis 2). When looking at the output of the binary logistic regression, B and the *Odds Ratio* for Euroscepticism indicate that the likelihood to vote the AfD increases for people with eurosceptic attitudes. The likelihood to vote the AfD is about 36% higher for someone with eurosceptic attitudes. The confidence interval for *Odds ratio* are also both above 1, which indicates that there is a significant positive effect for the factor “Euroscepticism”.

The third variable “Xenophobia” measures, whether people who have xenophobic attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD (Hypothesis 3). The values for B and the *Odds Ratio* indicate here as well, that the likelihood to vote the AfD increases for people with xenophobic attitudes. The likelihood to vote the AfD is even about 346% higher for someone with extreme xenophobic attitudes than for someone with non-xenophobic attitudes. The confidence interval for *Odds ratio* are also above 1, which indicates that there is a significant positive effect for the factor “Xenophobia”.

When looking at the exact values of odds ratio, a significant difference between the factors becomes visible. The factor of “Xenophobia” has the biggest influence on voting the AfD, followed by the factor “Populist attitudes”. The least important factor in this research when voting the AfD is “Euroscepticism”. Nevertheless, all factors included in this research increase the likelihood of voting the AfD.

								95% C.I.for	
								EXP(B)	
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Step	Gender (1)	,923	,247	13,930	1	,000	2,517	1,550	4,087
1 ^a	Date of birth: Year	,032	,008	16,792	1	,000	1,032	1,017	1,048
	SLQ*			4,253	6	,642			
	SLQ (1)	-2,063	19596,117	,000	1	1,000	,127	,000	.
	SLQ (2)	18,620	10531,222	,000	1	,999	122059130,112	,000	.
	SLQ (3)	18,907	10531,222	,000	1	,999	162641615,233	,000	.
	SLQ (4)	19,424	10531,222	,000	1	,999	272655699,746	,000	.
	SLQ (5)	19,168	10531,222	,000	1	,999	211070734,380	,000	.
	SLQ (6)	3,970	30290,911	,000	1	1,000	52,970	,000	.
	Populist Attitude	,690	,145	22,736	1	,000	1,994	1,502	2,648
	Normalized								
	Eurosceptic	,304	,104	8,581	1	,003	1,355	1,106	1,660
	Normalized								
	Xenophobia	1,494	,179	69,624	1	,000	4,457	3,137	6,331
	Normalized								
Constant		-84,821	10531,233	,000	1	,994	,000		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Date of birth: Year, *School-leaving qualification (SLQ), Populist Attitude Normalized, Eurosceptic Normalized, Xenophobia Normalized.

4.2 Assumptions

When looking at the linearity of the logit, all three interactions have significance values greater than 0,05. This indicates that the assumption of linearity of the logit has been identified for “populist attitude”, “euroscepticism” and “xenophobia”. That means that each independent variable is linearly related to the log of the outcome variable.

To exclude multicollinearity in the model, the logistic regression was tested for the vulnerability to the biasing effect of collinearity. By conducting a linear regression and including collinearity diagnostics, the value for VIF and for the tolerance are being shown. The tolerance values are above 0,1 and VIF values are below 10 which indicates no anomalies. Also, when analysing the collinearity diagnostics, no values show abnormalities. That means that no multicollinearity appears between the predictors.

The next step is to look on the different significance values and check if the model is suitable for the data. The first test to look on is the Omnibus test of the Model Coefficients. Here the significance of the model is below 0,05, which indicates that the model fits the data. Both R Square

in the model summary are pseudo R Square, which is why they have to be interpreted carefully. Generally, it can be said that the higher these values are, the better. In this model, both values are not particularly high, which would indicate that the data does not fit the model perfectly. But as already said, it is important to recognize, that in this case the R Square are pseudo R Square. For the Hosmer and Lemeshow test it is important, that the significance is above 0,05, which is the case for the present model. The Wald statistic verifies if the individual predictors have a significant influence. All three predictors have a significance level above 0,05, which indicates that all three have a significant influence on the outcome.

Looking now on the control variables gender, age and school-leaving qualification, there is a difference if just the variables in the binary logistic regression are included and if they are included among the three independent variables. The only significant variables are gender and age. There is no significance for school-leaving qualification in both models. The values are changing slightly when comparing the two models. Looking at the variable gender, it becomes apparent, that the likelihood to vote the AfD increases for men, as the value *B* is positive, and the *Odds Ratio* are above one. The likelihood to vote the AfD is about 132% higher for men than for women. This number even increases when looking at the model with the independent variables included. In this case the likelihood to vote the AfD is even about 152% higher for men than for women. Even though the control variable age is significant, the impact is rather low. The likelihood to vote the AfD is about 1% higher for rather older people than for younger ones. This number just slightly increases in the model with the independent variables included. There the likelihood to vote the AfD is about 3% higher for rather older people than for younger ones.

When comparing the significance of the two models, differences can be identified. The values for both R Square, Cox&Snell as well as Nagelkerke are higher in the model with the control variables included, which indicates that the data better fits the model when the control variables are being included.

Variables in the Equation 2 (control variables)

								95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	Gender (1)	,842	,182	21,423	1	,000	2,322	1,625	3,317
	Date of birth: Year	,011	,005	4,845	1	,028	1,011	1,001	1,021
	SLQ*			29,028	6	,000			
	SLQ (1)	,195	16948,131	,000	1	1,000	1,215	,000	.
	SLQ (2)	19,597	11986,870	,000	1	,999	324146075,102	,000	.
	SLQ (3)	19,672	11986,870	,000	1	,999	349465070,151	,000	.
	SLQ (4)	19,265	11986,870	,000	1	,999	232554901,411	,000	.
	SLQ (5)	18,490	11986,870	,000	1	,999	107171030,120	,000	.
	SLQ (6)	,753	26109,218	,000	1	1,000	2,123	,000	.
	Constant	-44,086	11986,874	,000	1	,997	,000		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Date of birth: Year, *School-leaving qualification (SLQ).

5. Discussion

After displaying the findings of the data analysis, the outcome will be referred to the theory and the scientific state of knowledge. It will be analysed what the findings mean in this context and what importance it has for further research.

First it has to be discussed why the percentage of people who voted the AfD by second vote is lower in the used dataset in opposite to the official election result. In the official election result the AfD got 12,6% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017) by second vote whereas in the used dataset by GLES the AfD only got 9,6% by second vote. Even though the dataset by GLES is a representative study with more than 2.000 respondents, some inaccuracies are unavoidable. The respondents were randomly chosen. Even if it was tried to get a realistic cross section of the population as possible, it is still a cross section and therefore it does not reflect the whole population of Germany. In this research it will be worked with the data of the GLES, as all values has to be comparable with each other. The data for the binary regression analysis is retrieved from the GLES, that is why all used data has to be based on the same data set to make it comparable and valid.

When first looking at the percentage share of the answers of AfD voters regarding the three independent variables, clear attitudes of the electorate can be identified. The majority of the AfD electorate agrees with populist and xenophobic statements and only a small share is rejecting them. In opposite to that the electorate is not that deficit regarding the further unification of the

EU. There is no clear majority that point into a direction. Therefore, the two sub questions formulated in the introduction can be answered as follows: AfD voters in the German federal election 2017 show a rather strong populist attitude and xenophobic attitude, but not such a clear eurosceptic attitude. AfD voters do not show a more populist attitude than a eurosceptic or xenophobic attitude. These tendencies are also getting visible when analysing the binary logistic regression. Populist attitudes and xenophobia are more important predictors in opposite to euroscepticism. This means, that it would be more likely that someone with strong xenophobic or populist attitudes votes the AfD than someone who with strong Eurosceptic attitudes. This is especially interesting when considering that the parties founding background was based on the criticism on the European monetary union and the grants paid for the financially weak member states. The at the beginning most important characteristic position euroscepticism has now lost importance. This could be traced back to the content wise-related shift of the party. As explained in the theory section, the party changed their focus from almost exclusively criticising the strategy of the EU in the context of the European monetary crisis towards a right-wing focusing on immigration policies and migration criticism (Decker, 2018). The so-called refugee crisis in 2015 was one of the big influences that helped the AfD to become successful and get elected into parliament. This might also be an indicator for the great number of xenophobic attitudes within the AfD electorate.

The populist character of the party also gets reflected in the attitudes of the electorate. Many AfD voters might feel represented by a new party with critical statements towards the long-established parties. They distrust the politicians and a certain kind of disenchantment with politics prevails. This lines up with previous studies that came to the conclusion that one of main reasons for voting the AfD was the general dissatisfaction with the performance of the government in federal and state level (Schmitt-Beck et al., 2017). Even though Euroscepticism is the least important feature, examined in this paper, that influences the AfD electorate to vote in their favour, it is still from great importance. The data analysis has shown that people with eurosceptic attitudes are more likely to vote the AfD than people with no eurosceptic attitudes. This is also shown in the already existing literature about the voting behaviour and characteristics of the AfD electorate. In the German parliament elections in 2013 the biggest topic of the AfD was the euro crisis what is also displayed in the voting intentions of the electorate (Schmitt-Beck, 2014). This characteristic is still of great importance for the AfD electorate, which is also based on the fact, that no other party is covering that topic to a relevant extend. This has a certain validity even though Arzheimer (2015) did not describe the AfD as a hard eurosceptic party, as they do not reject the EU as such, just the present form and Europe as a federal state. This may also be reflected in the question asked in the survey. Not the whole EU is criticized but the further unification. An impression of

the strict rejection of the EU has not been covered by the questions, just the general attitude towards the further unification.

The last independent variable to discuss is xenophobia. As already mentioned before, this factor has the biggest impact on voting the AfD. When looking on the theory section, it already becomes apparent that xenophobia has great impact on voting the AfD. When looking back on their development, the migration topic in the beginning was mainly focussed on economic issues. This has changed in the last years and is now more focusing on the societal issues. The general criticism on multiculturalism and anti-Muslim attitudes reflects the right-wing sentiment of the AfD and its electorate. Based on the question of the survey, most of the AfD voters are afraid that the German culture is being threatened by immigrants. Another common assumption is, that they are responsible for an increasing crime rate. They favour the will of the majority even though minority rights might get affected. Furthermore, minorities should adapt the German culture, traditions and habits. This conclusion is also supported by the study of Pickel (2019) where cultural threatening, ethnocentrism and mistrust towards established parties are analysed as the main intentions to vote the AfD.

When looking at the control variables (gender and age being significant factors,) previously studied characteristics are getting confirmed by the data analysis. The repeatedly mentioned characteristic of the AfD that the electorate contains mainly of men, is here also being reflected. It is much more likely to vote the AfD if someone is male instead of female. This has also been thematized in earlier studies. As age functions as a control variable in this research, it becomes clear that there is a better prediction possible when including the age of the AfD electorate. This might lead to the result that not mainly the three independent variables explain why a person votes the AfD, but also the gender and age of the voter. Even this is partly true, it must be stated that also without the control variables the model is significant and fits the data. It shows that the three factors might not be seen as the only explanations why people are voting the AfD, but as three relevant factors among others. The three independent variables may not explain every aspect why the AfD is voted but shows that these attitudes also have an influence.

As seen in the data analysis, the most important influence for voting the AfD is xenophobia. That underlines the assumption, that the AfD is not just a protest party and that the electorate just want to express their dissatisfaction with the current politics. In fact, the AfD has to get recognized as a party with a stable electorate that has specific political beliefs and views. It shows that the electorate does not just vote the AfD because of the absence of alternatives within the party spectrum. It reflects that a large part of the AfD electorate supports the party program and vote them with the expectation of specific policy changes.

Another aspect that should get discussed is the share of non-voters, which was not addressed in the data analysis. A big amount of the people who voted the AfD in 2017 did not vote at all in the previous election in 2013 (Pickel, 2019). That reflects, that previously the people did not feel represented by a party. It seems like the AfD was able to gain voters through their program and their policy. That would make the case for a party that is not just a protest party or a single-issue party. As Bieber et al. (2018) analysed it “that the AfD not only channels diffuse protest, but increasingly represents the interests of a specific social group whose members feel that their values, political concerns and ideas about the cultural traditions and roots of German society are represented by the party.” (in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59, p. 457).

The outcome of the data analysis regarding the theory shows that the AfD should not get underestimated, as the majority of the voters are not voting the party exclusively because of its populist attitude. The AfD cannot just be seen as a populist radical right-wing party only, but a party with clear political objectives and goals. As displayed above, the most influential characteristic is the xenophobic attitude which separates the society into “own” or “domestic” and “foreign”. The danger of splitting the society into two camps and to foment hatred could become a problem. To see that more than 70% of the AfD electorate supports xenophobic thinking shows how severe the political situation might become. The AfD electorate should be taken seriously, including their concerns and fears and to tackle political disenchantment. The AfD voters have to trust politics again and awareness-raising work must be implemented.

6. Conclusion

In the present study, the AfD electorate and their reasons for voting the AfD was examined. The emerge of a populist right-wing party in Germany was new in the political landscape, although the phenomenon of right-wing populism in Europe is not unknown. In countries like France or the Netherlands they have a longer tradition after 1945 and especially in the last few years, right-wing populism in Europe was a growing movement. Therefore, Germany was rather late when talking about populist right-wing parties. The question how important populist attitudes are in relation to other drivers, like Euroscepticism and xenophobia, in determining AfD vote in the German federal election 2017 can be answered in the way that even though populist attitudes are important in determining AfD votes, it is not the main driver. The proposition that the AfD gains their votes mainly because of their populist attitude cannot be confirmed. However also Euroscepticism is not the main driver like during the election in 2013. This change in the importance of factors determining AfD votes can be traced back to the development of the party.

Whereas in the beginning of the party's history and during the German federal election in 2013 the focus and almost only topic was the criticism of the EU and the politics during the EU financial crisis. After the thematic change within the party and the separation of the right wing of the party, the main focus changed.

Practical implications for other parties would be to perceive the AfD as a legitimate part of the German political party landscape with an electorate that has to be taken seriously. In the beginning of the party's success, many politicians underestimated the AfD and its electorate which led to ignorance towards the problems and concerns of AfD voters. Thereupon the other parties did not know how to react to the surprising success of the AfD. By recognizing the AfD voters demands, the party programs could include possible concerns and thereby let the AfD electorate felt taken seriously. Also, awareness-raising measures regarding foreigners could prevent possible racism and xenophobia.

Even though this research gives first indicative evidence that not populist attitudes are the main driver in determining AfD votes, more research should investigate this topic further. To get a fully evident picture of the AfD electorate more characteristics and possible drivers that may be responsible for voting the AfD should be included. Likewise, a long term study should focus on the changing nature of the party. In regular intervals the AfD electorate should be investigated regarding their political interests, mayor concerns and fears, urgent topics and how they look into the future. Further factors that also should be included in research are socioeconomic aspects. Due to the limitation of the capacity of this study, these aspects and external factors could not be included. Outside factors, like unpredictable crises and influences might also influence the AfD electorate. What also could be important in further research is the comparison of the AfD electorate with other parties – especially regarding the different preferences of the electorates and what was decisive for their vote. By comparing the AfD electorate with the electorate of other populist right-wing parties in Europe, possible similarities could get apparent. Due to collectively researching populist right-wing parties within Europe, possible decisive factors could get analysed better and in more detail.

7. Literature

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8. Appendix

Questions derived from the GLES by-election study 2017

8.1 Dependent variable

q19a-b: You were able to cast two votes in the Bundestag elections. The first vote for a candidate from your constituency, the second vote for a party. Here is a sample ballot paper, similar to the one you received in the Bundestag election. How did you mark your ballot paper? Please tell me the code number for your first and second vote.

(A) now please for the first vote

(B) now please for the second vote

Sample ballots for respondents:

first vote:

01 CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union) 02 SPD

(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

03 DIE LINKE (DIE LINKE)

04 GRÜNE (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN)

05 FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)

06 AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)

07 PIRATEN (Piratenpartei Deutschland)

08 NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

09 other party, in fact _____

Second vote:

21 CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union) 22 SPD

(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

23 DIE LINKE (DIE LINKE)

24 GRÜNE (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN)

25 FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)

26 AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)

27 PIRATEN (Piratenpartei Deutschland)

28 NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

29 other party, in fact _____

8.2 Independent Variables

8.2.1 Populist attitude

q85a-o: Now I would like to know your opinion on some general statements about politics. For each of the following statements, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with it.

- (A) What is called compromise in politics is in reality only a betrayal of principles.
- (B) The people, and not the politicians, should make the most important decisions.
- (C) The members of the German Bundestag must follow the will of the people.
- (D) The political differences between elites and the people are greater than the differences within the people.
- (E) A citizen would represent my interests better than a professional politician.
- (F) The politicians talk too much and do too little.
- (G) Most politicians are not interested in the opinion of the citizens.
- (H) Most politicians are trustworthy.
- (I) The biggest problem in Germany are the politicians.
- (J) A strong leader is good for Germany, even if he does not always follow the rules to move things forward.
- (K) Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful.
- (L) Political issues are often difficult for me to understand.
- (M) I dare to take an active part in a conversation about political issues.
- (N) Politicians care about what ordinary people think.
- (O) Today's problems are so complicated that politics can no longer solve them.

Characteristics:

- (1) agree completely
- (2) rather agree
- (3) partly/partially
- (4) rather reject
- (5) reject completely

8.2.2 Euroscepticism

q66j: There are different opinions on different political issues. How about you: How do you feel about the following statements? Please answer using the list.

- (J) The European unification should be pushed further.

Characteristics:

- (1) agree completely
- (2) rather agree
- (3) partly/partially
- (4) rather reject
- (5) reject completely

8.2.3 Xenophobia

q8a-e: And if you now think of minorities here in Germany: Please indicate for each of the following statements to what extent you agree or disagree with it.

- (A) Minorities should adapt to German customs.
- (B) The will of the majority should always prevail, even when minority rights are involved.

- (C) Immigrants are generally good for the German economy.
- (D) German culture is threatened by immigrants.
- (E) Immigrants increase the crime rate in Germany.

Characteristics:

- (1) agree completely
- (2) rather agree
- (3) partly/partially
- (4) rather reject
- (5) reject completely