

Are you going to the party?: The impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors

A comparative case study of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands

Anieke Kranenburg

**UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.**



Are you going to the party?: The impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors

A comparative case study of Baden-Württemberg,
North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands

Anieke Kranenburg

Master Thesis

September 2020

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of:

- Master of Science in Public Administration
- Master of Science in European Studies
- Master of Arts in Comparative Public Governance

Supervisors:

- Prof. dr. Bas Denters, University of Twente
- Prof. dr. Norbert Kersting, University of Münster

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the end of my journey in obtaining three master's degrees awarded by two higher education institutions. Combining the master's in Public Administration and the double degree master's in European Studies was a delight. It has been an unforgettable experience to study at the University of Twente and the University of Münster. These study programmes and universities each had its own charm, and it was a joy to unite them in their diversity.

The work presented in this thesis would not have been possible without several people. I therefore take this opportunity to extend my sincere gratitude and appreciation to all those who contributed in many ways to the completion of this thesis.

I would like to thank my supervisor prof. dr. Bas Denters for all his support throughout my master's study. I am grateful for the opportunity he gave me to write an academic paper together while I was one of his students. I undoubtedly wanted us to continue working together, and he gladly agreed to be my master's thesis supervisor. Several enjoyable coffee meetings followed in which we discussed the progress of my thesis. Prof. Denters always pushed me to further improve the quality of my work, and I am thankful for his guidance throughout each stage of the process. In addition to sharing his knowledge on local democracy, he helped me improve my academic writing, which is of great value for my future career. Extra-curricular activities, an internship at the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the municipality of Dordrecht, a job and political responsibilities have delayed the process of writing this thesis. I gratefully thank prof. Denters for his patience and his constant help to ensure the completion of this thesis. Working together has been a real delight.

I would like to acknowledge my second supervisor, prof. dr. Norbert Kersting, for deeply inspiring my interest in new and online forms of citizen participation. With great pleasure, I look back at our discussions about the differences between Dutch and German local democracies. I also appreciate our conversations about other interesting topics, such as the potential of nudging and the role of the Dutch water board. I was elated when prof. Kersting said he wanted to become my supervisor, and I thank him for his guidance.

My sincere thanks also goes to all local councillors who took the time to answer my survey. Your contribution has been valuable to my research.

There are others not associated with this thesis in an official capacity but who have contributed significantly nonetheless. I would like to thank my parents for their love, understanding, and encouragement throughout all my life, especially during my study. Furthermore, I am grateful to my friends who celebrated each accomplishment with me and provided welcome distractions at some moments. Finally, I would like to thank my boyfriend for his endless support throughout this journey and for supporting my decisions in life.

Anieke Kranenburg

Enschede, September 2020

Abstract

The current Dutch national programme ‘Democracy in Action’ aims to reform local democracy. The Minister emphasize the need for more citizen-oriented local democracy without weakening the local representative democracy. Therefore, local councillors need to focus more on citizens in their function as local representatives. However, local councillors have to give substance to their role within the local democratic institutional setting. Local democratic institutions differ in the extent to which they give citizens influence at the expense of party influence. In contrast to the Netherlands, German local democratic institutions are more citizen-oriented. It is therefore interesting to examine, from a Dutch perspective, how German local councillors give substance to their role. This research analyses the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. It focuses on the representative role of local councillors and their role regarding citizen participation specifically. A comparative analysis between the German states Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands was conducted to find the extent of the effect of institutional variations on local councillors’ role orientation and role behaviour. Regarding the representative role, findings indicated that institutions have a weak impact on role orientations and a weak impact on party-related role behaviour. Regarding the role towards citizen participation, institutions were found to have no impact on role orientation, but there was a weak direct impact on role behaviour. These results suggest that the impact of variations in local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors, in terms of giving influence to either parties or citizens, is somewhat weak.

Keywords: Citizen democracy, institutional effect, local councillors’ role.

Contents

List of Figures	12
List of Tables	14
Chapter 1. Introduction to the research	17
1.1 Introduction	18
1.2 Main research question and sub-questions	19
1.2 Outline of the research	23
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework	27
2.1 Role theory	28
2.1.1 The general concepts of role theory	28
2.1.2 Role orientation and role behaviour	29
2.1.3 The influence of collective norms and formal institutions	30
2.1.4 General theoretical expectations	31
2.2 The role of local councillors is changing	33
2.2.1 Changing role relations	33
2.3 Local democratic institutions	35
2.4 Representative role of local councillors	37
2.5 Role with regard to citizen participation	39
2.6 Hypotheses	41
Chapter 3. Method	45
3.1 Selection of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands	48
3.2. Methodology: research question 1	49
3.3 Methodology: research question 2	50
3.3.1 Data collection	50
3.3.2 Operationalisation of representative role	51
3.4 Methodology: research question 3	55
3.4.1 Selection of municipalities	55
3.4.2 Data collection	56
3.4.3 Response to the survey	59
3.4.4 Operationalisation of role with regard to citizen participation	62
3.5 Reliability and validity	64

Chapter 4. Local democratic institutions	67
4.1 Local democratic contexts	68
4.1.1 Germany	68
4.1.2 Baden-Württemberg	70
4.1.3 North Rhine-Westphalia	72
4.1.4 The Netherlands	74
4.1.5 Conclusion: similarities and differences among local democratic contexts	75
4.2 Local democratic models: party-oriented or citizen-oriented	76
4.2.1 Direct election of the mayor	77
4.2.2 Local electoral system	77
4.2.3 Local referendums	78
4.2.4 Results and conclusion	78
Chapter 5. The representative role of local councillors	81
5.1 Representative role orientation	83
5.1.1 Conclusion: representative role orientation	91
5.2 Representative role behaviour	92
5.2.1 Conclusion: representative role behaviour	101
5.3 Conclusion and discussion: representative role	102
Chapter 6. The role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation	109
6.1 Role orientation with regard to citizen participation	111
6.1.1 Conclusion: role orientation with regard to citizen participation	115
6.2 Role behaviour with regard to citizen participation	116
6.2.1 Facet 1: Setting frameworks	116
6.2.2 Facet 2: Scrutinising	123
6.2.3 Conclusion: role behaviour with regard to citizen participation	129
6.3 Conclusion: the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation	131
Chapter 7. Conclusion and discussion	137
7.1 Answer to main research question	138
7.2 Discussion of the results	139
7.2.1 Theoretical explanation of the results	139
7.2.2 Difference between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia	140
7.2.3 Possible opposite effect of citizen democratic reforms	141
7.2.4 Stronger executive leadership at the expense of party influence	142
7.3 Findings in the context of existing literature	143
7.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research	145
7.5 Practical implications	146
7.5.1 The national programme in the context of our findings	147

References	149
Appendix A	157
Appendix B	160
Appendix C	165
Appendix D	170
Appendix E	171
Appendix F	172
Appendix G	173
Appendix H	175
Appendix I	176
Appendix J	177
Appendix K	178
Appendix L	179
Appendix M	180
Appendix N	181
Appendix O	182

List of Figures


Figure 1.1: Diagram of the reasoning behind the main research question	20
Figure 1.2: Overview of how the research (sub-)questions are interrelated	23
Figure 2.1: General theoretical expectations	32
Figure 2.2: Party or citizen focus of local democratic institutions and the representative role	39
Figure 2.3: Party or citizen focus in the representative role and the role with regard to citizen participation specifically	41
Figure 2.4: Analytical framework connecting the three theoretical models	41
Figure 3.1: Overview of research questions and data sources of the three empirical chapters	47
Figure 3.2: Timeline of gathering survey data	58
Figure 5.1: Error bar for the aspect ‘Implementing the program of my political party/movement’ by region	84
Figure 5.2: Error bar for the aspect ‘Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation’ by region	85
Figure 5.3: Error bar for the aspect ‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government’ by region	86
Figure 5.4: Error bar for the aspect ‘The results of local elections should be the most important aspect in determining municipal policies’ by region	87
Figure 5.5: Error bar for the aspect ‘Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society’ by region	88
Figure 5.6: Error bar for the aspect ‘Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors’ by region	89
Figure 5.7: Error bar for the aspect ‘Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions’ by region	90
Figure 5.8: Error bar for the aspect ‘Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives’ by region	91
Figure 5.9: Error bar for the aspect ‘Meeting with the party’s council group’ by region	93
Figure 5.10: Error bar for the aspect ‘Other party meetings and activities’ by region	94
Figure 5.11: Error bar for the aspect ‘Members of my party groups’ by region	95
Figure 5.12: Error bar for the aspect ‘Implementing the programme of my political party/movement’ by region	96
Figure 5.13: Error bar for the aspect ‘Leading actors from voluntary associations’ by region	97
Figure 5.14: Error bar for the aspect ‘Organisations of ethnic minorities’ by region	98
Figure 5.15: Error bar for the aspect ‘Individual citizens in your role as a councillor’ by region	99
Figure 5.16: Error bar for the aspect ‘Representing the request and issues emerging from local society’ by region	100

Figure 5.17: Error bar for the aspect ‘Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society’ by region	101
Figure 5.18: Overview of how the research (sub-)questions concerning the representative role are interrelated	103
Figure 5.19: Visual representation of relationships between constructs and the hypothesis concerning the representative role of local councillors	105
Figure 6.1: Error bar for the aspect ‘Realising party programme’ by region	112
Figure 6.2: Error bar for the aspect ‘Acting in unity with the party’ by region	113
Figure 6.3: Error bar for the aspect ‘Contact with citizens and local organisations’ by region	114
Figure 6.4: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure channels of participation’ by region	115
Figure 6.5: Error bar for ‘Frequency of setting content frameworks’ by region	118
Figure 6.6: Error bar for the aspect ‘Party politics’ by region	119
Figure 6.7: Error bar for ‘Frequency of setting process frameworks’ by region	120
Figure 6.8: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure channels of participation’ by region	121
Figure 6.9: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure that everyone can participate’ by region	122
Figure 6.10: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process’ by region	123
Figure 6.11: Error bar for the aspect ‘Party politics’ by region	126
Figure 6.12: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure channels of participation’ by region	127
Figure 6.13: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure that everyone can participate’ by region	128
Figure 6.14: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process’ by region	129
Figure 6.15: Overview of how the (sub-)questions concerning the role with regard to citizen participation are interrelated	132
Figure 6.16: Visual representation of relationships between constructs and hypothesis concerning the role with regard to citizen participation	134

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Sub-questions related to the representative role of local councillors	21
Table 1.2: Sub-questions related to the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation	22
Table 2.1: Two analytical models of local democracy by Vetter (2009)	36
Table 2.2: Measurement criteria of two models of local democracy	36
Table 2.3: Types of direct influence related to the criteria of the two models of local democracy	36
Table 2.4: Two models of representation (Denters, 2012)	38
Table 3.1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the selected academic papers	49
Table 3.2: Survey data and response rates: Germany and the Netherlands	51
Table 3.3: Overview of the number of municipalities and number of local councillors	51
Table 3.4: Selected MAELG questions to measure representative role orientation	52
Table 3.5: Selected MAELG questions to measure representative role behaviour	53
Table 3.6: Results of principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha values for various aspects of the representative <u>role orientation</u> of local councillors	54
Table 3.7: Results of principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha values for various aspects of the representative <u>role behaviour</u> of local councillors	54
Table 3.8: Population size of the selected municipalities, rounded to the nearest 1,000	56
Table 3.9: Cover letter text implications based on the tailored design method by Dillman (1978; 2000)	57
Table 3.10: Overview of the number of respondents per selected municipality	59
Table 3.11: Socio-demographic and political characteristics of the respondents of the three regions	61
Table 4.1: Measurement criteria of the two models of local democracy	79
Table 4.2: Local democracy scores of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands	79
Table 5.1: Expected score of each region on party-focussed and citizen-focussed aspects	82
Table 5.2: Different categories of confirmation for analysing representative role orientation and role behaviour	83
Table 5.3: Aspects of representative role orientation: party focus vs. citizen focus	84
Table 5.4: Confirmation types of representative role orientation (RQ 2.A.2)	92
Table 5.5: Aspects representative role behaviour: party focus vs. citizen focus	93
Table 5.6: Confirmation types of representative role behaviour (RQ 2.A.2)	102
Table 5.7: Summary RQ 2.B.1 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion	104
Table 5.8: Summary RQ 2.B.2 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion	106

Table 6.1: <i>Expected score of each region on party-focussed and citizen-focussed aspects</i>	110
Table 6.2: <i>Confirmation types of role orientation with regard to citizen participation (RQ 3.A.1)</i>	116
Table 6.3: <i>Answer options for survey question 3 concerning the establishment of content frameworks</i>	117
Table 6.4: <i>Answer options for survey question about establishing process frameworks</i>	119
Table 6.5: <i>Percentage of respondents indicating a specific behaviour of the local council with regard to scrutinising citizen participation processes</i>	124
Table 6.6: <i>Percentage of respondents indicating the focus of the local council when scrutinising citizen participation processes</i>	125
Table 6.7: <i>Confirmation types of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation (RQ 3.A.2)</i>	131
Table 6.8: <i>Summary RQ 3.B.1 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion</i>	133
Table 6.9: <i>Summary RQ 3.B.2 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion</i>	134



Chapter 1

Introduction to the research

1.1 Introduction

The Dutch Minister for Interior and Kingdom Relations underscores the urgent need to strengthen and reform local democracies in the Netherlands. Local governments face many challenges due to societal changes and new responsibilities, which require a stronger local democracy. The Minister wants to hasten the process of local democratic reform. In June 2019, she wrote a letter to the House of Representatives to inform them about current and future actions needed to reform local democracies.¹ In a national programme called ‘Democracy in Action’, the Minister and relevant partners work together on strengthening and renewing local democracies.²

This master’s thesis was prompted by these local democracy reform plans. These reforms are deemed necessary by the Dutch Minister and several governmental research reports. The State Commission Remkes (2018) concluded that not everyone feels represented. Moreover, a group of people for whom democratic institutions are not working is at the risk of turning their backs on politics or have done this already. In the past years, several reports have explored how local democracy can address these issues, for example, ‘Maatwerkdemocratie’ (VNG, 2016) and ‘Op weg naar meervoudige democratie’ (Commissie Toekomstgericht lokaal bestuur, 2016). Other reports have stressed the importance of local councillors changing their role, such as ‘Raadswerk is Maatwerk’ (De Graaf, et al., 2016), ‘Loslaten in Vertrouwen’ (ROB, 2012), and ‘15,9 uur’ (ROB, 2016). All in all, the shortcomings of the local democracy and the changes needed in the role of local councillors are high on the Dutch political agenda.

Concerns about the shortcomings of local democracies are also shared and mentioned in the academic literature. Several researchers have noted that the position of the local council is weakened (Schaap et al., 2018; Boogers & Reussing, 2018; Peters & Castenmiller, 2019). The research of Schaap et al. (2018) showed that half of the people do not vote, people who do vote base their decision on national political opinions, and political parties are no longer the main link between the citizens and the local council in the Netherlands. In addition, citizens have become more demanding and want a more direct voice in politics (Pállinger, et al., 2007). These problems in the functioning of the party-oriented democracy underline the need for other forms of local democracy with more participatory citizens’ involvement (Schaap et al., 2018; Vetter, 2009). Therefore, local governments search for ways to reform the local democracy (Smith, 2009; Kersting et al., 2009; Geißel & Newton, 2012; Kersting, 2008; Schaap et al., 2018).

To accelerate the process of reform, the Minister launched a national programme ‘Democracy in Action’ with two key objectives: (a) to establish a powerful local council and (b) to increase the participation of citizens. First, the Minister wants a powerful local council that is connected with society. Local councils are the heart of our local democracies and their decisions greatly affect the daily life of citizens. It is important that local councillors adapt to changes in society. The proposed actions under the programme aim to strengthen the position of the local council and to improve its representative role. Second, the Minister

¹ Kamerstuk 35 000 VII, nr. 100. <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-35000-VII-100.html>

² Kamerstuk 34 775 VII, nr. 69. <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34775-VII-69.html>

supports measures giving citizens more influence and power in the policy-making process. The Minister wants a good mix of citizen participation possibilities. The goal is to establish a strong representative local democracy complemented by and integrated with a participative, deliberative, and direct democracy. It is a plea for a representative local democracy complemented by participative forms of democracies. Therefore, local councillors need to focus more on citizens in their role as local representatives. In line with the two key objectives of the programme proposed by the Minister, this master's thesis focuses on the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically.

The proposed actions corresponding to the two key objectives of the 'Democracy in Action' programme inform local councillors about instruments already available within current legislation. There is a clear focus on training, advising, and informing local councillors. The Minister leaves structural reforms to the autonomous decision of the municipalities and their elected councils. Only minor adjustments to current legislation have been proposed to increase citizen participation, such as a municipal model regulation for 'Right to Challenge'. Notably, actions are directed to change behaviour, interaction, roles, and expectations. The Dutch Minister clearly wants local councillors to change their role within current local democratic institutions.

In contrast to the programme proposed by the Dutch Minister, Germany has already adopted structural reforms to local democratic institutions to ensure more citizen participation. Vetter (2009) observed an invariably shift in the focus of local democracies from parties to citizens. It is thus interesting to examine, from a Dutch perspective, how German local councillors give substance to their representative role and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. This master's thesis compares the two German states Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia with the Netherlands. These regions have been selected because of the expected differences in the focus (on parties or citizens) of local democratic institutions. This thesis examines how local councillors perform their role as representatives in different local democratic institutional settings.

1.2 Main research question and sub-questions

Following the discussion in the previous section, the main research question has been formulated as:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors?

The line of reasoning behind the main research question is visualised in Figure 1.1. In line with the objectives of the 'Democracy in Action' programme, this master's thesis focuses on the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. Several theories are applied to answer the main research question (RQ). The concepts of role theory are introduced from which a number of general theoretical expectations are developed and translated into specific hypotheses. In formulating these hypotheses, I will build on previous work of Vetter (2009) to define local democratic

intuitions as either party-oriented or citizen-oriented and on the work of Denters (2012) to illustrate how the representative role looks like in a party democracy and in a citizen democracy.³ Lastly, several theories on the role of local councillors regarding citizen participation are combined to indicate their party or citizen focus when giving substance to their role regarding citizen participation.

This master's thesis determines to what extent the focus (i.e. party or citizen) in role orientation and role behaviour is in line with the focus of local democratic institutions (i.e. party or citizen). The research examines two roles of local councillors in three different regions. The aim is to provide a deeper understanding of how local councillors perform their role in different local democratic institutional settings.




Figure 1.1: Diagram of the reasoning behind the main research question

³ There are more models focusing on local democratic change in relation to representative and participatory democracy, such as the four dimensions of democratic participation developed by Kersting (2016a): representative democracy, direct democracy, deliberative democracy and demonstrative democracy.

To answer the main research question, three research questions and nine sub-questions have been formulated. The first research question is as follows:

What are the similarities and differences in the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands? (RQ1)

This research question aims to promote a deeper understanding of how local democratic institutions differ in the three regions. Underlying the main research question is the assumption that local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands differ from each other. An analysis of the local democratic institutions can confirm or disprove this assumption.

The following research questions are concerned with the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. The second research question has been formulated as:

*To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the **representative role** orientation and representative role behaviour of local councillors? (RQ2)*

With regard to the representative role, it needs to be clear whether local councillors have a party or citizen democratic focus in their role orientation (RQ2.A.1) and role behaviour (RQ2.A.2). Subsequently, the impact of local democratic institutions on role orientation (RQ2.B.1) and role behaviour (RQ2.B.2) is analysed. These sub-questions related to the representative role of local councillors are listed in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Sub-questions related to the representative role of local councillors

Research question 2.A.1:

To what extent do local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen democratic focus in their representative role orientation?

Research question 2.A.2:

To what extent do local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen democratic focus in their representative role behaviour?

Research question 2.B.1:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the representative role orientation of local councillors?

Research question 2.B.2:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a direct or indirect impact on the representative role behaviour of local councillors?

The third research question that has been formulated is as follows:

*To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors with regard to **citizen participation**? (RQ3)*

The same steps need to be taken when analysing the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation specifically. After clarifying role orientation (RQ3.A.1) and role behaviour (RQ3.A.2), the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation (RQ3.B.1) and role behaviour (RQ3.B.2) of local councillors are analysed. These sub-questions related to the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation are listed in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Sub-questions related to the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation

Research question 3.A.1:

To what extent do local councillors in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen democratic focus in their role orientation with regard to citizen participation?

Research question 3.A.2:

To what extent do local councillors in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen democratic focus in their role behaviour with regard to citizen participation?

Research question 3.B.1:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation?

Research question 3.B.2:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a direct or indirect impact on role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation?

Figure 1.2 provides an overview of how these research questions and sub-questions are related. Together, these research (sub-)questions answer the main research question.




Figure 1.2: Overview of how the research (sub-)questions are interrelated

1.2 Outline of the research

Answering the questions regarding the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors requires several analytical steps. Chapter 2 of this research explores relevant theories and builds a conceptual framework to answer the research questions. Chapter 3 explains the research design used in this study. Subsequent chapters each address a research question. Together, they answer the main research question and test the hypotheses.

Chapter 2 discusses the theories used to answer the research questions. The concepts of role theory are introduced from which a number of general theoretical expectations are developed. The remainder of this chapter translates these expectations to the specific context of this research. First, Vetter's (2009) analytical model is explained which characterized local democratic institutions as either a party model or a citizen model. Second, two models of representation by Denters (2012) are discussed to illustrate how the representative role looks like in a party-oriented democracy and in a citizen-oriented democracy. Denters' models of representation are then linked to Vetter's models of local democracy. Third, this chapter attempts to reconcile several theories on the role of local councillors regarding citizen participation. Two facets of role behaviour (i.e. setting frameworks and scrutinising) serve as the starting point. Two approaches to

setting frameworks and scrutinising with regard to citizen participation are discussed to demonstrate the differences between a party-oriented democracy and a citizen-oriented democracy. The chapter concludes by translating the general theoretical expectations into specific hypotheses.


Chapter 3 describes the comparative research design of this master's thesis. It explains the choice to compare the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Furthermore, this chapter describes the research design of the three empirical chapters of this research. The operationalisation of the representative role of local councillors and their role regarding citizen participation are discussed in detail. Several techniques are employed to increase the reliability and validity of this research.

Chapter 4 explores and describes the main similarities and differences in the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands (RQ1). The chapter starts with a brief overview of recent local democratic reforms. Relevant events in and the political ambitions of each region are discussed. This information is not strictly necessary to answer the main research question, yet it illustrates the local democratic context of the three regions. The second part of this chapter examines more closely the type of local democratic institutions in each region. Using Vetter's model, this chapter categorises the local democratic institutions of each region as either party-oriented or citizen-oriented. This chapter argues that Baden-Württemberg's local democratic institutions have a citizen focus, North Rhine-Westphalia's local democratic institutions have a moderate citizen focus, while the Dutch local democratic institutions have a party focus.

Chapter 5 analyses the representative role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors (RQ2). The survey dataset of the Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance (MAELG) project is used to determine whether local councillors have a party or citizen focus with regard to their representative role. Questions in which local councillors indicate the importance of tasks and statements are used to determine the focus of their role orientation. In addition, questions about time spending and stated contributions to tasks are used to identify the focus of local councillors' role behaviour. The results reveal the focus of local councillors when giving substance to their representative role. The question is whether they are more responsive to their party or to the views of citizens.

Chapter 6 examines the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors and their role regard to citizen participation specifically (RQ3). The chapter analyses self-collected survey data from 12 municipalities spread in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. A total of 131 local councillors answered the survey on role orientation and role behaviour regarding citizen participation. The survey attempts to assess the focus of local councillors when they set the frameworks for citizen participation and when they scrutinise these. The results reveal whether local councillors are inclined to use their party programme and focus on the content or are inclined to downplay their own substantive judgement and focus on the process.

Chapter 7 summarises the findings and answers to the research questions. The results indicate to what extent local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands influence the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. A distinction is made between the representative role of local councillors and their role towards citizen participation. The results of this research are discussed before evaluating them against academic literature. Accordingly, the limitations of this research and suggestions for future research are described. This chapter ends with highlighting the practical implications for policymakers, local councillors, and the national programme ‘Democracy in Action’ launched by the Minister.



Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

By presenting different theories concerning local democratic institutions and the role of local councillors, this chapter builds an analytical model to answer the main research question. The chapter is constructed as follows. First, section 2.1 introduces the general concepts of role theory. On the basis of this theory, a number of general theoretical expectations are developed. The remainder of this chapter then develops specific hypotheses that provide theoretically plausible answers to the research questions on the impact of democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. In subsequent sections, role theory – as a general theory – is translated to the specific domain of the role of local councillors as citizens’ representatives. Section 2.2 outlines the current debate on the role of local councillors in contemporary local democracy in Germany and the Netherlands. Section 2.3 introduces two basic models to institutionalise local representative democracies (party-oriented democracy versus citizen-oriented democracy; cf. research question 1). Subsequently, the implication of these two models for the representative role of local councillors is discussed in section 2.4 (cf. research question 2). The implications of these two models for the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation specifically, are discussed in section 2.5 (cf. research question 3). Based on the theories and concepts presented in previous sections, section 2.6 formulates six specific hypotheses.

2.1 Role theory

The research questions formulated in the previous chapter focus on the effects of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors. To answer these questions, it is helpful to consider role theory. Role theory discusses the role concept and provides a number of principles that can be used to explain role behaviour. Therefore, section 2.1. introduces the general concepts of role theory. First, section 2.1.1 explains the basic ideas of role theory. Second, section 2.1.2 discusses the concepts of role orientation and role behaviour. Section 2.1.3 then describes the influence of collective norms and formal institutions on role orientation and role behaviour. Lastly, section 2.1.4 formulates general theoretical expectations on the basis of role theory. These general concepts are subsequently used to describe and analyse the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically.

2.1.1 The general concepts of role theory

Role theory is a useful instrument to achieve a better understanding of how and why people behave in certain ways. It links perspectives from multiple research fields such as psychology, sociology and anthropology (Biddle, 1986). With the relatively simple presumptions of role theory, it is possible to study complex behavioural situations and interactions. In his often-cited work, Biddle (1979) describes role theory as ‘the study of behaviours that are characteristics of persons within contexts and with various processes that presumably produce, explain or are affected by those behaviours’ (p.4).

According to role theory, the behaviour of people in particular positions in society is affected by normative orientations and expectations regarding the behaviour of the persons in these positions. A person who occupies such a position is called a ‘role bearer’. The role bearer has conceptions about how he or she

should behave. In addition, other people have expectations regarding the behaviour of the role bearer. These people are called ‘role senders’. Central in role theory is the idea that together the role bearer’s role conceptions and the role senders’ expectations regarding the role bearer’s behaviour generate behaviour. A literature overview by Biddle (1986) indicated that role orientations and role expectations contribute to the understanding that human beings behave in ways that are different and predictable depending on their respective social identities and the situation (Biddle, 1986: 68).

Just like Biddle (1986), Visser et al. (1983) argued that the way people behave is influenced by the norms of behaviour of themselves and others. In their study, Visser et al. used three basic concepts to analyse a role, namely ‘role orientation’, ‘role expectations’ and ‘role behaviour’. The norms of behaviour could come from the person him- or herself (role orientations) or from other persons (role expectations). However, there are different interpretations of role theory and its basic concepts.⁴ Nevertheless, the approach of Visser et al. (1983) has been used by other researchers studying the role of local councillors in relation to local democratic institutions, such as Heinelt (2013) and Denters and Klok (2013). Therefore, the clear concepts of role orientation, role behaviour and role expectation have proven to be useful concepts in this context.

2.1.2 Role orientation and role behaviour

A role orientation or role conception is a person’s idea of how he or she should behave in a specific situation (Visser et al., 1983). More specifically, a role orientation consists of the normative role expectations of the role bearer regarding his or her own role behaviour. Role orientations are intrinsic motivation for the role bearer to adopt a certain role behaviour (Visser et al., 1983; Gronau, 1965; Kahn et al., 1964). Role behaviour is an individual’s behaviour following from a role within a social relation. According to role theory, role behaviour is primarily the result of role orientations (Visser et al., 1983). Role bearers are always inclined to act according to their role orientation. Therefore, the best way to predict an individual’s role behaviour is by looking at the person’s role orientation (Visser et al., 1983; Ter Heine, 1981). This is the first general expectation of role theory which will be used in this master’s thesis:

General theoretical expectation: *The role behaviour of a role bearer is determined to an important extent by the role orientations of the role bearer.*

However, a person’s role orientation does not always result in subsequent role behaviour since people do not always behave according to their own intentions. Visser et al. (1983) distinguished two factors which explain why a role bearer might behave differently than his or her own behavioural intentions. The two factors are a role bearer’s motivation to comply with the perceived role expectations of relevant others (role senders) and the role bearer’s ability to behave according to his or her own role orientation.

⁴ The well-known ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) use similar concepts to analyse a role as Visser et al. (1983). According to this model, there are two factors influencing behaviour, namely the individual’s attitude and subjective norms. Perceived behavioural control moderates the effect of these two factors on behaviour. The concept of ‘attitude’ is similar to the concept of ‘role orientation’ and the concept of ‘subjective norms’ is almost identical to ‘role expectations’.

The first factor is about what is commonly believed to be appropriate behaviour by other actors. Role expectations are the role sender's expectations about how the role bearer should or should not behave. Role expectations might act as an extrinsic motivation to adopt a certain role behaviour, while role orientations are an intrinsic motivation. However, the expectations of a role bearer regarding his or her own behaviour may be at odds with the expectations of what is commonly believed to be appropriate behaviour. A person might try to comply with the perceived norms of other relevant actors in the role relation (role senders) instead. There may be three reasons why an actor may act in accordance with the perceived role expectations of others (Visser et al., 1983):

- a.** An actor expects sanctions (or rewards imposed by others) due to (not) complying with others' role expectations;
- b.** The role bearer feels an obligation to comply with the role expectations of others or considers them legitimate. A role bearer might recognise the validity of normative behavioural role expectations and comply with these; and
- c.** The role bearer respects or admires the role sender and wants to behave according to this person's role expectations.

The second factor is a person's perceived ability to perform a particular behaviour. When role behaviour is not in line with the role orientation, then this person might think he or she is not able to perform his or her own desired role behaviour (Visser et al., 1983).⁵ There may be two reasons why a person is not able to give substance to his or her own desired behaviour (Visser et al., 1983):

- a.** The role bearer might experience personal constraints to behaving according to his or her role orientation. These personal limitations could be physical, related to personal characteristics or due to a lack of knowledge and skills (Sarbin & Allen, 1968).
- b.** The role bearer might experience a lack of the facilities needed to behave according to his or her role orientation. Moreover, the role bearer might lack the time to perform his or her own desired role behaviour or think that he or she does not have access to needed materials.

The next section discusses how two external factors (role expectations and constraints) and role orientations are shaped by the broader institutional contexts in which role bearers and role senders operate.

2.1.3 The influence of collective norms and formal institutions

Role orientations depend on the context. The context is shaped by collective norms, which are partly translated in formal institutions. These collective norms and formal institutions influence the role orientation of the role bearer, the role expectations of the role sender and place constraints on the role behaviour of the role bearer.

⁵ This situation is also recognized in the theory of planned behavioural control and labelled as 'perceived behavioural control' (Ajzen, 1991, p. 183). Perceived behavioural control is determined by the availability of resources such as time, money, skills and the co-operation of others.

Collective norms specify what is considered appropriate behaviour and thus influence normative role orientations and role expectations (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Lapinski and Rimal (2005) have defined collective norms as ‘prevailing codes of conduct that either prescribe or proscribe behaviours that members of a group can enact’ (p. 129). Collective norms operate at the societal level and emerge through shared interaction among members of a social community. Collective norms are the aggregate of individual norms. They are both an effect of and affected by human behaviour (Lapinski & Rimal, 2015). Collective norms are interpreted by individuals and shape their role orientation through intrinsic motivations (Morris et al., 2015). Collective norms are mostly not formally codified, but they are widely accepted as being legitimate. However, collective norms at times do influence formal institutions. Formal institutions are put in place because norms shared by the social community are codified in formal legislation. In this case, collective norms are translated into formal institutions. These formal institutions embody what people believe to be approved of in their society (Morris et al., 2015).

Formal institutions lay down formal rules on what people should and should not do. These formal rules are in turn likely to have a subsequent impact on role orientations, role expectations and role behaviour (Heinelt, 2013; Dobler, 2011). Following North (1991), institutions are ‘the rules of the game that set limits on human behaviour’ (p. 1), as they structure political, economic and social interactions. Institutions include any form of constraint set up to shape human interaction (North, 1990). Dobler (2011) has argued that institutions make human behaviour predictable because they imply universal rules for a population. In addition, formal institutions have implications for complying with or violating institutional rules. People who do not follow these institutionalised rules are often sanctioned. Burke and Young (2011) have argued that institutions affect the nature of social action and therefore also influence collective norms.

Formal institutions and collective norms not only influence a role bearer’s role orientation, but also set constraints. The legislative framework of formal institutions determines, for example, the financial compensation of the role bearer or the existence of certain facilities. Accordingly, constraints such as personal resources and facilities might be determined by formal institutions. Therefore, formal institutions have an impact on the role bearer’s ability to behave according to his or her own role orientation (see also section 2.1.2).

2.1.4 General theoretical expectations

In addition to the first general theoretical expectation about the behavioural effect of the role bearer’s role orientation, the discussion in the previous two sub-sections leads to two additional theoretical expectations. Section 2.1.2 stated that the role bearer’s role behaviour might also be affected by the role senders’ role expectations. Additionally, a lack of personal resources and needed facilities (i.e. constraints) might hinder a role bearer from acting according his or her own role orientation. These two external factors influence role behaviour, in addition to the role orientation. Subsequently, section 2.1.3 argued that these external factors are embedded in our society. The societal context is shaped by collective norms, which are partly translated in formal institutions. These collective norms and formal institutions influence the role bearer’s role orientation, affect the role sender’s role expectations and place constraints on the role bearer’s role behaviour. Therefore, the following two additional general theoretical expectations can be formulated:

General theoretical expectation: Formal institutions and collective norms influence the role bearer's role orientation.

General theoretical expectation: Formal institutions and collective norms influence the role bearer's role behaviour.

These three theoretical expectations from role theory are visualised in Figure 2.1. Collective norms and formal institutions embedded in society influence role orientation and role behaviour. Arrow 2 visualises the influence of formal institutions and collective norms on role orientations. People are raised and develop themselves in a particular way, which is influenced by the norms and values of the institutional context. The norms of behaviour resulting from formal institutions may affect what role bearers think is appropriate behaviour. Arrow 3 visualises the direct influence of formal institutions and collective norms on role behaviour. First, formal institutions and collective norms shape role expectations (the same way they influence role orientations), which in turn have an impact on role behaviour (see section 2.1.2). Second, formal institutions and collective norms constrain role behaviour in terms of personal resources and facilities (see section 2.1.2). These two factors are important in explaining why formal institutions and collective norms have a direct impact on role behaviour.⁶ In addition, it is necessary to look at the indirect effect of formal institutions and collective norms on the role bearer's role behaviour. As said before, the role orientation of local councillors is expected to be the strongest predictor of their role behaviour (arrow 1; see section 2.1.1). For that reason, local democratic institutions and collective norms are expected to have an indirect impact on the role behaviour of local councillors via their role orientations (combined result of arrow 2 and arrow 1).




Figure 2.1: General theoretical expectations

The arrows in Figure 2.1 are linked to the research questions as formulated in Chapter 1. Research questions 2.B.1 and 3.B.1, about the effect of local democratic institutions on role orientations, are

⁶ This is a quasi-direct effect which runs via role expectations and institutional constraints.

depicted by arrow 2. Research questions 2.B.2 and 3.B.2, concerning the direct effect of local democratic institutions on role behaviour, are depicted by arrow 3, and the indirect effect is illustrated by the combined result of arrow 2 and arrow 1. The impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors is studied for their representative role as well as their role with regard to citizen participation specifically.

2.2 The role of local councillors is changing

The remainder of this chapter translates these general theoretical expectations to the specific context of this research, namely the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors in Germany and the Netherlands. This section outlines the current debate on the role of local councillors in contemporary local democracies. Local democracies are under stress as a result of changing relations between local councillors and local citizens (Kersting, 2013). Conventional political participation and party ties are decreasing, while new forms of participation are being implemented by local governments in order to increase legitimacy. Citizen participation has the potential to enhance input legitimacy and output legitimacy (Kersting, 2009). However, these changes in local democratic institutions also have an impact on the role of local councillors. To some extent citizens take over what traditionally was the role of local representatives and their parties. Therefore, local councillors have to adjust their role accordingly to strengthen the intended citizen participation.

2.2.1 Changing role relations

The role of local councillors as representatives of the citizenry is subject to change since role relations are dynamic. In Western Europe, the link between voters and governments was primarily organised by political parties throughout the twentieth century. Democratic values such as representation, accountability and legitimation have been ensured through parties (Wildemann, 1986). The basic idea of representation through parties works as follows: a) parties reflect a political ideology, which is reflected in their party programme; b) candidates are selected on the basis of their capability and willingness to implement the party programme; c) during elections, people vote for the party which best reflects their own views and interests; and d) the election results determine which party has the largest influence on decision-making. Through this process, the wishes of citizens are taken into account in policymaking.

However, Mair (2005; 2014) has drawn attention to ongoing party failings and the weakening position of parties. The representative function of parties has been challenged by declining electoral turnouts, falling party membership and alternative channels for political participation (Groot et al., 2010; Geißel & Kersting, 2014; Delwit, 2011; Whiteley, 2010). Additionally, Denters and Rose (2005) have observed a loss of importance of party-oriented political participation in Western Europe. Parties are losing their foothold in society, and therefore they are less capable of linking society to the state. The declining representative function of parties contributes to the discussion about their legitimacy.

The decline of the representative function of political parties also creates opportunities for other forms of democratic representation. The lack of legitimacy of parties is a strong driver of the quest for participatory forms of democracy (Fung, 2007). Citizens increasingly demand to have a voice in matters that affect them since they no longer feel represented by parties. Furthermore, local governments have started to implement forms of direct citizen participation in the policymaking process to compensate for the failures of conventional representative democracy (Cain, 2006; Fung, 2015). Schaap and Daemen (2012) have observed a remarkable similarity in European local democracy reforms. Most reforms in local democracies focus on enriching democratic practices, inspired by alternative approaches to democracy, such as discursive and participatory democracy, or even direct democracy.

It is not surprising that new forms of democracy are being implemented at the local level instead of the national level. Local governments are the closest to the people and are increasingly responsible for public services. Therefore, local governments are often seen as a laboratory for democratic innovation (Kersting, 2016). Many Western local governments have introduced new forms of democracy and have reformed their systems to increase citizen participation and transparency (Cain et al., 2006; Kersting & Vetter, 2003). Accordingly, the repertoire of instruments of political participation has increased over the years (Kersting, 1998). These participatory democratic reforms empower citizens and decrease the need for parties as a channel of representation.

Participatory democracy reforms transform the relationship between local councillors and citizens. It raises questions about what the representative role of local councillors should look like now that the representative function of parties is decreasing and citizen's ability to represent themselves is increasing. Local councillors have to balance the tensions between representative and participatory democracy when giving substance to their representative role. More specifically, they continually have to balance their loyalty to their parties and their conception of the general interest with responsiveness to the concrete concerns and wishes of the citizens (Edwards, 2012). However, the outcomes of participatory democracy processes are only binding when the local council has decided this in advance or when it accepts the outcome of the process and makes it official. Therefore, new forms of democracy introduced by local governments are seen as complementary to the representative system (Schaap & Daemen, 2012).

Representative democracy is still at the core of local democracy in Western Europe. The formal position of the local council is quite strong since it is the highest public authority and the exclusive legislative institution. However, citizen participation marginalised the representative function of local councillors and consequently weakens the traditional archetype of representative democracy. Therefore, local councillors have to reformulate their representative role to develop a new strong model of representative democracy (Sørensen, 2006). This new role should be embedded in a local representative democracy complemented with participatory democratic processes.

To conclude, the role relation between local councillors and the citizenry is changing, and local councillors must therefore reflect on their role as elected representatives. The changing societal and democratic setting demands that local councillors focus more on citizens. Nevertheless, local councillors remain primarily

responsible for promoting citizens' demands and needs (Pitkin, 1972). However, local democratic institutions offer local councillors a setting in which they have to perform their role (Heinelt, 2013). Therefore, the next section takes a closer look at the differences between local democratic institutions.

2.3 Local democratic institutions

This section develops the conceptual framework needed to answer research question 1. This framework is used to categorise local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Section 2.2 made clear that the relationship between local councillors and citizens has changed. The results indicate whether the changing relationship has led to similarities or differences among local democratic institutions.

First, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by 'formal local democratic institutions'. This master's thesis focuses only on formal local democratic institutions, in order to provide a comprehensive comparison of the impact of different local democratic settings on the role of local councillors. Therefore, the term 'local democratic institutions' refers to formally codified regulations for local democracy.

The features of local democratic institutions differ among and within countries. A useful model for categorising local democratic institutions was developed by Angelika Vetter (2009), who distinguished two analytical models of local democracy: a model of local party democracy and a model of local citizen democracy. Vetter has used these two models as a frame and an analytical starting point to describe change in the local democracies of German states from 1989 to 2008. Vetter's analysis of local constitutions indicates a shift from local party democracy to local citizen democracy. In this period, German states amended their constitutions with citizen-oriented elements, which transformed the local representative democracy. Vetter's analytical models of local democracy are useful to characterise not only the local democratic institutions of German states but also local democratic institutions at the country level.

Vetter's two models of democracy both have distinct institutional features, but both models rest on a representative understanding of democracy. In the party model of local democracy, political parties have a strong institutional position. An institutional feature of this model is the election of the mayor by the parties in the municipal council. In addition, citizens do not have an opportunity to participate in local decision-making through referendums. Moreover, parties have a dominant position with regard to elections in the party model. These elections are based on a closed-list system, in which parties decide whose names end up on the voting ballot. Moreover, thresholds exclude smaller parties from winning seats in the municipal council, which is beneficial for large parties. The citizen model of local democracy is characterised by different institutional features. Here, the role of parties is weaker because institutional features give citizens more power. Citizens directly elect the mayor and have the right to initiate and hold binding referendums. Moreover, citizens can influence the composition of the party list by ticket-splitting and candidate preference ballots. Lastly, there is no threshold preventing small parties or independent candidates from being elected to the municipal council. Vetter categorised the distinguishing institutional

features of both models of local democracy based on four criteria (see Table 2.1). These criteria are used to identify the degree to which the local democracy is either a local party democracy or a local citizen democracy.

Table 2.1: *Two analytical models of local democracy by Vetter (2009)*

Local party democracy	Local citizen democracy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mayor elected by the municipal council • No possibility for citizens to initiate and hold a referendum • Closed-list system for the election of the local council • Threshold for the election of the local council 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct election of the mayor • Citizens may initiate and hold a referendum • Proportional representation with open lists (ticket-splitting and cumulation of votes) • No threshold for the election of the local council

Denters and Klok (2013) used Vetter's models of local democracy in their research, but chose to use a slightly different conceptualisation of the four criteria. Based on the criteria of Vetter, but with the simplified conceptualisation of Denters and Klok, the model used to analyse local democracy in this master's thesis includes three criteria (see Table 2.2). The criteria measurements range from 0 (local party democracy) to 1 (local citizen democracy).

Table 2.2: *Measurement criteria of two models of local democracy*

Direct election of mayor	0 = no; 1 = yes.
Local electoral system	1 = voters have as many votes as there are seats in the council for cumulation and ticket-splitting. 0 = closed-list system without cumulation and ticket-splitting.
Local referendums	0 = no; 0.5 = consultative; 1 = yes, binding referendum.

As opposed to the analytical framework of Vetter, this study leaves out the criterion 'threshold' for two reasons. First, thresholds are not employed in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, or the Netherlands. Therefore, this criterion would not indicate differences between the three local democratic institutional systems. Second, the criteria 'local electoral system' and 'threshold' both relate to institutional rules concerning the voting system. There is a better balance in the type of criteria when the criterion 'threshold' is omitted. The remaining criteria all address a particular field in which citizens exercise direct influence by voting (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: *Types of direct influence related to the criteria of the two models of local democracy*

Mayor	Electoral system	Referendum
- Executive - If citizens can directly elect their mayor, they directly influence the executive power of the municipal government.	- Legislature - If citizens can cumulate or split their votes, they directly influence which person is elected as a local councillor.	- Legislative - If citizens can initiate a binding local referendum, they directly influence the decision-making process and legislation.

These three indicators are used to determine the degree to which citizens have formal rights to participate at the expense of party influence. These channels of participation are defined by legal frameworks, which make these channels places where citizens are invited to participate (Kersting, 2013, 2016a). In addition, all three indicators are related to vote-centric participation. The first two indicators are related to the power of citizens to vote a specific person into office, while the last indicator concerns citizens' power to vote on legislation.

In summary, this section has presented two models: a model of local party democracy and a model of local citizen democracy. Three criteria have been formulated to categorise the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands in each of these two models. However, if local institutional conditions provide local councillors with options to perform their role, then one would expect differences in the role orientations and role behaviour among regions with different local democratic institutions. The next two sections discuss the implications of these two models of democracy for the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically.

2.4 Representative role of local councillors

This section provides the theoretical framework to analyse the representative role of local councillors. Research question 2 concerns the impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role of local councillors. To analyse the representative role of local councillors, this section discusses two models of representation by Denters (2012). These two models of representation indicate what the representative role looks like in a party-oriented democracy and in a citizen-oriented democracy. The section concludes by linking the two models of representation (Denters, 2012) to the two models of local democracy by Vetter (2009).

Local councillors are representatives who represent the citizenry. Local councillors have formal duties and responsibilities that come with the position, but they also have great freedom to perform their roles as they like. There are no rules on how local councillors should represent citizens. Therefore, local councillors themselves can determine how they give substance to their roles as representatives. There are different theories on what political representation entails. Pitkin (1967) famously stated that political representation 'means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them' (p. 209). However, local councillors themselves decide how to give substance to their functions as representatives. In the past, the theoretical literature on political representation has focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees (see Burke, 1999). However, changing political and societal realities have resulted in newly formulated concepts of political representation (see e.g. Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008; Mansbridge, 2003; Urbinati & Warren, 2008).

Using prominent normative democracy theories, Denters (2012) bundled multiple theories on political representation: descriptive representation, the trustee model, the party-political model and the democratic watchdog model. In line with the two models of local democracy by Vetter, this thesis focuses on the

party-political model and the democratic watchdog model, as described by Denters. These two models are directly linked to the transformation from a party-oriented democracy to a more citizen-oriented mix of representative and participatory democracy. The role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors are categorised according to one of these representation models. The results indicate how local councillors think they should behave as representatives and how they actually behave. The criteria of the two model of representation are presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: *Two models of representation (Denters, 2012)*

Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assuming a recognisable political profile • Realising the party manifesto • Acting in unity with the party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protecting the input of citizens • Taking account of current opinions • Maintaining channels of participation • Guarding the democratic process

In the model representing party-political democracy, local councillors are the embodiment of a political ideology. According to this model, parties act as agents of representation. Representation is ensured by democratic elections: citizens are represented by the party which they vote for on the basis of their interests and opinions. According to this vision, local councillors try to make clearly recognisable political points in council debates. In addition, local councillors are expected to actively pursue the party manifesto. Above all, the local councillors must act in unity with the party.

In the democratic watchdog model, local councillors act as a ‘monitor and facilitator of the democratic process’ (Denters, 2012: p. 19). Important principles of this representation model are openness and responsiveness to individual citizens and organisations (Denters, De Groot and Klok, 2008). Local councillors try to create more opportunities for citizens to participate directly in decision-making. In addition, local councillors make sure current opinions are taken into account and that the input of citizens is protected. This is essential for new deliberative processes which are non-binding and only become binding when local councillors vote in line with the results of these processes. The representative role of local councillors is to safeguard the democratic quality of the government process and to facilitate sufficient opportunities for citizens to participate.

There is a clear difference in focus between the two representation models. In the first model, representation runs through parties, but in the second model local councillors facilitate and monitor the participation of citizens, who represent themselves. Therefore, the two representation models are dichotomous to a certain extent. As Köller (2014) has stated, ‘new participatory demands by citizens are at odds with hierarchical party structures of representation’ (p. 10). Citizens have become more individually involved in politics, behind party structures. This poses challenges to the power structure within a party, which is based on a small group of ruling people. However, local councillors need to let go of their party-orientation if they want to focus more on citizens. Accordingly, a different interpretation of the representative role is needed.

This research study links the two models of representation by Denters (2012) to the two models of local democracy by Vetter (2009) in order to analyse the impact of local democratic institutions on the

representative role of local councillors. Denters distinguished between a representation model with a focus on parties and a model with a focus on citizens. The same distinction is present in the two local democracy models by Vetter (2009). Local councillors with a party-political view on representation will fit well in a local democracy with a focus on parties. By contrast, one would expect local councillors with a democratic watchdog perspective on representation in local democracies with a focus on citizens. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the two models of representation are connected to the two models of local democracy.




Figure 2.2: Party or citizen focus of local democratic institutions and the representative role

2.5 Role with regard to citizen participation

The representative role orientation of local councillors is expected to have an impact on their role with regard to citizen participation. Therefore, this section discusses the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. Research question 3 aims to study the impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. We focus on two facets of role behaviour: setting frameworks and scrutinising. Based on prominent literature, this section describes two approaches to setting frameworks and scrutinising with regard to citizen participation. These two approaches demonstrate the differences in setting frameworks and scrutinising between a party-oriented democracy and a citizen-oriented democracy. The section concludes by linking these two approaches to the two representation models of Denters (2012).

The local council is entrusted with the responsibility ‘for translating the needs and demands of citizens into binding collective decisions’ and ‘scrutinising the actual implementation of these decisions by the executive branch of government’ (Denters, 2013: p. 1). Besides being responsive to citizens, the local council set frameworks and control the local political executive and the municipal officers (Groot et al., 2010; Lupia, 2003). However, the increase of citizen participation affects these responsibilities of the local council. Democratic process of checks and balances becomes complicated when the local government works together with citizens. An increase in citizen participation does not mean that the local council can take a step backwards. Instead, citizen participation requires the active involvement of the local council since not all participation processes are binding. Their success is largely dependent on the attitudes and behaviour of local councillors (Kersting, 2016). Local councillors have to decide how they want to deal

with the results of (non-binding) citizen participation. They have a role in the institutional embedding of citizen participation processes in the formal process of decision making (Edelenbos et al., 2009; Edelenbos, 2005). Therefore, local councillors are responsible for the democratic anchorage of citizen participation processes (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2002).

There are two approaches to setting frameworks and scrutinising the executive branch when dealing with citizen participation processes. The local council can examine the results of participation processes based on the content before endorsing the results, or it can examine the results based on the process.

First, local councillors can **focus on the content** when setting frameworks and scrutinising them. In this respect, local councillors use their mandate to steer the content upfront or afterwards. When local councillors focus on content, they are likely to formulate targets, standards or SMART-formulated policy frames (Fraanje, 2015).⁷ Local councillors with a party-political representative role orientation are expected to focus on the content. They are inclined to use their party programme as a starting point and to translate this into policy frames.

Second, local councillors can **focus on the process** when setting frames and scrutinising them. Local councillors who follow this approach refrain from their own subjective judgement and only look at the acceptability of the process upfront or afterwards. By shifting the focus from the content to the process, citizens gain manoeuvring room to decide on the content. Process-oriented frameworks are more dynamic when operating in a network, which creates an enabling environment for citizen participation (Koppejan, 2007; Fraanje, 2015; Denters, 2016; Denters et al., 2017). Therefore, a focus on the process creates room for citizens to decide on the content via citizen participation processes. These participation processes are scrutinised by local councillors, who check whether the process followed the agreed procedure. Local councillors with a democratic watchdog representative role orientation are expected to focus on the process. They are inclined to watch over the democratic process and to protect the results of citizen participation processes.

This thesis links the two models of representation by Denters (2012) to the focus of local councillors when setting frames and scrutinising citizen participation processes. This conceptual framework is used to analyse the impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. When a local councillor has a role orientation in line with the party-political model, he or she is expected to focus on the content when setting frames and scrutinising. These local councillors are expected to translate their party programme into policy frames focusing on the content. By comparison, local councillors with a democratic watchdog perception of representation are expected to focus on the process. These local councillors want to facilitate citizen participation and therefore monitor the process, which leaves room for citizens to (co-)decide on the content. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the two models of representation are linked to the two approaches when setting frames and scrutinising with regard to citizen participation.

⁷ Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time bound (SMART)




Figure 2.3: Party or citizen focus in the representative role and the role with regard to citizen participation specifically

2.6 Hypotheses

Section 2.1.4 developed a number of general theoretical expectations. After discussing the role of local councillors, the chapter now translates these general theoretical expectations into specific hypotheses. These specific hypotheses relate to a) the representative role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors (cf. research question 2) and b) their role orientation and role behaviour with regard to citizen participation specifically (cf. research question 3). Figure 2.4 illustrates how the concepts of the three theoretical models relate to either a party focus or a citizen focus.




Figure 2.4: Analytical framework connecting the three theoretical models

In the previous sections, three theoretical models were presented. Together, these theoretical models constitute the analytical framework of this thesis. First, section 2.3 categorised a local democracy as either a local party democracy or a local citizen democracy. Second, section 2.4 distinguished between two models of representation: a party-political model and a democratic watchdog model. Lastly, section 2.5

argued that local councillors can focus on the content or the process in their role with regard to citizen participation. All three models have one thing in common: they distinguish between a focus on parties and a focus on citizens. The focus of the local democracy, the representative role and the role with regards to citizen participation are expected to be related. The type of local democracy is expected to have an impact on the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. On the one hand, if a local democratic institutional setting is characterised as a ‘local party democracy’, the representative role orientation of local councillors is expected to be in line with the party-political model of representation. Accordingly, the focus of local councillors in their role with regards to citizen participation is expected to be on the content. On the other hand, if a local democratic institutional setting is characterised as a ‘local citizen democracy’, the representative role orientation of local councillors is expected to be in line with the democratic watchdog model of representation. Accordingly, the focus of local councillors in their role with regard to citizen participation is expected to be on the process.

Based on the general theoretical expectations presented in Figure 2.1 and the analytical framework presented in Figure 2.4, six hypotheses are tested in this master’s thesis. Three hypotheses are related to the impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role of local councillors:

Hypothesis 1: Local democratic institutions directly influence the representative role orientation of local councillors.

Hypothesis 2: Local democratic institutions directly influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors.

Hypothesis 3: Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors.

In addition, three hypotheses are related to the impact of local democratic institutions on role of local councillors with regards to citizen participation specifically:


Hypothesis 4: Local democratic institutions directly influence the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

Hypothesis 5: Local democratic institutions directly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

Hypothesis 6: Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

The representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation are expected to differ among the locations of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands due to the expected differences among their local democratic institutions. In all three regions, local councillors are

elected representatives, but they have to give substance to their role in unique local democratic institutional settings. Research question 1 studies the similarities and differences among the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands (see Chapter 4). Then, research question 2 studies the impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role of local councillors in each region (see Chapter 5). Subsequently, research question 3 analyses the impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation specifically (see Chapter 6).



Chapter 3

Method

This chapter provides the analytical strategy needed to answer all the research questions. The aim of this thesis is to compare the impact of three local democratic institutional settings on the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. The comparative method is used to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, this research has an explanatory nature, as it attempts to discover whether there is a relationship between local democratic institutions and the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically.

Several steps were taken to answer the main research question. Accordingly, three research questions and several sub-questions were formulated. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the (sub-) research questions and the data sources used. Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 constitute the empirical chapters of this thesis. Each of these chapters addresses a research question with its corresponding sub-questions.

The first section of this methodology chapter explains the choice of the three selected cases: Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. The second section describes the research design of research question 1. Section 3.3 describes the research design of research question 2, including the data of the Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance (MAELG) project used for the analyses. Section 3.4 describes the research design of research question 3, which entails detailed information on the survey we conducted among local councillors. The chapter concludes with a section concerning the reliability and validity of the chosen research methods.




Figure 3.1: Overview of research questions and data sources of the three empirical chapters

3.1 Selection of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands

Comparing Dutch and German local councillors makes it possible to study the influence of a distinct local democratic institutional setting on how these representatives play their representative role and their role with regard to citizen participation specifically. In addition, a comparison of different local democratic institutions enables predictions of future developments when discussing and interpreting the results. Three regions were selected for this comparative study: Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands.

German local democratic institutions need to be studied at a state level because legislation with regard to local democracy is a matter of the state government. Each state enacts the local democratic institutional framework in the *Gemeindeordnung* (municipal charter). The municipal charter entails local government legislation, which varies across states. These variations are the result of regional traditions and political constellations (Vetter, 2009). Theo Schiller (2011) has pointed out that Germany developed an impressive mosaic of direct democracy at the local level. The Netherlands, by contrast, was not expected to have regional differences among local democratic institutions since it does not have a federal government structure. For these reasons, Germany was studied at the state level and the Netherlands at the country level.

Two criteria were used in the selection of German states. First, the number of selected states needed to fit the research capacity of this master's thesis. Therefore, two German states were chosen, along with the Netherlands. Second, these German states and the Netherlands had to differ with regard to their local democratic institutions. Accordingly, two German states were selected based on their presumed differences in local democratic institutions. The two selected German states are Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. The term 'region' is used in this thesis to refer to the territorial level of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands.

The local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are expected to range from having a focus on citizens to having a focus on parties. First, the state of Baden-Württemberg was selected due to its rich history of citizen participation. Baden-Württemberg was expected to have citizen-oriented local democratic institutions, as opposed to the other two selected regions. Second, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia was expected to be in the middle when looking at the focus of its local democratic institutions. Compared to other German states, local democratic institutions in North Rhine-Westphalia seem to have a party focus. However, in comparison to the Netherlands, it seems to rather have a citizen focus. The Netherlands, by contrast, was expected to have local democratic institutions which focus on parties. Chapter 4 elaborates on the similarities and differences among local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. The local democratic institutions are analysed to determine whether the expected differences in the focus (party or citizen) of local democratic institutions are indeed present.

The overarching point to note is that the three regions were selected based on the expected differences among their local democratic institutions. Therefore, the comparative design method is based on the most different system design (Mill, 1874). The independent variable, the local democratic institutions of each region, is expected to be different for each region. On this basis we can subsequently investigate whether these institutional differences have their expected effects to test our hypotheses.

3.2. Methodology: research question 1

This section discusses how the independent variable, the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands, was measured. The local democratic institutions were analysed at the regional level. Research question 1 studies the similarities and differences among local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. This descriptive research question is answered by using secondary data gathered through desk research.

First, an exploratory background search was conducted to ‘get a feel for’ the existing literature on local democratic institutions. Second, potential sources were identified using a snowballing approach. Based on the realistic literature review research method of Pawson et al. (2005), inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied when selecting academic papers. The inclusion and exclusion criteria for the selected academic papers are listed in Table 3.1. In short, the academic papers were chosen based on the relevance of the topic, the written language and availability. Furthermore, recommendations by Prof. Dr Denters and Prof. Dr Kersting on academic papers were added to the list of selected papers. The selected academic papers were used to sketch the local democratic context in Germany, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Conversations with the supervisors of this master’s thesis were helpful to check whether the sketch of local democratic contexts was accurate. In addition to academic papers, the coalition agreements of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands were analysed to gain insight into possible democratic reforms in the near future.

Table 3.1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the selected academic papers

Inclusion criteria	Exclusion criteria
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Academic papers and texts written in English, Dutch and German. Academic papers addressing local democratic reforms or local democratic institutions in Germany, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, or the Netherlands. Academic papers and texts which were available online or in the University of Twente library. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Papers written in any other language. Academic papers not addressing local democratic reforms or local democratic institutions. Academic papers and texts which were not available.

Local legislation was analysed to categorise the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands as representing either local party democracy or local citizen democracy. The local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the

Netherlands were operationalised using Vetter's model of local democracy. The measurement criteria of Table 2.1 were used to categorise local democratic institutions (see section 2.3).

3.3 Methodology: research question 2

The representative role of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands is the first dependent variable. Research question 2 is formulated to analyse local councillors' representative role. This research question is divided into four sub-questions, which are addressed in Chapter 5. A secondary data analysis was conducted using an international data set to answer these research questions.

3.3.1 Data collection

Empirical data of the MAELG project was used to answer research question 2 and its corresponding sub-questions. The MAELG project is undertaken by the European Local Government Network (Euroloc), a research network of researchers and research institutions in the field of local government and local politics. The MAELG project is an international research project which provides unique insights into local councillors, local politics and administration. The rich data set enables cross-country comparative research and intra-country variation studies. The MAELG survey was conducted in 15 European countries and Israel in 2007 and 2008. The data set includes responses from approximately 12,000 councillors from about 1,400 municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Only local councillors from municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants were asked to participate to achieve some similarity in terms of the milieu (of urbanity) in which the councillors were acting.

The survey was conducted by 16 national teams, each conducting research in its own country. It was up to the national teams to decide on the selection method and the sampling frequency. The only requirement was that a municipality had to have more than 10,000 inhabitants. A majority of teams used stratified sampling methods, which varied by country. However, different sampling methods were used to select local councillors in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany, municipalities were sampled by the number of inhabitants and state affiliation, while in the Netherlands local councillors were sampled using randomisation. Given its dualistic structure, only non-executive councillors were surveyed. In both countries, the questionnaires were sent to the town halls by post.

The standard questionnaire was translated and contextualised by the national teams. For comparative purposes, the national teams were asked to retain as many questions of the standard version as possible. The survey questions concerned the attitudes, behaviours and backgrounds of local councillors. The questionnaire consisted of five thematic components with questions about a) the council and actors in local democracy; b) the role as a councillor; c) views on local democracy and local policy; and d) councillors' political career, party and (personal) background. Most of these questions were closed-ended and were often presented in a response matrix. The questionnaire was quite lengthy and included sensitive personal information (e.g. age, party affiliation and vision on local democracy).

The numbers of respondents differed considerably among the three selected regions. The response rate of local councillors from municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants was 22.0% ($N = 894$) in Germany and 38.6% ($N = 1,222$) in the Netherlands – see Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Survey data and response rates: Germany and the Netherlands

	Survey conducted	Total councillors	Number of questionnaires sent out	Sampling rate %	Response rate %	Number of respondents
Germany	09/2007– 11/2007	51,774	4,060	7.8	22	894
The Netherlands	05/2007– 06/2007	9,242	3,163	34.2	38.6	1,222

With regards to the German respondents, the local councillors living in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were filtered out of the original data set. In Baden-Württemberg, 117 local councillors completed the survey. The number of local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia who completed the survey was almost twice as high, namely 208. On average, 7 to 10 respondents per municipality completed the survey in all three regions. Table 3.3 provides an overview of the number of municipalities and the number of respondents for each region.

Table 3.3: Overview of the number of municipalities and number of local councillors

	Number of municipalities	Number of respondents
Baden-Württemberg	16	117
North Rhine-Westphalia	22	208
The Netherlands	129	1,222

3.3.2 Operationalisation of representative role

The representative role of local councillors was operationalised based on the two models of representation by Denters (see Table 2.4 in section 2.4). On this basis, a number of MAELG survey items were selected to analyse the extent to which local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party-political or democratic watchdog focus in their representative role orientations and role behaviour. First, the operationalisation of the representative role orientation is described, followed by the operationalisation of the representative role behaviour.

Operationalisation of representative role orientation

Eight items of the MAELG survey - based on considerations of content validity - were selected as indicators to analyse the representative role orientation of local councillors. These survey items were divided into two dimensions, in line with the conceptual framework, namely the party-political model and the democratic watchdog model. Four survey items were used for each dimension to determine the representative role orientation. These survey items are part of three different MAELG survey questions. The first survey question is about the importance that local councillors attach to certain tasks, and the other two questions concern statements about local democracy and local politics. Table 3.4 lists the selected MAELG survey items which were used to measure the representative role orientation.

Table 3.4: Selected MAELG questions to measure representative role orientation

In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you as a councillor?	
<i>Scale: 'very great', 'great', 'moderate', 'little', 'none'</i>	
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementing the programme of my political party/movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	
<i>Scale: 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'disagree', 'strongly disagree'</i>	
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors
People have different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are:	
<i>Scale: 'of utmost importance', 'of great importance', 'of moderate importance', 'of little importance', 'not important at all'</i>	
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives

Operationalisation of representative role behaviour

Nine survey items of the MAELG survey were selected - again based on considerations of content validity - as indicators for analysing the representative role behaviour of local councillors. These indicators were divided into the same two dimensions as the selected survey items for representative role orientation. The survey items are part of three different survey questions. The first two questions are about how much time local councillors spend on specific activities. The third question is about the contribution of local councillors to specific tasks. Table 3.5 lists the selected MAELG survey items which were used to measure the representative role behaviour.

Table 3.5: Selected MAELG questions to measure representative role behaviour

How much time per month do you spend on the following activities?	
Average number of hours per month	
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meetings with the party’s council group Other party meetings and activities 	-
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Members of my party groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leading actors from voluntary associations Organisations of ethnic minorities Individual citizens in your role as a councillor
In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution regarding the following tasks?	
Scale: ‘very great’, ‘great’, ‘moderate’, ‘little’, ‘none’	
Party-political model	Democratic watchdog model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society Promoting the views and interests of minorities in local society

Principal component analysis and Cronbach’s alpha

A principal component analysis was conducted to investigate whether the respondents have a representative role orientation and role behaviour along the lines of the two models of representation. In the statistical analysis, two factors were extracted. Moreover, a varimax rotation was applied to associate each variable with at least one factor to improve the relevance of the results. Table 3.6 presents the results of the principal component analysis for role orientation and Table 3.7 for role behaviour for all regions together. These tables demonstrate that the indicated role orientation and role behaviour predominantly fall into two dimensions along the lines of the two models of representation. There are moderate correlations between the party-political items and component 2. Therefore, component 2 seems to measure the extent to which local councillors have a party-political focus in their representative role orientation. Moreover, there are moderate correlations between the democratic watchdog items and component 1. Therefore, component 1 seems to measure the extent to which local councillors have a democratic watchdog focus in their representative role orientation. However, not all items accurately correlate with the two models of representation. In addition, a principal component analysis was conducted per region (see Appendix A). The outcome per region suggests more or less the same picture as the analysis for all regions together. Overall, the principal component analysis confirms that the respondents more or less exhibit a representative role orientation and role behaviour along the lines of the two models of representation.

Table 3.6: Results of principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha values for various aspects of the representative *role orientation* of local councillors

		Component	
		1	2
Party-political <i>a</i> = 0.32	• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.337	.596
	• Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	.018	.635
	• Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	-.286	.448
	• The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies	.236	.522
Democratic watchdog <i>a</i> = 0.51	• Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	.547	.230
	• Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	.526	-.144
	• Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	.672	-.190
	• Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives	.704	-.186

Principal component analysis: two factor extraction; varimax rotation; loadings over 0.5 highlighted.

Table 3.7: Results of principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha values for various aspects of the representative *role behaviour* of local councillors

		Component	
		1	2
Party-political <i>a</i> = 0.65	• Meetings with the party's council group	.372	.913
	• Other party meetings and activities	.405	.898
	• Members of my party groups	.445	-.167
	• Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement	.362	-.151
Democratic watchdog <i>a</i> = 0.57	• Leading actors from voluntary associations	.562	-.270
	• Organisations of ethnic minorities	.537	-.208
	• Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	.600	-.220
	• Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	.513	-.181
	• Promoting the views and interests of minorities in local society	.494	-.171

Principal component analysis: two factor extraction; varimax rotation; loadings over 0.5 highlighted.

In addition to the principal component analysis, a Cronbach's alpha analysis was employed to measure the inter-relatedness of the selected survey items for the party-political model and the watchdog model. Since the selected survey items were expected to measure the same dimension (party-political model or the watchdog model), they needed to be correlated with one another. The results of the Cronbach's alpha test are also presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 for each dimension. Unfortunately, most of the Cronbach's alpha values are lower than the suggested value of 0.6 or 0.7, which is often considered as an acceptable threshold. Only the party-political dimension of representative role behaviour has a Cronbach's alpha value above 0.6. A qualitative description used for $a = 0.32$ is *not satisfactory*, while a

Cronbach's alpha between 0.5 and 0.6 is often reported in the academic literature as *acceptable* or *sufficient* (Keith, 2018). With a total sample of $N = 1,547$, one would expect higher values for Cronbach's alpha. The low Cronbach's alpha value suggests poor inter-relatedness between the survey items. Therefore, the survey items cannot be combined into one variable for each factor. The survey items selected to measure these two dimensions are discussed separately in the empirical chapter. With this in mind, the analysis was continued and justified as the items were selected based on the theories discussed in Chapter 2.

3.4 Methodology: research question 3

The second dependent variable of this research is the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. Research question 3 is formulated to analyse the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. This research question is divided into four sub-questions, which are addressed in Chapter 6.

Primary data were collected through a survey of local councillors in 12 municipalities: four municipalities in each region. The aim of the survey was to study the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. A cross-sectional study design was applied since the roles of local councillors with regard to citizen participation were compared at a single point in time. The conceptual framework in section 2.5 was the basis for developing and structuring the survey questions. Conclusions were drawn on a regional level. This section begins by describing the selection of municipalities and the data collection, followed by the operationalisation.

3.4.1 Selection of municipalities

Four municipalities in each region were selected for the survey. These municipalities were selected based on their number of inhabitants and their willingness to participate in the research. The 12 selected municipalities have an average population size of 100,000 people. Several steps were taken to find municipalities which were willing to participate in the research. Municipalities of cities with a university were avoided since local councillors are often surveyed in such cities, which might have resulted in a low response rate. Suitable municipalities were contacted by telephone to ask whether they wanted to participate in the research. In addition, an information email about the research and an overview of the survey questions were sent to these municipalities. After three weeks, the municipalities were contacted again to confirm their participation in the research. These steps were repeated until four municipalities in each region had agreed to participate in the research. In Baden-Württemberg, the municipalities of Heilbronn, Pforzheim, Reutlingen and Ulm agreed to participate in the research. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the municipalities of Bergisch Gladbach, Bottrop, Recklinghausen and Siegen agreed to participate. In the Netherlands, the municipalities of Deventer, Dordrecht, Enschede and Hengelo were willing to participate. An overview of the selected municipalities and their population size can be found in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Population size of the selected municipalities, rounded to the nearest 1,000

Baden-Württemberg		North Rhine-Westphalia		The Netherlands	
Heilbronn	125,000	Bergisch Gladbach	111,000	Deventer	100,000
Pforzheim	124,000	Bottrop	117,000	Dordrecht	119,000
Reutlingen	258,000	Recklinghausen	114,000	Enschede	159,000
Ulm	126,000	Siegen	102,000	Hengelo	81,000

3.4.2 Data collection

Survey questions and structure

Local councillors in the selected municipalities were asked to complete the survey about their attitudes and behaviour.⁸ Survey research is a suitable tool for measuring the attitudes and orientations of a population too large to observe (Babbie, 2012; Van den Berg & Kolk, 2014). The survey was divided into three sections. The first section was concerned with the role orientation of local councillors, the second section consisted of questions about their role behaviour during the current council period, and the last section consisted of demographic questions and factual political questions. Respondents had to answer a survey question to proceed to the next one. The survey took approximately four minutes to complete.

The survey consisted of different types of questions and statements. Questions about role orientation and role behaviour were closed-ended. The outcomes of these questions were measured with the use of multiple-choice responses or a Likert scale. In addition, the survey consisted of five contingency questions, which were only asked when the respondent had provided a particular response to a previous question. These contingency questions were Q2.1, Q3.1, Q5, Q6 and Q7. These questions tried to clarify the indicated role behaviour. These questions were not asked when the respondent had indicated that a specific role behaviour did not take place. The survey ended with demographic questions and factual political questions. These questions were multiple-choice questions or open-ended questions. All survey questions were discussed with the supervisors of this thesis: Prof. Dr Bas Denters and Prof. Dr Norbert Kersting. Accordingly, the survey went through several drafts and was refined in terms of wording, content and formatting. Furthermore, the survey questions were approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of Twente before the survey was administered.

Distribution and response strategy

The self-administrated survey was distributed by email with the use of the survey program Qualtrics. Sending surveys by email had some important advantages, which made this distribution method the most appropriate. Email surveys are an inexpensive and relatively time-efficient method when studying a geographically dispersed population. Furthermore, sending the survey by email contributed to the validity and reliability of the results (see section 3.5). Several efforts were made to achieve a high response rate. These efforts were divided into two categories: a) measures concerning the contact phase and b) measures relating to the structure and layout of the survey.

⁸ The German and Dutch survey are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C.

To achieve a high response rate, special efforts are required in the contact phase of the survey. Two measures were taken to increase the number of respondents in the contact phase. First, the survey was sent to the local councillors by the secretary of the local council. The local councillors' willingness to complete the survey was expected to be higher when the survey was sent by a credible source. Additionally, the survey would not be perceived as spam. The secretaries were well informed about the survey by telephone and email. They agreed to send the survey to all the local councillors of the local council. The secretaries also sent a reminder to complete the survey within three months. Second, the tailored design method by Dillman (1978; 2000) was applied to the cover letter to increase the response rate.⁹ This method is based on the principles of social exchange theory and consists of three central elements: maximising the rewards, minimising the costs and increasing confidence (Dillman, 1978). These three strategies resulted in a number of text implications for the cover letter, see Table 3.9. The cover letter included the survey link and explained why local councillors had received the survey, provided clear instructions on how to complete the survey and contained contact information in case the respondent had questions.

Table 3.9: Cover letter text implications based on the tailored design method by Dillman (1978; 2000)


Strategy	Text implications for the cover letter
Maximise the reward	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pointing out the importance of co-operation. • Promising to send the research results. • Thanking local councillors for their co-operation.
Minimise the costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suggesting that the survey takes little time to complete. • Emphasising that there are no wrong answers since the questions are about respondents' individual observations. • Guaranteeing anonymity.
Increase confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasising the support of the University of Twente and the University of Münster for this research. • Official letterhead of the University of Twente in the Qualtrics program was used to indicate that the survey was from a legitimate source.

In addition to measures concerning the contact phase of the survey, efforts were made concerning the structure of the survey to increase the response rate. A consistent format was used throughout the survey. Questions concerning the same topic were grouped in sections. As suggested by Dillman (1978), the survey started with a simple question and ended with more sensitive and demographic questions. New groups of questions were introduced, and instructions were included if necessary. These short introductions and instructions help to put respondents in the proper frame of mind for answering the questions (Babbie, 2012). Therefore, concepts such as the difference between focusing on the process or the content were explained clearly before they were included in the questions. In addition, local councillors could complete the survey in their own national language to avoid possible misinterpretation. There were Dutch- and German-language versions of the survey.

⁹The German and Dutch cover letter can be found in Appendix D and Appendix E.

A reminder was sent within three months to further urge participants to respond. The local council secretaries sent a reminder to all local councillors and stressed that councillors who had already completed the questionnaire did not need to do so again. Due to the anonymity of the research, it was not possible to resend the questionnaire to only the non-respondents. Despite the reminder, the response rate was not satisfactory. Therefore, additional measures were taken to increase the number of respondents. A second reminder was sent to all local councillors. However, this time the reminder was sent to the private email addresses of the local councillors, which were collected from the municipal websites. By contrast, the first reminder was sent to the official email addresses of the local councillors provided by the municipality. Almost every local councillor had a private email address listed on the municipal website. These local councillors were addressed personally and invited to complete the survey. The response rate did increase after sending the first personalised reminder, but it was still not sufficient. Therefore, a second personal reminder was sent to the German local councillors.

Another approach was taken with regards to the Dutch local councillors. Instead of sending the Dutch local councillors a second personal reminder, they were given the possibility to complete the survey on paper. With the possibility of completing the survey on paper, it became easier for Dutch local councillors to participate. This so-called drop-off survey technique was used in the municipalities of Hengelo, Enschede and Deventer. The surveys were personally handed out to local councillors who had not yet filled in the online survey before their council meeting started. The local councillors completed the survey on their own without interference from the researcher. Local councillors were asked to leave the completed survey in a box, which was later returned to the researcher. The drop-off survey technique was successful since it more than doubled the response rate. Unfortunately, due to practical considerations, it was not possible to use the drop-off survey technique in the eight German municipalities. Figure 3.2 provides the timeline of the whole survey data gathering process.



* The survey among the local councillors in the municipality of Dordrecht was conducted in September and October 2017.

** The local councillors of the municipality of Deventer did not receive a personal reminder since they had the opportunity to complete the survey on paper in May 2019.

Figure 3.2: Timeline of gathering survey data

3.4.3 Response to the survey

The survey procedure outlined above resulted in a total number of 131 responses from local councillors. Based on the initial research population of 544 local councillors, this equals an overall response rate of 24.1%. The response rate seems rather low, but this is not exceptional for email surveys in the field of political science. Compared to the response rate of the MAELG survey (23.1%), the response rate does not appear to be out of order. The response rate in the German regions was rather low compared to that in the Netherlands.¹⁰ This is disappointing considering the total amount of time and effort invested. The response rates of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were 19.4% and 11.5%, respectively. The response rate of the Netherlands was 48.0%, which is perceived to be satisfactory. Table 3.10 lists the number of respondents per municipality, which varies between 3 and 24.

Table 3.10: Overview of the number of respondents per selected municipality

	Total number of local councillors	Number of respondents who completed the survey
Baden-Württemberg		
Heilbronn	40	5
Pforzheim	40	5
Ulm	40	8
Reutlingen	40	13
North Rhine-Westphalia		
Bergisch Gladbach	62	14
Bottrop	54	5
Recklinghausen	53	5
Siegen	65	3
The Netherlands		
Enschede	39	24
Hengelo	37	16
Deventer	37	19
Dordrecht	39	14

Several factors might account for the low response rate, especially in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. First, it is reasonable to assume that the response rate in the Dutch municipalities was higher due to the possibility of completing the survey on paper before a local council meeting. The response rate of the Dutch municipalities before personally handing out the survey on paper was comparable to the German response rate after sending the second personal reminder. Therefore, the drop-off technique seems to be a successful approach to increase the response rate. However, the German councillors were not given the option to complete the survey on paper at a local council meeting due to practical reasons.

¹⁰ An overview of the of the response rate per region is presented in Appendix F, Table 1.

Second, due to practical obstacles, the tailored design method by Dillman (1978) was not applied in its entirety with regards to the timing of the reminders. Dillman suggested sending a reminder one week after sending the initial questionnaire. With an online survey, the time between a request and a reminder is recommended to be even shorter. The response may have been higher if the reminder to complete the survey had been sent sooner.

Third, looking at the six reasons for nonresponse by Lynn (2008), the most likely reasons for nonresponse are the refusal or inability to participate. Local councillors are surveyed quite often on a variety of topics. Accordingly, local councillors might ignore the request to complete a survey, a phenomenon called ‘respondent fatigue’. Furthermore, local councillors often combine their mandate with other occupations, which is already time consuming. Therefore, local councillors may have experienced a lack of time to fill in the survey.

Lastly, there is a notable difference in completion rates between Germany and the Netherlands. The completion rate of the German respondents was 67.5%, while in the Netherlands the completion rate was 80.6%. Almost one-third of the German respondents who started the survey did not submit it. In general, a low completion rate might be the result of poorly organised questions, personal or sensitive questions or an excessive survey length. Looking at the number of respondents per question, it is clear that the respondents who did not complete the survey dropped out during the first three questions.¹¹ Therefore, personal or sensitive questions might have caused the respondents to not complete the survey. In addition, the discrepancy in the completion rates might be the result of the terminology used in the questionnaire. In the Netherlands, it is common to say that the task of local councillors is to set frames, control the executive and represent citizens. In addition, the focus on the content or the process during these tasks is discussed in the Dutch literature. However, these distinctions seem to be less common in Germany. Therefore, special attention was paid to explaining these concepts in the survey. Nevertheless, the unfamiliarity with these concepts might have been the reason that German councillors chose not to complete the survey. The responses from partially completed surveys were not included in this research study.

Representativeness of the response

The previous section discussed the response rate of this survey, but is also important to look at the representativeness of the responses. A representative group of respondents, in relation to the target population it meant to represent, increases external validity. Therefore, the survey concluded with a number of questions to determine the representativeness of the response. Three socio-demographic questions were asked, concerning gender, age and education. In addition, four factual questions were asked about the political position of the respondent. These questions were the following: ‘How many years have you been a local councillor?’ ‘Does your party take part in the opposition or the coalition?’ ‘What is the name of the political party of which you are a member?’ ‘Of which municipality are you a local councillor?’ The last question was necessary to categorise the respondents into the right municipality since the survey was anonymous. The other questions were asked to gather background information on the respondents.

¹¹ An overview of the number of respondents for the first three survey questions, can be found in Appendix F, Table 2.

Most of the socio-demographic and political characteristics of the target population are not known. Therefore, we must be careful in making statements about the representativeness of the respondents. Nevertheless, we could compare the distribution of these socio-demographic and political characteristics across the respondents of the three regions. The results were analysed in terms of irregularities. Table 3.11 provides an overview of the obtained data on the socio-demographic and political characteristics of the respondents.

Table 3.11: Socio-demographic and political characteristics of the respondents of the three regions

	Baden- Württemberg <i>N = 31</i>	North Rhine- Westphalia <i>N = 27</i>	The Netherlands <i>N = 73</i>
Gender			
Male	61.3%	33.3%	67.1%
Female	38.7%	63.0%	32.9%
Other	0%	3.7%	0%
Age			
Mean	56.7	57.6	46.7
Std. deviation	11.8	9.8	17.9
Education			
Primary education	0%	0%	5.5%
Secondary education	16.1%	18.5%	8.2%
Vocational education	32.3%	33.3%	11.0%
Higher professional education	41.9%	44.4%	46.6%
Scientific education	9.7%	3.7%	28.8%
Years in position			
Mean	14.8	12.5	7
Std. deviation	9.1	8.8	8
Position in the local council			
Opposition	48.4%	48.1%	42.5%
Coalition	51.6%	51.9%	57.5%
Party			
European People's Party (EPP)	29.0%	18.5%	8.2%
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)	22.6%	40.7%	12.3%
Renew Europe (Renew)	9.7%	14.8%	20.5%
Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA)	16.1%	18.5%	9.60%
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	0%	0%	1.4%
European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL)	6.5%	3.7%	0%
Local/regional party	3.2%	0%	20.5%
Independent	9.7%	3.7%	0%
Unknown	3.2%	0%	27.4%

On average, the sample was predominately male in Baden-Württemberg (61.3%) and the Netherlands (67.1%). By contrast, 63.0% of the respondents in North Rhine-Westphalia were female. The average age of respondents in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia was around 57 years. The Dutch respondents had the lowest average age, namely 46.7 years. The data indicate that half of the respondents had completed a higher professional education or a scientific education. The average education level was the highest in the Netherlands. Notable differences between the regions were observed regarding the average number of years the respondents had occupied the position of local councillor. Respondents in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia had occupied a seat in the local council for considerably longer. A possible explanation is the longer term of office between elections. The terms of office in Baden-Württemberg is 5 years, in North Rhine-Westphalia 6 years and in the Netherlands 4 years. Respondents in Baden-Württemberg relatively hold their position for the longest period of time.

Lastly, the ratio of respondents occupying a seat in the opposition to respondents occupying a seat in the coalition was similar in the three regions. Respondents were asked to name the party of which they were a member. This was not an obligatory question, and therefore not all respondents answered it. Some respondents were not affiliated with a political party since they were independent politicians. To compare the parties in Germany and the Netherlands, parties were categorised according to their affiliated political groups in the European Parliament. In addition to these political groups, the following categories were added: ‘local/regional party’, ‘independent’ and ‘unknown’. First, it is remarkable that all respondents in North Rhine-Westphalia filled in their party name. Second, a variety of parties were represented within the group of respondents for each region. Third, the dominant party group among the respondents differed in each region. The European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) represented the largest political group in Baden-Württemberg, while the S&D was the dominant group in North Rhine-Westphalia. In the Netherlands, a large group of respondents were members of a party that is part of Renew or of a local/regional party. A relatively high percentage (27.4%) of respondents in the Netherlands did not fill in a party name, compared to the other regions. Overall, the analysis of the socio-demographic and political characteristics does not raise concerns.

3.4.4 Operationalisation of role with regard to citizen participation

Operationalisation of role orientation with regard to citizen participation

RQ3.A.1 is a descriptive research question aimed to measure the first dependent variable: the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of this variable were based on the two models of representation by Denters (2012). Accordingly, the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation has the dimensions of the party-political model or the democratic watchdog model. A number of survey items used by Denters (2012) were also used in this research study to measure role orientation. Survey item Q1 lists these four questions about different aspects of the role of local councillors as elected representatives:

- ‘Realising party programme’
- ‘Acting in unity with the party’
- ‘Contact with citizens and local organisations’
- ‘Ensuring channels of participation’

Local councillors were asked to indicate how much importance they attached to these different aspects of their role. The first two statements are related to the party-political model, and the last two statements are related to the democratic watchdog model. A five-point Likert scale was used, ranging from not or hardly important to very important. The results indicate whether local councillors had a party-focussed role orientation or a citizen-focussed role orientation regarding citizen participation.

Operationalisation of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation

RQ 3.A.2 is descriptive research question formulated to measure the second dependent variable: the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of this variable were based on the conceptual framework, as discussed in section 2.5. First, we focused on two facets of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation: setting frameworks and scrutinising. Second, the focus within these aspects of role behaviour was on the content or the process.

Multiple-choice survey item Q2 measured how often the local council had set frameworks with a focus on the process. When a respondent indicated that the local council had set frameworks with a focus on the process, he or she was directed to Q2.1. This survey item listed three aspects, and the respondents were asked to indicate to what extent these aspects played a role in setting polity frames: 'Ensure channels of participation', 'Ensure that everyone can participate' and 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process'. A four-point Likert scale was used, with the following answer options: 'no role', 'moderate role', 'important role' and 'very important role'. The same structure of questioning was used in survey items Q3 and Q3.1 to measure the role behaviour of local councillors when setting frameworks with a focus on the content. Survey item Q3.1 listed one aspect, namely 'Party politics'. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent this aspect played a role in setting polity frames. The same four-point Likert scale was used as with Q2.1.

Next, several survey items were formulated to measure the second aspect of role behaviour: scrutinising. Survey item Q4 is a multiple-choice question which measured how often the local council had scrutinised citizen participation processes. When a respondent indicated that the local council did scrutinise policy, he or she was directed to Q5. Survey item Q5 is a multiple-choice question with three answer options: scrutinising took place on the process, on the content or on both aspects. When a respondent indicated that the local council did scrutinise a certain aspect, he or she was directed to Q6 and/or Q7 for a follow-up question. The same four-point Likert scale as in Q2.1 was used to measure to what extent these aspects played a role. Survey item Q7 listed one aspect of scrutinising in terms of the content: 'Party politics'. Survey item Q6 listed three aspects of scrutinising in terms of the process: 'Ensure channels of participation', 'Ensure that everyone can participate' and 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process'.


3.5 Reliability and validity

This section briefly reflects on the reliability and validity of the research designs described in previous sections of this chapter. In addition, measures taken to maximise the reliability and validity of this research, and thus enhance the quality of measurement, are described. Specific issues of reliability and validity concerning statistical analyses are described in the relevant chapters.

The reliability of a research study increases when the research processes are clear and well defined. Therefore, a detailed description of the data collection process and of the variables contributes to the reliability of our research. Research question 1 is answered by the qualitative data, selected on the basis of transparent inclusion and exclusion criteria to structure the data collection process. The validity of our research is ensured by only using academic papers by local democracy experts. Individual subjective judgement has been avoided. In the survey we conducted, we checked whether the questions were clear and unambiguous. In addition, the sample had to be sufficient and representative in order to make statements about local councillors in the three regions. Therefore, attention was paid to the sample size of the selected respondents of the MAELG survey and the respondents of our own research. More comments can be made about the validity of the surveys used. Surveys can suffer from validity issues when they are not well designed. The survey items selected from the MAELG and the variables formulated for our own survey seem to be reasonable measures of the variables we wanted to study (face validity). The selected survey items and the formulated survey items are based on the academic literature (construct validity). To ensure a high degree of correspondence between the measures and the concepts in our own survey, some survey questions were derived from previous studies. Other survey questions were pre-tested by the supervisors of this master's thesis (content validity). Therefore, the validity of the research questions is considered to be satisfactory. The internal and external validity are described in the chapter answering the relevant research questions.

There is a possibility that local councillors reported socially desirable answers in the MAELG survey and in our own survey. In general, respondents are inclined to give socially desirable answers, according to Chan (2009). When questions evoke answers that are in conflict with prevalent social norms, respondents tend to misreport behaviours or to be reluctant to answer (Tourangeau, 2000). Even when a survey is conducted anonymously, social desirability threatens the validity of survey data. However, controversial issues which are in strong contrast with social norms were not part of either survey. Nevertheless, local councillors are in the public eye and might opt for answers which make them look good in the light of prevailing social norms. That is why we used four measures in our own survey to reduce social desirability distortions as much as possible. First, the survey's cover letter emphasised that the questions are about local councillors' own attitudes and orientation and that there were no wrong answers. Second, the privacy of respondents was guaranteed and emphasised. Third, the survey was a self-administrated survey, sent by email, to decrease the pressure to answer in line with prevailing social norms. Email surveys are less intrusive, and respondents may answer when and wherever they want (Chang & Krosnick, 2010; Joinson, 1999). Lastly, local councillors were asked to evaluate the performance of the whole local council instead of evaluating

their own individual performance. Social desirability bias is the most prevalent in self-evaluation questions (Stockemer, 2018), and therefore this type of question was not used.



Chapter 4

Local democratic institutions

Local democratic institutions are the formal context in which local councillors have to perform their role. Section 2.1.3 has argued that local democratic institutions influence the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the distinct features of the local democratic institutions of the selected regions. Accordingly, this chapter answers research question 1: *What are the similarities and differences in the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands?*

The local democratic institutions of the three regions were categorised as either party-oriented or citizen-oriented using the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. At its core, this conceptual framework is about the opportunities for party influence versus the opportunities for citizen participation in local politics. Formalised participation rights give citizens a stronger position in the local decision-making process, at the expense of party influence. The introduction of democratic rights for citizens changes the relationship between local councillors and citizens. Accordingly, the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors is expected to change. This chapter studies whether and to what extent democratic rights have been introduced in favour of parties or citizens.

This chapter starts by giving a brief overview of the local democratic contexts in Germany, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Remarkable events which triggered recent local democratic reforms are discussed. In addition, political ambitions are discussed to give the reader some additional information about possible future democratic reforms. Section 4.1 concludes with an overview of the similarities and differences among the local democratic contexts of the three regions. The local democratic contexts presented in section 4.1 provide background information for the results of the analyses in section 4.2. Section 4.2 takes a closer look at the focus of local democratic institutions. Three indicators are used to determine the local democratic focus: ‘direct election of the mayor’, ‘local referendum’ and ‘local electoral system’. The local democratic institutions of each region are placed on a scale from party-oriented to citizen-oriented. The results of the analyses indicate whether the expected differences in the focus (i.e. party or citizen) of the local democratic institutions of the three regions are indeed present.

4.1 Local democratic contexts

4.1.1 Germany

A characteristic of German local government is the rich variety of institutional arrangements. Four basic types of local government systems existed before reunification (Gunlicks, 1986). These systems differ with regards to the power of the local council vis-à-vis that of the mayor and the opportunities given to citizens to affect local council decisions. Irrespective of the type of local government system, all states witnessed an *‘Erneuerung der Politik von unten’*: the renewal of politics from below (Hesse, 1986; Edwards & Van der Meer, 2000; Hendriks & Tops, 1999). This movement tried to reform politics from the bottom up. Several initiatives were taken to involve citizens in local decision-making processes. As a result, participative forms of public decision-making were implemented through a bottom-up initiative at the municipal level. To

a considerable extent this is also the process upon which the Netherlands has relied for local democratic reforms. Citizen gatherings, neighbourhood committees and civic forums were grassroots enrichments to German local democracies. Most of these types of participation concerned planning procedures. This participative revolution was in full swing during the 1980s (Hendriks & Tops, 1999; Wollmann, 2000a; Vetter, 2013). However, the focus of local governments shifted after the German reunification.

After the German reunification, the idea of the ‘renewal of politics from below’ became overshadowed by the New Public Management movement. Initially, Germany was hesitant to implement the New Public Management ideas since it always had a strong focus on the Weberian model (Kersting et al., 2009). However, municipalities had to deal with a tight financial situation in the 1990s. Therefore, many German municipalities became inspired by the Dutch Tilburg model, which is based on the concept of New Public Management (Hendriks & Tops, 1999). The principles of the New Public Management theory and the Tilburg model were translated into a German version, the so-called new steering model (Banner, 1991). During this period, local governments focused on efficient government, with a business-like approach for cost-cutting purposes (Wollmann, 2000a; Kersting et al., 2009). Municipalities shifted their focus from citizen participation to budget management.

Nevertheless, all German states continue to invest in citizen participation and have adopted multiple direct democracy instruments at the municipal level (Wollmann, 2000a). In the 1990s, almost all states adjusted the municipal charters to give citizens a stronger position in the local political decision-making process (Vetter, 2009; Gabriel & Eisenmann, 2005). Binding local referendums were introduced in nearly all states in the early 1990s. Another institutional change was the direct election of mayors at the municipal level. In most states, this was complemented by introducing procedures to recall a sitting mayor by means of a local referendum. These two legislative acts gave citizens direct democratic rights. At that point in time, Germany was a frontrunner among Western European countries (except for Switzerland) with regards to local direct democracy procedures. Today, procedures for local referendums and directly elected mayors are implemented in the municipal charters of all German states.

Geißel and Kersting (2014) observed three waves of reform during which citizens gained influence in German local governments. First, the introduction of a directly elected mayor gave citizens the opportunity to elect the executive leader of the local council. However, the election behaviour is heavily dependent on regional political cultures (Kersting, 2002). The party membership of a mayoral candidate can be an advantage or a disadvantage. Kersting (2005) has pointed out that being a member of a party seems to be a drawback for mayoral candidates in Baden-Württemberg, as they are perceived as less independent. By contrast, mayors in other states, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, tend to be more party-oriented. Here, previous political experience is considered to be important. However, to be elected, a mayoral candidate needs to look across party lines, make compromises and be responsive to citizens instead to parties. Second, voting system reforms in a number of states gave citizens more influence to decide which candidates they wanted to have seats in the local council (Geißel, 2009). The abolition of rigid party lists fundamentally restricted party influence. Voters gained power since they could vote for not only their favourite party, but also their favourite candidate(s). Depending on the state, citizens have different possibilities for preference

voting (*kumulieren*) and panachage (*panaschieren*). Third, the introduction of direct democracy elements and co-decision practices such as local referendums, citizen initiatives and e-participatory budgeting (Kersting et al., 2017) expanded citizen influence at the local level.

The direct election of the mayor, local referendums and citizen initiatives are all forms of direct democratic participation. The reforms made to the local electoral system fall into the category of representative participation. Both forms of political participation are voter-centric. However, Kersting (2013;2015) has distinguished a third form of political participation in representative democracies: deliberative participation. Deliberative forms of democracy are consultative and do not lead to binding decisions since they often lack a legal framework. This sphere of political participation is talk-centric and has three types of instruments: the forum (assembly), the mini public (citizen jury) and modern advisory boards (Kersting, 2013; 2015). Informal deliberative participation has increased in Germany since the 1990s, but became popular with the participatory wave around the 2010s. Around that time, new deliberative participatory instruments were introduced, such as e-participatory budgeting (Kersting, 2013), crowdsourcing and crowd monitoring (Kersting, 2020). These new participatory instruments have the potential to trigger responsive organisational learning, as they generate important suggestions and complaints from citizens. Several research studies by Kersting (2002; 2016b) have confirmed that the expansion of civic participation in local governments currently focuses on dialogical-consultative or deliberative participatory processes. Furthermore, Kersting (2016) has studied the attitudes of German citizens and local councillors regarding new forms of participation. The results indicate that local elections are still one of the most important participatory instruments. In addition, citizens and local councillors are generally quite open to direct and deliberative participation. Therefore, Kersting (2007; 2013; 2015) has argued that a subtle blend of deliberative instruments and direct democratic participation could reinvigorate local representative democracy.

To conclude, changes in local democratic legislation indicate a uniform trend towards more citizen-oriented local democracy in Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany is based on a representative system, with a strong focus on political parties enshrined in its Constitution (Geißel & Kersting, 2014). Therefore, local parties previously played a major role in German local governments. However, Geißel and Kersting (2014) have demonstrated that the representative party democracy has lost its appeal and is complemented by direct and deliberative elements. Vetter's (2009) research indicates a massive institutional change from 1989 to 2008 towards citizen-oriented local government all over Germany. Overall, German political parties have lost power, and citizens have gained influence through several local democratic institutional changes.

4.1.2 Baden-Württemberg

The state of Baden-Württemberg has been a frontrunner with regard to citizen participation in Germany (Kersting et al., 2009). Until 1989, Baden-Württemberg was the only German state which regulated local direct democracy. Baden-Württemberg is known for two innovative and successful institutional changes with regards to direct democracy. First, Baden-Württemberg, together with the state of Bavaria, had a directly elected mayor long before other states. Baden-Württemberg introduced the directly elected mayor in 1956, which was a notable institutional innovation in European local government after the Second World War (Wollmann, 2000b). The rest of Germany introduced a directly elected mayor between 1990

and 1995. Second, Baden-Württemberg has made citizen initiatives and referendums available at the local level since 1956. North Rhine-Westphalia followed much later, in 1994. Today, local referendums can be held in all states. All in all, the state of Baden-Württemberg has long-standing experience with citizen participation at the local level.

Recently, the Stuttgart 21 project has placed the topic of citizen participation high on the political agenda of Baden-Württemberg. Stuttgart 21 refers to the burning conflict surrounding a railway project in the state capital. The vehement protests against the project made politicians realise that they have to change the way citizens are involved in large projects. The state government promised to strengthen citizen participation and to expand direct democratic rights. They were keen to reform direct democracy at both the state and local levels. The preparation of the reform package started in 2012 and was finalised in 2015. The reform package included several changes to the process of submission/approval of referendums and petitions for legislative proposals. Moreover, hurdles to direct democracy processes at the state and local levels were lowered. Since December 2015, the municipal charter of Baden-Württemberg has included new rules aimed at further improving the democratic rules. Legislation was adjusted with regards to public participation, direct democracy and the local council. Child and youth participation were expanded, working conditions for local councillors were improved and the procedure for citizen requests was simplified. With these new rules, Baden-Württemberg is catching up with other German states when it comes to lowering the threshold for democratic decision-making, according to the organisation Mehr Demokratie (2016). All in all, hurdles to direct democracy processes were removed in far-reaching changes to the municipal charter of Baden-Württemberg.

In addition to the changes made to the municipal code, the state government of Baden-Württemberg created a special office to bundle efforts with regard to citizen participation. Gisela Erler is the first State Councillor for Civil Society and Citizen Participation. Baden-Württemberg is the only German state to have a special office with the goals of expanding civic participation and strengthening civil society. Furthermore, the state of Baden-Württemberg launched an online participation portal to make citizen participation more visible and to provide information on public participation and direct democracy. In addition, this portal is used as a platform for online participation processes; citizens can inform themselves about legislative proposals, comment on them and help to develop new laws. This type of online participation is relatively experimental, but Baden-Württemberg is committed to integrating online participation in existing decision-making processes.

The current coalition of Alliance 90/The Greens and the Christian Democratic Union of the state parliament is committed to further developing citizen participation. This ambition is expressed in the coalition agreement's slogan '*Verlässlich. Nachhaltig. Innovativ*'.¹² Citizen participation and direct democracy are considered to be essential elements to enrich representative democracy. The coalition aims to create a diverse democracy with a strong civil society. Dialogical participation is often cited as

¹² Koalitionvertrag Baden-Württemberg 2016-2021. https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/fileadmin/redaktion/dateien/PDF/160509_Koalitionsvertrag_B-W_2016-2021_final.PDF

being important. A broad culture of dialogue has developed in recent years, especially at the local level. In addition, efforts have been made to educate state administrators in communication, dialogue and mediation. Moreover, the state government wants to strengthen municipal refugee dialogues and dialogues in the area of energy transition. Overall, the coalition agreement clearly indicates political ambitions and concrete measures to strengthen the position of citizens in local democracies.

The local democracy reform plans and measures introduced after the Stuttgart 21 protests indicate the latest trend in local democracy, according to Vetter (2013). The conflict in Stuttgart made clear that co-operation is seen as an appropriate way to resolve conflict while strengthening political legitimacy. Vetter has noted that current democratic reforms tend to focus more on implementing and strengthening the use of co-operative forms of participation. Co-operative forms of participation, in which civic actors are included in the local decision-making process, have gained popularity in recent years. According to Reidinger (2016), the debate in Baden-Württemberg is not just about direct democracy, but also about more public participation in general.

To conclude, the state of Baden-Württemberg expanded direct democracy and removed hurdles to citizen participation at the state and local levels. Systematically, attempts have been made to increase, facilitate and strengthen citizen participation. Citizen participation is more citizen friendly as a result of changes to the municipal charter. Furthermore, there is a political commitment to enriching the diversity of democracy with citizen participation. Online participation, dialogical participation and co-operative participation have gained in popularity.

4.1.3 North Rhine-Westphalia

The state of North Rhine-Westphalia is considered to be a conspicuous example of party rule at the local level in Germany (Wehling, 1991; Wollmann, 2004; Bogumil, 2002). Although direct elections for the mayor and local referendums are enshrined in the municipal charter, party influence remains strong compared to other German states. Bogumil (2002) has described two important reasons why party competition is relatively dominant at the local level in North Rhine-Westphalia. The most important reason is the historical understanding of the role of the local council. Before the reunification, North Rhine-Westphalia employed the Northern German council system. In this system, the local council occupies a strong position, leadership structures are fragmented and opposition parties exercise a strong parliamentary control function. By contrast, Baden-Württemberg had a Southern German council system. In this type of system, the power of the local council vis-à-vis the local executive is weaker, which reduces party influence (Vetter, 2009). At the beginning of the 1990s, states started to reform local democratic institutions along the lines of the Southern German council system in the wake of the German reunification. More states amended their municipal charters to allow for a directly elected mayor, citizen initiatives and local referendums. North Rhine-Westphalia was one of the last states to introduce directly elected mayors, in 1999. Second, Bogumil (2002) has argued that party influence is strong since there are many medium-sized and large municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia. North Rhine-Westphalia is the most densely populated state in Germany, but it does not have many municipalities (Kost, 2010; Kersting et al., 2009). Political parties are still very powerful since party politicisation increases with the size of

the local municipality (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). Bogumil has argued that the implementation of the directly elected mayor and local referendums in North Rhine-Westphalia did not have the same effect as in Baden-Württemberg due to a different historical understanding of the role of the local council and the size of the municipalities.

When one takes a closer look at the direct election of the mayor in North Rhine-Westphalia, party influence is noticeable in multiple ways. First, mayoral candidates do not have much chance of winning an election without party support (Holtmann, 2002; Kersting, 2005). Therefore, a great majority of mayoral candidates in North Rhine-Westphalia are members of a political party (Reiser & Holtmann, 2008). Second, the two largest national parties (the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats) participate in nearly every local council election. Nevertheless, the number of non-partisan local lists and independent candidates running for office has increased (Reiser, 2007; Bottom & Reiser, 2014). All in all, the direct election of the mayor in North Rhine-Westphalia offers little capacity to bring change due to strong party politicisation. This is remarkable since strengthening the position of the mayor is a measure to counter party influence.

Despite strong party influence, local democratic participation procedures have become more citizen friendly. The German organisation *Mehr Demokratie* (2016) argues that the North Rhine-Westphalia's direct democracy procedures are more citizen friendly than the legislation in this field in Baden-Württemberg. *Mehr Demokratie* has compared and evaluated all state legislation since 2003. The latest report of 2016 indicates that North Rhine-Westphalia's direct democracy procedures are considered to be 'acceptable'. Procedures regarding signatures, voting and approval quorums have become more citizen friendly at the local level. Although legislation improved gradually, North Rhine-Westphalia remained in fifth place in the local legislation ranking. Baden-Württemberg was a pioneer in the field of direct democracy, but its procedures were not considered to be citizen friendly. The catalogue of permitted topics was narrow, and the quorum was high. Therefore, many citizen requests were found to be inadmissible. The procedures were thoroughly reformed in 2015 as a result of the Stuttgart 21 project. Major reforms at the local level were reducing the approval quorum, lowering the signature quorum, extending the deadline for submitting citizen requests and permitting referendums with regards to developing plans. Due to these adjustments, Baden-Württemberg moved from place 16 up to place 7 in the ranking. Overall, the direct democracy procedures in North Rhine-Westphalia are more citizen friendly than those in Baden-Württemberg, but party influence remains strong.

The coalition agreement of North Rhine-Westphalia describes several ambitions with regard to citizen participation.¹³ However, these ambitions seem to be less far-reaching than the coalition agreement of Baden-Württemberg. The Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats have expressed their will to further develop direct democratic instruments. Special attention is being paid to citizen initiatives. The coalition partners want more legal certainty for citizens in the process of citizen initiatives. In addition, the coalition aims to create an independent and directly elected state youth parliament to encourage

¹³ Koalition vertrag Nordrhein-Westfalen 2017-2022. https://www.cdu-nrw.de/sites/default/files/media/docs/nrwkoalition_koalitionsvertrag_fuer_nordrhein-westfalen_2017_-_2022.pdf

young people to become active in politics. However, only a few sentences in the coalition agreement are dedicated to citizen participation and direct democracy. More attention is paid to ideas for strengthening the local government and to increasing the attractiveness of becoming a local councillor.

To conclude, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia has incorporated direct participation into its municipal charter. However, party influence is still strong due to a different historical understanding of the role of the council and the large size of municipalities. The coalition agreement expresses the ambition to further develop direct democratic instruments, but strengthening the local council is also seen as important. Overall, citizen participation rights have improved, but in practice, parties are still influential.

4.1.4 The Netherlands

Until the 1960s, citizen participation in the Netherlands was equated to casting a vote for the party representing one's 'pillar'. The pillars separated Dutch society into groups by religion and associated political beliefs. These pillars in the social and political system were the traditional institutionalised linkages between political parties and citizens. The relationship between politicians and citizens radically changed when the pillars started to break down (Denters & Klok, 2005). Consequently, party membership, party identification and local election turnouts declined.

In the 1980s, Dutch local governments were inspired by the concept of New Public Management (Denters & Klok, 2005). The orientation of local governments shifted to the ideology of New Public Management due to declining financial resources, which necessitated cutbacks. A turning point was the municipal elections of 1990, in which less than 50% of voters participated. Tops' (1991) analyses indicate that voters were positive about government services, but the quality of local politics was perceived as a problem. Therefore, municipalities started several political and administrative reform projects in line with the German tradition of bottom-up initiatives. With these participation projects, municipalities aimed to make local politics more attractive and accessible for citizens. The emphasis shifted to the issue of public responsiveness (Denters & Klok, 2005).

In the 1990s, many Dutch municipalities started to implement interactive forms of governance. Municipalities started experimenting with direct participation by interested citizens and other stakeholders in the decision-making process (Denters, et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 2005; Edelenbos, 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Denters and Klok (2005) have explained that these interactive schemes were often applied at a neighbourhood level. However, the role of citizens was modest in most instances since professional networks and organisations were dominant. Furthermore, the Dutch government tried to implement direct mayoral elections and binding referendums at the national level, but failed to do so in both cases. A detailed study by Geurtz (2012) describes several reasons why the Netherlands was not successful in implementing direct democratic reforms. An important reason that the reforms failed was the rigid and difficult formal procedures. A constitutional amendment was required to implement direct mayoral elections and binding referendums. The high quorum needed to effect a constitutional change was not achieved for the second reading in the Senate for both pieces of legislation. Both reforms were blocked, despite popular support among Dutch citizens (Hendriks et al., 2011; Van der Meer & Van

der Kolk, 2016). Compared to their German colleagues, Dutch politicians feel freer to disregard public opinion, as the Senate is considered to be a chamber of reflection (Geurtz, 2012). To summarise, despite several attempts and popular support, there have been few to no formal local democratic reforms giving Dutch citizens direct influence in the local decision-making process.

Hendriks and Tops (1999) have compared the local government reforms of Germany and the Netherlands in the 1980s and early 1990s. They have observed that local government reforms in Germany shifted from a focus on more democracy to a focus on more efficiency, while in the Netherlands the shift was the other way around. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, both countries demonstrated renewed attention to the role of citizens in local democracy. However, in contrast to the Netherlands, democratic reforms were implemented more often in Germany (Haus, 2005). Hendriks (2008) has noted that the Netherlands planned major structural changes, ‘but ultimately the overall institutional structure has remained largely the same’ (p. 257). Instead, Dutch democracy has changed by small-scale adaptations, a process called ‘reinventing traditions’ by Hendriks (2008). In addition, the Netherlands tends to favour informal democratic reforms, while Germany tends to be more rule oriented and favours a legal background. This is also evident in the current local democratic reform plans of the Dutch government. The Dutch minister relies on bottom-up initiatives in the light of the high institutional thresholds preventing nation-wide institutional reforms.

4.1.5 Conclusion: similarities and differences among local democratic contexts

This section has sketched the local democratic contexts of Germany, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. There are several similarities and differences among these regions and countries. First, there are similarities and differences with regards to the (local) democratic settings. Germany and the Netherlands are both considered to be ‘consensual democracies’, according to the typology developed by Lijphart (1999). Consensual democracies are based on the idea that democracy should represent as many people as possible and should provide for multiple checks and balances which limit the power of the central government. In addition, Germany and the Netherlands both have a Germanic state tradition (Loughlin & Peters, 1997; Hendrik, Loughlin & Lidström, 2011; Painter & Peters, 2010). Both countries have more or less similar philosophical and cultural traditions, which may have an impact on local democratic institutional settings. However, the two countries differ with regards to their institutional design. Germany is a federal republic, consisting of 16 partly-sovereign states. Local democracy is a matter of state government, which explains the variations in local democratic institutions among states. The municipal charters of states vary as a result of different historical understandings of the role of the local council and due to political constellations. The state of Baden-Württemberg previously had a Southern German council, in which party influence is reduced. By contrast, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia previously had a Northern German council system, with the local council occupying a strong position and more political politicisation. All in all, the historical differences among local democratic systems explain the different understandings of the role of the local council. Baden-Württemberg’s local democratic system focuses on citizens, while the local democratic system of North Rhine-Westphalia focuses more on parties. Even after the introduction of the directly elected mayor and local referendums, North Rhine-Westphalia still retains a strong focus on parties compared to Baden-

Württemberg. The Netherlands tried to introduce direct participation rights like Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. However, the introduction of a directly elected mayor and local referendums was not successful due to rigid and formal national procedures and the national political coalitions.

Second, there are similarities and differences among recent measures taken with regards to local democratic institutions and political ambitions in this field. All three regions would like to have more participative forms of local democracy withing local representative democracies. However, the extent of participation and the measures taken differ considerably among regions. As a result of the Stuttgart 21 protest, Baden-Württemberg effected far-reaching changes to its municipal charter by removing hurdles to direct democracy processes at the state and local levels. In addition, Baden-Württemberg is increasingly focusing on intensifying citizen engagement in the online, dialogical and co-operative democracy domains. The coalition agreement is ambitious and aims to create a diverse democracy with a strong civil society. The coalition agreement of North Rhine-Westphalia expresses the will to increase citizen participation in policy decision-making at the local level. Some measures have been proposed at the state level, but this is less the case at the local level. North Rhine-Westphalia wants to strengthen the local government and make the position of the local councillor more attractive. These measures strengthen the role of the local council instead of increasing the influence of citizens. The Dutch national government wants to increase citizen participation within local representative democracy. The Dutch minister would like local councillors to focus more on citizens without weakening the local representative democracy. However, only minor legislative adjustments have been proposed to increase citizen participation. Therefore, local councillors are asked to change their role within the current local democratic institutions. All in all, the three regions vary with regards to recent changes made to local democratic institutions and their political ambitions.

In summary, section 4.1 described the local democratic contexts of Germany, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Attention was paid to the historical understandings of the local council, recent events affecting local democracy and the political ambitions with regards to reforming local democratic institutions. Section 4.2 looks at local democratic institutional differences among Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Some of these local democratic institutional differences have been mentioned in previous sections. However, the structural analyses, based on previous research, were needed to determine whether local democratic institutions are party-oriented or citizen-oriented.

4.2 Local democratic models: party-oriented or citizen-oriented

In this section, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are categorised as either a local party democracy or a local citizen democracy. Their local democratic institutions are analysed on the basis of three indicators: ‘direct election of the mayor’, ‘local electoral system’ and ‘local referendum’. The indicators are derived from Vetter’s model of local democracy (see section 2.3). Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are scored on each indicator. The summary of the scores indicates whether the local democratic institutions of each region are party-oriented or citizen-oriented.

4.2.1 Direct election of the mayor

The direct election of a mayor allows citizens to have a direct say in the executive power of the local council. Accordingly, political parties lose their power to appoint the mayor, and the recruitment of mayoral candidates by parties is more responsive to citizens (Kersting, 2002). Furthermore, candidates from outside established parties are now able to run for office. Due to the direct linkage to the electorate, direct elected mayors are more motivated to be responsive to citizens (Wollmann, 2005). The procedure to recall a sitting mayor by means of a local referendum establishes direct accountability (Kersting et al., 2009).

In all German states, citizens directly elect their mayor. The direct election of the mayor in Baden-Württemberg has been in place since the early 1950s. The state of North Rhine-Westphalia introduced the direct election of the mayor in 1994. In the Netherlands, mayors are not directly elected but nominated by the local council. The job offer for the position of mayor is open to all citizens. Eventually, the mayor is ‘appointed by the King’, based on the advice of the local council and the Ministry of Interior Affairs. An effort to change the Constitution to allow for a directly elected mayor failed in 2005. However, the procedure for appointing a mayor was removed from the Dutch Constitution in 2018. This constitutional amendment makes it much easier for the lower house of the Dutch Parliament to implement a new system in the future. At the moment, Dutch mayors are still nominated by the local councils and officially appointed by royal decree. To summarise, citizens in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia directly elect their mayors, while Dutch citizens do not have this right.

4.2.2 Local electoral system

When citizens are allowed to cumulate or split their votes in local elections, they directly influence which persons are elected as local councillors. Cumulation and ticket-splitting (i.e. panachage) give citizens influence at the expense of parties. Parties lose the ability to determine the order of the party list and to give their preferred candidates high places on the election ballot (Kersting, 2002). In this open-list system, every person has as many votes as there are municipal councillors to be elected. Voters can cast up to three votes for a single candidate; this is called ‘cumulation’. Accordingly, voters have the power to change the order of the party list. Parties no longer monopolise the party lists since voters have the power to rebalance the lists. Moreover, voters can split their votes among candidates from several parties; this is called ‘ticket-splitting’. Voters can put together candidates from various lists to compose their ‘desired council’. Accordingly, citizens can influence the composition of the whole council. Ticket-splitting makes the local electoral system more person oriented since local councillors are not elected solely based on their party membership. As a result, local councillors are primarily accountable to the citizens instead of the political parties of which they are members.

German states vary with regards to the openness of the electoral system to ticket-splitting and preference voting. The local electoral system in Baden-Württemberg allows for cumulation and ticket-splitting. In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, voters cannot change the order of candidates on the party lists in local elections. The local electoral system has closed lists, and each voter can cast one vote. The local electoral system in the Netherlands is similar to the system in North Rhine-Westphalia: party lists are closed, and each voter has one vote. Voters vote for a specific candidate, which automatically counts as a

vote for the party of this candidate. Candidates are chosen according to their place on the list. However, when a candidate gets more votes than the electoral quota, this person enters the local council at the expense of another candidate on the same list. In the municipal elections of 2014, 8.97% of the Dutch local councillors earned their seats in the local council by exceeding the electoral quota (Groot, 2017). To summarise, the local electoral systems differ greatly among Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Cumulation and ticket-splitting are only possible in the local electoral system in Baden-Württemberg. Here, citizens have a great influence on the composition of the local council since they directly decide which persons are elected as local councillors. By contrast, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a closed-list system, which enhances the influence of parties. Here, parties decide on the party list by an internal selection process.

4.2.3 Local referendums

Local referendums give citizens the possibility to directly influence the decision-making process and legislation. Issues that can be decided by local referendums are no longer under the exclusive legislative power of the local council (Gabriel & Eisenmann, 2005). In addition, the monopoly of parties to decide on the municipal agenda is undermined (Kersting, 2002). Local referendums are issue oriented and can lead to binding decisions (Kersting, 2015). There are different legal settings for local referendums, concerning quorums, time frames and other legal requirements (Kersting, 2007; Kersting, 2013b; Vetter & Kersting, 2017). Local referendums can become a ‘sword of Damocles’. If there is no citizens’ request for a referendum, local councillors have made the right decision (Kersting, 2013c; Kersting, 2015; Kersting, 2018). Overall, the possibility of a local referendum forces local councillors to pay greater attention to citizens’ concerns before making a decision (Kersting, 2007).

The municipal charters of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia give citizens the right to initiate a referendum. Consultative as well as binding referendums are possible. Citizens could start a popular initiative (*bürgerbegehren*) to correct a decision of the local council or to place a topic on the political agenda. Such a petition has certain requirements, such as the number of supporting signatures. The local council needs to discuss the petition when it fulfils all the requirements. When the local council refuses the proposal, the proposal is put to a popular vote (*Bürgerentscheid*). In 2015, the Netherlands implemented the national Advisory Referendum Act, which gave citizens the right to initiate a national consultative referendum. Two national referendums were held, but the Advisory Referendum Act was repealed in 2018. According to the Constitution, municipalities may hold referendums as long as they are not binding. If they want to organise a consultative referendum, they have to implement a local referendum regulation. Roughly a quarter of all municipalities have implemented such a regulation, which allows citizens to initiate a referendum under strict conditions. To summarise, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia give citizens the right to initiate consultative and binding local referendums. Binding local referendums are not allowed in the Netherlands. Consultative local referendums are only allowed if Dutch local government has implemented the local referendum regulation.

4.2.4 Results and conclusion

Based on the analyses above, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands were

scored on each indicator. The value 0 was attributed if the institutional characteristics corresponded to the party model, and the value 1 was attributed if the institutional characteristics corresponded to the citizen model. Table 4.1 lists the precise measurement criteria for each indicator.


Table 4.1: Measurement criteria of the two models of local democracy

Direct election of mayor	0 = no; 1 = yes.
Local electoral system	1 = voters have as many votes as there are seats in the council for cumulation and ticket-splitting. 0 = closed-list system without cumulation and ticket-splitting.
Local referendums	0 = no; 0.5 = consultative; 1 = yes, binding referendum.

The scores on the three indicators for each region are presented in Table 4.2. The summary index on local democracy is the sum of all three indicators. It is apparent from this table that local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg are strongly citizen-oriented. On every indicator, Baden-Württemberg has the highest score, which indicates a citizen model of local democracy. Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia both have direct mayoral elections and binding local referendums. They differ with regards to the local electoral system since North Rhine-Westphalia has a closed-list system. As indicated in Table 4.2, North Rhine-Westphalia has a summary index score of 2. Therefore, local democratic institutions in North Rhine-Westphalia are considered to be moderately citizen-oriented. The Netherlands is at the other end of the continuum, with an index value of 0.5. This index score clearly indicates that the local democratic institutions of the Netherlands are strongly party-oriented. Direct mayoral elections and binding local referendums are prohibited by the national Constitution. Local consultative referendums are allowed if a municipality implements a specific regulation. Therefore, the Netherlands only scores on the indicator ‘local referendum’. To summarise the results, the local democratic institutions of each region differ with regards to their orientation. The citizen-oriented model is most distinctive in Baden-Württemberg, while the model of the Netherlands is strongly party-oriented. North Rhine-Westphalia is in the middle, but its local democratic institutions tend to be more citizen-oriented than party-oriented. Furthermore, the two regions in Germany are more citizen-oriented than the Netherlands. To conclude, these findings confirm our expectation that the local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands range from citizen-oriented to party-oriented. The next two chapters analyse the extent to which the three types of local democratic institutions have an impact on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors with regards to their representative role and their role regarding citizen participation specifically.

Table 4.2: Local democracy scores of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands

	Mayor	Electoral system	Referendum	Summary index on local democracy
Baden-Württemberg	1	1	1	3
North Rhine-Westphalia	1	0	1	2
The Netherlands	0	0	0.5	0.5



Chapter 5

The representative role of local councillors

This chapter analyses the impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role orientation and representative role behaviour. To this end, research question 2 has been formulated: *To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the representative role orientation and representative role behaviour of local councillors?* This chapter begins by examining representative role orientation. It then analyses representative role behaviour. Items from the MAELG survey are then used to operationalise representative role orientation and role behaviour (see section 3.3.2). These survey items are divided into two categories: aspects of the representative role focussed on parties and aspects focussed on citizens. Several statistical analyses are applied to answer research question 2 and its corresponding sub-questions.

These aspects are systematically analysed based on their alignment with our expectations. As described in Chapter 2, we predicted that local democratic institutions influence the role orientation (cf. hypothesis 1) and role behaviour (cf. hypothesis 2) of local councillors. Based on the findings of Chapter 4, this study has concluded that Baden-Württemberg has a citizen-oriented model, North Rhine-Westphalia has a moderate citizen model and the Netherlands has a party-oriented model. We also expected the scores representing party-focussed and citizen-focussed aspects to align with these local democratic institutional models. For example, Baden-Württemberg has a citizen-oriented local democratic institutional model and was expected to score low on party-focussed aspects and high on citizen-focussed aspects in comparison to the other regions. In contrast, the Netherlands has a strong party-oriented local democratic institutional model and was expected to score high on party-focussed aspects and low on citizen-focussed aspects. North Rhine-Westphalia has a moderate citizen-oriented model and was expected to score between the other regions for both types of aspects. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the expected score of each region for both types of aspects.

Table 5.1: Expected score of each region on party-focussed and citizen-focussed aspects

	Local democratic institution	Expected score on party-focussed aspects	Expected concerning score on citizen-focussed aspects
Baden-Württemberg	Citizens-oriented model	Low	High
North Rhine-Westphalia	Moderate citizen-oriented model	Middle	Middle
The Netherlands	Party-oriented model	High	Low

As can be seen in table 5.1, we expected a certain pattern across the region's scores. The table identifies the extent to which the expected pattern is present. Table 5.2 provides an overview of four categories of confirmations, ranging from *no confirmation* to *strong confirmation*. We analysed the aspects to determine the extent to which the pattern across the results confirm our expectations. Drawing on these analyses, this chapter ends with a conclusion about the results.

Table 5.2: Different categories of confirmation for analysing representative role orientation and role behaviour

Strong confirmation	According to our expectations, the regions differ significantly from each other.
Moderate confirmation	According to our expectations, the regions differ from each other. However, only Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands differ significantly from each other.
Weak confirmation	According to our expectations, most of the regions differ from each other. However, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not significant differ from each other. Nevertheless, the Netherlands does differ significantly from the two German regions.
No confirmation	According to our expectations, the regions do not differ from each other.

5.1 Representative role orientation

The representative role orientation of local councillors was analysed based on eight aspects. Four aspects were used to measure party focus, and four different aspects were used to determine citizen focus (see Table 3.4). These aspects were analysed based on three statistical calculations: a) means and standard deviations, b) top box score and c) one-way ANOVA and Tukey post hoc test. The results of these calculations are presented in an error bar graph, which displays a 95% confidence interval (CI). The error bar demonstrates the spread of the values for each region. As indicated in section 3.3.2., each aspect is discussed individually due to poor inter-relatedness. The mean is written next to the dot, and the standard deviation is placed between brackets. A top box analyses is applied to compare the sum percentages of respondents who selected either the highest point on the Likert scale or the two highest points. These percentages are written on top of the CI for each region. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether the differences in means between the three regions are statistically significant. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The results of the one-way ANOVA test are written at the top of the graph underneath the name of the aspect. A Tukey post hoc test was conducted to determine which regions statistically significantly differ from each other.¹⁴ The section starts with a description of the results of the party-focussed aspect, followed by a discussion of the citizen-focussed aspects. The section then concludes with an answer to RQ 2.A.1 concerning the extent to which local councillors focus on either parties or citizens in their representative role orientation.

¹⁴The results of the Tukey post hoc test are presented in Appendix G.

Table 5.3: Aspects of representative role orientation: party focus vs. citizen focus

Party focus	Citizen focus
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementing the programme of my political party/movement. • Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizens participation. • Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government. • The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society. • Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors. • Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions. • Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives.

Figure 5.1 displays the spread of the population of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands for the aspect 'Implementing the program of my political party/movement'. What stands out in the figure is the narrow CI of the Netherlands. This is the result of a small standard error due to a larger sample size compared to the other regions. The number of respondents in the Netherlands is 1,222, while the numbers of respondents in Baden-Württemberg are North Rhine-Westphalia are 117 and 208, respectively. As a result, the CI of the Netherlands is smaller for every aspect we analysed. In line with our theoretical expectations, the mean score of Baden-Württemberg is the lowest and highest for the Netherlands. Of the Dutch respondents, 71.7% perceive the importance of implementing the programme of their political party or movement as *great* or *very great* compared to half of the respondents in Baden-Württemberg. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the differences between the regions are statistically significant ($p < .001$). Additionally, there is a significant difference between each regional pair. However, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia does not overlap with the Netherlands. Overall, these results present a moderate confirmation of our expectations.


**Figure 5.1:** Error bar for the aspect 'Implementing the program of my political party/movement' by region

Figure 5.2 presents the results of the statistical analyses for the second party aspect, namely ‘Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation’. This figure demonstrates that North Rhine-Westphalia has the highest score: 3.01 on a five-point Likert scale. Of this group of respondents, 76% of this group of respondents perceive the importance of this factor as being of *great importance* or *utmost importance*. However, we expected the Netherlands to have the highest score on this aspect. A one-way ANOVA found an overall difference between the regions. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands, as is demonstrated by the overlap in CI. Overall, these findings do not confirm our expectations as the pattern of the results does not align with our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.2: Error bar for the aspect ‘Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation’ by region

Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the aspect ‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government’ scored low in every region. In addition, the differences between regions’ means are small. Nevertheless, the percentage of the top two box scores in the Netherlands is almost twice that of Baden-Württemberg. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, North Rhine-Westphalia has the highest average score. The figure also demonstrates that there is an overlap in CI between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands. A Tukey post hoc test confirmed that there is no significant difference between these two regions (p=.805). Nevertheless, there is an overall significant difference between the three regions. In summary, these results do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.3: Error bar for the aspect 'Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government' by region

Figure 5.4 presents the results of the statistical analyses of the aspect 'The results of local elections should be the most important aspect in determining municipal policies'. The average scores of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are approximately the same. However, 69.3% of the respondents in the Netherlands scored this aspect as being of *great importance* or *utmost importance*, compared to 69.3% in North Rhine-Westphalia. No statistical differences were found between North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands ($p = .989$). Nevertheless, there is an overall significant difference between the regions, as $F(2,1513) = 7.91, p < .001$. The pattern of results across the three regions are more or less in line with our expectations. Together, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have the highest average score. In addition, there is a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands. These findings are a weak confirmation of our expectations.




Figure 5.4: Error bar for the aspect 'The results of local elections should be the most important aspect in determining municipal policies' by region

Figure 5.5 presents the first aspect used to indicate a focus on citizens in representative role orientation: 'Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society'. On average, this is the aspect with the highest score for representative role orientation. Between 84% and 87% of the respondents perceive this aspect as being of *great importance* or *utmost importance*. The average scores of the regions are quite similar to one another. In accordance with our theoretical expectations, the Netherlands has the lowest score. The CI of Baden-Württemberg overlaps with the other two regions, and a Tukey post hoc test confirmed that the differences with the other two regions are not statistically significant. These results do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.5: Error bar for the aspect 'Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society' by region

Figure 5.6 displays the results for the statistical analyses of the aspect 'Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors'. This aspect has the highest standard deviation of all aspects. The pattern of results is the opposite of what we expected: the Netherlands has the highest score and Baden-Württemberg has the lowest. Although the Netherlands has the highest mean, only 40.4% of the respondents selected the two highest point on the Likert scale. This percentage is higher in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia: 58.1% and 59.6%, respectively. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that there is no overall statistical significance between the regions. Overall, these results do not confirm our expectations since the pattern of results is not in line with our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.6: Error bar for the aspect ‘Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors’ by region

Figure 5.7 presents the aspect ‘Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions’. The regions’ average scores are in line with our theoretical expectations. The low average score of the Netherlands compared to the other regions stands out in the figure. There is an overall statistically significant difference between the regions’ means. Additionally, the results of the Tukey post hoc test demonstrate that Baden-Württemberg statistically differs from the Netherlands, but not from North Rhine-Westphalia. Overall, these findings present a weak confirmation of our expectations.




Figure 5.7: Error bar for the aspect 'Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions' by region

Figure 5.8 displays the regions' results for the aspect 'Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives'. The pattern across the results displays an opposite pattern from that which we expected. The results of the top box analyses demonstrate that around 85% of the respondents perceive the importance of these aspects as being of *great importance* or *utmost importance*. A one-way ANOVA revealed no overall significant differences between the regions. Additionally, no significant difference was found between any regional pair. Overall, the results for this aspect do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.8: Error bar for the aspect ‘Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives’ by region

5.1.1 Conclusion: representative role orientation

This section explores whether local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen-democratic focus in their representative role orientation (cf. RQ 2.A.1). Table 5.4 summarises the results for the aspects of representative role orientation and demonstrates the extent to which these results align with our theoretical expectations.

With regard to the aspects indicating a party focus, a significant difference was found between regions’ means on all aspects. This demonstrates that local councillors in each region do have different role orientations concerning these aspects. In line with our theoretical expectations, Baden-Württemberg has the lowest score on all four party focus aspects of representative role orientation. However, North Rhine-Westphalia has the highest score on two aspects and shares the highest score with the Netherlands on one aspect. These findings suggest that local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia are more party-oriented in their representative role orientation than expected.

The findings for the aspects indicating a citizen focus present a weak confirmation, and possibly no confirmation, of our theoretical expectations. The expected pattern of the regions’ results is not present for three of the four aspects. For two of these aspects, we found an opposite pattern in the regions’ results. However, the regions did not significantly differ from each other on these aspects. These results do not support an opposite focus in representative role orientation compared to our theoretical expectations. Nevertheless, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly from each other on any citizen-related aspect. This indicates that the representative role orientations of local councillors for these aspects in these two regions are similar. Overall, the results for the citizen-focussed

aspects of representative role orientation present a weak confirmation, and possibly no confirmation, of our theoretical expectations

In summary, the results of our analyses are somewhat in line with our theoretical expectations. Baden-Württemberg has the lowest score on all party focus aspects, and the Netherlands has the lowest score on all citizen focus aspects. Based on our findings, we can carefully conclude that local councillors in Baden-Württemberg have a citizen-focussed representative role orientation, local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia have a moderate party focus in their representative role orientation, and local councillors in the Netherlands have a party-focussed representative role orientation. However, this conclusion is based on results indicating only a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.

Table 5.4: Confirmation types of representative role orientation (RQ 2.A.2)

		Expected pattern	Sign. difference BW and NL	Sign. difference BW and NRW	Overlapping CI of NRW with BW and NL	Type of confirmation
Party-focussed aspects	Implementing the programme of my political party/movement.					++
	Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation.					-
	Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government.					-
	The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies.					-/+
Citizen-focussed aspects	Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society.					-
	Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors.	Opposite pattern				-
	Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions					-/+
	Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives.	Opposite pattern				-

Strong confirmation= ++, *Moderate confirmation*= +, *weak confirmation*= -/+, *no confirmation*= -.

5.2 Representative role behaviour

Based on the above analysis of the focus of local councillors in their representative role orientations, this section turns to their representative role behaviour. In total, seven items were selected from the MAELG survey. Three of these survey items were used to measure party focus in representative role behaviour. The other four survey items were used as aspects to measure citizen focus in representative role behaviour, see Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Aspects representative role behaviour: party focus vs. citizen focus

Party focus	Citizen focus
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meetings with the party’s council group • Members of my party groups • Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leading actors from voluntary associations • Individual citizens in your role as a councillor • Representing the request and issues emerging from local society • Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society

Figure 5.9 presents the first aspect of representative role behaviour. Respondents were asked to indicate the average hours per month they spend on meetings with their party’s council group. On average, Dutch respondents spend the most hours, and the respondents of Baden-Württemberg spend the least time. This pattern of results is in line with our theoretical expectations. The top box score for this aspect and the aspect ‘Other party meetings and activities’ was computed differently than the other aspects as these aspects were not measured on a Likert scale (see Appendix H for calculations). The top box score of these aspects indicates the percentage of respondents who spend 10 or more hours per month on these activities. The percentage of Dutch local councillors spending 10 or more hours is almost twice as high as that of local councillors indicating the same average hours per month in Baden-Württemberg. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall statistical difference between the regions’ means. Additionally, there is a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands. The CI of North Rhine-Westphalia does not overlap with the CI of the Netherlands. These findings present a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.9: Error bar for the aspect ‘Meeting with the party’s council group’ by region

Figure 5.10 presents the results for the aspect ‘Other party meetings and activities’. Similar to the previous aspect, this aspect was measured based on the average hours per month respondents spend on these activities. The figure demonstrates that respondents in the Netherlands spend the most hours per month on these activities and Baden-Württemberg spend the least hours. This pattern is in line with our theoretical expectations. Based on the results, 41.6% of the Dutch respondents spend more than 10 hours per month on ‘other party meetings and activities’. The percentages are considerably lower in North Rhine-Westphalia (17.8%) and Baden-Württemberg (10.3%). The three regions do significantly differ from each other, as $p < .001$. A Tukey post hoc test revealed a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands. However, no significant difference was found between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. Moreover, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia does not overlap with the CI of the Netherlands. These findings present a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.10: Error bar for the aspect ‘Other party meetings and activities’ by region

Figure 5.11 presents the results for the aspect ‘Members of my party groups’. This aspect was measured on a four-point Likert scale. Again, the Netherlands’ scores are considerably higher than Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. Respondents who stated they have contact with members of their party groups *a few times a week* are marked as a top box score. In all regions, between 92.3% and 98.7% of the respondents indicated that they have contact with members of their party group *a few times a week*. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall statistical difference between the regions. Furthermore, Baden-Württemberg statistical differs from the Netherlands. However, there is no significant difference between the German regions. Additionally, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia does not overlap with the CI of the Netherlands. These findings are a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.11: Error bar for the aspect ‘Members of my party groups’ by region

Figure 5.12 presents the data for the aspect ‘Implementing the programme of my political party/movement’. This aspect was measured on a five-point Likert scale. The formulation of this question is somewhat ambiguous. Respondents were asked to define their contribution with regard to implementing the programme of their party or movement. Respondents could have interpreted this survey question in two ways. On the one hand, respondents could have interpreted it as their contribution or effort exerted to implement the programme. On the other hand, respondents could have interpreted this question as exploring the extent to which the programme is implemented successfully. There are two more ambiguous questions items that are discussed later in this text. The pattern of the regions’ results aligns with our theoretical expectations. As can be seen in the figure, approximately half of the Dutch respondents described their contribution to implementing the programme of their political party or movement as *great* or *very great*. The results of a one-way ANOVA analysis revealed an overall significant difference between the regions. Moreover, Baden-Württemberg significant differs from the Netherlands and North Rhine-Westphalia. Additionally, there is an overlap in the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Overall, these findings are a strong confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.12: Error bar for the aspect 'Implementing the programme of my political party/movement' by region

Figure 5.13 presents the first aspect indicating a citizen focus in representative role behaviour: 'leading actors form voluntary associations'. The average score of the regions indicates that respondents almost never have contact with leading actors from voluntary associations. From the group of Dutch respondents, 27.1% stated that they have contact with leaders of voluntary associations *a few times a week*. Similar percentages were found in North Rhine-Westphalia (24.5%) and Baden-Württemberg (23.1%). The pattern across the regions' scores is not in line with our theoretical expectations, since we expected Baden-Württemberg to have the highest score on citizen-focussed aspects. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant difference between the regions. Nevertheless, no significant difference was found between any regional pair. Overall, the results for this aspect do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.13: Error bar for the aspect ‘Leading actors from voluntary associations’ by region

Figure 5.14 presents the aspect ‘Organisations of ethnic minorities’. The low average score in every region stands out in this figure. The results indicate that respondents almost never have contact with organisations of ethnic minorities. The percentage of respondents in the Netherlands who say they have contact with organisations of ethnic minorities *a few times a week* is 5.2%. This percentage is lower in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg: 1.9% and 3.4%, respectively. The pattern across the regions’ score does not align with our theoretical expectations, as the Netherlands has the highest score, not Baden-Württemberg. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant difference between the regions. The two German regions do not significantly differ. Overall, these findings do not confirm our expectation because the regions’ results reveal an opposite pattern.



Figure 5.14: Error bar for the aspect 'Organisations of ethnic minorities' by region

Figure 5.15 demonstrates how frequently respondents have contact with individual citizens in their roles as local councillors. This figure demonstrates that the Netherlands' average score is considerably higher than the scores of North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg. On average, the Dutch respondents stated that they have contact with individual citizens a few times a year to a few times per month. Of the Dutch respondents, 90.8% specified having contact with organisations of ethnic minorities a few times a week. There is an overall significant difference, but Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly from each other. In contrast, the Netherlands clearly differs significantly from the two German regions, as is reflected in the IC and confirmed by the Tukey post hoc test. Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations, as we found an opposite pattern.




Figure 5.15: Error bar for the aspect ‘Individual citizens in your role as a councillor’ by region

Figure 5.16 displays the results for the aspect ‘Representing the request and issues emerging from local society’. This aspect is one of the three ambiguous survey questions mentioned earlier. This ambiguity may be a reason for the wide spread of the results around the middle of the five-point Likert scale. The results of the top two box analyses showcase that around 50% to 55% of the respondents define their contribution to this aspect as *great* to *very great*. The Netherlands has the lowest average score, but the differences between the Netherlands and the two German regions are not significant. There is no overall significant difference between the regions based on the one-way ANOVA ($F(2,1517) = 0.96, p = .382$). Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.16: Error bar for the aspect 'Representing the request and issues emerging from local society' by region

Figure 5.17 presents the results for the aspect 'Promoting the views and interests of minorities in local society'. This aspect was the last ambiguous survey question. The results are widespread and similar to the previous aspect. On average, respondents define their contributions regarding promoting the views and interests of minorities in local society as *little*. The top two box scores demonstrate that around a quarter of the respondents define their contribution to this aspect as *great* or *very great*. The pattern of regional results is in line with our theoretical expectations. However, no overall significance was found between the regions, nor between regional pairs. Therefore, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 5.17: Error bar for the aspect 'Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society' by region

5.2.1 Conclusion: representative role behaviour

This section aims to answer research question 2.A.2: To what extent do local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen focus in their representative role behaviour? Table 5.6 summarises the results of the aspects of representative role behaviour and presents the extent to which these results align with our theoretical expectations.

The pattern of the results on all party-focussed aspects align with our theoretical expectations. Baden-Württemberg has the lowest score on these aspects, the Netherlands has the highest score, and North Rhine-Westphalia scores between the two other regions. Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands statistically differ on every party-focussed aspect. The results of the party-focussed aspects are between a weak and strong confirmation of our theoretical expectations.

The results for the citizen-focussed aspects do not confirm our theoretical expectations. Contrary to our expectations, the Netherlands has the highest score for three citizen-focussed aspects. Moreover, Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands differ significantly on these aspects. For the aspect that demonstrated the expected pattern in the regions' results, the differences between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands were not significant. A possible explanation for this lack of significance might be the ambiguous formulation of this survey questions. Another important finding was that Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly for any aspect indicating a citizen focus. Overall, these results indicate that the Netherlands is more citizen-oriented in its representative role behaviour than expected and that there are no significant differences between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia.

In summary, the local councillors Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly from each other in their representative role behaviour. The regions' results of the party focus aspects do support our theoretical expectations. Based on these findings, we conclude that local councillors in Baden-Württemberg have a citizen-focussed representative role behaviour, local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia have a moderate party focus in their representative role behaviour, and the local councillors in the Netherlands display party-focussed representative role behaviour. However, the regions' results on the citizen-focussed aspects contradict our theoretical expectations. Overall, the results for party-related representative role behaviour are in line with our theoretical expectations, but the results for the citizen-related behaviour are not.

Table 5.6: Confirmation types of representative role behaviour (RQ 2.A.2)

		Expected pattern	Sign. difference BW and NL	Sign. difference BW and NRW	Overlapping CI of NRW with BW and NL	Type of confirmation
Party-focussed aspects	Meetings with the party's council group					-/+
	Other party meetings and activities					-/+
	Members of my party groups					-/+
	Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement					++
Citizen-focussed aspects	Leading actors from voluntary associations	Opposite pattern				-
	Organisations of ethnic minorities	Opposite pattern				-
	Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	Opposite pattern				-
	Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society					-
	Promoting the views and interests of minorities in local society					-

Strong confirmation= ++, *Moderate confirmation*= +, *weak confirmation*= -/+, *no confirmation*= -.

5.3 Conclusion and discussion: representative role

This chapter has aimed to analyse the orientation and behaviour of the representative role of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. This analysis has centred around the following research question: *To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the representative role orientation and representative role behaviour of local councillors? (RQ2).*

With the use of the MAELG dataset, we were able to explore whether the focus of local councillors' representative role orientation and role behaviour is on their party or on citizens. We analysed the extent

to which their focus aligned with expected patterns of results for the three regions. This analysis is outlined in in Table 5.18.




Figure 5.18: Overview of how the research (sub-)questions concerning the representative role are interrelated

With regard to representative role orientation, the results are more or less in line with our expectations. The results of our analysis indicate that local councillors in Baden-Württemberg have a citizen-focussed representative role orientation, local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia have a moderate party focus in their representative role orientation, and local councillors in the Netherlands have a party-focussed representative role orientation. A high score on party aspects indicates a party-political model of representation, while a high score on citizen aspects suggests a democratic watchdog model of representation, see section 2.4.

Research question 2.B.1 concerns the impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role orientation of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. As stated in section 2.1, formal institutions and collective norms were expected to influence the role orientation of role bearers. Accordingly, we also expected local democratic institutions to influence, to some extent, the representative role orientation of local councillors. The results of our analyses point to a significant difference in the representative role orientations of local councillors between the three

regions. These results present weak evidence for a conclusion that local democratic institutions in the three regions have an impact on the representative role orientation. Local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg are strongly citizens-oriented, and local councillors have citizen-focussed representative role orientations. North Rhine-Westphalia's local democratic institutions are moderately citizen-oriented, and local councillors in this region have a moderate party focus. Local democratic institutions in the Netherlands have been characterised as strongly party-oriented, and the representative role orientation of Dutch local councillors have a party focus. Based on these results, we can confirm hypothesis 1: *Local democratic institutions influence the representative role orientation of local councillors directly*. Table 5.7 summarises RQ 2.B.1, including the hypothesis and conclusion.

Table 5.7: Summary RQ 2.B.1 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion

Research question 2.B.1:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on representative role orientation?

Hypothesis 1:

Local democratic institutions directly influence the representative role orientation of local councillors.

Conclusion:

Based on our analyses, local democratic institutions have a weak impact on the representative role orientation of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. We can confirm the theoretical expectations formulated in hypothesis 1.

With regard to representative role behaviour, the outcomes of this study are contradictory. The results of all party-focussed aspects align with our theoretical expectations. In contrast, none of the results of the citizen-focussed aspects support our theoretical expectations. An opposite pattern compared to our theoretical expectations was observed for these aspects. Research question 2.B.2 concerns the impact of local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands on representative role behaviour. Formal institutions and collective norms were expected to influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors as they set institutional constraints on their role behaviour and embody role expectations which influence role behaviour. The results of the party-focussed aspects indicate that the representative role behaviour of local councillors aligns with the models of local democracy in their regions. Therefore, the hypothesis seems to be right for party-related representative behaviour. However, the results of the citizen-focussed aspects contradict with our theoretical expectations. Therefore, we partially confirm hypothesis 2: *Local democratic institutions influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors directly*.

The third hypothesis concerns the indirect impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role behaviour of local councillors. Figure 5.19 shows a visual representation of relationships between constructs and the third hypothesis. According to role theory, the behaviour of a role bearer is, to a large extent, determined by their orientations. Therefore, local democratic institutions (and collective norms) were expected to have an indirect impact on the role behaviour of local councillors through

their role orientations. We have rejected hypothesis 2, and therefore, an indirect effect of institutions on role behaviour is not possible. However, we did observe a possible indirect effect of local democratic institutions on the representative role behaviour concerning party-focussed aspects, not citizen-focussed aspects. Hence, hypothesis 3 could be right for the party-related representative behaviours: *Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors*. Table 5.8 summarises RQ 2.B.2 with corresponding the hypothesis and conclusion.




Figure 5.19: Visual representation of relationships between constructs and the hypothesis concerning the representative role of local councillors

Table 5.8: Summary RQ 2.B.2 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion

Research question 2.B.2:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a direct and/or indirect impact on representative role behaviour?

> DIRECT IMPACT

Hypothesis 2:

Local democratic institutions directly influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors.

Conclusion:

The outcome of our analyses display contradictory results concerning the focus of representative role behaviour. The results of the party-focussed aspects indicate that the representative role behaviour of local councillors align with the models of local democracy in their regions, but the results of the citizen-focussed aspects contradict with our theoretical expectations. Accordingly, we partially confirm the theoretical expectations set forth in hypothesis 2.

> INDIRECT IMPACT


Hypothesis 3:

Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the representative role behaviour of local councillors.

Conclusion:

Given the results related to hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3 could be right for the party-related representative behaviour. Therefore, we have to partially confirm the theoretical expectations described in hypothesis 3.

In summary, the findings of this chapter are somewhat in line with our theoretical expectations concerning the impact of institutions on role orientation, but they are not aligned with regard to the impact on citizen-related role behaviour. Based on the results of our analyses, this section argues that local democratic institutions, to some extent, influence the representative role orientation of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Regarding representative role behaviour, findings indicate that institutions have a weak impact on party-related role behaviour, but not on citizen-related behaviour. In addition, local democratic institutions might indirectly influence party-related representative behaviour through role orientation.



Chapter 6

The role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation

After analysing the representative role of local councillors, we now turn our attention to their role regarding citizen participation. This chapter analyses the impact of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role orientation and role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. To this end, research question 3 was formulated: *To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation and representative role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation?*

This chapter begins with an analysis of the role orientation (cf. RQ 3.A.1) and role behaviour (cf. RQ 3.A.2) of local councillors in relation to citizen participation. These two concepts are operationalised in section 3.4.4 based on several theories. To answer the research questions, we collected primary data through a survey distributed among local councillors in 12 municipalities, four municipalities in each region. In this survey, a distinction was made between a party focus or a citizen focus in the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. These aspects were systematically analysed in order to determine the extent to which they align with our expectations of role orientation and role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. As described in Chapter 2, we expected local democratic institutions to have an impact on the role orientation (cf. hypothesis 4) and role behaviour (cf. hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6) of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. Based on the findings of Chapter 4, we were able to conclude that Baden-Württemberg has a citizen-oriented institutional model, North Rhine-Westphalia has a moderate citizen model, and the Netherlands has a party-oriented model. Accordingly, we expected the score on party-focused and citizen-focussed aspects to align with local democratic institutional models. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the expected scores for aspects indicating a party focus and aspects indicating a citizen focus. This is the same expected pattern as was discussed in Chapter 5 for the analysis of the representative role of local councillors. Additionally, the same criteria were used to analyse the extent to which the outcomes align with the expected pattern of results (see Table 5.2 Chapter 5).

Table 6.1: Expected score of each region on party-focussed and citizen-focussed aspects

	Local democratic institution	Expected score on aspects with party focus/content focus	Expected score on aspects with a citizen focus/process focus
Baden-Württemberg	Citizens-oriented model	Low	High
North Rhine-Westphalia	Moderate citizen-oriented model	Middle	Middle
The Netherlands	Party-oriented model	High	Low

This chapter is divided into three parts. Section 6.1 analyses the focus of local councillors' role orientation on citizen participation. Then, section 6.2 discusses the focus of local councillors' role behaviour on citizen participation. The last section of this chapter analyses the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour towards citizen participation.

6.1 Role orientation with regard to citizen participation

The first question of the survey concerns the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of four aspects of their role according to their opinions. Two of these aspects have a party focus, namely ‘Realising party programme’ and ‘Acting in unity with the party’. When local councillors have a party-focussed role orientation, they are likely to focus on the content of their role. They are inclined to use their party programme as a starting point for translation into policy frames. The other two aspects have a citizen focus, namely ‘Contact with citizens and local organisations’ and ‘Ensure channels of participation’. Local councillors with a citizen-focussed role orientation are inclined to be more responsive to citizens views and downplay their own substantive judgments. They tend to focus more on processes that give citizens more room to decide on the content which enables an environment of citizen participation.

A principal component analysis and the Cronbach’s Alpha were used in order to determine whether the two aspects of each focus could be combined into one scale. As can be seen in Appendix I, the role orientation of local councillors *vis-à-vis* citizen participation does not fall into the same two dimensions. Furthermore, the test for the internal reliability resulted in a Cronbach’s alpha $\alpha > 0.05$. With this result, we are unable to construct a scale for each dimension. Accordingly, the four aspects of the role orientation regarding citizen participation are discussed individually. In addition, we decided to individually analyse the aspects of role behaviour related to citizen participation in the next section.

An overview of the results connected to the first survey question is presented in Appendix J. The results are presented on a five-point Likert scale ranged from one (*no or little importance*) to five (*very important*). This Appendix presents the average score of every municipality individually and for the region as a whole. However, the analysis was conducted regionally and not municipally due to a low number of respondents. The four aspects were individually analysed based on the same statistical calculations those as used in Chapter 5. Each aspect is presented in an error bar graph, which displays a 95% CI. The results of the Tukey post hoc test can be found in Appendix K.

Figure 6.1 displays the results for the first party-focussed aspect, ‘Realising party programme’. On average, the respondents in Baden-Württemberg perceive this aspect as rather important, while the Dutch respondents perceive this aspect as important. The top box score indicates the percentage of respondents who perceive this aspect as important or very important. Of the Dutch respondents, 75.3% think that realising their party programme is (very) important. The pattern of results in the regional scores aligns with our expectation for an aspect measuring a party-focussed role orientation. An overall significant difference was found between the three groups. Further analyses with a Tukey post hoc test found that only Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands statistically differ from each other. As can be seen from the figure, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia overlaps with the other two regions. Taken together, these findings are a moderate confirmation of our expectations.




Figure 6.1: Error bar for the aspect 'Realising party programme' by region

The second aspect measuring party-focussed role orientation with regard to citizen participation is 'Acting in unity with the party' (see Figure 6.2). What stands out is the high score of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, which perceive this aspect as (very) important. The Netherlands has the lowest score, with an average score of 3.67. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant difference between the three regions. A post hoc Tukey test demonstrated that the Netherlands significantly differ from the German regions. However, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly from each other. Overall, the high score of the German regions and the low score of the Netherlands is the opposite of what we expected. These findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations, as described in Table 6.1.




Figure 6.2: Error bar for the aspect ‘Acting in unity with the party’ by region

Figure 6.3 displays the aspect ‘Contact with citizens and local organisations’, the first aspect measuring a citizen focus in role orientation related to citizen participation. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, Netherlands has the highest score, and Baden-Württemberg has the lowest. Of the Dutch respondents, 78.1% perceive this aspect as (very) important. In contrast, less than half of the respondents in the German regions described this aspect as (very) important. There is an overall significant difference between all groups. However, the two German regions do not differ significantly with each other. In summary, these findings do not support our expectations as an opposite pattern was found.




Figure 6.3: Error bar for the aspect 'Contact with citizens and local organisations' by region

The last aspect of role orientation related to citizen participation is 'Ensure channels of participation', see Figure 6.4. What stands out in the figure is the overlap between the CIs for every region. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that there is no overall significant difference between the regions. Moreover, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that none of the differences between the groups are statistically significant. This is the only aspect of role orientation where there was no overall significant difference found. Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.4: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure channels of participation’ by region

6.1.1 Conclusion: role orientation with regard to citizen participation

Research question 3.A.1 explores the extent to which local councillors in the selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party- or citizen- focus in their role orientation with regard to citizen participation. The results of our analyses are summarised in Table 6.2. This table illustrates the extent to which the pattern of the regions’ results aligns with our theoretical expectations.

As can be seen in the table, the results of most aspects do not confirm our theoretical expectations. Only for the aspect ‘Realising party programme’ did the focus of local councillors’ role orientation with regard to citizen participation align with our theoretical expectations. For two of the aspects, the results of the regions reflected a pattern that was opposite to our theoretical expectations. These findings indicate that Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are less citizen-oriented than expected. Additionally, the findings suggest that the Netherlands is less party-oriented than expected. However, the results of our analyses do not suggest a clear focus in role orientation on either parties or citizens for any region. In summary, these results do not confirm our theoretical expectations regarding the focus of local councillors in their role orientation as it relates to citizen participation.

Table 6.2: Confirmation types of role orientation with regard to citizen participation (RQ 3.A.1)

		Expected pattern	Sign. difference BW and NL	Sign. difference BW and NRW	Overlapping CI of NRW with BW and NL	Type of confirmation
Party focus aspects	Realising party programme					+
	Acting in unity with the party	Opposite pattern				-
Citizen focus aspects	Contact with citizens and local organisations	Opposite pattern				-
	Ensure channels of participation					-

Strong confirmation= ++, moderate confirmation= +, weak confirmation= -/+, no confirmation= -.

6.2 Role behaviour with regard to citizen participation

After discussing the role orientation of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands with regard to citizen participation, we turn our attention to their role behaviour. As explained in section 2.5, there are two facets of role behaviour related to citizen participation: setting frameworks and scrutinising. The focus of these facets is either on the content or on the process. As discussed earlier, a **focus on content** indicates a party focus in role behaviour. In contrast, a focus on the process indicates a citizen-focussed role behaviour. As explained in our theoretical framework, we expected the three regions to differ in focus when setting frameworks and scrutinising. Baden-Württemberg was expected to focus on the process (i.e. citizen focus), and the Netherlands was expected to focus on the content (i.e. party focus). We expected North Rhine-Westphalia to have a position between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands. In this section, we first analyse the focus of local councillors when setting frameworks and then analyse their focus when scrutinising citizen participation processes.

6.2.1 Facet 1: Setting frameworks

Local councillors can use their mandate to steer upfront by providing directions for municipal operations. They can define objectives, set goals and express priorities. This first facet of role behaviour is called **setting frameworks**. Local councillors can also use their mandate to check frameworks and the executive branch afterwards. They can scrutinise the executive decisions made by the council. Furthermore, they can also impose instruments to review policy or monitor performance. This second facet of role behaviour is called **scrutinising**. With regard to citizen participation, the local council can establish objectives and provide directions (i.e. setting frameworks). The local council can then review the participation process to examine whether these objectives were met (i.e. scrutinising).

Setting content-based frameworks (party focus)

This section starts with an analysis of the first facet of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation: setting frameworks. Local councillors can focus on the content or process when setting frameworks for citizen participation processes. When they focus on content, local councillors use their mandate to

steer in advance on the content. These local councillors are inclined to use their party programme as a starting point for translation into policy frames. In this case, local councillors’ party-political views and their substantive judgements guide their establishment content-based frameworks. Setting content-based frameworks for citizen participation points to a party focus in role behaviour.

One of our survey questions revolves around setting content-based frameworks (party focus). Respondents were asked to specify how often their local council has established frameworks concerning citizen participation processes with a focus on content. We expected the Netherlands to have the highest score and Baden-Württemberg to have the lowest score. There were five options for responses to this question (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Answer options for survey question 3 concerning the establishment of content frameworks

The local council did not establish content frameworks	The local council did establish content frameworks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The local council did not establish content frameworks, and the local council/commission did not consider this (Likert scale = 0). • The local council did not establish content frameworks, but the local council/commission did consider it (Likert scale = 1). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The local council did establish a few content frameworks (Likert scale = 2). • The local council established content frameworks in most cases (Likert scale = 3). • The local council (almost) always established content frameworks (Likert scale = 4).

The results of this survey question are presented in an error bar displaying the 95% confidence interval of the variable ‘Frequency of setting content frameworks’, see figure 6.5. The results are presented on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 to 4. The top box score highlights the percentage of respondents who indicated that their local council did establish content frameworks. As can be seen in the figure, 81.4% of the Dutch respondents indicated that their local council did establish content frameworks. This percentage is somewhat lower in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia: 64.6% and 62.9%, respectively.¹⁵ As expected, the Netherlands had the highest percentage of respondents indicating that the local council did establish content frameworks regarding citizen participation. However, the results of a one-way ANOVA reveal that these differences are not statistically significant, as there is no overall significant difference between Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Additionally, a Tukey post hoc test found that there is no significant difference between any of the regions.¹⁶ Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations since the results are not significant.

¹⁵ The detailed results for the question are presented in Appendix L, Table 1.

¹⁶ See Appendix L, Table 2.




Figure 6.5: Error bar for 'Frequency of setting content frameworks' by region

The respondents who indicated that their local council did establish content frameworks for citizen participation were directed to a follow-up question. These respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which party politics has played a role when setting content frameworks for citizen participation. Since this aspect is related to setting content-based frameworks, we expected the Netherlands to have the highest average score and Baden-Württemberg to have the lowest average score.

Figure 6.6 presents the error bar with a 95% CI for the aspect 'Party politics'. On average, the regions' scores are low on this aspect, which suggests that this aspect plays a minimal role in the process of setting content frameworks. A score of two indicates a *modest role* and a score of three indicates an *important role*. The top box scores demonstrate that almost none of the respondents indicated that these aspects play a *very important role*. The pattern of results is in line with our theoretical expectations. Moreover, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia overlaps with the other regions. A one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant difference between the three regions. The outcome of Tukey's post hoc test demonstrates that only Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands differ significantly from each other.¹⁷ Overall, these results present a moderate confirmation of our theoretical expectations.

¹⁷ See Appendix L, Table 3.




Figure 6.6: Error bar for the aspect 'Party politics' by region

Setting process-based frameworks (citizen focus)

In addition to focussing on the content, local councillors also concentrate on the process when setting frameworks for citizen participation. When local councillors **focus on the process**, they are inclined to be more responsive to citizens' views and downplay their own substantive judgments. In this case, local councillors' party-political or personal policy preferences are minimised. As a result, citizens gain room to make decisions about content. The tendency to set process-based frameworks for citizen participation points to a citizen focus in role behaviour.

One of our survey questions addresses the setting process-based frameworks (citizen focus). Respondents were asked to specify how often the local council establishes process-based frameworks. This question had five possible answers (see Table 6.4). According to our theoretical framework, a high percentage of respondents indicated that the local council does establish process frameworks, suggesting a citizen-focussed in role behaviour. We thus expected Baden-Württemberg to have the highest percentage and the Netherlands to have the lowest.

Table 6.4: Answer options for survey question about establishing process frameworks

The local council does not establish process frameworks	The local council does establish process frameworks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The local council does not establish process frameworks, and the local council/commission does not consider this (Likert scale = 0) The local council does not establish process frameworks, but the local council/commission does consider this (Likert scale = 1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The local council has established a few process frameworks (Likert scale = 2) The local council has established process frameworks the majority of times (Likert scale=3) The local council (almost) always established process frameworks (Likert scale = 4)

Figure 6.7 presents the results for the variable ‘Frequency of setting process frameworks’. These results were measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from zero to four. The results clearly demonstrate that setting process frameworks is a common practice in all regions. Contrary to our expectations, the Netherlands has the highest score, and North Rhine-Westphalia has the lowest. The top box scores represent the percentage of respondents who indicated that their local council does establish content frameworks.¹⁸ As can be seen in the figure, 45% of the respondents in North Rhine-Westphalia stated that their local council does establish process frameworks. This percentage is somewhat higher in Baden-Württemberg (77.4%) and the Netherlands (81.4%). A one-way ANOVA revealed, however, that there is no overall significant difference between the regions for this variable. Moreover, no significant differences were found between any regions, as confirmed by the Tukey post hoc test.¹⁹ Overall, these results do not follow the expected pattern, and the differences between the regions are not significant. Therefore, these results do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.7: Error bar for ‘Frequency of setting process frameworks’ by region

The respondents who stated that their local council has established process-based frameworks were directed to a follow-up question. This question zooms in on three specific aspects of setting process-based frameworks. These aspects are as follows: ‘Ensure channels of participation’; ‘Ensure that everyone can participate’; and ‘Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process’. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which these aspects play a role in the process of setting process frameworks for citizen participation. Each aspect is presented in an Error bar graph displaying a 95% CI. The results of the Tukey post hoc test can be found in Appendix M, Table 3. We expected Baden-Württemberg to have the highest score and the Netherlands to have the lowest score.

¹⁸ An overview of the percentages of respondents per answer option can be found in Appendix M, Table 1.

¹⁹ See Appendix M, Table 2.

The first aspect of setting process frameworks for citizen participation is to ‘Ensure channels of participation’ (see Figure 6.8). All regions have more or less an average score of three on a four-point Likert scale. This demonstrates that ‘Ensuring channels of participation’ plays an important role when councillors set process-based frameworks for citizen participation. The top box score represents the percentage of respondents who indicated that this aspect plays a very important role. Although North Rhine-Westphalia has the highest average score, it also has the lowest top box score. The pattern of results is more in less in line with our theoretical expectations. The German regions have the highest score, and the Netherlands has the lowest score. We did not find an overall significant difference between the regions. Moreover, none of the differences between the regions are significant. Therefore, the results for this aspect do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.8: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure channels of participation’ by region

The results of the second aspect, ‘Ensure that everyone can participate’, are presented in Figure 6.9. Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia have a high average score for this aspect, namely 3.5 on a four-point Likert scale. Of the respondents in Baden-Württemberg, 58.3% stated that ‘Ensuring that everyone can participate’ plays a very important role in setting process frameworks for citizen participation. In contrast, 21% of the Dutch respondents indicated that this aspect plays a very important role. The pattern of the regions’ results align with our theoretical expectations. A one-way ANOVA revealed overall significant differences between the regions. The CIs of the two German regions almost completely overlap, and a Tukey post hoc test confirms that they do not differ significantly. However, the Netherlands does differ significantly from both Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. Therefore, these findings present a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.9: Error bar for the aspect 'Ensure that everyone can participate' by region

Figure 6.10 presents the results for the last aspect, 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process'. The results for this aspect are similar to the previous aspect. For this aspect, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia have high average scores. Respectively, 41.7% and 46.7% of the respondents in these regions stated that this aspect plays a very important role. The Netherlands has the lowest average score: 2.74 on a four-point Likert scale. The CIs of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia completely overlap, and a Tukey post hoc test confirmed that there is no significant difference. The Netherlands does differ significantly from the German regions. In addition, a one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant difference. Overall, these findings are a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.10: Error bar for the aspect 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process' by region

6.2.2 Facet 2: Scrutinising

After analysing the focus of the local council when setting frameworks, this section concentrates on the process of scrutinising citizen participation. First, we needed to understand whether the selected local councils of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands scrutinise citizen participation processes or not. Respondents were asked to identify how often the local council scrutinises citizen participation processes. This explorative question was asked in order to filter out the respondents whose local council does not scrutinise citizen participation processes. The results are presented in Table 6.5. The differences between the three regions are small. A large majority of the respondents indicated that their local council does at least occasionally scrutinise citizen participation processes: 90.3% in Baden-Württemberg, 85.1% in North Rhine-Westphalia and 98.3% in the Netherlands. However, almost 40% of the respondents stated that their local council does not play an active role in most cases. Around half of the respondents specified that their local council (almost always) plays an active role. Therefore, scrutinising citizen participation processes does not seem to be a common practice in the selected municipalities.

Table 6.5: Percentage of respondents indicating a specific behaviour of the local council with regard to scrutinising citizen participation processes

	The local council does not scrutinise citizen participation processes	The local council does scrutinise citizen participation processes		
		The local council never plays an active role	The local council does not play an active role in most cases	The local council plays an active role in most cases
Baden-Württemberg N=31	9.7%	35.5%	41.9%	12.9%
North Rhine-Westphalia N=27	14.8%	37.0%	29.6%	18.5%
The Netherlands N=73	1.7%	39.0%	50.8%	8.5%

Then, we aimed to understand whether these local councils scrutinise citizen participation based on a consideration of content, process or both. When a local council scrutinises citizen participation based on content or financial considerations, they typically review the outcomes of the process. If a local council only scrutinises based on the content related to the citizen participation process, this indicates a party focus, according to our theoretical framework. In contrast, when a local council scrutinises citizen participation based on the process, they typically review whether the procedure and process are following proper conduct. If a local council only scrutinises citizen participation based on the process, this points to a citizen focus, according to our theoretical framework. We expected that the local councils in the Netherlands scrutinise citizen participation mostly on the basis of content. The local councils in Baden-Württemberg were expected to scrutinise citizen participation mostly based on process. The local councils of North Rhine-Westphalia were expected to scrutinised citizen participation on the basis of content and process considerations.

Table 6.6 presents whether the respondents indicated that their local council scrutinises citizen participation processes based on content, process or both. Contrary to our expectations, the majority of respondents of each region indicated that their local council scrutinises citizen participation based on content and financial consideration as well as process considerations. We expected the Netherlands to have the highest percentage of respondents indicating that the local council scrutinises citizen participation based on content considerations compared to the other regions. However, the results revealed an opposite pattern. We also expected that local councils in Baden-Württemberg mainly scrutinise citizen participation based on process considerations. However, 46.4% of the respondents in this region indicated that their local council scrutinises citizen participation based on content and financial aspects, in addition to process considerations. Lastly, we expected the majority of respondents of respondents in North Rhine-Westphalia to indicate that their council scrutinises citizen participation on the basis of content and process consideration. However, only 43.5% of the respondents indicated that this was the case.

Overall, these results are not in line with our theoretical expectations. The remaining part of this section focuses on the different aspects of scrutinising citizen participation processes based on content and process considerations.

Table 6.6: Percentage of respondents indicating the focus of the local council when scrutinising citizen participation processes

	The local council only scrutinised on the basis of content/financial considerations	The local council only scrutinised on the basis of process considerations	The local council scrutinise on the basis of content/financial aspects and process considerations
Baden-Württemberg N=28	25.0%	28.6%	46.4%
North Rhine-Westphalia N=23	34.8%	21.7%	43.5%
The Netherlands N=58	17.2%	29.3%	53.4%

Scrutinising on the basis of content considerations (citizen focus)

The respondents who indicated that their local council scrutinises citizen participation based on content consideration were directed to a follow-up question. This question concerns the extent to which the aspect ‘Party politics’ plays a role in the process of scrutinising based on content and financial considerations. We expected the Netherlands to have the highest score on this aspect and Baden-Württemberg to have the lowest score.

Figure 6.11 presents the error bar, with a 95% CI for the aspect ‘Party politics’. This figure demonstrates that ‘Party politics’ play a moderate role in the three regions, especially in Baden-Württemberg. In line with our expectations, the Netherlands has the highest average score, and Baden-Württemberg has the lowest. None of the respondents in Baden-Württemberg indicated that party politics plays a very important role in the process of scrutinising citizen participation with a focus on the content. A one-way ANOVA pointed to an overall significant difference between the three regions. However, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that only Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands differ significantly from each other.²⁰ As can be seen in the figure, the CI of North Rhine-Westphalia overlaps with that of other regions. Overall, these findings present a moderate confirmation of our expectations.

²⁰ See Appendix N, Table 1.




Figure 6.11: Error bar for the aspect 'Party politics' by region

Scrutinising on the basis of process considerations (party focus)

After analysing the behaviour of the local council with regards to scrutinising on the basis of content considerations, we now turn to our focus to scrutinising based on process considerations. The respondents who indicated that their local council scrutinise citizen participation processes based on process considerations were directed to a follow-up question. This question asked respondents to indicate the extent to which three aspects play a role in the process of scrutinising based on process considerations. These aspects are as follows: 'Ensure channels of participation'; 'Ensure that everyone can participate'; and 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process'. Each aspect is presented in an error bar graph, which displays a 95% CI. The results of the Tukey post hoc test can be found in Appendix N, Table 2. We expected Baden-Württemberg to have the highest average score on every aspect and the Netherlands to have the lowest score.

Figure 6.12 presents the first aspect, 'Ensure channels of participation'. Baden-Württemberg has the highest average score (3.05), and the Netherlands has the lowest average score (2.65). Of the respondents in Baden-Württemberg, 23.8% indicated that this aspect plays a very important role when scrutinising citizen participation based on process considerations. In the Netherlands, 8.1% of the respondents stated that this aspect plays a very important role. North Rhine-Westphalia average scores and top box score fall in between the other regions. This pattern of results across the three regions aligns with our theoretical expectations. However, no overall significant difference was found between the regions. In addition, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the differences between pairs of regions were also not significant. Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations.




Figure 6.12: Error bar for the aspect 'Ensure channels of participation' by region

Figure 6.13 presents the results for the aspect 'Ensure that everyone can participate'. Of all three aspects, the regions indicated that this aspect plays the least important role in the process of scrutinising citizen participation based on process considerations. The top box scores also demonstrate that only a few respondents stated that this aspect plays a very important role. In conformity with our expectations, Baden-Württemberg has the highest score, and the Netherlands has the lowest. However, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the differences between the regions are not significant. Moreover, there is also no significant difference between pairs of regions. Overall, these findings do not confirm our theoretical expectations, since the differences between Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are not significant.




Figure 6.13: Error bar for the aspect 'Ensure that everyone can participate' by region

Figure 6.14 presents the last aspect, namely 'Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process'. North Rhine-Westphalia has the highest average score, and almost half of its respondents indicated that this aspect plays a very important role. In contrast, only 9.7% of the Dutch respondents stated that this aspect plays a very important role in the process of scrutinising citizen participation based on process considerations. The confidence intervals of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia completely overlap, and a Tukey post hoc test confirmed that these regions do not differ significantly. There is a significant difference between the Netherlands and each German region. Additionally, a one-way ANOVA test revealed an overall significant difference. Overall, these findings present a weak confirmation of our theoretical expectations since the pattern of results aligns with our expectations, and there is a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and the Netherlands.




Figure 6.14: Error bar for the aspect ‘Ensure that all participants understand the outcomes of the process’ by region

6.2.3 Conclusion: role behaviour with regard to citizen participation

This section has explored the extent to which local councillors in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a party or citizen-democratic focus in their role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. The analyses focused on two facets of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation: setting frameworks and scrutinising. With the use of a survey, we analysed whether councillors’ focus is either on the content (i.e. party focus) or on the process (i.e. citizen focus). Table 6.7 summarises the results of our analyses and presents the results’ alignment with our theoretical expectations.

First, we have discussed the outcomes revolving around role behaviour with regard to citizen participation when setting frameworks. Respondents indicated that the majority of times, the local council does establish content and process frameworks for citizen participation processes. Our results demonstrate that the frequency with which councillors set content and process frameworks is similar in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. In Baden-Württemberg, setting process frameworks is more common than setting content frameworks in line with our theoretical expectations. However, we expected the frequency of setting content frameworks to be higher than the rate of setting process frameworks in the Netherlands. These findings indicate that local councils in the Netherlands are more citizen-oriented in their role behaviour than expected. However, the differences between the regions are not significant for the questions addressing the frequency of setting content frameworks and the frequency of setting process frameworks.

Second, we have analysed the role behaviour of local councillors when scrutinising citizen participation processes. A large majority of respondents stated that their local council does (at least occasionally) scrutinise citizen participation processes. We expected that local councils in Baden-Württemberg mainly scrutinise citizen participation based on process considerations, that the Netherlands does so based on content considerations, and that North Rhine-Westphalia scrutinises based on both types of considerations. However, the results do not align with our theoretical expectations. In all regions, the majority of the respondents indicated that their local council scrutinises citizen participation processes based on content and process considerations.

Third, we analysed the party-focussed aspects and citizen-focussed aspects of setting frameworks and scrutinising citizen participation processes. The results of the aspect 'Party politics' for setting frameworks and scrutinising citizen participation moderately confirm of our theoretical expectations. These findings indicate that party politics play an important role in the Dutch local councils in the processes of setting frameworks and scrutinising citizen participation processes. In contrast, party politics play a modest role in the local councils of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. The results of our analyses for the citizen-related aspects are less confirmative of our theoretical expectations. The findings present a weak confirmation or perhaps do not support our theoretical expectations. Although the pattern of the regions' result for these aspects align with our expectations, the differences between the regions were not always found to be significant. The importance of the aspects 'Party politics' and 'Ensure channels of participation' was similar for both processes of setting frameworks and scrutinising citizen participation processes. However, the two other aspects play a more important role in the process of setting frameworks for citizen participation than scrutinising. It is notable that Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia do not differ significantly for any aspects. This finding suggests that the role behaviour of local councillors regarding citizen participation is similar in the two German regions.

In summary, the findings of our analyses demonstrate that the role behaviour related to citizen participation differs between local councils in the Netherlands and in the two German regions. Based on the results for the party- and citizen-focussed aspects, we can conclude that Dutch local councillors have party-focussed role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. Local councillors in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia more strongly focus on citizens in their behaviour related to citizen participation processes.

Table 6.7: Confirmation types of role behaviour with regard to citizen participation (RQ 3.A.2)

		Expected pattern	Sign. difference BW and NL	Sign. difference BW and NRW	Overlapping CI of NRW with BW and NL	Type of confirmation
<i>Setting frameworks</i>						
Party focus	Frequency of setting content frameworks					-
	Party politics					+
Citizen focus	Frequency of setting process frameworks					-
	Ensure channels of participation					-
	Ensure that everyone can participate					-/+
	Ensure that everyone participated in the process understands the outcomes					-/+
<i>Scrutinising</i>						
Party focus	Party politics					+
Citizen focus	Ensure channels of participation					-
	Ensure that everyone can participate					-
	Ensure that everyone participated in the process understands the outcomes					-/+

Strong confirmation= ++, *moderate confirmation*= +, *weak confirmation*= -/+, *no confirmation*= -.

6.3 Conclusion: the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation

The aim of this chapter has been to analyse the role orientation and behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. Accordingly, the following research question was developed: To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine- Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation and role behaviour local councillors with regard to citizen participation? (RQ3) Using the survey data of 131 local councillors in 12 municipalities, we analysed the extent to which the focus in the role orientation and role behaviour of the three regions align with our expected patterns. Section 6.1 has analysed the focus of local councillors’ role orientation with regard to citizen participation processes (RQ 3.A.1), and section 6.2 has analysed the focus of local councillors’ role behaviour when setting frameworks and scrutinising citizen participation processes (RQ 3.A.2). This last section has analysed the impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation and role behaviour local councillors with regard to citizen participation (causal research question 3.B.1 and 3.B.2). Figure 6.15 illustrates how these research questions are interrelated




Figure 6.15: Overview of how the (sub-)questions concerning the role with regard to citizen participation are interrelated

The results for our analysis concerning the focus of role orientations with regard to citizen participation do not confirm our theoretical expectations. Accordingly, we did not observe a direct impact of local democratic institutions on the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation (cf. RQ 3.B.1). We thus have to reject hypothesis 4: *Local democratic institutions directly influence the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation*. Table 6.8 provides a summary of RQ 3.B.1, including the hypothesis and conclusion.

Table 6.8: Summary RQ 3.B.1 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion

Research question 3.B.1:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation of councillors with regard to citizen participation?

Hypothesis 4:

Local democratic institutions directly influence the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

Conclusion:

The results do not confirm our theoretical expectations, nor do they indicate whether respondents in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands exhibit a focus on party or citizens in their role orientation with regard to citizen participation. Therefore, we have to reject the theoretical expectations as described in hypothesis 4.

Our analyses concerning role behaviour as it pertains to citizen participation have focused on two facets: setting frameworks and scrutinising. Local councillors' focus within these categories is either on the process (i.e. citizen focus) or on the content (i.e. party focus). We have observed the direct impact of local democratic institutions on role behaviour (cf. RQ 3.B.2). Local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg are citizen-oriented, and this region also has the lowest score for party-focussed aspects of role behaviour. In contrast, the Netherlands' local democratic institutions are strongly party-oriented, and this region has the highest score for party aspects of role behaviour. Based on these results, we can confirm hypothesis 5: *Local democratic institutions directly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.*

The established relationship between institutions and behaviour could be the result of either or both a direct effect and an indirect effect. Hypothesis 6 concerns the possible indirect impact of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. Figure 6.16 presents a visual representation of relationships between constructs and hypothesis concerning the role with regard to citizen participation. As explained earlier, the role behaviour of a role bearer is determined to a large extent by their role orientation. Therefore, local democratic institutions (and collective norms) were expected to have an indirect impact on the role behaviour of local councillors through their role orientations. This indirect effect can only exist if local democratic institutions have a direct effect on local councillors' orientations (hypothesis 4), and this direct effect was not found. Therefore, we conclude that the relationship described in hypothesis 5 is due to direct effects. There is no indirect effect through role orientation. Based on these findings, we have to reject hypothesis 6: *Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.* Table 6.9 provides a summary of RQ 3.B.2 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion.




Figure 6.16: Visual representation of relationships between constructs and hypothesis concerning the role with regard to citizen participation

Table 6.9: Summary RQ 3.B.2 with corresponding hypothesis and conclusion

Research question 3.B.2:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have a direct and/or indirect impact on the role behaviour of councillors with regard to citizen participation?

> DIRECT IMPACT

Hypothesis 5:

Local democratic institutions directly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

Conclusion:

We observed a direct impact of local democratic institutions on role behaviour. Local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg are citizen-oriented, and this region also has the lowest score on the party-focussed aspects of role behaviour. In contrast, the Netherlands' local democratic institutions are strongly party-oriented, and this region has the highest score on party-focussed aspects of role behaviour. In summary, the findings of the analyses are in line with the expected as formulated in hypothesis 5.

> INDIRECT IMPACT


Hypothesis 6:

Local democratic institutions indirectly influence the role behaviour of local councillors with regard to citizen participation.

Conclusion:

Given the combined results found for hypotheses 4 and 6, we conclude that the relationship found for hypothesis 5 is completely due to a direct effect and that there is no indirect effect through role orientations. We thus reject the theoretical expectation as formulated in hypothesis 6.

In summary, we cannot conclude that local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands impact the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation. However, the results of our analyses do demonstrate that these local democratic institutions have, to some extent, a direct impact on the role behaviour of local councillors with regard citizen participation. Given the combined results found for hypotheses 4 and 6, we did not observe an indirect effect of local democratic institutions on role behaviour through role orientations.



Chapter 7

Conclusion and discussion

Through a regional comparison, this thesis has examined the extent to which local democratic institutions (i.e. party or citizen-oriented) in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands influence the focus (whether on parties or citizens) of the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. Our research has focussed on the representative role of local councillors and, more specifically, their role with regard to citizen participation. This final chapter summarises our research findings and answers the main research question. These outcomes are discussed in section 7.2. Section 7.3 contextualises the outcomes of this thesis based on existing literature. Section 7.4 elaborates on the limitations of this study and introduces suggestions for future research. This chapter ends by highlighting the practical implications of our findings.

7.1 Answer to main research question

In Chapter 1, we formulated a number of sub-research-questions in order to answer our main research question:

To what extent do local democratic institutions in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors?

First, we were interested in exploring whether the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are party-oriented or citizen-oriented (RQ1). These local democratic institutions were categorised based on two models of democracy developed by Vetter (see section 2.3). The analyses in Chapter 4 demonstrated that Baden-Württemberg has a strong local citizen democracy, North Rhine-Westphalia has a moderate local citizen democracy, and the Netherlands has a strong local party democracy.

Second, we wanted to understand whether the representative role orientation (RQ 2.A.1) and behaviour (RQ 2.A.2) of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands focus on parties or citizens. In line with our expectations, local councillors in Baden-Württemberg exhibit a focus on citizens in their role orientation, local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia exhibit a moderate party focus, and local councillors in the Netherlands exhibit a party focus. The results concerning representative role behaviour align with our theoretical expectations for party-related behaviour, but not for citizen-related behaviour. In addition, we analysed the extent to which the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on the representative role orientation (RQ 2.B.1) and representative role behaviour (RQ 2.B.2) of local councillors. Our results demonstrate that local democratic institutions do influence, to some extent, the representative role orientation of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Based on these results, we weakly confirm hypothesis 1. We did observe a direct impact of local democratic institutions on party-related representative role behaviour, but not on citizen-related behaviour. Therefore, we had to partially confirm hypothesis 2. In combination with the results

of hypothesis 2, we also had to partially confirm hypothesis 3 concerning the indirect effect of local democratic institutions on representative role behaviour through role orientation.

This study also aimed to analyse whether local councillors' role orientation (RQ 3.A.1) and role behaviour (RQ 3.A.2) with regard to citizen participation focusses on parties or citizens. Our findings do not suggest a clear focus on either parties or citizens in their role orientation. The results on the focus of their role behaviour with regard to citizen participation are somewhat in line with our theoretical expectations. Local councillors in the selected municipalities in Baden-Württemberg are the most citizen-focussed, and local councillors in the Netherlands are more party-focussed. Furthermore, we analysed the extent to which the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands have an impact on role orientation (RQ 3.B.1) and role behaviour (RQ 3.B.2) with regard to citizen participation. Our findings do not point to any impact of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role orientation with regard citizen participation. Therefore, we rejected hypothesis 4. In contrast, we did observe a weak direct impact of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. Accordingly, our findings support hypothesis 5 to some extent. In combination with the results found for hypothesis 4, we were able to conclude that the relationship found for hypothesis 5 is completely due to a direct effect. Therefore, we rejected hypothesis 6, which proposed the possible indirect effect of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role behaviour with regard to citizen participation.

We expected that if regional democratic institutions are focussed on parties, then the focus of local councillors' role orientation and role behaviour would also be directed to parties. In contrast, when local democratic institutions are focussed on citizens, we expected there to be a focus on citizens in the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors. Additionally, we expected that the focus of local councillors' representative role and their role with regard citizen participation to be the same, in line with the focus of the regional local democratic context. However, the results of the analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provide weak to no support of our theoretical expectations concerning the impact of local democratic institutions. Particularly the results on the party-focussed aspects, and less on citizen-focused aspects, weakly support our theoretical expectations. Local councillors in the Netherlands tend to be more party-focused in their role orientation and role behaviour than their colleagues in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. However, local councillors' focus in their role orientation and role behaviour in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands are not as distinct as we expected. We found that the focus of local councillors in these regions are more alike for both roles than expected.

7.2 Discussion of the results

7.2.1 Theoretical explanation of the results

Regarding the representative role, we found that local democratic institutions weakly influence the role orientation of local councillors. Local democratic institutions establish rules that seem to have a subsequent impact on the role orientation of local councillors. This is likely to be the result of collective norms that

are partly translated into the local democratic institutions, which consequently influence local councillors' role orientation. In addition, we found a direct impact of local democratic institutions on party-related representative behaviour, but not on citizen-related representative behaviour. This is an interesting result from a behavioural perspective, since this thesis has argued that the institutional effect on role behaviour runs via institutional constraints and role expectations embedded in local democratic institutions. The strong effect of local democratic institutions on party-related representative role behaviour might be explained by a strong institutionalisation of party-related behaviour in a representative democracy with a party-orientation. Here, parties are the institutional arrangements which set constraints and enforce peer pressures to operate according to the party line, whereas behaving in a more responsive manner towards citizens is less supported by an institutional infrastructure. Following role theory, we expected local councillors to act according to their own role conceptions, since role orientations are an intrinsic motivation to adopt a certain role behaviour. Given the results regarding representative role behaviour, we only found a possible indirect effect through role orientation of local democratic institutions on party-related representative behaviours.

In terms of their role regarding citizen participation, we found that institutions influence the role behaviour but not the role orientation of local councillors. Local councillors' role orientations are not in line with the local democratic model. Their role behaviour is therefore not the result of intrinsic motivation from their role orientation (i.e. indirect effect). Accordingly, their role behaviour is the result of external factors, such as role expectations and/or institutional constraints (i.e. direct effect). First, local councillors' role behaviour regarding citizen participation might be the result of role expectations. Role expectations are reflected in collective norms, which are partly translated in the local democratic institutions. Local councillors might want to comply with what is believed to be appropriate role behaviour by citizens or administrators, due to a number of factors (see section 2.1.2). These role expectations might also be part of collective norms which are not formalised in local democratic institutions. Second, local councillors' role behaviour regarding citizen participation might be the result of behaviour constraints set by local democratic institutions. Local democratic institutions not only establish formal rules but also determine the existence of certain facilities, financial compensation, and education programmes for local councillors.

7.2.2 Difference between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia

Contrary to our theoretical expectations, we did not observe a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia for the large majority of aspects in our analyses. The two German regions were only found to differ significantly for the analyses concerning the party-focussed aspects of representative role orientation and their role orientation with regard to citizen participation. We found that local councillors in North Rhine-Westphalia attach more importance to implementing the party programme, party politics and the party as a main link between citizens and local government than their colleagues in Baden-Württemberg. These local councillors attach the same importance to aspects concerning representing issues emerging from society, ensuring channels of participation and contact with citizens.

There are two possible explanations for why we did not identify a significant difference between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. First, the local democratic institutions of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are relatively similar based on the indicators used to categorise them (see section 4.2). The regions only differ with regard to their electoral system, which may or may not allow for cumulation and ticket splitting. The similarities between the local democratic institutions are greater than their differences. This might explain the small differences in impact of these local democratic institutions on the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation. Future researchers could use a different model than the model developed by Vetter to categorise local democracies because two of the three indicators are present in every German state. Additionally, the indicators used are all related to vote-centric participation, as explained in section 4.1.1. This form of participation is defined by legal frameworks, which makes it easier to compare countries and regions. However, other forms of (deliberative) participation also create opportunities for party or citizen influence. Furthermore, the indicators of Vetter's model do not include differences in the extent to which direct democratic instruments are citizen-friendly and how often they are used. For example, the referendum ranking report of the German organisation *Mehr demokratie* (2016) use more extensive indicators to differentiate between states. In this report, the differences in local democratic legislation between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are described in more detail.

Another explanation could be the minimal differences in collective norms between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. As argued in section 2.1.3, collective norms influence the role orientation of the role bearer, shape the role expectations of a role sender and set constraints on the role behaviour of the role bearer. Similar collective norms might be the result of the same dominant parties in the state parliament. The Christian Democratic Union party is part of the coalition of the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. However, the Greens are the largest party in Baden-Württemberg, while the Christian Democratic Union is dominant in North Rhine-Westphalia. Similar collective norms might also be explained by the fact that Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are two federal states within the same country. Collective norms could also exist nationally, representing a collective awareness of preferred and appropriate behaviour for local councillors. In summary, comparable local democratic institutions and shared collective norms might explain why we attained similar outcomes for Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia with regard to the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors.

7.2.3 Possible opposite effect of citizen democratic reforms

We expected that the local councillors' focus in role orientation and role behaviour would be in line with the local democratic institutional model. On the contrary, we found that the Dutch local councillors spend significantly more time on citizen-focussed activities relating to their representative role than local councillors in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. A close examination of the effects of citizens democratic reforms in Germany on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other hand might explain this unexpected finding.

A wide variety of formal citizen participation instruments have been implemented in Germany. These instruments range from giving citizens direct decision-making power through referendums to non-binding deliberative forms of participation. The existence of a variety of (deliberative) citizen participation channels in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia might reduce the need for citizens to have contact with local councillors. This situation in which citizens bypass local councillors and bargain with civil servants and the executive has been mentioned in literature (e.g. Edwards, 2017). However, we should not forget that the success of these non-binding deliberative instruments largely depends on the attitudes and behaviour of local councillors (Kersting, 2016b). In contrast, the Dutch system has a long tradition of cooperative relations and consultations, so-called the ‘polder model’. In this model, it is important that all relevant parties in society join the conversation. This might explain why local councillors spend more time engaging with leading actors of voluntary associations, organisations of ethnic minorities, and individual citizens. However, this type of involvement of citizens and organisations in the decision-making process is often not formalised. Although they are involved in the process, citizens do not have formal rights at the expense of party influence. Overall, the existence of a variety of participatory forms of democracy in Germany might reduce the need of citizens to have direct contact with local councillors. This might explain why local councillors in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia spend less time on citizen-focused activities related to their representative role than their counterparts in the Netherlands.

7.2.4 Stronger executive leadership at the expense of party influence

The democratic reforms implemented in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia moved away from the idea that representative democracy is party-oriented democracy. Here, political parties have lost influence, such as the power to appoint the mayor. However, less party-oriented democracy does not automatically mean more citizen-oriented democracy. It might lead to stronger personal executive leadership by elected mayors. This thesis focuses on institutional varieties concerning party influence versus citizen influence, using a model developed by Vetter (2009). However, there are different typologies to distinguish different types of local democracies which also consider the influence of the executive branch.

Mouritzen and Svava (2002) have offered a typology that focuses on institutionally determined power relations between the council, the mayor, and the administrative executive. This typology not only considers citizens’ influence at the expense of parties, but also takes into account the influence of the mayor vis-à-vis the local council. Heinelt (2013) used this typology to test whether the understanding of democracy by local councillors is affected by the institutional structures in which they have to act. According to the typology of Mouritzen and Svava, German local democratic institutions are characterised by a *strong executive mayor model* in which the mayor is formally the head of the municipal administration and is fully in charge of it. The direct election of the mayor decreased the power of the local council and reduced party influences. By contrast, the Netherlands is categorised as having a *collective form* of local government system. Mayors in the Netherlands can be characterised as collegial leaders. Accordingly, the institutional setting requires collegiality with other powerful actors and bodies.

Strengthening the political executive in local governments has an impact on the relation between the executive branch and the local council (Denters, 2006). The introduction of a directly elected mayor tilted the balance of power between the mayor and the local council, with the former gaining political leverage over the latter. Therefore, a directly elected mayor not only gives citizens more direct influence at the expense of parties, but also strengthens his or her position at the expense of the local council. Strengthening the influence of citizens and the political executive has the tendency to bypass political parties and local councillors (Bäck et al., 2006).

Local councillors need to reconsider their role due to new forms of citizen participation and the possible strengthening of the executive leadership. In particular, these changes ‘hollow out’ the representative function of parties in the local council. According to Denters (2006), the local council must be capable of voicing the demands and opinions of citizens in a public debate (i.e. external role) and of exerting its influence in its relationship with the executive branch to make the local government responsive to the local community (i.e. internal role). Therefore, the position of the local council vis-à-vis steering and scrutinising the executive needs to be strengthened. Regarding citizen participation, the local council needs to set and scrutinise content and process frameworks. Given the increased power position of the mayor, the local council also needs to position itself so that it can steer and scrutinise the executive branch.

7.3 Findings in the context of existing literature

This section discusses our findings in the context of existing literature. There are relatively few studies on the impact of local democratic institutions and the role of local councillors. A lack of empirical data might explain this research gap. It is only recently, since the MAELG survey took place, that a rich source of data regarding the role of local councillors across countries became available.

The book ‘Local councillors in Europe’ by Egner, Sweeting and Klok (2013) presents the results of the MAELG project. Klok and Bas Denters (2013) studied general role perceptions and role behaviour at the country level. The authors focussed on the differences in institutional rules concerning the positions of local councillors in relation to other relevant actors. Their comparative research found that the scores for local councillors in Germany and the Netherlands were generally close to the European mean for role perception and role behaviour. Therefore, these two countries were deemed particularly interesting for further research. We expected to find differences in the role orientation and role behaviour between German states due to differences in their local democratic institutions. Appendix O presents the scores for our selected MAELG questions of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia as well as the German average concerning the representative role orientation and role behaviour. These results demonstrate that Baden-Württemberg scores below the German average for all aspects measuring representative role orientation and that North Rhine-Westphalia scores above the average. The results for the aspects measuring role behaviour do not exhibit a similar pattern in results. Nevertheless, the previous section has pointed out that the differences found between Baden-Württemberg and North

Rhine-Westphalia were often not significant. Our research casts doubt on the hypothesis that the role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors differ significantly within Germany.

A second group of studies which made use of the MAELG data set is addressed in the book 'The Changing Context of Local Democracy. Role Perception and Behaviour of Municipal Councillors' (Heinelt, 2013a). In this book, Heinelt (2013b) argues that councillors' role perceptions and role behaviour depend on their notion of democracy as an expression of their basic beliefs about appropriate behaviour and their subjective norms. As mentioned previously, Heinelt uses the typology developed by Mouritzen and Svava (2002), which divide local government systems into four categories instead of the categorisation used by Vetter (2009). Heinelt also tested whether local councillors' understanding of democracy is affected by their personal characteristics. A specific local democratic institutional setting may attract local councillors with a specific role orientation. Heinelt found that age, political orientation and gender have an impact on local councillors' notion of democracy. In our survey, we included questions about socio-demographics and political characteristics. However, we only used these results to determine whether the respondents more or less formed a representative sample. These observations of Heinelt suggest that it may be interesting to analyse the impact of personal characteristics on local councillors' representative role and their role with regard to citizen participation. Particular options offered to local councillors by local democratic institutions may attract certain persons with a specific understanding of democracy to become a local councillor.

Two similarities in outcomes were found between research conducted by Denters and Klok (2013) and the results of our analyses. Denters and Klok previously analysed whether and how cross-national variations in local democratic institutions affect the responsiveness of local councillors in their role orientation and role behaviour. Their research found a weak relation between citizen-focussed democratic institutions and role orientations revolving around responsiveness. Our research also observed a weak impact of local democratic institutions on the representative role orientation of local councillors. In both studies, the impact of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role orientation was found to be minor. Second, Denters and Klok found that the stronger citizen-oriented democratic institutions in local government are, the less councillors tend to maintain contacts with citizens and local groups. We also concluded that Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia have (moderate) citizen-oriented local democratic institutions, but the frequency of contact with citizens was found to be low compared to the Netherlands. In the previous section, we argued that the existence of (deliberative) citizen participation may reduce the need for citizens to have direct contact with local councillors. In contrast, the Dutch polder model may increase the need for local councillors to consult citizens. Therefore, our findings point to a need for further research on the effects of different democratic institutions on local councillors' need to have contact with citizens. An alternative explanation could be tested through citizen surveys in different local democratic settings. The focus of such research would be on the relation between local councillors and citizens from the citizens' perspective.

In summary, the analyses in this thesis have provided deeper insights into the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation. Furthermore, this study contributes to our

understanding of the impact of local democratic institutions on the two roles of local councillors in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. Additionally, this study contributes to existing literature by applying the principles of role theory to the role of local councillors. This thesis draws on the theoretical frameworks and methods of other academic studies (Vetter, 2009; Denters, 2012). It contributes to the existing body of knowledge by focussing on regional differences and specific aspects of the role of local councillors. To date, research related to this topic has only analysed local democratic institutions at the national level and the general role of local councillors (Klok & Denters, 2013; Heinelt, 2013; Denters & Klok, 2013). Our research has explored regional differences and discussed the various roles of local councillors. Overall, this thesis has strong links with existing literature and addresses gaps in public knowledge.

7.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research

There are inherent limitations in the methods and scope of this study. First, the small sample size increases the risk of a Type I or Type II error. In our analyses for research question 2, the sample size of Baden-Württemberg (N = 117) and North Rhine-Westphalia (N = 208) were considerably lower than the Netherlands (N = 1.222). If the sample size of the German regions would have been larger, we might have found more significant differences between these regions. In our analyses for research question 3, the sample size of Baden-Württemberg (N = 31), North Rhine-Westphalia (N = 27) and the Netherlands (N = 73) were all small.

Second, we were limited to using data collected through the MAELG project and the questions formulated in this survey. These questions do not exactly suit Denters' theoretical model concerning the representative role of local councillors (2012). Nevertheless, the selected questions do seem sufficient to justify the use of this theoretical model. In addition, the MAELG survey was carried out in 2007 and 2008 which makes the dataset somewhat outdated.

Third, it would have been interesting to include the selected MAELG questions in our own survey. This would have allowed us to compare the representative role of local councillors with their role in relation to citizen participation at the individual level. However, for practical reasons, these questions were not included. The data of the municipality of Dordrecht was drawn from a survey conducted during my internship. If we would have included the MAELG questions, we would have not been able to use this data. Therefore, the selected MAELG questions were not included in the questionnaire conducted to answer research question 3.

Fourth, the aspects used to analyse local councillors' role orientation with regard to citizen participation did not fall apart into two dimensions: a party focus and a citizen focus. Additionally, the inter-item correlation of these two dimensions was quite low. Future research on the role of local councillors with regard to citizen participation should address this methodological issue. We recommend that future researchers formulate aspects which clearly entail a party-focussed or citizen-focussed role orientation with regard to citizen participation.

Fifth, we linked the possible indirect effect of local democratic institutions on role behaviour to the existence of a direct effect of local democratic institutions on role orientation. However, according to role theory, local democratic institutions could have an indirect effect on role behaviour through individual role orientation. To accurately measure an indirect effect, one would need to analyse the impact of individual role orientation on individual role behaviour. Due to the design of this study's survey, we were not able to statistically measure the indirect effect of local democratic institutions on local councillors' role behaviour. Future research could explore the existence of an indirect effect through a statistical analysis conducted on the individual level.

Lastly, this thesis comprises a comparative case study of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands. It would be interesting to expand the scope of this study to explore the impact of local democratic institutions on the role of local councillors in more regions and different countries. Furthermore, a more detailed comparative study between German states is needed to confirm our conclusion that the differences in role orientation and role behaviour of local councillors between Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia are indeed small.

7.5 Practical implications

Several practical implications and recommendations can be made based on the outcomes of this thesis. Our comparison of different institutional settings has provided insights into how the division of influence between parties and citizens impacts the role of local councillors. In this way, this study has contributed to the discussion about the relationship between the represented and their representatives. This study is of particular value for policy makers in Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and the Netherlands who are interested in understanding the attitudes and behaviour of their local councillors. This section starts by introducing the practical implications and recommendation for all three regions and ends with a discussion of the implications for the Dutch national programme, as discussed in the introduction.

First, the results could encourage policy makers to review the local democratic setting. As discussed in section 7.2.1, local councillors might experience behavioural constraints set by local democratic institutions. Based on role theory and our theoretical framework, there are two possible explanations: a) lack of facilities or personal resources or b) constraints by formal institutions. For a strong local democracy, it is crucial that councillors have the support to perform their role. An evaluation of institutional regulations might be needed in order to remove existing constraints.

Moreover, through this study, we have urged local councillors to evaluate their own role orientation and role behaviour. Based on this study, local councillors could ask themselves the following questions: What do you consider important aspects of your representative role? How important is it for you to realise your party's manifesto and act in unity with your party? How important is it for you to provide channels for citizens to participate in local politics and to protect their input? To what extent is the time you spend on specific activities aligned with the importance you assign to these activities? This study could cause

local councillors to make conclusions about their division of time. Additionally, local councillors should take a closer look at the specific aspects of the representative role, such as their role with regard to citizen participation.

Additionally, we recommend that local councillors start a dialogue about the role of the local council with regard to citizen participation. It is important that the role of the local council be well defined if they wish to encourage (new forms of) citizen participation. The question that remains is how participatory processes should be linked to formal decision-making systems. The institutional embedding of citizen participation requires special attention, since local councillors are responsible for the democratic anchorage. Local councils should avoid situations in which citizens join participation processes with high expectations, but are disappointed and frustrated due to confusion about their role in comparison to the role of the local government. This type of case would counteract efforts to tackle the legitimacy problems of local governments through an increase in citizen participation. Therefore, the local council, the executive branch and citizens would benefit from a strategic framework concerning citizen participation processes in local decision-making systems. This framework should describe the role of the local council and the executive branch as well as the role of citizens. Research conducted by the organisation ProDemos (2018) has found that around half of local Dutch councillors have formally adopted such a framework.

We have observed that the process of completing our survey offered Dutch local councillors the opportunity to discuss their role with each other. The local councillors in three Dutch municipalities were given the chance to complete the survey on paper. We observed discussions among local councillors surrounding the concepts addressed in the survey. In the survey, we distinguish between the following terminologies: a) party focus and citizen focus; b) a focus on content and focus on process; and c) setting frameworks and scrutinising these frameworks. These concepts might help local councils develop a more structured dialogue about their roles with regard to citizen participation. Furthermore, local councillors could leverage this research to organise further dialogue about their role with regard to citizen participation and the need to build a strategic framework or re-evaluate an existing one.

7.5.1 The national programme in the context of our findings

The national programme launched by the Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations aims to establish powerful local councils and to increase citizen participation. Therefore, local councillors need to focus more on citizens as elected representatives. The Minister leaves structural reforms to the autonomous decision of the municipalities and their elected local councils. The strategy of the Minister seems to focus on: a) making its role expectations known, and b) increasing the perceived ability of local councillors to behave in line with the key objectives of the programme.

First, these actions seemed to be directed towards changing the role orientation of local councillors by explicitly stating role expectations. The national programme gives a clear indication of how the Minister would like local councillors to behave. The programme expresses expectations for the behaviour of local councillors. Local councillors may comply with these role expectations if they consider the Minister a relevant role sender, see section 2.1.2. Local councillors may even incorporate the role expectations of the

minister into their own role orientation. Second, these proposed actions seem to be directed towards local councillors' perceived ability to translate their role orientation into role behaviour. As explained in section 2.1.2, role bearers could experience personal constraints – as a result of institutional constraints – that affect their ability to behave according to their orientation. These personal limitations could be physical, related to personal characteristics, or due to a lack of knowledge and skills. The proposed actions provide local councillors with the additional knowledge and skills needed to become more citizen-focused in their role behaviour.

The future success of the national programme depends on the extent to which local councillors correctly perceive and incorporate the ambitions of the Minister into their own role orientation. Accordingly, this role orientation needs to be translated into corresponding role behaviour. The strategy of the Minister is aligned with the principles of role theory and the theoretical frameworks described in section 2.1. In this section, we explained how role expectations and institutional constraints might influence both role behaviour and role orientation. Therefore, explicitly stating role expectations and removing institutional constraints could potentially influence the behaviour of local councillors. However, according to role theory, the role behaviour of local councillors is influenced primarily by their role orientation. Therefore, what stands in the way of a strong, citizen-oriented local democracy is, first and foremost, the way local councillors perceive their role.

Time will tell whether the proposed actions by the Minister are sufficient to establish a more citizen-oriented local representative democracy. If not, the Minister could explore the possibility of adjusting local democratic institutions and seek inspiration in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. The results of our research have demonstrated that local democratic institutions do have a weak impact on the representative role orientation of local councillors and on their role behaviour with regard to citizen participation. At present, the Dutch national programme relies on bottom-up initiatives in the light of high constitutional thresholds preventing nationwide institutional reform. Germany has made top-down changes to local democratic institutions, but also has a variety of informal and non-binding citizen participation instruments, which might be even more important. Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that local democratic institutional reforms are not sufficient to change the representative role of local councillors and their role with regard to citizen participation.

References

- Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50(2), 179-211.
- Ajzen, I., Fishbein, M. (1980). *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour*. Prentice-Hall.
- Babbie, E. (2012). *The Practice of Social Research* (13th Ed). Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Bäck, H., Magnier, A., Heinelt, H. (2006). *The European Mayor. Political leaders in the changing context of local democracy*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Banner, G. (1991). *Von der Behörde zum Dienstleistungsunternehmen. Die Kommunen brauchen ein neues Steuerungsmodell*. Verwaltung, Organisation, Personal (VOP), 6–11.
- Biddle, B. J. (1979). *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors*. Academic Press.
- Biddle, B. J. (1986). Recent development in role theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 12, 67–92.
- Bogumil, J. (2002). Party Competition, Constraints to Negotiate and Economisation – Changes in Municipal Decision-Making: the Example of North Rhine-Westphalia. *German Journal of Urban Studies*, 41(2), 109-126.
- Bottom, K. A., Reiser, M. (2014). Still want to party? An assessment of party-politicization in directly-elected mayoral authorities in England and Germany's North Rhine Westphalia. *Public Money & Management*, 34(5): 339-346.
- Boogers, M., Reussing, R. (2018). *Decentralisatie, schaalvergroting en lokale democratie: samenvattend onderzoek naar gevolgen voor rollen en posities van lokale bestuurders en naar gevolgen voor bestuurskracht en democratie*. University of Twente.
- Burke, E. (1999). Speech at Mr. Burke's Arrival in Bristol. In I. Kramnick (Eds.), *The Portable Edmund Burke* (pp. 155-157). Penguin Books.
- Burke, M. A., Young, P. H. (2011). Social norms. In J. Benhabib., A. Bisin., M. O. Jackson (Eds.), *Handbook of social economics* (pp. 311–338). North-Holland.
- Cain, B.E., Dalton, R.J., Scarrow, S.E. (2006). *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford University Press.
- Chan, D. (2009). So why ask me? Are self-report data really that bad? In C. E. Lance & R. J. Vandenberg (Eds.), *Statistical and methodological myths and urban legends* (pp. 309–336). Routledge.
- Chang, L., Krosnick, J. A. (2010). Comparing oral interviewing with self-administered computerized questionnaires: An experiment. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 74, 154–167.
- Commissie Toekomstgericht lokaal bestuur. (2016). *Op weg naar meervoudige democratie*. The Association of Netherlands Municipalities. https://vng.nl/sites/default/files/2016_van_den_donk_op-weg-naar_20160603.pdf
- Delwit, P. (2011). Still in Decline? Party Membership in Europe. In E. Van Haute (Eds.), *Party Membership in Europe. Exploration into the Anthills of Party Politics* (pp. 25-42). Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Denters, S. A. H. (2006). Duo of Duel? The Relations between Mayors and Councils in Democratic Local Government. In H. Bäck, H. Heinelt, & A. Magnier (Eds.), *The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (pp. 271-285). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

- Denters, S. A. H. (2012). A dirty job that needs to be done! De rol van het raadslid in de ogen van Nederlandse burgers. *Bestuurswetenschappen*, 66(3), 14-34.
- Denters, S. A. H. (2013). *What people think about municipal councillors as citizens' representatives*. Paper for 7th ECPR General Conference Bordeaux (4-7 September 2013) Section 12: Contemporary Challenges to Local Self-Government and Democracy Panel 241: Pillar or Piece of Local Democracy? Contemporary Developments in the Role of the Councillor. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/cc63bf83-87f0-4baf-a1c1-cfb11e1dfc14.pdf>
- Denters, S. A. H., Rose, L. E. (2005). *Comparing Local Governance. Trends and Developments*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Denters, S. A. H., Klok, P.-J. (2005). The Netherlands in search of responsiveness. In S. A. H. Denters & L. E. Rose (Eds.), *Comparing Local Governance, trends and developments* (pp. 65-82). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Denters, S. A. H., De Groot, M., Klok P.-J. (2008). Een wezenlijke vertegenwoordiging der burgerij. Over de rollen van de gemeenteraad na de dualisering van het gemeentebestuur. *In Congresuitgave Staat van de Dualisering* (pp. 59-73). Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.
- Denters, S. A. H., Klok, P.-J. (2013). Citizen Democracy and the Responsiveness of Councillors: The Effects of Democratic Institutionalisation on the Role Orientation and Role Behaviour of Councillors. *Local Government Studies*, 39(5), 661-680.
- Denters, S. A. H., van Heffen, O., Huisman, J., & Klok, P. J. (2003). *The rise of interactive governance and quasi markets*. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Denters, S. A. H., Klok, P.-J., Kranenburg, A. (2017). Greep op het ongrijpbare! Handreiking nieuwe vormen van controle en verantwoording in een samenwerkend lokaal bestuur. *Bestuurswetenschappen*, 71(4), 25-44.
- Dillman, A. D. (1978). *Mail and telephone surveys, the total design method*. Wiley.
- Dillman, A. D. (2000). *Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method*. Wiley.
- Dobler, C. (2011). *The Impact of Formal and Informal Institutions on Economic Growth: A Case Study on the MENA Region*. Hohenheimer volkswirtschaftliche Schriften, 65. Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Dryzek, J., Niemeyer, S. (2008). Discursive Representation. *American Political Science Review*, 102(4), 481-493.
- Edelenbos, J. (2005) Institutional implications of interactive governance: Insights from Dutch practice. *Governance*, 18(1), 111-134
- Edelenbos, J., Klok, P. J., Van Tatenhove, J. (2009). The institutional embedding of interactive policy making: insights from a comparative research based on eight interactive projects in the Netherlands. *The American review of public administration*, 39(2), 125-148.
- Edwards, A. (2012). Tensions and New Connections between Participatory and Representative Democracy in Local Governance. In L. Schaap & H. Daemen (Eds.), *Renewal in European Local Democracies*(pp.55-77). Urban and Regional Research International. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Edwards, A., Van der Meer, J. (2002). Germany: Administration meets community. In H. Daemen & L. Schaap (Eds.), *Citizen and city: development in fifteen local democracies* (pp. 95-109). Erasmus University.

- Egner, B., Sweeting, D., Klok, P.-J. (2013). *Local Councillors in Europe. Urban and Regional Research International*. Springer VS.
- Fraanje, R. (2015). Sturen in dienstbaarheid. Verkennend essay naar de rollen van de gemeenteraad bij de uitvoering van de nieuwe taken in het sociaal domein. Raadslid.NU. https://www.raadsleden.nl/sites/www.raadsleden.nl/files/documenten/sturen_in_dienstbaarheid.pdf
- Fung, A. (2007). Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method of Constructive Engagement. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3), 443–58.
- Fung, A. (2015). Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future. *Public Administration Review*, 75(4), 513–522.
- Graaf, L. J. de, Schaap, L., Theuns, M. (2016). Raadswerk is Maatwerk. *Hoe kun je als raad(slid) meer kleur geven aan de lokale democratie?* University of Tilburg. <https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/being-a-councillor-is-a-tailormaking-job-hoe-kun-je-als-raadslid->
- Gabriel, A. W., Eisenman, S. (2005). Germany: a new type of local government? In S. A. H. Denters. & L. E. Rose (Eds.), *Comparing Local Governance, trends and developments*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Geißel, B. (2009). How to Improve the Quality of Democracy? Experiences with Participatory Innovations at the Local Level in Germany. *German Politics and Society*, 27(4), 51–71.
- Geißel, B., Newton, K. (2012). *Evaluating democratic innovations—curing the democratic Malaise?* Routledge.
- Geißel, B., Kersting, N. (2014). *Zwischen Parteidemokratie und partizipativen Innovationen – Beteiligungskultur in Deutschland*. eNewsletter Wegweiser Bürgergesellschaft 12/2014 vom 20.06.2014. https://www.buergergesellschaft.de/fileadmin/pdf/beitrag_geissel_kersting_140620_end.pdf
- Geurtz, J. C. H. C. (2012). *Immune to reform? Understanding democratic reform in three consensus democracies: the Netherlands compared with Germany, and Austria*. Optima Grafische Communicatie.
- Gunlicks, A. B. (1986). *Local Government in the German Federal System*. Duke University Press.
- Gronau, H. (1965). *Die soziologische Rollenanalyse als betriebsorganisatorisches und berufspädagogisches Instrument*. Enke Verlag.
- Groot, S. J. (2017). *Een eigen mandaat in de raad? De invloed van voorkeurstemmen op fractie-afsplittingsen in gemeenteraden*. Bachelorscriptie, Instituut politieke wetenschap Leiden.
- De Groot, M., Denters, S. A. H., Klok, P.-J. (2010). Strengthening the Councillor as a Representative and Scrutiniser: The Effects of Institutional Change on Councillors' Role Orientations in the Netherlands. *Local Government Studies*, 36(3), 401–423.
- Haus, M. (2005). Lernen im Föderalismus? Die Reform der Kommunalverfassungen in Deutschland in institutionenpolitischer Perspektive. In M. Haus (Ed.), *Institutionenwandel lokaler Politik in Deutschland* (pp. 56–84). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Heine, E. J. H., ter. (1981). *Analyse van rolgedrag: een toepassing op het terrein van het algemeen maatschappelijk werk*. Dissertation. Radboud University Nijmegen.
- Heinelt, H. (2013a). The Changing Context of Local Democracy: Role Perception and Behaviour of Municipal Councillors. *Local Government Studies*, 39(5).
- Heinelt, H. (2013b). Introduction: The Role Perception and Behaviour of Municipal Councillors in the Changing Context of Local Democracy. *Local Government Studies*, 39(5), 633–639.
- Hendriks, F. (2008). Democratic reform between the extreme makeover and the reinvention of tradition: *the case of the Netherlands*. *Democratization*, 12(2), 243–268.

- Hendriks, F., Tops, P. (1999). Between Democracy and Efficiency: Trends in Local Government Reform in the Netherlands and Germany. *Public Administration*, 77(1), 133-153.
- Hendriks, F., Van Ostaaijen, J., Boogers, M. (2011). *Legitimiteitsmonitor Democratisch Bestuur*. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. <https://kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl/media/48907/legitimiteitsmonitor-democratisch-bestuur.pdf>
- Hendriks, F., Loughlin, J., Lidström, A. (2011). European Subnational Democracy: Comparative Reflections and Conclusions. In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidstrom (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe* (pp. 715-743). Oxford University Press.
- Hesse, J. J. (1986). *Erneuerung der Politik von Unten? Stadtpolitik und kommunale Selbstverwaltung im Umbruch*. Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Holtmann, E. (2002). Parteien und Wählergruppen in der Kommunalpolitik. In G. Oscar, O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss. (Eds.), *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland* (pp. 407-428). Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hubert, H. (2013). Councillors' Notions of Democracy, and their Role Perception and Behaviour in the Changing Context of Local Democracy. *Local Government Studies*, 39(5), 1-21.
- Joinson, A. N. (1999). Social desirability, anonymity and Internet-based questionnaires. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and Computers*, 31, 433-438.
- Kahn, R. L., Wolfe, D. M., Quin, R. P., Snoek, J. D. (1964). *Organizational stress: studies in role conflict and ambiguity*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Keith, S. (2018). The Use of Cronbach's Alpha When Developing and Reporting Research Instruments in Science Education. *Research in Science Education*, 48, 1273-1296.
- Kersting, N. (2002). Die Zukunft der Parteien in der Lokalpolitik. In J. Bogumil (Ed.), *Kommunale Entscheidungsprozesse im Wandel - Theoretische und empirische Analysen* (pp. 139-162). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Kersting, N. (2005). *Die Zukunft der lokalen Demokratie. Modernisierungs- und Reformmodelle*. Campus Verlag.
- Kersting, N. (2007). Assessing Local Referendums and innovative participatory instruments. In P. Delwit, H. Reynaert, K. Steyvers, J-B. Pilet (Eds.), *Towards DIY-Politics? Participatory and direct democracy at the local level in Europe* (pp. 31-50). Van der Broele.
- Kersting, N. (2008). *Politische Beteiligung. Einführung in dialogorientierte Instrumente politischer und gesellschaftlicher Partizipation*. VS Verlag.
- Kersting, N. (2013a). *Bürgerhaushalte in Deutschland*. Haushaltszeitung, 15-16.
- Kersting, N. (2013b). Online participation: from 'invited' to 'invented' spaces. *International Journal of Electronic Government*, 6(4), 270-280.
- Kersting, N. (2013c). *Hybride Partizipation – Verknüpfung von direkter und deliberativer Demokratie anhand zweier internationaler Beispiele*. eNewsletter Netzwerk Bürgerbeteiligung 02/2013 vom 09.07.2013. https://www.netzwerk-buergerbeteiligung.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/PDF-Dokumente/newsletter_beitraege/nwbb_beitrag_kersting_130708.pdf
- Kersting, N. (2015). Local political participation in Europe: elections and referendums. *Croatian and Comparative Public Administration*, 15(2), 319-334.
- Kersting, N. (2016a). Participatory Turn? Comparing Citizens' and Politicians' Perspectives on Online and Offline Local Political Participation. *Lex Localis*, 14(2), 251-263.

- Kersting, N. (2016b). New power claims in local politics: the attitudes of council members to civic participation. *Journal of Comparative Political Science*, 10(3-4), 311-339.
- Kersting, N. (2018). Afrika. In M. Qvortrup (Ed.), *Referendums around the world* (pp. 213-235). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kersting, N. (2020). Crowd-Sourced Planning, Crowd-Monitoring, and Organisational Learning. In L. Van Dool (Ed.), *Urban Network Learning. A comparison of international experiences* (pp. 233-254). Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kersting, N., Vetter, A. (2003). *Reforming Local Government in Europe. Closing the Gap between Democracy and Efficiency*, Urban and Regional Research International. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Kersting, N., Caulfield, J. R., Nickson, A., Olowu, D., Wollmann, H. (2009). *Local Governance Reform in Global Perspective*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Klok, P-J., Denters, B. (2013). The roles councillors play. In B. Egner, D. Sweeting, & P-J. Klok (Eds.), *Local councillors in Europe* (pp. 63-83). Springer.
- Klijin, E. H., Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2000). Interactive decision making and representative democracy: institutional collisions and solutions. In O. van Heffen., W. J. M. Kickert & J. Thomassen (Eds.), *Governance in Modern Society* (pp. 109-134). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Klijin, E., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2002). Politicians and interactive decision-making: Institutional spoilsport or playmakers? *Public Administration*, 78(2), 365-387
- Kölln, A-K. (2014). *Party decline and response*. The effects of membership decline on party organisations in Western Europe, 1960-2010. University of Twente.
- Koppenjan, J., Kars, M., Voort, H. van der. (2007). Verticale politiek in horizontale beleidsnetwerken: kaderstelling als koppelingsarrangement. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 34(4), 210-225.
- Kost, A. (2010). Kommunalpolitik in NordrheinWestfalen. In A. Kost & H. G. Wehling (Eds.), *Kommunalpolitik in den deutschen Ländern* (pp. 231–254). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Lapinski, M. K., Rimal, R. N. (2005). An explication of social norms. *Communication Theory*, 15, 127–147.
- Lapinski, M. K., Rimal, R. N. (2015). A re-explanation of social norms, ten years later. *Communication Theory*, 25, 393-409.
- Loughlin, J., Peters, B. G. (1997). State traditions, administrative reform and regionalization. In M. Keating & J. Loughlin (Eds.), *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (pp. 41-62). Routledge.
- Lupia, A. (2003). Delegation and its perils. In K.W.C.M.T.B. Strom (Ed.) *Delegation, Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford University Press.
- Lyn, F. (2008). The problem of nonresponse. In E. D. De Leeuw., J. J. Hox., D. A. Dillman (Eds.), *International handbook of survey methodology* (pp. 35-55). Psychology Press.
- Mair, P. (2005). *Democracy Beyond Parties*. UC Irvine: Centre for the Study of Democracy.
- Mair, P. (2014). *On Parties, Party Systems and Democracy*. ECPR Press.
- Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking Representation. *American Political Science Review*, 97, 515–528.
- Mayer, I., Edelenbos, J., Monnikhof, R (2005). Local Interactive Policy Development: undermining or sustaining democracy? *Public Administration*, 83(1), 179-199.

- Meer, T. W. G., Kolk, H. van der. (2016). Democratie dichterbij, Lokaal Kiezers Onderzoek 2016. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. <https://kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl/media/254112/democratie-dichterbij-lokaal-kiezersonderzoek-2016.pdf>
- Mehr Demokratie. (2016). *Volksentscheidsrangking 2016*. https://www.mehr-demokratie.de/fileadmin/pdf/volksentscheidsrangking_2016.pdf
- Mill, J. S. (1874). *System of logic*. Harper & Brothers.
- Mourizen, P. E., Svava, J. H. (2002). *Leadership at the apex. Politicians and administrators in western local governments*. Pittsburgh University Press.
- Morris, M. W., Hong, Y.-Y., Chiu, C.-Y., Liu, Z. (2015). Normology: Integrating insights about social norms to understand cultural dynamics. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 129, 1–13.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. C. (1991). *Institutions*. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97-112.
- Painter, M., Peters, B. G. (2010). The Analysis of Administrative Traditions. In M. Painter & B. G. Peters (Eds.), *Tradition and Public Administration* (pp. 3-16). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pállinger, Z. T., Kaufmann, B., Marxer, W., Schiller, T. (2007). *Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects*. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Pawson, R., Greenhalgh, T., Harvey, G., Walshe, K. (2005). Realist review—A new method of systematic review designed for complex policy interventions. *Journal of Health Services Research & Policy*, 10(1), 21–34.
- Peters, K., Castenmiller, P. (2019). *Om de controle door de raad. Een onderzoek naar de toepassing van het raadsinstrumentarium voor controle en kaderstelling in de gemeentelijke praktijk*. Stichting Decentraalbestuur.nl. <https://kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl/media/256219/om-de-controle-door-de-raad.pdf>
- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The concept of representation*. University of California Press.
- ProDemos. (2018). *Monitor Burgerparticipatie 2018*. <https://prodemos.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ProDemos-Monitor-Burgerparticipatie-2018.pdf>
- Reidinger, F. (2016). Baden-Württemberg zwischen Wählen, Mitreden und Entscheiden – Mehr Partizipation als Regierungsauftrag. In H. Botha., N. Schaks., Steiger, D (Eds.), *Das Ende des repräsentativen Staates? Demokratie am Scheideweg* (pp. 273-290). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Reiser, M. (2007). *Local party system in Germany*. Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, 7 – 12 May 2007. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/9a5fde43-df83-4e95-a630-7ee3f7abc418.pdf>
- Reiser, M., Holtmann, E. (2008). *Farewell to the Party Model? Independent List in East and West European Countries*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur. (2012). *Loslaten in vertrouwen*. <https://kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl/media/63034/loslaten-in-vertrouwen.pdf>
- Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur. (2016). 15,9. *De verbindende rol van het raadslid in een vitale democratie*. [file:///C:/Users/Gebbruiker/Downloads/15_9_uur_Adviesrapport_201604%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebbruiker/Downloads/15_9_uur_Adviesrapport_201604%20(1).pdf)
- Sarbin, T. R., Allen, V. L. (1968). Role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 488-566). Addison-Wesley.
- Schaap L., Daemen H. (2012). *Renewal in European Local Democracies, Puzzles, Dilemmas and Options. Urban and Regional Research International*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

- Schaap, L., Blijleven, W., Hendriks, F., Jacobs, D., Karsten, N., van Ostaaijen, J., Wagenaar, C. (2018). Ambitie & ambivalentie: Vernieuwing van de lokale democratie in Nederland. *Bestuurswetenschappen*, 73(2), 47-69.
- Schiller, T. (2011). Local direct democracy in Germany – varieties in a federal state. In T. Schiller (Ed.), *Local Direct Democracy in Europe* (pp. 54-74). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Smith, G. (2009). *Democratic innovations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sørensen, E. (2006). Metagovernance: The changing role of politicians in processes of democratic governance. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 36(1), 98-114.
- Sørensen, E., Torfin, J. (2005). The Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 28(3), 195-218.
- State Commission Remkes. (2018). *Lage Drempels, Hoge Dijken. Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans Eindrapport van de staatscommissie parlementair stelsel*. <file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/Eindrapport+Lage+drempels,+hoge+dijken.pdf>
- Stockemer, D. (2018). *Quantitative Methods for the Social Sciences: A Practical Introduction with Examples in SPSS and Stata*. Springer International Publishing.
- Tourangeau, R., Rips, L.J., Rasinski, K. (2000). *The psychology of survey response*. Cambridge University Press.
- Urbinati, N., Warren, M. (2008). The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 387-412.
- Van den Berg, S., Van der Kolk, H. (2014). *Data collection and scale Development*. SAGE.
- Vetter, A. (2009). Citizens versus Parties: Explaining Institutional Change in German Local Government, 1989-2008. *Local Government Studies*, 35(1), 125-142.
- Vetter, A. (2013). *Germany: Local Democracy and its Reforms*. University of Stuttgart.
- Vetter, A., Kersting, N. (2017). *Transforming democratic accountability in German local politics*. Paper to be presented at the ECPR GC 2017 in Prague. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6d11d39c-b664-4453-945b-4099e4107ede.pdf>
- Visser, A. P. H., van de Vliert, E., ter Heine, E. J. H., Winnust, J. A. M., (1983). *Rollen: Persoonlijke en Sociale Invloeden op het Gedrag*. Boom Meppel.
- Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten. (2016). *Maatwerkdemocratie. Jaarbericht 2016, Denktank Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten*. https://vng.nl/sites/default/files/nieuws_attachments/2016/2016_vng_denktank_web.pdf
- Wehling, H. G. (1991). Parteipolitisierung von lokaler Politik und Verwaltung? Zur Rolle der Parteien der Kommunalpolitik. In H. Heinelt & H. Wollmann (Eds.), *Brennpunkt Stadt. Stadtpolitik und lokale Politikforschung in den 80er und 90er Jahren* (pp. 149-166). Birkhäuser.
- Whiteley, P. (2010). Is the Party Over? The Decline of Party Activism and Membership across the Democratic World. *Party Politics*, 17(1), 1-24.
- Wildemann, R. (1986). The Problematic of Party Government. In F. G. Castles & R. Wildemann. (Eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government* (pp. 1-30). De Gruyter.
- Wollmann, H. (2000a). Local Government Modernization in Germany: Between Incrementalism and Reform Waves. *Public Administration*, 78(4), 915-936.
- Wollmann, H. (2000b). The directly-elected mayor in the German Länder—introduction, implementation and impact. *Public Money & Management*, 34(5), 331-337.

- Wollmann, H. (2004). Urban leadership in German local politics. The rise, role and performance of the directly elected (chief executive) mayor. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28(1), 150–165.
- Wollmann, H. (2005). The directly-elected executive mayor in German local government. In R. Berg & N. Rao (Eds.), *Transforming Local Political Leadership* (pp. 29-41). Macmillan.

Appendix A

Table 1: Results of principal component analysis for various aspects of the representative role orientation of local councillors per region

			Component	
			1	2
<i>Baden-Württemberg</i>	Party-political	• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	-.024	.528
		• Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	.175	.762
		• Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	-.283	.522
		• The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies	.127	.638
	Democratic watchdog	• Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	.448	.085
		• Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	.380	.182
		• Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	.802	-.153
		• Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives	.736	-.112
			Component	
			1	2
<i>North Rhine-Westphalia</i>	Party-political	• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.333	.630
		• Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	-.193	.591
		• Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	-.274	.501
		• The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies	.026	.634
	Democratic watchdog	• Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	.238	.494
		• Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	.529	-.082
		• Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	.737	.109
		• Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives	.805	.037

			Component	
			1	2
<i>The Netherlands</i>	Party-political	• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.104	.725
		• Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	-.275	.593
		• Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	-.443	.215
		• The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies	.065	.516
	Democratic watchdog	• Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	.430	.430
		• Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	.562	.046
		• Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	.675	.062
		• Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives	.725	.089

Principal component analysis: two factor extraction; varimax rotation; loadings over 0.5 highlighted.

Table 2: Results of principal component analysis for various aspects of the representative role behaviour of local councillors per region

			Component	
			1	2
<i>Baden-Württemberg</i>	Party-political	• Meetings with the party's council group	.973	-.074
		• Other party meetings and activities	.970	-.083
		• Members of my party groups	-.069	.659
		• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.121	.241
	Democratic watchdog	• Leading actors from voluntary associations	.149	.729
		• Organisations of ethnic minorities	-.069	.382
		• Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	.007	.670
		• Representing the request and issues emerging form local society	.215	.583
• Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society	.312	.316		

			Component	
			1	2
<i>North Rhine-Westphalia</i>	Party-political	• Meetings with the party's council group	-.319	.723
		• Other party meetings and activities	.039	.743
		• Members of my party groups	.253	.554
		• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.371	.273
	Democratic watchdog	• Leading actors from voluntary associations	.665	.116
		• Organisations of ethnic minorities	.213	.556
		• Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	.682	.224
		• Representing the request and issues emerging form local society	.664	-.067
		• Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society	.528	-.006
			Component	
			1	2
<i>The Netherlands</i>	Party-political	• Meetings with the party's council group	-.143	.626
		• Other party meetings and activities	-.120	.660
		• Members of my party groups	.102	.499
		• Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	.497	-.048
	Democratic watchdog	• Leading actors from voluntary associations	.313	.573
		• Organisations of ethnic minorities	.482	.344
		• Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	.372	.443
		• Representing the request and issues emerging form local society	.683	.060
		• Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society	.743	-.027

Principal component analysis: two factor extraction; varimax rotation; loadings over 0.5 highlighted.

Appendix B

Ratsmitglieder Umfrage zu Rollenwahrnehmung und –Verwirklichung

Frage 1.

Die Menschen haben unterschiedliche Ansichten über die Rolle, die die Ratsmitglieder als Vertreter der Bürger im Rat spielen sollten. Wie wichtig finden Sie persönlich, dass Ratsmitglieder ...

	Nicht wichtig	Nicht sehr wichtig	Teils/ teils	Wichtig	Sehr wichtig
... Das Parteiprogramm umsetzen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... Geschlossenheit innerhalb der lokale Partei sind	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... Kontakt zu Bürgern und zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen anbieten	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
... Politische Partizipationsmöglichkeiten bieten	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Im Folgendem untersuchen wir Bürgerbeteiligung zum Einen als politische Partizipation (Co-Dezision), zum Anderen als zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement (Co-Produktion).

Frage 2.

Bei den folgenden Fragen geht es um die Rolle des Rates bei der Festlegung der Regeln für die Bürgerbeteiligung.

Diese erste Frage betrifft die Verfahrensvorschriften, d.h. die Prozess -Voraussetzungen und Prozess Anforderungen, welche die Verfahren zum Bürgerbeteiligungsprozess erfüllen müssen.

Welche der folgenden Optionen gibt den Ablauf der Formulierung von Verfahrensregeln für die Bürgerbeteiligung - in der vergangenen Ratsperiode - am besten wieder:

- Der Rat hat noch nie Verfahrensvorschriften für die Bürgerbeteiligung vorgelegt
- Die beratenden Ausschüsse und des Verwaltungsrates haben Verfahrensvorschriften vorgelegt
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für einige Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für die meisten Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für alle Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert

Frage 2.1

Inwieweit spielen die folgenden Punkte eine Rolle, wenn der Rat Verfahrensvorschriften für die Bürgerbeteiligung festlegt?

	Keine Rolle	Keine wichtige Rolle	Wichtige Rolle	Sehr wichtige Rolle
Zusätzliche Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten realisieren	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ermöglichen, dass jeder teilnehmen kann	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ermöglichen, dass die Ergebnisse des Prozesses für Teilnehmende und für nicht Teilnehmende transparent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Frage 3.

Zusätzlich zu den Verfahrensvorschriften (Prozess) kann der Rat auch wesentliche inhaltliche Vorschriften (Inhalt) für die Bürgerbeteiligung festlegen. Hierbei handelt es sich um vom Rat vorab festgelegten inhaltlichen und finanziellen Anforderungen und Rahmenbedingungen die Ergebnisse der Bürgerbeteiligung erfüllen müssen.

Die nächste Frage betrifft solche inhaltlichen Vorschriften.

Welche der folgenden Möglichkeiten prägt den Ablauf der inhaltlichen Vorschriften für die Bürgerbeteiligung - in der vergangenen Ratsperiode - am besten:

- Der Rat hat noch nie inhaltliche Vorschriften für die Bürgerbeteiligung vorgelegt
- In den beratenden Ausschüssen des Verwaltungsrates wurden inhaltliche Vorschriften vorgelegt
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für einige Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für die meisten Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert
- Vom Rat wurden Verfahrensvorschriften für alle Beteiligungsprozesse formuliert

Frage 3.1.

Inwieweit spielen die folgenden Punkte eine Rolle, wenn der Rat inhaltliche Vorschriften für die Bürgerbeteiligung festlegt?

	Keine Rolle	Keine wichtige Rolle	Wichtige Rolle	Sehr wichtige Rolle
Parteilpolitik	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Langzeiteffekte	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gemeinwohl	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sachkompetenz der Ratsmitglieder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gemeindekenntnisse der Ratsmitglieder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Frage 4.

Im Folgenden möchten wir Sie befragen auf welche Art und Weise der Rat an der Kontrolle der Bürgerbeteiligung beteiligt war.

Zunächst möchten wir einen Einblick in den Stand der Dinge hinsichtlich der Rolle des Gemeinderats in dieser Gemeinde bei der Bürgerbeteiligung in der vergangenen Ratsperiode erhalten.

Welche der folgenden Optionen beschreibt den Ablauf der Kontrolle der Bürgerbeteiligung in der vergangenen Ratsperiode am besten:

- Der Rat hat bei der Prüfung nie eine aktive Rolle gespielt
- Der Rat hat in den meisten Fällen keine aktive Rolle gespielt
- Der Rat hat in den meisten Fällen eine aktive Rolle gespielt
- Der Rat hat (fast) immer eine aktive Rolle gespielt

Frage 5.

Wie läßt sich die Kontrollfunktion des Rats bei der Bürgerbeteiligung in der vergangenen Ratsperiode beschreiben?

- Der Rat hat das Verfahren nur formal geprüft (reibungslose Abläufe und Prozesse)
- Der Rat hat nur anhand inhaltlicher / finanzieller Überlegungen geprüft (basierend auf dem Ergebnis des Prozesses)
- Der Rat hat sowohl aus inhaltlichen Gründen das Verfahren betreffend als auch auf der Grundlage inhaltlicher / finanzieller Überlegungen geprüft

Frage 6.

Inwiefern hat der Rat die folgenden Punkte bei der Verfahrenskontrolle der Bürgerbeteiligung berücksichtigt?

	Keine Rolle	Keine wichtige Rolle	Wichtige Rolle	Sehr wichtige Rolle
Ob ausreichende Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten realisiert wurden	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Welche Bürgergruppen teilgenommen haben oder nicht	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ob die Ergebnisse des Prozesses für Teilnehmende und für nicht Teilnehmende transparent sind	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Frage 7.

Inwieweit spielen die folgenden Punkte eine Rolle, wenn der gesamte Rat bei Bürgerbeteiligung eine Verfahrenskontrolle ausübt?


	Keine Rolle	Keine wichtige Rolle	Wichtige Rolle	Sehr wichtige Rolle
Parteilpolitik	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mögliche Langzeiteffekte	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gemeinwohl	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sachkompetenz der Ratsmitglieder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gemeindekenntnisse der Ratsmitglieder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Allgemeine Fragen

Ich bin ...

- Ein Mann
- Eine Frau
- Anders

Ich bin ... Jahre alt



Mein höchster formaler Bildungsabschluss ist ...

- Grundschule
- Mittlere Reife / Sekundarabschluss
- Fachhochschulabschluss / Berufsausbildung
- Wissenschaftliche Ausbildung / Universität
- Wissenschaftliche Promotion / Doktorgrad

Ratsmitglied bin ich jetzt seit ... Jahre



Ich gehöre der ... an

- Opposition
- Koalition/regierenden Partei

Von welcher Partei sind Sie Mitglied?

Von welcher Gemeinde sind Sie Ratsmitglied?

- Heilbronn
- Pforzheim
- Ulm
- Bergisch Gladbach
- Bottrop
- Recklinghausen
- Siegen

Appendix C

Vragenlijst over rolopvatting en rolgedrag van raadsleden

Vraag 1

Mensen hebben verschillende opvattingen over de rol die raadsleden als vertegenwoordigers van burgers in de gemeenteraad zouden moeten spelen. Hoe belangrijk vindt u het persoonlijk dat raadsleden

	Niet of weinig van belang	Niet erg belangrijk	Tamelijk belangrijk	Belangrijk	Zeer belangrijk
Contact onderhouden met burgers en organisaties uit de lokale samenleving	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zich inzetten voor het realiseren van hun partijprogramma	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Van één partij met één stem spreken en eensgezind optreden	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zorgen dat het gemeentebestuur voldoende mogelijkheden biedt om mee te beslissen over het gemeentelijk beleid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Vraag 2

De volgende vragen gaan over de rol van de raad bij de kaderstelling bij burgerparticipatie.

Deze eerste vraag gaat over de procedurele kaderstelling, dat wil zeggen het vooraf aangeven van de randvoorwaarden en eisen waaraan procedures bij en het procesverloop van burgerparticipatie moeten voldoen.

Welke van de onderstaande mogelijkheden typeert de gang van zaken rond de procedurele kaderstelling bij burgerparticipatie – in de afgelopen raadsperiode – het beste:

- Vanuit de raad zijn nimmer procedurele kaders voor burgerparticipatie gesteld, en dat is in raad/raadscommissies ook nooit overwogen
- Vanuit de raad zijn nimmer procedurele kaders voor burgerparticipatie gesteld, maar in raad/raadscommissies is dat wel overwogen
- Vanuit de raad zijn bij enkele participatieprocessen procedurele kaders geformuleerd
- Vanuit de raad zijn bij de meeste participatieprocessen procedurele kaders geformuleerd
- Vanuit de raad worden bij (vrijwel) alle participatieprocessen procedurele kaders geformuleerd

Vraag 2.1

In hoeverre heeft de raad zich bij het stellen van procedurele kaders bij burgerparticipatie ingezet voor onderstaande zaken?

	Geen rol	Bescheiden rol	Belangrijke rol	Zeer belangrijke rol
Realiseren van extra participatiemogelijkheden	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ervoor zorgen dat iedereen kan deelnemen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zorgen dat de uitkomsten van het proces duidelijk zijn voor deelnemers en niet deelnemers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Vraag 3

Naast procedurele kaders kan de raad bij burgerparticipatie ook inhoudelijke kaders stellen. Dan gaat het erom dat de raad tevoren aangeeft aan welke inhoudelijke en financiële eisen en randvoorwaarden de uitkomsten van burgerparticipatie moeten voldoen.

De volgende vraag gaat over dergelijke inhoudelijke kaders.

Welke van de onderstaande mogelijkheden typeert de gang van zaken rond de inhoudelijke kaderstelling bij burgerparticipatie – in de afgelopen raadsperiode – het beste:

- Vanuit de raad zijn nimmer inhoudelijke kaders voor burgerparticipatie gesteld, en dat is in raad/raadscommissies ook nooit overwogen
- Vanuit de raad zijn nimmer inhoudelijke kaders voor burgerparticipatie gesteld, maar in raad/raadscommissies is dat wel overwogen
- Vanuit de raad zijn bij enkele participatieprocessen inhoudelijke kaders geformuleerd
- Vanuit de raad zijn bij de meeste participatieprocessen inhoudelijke kaders geformuleerd
- Vanuit de raad worden bij (vrijwel) alle participatieprocessen inhoudelijke kaders geformuleerd

Vraag 3.1

In hoeverre spelen de onderstaande zaken een rol als de raad inhoudelijke kaders stelt bij burgerparticipatie?

	Geen rol	Bescheiden rol	Belangrijke rol	Zeer belangrijke rol
In hoeverre speelt partijpolitiek een rol	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In hoeverre stelt de raad kaders met oog op de lange termijn	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In hoeverre stelt de raad kaders met oog op het belang van de gemeente als geheel	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In hoeverre stelt de raad op basis van inhoudelijke expertise kaders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In hoeverre stelt de raad kaders gebaseerd op kennis van wat er leeft in de samenleving	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Vraag 4

Nu willen we het graag hebben over de manier waarop de raad bij de controle op burgerparticipatie betrokken is geweest.

Eerst willen we graag zicht krijgen op de gang van zaken bij de rol van de gemeenteraad in deze gemeente op de burgerparticipatie in de afgelopen raadsperiode.

Welke van de onderstaande mogelijkheden typeert de gang van zaken bij de controle op burgerparticipatie in de afgelopen raadsperiode naar uw mening het beste:

- De gemeenteraad heeft nimmer een actieve rol gespeeld in de controle
- De gemeenteraad heeft in de meeste gevallen geen actieve rol gespeeld
- De gemeenteraad heeft in de meeste gevallen een actieve rol gespeeld
- De gemeenteraad heeft (vrijwel) altijd een actieve rol gespeeld in de controle

Vraag 5

Welke van de onderstaande mogelijkheden typeert het karakter van de controle van de raad bij burgerparticipatie in de afgelopen raadsperiode naar uw mening het beste:

- De gemeenteraad heeft alleen gecontroleerd op basis van procedurele overwegingen (goed verloop van procedures en processen)
- De gemeenteraad heeft alleen gecontroleerd op basis van inhoudelijk / financiële overwegingen (op basis van de uitkomsten van het proces)
- De gemeenteraad heeft zowel op procedurele als op inhoudelijk/financiële aspecten gecontroleerd

Vraag 6

In hoeverre heeft de raad bij de procedurele controle bij burgerparticipatie aandacht besteedt aan onderstaande zaken?

	Geen rol	Bescheiden rol	Belangrijke rol	Zeer belangrijke rol
Of er voldoende participatiemogelijkheden waren gerealiseerd	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Welke (groepen) burgers wel of niet hebben deelgenomen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Of de uitkomsten van het proces duidelijk zijn voor deelnemers en niet deelnemers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Vraag 7

In hoeverre spelen de onderstaande zaken een rol als de raad inhoudelijke controle uitoefent bij burgerparticipatie?

	Geen rol	Bescheiden rol	Belangrijke rol	Zeer belangrijke rol
Partijpolitiek profilering	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overwegingen betreffende effecten op lange termijn	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overwegingen betreffende het belang van de gemeente als geheel	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overwegingen ingegeven door inhoudelijke expertise van raadsleden	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overwegingen vanuit onze kennis over wat er leeft in de samenleving	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Vraag 8

Ik ben een:

- Man
- Vrouw
- Anders

Wat is uw leeftijd?

Wat is de hoogste opleiding die u heeft afgerond?

- Basisonderwijs
- Middelbaar onderwijs
- Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (mbo)
- Hoger beroepsonderwijs (hbo)
- Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (wo)

Hoeveel jaar bent u in totaal raadslid?

Ik zit met mijn partij in de:

- Oppositie
- Coalitie

Ik ben raadslid namens de partij:

Appendix D

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, Ratsmitglieder,

Wir bitten Sie eine kurze Umfrage (ca. 4min) zu Rollenwahrnehmung und –verwirklichung auszufüllen. Es geht um Wahrnehmungen/Meinungen, damit gibt es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten – es ist einfach von Interesse ob es bestimmte Zusammenhänge gibt.

LINK

Das Projekt ist angelehnt an internationale Erhebungen und zielt darauf ab die Arbeitsrealität von Ratsmitgliedern für Wissenschaft und Allgemeinheit verständlich zu machen und erste Vergleiche zwischen Niederlande, Deutschland und anderen Faktoren zu entdecken. Alle Daten werden streng vertraulich gehandhabt – es sind letztlich allgemeine Zusammenhänge von Interesse.

Bei Interesse werden die Befunde in Form des wissenschaftlichen Artikels (beinhaltet ein executive Summary), als Broschüre, Präsentation oder Video angeboten.

Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir gerne Rede und Antwort.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Anieke Kranenburg,

EMAIL

Universität Twente, Enschede, im Verbundprojekt mit Universität Münster

**UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.**



Appendix E

A

Geachte Raadslid,

Wij vragen u een korte vragenlijst (ca. 4 min) in te vullen over de rolopvatting en rolgedrag van raadsleden. De vragen gaan over u waarnemingen en meningen. U komt bij de vragenlijst door op de onderstaande link te klikken: [LINK](#)

De Universiteit Twente en de Universiteit Münster doen samen onderzoek naar de rolopvatting en rolgedrag van raadsleden met betrekking tot burgerparticipatie. Het onderzoeksproject staat onder leiding van Prof. Dr. Norbert Kersting. Raadsleden van verschillende Duitse en Nederlandse gemeenten worden gevraagd om een vragenlijst in te vullen.

Het onderzoeksproject zal aan het einde van dit jaar afgerond zijn. U ontvangt dan een samenvatting van de bevindingen. Het spreekt voor zich dat alle informatie die wordt verkregen vertrouwelijk wordt verwerkt. Aarzel niet om contact met mij op te nemen wanneer u vragen heeft [EMAIL](#)

Bij voorbaat hartelijk dank voor uw medewerking.

Met vriendelijke groeten,

Anieke Kranenburg

**UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.**



Appendix F

Table 1: Overall response rate per region

	Total number of local councillors in the selected municipalities	Total number of respondents who completed the survey	Response rate
Baden-Württemberg	160	31	19,4%
North Rhine-Westphalia	234	27	11,5%
The Netherlands	152	73	48,0%

Table 2: Number of respondents for the first three survey questions

	Germany	The Netherlands
Question 1	86	98
Question 2	79	94
Question 3	72	79

Appendix G

Table 1: Tukey post hoc test for the aspects of representative role orientation

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Implementing the programme of my political party/movement	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.016
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.001
Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizens participation	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.000
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.489
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.046
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.805
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.011
The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.002
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.989
Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.466
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.464
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.055
Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.876
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.692
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.952
Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.665
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.872
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.751
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.985

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Table 2: Tukey post hoc test for the aspects of representative role behaviour

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig,
Meetings with the party's council group	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.062
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.001
Other party meetings and activities	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.336
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Members of my party groups	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.312
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.000
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.028
Leading actors from voluntary associations	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.987
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.127
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.060
Organisations of ethnic minorities	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.329
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.030
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.170
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Representing the request and issues emerging from local society	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.761
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.973
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.349
Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.997
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.608
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.493

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Appendix H

Table 1: Descriptive information of the aspect 'Meetings with the party's council group' and 'Other party meetings and activities' in average hours per month

	Meetings with the party's council group, <i>N</i> = 1526	Other party meetings and activities, <i>N</i> = 1507	
Mean	8.1	8.2	
Std. Deviation	4.5	6.4	
Minimum	0	0	
Maximum	50	60	
Percentiles			
	25	5	4
	50	8	7
	75	10	10

Only 25% of respondents spend 10 or more hours per month on these activities. Therefore, we consider 10 or more hours per month as a high score.

Appendix I

Table 1: Results of principal component analysis for various aspects of the role orientation of local councillors with regard to citizen participation

		Component	
		1	2
Party focus <i>a</i> =0.03	• Realising party programme	.698	-.030
	• Acting in unity with the party	-.244	.840
Citizen focus <i>a</i> =0.42	• Contact with citizens and local organisations	.862	-.106
	• Ensure channels of participation	.484	.654

Principal component analysis: two factor extraction; varimax rotation; loadings over 0.5 highlighted.

Appendix J

Table 1: Average score for aspects measuring role orientation with regard to citizen participation.
Measured on a 5-point Likert scale

		Party political		Democratic watchdog	
		Realising party programme	Acting in unity with the party	Contact with citizens and local organisations	Ensure channels of participation
Baden-Württemberg <i>N = 31</i>	Heilbronn	2.80	5	2.60	4.40
	Pforzheim	3.40	4.80	3.80	4.60
	Ulm	3.50	4.50	2.63	3.50
	Reutlingen	3.54	4.69	3.15	4.31
	<i>Total region</i>	3.39	4.71	3.03	4.16
North Rhine-Westphalia <i>N = 27</i>	Bergisch Gladbach	3.93	4.79	3.57	4.36
	Bottrop	3.40	4.80	3.40	4.60
	Recklinghausen	4.00	4.80	3.60	4.40
	Siegen	3.67	4.67	3.67	4.00
	<i>Total region</i>	3.81	4.78	3.56	4.37
The Netherlands <i>N = 73</i>	Enschede	4.29	3.88	4.58	4.42
	Hengelo	4.00	3.75	4.50	4.13
	Deventer	4.05	3.68	4.21	4.05
	Dordrecht	3.50	3.21	3.21	3.29
	<i>Total region</i>	4.01	3.63	3.79	4.14

Appendix K

Table 1: Tukey post hoc test for the aspects of role orientation with regard to citizen participation

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Realising party programme	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.122
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.002
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.532
Acting in unity with the party	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.948
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.000
Contact with citizens and local organisations	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.095
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.008
Ensure channels of participation	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.640
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.800
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.225

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Appendix L

Table 1: Percentage of respondents indicating how often the local council has set content frameworks with regard to citizen participation processes

	The local council did not establish content frameworks		The local council did establish content frameworks		
	The local council did not establish content frameworks and the local council/ commission did not consider this	The local council did not establish content frameworks, but the local council/ commission did consider it	The local council did establish a few content frameworks	The local council established content frameworks in most cases	The local council (almost) always established content frameworks
Baden-Württemberg <i>N = 31</i>	22.6%	12.9%	35.5%	19.4%	9.7%
North Rhine-Westphalia <i>N = 27</i>	22.2%	14.8%	37.0%	18.5%	7.4%
The Netherlands <i>N = 73</i>	6.8%	11.9%	42.4%	28.8%	10.2%

Table 2: Tukey post hoc Test of 'Frequency of setting content frameworks'

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Frequency of setting content frameworks	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.974
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.209
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.152

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Table 3: Tukey post hoc test for the aspect 'Party politics'

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Party politics	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.171
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.008
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.759

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Appendix M

Table 1: Percentage of respondents indicating the frequency of establishing process frameworks concerning citizen participation process

	The local council did not establish content frameworks		The local council did establish content frameworks		
	The local council did not establish content frameworks and the local council/ commission did not consider this	The local council did not establish content frameworks, but the local council/ commission did consider it	The local council did establish a few content frameworks	The local council established content frameworks in most cases	The local council (almost) always established content frameworks
Baden-Württemberg <i>N = 31</i>	19.4%	3.2%	32.3%	29.0%	16.1%
North Rhine-Westphalia <i>N = 27</i>	18.5%	25.9%	29.6%	18.5%	7.4%
The Netherlands <i>N = 73</i>	5.1%	13.6%	39.0%	28.8%	13.6%

Table 2: Tukey post hoc Test of 'Frequency of setting content frameworks'

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Frequency of setting content frameworks	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.248
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.872
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.061

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Table 3: Tukey post hoc test for aspects of setting process frameworks

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Ensure channels of participation	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.952
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.460
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.376
Ensure that everyone can participate	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.836
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.000
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.016
Ensure that everyone participated in the process understands the outcomes	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.977
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.001
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.003

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Appendix N

Table 1: Tukey post hoc test for the aspect 'Party politics'

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Party politics	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.502
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.004
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.169

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Table 2: Tukey post hoc test for the aspects of scrutinising on the basis of process considerations

	Name of region	Name of region	Sig.
Ensure channels of participation	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.543
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.060
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.718
Ensure that everyone can participate	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.666
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.409
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.993
Ensure that everyone participated in the process understands the outcomes	Baden-Württemberg	North Rhine-Westphalia	.949
	The Netherlands	Baden-Württemberg	.011
	North Rhine-Westphalia	The Netherlands	.011

Results above 0.05 are highlighted in red.

Appendix O

Table 1: Average score for party focus aspects for role orientation measured on 5-point Likert

Scale

	Implementing the program of my political party/ movement	Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government	The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies
Baden-Württemberg	2.42 (1.07)	2.44 (1.02)	1.05 (0.93)	2.51 (0.80)
North Rhine-Westphalia	2.68 (0.93)	3.01 (0.88)	1.34 (1.05)	2.82 (0.84)
The Netherlands	2.92 (0.83)	2.54 (0.85)	1.11 (1.01)	2.81 (0.76)
Germany	2.62 (0.98)	2,78 (0.96)	1,14 (1,00)	2.69 (0.92)

Table 2: Average scores for citizen focus aspects for role orientation measured on 5-point Likert

Scale

	Representing the requests and issues emerging from local society	Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors	Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by representatives
Baden-Württemberg	3.33 (0.73)	2.38 (1.05)	2.90 (0.79)	3.11 (0.77)
North Rhine-Westphalia	3.43 (0.71)	2.44 (1.09)	2.81 (0.88)	3.15 (0.68)
The Netherlands	3.28 (0.73)	2.46 (1.07)	2.29 (0.92)	3.16 (0.70)
Germany	3.40 (0.66)	2,43 (1.07)	2.79 (0.89)	3.12 (0.72)

Table 3: Average scores for party focus aspects for representative role behaviour

	Meetings with the party’s council group	Other party meetings and activities	Members of my party groups	Implementing the programme of my political party/ movement
	<i>Average hours per month</i>	<i>Average hours per month</i>	<i>4-point Likert Scale</i>	<i>5-point Likert Scale</i>
Baden-Württemberg	6.08 (3.85)	4.12 (4.59)	2.29 (0.55)	2.12 (0.92)
North Rhine-Westphalia	7.25 (4.52)	5.18 (4.63)	2.37 (0.52)	2.33 (0.94)
The Netherlands	8.48 (4.47)	9.03 (6.45)	2.78 (0.47)	2.50 (0.81)
Germany	7.63 (31.68)	5.82 (24.37)	2.29 (0.57)	2.30 (0.91)

Table 4: Average scores for citizen focus aspects for representative role behaviour

	Leading actors from voluntary associations	Organisations of ethnic minorities	Individual citizens in your role as a councillor	Representing the request and issues emerging from local society	Promoting the views and interest of minorities in local society
	<i>4-point Likert Scale</i>	<i>4-point Likert Scale</i>	<i>4-point Likert Scale</i>	<i>5-point Likert Scale</i>	<i>5-point Likert Scale</i>
Baden-Württemberg	1.10 (0.69)	0.41 (0.56)	1.91 (0.82)	2.56 (0.71)	1.97 (0.84)
North Rhine-Westphalia	1.11 (0.73)	0.31 (0.50)	1.76 (0.73)	2.62 (0.75)	1.97 (0.90)
The Netherlands	1.22 (0.62)	0.56 (0.62)	2.38 (0.65)	2.54 (0.78)	1.89 (0.94)
Germany	1.08 (0.72)	0.32 (0.53)	1.81 (0.76)	2.58 (0.74)	1.98 (0.90)

