# University of Twente Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences

**Graduation Committee Members:** 

First Supervisor: Dr. A.G. Sigurdardottir

Second Supervisor: - H. Fitschen

# Master Thesis Business Administration 2020

Electronic Salary Negotiations: The Influence of Gender and EI on Negotiation Behaviour and Social Preservation Behaviour

Author: Conny Willemsen (S2094673)

Contact e-mail: conny.willemsen@outlook.com

Enschede, 17th of December 2020

Number of pages: 43

Number of words: 16.893

#### **Abstract**

The effect of emotional intelligence (EI) on negotiation behaviour is part of a growing body of literature. Nevertheless, the effect of EI on negotiation behaviour in electronic salary negotiations has received little attention. Similarly, the effects of gender on negotiation and social preservation behaviours in electronic negotiations has been under-researched, despite promising implications in several studies. This research aims to gain more insight into whether an individual's gender and level of EI affect their negotiation and social preservation behaviour during electronic salary negotiations conducted via e-mail. Qualitative data in the form of written transcripts of a negotiation case conducted via e-mail correspondence was collected. Furthermore, a questionnaire with open-ended questions was used. Participant's level of EI was measured using the WLEIS-measure. The results show that level of EI and gender do indeed influence negotiation and social preservation behaviour. A higher level of EI indicates more distributive negotiation behaviours in both genders. Furthermore, female negotiators are more sensitive to negative social consequences as a result of their negotiation behaviour. Most interestingly, electronic negotiation lead female negotiators to be less susceptible to gender role stereotypes, which improves their negotiation behaviour and ability to claim value for themselves. To conclude, future research is required to gain more insights into differences between face-to-face and electronic negotiations, and the effects of electronic negotiations on the negotiation behaviour of women.

**Keywords:** Negotiation behaviour, Emotional intelligence, Gender, Social preservation behaviour, Electronic negotiations

## **Table of contents**

List of tables and figures	V
List of abbreviations	VI
1. Introduction	1
1.1. The unexplained gender pay gap is still prevalent in modern-day society	1
1.2. Gender stereotypes may explain the gender pay gap	1
1.3. Gender stereotypes affect negotiation behaviour during salary negotiations	2
1.4. Emotional intelligence influences negotiation and social preservation behaviour	3
1.5. The role of emotions in face-to-face negotiations versus electronic negotiations	4
1.6. Aim of this study	4
2. Literature review	5
2.1. Different types of negotiation behaviour: integrative or distributive	5
2.1.1. Gender may influence negotiation behaviour	7
2.1.2. Emotional intelligence influences negotiation behaviour	8
2.2. Focus on relational capital during negotiations.	10
2.2.1. Gender predicts whether negotiators prioritize social capital	11
2.2.2. EI and preserving social relationships during negotiations	13
2.3. The influence of gender on negotiation behaviour in electronic negotiations	14
3. Methodology	15
3.1. Participants: NPT and SUM students	15
3.2. Data collection	16
3.3. Assessing EI: the WLEIS measure	16
3.4. Analysis of negotiation rounds	17
3.6. Ethical considerations.	18
4. Assessing the individual level of EI	18
4.1. Validity, reliability and internal consistency of the WLEIS measure	18
4.2. Grouping participants by level of EI	19
5. Findings: The influence of gender and EI on negotiation behaviour	20
5.1. Overview of used negotiation behaviours	20
5.2. The influence of gender on negotiation behaviours in high EI individuals	22
5.2.1. Integrative negotiation behaviours by high EI individuals	22
5.1.2. Distributive negotiation behaviours by high EI individuals	23
5.3 Influence of gender on negotiation behaviours in low EI individuals	24
5.3.1. Integrative behaviours by low EI individuals	25
5.3.2. Distributive behaviours by low EI individuals	26
5.4. The influence of EI on negotiation behaviour	27
5.5. Overview of used social preservation behaviours	27

	5.6. Influence of gender on social preservation behaviours in high EI individuals	28
	5.6.1. Integrative social behaviours by high EI individuals	29
	5.6.2. Distributive social behaviours by high EI individuals	30
	5.7. The influence of gender on social preservation behaviours in low EI individuals	31
	5.7.1. Integrative social behaviours by low EI individuals	31
	5.7.2. Distributive social behaviours by low EI individuals	32
	5.8. The influence of EI on social preservation behaviours	33
	5.9. The influence of an electronic negotiation setting on female negotiation behaviour	33
6.	. Discussion	34
	6.1. A higher level of EI leads to more distributive negotiation behaviour in electronic sal negotiations.	
	6.2. When level of EI is high, gender influences the preferred negotiation behaviour	35
	6.3. Female negotiators with a lower level of EI feel the need to prove themselves before negotiating a higher salary	
	6.4. Gender stereotypes do not influence social behaviour during electronic negotiat settings	
	6.5. Female negotiators are more aware of the social consequences of a negotiation, but does not show in their negotiation behaviour	
	6.6. Electronic negotiations may be beneficial for women in acquiring a higher salary	38
7.	. Conclusion	39
	7.1. Gender and EI do influence negotiation behaviour and social preservation behaviour	:.39
	7.2. Theoretical and practical implications	40
8.	. Limitations and directions for future research	41
	8.1. Shortcomings of the current study	41
	8.2. Suggestions for future research	42
R	References	44
A	ppendices	52
A	ppendix A – Participant instructions and informed consent form	52
A	ppendix B - Questionnaire part 1	53
A	ppendix C - Questionnaire part 2	54
A	ppendix D - Coding scheme negotiation behaviour	55
A	ppendix E - Coding scheme social preservation behaviours	56
A	ppendix F - Negotiation instructions case graduate	57
A	ppendix G - Negotiation instructions HR employee	58
A	ppendix H – Log of participant numbers and level of EI	60
A	ppendix I - Summary of negotiation behaviours per participant group	62
A	Appendix J - Summary of social behaviours per participant group	70

# List of tables and figures

Types of negotiation behaviour according to Saorín-Iborra (2008, p. 135)5
Table 1: Typology of negotiation strategies. Source: Olekalns et al. (2003); Weingart et al.
(2002)6
Table 2: Overview of integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours7
Table 3: Overview of integrative and distributive social behaviors
Table 4: Distribution of participants in Graduate role ( $n = 31$ ) by gender, age and level of
experience
Table 5: Chronbach's alpha for WLEIS and its four dimensions. '-' indicates no improvement
in the Cronbach alpha value
Table 6: Distribution (n = 31) of level of EI per gender
Table 7: Overview of integrative and distributive negotiation actions used by participants21
Table 8: Overview of social preservation behaviours used by participants28

### List of abbreviations

EI Emotional Intelligence

WLEIS Wong & Law Emotional Intelligence Scale

SEA Self-Emotional Appraisal

OEA Other's Emotional Appraisal

ROE Regulation of Emotions

UOE Use of Emotions

#### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1. The unexplained gender pay gap is still prevalent in modern-day society

There are still differences between the salaries of men and women, often referred to as the ''pay gap''. In 2019, the gender pay gap between men and women in The Netherlands was 14 per cent (CBS, 2020), indicating that women's average hourly earnings were 14 per cent lower than men's. In Germany, the gender pay gap is at 20 per cent (Statistisches Bundersamt, 2020). This gender pay gap is a combination of the explained and the unexplained gender pay gap. Researchers have tried to explain the existence of the pay gap by examining differences between men and women in terms of work preferences. For example, Webber (2016) shows that marital status and motherhood explain around 60 per cent of the differences in labour supply elasticity, effecting women's but not men's elasticity. This indicates that women with children are more likely to apply to a firm that focusses more on a good balance between family and working life, whereas men with children are more likely to have turnovers for monetary reasons, such as choosing a high-paying firm (Fuller, 2008; Webber, 2016). Card, Curdoso and Kline (2016) confirm this by concluding that women are more likely to work in lower-paying firms. The higher preference of women to stay with a firm may lead to lower bargaining power during salary negotiations (Bächmann & Zucco, 2020), as women are less inclined than men to switch employers when they do not receive the desired salary.

Another example of the explained gender pay gap can be found in Germany, where the gender pay gap was still 21 per cent (Boll & Lageman, 2018) in 2017. However, 5 per cent of this gender pay gap can be explained by the fact that German women usually work in lower occupational positions than men on average (Boll & Lageman, 2018). When controlling for other differences in occupational position, the unexplained gender pay gap was reduced to 2 per cent. This indicates that German men's average hourly pay is 2 per cent higher than the pay of their female colleagues in the same positions, without any identifiable reason for this difference (Finke, Dumpert & Beck, 2017). This is called the unexplained gender pay gap, as all circumstances are the same for both men and women, but there is still a difference in pay between the two genders.

#### 1.2. Gender stereotypes may explain the gender pay gap

Beeghly (2015) calls a stereotype a universal generalization about a specific social group, often used to state general claims about those social groups. For the purpose of this

paper, the focus is on gender stereotypes, which are general claims about either men or women. There is a difference between descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes. Descriptive gender stereotypes serve to explain what men and women presumably are (Rudman & Glick, 2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes, on the other hand, prescribe what men and women should be. For example, prescriptive stereotypes for women are about being communal, thoughtful, kind and sensitive to others' feelings (Rudman & Glick, 2001). These prescriptive stereotypes are in line with research that states that the lower status group (i.e. women) in a stable system of inequality (i.e. modern society ruled by gender norms) is often stereotyped as communal (Jackman, 1994). Moreover, historically, most people stereotype women as being nicer than men (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Despite society encouraging women to become more self-assertive and independent, women are still discouraged from advancing their own interests in such a way that conflicts with the interests of others (Rudman & Glick, 2001), which reflects the societal need for women to remain communal and adhere to the prescriptive gender stereotypes.

These stereotypes and societal norms upheld in modern society are often harmful and may drastically alter the career path of women. The most prominent example of this is the Orchestra Study by Goldin and Rouse (2000), who introduced ''blind'' auditions in orchestras across the U.S. The results of this study showed that the ''blind'' audition increased the probability of a woman being selected for the next round by 50 per cent. Furthermore, Baert, Pauw and Deschacht (2016) investigated the differences in receiving job offers between men and women during a randomized control trial. They found that woman receive 33 per cent fewer invitations to a job interview when this job implies a promotion in the future. Furthermore, several studies have shown that women have to be more able than men to be promoted (Blau & DeVaro, 2007; Bronson & Thoursie, 2019).

#### 1.3. Gender stereotypes affect negotiation behaviour during salary negotiations

As mentioned above, gender stereotypes affect the reasoning of employers. For example, during salary negotiations, women seem to be at a disadvantage due to stereotypical gender roles (Bohnet & Bowles, 2008) and stereotypical expectations (Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008) that are upheld by negotiation partners. These same gender stereotypes may also directly affect the negotiation behaviour of women. Eckel, de Olivera and Grossman (2008) believe that women unintentionally discredit themselves with their negotiation behaviour, because of the stereotypical expectations and norms in our current society. For example,

Sigurdardottir and Leifsson (2010) found that women in Iceland are less likely to counter-offer in salary negotiations than men, with 66 per cent of men and 4 per cent of women choosing to counteroffer. Similarly, Small, Gelfand, Babcock and Gettman (2007) propose that women initiate fewer negotiations to improve their compensation, compared to men. These differences in negotiation behaviour may be the result of women fearing social repercussions because of their behaviour during salary negotiations, whereas men do not have these fears (Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008). Gender may thus also influence the number of social preservation behaviours used during a negotiation. Social preservation behaviours are social behaviours with the intent to improve the long-term relationship with the negotiation partner. These behaviours are a form of building social or relational capital (Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishi & O'Brien, 2006). Women may prioritize building social capital before gaining monetary outcomes, which means women may be more concerned with maintaining positive social relationships, even if this costs them a higher salary.

Scholars debate whether social capital contributes to increasing gender equality or instead furthers the exploitation of women's labour (Healy, Haynes & Hampshire, 2007). Edwards (2004) suggests that the dominant social capital discourse reinforces traditional gender roles of women being more sensitive and kind. Women may thus be more inclined to adhere to the prescriptive gender role of being kind and sensitive to others' feelings (Rudman & Glick, 2001) by displaying social preservation behaviours, instead of negotiating a higher salary.

#### 1.4. Emotional intelligence influences negotiation and social preservation behaviour

Not only gender can influence an individual's negotiation behaviour. A person's level of emotional intelligence (EI) also determines negotiation behaviour. EI is the awareness and management of one's emotions and other's emotions (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006). Success in negotiations is known to depend on this emotional awareness and ability to manage emotions (Reilly, 2005). During the last two decades, there has been a steady increase in research on EI (EI). Numerous empirical studies have found that EI positively relates to effective stress management (Gohm et al. 2005), organizational citizenship behaviour (Carmeli & Josman, 2006) and the performance of leaders (Nikolaou & Tsaousis, 2002). However, studies that focus on the effect of EI on negotiation behaviour are not as numerous.

#### 1.5. The role of emotions in face-to-face negotiations versus electronic negotiations

Most negotiation studies focus on face-to-face negotiations (e.g. Sigurdardottir, Hotait, & Eichstädt, 2019). However, negotiations are increasingly conducted via electronic media instead of more traditional face-to-face settings (Loewenstein et al., 2005). In the case of this study, electronic negotiations refer to negotiations conducted via e-mail correspondence. The bandwidth of a communication channel, or the possibilities and limitations that the channel provides to express emotions, directly influences the degree in which emotion can be expressed in electronic negotiations (Griessmair et al., 2015). In electronic negotiations, the channel does not provide visual access to emotions (e.g. seeing facial expressions is not possible via e-mail), so alternative ways to express emotions must be found. When these alternative ways are not as efficient as real facial expressions, negotiators will not be able to coordinate the negotiation using emotions (Griessmair et al., 2015). It is thus interesting to see to what extent EI and gender, apart from influencing face-to-face negotiations, impact electronic negotiations.

#### 1.6. Aim of this study

This study aims to examine in what way gender and level of EI of a graduate negotiator influences their negotiation behaviour and social preservation behaviour during electronic salary negotiations conducted via email. This study will contribute to the societal debate surrounding the unexplained gender pay gap, by looking further into the aforementioned effects of gender and EI on negotiation behaviour during electronic negotiations. Furthermore, this study will provide a more in-depth understanding of why certain negotiation behaviours occur among negotiators, and to what extent these behaviours are related to an individual's gender or level of EI. This study will give more insights into male and female negotiation behaviour during online salary negotiations. More knowledge about this topic will hopefully contribute to eventually eradicating the unexplained gender pay gap. This results in the following research question:

To what extent do gender and level of EI influence graduate's negotiation behaviour and social preservation behaviour during electronic salary negotiations?

#### 2. Literature review

#### 2.1. Different types of negotiation behaviour: integrative or distributive

Two primary goals in any negotiation situation are creating value and claiming value (Sebenius, 1992). Creating value is also known as integrative bargaining, collaborative negotiation or creating joint gains. For the purpose of this research, the term integrative negotiation behaviour will be used. In integrative negotiations, the mutual process of discovering the opponents' interests allows for the creation of creative solutions that can increase the total sum of resources available to all parties (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). Integrative negotiation behaviour thus aims to create joint value, collaborate and reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties (Sharma, Bottom & Elfenbein, 2013). The opposite of integrative negotiation behaviour is distributive behaviour. Negotiators with a distributive negotiation style aim to take the total sum of resources and divide them among the parties, instead of focusing on value creation. Negotiators who prefer to use distributive behaviours are seen as more competitive and often decline cooperation with their negotiation counterpart (Ramsay, 2004). Such distributive behaviours are also known as competitive bargaining, or claiming value, and focusses on individual gains instead of joint value. Furthermore, Ramsay (2004) suggests that distributive behaviours are often used to preserve power during the negotiation process, making the style much more competitive.




Figure 1: Types of negotiation behaviour. Source: Saorín-Iborra (2008, p. 135)

Naturally, effective negotiation depends on the ability of negotiators to manage both integrative and distributive components. In the past, both types of behaviours were seen as mutually exclusive (Olekalns et al., 1996), but more recent works position distributive and integrative behaviours as complementary (Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo, 2019). Saorín-Iborra and Cubillo (2019) state that there are six types of negotiation behaviours (see figure. 1). Classified as distributive behaviours ('competitive orientation' in figure 1) are 'pure competitive behaviour', 'competition, 'soft competition', whereas 'compromise', 'collaboration' and 'pure

integrative behaviour' are classified as integrative behaviours (Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo, 2019). For the scope of this research, however, only the distinction between integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours will be made, therein including the other categories mentioned in figure 1. The typology developed by Weingart et al. (2007) comprises four strategies based on two dimensions. The first dimensions represent the strategic orientation, which can be either integrative or distributive. The second dimension is the strategic function, which comprises the information exchanged, and actions taken. Table 1 shows the interrelation between the two dimensions and the four different negotiation behaviours.

	Strategic orientation		
Strategic function	Distributive Integrative		
	Distributive information	Integrative information	
Information	Positions	Priorities	
	Facts	Needs	
		Interest	
	Claiming value	Creating value	
	Threats	Tradeoffs	
Action	Power use	Creative solutions	
	Bottom-line	Multi-issue offers	
	Single-issue offers		

Table 1: Typology of negotiation strategies. Source: Olekalns et al. (2003); Weingart et al. (2002)

Following the frameworks mentioned above, an overview of typical examples of both integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours can be made. See table 2 for an overview of integrative and distributive actions that can be used during negotiations. These include understanding an opponent's needs, seeking mutual satisfaction, trust between negotiators, ensuring a positive relationship, asking questions, giving explanations, free information flow and self-disclosures. Examples of distributive negotiation behaviours are misrepresentation of information, traditional competitive bargaining, bluffing or making high opening demands. The distinction between acceptable and unacceptable distributive behaviours is discussed extensively in literature, whereby misrepresentation is seen as unacceptable (Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo, 2019). Bluffing is considered amoral but acceptable (Kaufmann, Rottenburger, Carter & Schlereth, 2018).

Behaviour	Source			
Integrative behaviours				
Progress seeking	De Dreu & Van Kleef (2004)			
Concessions	Olekalns et al. (1996)			
	Baron (1990)			
Self-advocating	Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman (2008)			
Collaboration	Sharma et al. (2013)			
Seeking mutual satisfaction	Kim et al. (2005)			
	Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)			
Understanding opponents needs	Saorín-Iborra (2008)			
Distributive behaviours				
Acceptable distributive behaviours				
Rejection	Perdue (1992)			
	Olekalns et al. (1996)			
Traditional competitive bargaining	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)			
	Robinson et al. (2000)			
High opening demands	Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)			
Bluffing	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)			
	Robinson et al. (2000)			
Inacceptable distributive behaviours				
Misrepresentation	Lewicki & Robinson (1998)			

Table 2: Overview of integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours

#### 2.1.1. Gender may influence negotiation behaviour

The gender of a negotiator may influence their negotiation behaviour and outcomes. Gender roles can be defined as "a set of expectations and norms that are associated with being a man or a woman" (Bear, 2011, p. 50). Rosenberg (1989) found gender differences in adolescents, with young girls putting more importance on harmony and sensitivity, and boys evaluating toughness and dominance as more important. Gender differences in negotiations can often be explained by gender role theory. Gender role theory proposes that differences in negotiation behaviour stem from an (in)consistency between the gender role and the negotiator role. More specifically, this means that the masculine gender role and the negotiator role are more naturally consistent with each other, compared to the feminine gender role and the negotiator role, which are seen as more naturally inconsistent (Bear, 2011; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Skills that are most often deemed necessary to effectively negotiate are generally seen as masculine, for example being assertive or acting rationally. Typical feminine skills such as being emotional and being passive, are generally

considered less effective behaviours during negotiations (Kray & Thompson. 2005). Of course, this division is based on stereotypical gender roles. As previously mentioned, the masculine gender role involves agency, whereas the feminine gender role encompasses a focus on communality (Rudman & Glick, 1999). These gender roles are reinforced by individuals via descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes (Bear, 2011) that individuals internalize and use to form their own gender identity (Wood & Eagly, 2012).

These internalized gender roles may in turn influence the negotiation behaviour of an individual. For example, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) concluded that women use fewer assertive competing tactics, which resulted in obtaining lower outcomes. Similarly, Small, Gelfand, Babcock and Gettman (2007) found that women initiate fewer negotiations to improve their compensation, compared to men. These examples show women assuming a feminine gender role of being more submissive and communal, instead of the more masculine aggressive role. Adhering to this ''gender standard'' may be more important than a positive negotiation outcome, as a perceived match between one's gender-related behaviour and the gender role norm is rewarded by the production of positive emotions and an increase in self-esteem (Wood & Eagly, 2012). Moreover, behaving in line with one's gender role is also rewarded on an interpersonal level (Clark & Kashima, 2007), in such a way that a violation of the gender stereotype can lead to backlash or other negative social reactions (Wood & Eagly, 2012). In sum, female negotiators may be more likely to adopt an integrative negotiation style as to not deviate from the stereotypical gender norm expectation of women being more passive and understanding of others' needs. This leads us to the following sub-questions:

Q1a: Do female graduates use more integrative negotiation behaviours during electronic salary negotiations, compared to male graduates?

Q1b: What are the main differences in negotiation behaviour between male and female graduates during electronic salary negotiations?

#### 2.1.2. Emotional intelligence influences negotiation behaviour

An individual's level of EI (EI) influences the type of negotiation behaviour used by male and female negotiators. Different definitions of EI exist in academic literature, as the concept is still in development (Law, Wong, & Song, 2004). The concept of EI was popularized by Goleman in 1995, who stated that EI entails being aware of the emotions of the self and others, having control over one's emotions and being able to successfully manage others'

emotions (Goleman, 1995). In this study, the definition of Salovey and Mayer (1990) will be used. Salovey and Mayer (1990) conceptualized EI into four dimensions: 1) the appraisal and expression of emotion in the self, 2) the appraisal and recognition of emotion in others, 3) regulation of emotion in the self, thus enabling a more rapid recovery from psychological distress, and 4) the use of emotion to facilitate performance by guiding constructive activities and personal performance. Salovey and Mayer (1990) translate these facets of EI into four correlated scales, each comprised of 4 items: Self-Emotion Appraisal (SEA), Other's Emotion Appraisal (OEA), Use of Emotion (UOE), and Regulation of Emotion (ROE). Wong and Law (2002) used this conceptualization to form a 16-item measurement scale to assess EI. In 1997, Mayer & Salovey renamed the four branches of EI into "[...] the ability to (a) perceive emotion, (b) use emotion to facilitate thought, (c) understand emotions, and (d) manage emotions' (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004, p. 199). These branches are to be understood as a hierarchy in which managing one's emotions took the place at the top, and emotional perception at the bottom (Mayer et al., 2001). Interestingly, Mayer et al. (1997) state that EI is a learned behaviour, and thus a skill that can be gained and improved upon through practice.

Several studies have illustrated the positive effects of EI, for example illustrating how individuals scoring high in EI have more positive relations with others (Lopes, Salovey & Straus, 2003) and how high EI individuals are more likely to be elected as leaders (Wolff, Pescosolido & Druskat, 2002). In the workplace, higher levels of EI are positively related to supervisor evaluations of job dedication, interpersonal facilitation and even task performance (Law et al., 2004). Besides these effects, EI can also specifically impact negotiation behaviours. Several researchers have found that the presence of positive emotions in negotiations can lead to different negotiation behaviours such as concession making (Baron, 1990), satisfaction (Forgas, 1998) and desire to stay in the relationship (Hollingshead & Carnevale, 1990). Negative emotions in negotiations, on the other hand, can lead to a negative impression of the opponent, less flexibility in thinking, more impasses and a lesser joint gain (Allerd et al. 1997). This seems to indicate that having a high level of EI is critical in enhancing one's negotiation performance, as individuals with a high level of EI are more aware of their own emotions and the emotions of others, which makes them more capable of choosing the most appropriate communication (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). Rozell, Pettijohn and Parker (2004) also found that people scoring high on EI could be more competent in selecting the most ideal course of action. Additionally, Baron (1990) found that the negotiation counterpart of a high EI negotiator is more willing to perform concessions, because of the positive environment that a negotiator with a high level of EI is able to create. Negotiators with a high level of EI are thus better equipped to understand subtle communication cues, maintain their composure and a positive attitude during the negotiation process, leading to the creation of joint objective value (Naquin & Paulson, 2003). The better regulation of ones owns emotions that comes with higher levels of EI also facilitates negotiation behaviour, as it enables negotiators to remain focussed on joint interests and retain perspective, even when emotions may run high during the negotiation (Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan & Aik, 2004). Given that high EI negotiators are more capable of understanding subtle emotional cues and observing a counterpart's reactions and are thus more able to determine the best joint value, they may use more distributive behaviours during a salary negotiation. However, the specific negotiation behaviours used by both high and low EI negotiators is not as clear. This leads to the following sub-questions:

Q2a: Do graduates with high EI use more integrative negotiation behaviours in electronic salary negotiations, compared to graduates with low EI?

Q2b: What are the main differences in negotiation behaviour between graduates with high EI and graduates with low EI during electronic salary negotiations?

#### 2.2. Focus on relational capital during negotiations.

The negotiation field has, historically, been dominated by a focus on economic outcomes (Mestdagh & Buelens, 2003). However, a growing body of research stresses the importance of social-psychological outcomes, such as relational capital between negotiating parties (Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishi & O'Brien, 2006). Relational capital is similar to social capital, in which you gain individual relational ties within a network of people. In relational capital, however, the quality of the relationship with these people is most important. Hence, relational capital refers to the accumulation of mutual liking and trust, as well as gaining a good dyadic relationship with your negotiation partner (De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006). It may occur that negotiators, either consciously or unconsciously, lessen their economic outcomes (e.g. a higher salary) in their pursuit of relational goals or the adherence to relational norms. Curhan et al. (2008) found that women are more likely to forfeit economic gains to gain greater relational satisfaction, meaning women are more likely to value the interpersonal relationship with the negotiation partner more than the actual salary outcome. The negotiation behaviours that occur with the conscious or unconscious intent to acquire social capital, and thus preserving a positive (long-term) relationship with the negotiation partner, are what we call social preservation behaviours.

Behaviour	Source
Integrative social behaviours	
Desire to stay in positive relationship	Hollingshead & Carnevale (1990)
Ensuring positive personal relationship	Kim et al. (2005)
Understanding others' needs	Kim et al. (2005), Saorín-iborra (2018)
Trust	Kim et al. (2005)
Distributive social behaviours	
Fear of social repercussions	Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman (2008)
Preserving power (e.g. demanding)	Ramsay (2004)
Manipulating inappropriate	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)

Table 3: Overview of integrative and distributive social behaviors

#### 2.2.1. Gender predicts whether negotiators prioritize social capital

Eckel, de Olivera and Grossman (2008) state that women face more stereotypical expectations and have a bigger fear of social repercussions due to their behaviour during a negotiation. These implicit norms and stereotypical expectations may be a significant disadvantage for women during salary negotiations (Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008), and may lead to worse negotiation performance and outcomes compared to men. Based on these stereotypes, people often expect women to perform worse than men during negotiations. For example, the stereotype of seeing women as being cooperative and men as competitive during negotiations, may lead people to expect that men will always negotiate better deals, and to value the used negotiation behaviours differently for men and women (Sigurdardottir & Leifsson, 2010). Gender may also influence employers' salary offers, as Karlsson, Jonsdottir and Vilhjalmsdottir (2007) state that both male and female negotiators offered women less salary than men for the same tasks. Furthermore, these implicit norms and stereotypes are prevalent the direct environment of an individual, which can be seen in the finding that both men and women advised women to settle for a lower salary than men for the same position (Karlsson, Jonsdottir and Vilhjalmsdottir, 2007).

In terms of negotiation behaviour, these stereotypical expectations may cause women and men to feel that they must comply with implicit norms, such as stereotypes that women are expected to be more caring and more generous than men (Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008). Even women who are generally assertive and self-advocating, are more likely than men to make concessions during salary negotiations, as they are afraid of facing social sanctions for being too demanding (Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schnedier & Amanatullah, 2009). For example, female negotiators who are generally assertive and self-advocating by nature, are more likely than men

to make concessions during negotiations, out of fear for social sanctions that are often the result of these implicit norms and stereotypical expectations (Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008).

Compared to men, women thus seem to take social context into higher account when negotiating, often adjusting their negotiation behaviour to maintain social impressions and avoid negative social consequences (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) that could damage the relationship. Indeed, a negotiators behaviour during the negotiation process affects the likelihood of creating a long-term business relationship with the negotiation partner (Thomas, Thomas, Manrodt & Rutner, 2013). Rubin and Brown (1975) propose that women might be more responsive to interpersonal aspects of the negotiation relationship and are thus more sensitive and reactive to their counterpart's behaviour, which they call 'high interpersonal orientation'. Male negotiators, on the other hand, tend to be less likely to respond to their opponent's negotiation behaviour as they are, in general, primarily interested in their own gain, which is a 'low interpersonal orientation'. Social pressure can also reflect in salary outcomes, as Wade (2001) argues that socialization pressures have often caused women to assert themselves less salary, often out of fear that making a higher-than-average request will be penalized, which often leads to women to negotiating a lower salary than men.

However, women do seem to negotiate significantly better when negotiating on behalf of others, rather than themselves (Bowles et al., 2005). The reason for this seems to be that they do not fear social repercussions for assertive behaviour when negotiation on others' behalf, and thus make fewer concessions and come to higher monetary results (Sigurdardottir & Leifsson, 2010). Amanatullah and Morris (2010) also support the notion that gender interacts with advocacy (e.g. self-advocacy) in a way that determines negotiation behaviour and outcomes, in the sense that assertive negotiation behaviour is attenuated when negotiating on behalf of others, but that gender differences in assertive negotiation behaviours are mediated by women's' fear of negative backlash. This indicates that the social aspect of negotiations is important to female negotiators, given that they base their negotiation behaviour on it. The expectation is that women will show more integrative social behaviours (see table 3), with the intent of preserving a positive social relationship with the negotiation partner. This leads to the following subquestions:

Q3a: Do female graduates show more integrative social behaviours during electronic salary negotiations, compared to male graduates?

Q3b: What are the main differences in social preservation behaviours between male and female graduates during electronic salary negotiations?

#### 2.2.2. EI and preserving social relationships during negotiations

Individuals high in EI were more likely to have positive relationships with others and are less likely to report negative interactions with their friends (Lopes, Salovey & Straus, 2003). Given that Law et al. (2004) found EI to be distinct from personality, this could indicate that the ability to foster a positive social relationship does depend on an individual's level of EI. An individual's level of EI can also influence the use of social preservation behaviours in negotiation situations. Given that they are more able to regulate their own emotions effectively, negotiators with a higher level of EI are more likely to develop a good relationship with their negotiation partners (Baron, 1990). In terms of specific negotiation behaviours, research suggests that a person with a high level of EI may prove to make concessions and focus more on the counterpart's interests (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni & Manstead, 2006). Put more generally, several studies (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii & O'Brien, 2006; Wolff et al., 2002) show that negotiators with high levels of EI are more likely to create value by gaining the trust of their counterpart. This is interesting, given that Naquin and Paulson (2003) found that trust promotes integrative negotiation behaviour, indicating that negotiators high in EI may engage in more integrative behaviours during negotiations. Furthermore, positive emotions more often lead to creative negotiation strategies and integrative negotiation outcomes, whereas negative emotions lead to distributive negotiation situations (Kumar, 1997). Similarly, Der Foo et al. (2015) found that emotionally intelligent negotiators can positively influence their negotiation outcomes with their ability to create value and establish trust, which further points to an integrative negotiation style. Foo, Elfenbein and Tan (2004) also argue that individuals scoring high on EI have a more positive experience during the negotiation process.

It thus seems that negotiators with high EI seem more likely to value the creation of a long-term relationship with their negotiation counterpart. However, high EI negotiators seem unable to claim the created value for themselves (Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan & Aik, 2004), leading to lower objective scores. Similarly, Foo et al. (2004) argue that negotiators high in EI receive significantly lower objective scores, indicating a tension between affective and objective negotiation outcomes due to high levels of EI. It is thus not surprising that a negotiators' behaviour during the negotiation process affects the likelihood of creating a long-term business relationship with the negotiation partner (Thomas, Thomas, Manrodt & Rutner, 2013), in the

sense that integrative behaviours seem to have a more positive influence on the long-term relationship. This leads to the expectation that negotiators who put more importance on having a positive social relationship with their negotiation counterpart, may engage in more integrative behaviours during negotiations. This leads to the following sub-questions:

Q4a: Do graduates with high EI show more integrative social behaviour than graduates with low EI?

Q4b: What are the main differences in use of social preservation behaviours between high EI and low EI graduates during electronic salary negotiations?

#### 2.3. The influence of gender on negotiation behaviour in electronic negotiations

The current study will focus on electronic negotiations conducted through email. Matheson (1991) already suggested that such computer-mediated communications are low on social presence, as almost all channels are removed, except the written word. This absence of social presence may diminish the influence of social norms and pressures. For example, McGuire, Kiesler and Siegel (1987) found that computer-mediated group decision was less influenced by social norms than face-to-face group decisions. Similarly, Kiesler and Sproull (1986) concluded that people use less socially desirable terms during a computer-mediated interview, compared to a face-to-face interview, presumably because they are less concerned with social impression management. It could thus be expected that gender stereotypes and social norms may play a less prominent part in electronic negotiations. However, the absence of social norms may also have negative consequences, such as an increased display of distributive social behaviour such as name-calling and swearing (Kiesler et al., 1984).

In terms of gender, Stuhlmacher, Citera and Willis (2007) found that women's behaviour in negotiations becomes much more hostile and competitive in a situation in which social pressure is significantly reduced, such as in a virtual negotiation setting like the email correspondence used in the current study. The fact that the negotiation case was conducted via email correspondence, may thus have led female negotiators to adopt more distributive negotiation behaviours than they would in a face-to-face setting. This assumption is further supported by previous studies that found that the absence of personal cues and the reduction of social context in computer-mediated communication, may reduce the impact of status effects such as social status or hierarchy (Dubrovsky, Kiesler and Sethna, 1991; Parks and Floyd, 1995; Tan et al., 1998). Thus, compared to face-to-face negotiations, maintaining a positive social

relationship may be of less importance in electronic negotiations. This leads to the following sub-question:

Q5: Do female graduates use more distributive behaviours during electronic negotiations, compared to face-to-face negotiations?

#### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1. Participants: NPT and SUM students

To answer this research question, the negotiation behaviour of students from the University of Twente in Enschede, The Netherlands will be studied. See table 4 for an overview of participants. These students either take part in the Negotiation Project Twente (NPT), a voluntary and extra-curricular course for undergraduate and graduate students with the aim to improve student's negotiation skills, or are undergraduate students that followed the elective course Supply Management, which includes negotiation training. Both groups have thus received negotiation training, but differ in level of experience and duration of training. NPT students are bachelor and master students from diverse study backgrounds, with a total of 8 months of negotiation experience.

Gender	n	Percentage
Female	21	77.8
Male	6	22.2
Age bracket		
19 - 21	21	77.8
22 - 25	6	22.2
Experience		
None at all	6	22.2
A little	17	63
A moderate amount	4	14.8
A lot	0	0
Total	27	100

Table 4: Distribution of participants in Graduate role (n = 31) by gender, age and level of experience.

The SUM students are a group of bachelor students with the same study track, with only a few hours of negotiation training. It is during their training period that data will be collected. Participants are from The Netherlands and Germany, so English is not their mother tongue. All participants are Bachelor and Master level university students from different fields, which

means our participants all have a higher education level. The total group of participants has a sample size of N=60 students, split between female N=21 and male N=39 students. See table 4 for more detailed participant information.

#### 3.2. Data collection

Due to the emergence of COVID-19, it was not possible to do face-to-face negotiations between participants. Instead, participants were instructed to perform an online salary negotiation case via email. In this case, participants played either a graduate applying for a job, or an HR employer looking to hire. Participants received confidential written instructions for either the role of graduate (see appendix F) or the role of HR employee (see appendix G), indicating their desired outcomes. The HR roles were filled solely with male participants, given the skewed gender distribution. This gives us 30 HR employees, with male graduates N = 9 and female graduates N = 21. For the purpose of this analysis, only the responses of the graduate roles were analysed. Unfortunately, some male participants in the Graduate role did not complete the whole questionnaire, so their responses were deleted. The total number of graduates, and thus useful samples, after deleting missing cases was N = 27, divided between female graduates N = 21 and male graduates N = 6. They all negotiated with a male HR employer N = 27. Before starting the negotiation case, participants were asked to complete part 1 of an online survey using the online data collection tool Qualtrics (see appendix B). This survey includes an informed consent statement (see appendix A), the EI measure and biographical information. Participants had a time limit of 2 days to reach an agreement. After participants complete their negotiation case, they finished part 2 of the questionnaire, which consists of open-ended interview questions about their negotiation behaviour (see appendix C).

#### 3.3. Assessing EI: the WLEIS measure

During part 1 of the questionnaire, participant's EI was measured using the 16-item self-report scale on EI (WLEIS), one of the most widely used measures of EI, fabricated by Wong & Law (2002, p. 270-271). This scale consists of four dimensions of EI: self-emotion appraisal (SEA), use of emotions (UOE), regulation of emotions (ROE) and other's emotion appraisal (OEA). SEA measures the ability of individuals to understand and express their emotions. An example of a SEA measure is: 'I really understand what I feel'. UOE is the ability to direct one's emotions to improve performance. An example of a UOE measure is: I am a self-motivated person. 'ROE is an individual's ability to regulate their own emotions. An example of an ROE measure is: I am quite capable of controlling my own emotions. 'Lastly, OEA

measures one's capability to understand the emotions of others. An example of an OEA measure is: *I am a good observer of other's emotions*. Participants will use the WLEIS as a self-report measure to assess their own EI, answering the questions using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *never* to *always*. The WLEIS will result in a total individual score on EI.

There are many reasons for using WLEIS to assess EI. The main reason for including it in this study is that WLEIS is consistent with Mayer and Salovey's definition of EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1990), which is the definition used in this paper. Furthermore, several studies have proven the WLEIS to be reliable across different cultures (Shi & Wang, 2007; Law, Wong & Huang, 2008; Kong, 2017). Additionally, Kong (2017) found that WLEIS can be reliably applied to measure EI in individuals of different gender and age groups in China. Third, reliability of the WLEIS measure is generally considered very good. Kok-Mun, Wang, Zalaquett and Bodenhorn (2007) report WLEIS' reliability to be good ( $\alpha$  = .88) and Shi and Wang (2007) state ( $\alpha$  = .81). Lastly, unlike other self-report EI scales, WLEIS does not confuse EI for personality, as it is conceptually different from measures of personality such as the Big Five personality model (Law et al., 2004).

#### 3.4. Analysis of negotiation rounds

After participants have completed the negotiation case, they were required to hand in one PDF file in which the complete e-mail correspondence between the respondents over the course of the 2-day period is documented. The directed content analysis method (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) was used to analyse the data. This means that literature and previous studies were used to identify key concepts or variables surrounding negotiation behaviour, which are then used as initial coding categories (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). Preliminary to the analysis, pre-defined coding schemes were formulated, based on literature and previous studies. The coding scheme to assess the negotiation rounds is divided into integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours. A complete overview of pre-defined codes and their respective sources can be found in appendices D and E. During the analysis, behaviours may come forward that do not fit with the pre-defined codes. Any text that cannot be categorized using the initial coding scheme, will be given a new code (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Unfortunately, because of the thorough literature study preliminary to the data analysis, and the reliance on a start-list of codes, this method is prone to biases (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The researcher must be aware of these biases and actively seek out to eliminate them. A downside of the directed content method of analysis is that the overemphasis on theory could

blind the researcher to contextual aspects of the phenomenon (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This problem is partially solved by having the participants fill in an open-ended questionnaire in which they are asked to explain their negotiation behaviour. This will lower the chances of researcher bias, as the interpretation of data is supported by participants own explanations, rather than the sole interpretation of the researcher. The trustworthiness of the research is safeguarded by the use of a coding scheme. According to Folger, Hewes and Poole (1984), this is central to ensure trustworthiness of any research using content analysis.

#### 3.6. Ethical considerations

Participants needed to fill in an informed consent form (see appendix A) detailing their rights. Participants will be completely anonymous throughout the research project and are informed about the fact that their negotiation sessions and questionnaires will be used in a study. Anonymity is guaranteed by given the participant a number, for example FH1 for a female graduate with high EI, and ML3 for a male graduate with low EI. Participants will only ever be referred to by these codes, and their names will be deleted. All participants are required to fill in a short-informed consent form before taking part in the study, indicating that they are informed about the use of their information. Participants can decide to retract from participating at any given moment by contacting the researcher, upon which their data will be deleted. After finishing the research project successfully, participants data will be permanently deleted from the researcher's files.

#### 4. Assessing the individual level of EI

#### 4.1. Validity, reliability and internal consistency of the WLEIS measure

To assess the validity of our EI construct measure, the WLEIS, Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is used as a measure of internal consistency. However, given that the WLEIS is not a unidimensional scale, additional analyses are needed. To this end, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to confirm construct validity of the items in the initial WLEIS categories. To test internal consistency and thus reliability of the measure, Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is used. The Cronbach's Alpha value indicates a relatively high internal consistency when it is equal to or exceeds the 0.70 threshold usually applied in social sciences. All four WLEIS-components seem to be highly internally consistent, except the alpha for the OEA measure (see table 5). A four-factor analysis was conducted, as proposed by Law and Wong (2002). The results of this analysis and the scree plot showed 5 factors. All items indeed

load highest on their respective category of the WLEIS measurement scale, except for item 7 (measuring UOE with the item *I am a self-motivated person*). Item 7 was the only item to load highest on the 5<sup>th</sup> factor. Another factor analysis was performed, this time while specifying the set number of factors to extract 4 factors. The scree plot still shows 5 factors. However, item 7 now loads highest on factor 4 as well. The rest of the factor loadings changed to both lower and higher number across all 4 factors, so there is no significant increase in overall factor loadings. Item 7 did not load high on factor 4 in the factor analysis. The Cronbach's alpha when item 7 is deleted from all 16 items improves from 0.745 to 0.761 (see table 5). Furthermore, there is no missing response for item 7 that could explain the found difference in alpha level. The Cronbach's alpha of OEA improved from 0.649 to 0.692 when item 7 is deleted. Although this is still below 0.7, an alpha between 0.6 and 0.7 is generally accepted by many scholars in the field of social sciences (Vaske, 2008). This leads to the decision to delete item 7 in computing the participants individual EI scores.

Item	Cronbach's alpha	Change after deletion of item 7
WLEIS	0.745	0.761
SEA	0.712	-
OEA	0.649	0.693
UOE	0.766	-
ROE	0.814	-

Table 5: Chronbach's alpha for WLEIS and its four dimensions. '-' indicates no improvement in the Cronbach alpha value

#### 4.2. Grouping participants by level of EI

Participants level of EI was calculated by computing a new variable called Total\_EI, which shows the computed mean score of EI for each participant (see appendix H). Based on their mean score, participants are classified as either 'high EI' or 'low EI'. The WLEIS score can range between 0 and 5, where 0 is very low and 5 is very high. Participants who scored above 4.00 will be classified as individuals with a high level of EI, as several studies have indicated that a WLEIS score of 4.00 is average among this age category (Law, Wong & Song, 2004). Participants scoring below 3.80 will be classified as low EI individuals, given this is lower than the average mean score in this age category (Law, Wong & Song, 2004). The WLEIS scores of the 27 participants ranged from 2.87 to 4.27 with a mean of 3.90. 12 participants ranged between 2.87 and 3.80, and were classified as low EI, seven scored in the medium section from 3.80 to 4.00 and eight participants reached 4.00 and over, being classified as high EI. This leads to 8 participants scoring as high EI, consisting of 5 female and 3 male

participants. This leads to 12 participants being classified as low EI, consisting of 11 female participants and 1 male participant. There were 7 participants with a medium score ranging between 3.80 and 4.00, who were omitted from the analysis as their scores were too close to either category to be properly classified and may skew the results. The mean EI scores of the respective groups can be seen in table 6.

Gender	Level of EI	n	percentage	M
Female	High (>4.00)	5	31.25	4.00
Female	Low (<3.80)	11	68.75	3.47
	Total	16	100.0	
Male	High (>4.00)	3	75.0	4.02
Female	Low (<3.80)	1	25.0	3.60
	Total	4	100.0	

*Table 6: Distribution (n = 31) of level of EI per gender* 

It is important to note that EI exists on a spectrum and is thus not the be defined as a definite 'high' or 'low' in reality. However, for the purpose of this study, such a hard cut-offline is needed to be able to group participants.

#### 5. Findings: The influence of gender and EI on negotiation behaviour

#### 5.1. Overview of used negotiation behaviours

The following section will summarize the 20 selected negotiation cases and questionnaires in terms of negotiation behaviour used by participants. Appendix I contains an overview of the distributive and integrative negotiation behaviours that were used per participant group in all the 20 negotiation cases. Table 7 shows a summary of the findings, which will be discussed and compared in the following section. First, a general overview of the outcome per group will be given. Next, a more detailed account of the negotiation rounds will follow, illustrated with example statements from the negotiation cases.

Gender	Female		Male				
Level of EI	<b>High</b> (> 4.00)	<b>Low</b> (< 3.80)	<b>High</b> (> 4.00)	<b>Low</b> (< 3.80)			
<b>Integrative actions</b> Low (1-4,9%) Low-Medium (5-9,9%) Medium (10-14,9%) Medium-High (15-19,9%)							
High (>20%)							
Progress seeking	-	Low (0,7)	Low-Medium	-			
			(5,1)				
Concessions	Low-Medium	Low (4,8)	-	Low-Medium (6,6)			
	(6,1)						
Self-advocating	Medium (12,2)	Low-Medium (7,5)	Low (2,6)	-			
Collaboration	Low (5,1)	Medium-High	Low-Medium	High (20,0)			
		(17,1)	(5,1)				
Seeking mutual	Low (1,0)	-	-	-			
satisfaction							
Understanding	Low (4,1)	Low-Medium (5,5)	-	High (20,0)			
opponents needs							
Asking for	-	Low (4,8)	-	-			
renegotiation in							
future							
Providing sources	-	Low-Medium (5,3)	Low-Medium	-			
			(5,1)				
Total	29,5	45,7	17,9	46,6			
Distributive actions	Low (1-4,9%) Low	-Medium (5-9,9%) Med	dium (10-14,9%) M	edium-High (15-			
19,9%) High (>20%)							
Rejection	Low-Medium	Low (1,4)	Medium (12,8)	Medium (13,3)			
	(7,14)						
Bluffing	Low (1,0)	Low (3,4)	Low (2,6)	-			
Traditional	Medium (14,3)	Medium (13,0)	High (23,1)	High (20,0)			
competitive							
bargaining							
High opening	Low (2,0)	Low (2,1)	-	-			
demands							
Repeating demand	Low-Medium	-	-	-			
	(5,1)						
Total	29,5	19,9	38,5	33,3			
Total negotiation	59	65,5	56,4	79,9			
tactics							
Negotiation	Combination	Integrative	Distributive	Integrative			
behaviour							

Table 7: Overview of integrative and distributive negotiation actions used by participants

The questionnaire answers will be used to provide more understanding of participants reasoning behind their chosen negotiation behaviours. Participants' codes reveal their gender and level of EI, in the sense that FL is used to abbreviate female low EI participants, and MH indicates a male high EI participant.

#### 5.2. The influence of gender on negotiation behaviours in high EI individuals

An overview of the percentage of integrative and distributive negotiation actions used by participants can be found in table 7. As mentioned in chapter 2, the expectation is that female negotiators use more integrative negotiation behaviours, whereas male negotiators will use more distributive negotiation behaviours. However, the results show that female participants with a high level of EI use an equal amount of both integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours, as they used integrative behaviours 29,5 per cent of the time and distributive behaviours 29,5 per cent. The male participants with a high level of EI can be classified as having a predominantly distributive negotiation style, as they used competitive behaviours in 38,5 per cent of the cases, while only using integrative behaviours 17,9 per cent of the time. This shows that the female high EI participants used a much more balanced combination of the two negotiation styles, whereas the male high EI negotiators preferred distributive behaviours. Both groups used a similar amount of negotiation tactics, using a total of 59 and 56,4 behaviours respectively.

#### 5.2.1. Integrative negotiation behaviours by high EI individuals

Integrative behaviours show a willingness to work together with the negotiation partner, to reach the best outcome for both parties. In terms of integrative negotiation behaviours, the male participants did not make concessions, whereas the female participants did. For example, one participant was ''prepared to make a trade-off between getting no vacation days but working for a higher salary'' (FH18). The female participants also showed more, and clearer self-advocating behaviours compared to the male high EI participants, for example: ''Because of my personal motivation and my many more skills and experiences as regular graduates from PSM, I see myself as qualified to enrich your team at your company'' (FH5). Contrastingly, the male high EI participant that used self-advocating, did so much less convincingly: ''As I already mentioned during the interview, I am a great opportunity for you'' (MH3).

Both genders used collaboration in an equal amount. The female group was more understanding of opponents needs and sought out to reach mutual satisfaction, whereas the male

high EI participants showed neither of these behaviours. Both the willingness to understand the opponent and aiming for mutual satisfaction can be seen during the negotiation: 'I understand the side of your company, but maybe it makes sense at this point to offer you a little more insight into my situation, so you can understand my side". (FH5). This participant also mentioned that she was trying to foster a mutual understanding in the questionnaire: "I tried to make him understand my situation, as I thought that's the easier way to get what I need'' (FH5). One female high EI participants also mentioned trying to foster a win-win situation in their questionnaire: "I wanted to be fair and honest, by doing this I wanted to create a win-win situation'' (FH10). These are all examples of integrative negotiation behaviours. The male high El participants displayed more progress-seeking behaviours, such as: "Would you be able to match these conditions and numbers?''(MH5). Furthermore, the male participants used sources to strengthen their arguments, for example ''I have also added a report about the housing market in the Netherlands as an attachment, which is from ABN Amro, October 2019. In that report, one can see that it is extremely difficult to find proper housing with lower salaries" (MH3) and 'However, according to my research, the typical salary range for somebody with my qualifications in this role is at least €4500 / month'' (MH5). The female participants did not use sources.

#### 5.1.2. Distributive negotiation behaviours by high EI individuals

Distributive behaviours are competitive and focus on reaching the best possible individual goals. The male high EI group used more distributive negotiation behaviours than the female participants. Male participants showed more rejection behaviours, for example: "I would like to accent that this is not a normal offer, I would be better off working at the Albert Heijn [Dutch supermarket]" (MH2) and "I would suggest that you give other participants a try, and if the firm is still interested in me than please do another offer" (MH2). This rejection is much more aggressive than those of the female high EI participants: "As someone who has a master's degree, I will not accept any offers lower than 2200 excluding benefits" (FH15). Furthermore, male high EI participants used more traditional competitive bargaining behaviours than female high EI participants, which can, for example, be seen in the fact that male participant counter-offered much more often. The male high EI participants also scored slightly higher on use of bluffing, for example mentioning other opportunities: "I am currently looking for other opportunities in the region" (MH2). Interestingly, none of the high EI male participants were seen making high opening demands, whereas some female participants did, for example: "As a starting point I would like to get a 3000 Euros salary that does not include

any additional monetary or non-monetary, fixed or variable components not stated in this case and does not depend on conditional clauses. Since I do not live in western Netherlands, I would like to receive a company car that will get me to work every day'' (FH15).

Furthermore, most high EI participants tried to make up for their lack of experience and status as a recent graduate by providing a lot of facts, as a way of taking charge of the conversation. One female negotiator specifically mentioned that she saw their status as a recent graduate as a weakness during the negotiation: "Since it's a salary negotiation where I did not have a very strong side (not many years of experience, previous projects etc) it was important not to ask for too much but still get what I wanted" (FH18). She decided to solve this issue by being descriptive and argumentative: "Therefore, I tried to be as descriptive as I could and give arguments for everything I wanted, or I did not want' (FH18). The male negotiators had a much more aggressive solution and tried to overwhelm their counterpart: "I wanted to give him as much information as possible (and facts as well), so that he had to do a lot of effort to counter me" (MH3) and "It took him [negotiation partner] a very long to come up with just a little bit of useful information. I think he had a lot of difficulty with responding to my long, factual email'' (MH3). These comments show that the male high EI negotiators have a somewhat more aggressive distributive negotiation style, compared to the more analytical approach by the female negotiators. Furthermore, the female negotiators were often seen repeating demands: "Again I would like to mention that the earliest point in time for me to start working at your company is July, not June". (FH10). The male negotiators did not repeat themselves, perhaps indicating a more arrogant or aggressive relationship with their negotiation partners. However, by repeating demands negotiators are not giving in to the needs of the opponent, but instead repeating their own wishes and demands in hopes of the other party giving in, which is also indicative of a very distributive negotiation style.

#### 5.3 Influence of gender on negotiation behaviours in low EI individuals

Contrary to our expectations (see chapter 2), both male and female participants with a low level of EI had an integrative negotiation style (see table 7), as the male low EI participants used integrative behaviours 46,6 per cent of the time and the female low EI participants used integrative behaviours 45,7 per cent of the time. These percentages greatly outweigh the use of distributive negotiation behaviours in the low EI group, which are used 33,3 per cent of the time amongst male negotiators and only 19,9 per cent amongst female low EI negotiators. Interestingly, the male low EI participants used much more negotiation tactics in general,

compared to all the other groups. The low EI male participants used both integrative and distributive negotiation tactics 79,9 per cent of the time, which is much higher than the other groups.

#### **5.3.1.** Integrative behaviours by low EI individuals

Both female and male low EI participants tried to seek mutual satisfaction with their negotiation behaviours. For example, the female negotiators stated: ''I understand your point that summer is the busiest time and you, therefore, need every employee available and that you want me to start on the 6th of April. Could we agree on the 15th of April with one week extra holiday?'' (F20) and ''I understand that you cannot immediately decide the salary increase after 6 months, but I would need the increase to make sure that I can pay the rent'' (F20), trying to reach a mutual understanding. In the questionnaire, two female low EI participants mentioned that they were trying to achieve a win-win situation: 'I planned to try to make a win-win situation. The company has something I want, I have something they want'' (FL20) and ''Both were in need for an agreement. I wanted a job, the company needed someone before the busy summer to be ready to work then. Because both parties were in need, I think this behaviour was successful'' (FL20). The results show that male low EI participants were also willing to understand and consider other's needs, compared to the female low EI participants, and were regularly using statements as ''I understand your point'' (ML4) and ''I also see why you do not want to exceed a specific budget'' (ML4).

The female participants used progress seeking and self-advocating behaviours, while the male participants used neither. Some examples of self-advocating behaviours as displayed by the female low EI participants are 'I believe that I am academically capable of this taking on this position'' (FL4) and 'I believe my fundamentals will be significantly of great importance to the success of the company'' (FL6). Furthermore, female negotiators provided sources to strengthen their arguments: 'I did some research and looked into Glassdoor and Payscale to get more information on average salaries for a starting Purchasing Managers and found an annual average of  $50.000\epsilon$  in the Netherlands. Which would mean a monthly salary of 4.116." (FL9) and 'I would like to remind you to think about the average salary of purchase managers in Amsterdam of around  $\epsilon 5000$  per month'' (FL13). Male low EI negotiators did not use sources during the negotiation.

Both groups were shown to use a lot of collaboration behaviours. The collaboration behaviours by female low EI participants were somewhat timid, and mostly based on asking for

a deal instead of negotiating one: 'Is a company car an option?'' (FL9) and 'Is there any chance that the salary will increase after months? If there is, how much can I get?'' (FL12), whereas the male collaboration behaviours were more focused and giving suggestions themselves 'Depending on how urgently you need this position to be filled we can arrange an appropriate time, but I have thought about some months so I can help you as much as possible when I would start'' (ML4). Nonetheless, both quotes show integrative negotiation behaviour, as they are trying to seek a solution that fits both parties. The female negotiators showed a willingness to work with the counterpart in trying to set up a renegotiation for a salary raise in the future: 'If I successfully achieve these goals within a specified period, I shall get a raise to 2700 in 6 months' (F6L) and 'I can go to 2500 per month but I would like to make an arrangement that my salary can go up by the years as I will be more experienced in the job' (FL7). This is a prime example of integrative negotiation behaviour, as negotiators try to reach the best mutual outcome by working together and offering up creative solutions that will help both parties achieve the best deal.

Low EI participants were aware of their preference for collaborative, integrative negotiation behaviours, as they explained in the questionnaire: ''I think I was quite down-to-earth and open for discussions and compromise'' (FL4). That same participant states that she was very accepting of the offers and tried to be reasonable: 'I accept with most of the deals from the HR side, which I find reasonable and only ask for extra acceptable deals'' (FL4). Unfortunately, this participant later states that she should have been more assertive: ''I think I could be more assertive with my monthly salary''(FL4).

#### **5.3.2.** Distributive behaviours by low EI individuals

The male low EI participants used more distributive behaviours, compared to the female low EI participants. Both genders were seen rejecting offers. One male negotiator rejected a salary offer with 'In my honest opinion, I feel some doubts that this salary is nearly appropriate, even for new team members. Even considering the benefits that are associated with it' (ML4). However, the rejection of the female low EI participant was much more direct and abrasive: '' 'Your offer is almost insulting to me, since we are negotiation about the function of purchasing manager. (...) If you cannot make an offer that is less insulting, I am afraid I will not be able to work for you company, even though I am really interested in the function.'' (FL13). The female participants used bluffing, for example: ''Is that really the best the company can do? I might need to consider other options, if there is really no chance of a

higher salary than that. Which would be only my last resort." (FL9), whereas the male participants did not. The counteroffers of the male low EI participant were factual and clean: "I state two last options and I would like if you can tell me what you think of it. Option 1: Salary: 2000 - Vacation: 6 weeks - Benefits: OV, Free lunch. Option 2: Salary: 2100 - Vacation: 5 weeks - Benefits: OV, Free lunch" (ML4), whereas the female low EI counter-offers were more demanding: "I can accept the job with a starting salary of 4000 euro per month, which includes all the transportation costs. OR 3700 euro per month, which includes either a company car or an OV card worth 300 euros each month" (FL3). The female negotiators admitted to using distributive negotiation behaviours, such as being dishonest about their desired salary, in their responses on the questionnaire: "My ideal salary will be around 2500 per month but I told the HR that I want 3100 per month" (FL12) and "I planned to over-estimate the salary a little bit, so the other party would compromise to an amount I'd be happy with" (FL21).

Furthermore, the female low EI participants stressed the importance of good preparation and use of sources: '' I also planned on using the internet for finding out what is reasonable to ask for'' (FL1), '' I did not plan any behaviour besides knowing my worth and having some research (Glassdoor, Payscale) to make comprehensive arguments'' (FL9) and ''Since the function was purchasing manager, I looked on the internet for the average salary of a purchasing manager in Amsterdam'' (FL13). None of the male low EI participants mentioned extensive preparation or using resources before taking part in the negotiation case.

#### 5.4. The influence of EI on negotiation behaviour

As mentioned in chapter 2, the expectation is that negotiators with a high level of EI will prefer an integrative negotiation style, as they are more capable of creating joint value through the appropriate use of emotions. However, the results show that the low EI negotiators have an integrative negotiation style, whereas high EI negotiators are either a combination (female group) or a distributive negotiation style (male group).

#### 5.5. Overview of used social preservation behaviours

The following section will summarize the 20 selected negotiation cases and questionnaires in terms of social preservation behaviours used by participants. Appendix J contains an overview of the integrative and distributive social behaviours that were used per participant group in all the 20 negotiation cases. Table 8 shows a summary of the findings, which will be discussed and compared in the following section. First, a general overview of the

28

outcome per group will be given. Next, a more detailed account of the negotiation rounds will follow, illustrated with example statements from the negotiation cases. The questionnaire answers will be used to provide more understanding of participants reasoning behind their chosen negotiation behaviours. Participants' codes reveal their gender and level of EI, in the sense that FL is used to abbreviate female low EI participants, and MH indicates a male high EI participant.

Gender	Female		Male				
Level of EI	High (>4.00)	Low (<3.80)	High (>4.00)	Low (<3.80)			
Integrative social behaviou	Integrative social behaviours						
Low (1-4,9%) Low-Medium (5	5-9,9%) Medium (1	0-14,9%) Medium-F	High (15-19,9%) Hi	gh (>20%)			
Desire to stay in positive	High (23,3)	Medium-High	High (26,3)	High (28,6)			
relationship		(16,5)					
Affirmation seeking	Low (3,3)	Medium (10,3)	Medium (10,5)	-			
Complimenting	Low-Medium	Medium (10,3)	Low-Medium	-			
	(8,3)		(5,3)				
Showing appreciation	Low (1,7)	Low-Medium	-	Medium (14,3)			
		(6,2)					
Thanking	High (26,7)	High (24,7)	High (31,6)	Medium (14,3)			
Total	63,3	68	73,7	57,2			
Distributive social behaviou	ırs						
Low (1-4,9%) Low-Medium (5	5-9,9%) Medium (1	0-14,9%) Medium-F	High (15-19,9%) Hi	gh (>20%)			
Fear of social repercussions	Low (1,7)	Low (1,0)	-	-			
Demanding	Low (3,3)	Low (2,1)	-	-			
Disagreeing	Low-Medium	Low (1,0)	-	-			
	(5,0)						
Total	10	4,1	0	0			
Total number of behaviours	73,3	72,1	73,7	57,2			
used							
Social behaviour	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive			

Table 8: Overview of social preservation behaviours used by participants

#### 5.6. Influence of gender on social preservation behaviours in high EI individuals

As mentioned in chapter 2, the expectation is that female negotiators will use more integrative social preservation behaviours as they are likely to be more concerned with being liked by their counterparts to avoid negative backlash. However, the results show that both male

high EI negotiators show more integrative social behaviours. Table 8 shows that female high EI negotiators used integrative social behaviours 63,3 per cent of the time, while male high EI negotiators used integrative social behaviours in 73,7 per cent of the cases. In terms of distributive social behaviours, the female high EI negotiators used distributive social behaviours in 10 per cent of the cases, the male negotiators used no distributive social behaviours (see table 8). However, when incorporating the questionnaire answers, it becomes clear that high EI female negotiators are much more concerned with preserving a positive (long-term) relationship with the negotiation partner. Male negotiators do not mention such concerns.

#### 5.6.1. Integrative social behaviours by high EI individuals

Both male and female high EI negotiators showed an equal interest in staying in a positive relationship with the negotiation partner. The female negotiators expressed looking forward to joining the team and a good professional relationship: "I am looking forward to joining the team and making a positive contribution to the company" (FH16) and "I appreciate that you respect my wishes and think that this is a great start of our professional relationship" (FL18), while the male negotiators wording was a bit more distant and generic: 'I look forward to meeting with you' (M3) and 'I am looking forward to working with you!' (MH5). In the questionnaires, one participant mentioned that she would have liked to know more about the negotiation partner, as that would have helped her reach a better outcome: 'If I would have had the opportunity to know more about the person I emailed, that might have helped'' (FH5), which is similar to another response by a male high EI participant: "If I had more information than I could have done a better job maybe'' (MH2). When asked whether having a positive long-term relationship with the negotiation partner is important, most female participants replied confirmatory: 'I think it is important in this kind of situation that the other party feels at least not negative towards me, as I intend to start working in that company. But I think personal feelings are not important when they are not negative. A positive or neutral professional relationship is more important" (FH5). For most female negotiators, the main reason for maintaining a positive relationship was building a long-term relationship with coworkers and the employer: "Because it [negotiation behaviour] would show how I would communicate as an employee" (FH16) and "Before the negotiation, I set my mind onto really making sure I preserve the relationship with my future employer'' (FH18).

Similarly, another main difference between male and female high EI negotiators was that the females put more emphasis on showing appreciation for their negotiation partner, which is focused on making the other party feel good. For example: ''I appreciate that you respect my wishes and think that this is a great start of our professional relationship'' (F18). None of the male high EI participants showed explicit appreciation for their negotiation partner. Both parties did, however, thanked their negotiation partners an equal amount. Another difference is that male high EI negotiators are more concerned with affirmation seeking that is focused on making themselves feel validated. Most high EI male negotiators are, for example, asking validation about their statements ''I hope my summary of why you should consider me as the new commodity buyer is clear to you'' (MH3) and ''A little bit of charisma, as well as the ability to separate your feelings from the job, are important skills a purchaser should possess, in my opinion. I hope we can agree with each other on this subject'' (MH3). Interestingly, female affirmation seeking behaviours is more focused on the counterpart: ''I hope I could answer your questions satisfactorily'' (FH5).

The female high EI participants put specific importance on the values honesty and politeness: "Towards the end, I tried to make him empathize with my situation by seeming honest and in need" (FH5) and "I wanted to be fair and honest, by doing this I wanted to create a win-win situation" (FH10), "I chose the politeness since it shows professionalism which is crucial when negotiating at the workplace" (FH15), "I believe that it will help you more if you are polite and respectful towards the other party" (FH16). Trust was also often mentioned: "I chose to be transparent and honest in order to get what I want and build trust at the same time" (FH18) and "Trust and a good relationship is a really important factor in this type of negotiations" (FH18). The male negotiators did not specifically mention these concepts in their answers. Besides being seen as honest and polite, high EI female negotiators expressed the need to be perceived as professional: "I chose the politeness since it shows professionalism which is crucial when negotiating at the workplace" (FH15) and "Yes. I wanted to be preserved as serious as possible and also prove that I am really experienced enough for the job and deserve everything I was asking for" (FH18). One male high EI negotiator expressed that he had been professional during the negotiation: "I was professional, spoke in Dutch and English" (MH2).

#### 5.6.2. Distributive social behaviours by high EI individuals

Surprisingly, the male high EI participants did not show any distributive social behaviours in their negotiation cases. Some female high EI negotiators showed demanding and disagreeing behaviours. For example, demanding the counterpart reconsider their offer: 'I have noticed that you did not reply to my question of reconsidering the salary you offered me. Hence

I would request you to reconsider your salary offer" (FH10) or disagreeing with the firm's policy: 'You mentioned that you are currently very busy due to the coronavirus, I understand that but I do not think that the consequences of this disruption will last as far in the future as July or August'' (FH10). Furthermore, the male negotiators did not show any fear of social repercussion, while some female participants do, for example in statements such as: "I hope I do not appear as rude or ungrateful, as this is not my intention at all" (FH5). In the questionnaire, the female high EI negotiators confirmed they were aware that a negotiation may lead to negative social consequences: "Because I stayed friendly and polite I was not afraid of any negative consequences. The risk is always there, especially when the conversation is not in person, but I tried to do everything to minimize this risk'' (FH5) and 'I found it somewhat important [to be liked] since my future plans were in his hands" (FH15). One female negotiator even refrained from pointing out a mistake out of fear of social repercussions: 'The HR manager used some reasonings that were factually incorrect, I felt like it did not add much to the discussion to tell them they were not telling the truth or were misinformed" (F10). On the other hand, the male high EI negotiator stated: "No I don't really care [about negative consequences], because we both know each party has its own interests and wants to achieve *that* '' (MH3).

#### 5.7. The influence of gender on social preservation behaviours in low EI individuals

Contrary to expectation stated in chapter 2, male and female low EI negotiators do not seem to differ much in terms of displayed social behaviours during negotiations. Female low EI negotiators display integrative social behaviours 68 per cent of the time, whereas male low EI negotiators use these integrative social behaviours in 57,2 per cent of cases (see table 8). In terms of distributive social behaviour, female negotiators engage 4,1 per cent of the time, whereas none of the male negotiators displayed any distributive social behaviours (see table 8). However, upon analysing the negotiation behaviours and questionnaire responses, it becomes clear that female low EI negotiators are more concerned with building a positive relationship with their negotiation partner.

#### 5.7.1. Integrative social behaviours by low EI individuals

Female low EI negotiators show a considerable amount of affirmation seeking behaviours (10,3 per cent), for example: ''I hope I have provided enough relevant information'' (FL4) and ''I hope that you still remember me since our interview last week'' (FL6). Male low EI do not engage in affirmation seeking behaviours. Furthermore, both male and female low EI

negotiators showed appreciation for their negotiation partner. Male appreciation statements mostly focussed on professional discourse, such as job benefits: 'I recognize the benefits you can give me'' (ML4), whereas female participants showed appreciation about more personal information: 'First of all, I really appreciate that you let me have some moments considering this'' (FL4) and 'I am glad to hear that you understand my financial issues'' (FL20) and 'I am glad to hear recognition for the Master course I have followed'' (FL21). Female low EI negotiators thank the counterpart much more than male negotiators do, with 24,7 per cent and 14,3 per cent respectively.

Female participants were more concerned with being disliked due to the negotiation: "Yes, because I would not want him to think I was being rude. I like coming across as a reasonable and nice person' (FL1) and 'I only do not want him/her to think I am stupid' (FL20). That same participant explains that feeling liked during a negotiation helps to feel good about oneself: "Because I thought it [being nice to each other] may feel more comfortable for both of us. I had the feeling to be nearly on the same level and really be important for the company and needed. That felt good." (FL20) and that it helped build trust: "I somehow had the feeling I can trust the other person and I wanted the job, so I tried to make the best'' (FL20). Some female low EI participant stated that a good relationship with their future boss depended on their behaviour during the negotiation: 'I wanted to choose for win-win as he would be my future boss. You need a good relationship with him' (FL7). The male low EI negotiator was less concerned with being liked: 'In general yes [it is important to be liked], here we did not know each other. But even if, one should not consider it too much while negotiating" (ML4). During the negotiation case, male negotiators do express a desire to stay in a positive relationship with their counterpart, mostly through short generic statements like 'I hope to hear from you soon" (ML4).

In the questionnaire, low EI participants from both genders stated honesty and politeness as important: 'I think if I would have hold back information which might have been important this would have negatively influenced the case'' (FL2) and 'It [my negotiation behaviour] was effective, because I was being honest, polite and reasonable" (FL1) and 'I used feelings, was formal and polite plus asked some open questions" (ML4).

#### 5.7.2. Distributive social behaviours by low EI individuals

In the questionnaire, two female low EI participant admitted she feared being seen as aggressive or having unrealistic demands: 'The point was to meet an amicable agreement, so

I decided that if I could get all my minimum requirements, plus some extra, then I'd be happy. That mean I was able to negotiate without being too aggressive or making unrealistic requests'' (FL21) and 'yes the manager might have a bad impression about me, which affects my future profession in the company'' (FL6). This fear can be seen in the careful wording of this counter-offer in the negotiation case: 'Without sounding unappreciative, I was wondering to what degree the 2000€ salary is a fixed price. I, of course, very much appreciate the offer, however can't help but compare the quote to other peers and fellows working in Amsterdam with the same level of experience'' (FL21).

However, most negotiators stated that fearing social repercussions was not necessary in the context of a salary negotiation: "No, at least not as long as my way of negotiation is fine and not offensive" (ML4) and "I did not [fear negative consequences]. A salary negotiation is salary negotiation and nothing personal. It has to do with the skill worth of a person" (FL7) and "No, once we have a deal, everything is done, and it is my job performance matters, not the negotiation" (FL12).

#### 5.8. The influence of EI on social preservation behaviours

As mentioned in chapter 2, the expectation is that negotiators with a high level of EI will put more importance on maintaining a positive social relationship, as they are better equipped to do so. However, the results of the questionnaire show that both high and low EI negotiators uphold the same core values: honesty, politeness and trust between negotiation partners. High EI negotiators are also more aware that they can use emotions to increase their negotiation performance, as stated by one participant: ''I believe that if I stated my feelings more often it would have been more successful'' (FH15). Out of all groups, high EI female negotiators seemed to fear negative social consequences or backlash as a result of their social behaviour most, followed by female negotiators with low EI.

#### 5.9. The influence of an electronic negotiation setting on female negotiation behaviour

As mentioned in chapter 2, the expectation is that female negotiators will use more distributive negotiation behaviours because of the electronic nature of the interaction. The result indeed shows that the female negotiators in this sample used more distributive social behaviours compared to the male negotiators. For example, one female negotiator demanded an explanation for a certain offer: ''If you feel like you can pay me greatly underneath the average salary of a purchase manager, I would like to know why'' (FL13). Others disagreed with the firm: 'You

mentioned that you are currently very busy due to the coronavirus, I understand that but I do not think that the consequences of this disruption will last as far in the future as July or August'' (FH10). In terms of negotiation behaviour, even though female participants were overall more integrative in their negotiation behaviour, they seem to be much more aggressive than the male negotiators when they do use distributive behaviours. Surprisingly, male negotiators used no distributive social behaviours in any of the negotiation cases. Both genders used an equal amount of integrative social behaviours.

#### 6. Discussion

# 6.1. A higher level of EI leads to more distributive negotiation behaviour in electronic salary negotiations

The following section will compare the findings of the current study with existing literature, with the intent of answering the main research question: *To what extent do gender and level of EI influence graduate's use of negotiation tactics and social preservation behaviour during electronic salary negotiations?* 

In terms of the relationship between negotiation behaviour and level of EI, the literature suggests that negotiators with a higher level of EI will prefer integrative negotiation behaviours, as they are more capable of creating joint value than negotiators with a lower level of EI (Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan & Aik; 2004). Contrary to this expectation, the results show that low EI negotiators have a mainly integrative negotiation style, whereas high EI negotiators use either a combination of integrative and distributive behaviours (female group), or mainly distributive behaviours (male group). A possible explanation for more frequent use of distributive behaviours amongst high EI negotiators is that they are more capable of making an emotional assessment and are more capable of managing emotional situations (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Ogilvie & Carsky, 2002). Due to their high level of EI, these individuals are able to recognize emotions and can use them as a basis for reasoning and problem solving (Mayer et al., 2001). EI individuals may thus feel better equipped and be more inclined to use distributive negotiation behaviours, as they can quickly recognize any negative emotions in their negotiation partner and change their negotiation strategy accordingly. Interestingly, the female negotiators with a high level of EI may have chosen the best negotiation strategy: a combination of both integrative and distributive actions. Previous studies found that negotiators will "achieve a higher joint outcome when they use distributive negotiation tactics along with integrative tactics rather than using integrative tactics alone." (Han et al., 2012, p.143).

#### 6.2. When level of EI is high, gender influences the preferred negotiation behaviour

Whereas low EI negotiations have a decidedly integrative negotiation style, the group of high EI negotiators shows more variation. In the high EI group, the female negotiators displayed an evenly distributed combination of both integrative and distributive negotiation behaviours, whereas the male group showed mainly distributive behaviours. This is partly in line with the expectation as stated in chapter 2; that female negotiators use more integrative behaviours whereas male negotiators use more distributive behaviours. However, this thus only seems to count for male negotiators with a high level of EI, as the male negotiators with a lower level of EI showed predominantly integrative behaviours in this study.

The main differences in negotiation behaviours between the two high EI level groups, show the difference between the two negotiation styles. The female negotiators were more concerned with the opponent's needs and reaching mutual satisfaction, which is indicative of an integrative negotiation style. Female participants explained they wanted to create a win-win situation. The male participants did not seek out mutual agreements, but instead used sources to back up their arguments and enlarge their individual gains, which is indicative of a distributive negotiation style. This is in line with conclusions drawn by Cross and Madson (1997), who hypothesize that women develop interdependent self-construals (e.g. seeking to affirm their identities as a member of the collective by focusing on others) whereas men develop independent self-construals (e.g. seeking to maintain their independence by attending to the self). In short, this means that women are more focused on maintaining a positive relationship with their negotiation counterpart, which could explain why high EI women show more integrative negotiation behaviours. Men are mostly focused on their own self-interests, which results in more distributive behaviours by high EI male negotiators.

# 6.3. Female negotiators with a lower level of EI feel the need to prove themselves before negotiating a higher salary

The majority of low EI female negotiators were willing to accept a lower starting salary, but wanted the possibility to renegotiate their salary after a few months of work, which was mostly accepted by their negotiation partners. None of the high EI female or male negotiators negotiated this possibility. This finding may be explained by previous literature on women's

negotiation behaviour. For example, Barron (2003) found that women are more likely to hold the belief that they first have to prove their worth on the job, or should have proved their worth in a previous job, before they deserve a better salary than others. Similarly, Babcock & Laschever (2003) found that women believe they first need to prove themselves on the job in order to attain a higher salary. These findings are in line with the findings of the current study, that show that the female low EI negotiators in this sample accept a lower starting salary on the condition that they will be able to renegotiate it in the future. Contrastingly, men believe that they can prove themselves during the salary negotiations. This difference may explain why the current study only shows low EI female participants suggesting a salary raise in the future, compared to none of the male negotiators.

Another interesting finding by Barron (2003) states that women are more unsure of their worth than men, and are thus more likely than men to have their monetary value be determined by their employer. This could explain why women, in general, are more likely to accept an initial salary offer without counter-offering, as was concluded by Sigurdardottir and Leifsson (2010). Given that women are more unsure of their worth, they may believe that their employer knows best in terms of their monetary worth. Moreover, research shows that some minority groups do have to spend more time to prove themselves (Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). This means that women's believe that they need to prove themselves before deserving a higher salary may be true. Furthermore, given that women are still being paid less than men, they may have internalized the belief that they have to work harder to attain the same rewards as men (Valian, 1999).

# 6.4. Gender stereotypes do not influence social behaviour during electronic negotiation settings

Contrary to expectations based on the literature (see chapter 2), the gender role stereotypes do not seem to be upheld during the electronic negotiation case. Firstly, the results show that male negotiators with a high level of EI showed more integrative social behaviours than female negotiators in general. They were seen to prioritize understanding of others needs much more than female participants. This is surprising, given that the literature on stereotypes (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Rudman & Glick, 2001) suggests that women are expected to act more communal and understanding of others, even in a professional setting, and risk getting penalized when they do not follow this gender role. The individual's level of EI does not seem

to play a role here, as the female negotiators with low EI did not show understanding of others, whereas the male negotiators with lower EI did.

Secondly, the female negotiators in this sample used more distributive social behaviours compared to the men. Surprisingly, male negotiators used no distributive social behaviours in any of the negotiation cases. Male and female negotiators did display an equal amount of integrative social behaviours, this is surprising given the body of literature that suggests women display more integrative behaviours than men (Small, Gelfand, Babcock and Gettman, 2007; Bohnet & Bowles, 2008 & Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman, 2008), and runs contrary to the expectations stated in chapter 2 that state that women focus more on being liked and preserving a long-term positive relationship with their negotiation partner. Thus, the amount of distributive social behaviours used by the female negotiators is surprising. Moreover, the responses on the questionnaire make clear that female negotiators with a high level of EI seem to fear negative social consequences or backlash as a result of their social behaviour most, followed by female negotiators with a low level of EI. This shows that the female negotiators are indeed afraid of negative consequences of their negotiation behaviour, but that this has not stopped them from engaging in more distributive, less integrative negotiation behaviours. These results may be explained by the fact that the salary negotiations were electronic, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

# 6.5. Female negotiators are more aware of the social consequences of a negotiation, but it does not show in their negotiation behaviour

The literature (see chapter 2) suggests that female negotiators will use more integrative social behaviours out of fear of social repercussions. As we have concluded, the results show that male high EI negotiators used more integrative social behaviours during the negotiation case. In terms of actual negotiation behaviour, women do not seem to display more integrative social behaviours with the intent to preserve a positive social relationship than men, which is contrary to expectations. However, when incorporating the questionnaire answers, it becomes clear that female negotiators are much more aware of negative social consequences that may result from their negotiation behaviour. Out of all groups, female negotiators with a high level of EI seem to fear negative social consequences or backlash as a result of their social behaviour most, followed by female negotiators with a low level of EI. The women are also more concerned with preserving a positive long-term relationship with the negotiation partner. Most female negotiators, independent of level of EI, specifically mentioned the importance of the

values honesty politeness and trust during a negotiation. Indeed, increasing trust between negotiators results often results in better long-term connections (Kim et al., 2015; Sigurðardóttir et al., 2019). None of the male negotiators mentioned such values or a long-term relationship with their new employer. Another striking difference between male and female negotiation behaviour was that women put more emphasis on showing appreciation for their negotiation partner, which is indeed focused on making the other party feel good and thus preserving a positive social relationship.

These findings are in line with conclusions drawn by Greenhalgh and Gilkey (1986), who found that female negotiators indeed perceive a negotiation as part of a long-term relationship and are more likely to emphasize fairness. This coincides with the results of the questionnaire, in which many female negotiators stated that having a positive long-term relationship with the negotiation partner is important. Male negotiators, on the other hand, see negotiations as more of a 'one-shot' event that does not interfere with later relationships (Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1986), which is also in line with the results of the current study. These findings could be explained by the fact that men and women historically have completely different frames of reference in terms of worth. Historically, men derived their worth from the accumulation of goods, status and power in the marketplace, whereas women based their worth on the ability to maintain order and control in the domestic environment (Eckert, 1990). This could explain why women place more importance on the evaluation of their character, and thus on being liked by their employer, whereas men do not focus on these relational aspects in favour for more tangible outcomes such as a higher salary.

#### 6.6. Electronic negotiations may be beneficial for women in acquiring a higher salary

The above does not explain, however, why this higher awareness of social repercussions in women did not translate into more integrative negotiation behaviour during the negotiation case. Instead, women showed an equal amount of distributive behaviours as men, who did not fear social repercussions. This may be because of the electronic negotiation setting. Perhaps positive social interactions are more often conducted through small-talk before the actual negotiation, often called the first phase, which is mostly used to get acquainted with the negotiation partner and engage in 'relational positioning' (Adair & Brett, 2005; Pesendorfer et al., 2007). According to Adair and Brett (2005), negotiators only engage in actual information exchange after this relational positioning is done. Interestingly, the participants in the current study omitted this relational positioning stage, in favour of going directly into the actual

negotiation. This crucial phase in relationship building may have been omitted due to this being an electronic negotiation. This is in line with conclusions drawn by Pesendorfer et al. (2007), who suggest that computer-mediated communication entails a lack of social and personal cues, which may in turn lead to less relational positioning. However, another explanation for the absence of relationship-building actions during the negotiations, might be that the participants may already know each other from either the NPT or SUM projects. People who know each other prior to the start of a negotiation, tend to start the negotiation process with value creation (Pessendorfer et al., 2007), omitting the relational positioning stage.

However, the fact that the negotiation was conducted via email may also have played a pivotal part in the increase in distributive behaviour among the female negotiators. In line with the literature, the electronic negotiation setting seemed to diminish the fear of social repercussions for women, resulting in them using more distributive behaviours than expected. Indeed, Stuhlmacher, Citera and Willis (2007) found that women's behaviour in negotiations can become more hostile and competitive in a situation in which social pressure is significantly reduced, such as the email correspondence used in the current study. It seems as though female negotiators may benefit from electronic negotiations conducted via e-mail, as they display more distributive behaviours compared to face-to-face situations. Using more distributive negotiation behaviours may lead to a higher salary outcome, as negotiators who use a combination of both distributive and integrative behaviours gain the best monetary results and are best able to claim value for themselves (Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan & Aik, 2004).

#### 7. Conclusion

### 7.1. Gender and EI do influence negotiation behaviour and social preservation behaviour

The current study was conducted to test the influence of gender and EI on negotiation behaviours and use of social preservation behaviours. The main research question was: To what extent do gender and level of EI influence graduate's use of negotiation tactics and social preservation behaviour during electronic salary negotiations? To this end, 20 negotiation cases were analysed on the use of both integrative and distributive negotiation tactics and integrative and distributive social behaviours. The analysis was complemented with a questionnaire to be filled out before and after completion of the negotiation case. The WLEIS-measurement (Law, Wong & Song, 2004) was used to indicate individuals' level of EI. The results of this study show that both gender and level of EI indeed influence the negotiation behaviour of participants. Participants with a higher level of EI, independent of gender, tend to use more distributive

negotiation behaviours than low EI negotiators. However, in general, most negotiators had an integrative negotiation style. Only the male high EI negotiators had a mainly distributive negotiation style. It seems that gender is more important in determining negotiation behaviour, as the differences in EI within a gendered group are bigger than the overall differences.

Furthermore, the results of this study show that gender and level of EI do indeed influence social preservation behaviours of negotiators, although the displayed behaviours are not always in line with conclusions of previous studies. This gives reason to believe that the unexplained gender pay gap may partially exist because women use more integrative negotiation behaviours, and are thus less able to claim value for themselves. However, it seems as though electronic negotiations may be beneficial to female negotiators, as the female negotiators in the current study were less preceptive to gender role stereotypes and showed more distributive negotiation behaviours compared to traditional face-to-face negotiation settings. The emergence of more electronic negotiations may thus be beneficial to diminishing the unexplained gender pay gap, as it helps minimize the influence of (sub)conscious gender stereotypes and expectations.

### 7.2. Theoretical and practical implications

The most important theoretical implication that emerges from this study is the need for more research on the role of gender stereotypes and social norms in electronic negotiations. Future research should focus in particular on the implication that electronic negotiation setting may be beneficial to female negotiators and how these electronic settings must be shaped in order to even the playing field between the genders during salary negotiations. In terms of practical implications, it is interesting to note that EI is a learned behaviour (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) and can be improved through training and practice. Female high EI negotiators in the current study showed an almost equal combination of distributive and integrative negotiation behaviour, which is known to deliver the best negotiation results (Han et al., 2012). It may thus be interesting for negotiators, in particular women, to follow EI training to improve their negotiation behaviour. Investing in EI training will not only help women negotiate a better (starting) salary, it may also improve their overall performance in professional negotiations, which may be necessary to acquire promotions during their careers. Given that women receive fewer job opportunities (Baert, Pauw & Deschacht, 2016) and face more difficulties getting a promotion because of their gender (Blau & DeVaro, 2007; Bronson & Thoursie, 2019), improving their level of EI, and thus the effectivity of their negotiation behaviour, could

contribute to challenging the prevailing gender stereotypes and thereby diminish the gender pay gap.

#### 8. Limitations and directions for future research

### **8.1.** Shortcomings of the current study

The most notable shortcoming of the current study is the small sample size of 27 participants, of which only 20 negotiation cases were taken into account for extensive analysis. This small size could lead to falsified results in an attempt to generalize the findings. This means that no conclusions can be drawn based on this study, and its purpose is thus to serve as a guideline and indicator for future (quantitative) research avenues on a larger scale.

A second shortcoming can be found in the uneven distribution between male and female participants, given that the sample consists of 21 female graduates and only 7 male graduates. This may impact the findings and gives an incomplete view of the male perspective in particular. In future studies, this distribution should be more evenly divided to be able to better compare the findings across genders, and infer its influence. Furthermore, most negotiators were shown to have an integrative negotiation style. This may have been because the participants knew each other personally, as a result of being classmates. A future study with participants that are strangers may show different results, and perhaps display more distributive behaviours.

Thirdly, even though the appropriateness of the WLEIS measurement has been extensively researched and proved by several authors (Kok-Mun, Wang, Zalaquett and Bodenhorn, 2007; Shi and Wang, 2007) it also has shortcomings. For example, participants can still fake their level of EI when motivated to do so (Boets & Fraeyman, 2009). Given that the WLEIS is a self-measurement tool, participants may be prone to given false answers or suffer from biased self-perception. Indeed, several scholars have expressed concerns regarding the construct validity of such self-report measures of EI (Cherniss, 2010; Der Foo et al., 2004). However, we assume that participants had no motivation to do so, given that participants were under the impression that this negotiation exercise was just a part of their negotiation training in SUM or NPT. Being dishonest on the self-assessment would not have been in their best interest, which makes it unlikely. Nevertheless, there are many other tested and accepted measures to quantify EI that do not depend on self-report measures, for example the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso EI Test (MSCEIT) (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2003) or the Geneva

Emotional Recognition Test (GERT) (Schlegel, Grandjean & Scherer, 2014). These could be used in a future replication of the current study.

Furthermore, the participants differed in terms of experience with negotiation situations. The participants in the current sample specified varying degrees of experience with negotiations, ranging from several hours (SUM) up to several months (NPT) of training. Negotiators who are familiar with the development of negotiation processes, either through training or experience, may have an advantage during the negotiation case. For example, experience with negotiations has been shown to help negotiations identify whether a negotiation is heading in the wrong direction and take measures to redirect the process (Pesendorfer et al., 2007).

Moreover, the current study suffers from biases from the researcher. As the research was conducted and supervised by a team of only women, the outlook on female and male negotiation behaviour may be biased. Despite being actively aware of biases, the researcher is at risk of interpreting the behaviours from both genders according to their own (gendered) frame of reference or previous personal experiences with negotiations. To avoid this, future studies could include a team of mixed genders or incorporate member checks to safeguard trustworthiness of the findings.

#### 8.2. Suggestions for future research

This study has resulted in more insights into the negotiation behaviours of recently graduated young professionals, while looking at the influence of their gender and level of EI. Furthermore, the impact of these factors on the use of social preservation behaviours was analysed. However, these factors are not the only telling contributors in the context of negotiation behaviours. Different factors have also proven to influence negotiation behaviour, for example nationality, level of education, ethnicity and previous experience (Robinson et al., 2000), but were not considered in the current study. Future research could include these factors to see whether they influence the results.

Similarly, future research could focus on the reasons for the existing differences in negotiation tactics between men and women. More qualitative interviews could be used to infer negotiators' reasoning behind their preferred negotiation behaviours. It could be particularly interesting to see whether negotiators are indeed less impacted by social norms when the negotiation is conducted digitally instead of face-to-face, as suggested by the current findings,

and whether they are consciously aware of a change in their negotiation behaviour because of this context.

Furthermore, there were some minor differences in terms of preparation time before the negotiation case. Several female participants with a low level of EI stressed the importance of good preparation. None of the high EI participants mentioned extensive preparation before taking part in the negotiation case. This could have many explanations, for example that high EI negotiators are more confident in their own knowledge. They could also prefer to improvise instead of rehearsing, perhaps because they feel that their higher level of EI makes up for any factually incorrect information they may provide during the negotiation. The exact reason cannot be specified based on the in this study, and could thus be an interesting avenue for future research.

#### References

- Adair, W. L., and Brett, J. M. (2005). 'The Negotiation Dance: Time, Culture, and Behavioural Sequences in Negotiation'. Organization Science 16(1), 33–51.
- Allerd, K.G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., Raia, C.P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. Organizational Behaviour Human Decision Process 70:175–187
- Amanatullah, E. T., & Morris, M. W. (2010). Negotiating gender roles: Gender differences in assertive negotiating are mediated by women's fear of backlash and attenuated when negotiating on behalf of others. Journal of personality and social psychology, 98(2), 256.
- Babcock, L., & Laschever, S. (2003). Women Don't Ask, Negotiation and the Gender Dived. Princeton: University Press.
- Baert, S., De Pauw, A. & Deschacht, N., (2016). "Do Employer Preferences Contribute to Sticky Floors?" In: ILR Review 69.3, pp. 714–736.
- Baron, R. A. (1990) Environmentally induced positive affect: its impact on self-efficacy, task performance, negotiation, and conflict. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 20:368–384
- Barron, L. A. (2003). Ask and you shall receive? Gender differences in negotiators' beliefs about requests for a higher salary. Human Relations, 56, 635-662
- Bear, J. (2011). "Passing the buck": Incongruence between gender role and topic leads to avoidance of negotiation. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 4, 47–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2010.00072.x
- Bear, J. B., & Babcock, L. (2012). Negotiation topic as a moderator of gender differences in negotiation. Psychological Science, 23, 743–744. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612442393
- Blau, F. D. & Jed DeVaro, J., (2007). "New Evidence on Gender Differences in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis of a Sample of New Hires". In: Industrial Relations 46, pp. 511–550.
- Boets, Y., & Fraeyman, E. (2009). *Emotionele Intelligentietests: een onderzoek naar faking bij sollicitanten*. (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from <a href="https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/393/011/RUG01-001393011">https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/393/011/RUG01-001393011</a> 2010 0001 AC.pdf
- Bohnet, I., & Bowles, H. R. (2008). Gender in Negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 24(4), 389-392.
- Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L. and McGinn, K. L. (2005). Constraints and triggers: Situational mechanics of gender in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 951-965.

- Boll, C., & Lagemann, A., (2018). Gender pay gap in EU countries based on SES (2014). Tech. rep. European Commission.
- Bronson, M. A., & Thoursie, P. S., (2019). The Wage Growth and Within-Firm Mobility of Men and Women: New Evidence and Theory. Working Paper.
- Card, D., Cardoso, A. R., & Kline, P., (2016). "Bargaining, sorting, and the gender wage gap: quantifying the impact of firms on the relative pay of women". In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 131.2, pp. 633–686.
- Carmeli, A., & Josman, Z. E. (2006). The relationship among EI, task performance, and organizational citizenship behaviours. Human performance, 19(4), 403-419.
- Cherniss, C., Extein, M., Goleman, D., & Weissberg, R. P. (2006). EI: What Does the Research Really Indicate? EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 41(4), 239-245.
- Cherniss, C. (2010). EI: New Insights and Further Clarifications. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 3(2), 183-191. doi:10.1111/j.1754- 9434.2010.01222.x
- Clark, A. E., & Kashima, Y. (2007). Stereotypes help people connect with others in the community: A situated functional analysis of the stereotype consistency bias in communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 1028–1039. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.1028.3514.93.6.1028
- Cross, S. E., & Madson, L. (1997). Models of the self: Self-construals and gender. Psychological Bulletin, 122, 5–37.
- Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. *psychometrika*, *16*(3), 297-334.
- Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 493–512.
- De Clercq, D., & Sapienza, H. J. (2006). Effects of relational capital and commitment on venture capitalists' perception of portfolio company performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 21, 326–347.
- Der Foo, M., Elfenbein, H. A., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2004). EI and negotiation: The tension between creating and claiming value. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 15(4), 411-429.
- Diekman, A. B., & Eagly, A. H. (2000). Stereotypes as dynamic constructs: Women and men of the past, present, and future. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1171–1188.
- Dubrovsky, V. J., Kiesler, S., and Sethna, B. N. (1991). 'The Equalization Phenomenon: Status Effects in Computer-Mediated and Face-to-Face Decision-Making Groups'. Human-Computer Interaction 6, 119–146.

- Eckel, C., de Olivera, A. C. and Grossman, P. J. (2008). Gender and negotiation in the small: Are women (perceived to be) more cooperative than men? Negotiation Journal, 24(2), 224-429.
- Eckert, P. (1990). Cooperative competition in adolescent "girl talk". Discourse Processes, 13(1), 91-122.
- Edwards R (2004). Present and absent in troubling ways: families and social capital debates. The Sociological Review 60: 1–21
- Finke, C., Dumpert F. & Beck, M., (2017). Verdienstunterschiede zwischen Mannern und Frauen. WISTA 2. Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (2nd ed.). New York: Penguin Books.
- Forgas, J. P. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: mood effects on negotiator, cognition and bargaining strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74:565–577.
- Folger, J. P., Hewes, D. E., & Poole, M. S. (1984). Coding social interaction. In B. Dervin & M. J. Voigt (Eds.), Progress in communication sciences (pp. 115-161). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Froman Jr, L. A., & Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes. *Behavioral Science*, *15*(2), 180-183.
- Fuller, S., (2008). "Job Mobility and Wage Trajectories for Men and Women in the United States". In: American Sociological Review 73, pp. 158–183.
- Gelfand, M. J., Major, V. S., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L. H., & O'Brien, K. (2006). Negotiating relationally: The dynamics of the relational self in negotiations. Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 427-451.
- Gohm, C. L., Corser, G. C., & Dalsky, D. J. (2005). EI under stress: Useful, unnecessary, or irrelevant?. Personality and individual differences, 39(6), 1017-1028.
- Goldin, C., & Rouse, C., (2000). "Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of" blind" auditions on female musicians". In: American economic review 90.4, pp. 715–741.
- Goleman, D. (1995) EI. Bantam Books, New York
- Greenhalgh, L., & Gilkey, R. W. (1986). Our game, your rules: Developing effective negotiating approaches. Not as far as you think: The realities of working women, 135-148.
- Griessmair, M., Hippmann, P., & Gettinger, J. (2015). Emotions in e-negotiations. In Emotion in group decision and negotiation (pp. 101-135). Springer, Dordrecht.
- Han, I., Kwon, S., Bae, J., & Park, K. (2012). When are integrative tactics more effective? The moderating effects of moral identity and the use of distributive tactics.

- International Journal of Conflict Management, 23(2), 133-150. doi:10.1108/10444061211218258
- Healy, K., Haynes, M., & Hampshire, A. (2007). Gender, social capital and location: understanding the interactions. International Journal of Social Welfare, 16(2), 110–118. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2006.00471.
- Hollingshead, A.B., Carnevale, P. J. (1990). Positive affect and decision frame in integrative bargaining: a reversal of the frame effect. Paper presented at the 50th annual meeting of the academy of management, San Francisco.
- Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, *15*(9), 1277–1288. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687
- Jackman, M. R. (1994). The velvet glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class, and race relations. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Karlsson, Th., Jonsdottir, M., & Vilhjalmsdottir, H. (2007). Cited according to: Leifsson, A., & Sigurðardóttir, A. G. (2010). Gender in individual salary negotiations. Learning to counter-offer.
- Kaufmann, L., Rottenburger, J., Carter, C. R., & Schlereth, C. (2018). Bluffs, Lies, and Consequences: A Reconceptualization of Bluffing in Buyer Supplier Negotiations. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 54(2), 49-70.
- Kiesler, S., Siegel, J., & McGuire, T. W. (1984). Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication. American Psychologist, 39, 1123-1134
- Kim, P. H., Pinkley, R. L., & Fragale, A. R. (2005). Power dynamics in negotiation. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 799-822.
- Kim, K., Cundiff, N. L., & Choi, S. B. (2015). EI and Negotiation Outcomes: Mediating Effects of Rapport, Negotiation Strategy, and Judgment Accuracy. Group Decision and Negotiation, 24(3), 477-493. doi:10.1007/s10726-014-9399-1
- Kong, F. (2017). The validity of the Wong and Law EI Scale in a Chinese sample: Tests of measurement invariance and latent mean differences across gender and age. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *116*, 29-31.
- Kok-mun, N., Wang, C., Zalaquett, C. P., & Bodenhorn, N. (2007). A confirmatory factor analysis of the Wong and Law EI Scale in a sample of international college students. *International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling*, 29(3-4), 173.
- Kray, L. J., & Thompson, L. (2005). Gender stereotypes and negotiation performance: An examination of theory and research. In B. M. Staw & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), Research in organizational behaviour: An annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews (pp. 103–182). Oxford, UK: Elsevier.

- Kumar, R. (1997). The role of affect in negotiations: An integrative overview. Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 33, 84–100.
- Law, K. S., Wong, C. S., & Song, L. J. (2004). The construct and criterion validity of EI and its potential utility for management studies. *Journal of applied Psychology*, 89(3), 483.
- Law, K. S., Wong, C. S., Huang, G. H., & Li, X. (2008). The effects of EI on job performance and life satisfaction for the research and development scientists in China. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 25(1), 51-69.
- Leifsson, A., & Sigurðardóttir, A. G. (2010). Gender in individual salary negotiations. Learning to counter-offer.
- Loewenstein, J., Morris, M. W., Chakravarti, A., Thompson, L., & Kopelman, S. (2005). At a loss for words: Dominating the conversation and the outcome in negotiation as a function of intricate arguments and communication media. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 98, 28–38. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.03.007.
- Lopes, P. N., Salovey, P., & Straus, R. (2003). EI, personality, and the perceived quality of social relationships. Personality and Individual Differences, 35, 641–658.
- Matheson, K. (1991). Social cues in computer-mediated negotiations: Gender makes a difference. Computers in human behaviour, 7(3), 137-145.
- Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1993). The intelligence of EI. Intelligence, 17(4), 433-442. doi:10.1016/0160-2896(93)90010-3
- Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is EI? New York: Harper Collins.
- Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2001). EI as a Standard Intelligence. Emotion, 1(3), 232-242. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.1.3.232
- Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring EI with the MSCEIT V2.0. Emotion, 3(1), 97-105. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.3.1.97
- Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2004). EI: Theory, Findings, and Implications. Psychological Inquiry, 15(3), 197-215.
- McGuire, T. W., Kiesler, S., & Siegel, J. (1987). Group and computer-mediated discussion effects in risk decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 917-930.
- Mestdagh, S., & Buelens, M. (2003, June). Thinking back on where we're going: A methodological assessment of five decades of research in negotiation behavior. Paper presented at the 16th Annual International Association for Conflict Management Conference, Melbourne, Australia
- Narsimhan, S., & Prasad, D. (2016). Competitive negotiation tactics and Kraljic portfolio category in SCM. *Journal of Supply Chain Management System*, *5*(3).

- Naquin, C. E., & Paulson, G. D. (2003). Online bargaining and interpersonal trust. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (1), 113–120.
- Ogilvie, J. R., & Carsky, M. L. (2002). Building EI in negotiations. International Journal of Conflict Management, 13(4), 381-400. doi:10.1108/eb022883
- Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Walsh, T. (1996). The process of negotiating: Strategy and timing as predictors of outcomes. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 68(1), 68-77.
- Parks, M. R., and Floyd, K. (1995). 'Making Friends in Cyberspace'. Journal of Communication 46(1), 80–97.
- Perdue, B. C. (1992). Ten aggressive bargaining tactics of industrial buyers. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing.
- Pesendorfer, E. M., Graf, A., & Koeszegi, S. T. (2007). Relationship in electronic negotiations: Tracking behaviour over time. Journal of Business Economics, 77(12), 1315-1338.
- Potter, W. J., & Levine-Donnerstein, D. (1999). Rethinking validity and reliability in content analysis. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 27, 258-284.
- Ramsay, J. (2004). "Serendipity and the realpolitik of negotiations in supply chains", Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 9 Issue: 3, pp. 219-229.
- Reilly, P. (2005). Teaching Law Students How to Feel: Using Negotiations Training to Increase EI. Negotiation Journal, 21(2), 301-314. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2005.00065.x
- Robinson, R. J., Lewicki, R. J., & Donahue, E. M. (2000). Extending and Testing a Five Factor Model of Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: Introducing the SINS Scale. Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 21(6), 649-664.
- Rosenberg, M. (1989). Society and the adolescent self-image. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press
- Rozell, E. J., Pettijohn, C. E., & Parker, R. S. (2004). Customeroriented selling: Exploring the roles of EI and organizational commitment. Psychology & Marketing, 21(6), 405-424. doi:10.1002/mar.20011
- Rubin, J. & Brown, B. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
- Rudman, L. A., & Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash toward agentic women. Journal of social issues, 57(4), 743-762.
- Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). EI. *Imagination, cognition and personality*, 9(3), 185-211.

- Saorín-Iborra, M. C. M. M. C. (2008). Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum? Esic-Market, 129, 125-181.
- Saorín-Iborra, M. C., & Cubillo, G. (2019). Supplier behaviour and its impact on customer satisfaction: A new characterization of negotiation behaviour. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management*, 25(1), 53-68.
- Schlegel, K., Grandjean, D., & Scherer, K. R. (2014). Introducing the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test: An example of Rasch-based test development. Psychological Assessment, 26(2), 666-672. doi:10.1037/a0035246
- Sebenius, J. K. (1992). Negotiation analysis: A characterization and review. Management Science, 38 (1), 18–38.
- Sharma, S., Bottom, W. P., & Elfenbein, H. A. (2013). On the role of personality, cognitive ability, and EI in predicting negotiation outcomes: A meta-analysis. Organizational Psychology Review, 3(4), 293–336.
- Shi, J., & Wang, L. (2007). Validation of EI scale in Chinese university students. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 43(2), 377-387.
- Sigurdardottir, A. G., Ujwary-Gil, A., & Candi, M. (2018). B2B negotiation tactics in creative sectors. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing.
- Sigurðardottir, A. G., Hotait, A., & Eichstädt, T. (2019). Buyer and Seller Differences in Business-to-Business Negotiations. Negotiation Journal, 35(2), 297-331.
- Small, D. A., Gelfand, M., Babcock, L., & Gettman, H. (2007). Who goes to the bargaining table? The influence of gender and framing on the initiation of negotiation. Journal of personality and social psychology, 93(4), 600.
- Sproull, L., & Kiesler, S. (1986). Reducing social context cues: Electronic mail in organizational communication. Management science, 32(11), 1492-1512.
- Stuhlmacher, A. F., Citera, M., & Willis, T. (2007). Gender differences in virtual negotiation: Theory and research. Sex Roles, 57, 329–339. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-007-9252-y">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-007-9252-y</a>
- Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Linnabery, E. (2013). Gender and negotiation: A social role analysis. In M. Olekalns & W. L. Adair (Eds.), Handbook of research on negotiation (pp. 221–248). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781005903
- Tan, B. C., Wei, K. K., Watson, R. T., & Walczuch, R. M. (1998). Reducing status effects with computer-mediated communication: Evidence from two distinct national cultures. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, *15*(1), 119-141. Management Information Systems 15(1), 119–141.
- Thomas, D. A., & Gabarro, J. J. (1999). Breaking through: The making of minority executives in corporate America.

- Thomas, S. P., Thomas, R. W., Manrodt, K. B. and Rutner, S. M. (2013). An Experimental Test of Negotiation Strategy Effects on Knowledge Sharing Intentions in Buyer—Supplier Relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49: 96-113.
- Tinsley, C. H., Cheldelin, S. I., Schneider, A. K., & Amanatullah, E. T. (2009). Women at the bargaining table: Pitfalls and prospects. Negotiation Journal, 25(2), 233-248.
- Tsaousis, I., & Nikolaou, I. (2005). Exploring the relationship of EI with physical and psychological health functioning. Stress and Health: Journal of the International Society for the Investigation of Stress, 21(2), 77-86.
- Valian, V. (1999). Why so slow?: The advancement of women. MIT press.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K., & Manstead, A. S. (2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 86(1), 57.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on concession making. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36(4), 557-581.
- Vaske, J. J. (2008). Survey research and analysis: Applications in parks, recreation and human dimensions. State College, PA: Venture Publishing Inc.
- Volkema, R. J., & Fleury, M. T. L. (2002). Alternative negotiating conditions and the choice of negotiation tactics: A cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Business Ethics, 36(4), 381-398.
- Wade, M. (2001). Women and salary negotiation: The costs of self-advocacy. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 65–76.
- Webber, D., (2016). "Firm-Level Monopsony and the Gender Pay Gap". In: Industrial Relations 55.2, pp. 323–345.
- Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups. Journal of personality and social psychology, 93(6), 994.
- Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (2012). Biosocial construction of sex differences and similarities in behaviour. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 46, pp. 55–123). London, UK: Elsevier.
- Wolff, S. B., Pescosolido, A. T., & Druskat, V.U. (2002). EI as the basis of leadership emergence in self-managing teams. Leadership Quarterly, 13, 505–522.
- Wong, C. S., Law, K. S. (2002). The effects of leader and follower EI on performance and attitude: An exploratory study. Leadership Quarterly, 13, 243-274.
- Zucco, A., & Bächmann, A. C. (2020). A question of gender? How promotions affect earnings.

## **Appendices**

## Appendix A – Participant instructions and informed consent form

Dear student,

Thank you for participating in this survey!

Please read the following instructions carefully.

#### This survey consists of 2 parts:

- The first part must be completed **before** you start the negotiation case
- The second part miust be completed after you have finished the negotiation case

The survey will let you know when you have finished the first part. When you reach this point, please close the survey, your progress will be automatically saved. After completing the negotiation case, revisit the survey with the link given to you, to continue with the second part.

PLEASE NOTE: the survey uses cookies to save your progress, so you must return to the survey on the <u>same</u> <u>internet browser</u> and on the <u>same computer</u> to finish it correctly.

You will need to provide some personal information, such as your student number, age and gender. Your student number will be changed into an anonymous participant number, so this survey remains completely anonymous and cannot be traced back to you. Please fill in all answers honestly and elaborate on your answers when needed.

Do you agree with these terms?

Yes/No

"What is your student number?"

Note: Your student number will only be used to match your survey answers to your negotiation case file. Your student number will then be deleted and changed into an anonymous participant number, so your answers cannot and will not be traced back to you.

### Appendix B - Questionnaire part 1

#### **Demographical questions**

- 1. What is your age?
- 2. What is your gender?
- 3. How much experience do you have with negotiations? (4 point likert scale)
- 4. Could you describe what kind of experience you have with negotiations?

#### **EI Measurement Scale**

Please rate to what extent the following statements apply to yourself.

Use the 5-point measurement scale.

#### Self-emotion appraisal (SEA)

- 1. I have a good sense of why I have certain feelings most of the time.
- 2. I have good understanding of my own emotions.
- 3. I really understand what I feel.
- 4. I always know whether I am happy.

#### Others' emotion appraisal (OEA)

- 5. I always know my friends' emotions from their behaviour.
- 6. I am a good observer of others' emotions.
- 7. I am sensitive to the feelings and emotions of others.
- 8. I have good understanding of the emotions of people around me.

#### Use of emotion (UOE)

- 9. I always set goals for myself and then try my best to achieve them.
- 10. I always tell myself I am a competent person.
- 11. I am a self-motivated person.
- 12. I would always encourage myself to try my best.

#### **Regulation of emotion (ROE)**

- 13. I am able to control my temper and handle difficulties rationally.
- 14. I am quite capable of controlling my own emotions.
- 15. I can always calm down quickly when I am very angry.
- 16. I have good control of my own emotions.

## Appendix C - Questionnaire part 2

- 1. Did you plan to use particular behaviours during this negotiation case? Please describe.
- 2. Why did you choose to use these particular behaviours during this negotiation case?
- 3. Why do you think your behaviour was effective during this negotiation case?
- 4. Do you think there is anything that could have influenced your negotiation behaviour (positively or negatively) during the negotiation case? Please explain.
- 5. Did you use certain behaviours to make your negotiation counterpart like you more? Please describe.
- 6. Why did you choose to use these behaviours during this negotiation case?
- 7. Do you find it important how your negotiation counterpart personally feels towards you because of this negotiation case? Please explain why.
- 8. Were you afraid of negative social consequences because of the negotiation case? Please explain which consequences and why (not).

# Appendix D - Coding scheme negotiation behaviour

Integrative negotiation behaviour	Source
Progress seeking	De Dreu & Van Kleef (2004)
Concessions	Olekalns et al. (1996)
	Baron (1990)
Self-advocating	Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman (2008)
Collaboration	Sharma et al. (2013)
Step-by-step tradeoffs (Logrolling) (trading	Froman & Cohen (1970)
something less important to them but desired by the	
counterpart)	
Seeking mutual satisfaction	Kim et al. (2005)
	Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo.2019
Understanding opponents needs	Saorín-Iborra (2008)

Distributive negotiation behaviour	Source
Rejection	Perdue (1992)
	Olekalns et al. (1996)
Traditional competitive bargaining (appropriate	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)
competitive)	Robinson et al., 2000
Misrepresentation (inappropriate competitive)	Lewicki & Robinson (1998)
Manipulation of opponents network (inappropriate	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)
competitive)	
Bluffing	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)
(inappropriate competitive)	Robinson et al., 2000
False promises	Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)
High opening demands	Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)

# Appendix E - Coding scheme social preservation behaviours

Integrative social behaviours	Source
Fear of social repercussions	Eckel, de Olivera & Grossman (2008)
Desire to stay in the relationship	Hollingshead & Carnevale (1990)
Desire to be liked	
Ensure positive and productive personal relationship	Kim et al. (2005)
Trusting information of counterpart	Kim et al. (2005)
Participation both parties in decision making process	Kim et al. (2005)
Understanding counterparts needs	Kim et al. (2005), Saorín-iborra (2018)

Distributive social behaviours	Source
Manipulating counterparts network inappropriate	Lewicki and Robinson (1998)
Preserving power	Ramsay (2004)

## **Appendix F - Negotiation instructions case graduate**

#### CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION GRADUATE

Time: you get two days to finalize the deal. No deal is not an option! Once you have finalized the deal, you will upload the transcript on Canvas. Att. Upload a copy of your email conversation in "one file" only. Each student pair uploads one document jointly. You are a graduate student and about to graduate with your master's in PSM from the UT.

You have been dying to get out of here and can't wait to get a job in one of the big cities in the western part of the Netherlands. You used to work for your family company, which is a family-owned firm, importing fish from Iceland, and your father sold it at the Market in Enschede, Hengelo, and Almelo each week. Because of your background, being raised in a family-owned firm, where you lived and breath purchasing, it was no brainer when the time came to select what to study and in which university. The University of Twente is one of the few that offers a specified purchasing track, and even if you were excellent in purchasing, you were eager to learn more. After graduation, you want to try another type of firm and preferably one of the more prominent firms in the big cities.

You have had one promising interview before and send out your CV to at least 12 different companies yesterday. You haven't received any other positive responses over the last month, and with your master thesis out of the way, you are starting to feel the pressure of finding a job soon. You do not prefer to go back to working for your family firm as your father looks at this as a joint project where you get housing and food for free, but you work instead. You are interested in moving away from your family within the next three years (even though it is beautiful there and you love your family) but you need time to save up money to be able to buy your own house. It is time to stand on your own feet. You have made up your mind, and this is the time.

#### • You would **preferably have**:

- o **Minimum of 1800 per Month** as you need a least 1800 to be able to afford the cost of living in the expensive western part of the Netherlands. Still, anything lower than 2000 will feel like a disappointment as you heard that your friend that studies mechanical engineering has a signing salary of **3800/ month**.
- o At least one month of preparation time before you start, to take a little vacation (worth months' salary \* months).
- o You would like to live for at least 3 more years at your family house so you can save up for a place of your own and therefore it is important to negotiate an OV card as a benefit or similar.
- o or... A company car would be nice, or any means to get to the company really (worth € 200-300 per month).

#### • You can offer:

- o You are a fluent English speaker, at least level C1!
- o Your mother tongue is Dutch
- o Academic and practical skills, as you have, of course, a master's degree and during your studies attended additional purchasing activities from Professor Schiele, and you were his student assistant throughout your education where you partook in various purchasing conferences and seminars.
- o You also participated in the initiative of Dr. A.G. Sigurdardottir of Negotiation Project Twente, where you learned how to master your negotiation skills.

- You already had that promising interview last week; you are relatively sure that you might get that position. However, the salary offer was too low, and you'd have to live somewhere far away from the city as it would be too expensive to live in the city.
- Try to land the job for much money as possible and max out all the options available!
- Make sure your salary does not include any additional monetary or non-monetary, fixed or variable components not stated in this case and does not depend on conditional clauses.
- It is better for you to reach an agreement as otherwise you will be stuck at the family firm and never get anywhere. If you don't reach a deal, you will have to go work for your parents again, and even though they love you and all, you don't think you mentally ready to do that again any time soon.

## Appendix G - Negotiation instructions HR employee

#### CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HR EMPLOYEE

Time: you get two days to finalize a deal. No deal is not an option! Once you have finalized the deal, you will upload the transcript on Canvas. Att. Upload a copy of your email conversation in "one file" only. Each student pair uploads one document jointly.

You are a recruiter for a young firm in Amsterdam that specializes in Purchasing management recruiting for other companies to make sure firms receive the best of the best purchasing manager material there is, so firms maintain their competitive advantage. Your boss has just landed a big new project and ordered you to hire the most exceptional talents fresh out of the leading universities around the Netherlands. Your colleagues are, as we speak, recruiting at TU Delft and TU Eindhoven, and you are quite keen on beating them in finding the best Purchasing managers. You know that the other universities do not provide as good education as the University of Twente as they do not offer Purchasing Management track as UT does. However, other universities do have some promising students. You had a lot of promising interviews already and almost finished the multidisciplinary team that your boss has requested. You need one more graduate with a Purchasing and Supply Management (PSM) background.

- You would **preferably have** someone that:
- o Speaks Dutch or German and English, as they might work in an international context.
- o Could start as soon as possible, but no later than three months after this interview.
- o Has extracurricular experience working in teams or had a part-time job during their studies related to purchasing.
- o Preferably has a background in purchasing and has the know-how of spend analysis and has some experience of negotiation so that s/he can start right away as a commodity buyer.

#### • You can offer:

For the perfect candidate, you have a budget of € 2200/month, excluding benefits. Additionally, you can contribute:

- o free lunch at the company
- o a gym membership close by the company € 50/month
- o up to 4 weeks of vacation. It is your preference to keep this as low as possible because there is much work to

be done.

If the graduate lives further than 30 km away from Amsterdam and is not going to relocate within the first year of work, you can offer:

o a first-class OV year card (public transporting chip card) worth 200 euro/month,

o or a company car (VW UP € 300/month)

However, preferably employees should live close to their work, and the company wants to avoid all additional transport costs if possible.

Your candidate needs to score high on those demands (see preferences here above); otherwise, you don't get the green light for hiring, and if you do try to hire a candidate that is less qualified, you will also be ranked as a less qualified employee.

- You already have a back-up candidate, an HBO graduate of applied psychology from Saxion. However, you are not convinced that this candidate has the capacity or skills you in your bosses' interdisciplinary team.
- Try to sign the qualified graduate, for as little money as possible, and avoid that you will harm your ranking as a qualified HR person.
- It is in your favor to reach an agreement. If you don't reach a deal, you will sign the less favored HBO graduate, and your boss might doubt your recruitment capabilities as your colleagues have all found extremely talented people at the other technical universities. Ergo, your ranking will go for sure drop significantly.

# Appendix H-Log of participant numbers and level of EI

Female	
Participant number	Level of EI
1	3.67 – low
2	3.73 – low
3	3.53 – low
4	3.67 – low
5	4.00 – high
6	3.53 – low
7	3.60 – low
8	3.87 – middle
9	3.53 – low
10	4.07 – high
11	3.80 – middle
12	3.20 – low
13	3.27 – low
14	3.87 – middle
15	4.27 – high
16	4.20 – high
17	3.80 – middle
18	4.27 – high
19	3.87 – middle
20	2.87 – low
21	3.60 – low
	Mean: 3.57
Male	
1	3.93 – middle
2	4.00 – high
3	4.20 – high
4	3.47 – low
5	4.07 – high
6	3.93 – high
	Mean: 3.90

Table 1: Participants ranked based on their Gender and EI

	Low EI	High EI	Middle EI
Female	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13,	5, 10, 15, 16, 18	8, 11, 14, 17, 19
	20, 21		
Male	4	2, 3, 5	1, 6

Table 2: Overview of participants EI classification

## Appendix I - Summary of negotiation behaviours per participant group

Table 1-Overview of negotiation behaviour of female low EI

Behaviour	Source	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
behaviours		
Asking instead	Collaboratio	Is it also possible to get the first month preparation time and still
of negotiating	n Sharma et	get payment? (F7)
(=collaboration)	al. (2013)	Is a company car an option? (F9)
		is there any chance that the salary will increase after months? If
		there is, how much can I get? (F12)
Self-advocating	Eckel, de	"I believe that I am academically capable of this taking on this
	Olivera &	position." (F4)
	Grossman	"I believe my fundamentals will be significantly of great
	(2008)	importance to the success of the company." (F6)
		"You have a job and I might have the skills and knowledge that
		you are searching for." (F20)
Concessions	Olekalns et	Since I really like your company, the benefits and the help with
	al. (1996)	transportation I am willing to go below the market average. I
	Baron (1990)	would accept 4.050€ per month as starting salary. (F9)
		But for now, I am content to begin with 2000 euro per month.
		(F4)
Understanding	Aim for	I understand your point that summer is the busiest time and you,
of opponents	mutual	therefore, need every employee available and that you want me
needs	understandin	to start on the 6th of April. Could we agree on the 15th of April
	g	with one week extra holiday? In the meantime, I will prepare
	(Saorín-	myself with repeating some university content to be totally ready
	iborra, 2008)	and available for you. (F20)
		I understand that you cannot immediately decide the salary
		increase after 6 months, but I would need the increase to make
		sure that I can pay the rent. Could we agree on a feedback
		session and a discussion with responsible people after 4 months
		about my work and the chance for a salary increase? Then there

		is still enough time to search for a suitable place to live or to
		shift the time of movement further. (F20)
Progress- Γ	De Dreu &	Please let me know if you are fine with this and the idea of the
seeking V	Van Kleef	salary decision (F20)
("	(2004)	
Asking for raise		If I successfully achieve these goals within a specified period, I
in the future		shall get a raise to 2700 in 6 months. (F6)
		I can go to 2500 per month but I would like to make an
		arrangement that my salary can go up by the years as I will be
		more experienced in the job. (F7)
Providing		However, I did some research and looked into Glassdoor and
sources		Payscale to get more information on average salaries for a
		starting Purchasing Managers and found an annual average of
		50.000€ in the Netherlands. Which would mean a monthly salary
		of 4.116. (F9)
		I would like to remind you to think about the average salary of
		purchase managers in Amsterdam of around €5000 per month.
		(F13)
Distributive		
Rejection P	Perdue	"Your offer [1800] is almost insulting to me, since we are
(	(1992)	negotiation about the function of purchasing manager. () If
C	Olekalns et	you cannot make an offer that is less insulting, I am afraid I will
a	al. (1996)	not be able to work for you company, even though I am really
		interested in the function." (F13)
High opening S	Saorín-Iborra	"Based on some research on average salaries in the PSM area, I
demand &	& Cubillo	would like to start working for your company for a salary of
(2	(2019)	€5.000 per month."(F13)
Mentioning L	Lewicki and	Is that really the best the company can do? I might need to
other offers (=	Robinson	consider other options, if there is really no chance of a higher
bluffing) (	(1998)	salary than that. Which would be only my last resort. (F9)
inappropriate R	Robinson et	I am looking forward to hearing from you so I can also make a
11 1		

Traditional	Lewicki and	I can accept the job with a starting salary of 4000 euro per
competitive	Robinson	month, which includes all the transportation costs. OR 3700 euro
bargaining	(1998)	per month, which includes either a company car or an OV card
(=counter-	Robinson et	worth 300 euros each month. (F3)
offers)	al., 2000	
appropriate		Since you have choses to go with someone who recently
competitive		graduated, I think we can get somewhere between the average
		for a recently graduated employee and a manager. The only
		option I would still consider is €3000. (F13)

Table 2 - Summary of most used actions female high EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
behaviours		
Asking instead	Collaboratio	I want to ask now what the exact offer from your company is?
of negotiating	n	Especially regarding the position and salary proposal. (F5)
(=collaboration)	Sharma et al.	
	(2013)	I would accept the train ticket, however, I will need it for 3
		years; Is there an alternative? (F15)
		In the case of financial help, will it be included or excluded from
		the salary? (F15)
Self-advocating	Eckel, de	Because of my personal motivation and my many more skills
	Olivera &	and experiences as regular graduates from PSM, I see myself as
	Grossman	qualified to enrich your team at your company. (F5)
	(2008)	
		Please take into account when doing so that I am one of the top
		students that will graduate from a University level purchasing
		programme that is offered only at the University of Twente.
		(F10)
		I think I am a particularly good match for this position and
		would add significant value to the company from day one. (F18)
Concessions	Olekalns et	If I would agree to starting right after finishing my gradiuation, I
	al. (1996)	think that honoring my asking salary of 2450 would need to be

	Baron (1990)	possible. (F10)
		I am ok with starting in June only if I can receive a salary of
		2150 and OV for the entire period I work at the company. (F10)
		2130 and 6 v for the entire period I work at the company. (1·10)
		Also, as a young and enthusiastic professional, I am prepared to
		make a trade-off between getting no vacation days but working
		for a higher salary (F18)
Understanding	Aim for	I understand the side of your company, but maybe it makes
of opponents	mutual	sense at this point to offer you a little more insight into my
needs	understandin	situation, so you can understand my side. (F5)
	g	
	(Saorín-	You mentioned that you are currently very busy due to the
	iborra, 2008)	coronavirus, I understand that but I do not think that the
		consequences of this disruption will last as far in the future as
		July or August. (F10)
Progress-	De Dreu &	I am looking forward to hearing from you, so that we can
seeking	Van Kleef	finalize the process soon. (F18)
	(2004)	
Distributive		
behaviours		
Rejection	Perdue	Additionally, the transportation is still a problem for me, I can
	(1992)	simply not go to my job if I do not have transportation regardless
	Olekalns et	of the location of my home. (F10)
	al. (1996)	
		As someone who has a master's degree, I will not accept any
		offers lower than 2200 excluding benefits. (F15)
High opening	Saorín-Iborra	As a starting point I would like to get a 3000 Euros salary that
demand	& Cubillo	does not include any additional monetary or non-monetary, fixed
	(2019)	or variable components not stated in this case and does not
		depend on conditional clauses. Since I do not live in western
		Netherlands, I would like to receive a company car that will get
	i e	1
		me to work every day. (F15)
Bluffing	Bluffing	me to work every day. (F15)  Please take into account when doing so that I am one of the top

(Lewicki and	programme that is offered only at the University of Twente.
Robinson,	(F10)
1998)	
Robinson et	
al., 2000	
Lewicki and	I would like to suggest to you that the company pays for my OV.
Robinson	card, but not for free lunch (as I can provide myself with lunch)
(1998)	and I will receive a salary you previously offered me, being
Robinson et	€1815. (F5)
al., 2000	
	Thank you for increasing your offer of salary, it is however
	much appreciated. Unfortunately, it is not enough at this time. I
	would like to counter your offer to 2300. (F10)
	I already explained in another email that I want to stay in
	Enschede for about three years so I can save up enough money
	to have a down payment on a property. (F10)
	Again I would like to mention that the earliest point in time for
	me to start working at your company is July, not June. (F10)
	Robinson, 1998) Robinson et al., 2000 Lewicki and Robinson (1998) Robinson et

Table 3 - Summary of most used actions male high EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
behaviours		
Asking instead	Collaboration	If I move to Amsterdam, would you consider giving me a higher
of negotiating	Sharma et al.	salary of at least €3000,- / month, since the cost of living there
(=collaboration)	(2013)	are much higher. (M5)
Self-advocating	Eckel, de	As I already mentioned during the interview, I am a great
	Olivera &	opportunity for you. (M3)
	Grossman	
	(2008)	

Concessions	Olekalns et	-
	al. (1996)	
	Baron (1990)	
Understanding	Aim for	-
of opponents	mutual	
needs	understanding	
	(Saorín-	
	iborra, 2008)	
Progress-	De Dreu &	I hope we have come to an agreement and I would like to hear
seeking	Van Kleef	from you soon. (M3)
	(2004)	Would you be able to match these conditions and numbers?
		(M5)
Distributive		
behaviours		
Rejection	Perdue	I think our potential agreement lays off reach. If I calculate the
	(1992)	salary with a 40 hours work week where I have to travel every
	Olekalns et	day 5 hours, than I would earn € 6,15 per hour. I would like to
	al. (1996)	accent that this is not a normal offer, I would be better off
		working at the Albert Heijn. (M2)
		I would suggest that you give other participants a try, and if the
		firm is still interested in me than please do another offer. (M2)
High opening	Saorín-Iborra	-
demand	& Cubillo	
	(2019)	
Bluffing	Lewicki and	I am currently looking for other opportunities in the region (M2)
inappropriate	Robinson	
competitive	(1998)	
	Robinson et	
	al., (2000)	
Traditional	Lewicki and	The salary you offered me of 1950 euros per month, is a step in
competitive	Robinson	the right direction in my opinion. However, I would settle for
bargaining	(1998)	2000 euros per month. I think this is a fair salary, provided I get
(=counter-	Robinson et	an OV card/company car. Do you think we can make an
offers)	al., 2000	agreement for 2000 euros per month? (M3)

appropriate	
competitive	
Other	
Providing	As a side note: I have also added a report about the housing
sources	market in the Netherlands as an attachment, which is from ABN
	Amro, October 2019. In that report, one can see that it is
	extremely difficult to find proper housing with lower salaries.
	(M3)
	However, according to my research, the typical salary range for
	somebody with my qualifications in this role is at least €4500 /
	month. (M5)

Table 4 - Summary of most used actions male low  ${\rm EI}$ 

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
behaviours		
Asking instead	Collaboration	Depending on how urgently you need this position to be filled
of negotiating	Sharma et al.	we can arrange an appropriate time, but I have thought about
(=collaboration)	(2013)	some months so I can help you as much as possible when I
		would start. (M4)
		Before we start talking about the salary, can I ask if all the
		already discussed topics with its specific details are okay for
		you? Like the OV card or the date when I start? If this is the
		case, I'm fine with proceeding with the salary. (M4)
Self-advocating	Eckel, de	-
	Olivera &	
	Grossman	
	(2008)	
Concessions	Olekalns et	In my case, since I really need the preparation time, I would
	al. (1996)	accept a salary of 2000 but aim for 6 weeks vacation time in the
	Baron (1990)	beginning.

Understanding	Aim for	I understand this. (M4)
of opponents	mutual	I see your point. (M4)
needs	understanding	I agree with you regarding the lunch. Then I will realize this of
	(Saorín-	course. I also see why you do not want to exceed a specific
	iborra, 2008)	budget. (M4)
Progress-	De Dreu &	-
seeking	Van Kleef	
	(2004)	
Distributive		
behaviours		
Rejection	Perdue	But in my honest opinion, I feel some doubts that this salary is
	(1992)	nearly appropriate, even for new team members. Even
	Olekalns et	considering the benefits that are associated with it. (M4)
	al. (1996)	
High opening	Saorín-Iborra	-
demand	& Cubillo	
	(2019)	
Bluffing	Lewicki and	-
inappropriate	Robinson	
competitive	(1998)	
	Robinson et	
	al., 2000	
Traditional	Lewicki and	Since I aim for at least 4 weeks preparation time, what about if
competitive	Robinson	we modify option 2 like this:
bargaining	(1998)	Salary: 2200 - Vacation: 4 weeks - Benefits: OV (M4)
(=counter-	Robinson et	
offers)	al., 2000	I state two last options and I would like if you can tell me what
appropriate		you think of it.
competitive		Option 1: Salary: 2000 - Vacation: 6 weeks - Benefits: OV, Free
		lunch
		Option 2: Salary: 2100 - Vacation: 5 weeks - Benefits: OV, Free
		lunch (M4)

# Appendix J - Summary of social behaviours per participant group

Table 1 - Summary of social behaviours female low EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
social		
behaviours		
Desire to stay in	Hollingshead	I look forward to working with you in the future. (FL4)
positive	& Carnevale	
relationship	(1990)	I hope with this list of my considerable offers, you will consider
	Kim et al.	me as a new employee (FL6)
	(2005)	
		If you need any further information please do not hesitate to
		contact me. (FL9)
		I [} would be interested in further contact. (FL21)
Affirmation		I hope I have provided enough relevant information. (FL4)
seeking		
		Hopefully, this has answered your question. (FL4)
		I hope that you still remember me since our interview last week.
		(F6)
		Overall, I can say that I have more experience than a standard
		graduate and I hope my time invested in doing external activities
		will be rewarded. (FL7)
Complimenting		It would be a privilege to work for your company. (FL3)
		After graduation, I want to thrive and learn from the best
		purchasers from the most prominent companies in big cities.
		Therefore, the chance to work in your company deeply appeals
		to me. (FL6)

	It is a really practical job [other offer] that suits my interests, but it surely cannot teaches me as much as the position in your company (FL6)
	Your company is one of the most prominent companies in the big cities so you have a very profitable firm. (FL7)
Showing appreciation	First of all, I really appreciate that you let me have some moments considering this. (FL4)
	I am also grateful that you accept to subsidize the transportation cost. (FL6)
	You have been very forthcoming. I believe that you can currently not pay more. (FL9)
	I am glad to hear that you understand my financial issues (FL20)
	I am glad to hear recognition for the Master course I have followed, as it has provided me with great opportunities for development. (FL21)
Thanking	Thank you for your time and consideration (FL6)
	Thank you for your fast reply. I am also grateful that you accept to subsidize the transportation cost. (FL6)
	That's great to hear! Thank you for the opportunity, and looking forward to working with you. (FL21)
Distributive social behaviours	

Fear of social	Without sounding unappreciative, I was wondering to what
repercussions	degree the 2000€ salary is a fixed price. I, of course, very much
	appreciate the offer, however can't help but compare the quote
	to other peers and fellows working in Amsterdam with the same
	level of experience. Would 2600€ be negotiable, also taking into
	account the higher living costs of the Amsterdam area? (FL21)
Demanding	. If I successfully achieve these goals within a specified period, I
	shall get a raise to 2700 in 6 months. (FL6)
	If you feel like you can pay me greatly underneath the average
	salary of a purchase manager, I would like to know why. (FL13)
Disagreeing	I understand your reaction to the cornavirus, but I think it's a
	possibility that by the 1st of June the strain on business is lower.
	(FL9)

Table 2 -Summary of social behaviours female high EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative social behaviours		
Desire to stay in positive relationship	Hollingshead & Carnevale (1990)	I am looking forward to <i>joining the team</i> and making a positive contribution to the company (F16).
	Kim et al. (2005)	I appreciate that you respect my wishes and think that this is a great start of our professional relationship. (F18)
		I am looking forward to starting at my new position in 6 weeks and working with your company. (F18)
Affirmation seeking		I hope I could answer your questions satisfactorily. (F5)
Complimenting		I find happiness in challenging opportunities to gather new experiences and improve, and this I see this opportunity exactly

	in working for a great company such as yours. (F5)
	And, I'm definitely looking for a position where I can grow, professional development is something that's really important to me. and I am confident that your company, Mr *, is a place that offers me exactly that. (F5)
	In order to start our negotiations I would firstly like to thank you for the opportunity of working for one of the biggest purchasing firms in the country. (F10)
Showing appreciation	I appreciate that you respect my wishes and think that this is a great start of our professional relationship. (F18)
Thanking	I thank you for acknowledging my experience with purchasing.  (F5)
	thank you again for this kind offer. (F5)
	Thank you for giving me this great opportunity by securing the contract for 5 years (F16)
	Thank you for your time, and I am looking forward to talking with you. (F18)
Distributive social behaviours	
Fear of social	I hope I do not appear as rude or ungrateful, as this is not my
repercussions	intention at all. (FH5)
Demanding	I have noticed that you did not reply to my question of reconsidering the salary you offered me. Hence I would request you to reconsider your salary offer. (F10)
Disagreeing	You mentioned that you are currently very busy due to the coronavirus, I understand that but I do not think that the consequences of this disruption will last as far in the future as July or August. (F10)

	As far as the vacation goes I would like you to reconsider as the
	corona crisis will probably be over by the time I would be able
	to start working for the company (F10)

Table 3 - Summary of social behaviours male low EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants
Integrative		
social		
behaviours		
Desire to stay in	Hollingshead	I hope to hear from you soon. (M4)
positive	& Carnevale	
relationship	(1990)	
	Kim et al.	
	(2005)	
Affirmation		-
seeking		
Complimenting		-
Showing		I recognize the benefits you can give me. (M4)
appreciation		
Thanking		Thank you for your patience. (M4)
Distributive		
social		
behaviours		
Fear of social		-
repercussions		
Demanding		-
Disagreeing		-

Table 4 - Summary of social behaviours male high EI

Behaviour	Definition	Representative quotes of participants

Integrative		
social		
behaviours		
Desire to stay in	Hollingshead	I am looking forward to hearing from you soon. (M3)
positive	& Carnevale	
relationship	(1990)	I look forward to meeting with you. (M3)
	Kim et al.	
	(2005)	I am looking forward to working with you! (M5)
		I hope we will be able to share our thoughts about the interview
		and the job position a bit more. (M3)
Affirmation		I hope my summary of why you should consider me as the new
seeking		commodity buyer is clear to you, and that my salary offer is
		negotiable. (M3)
		A little bit of charisma, as well as the ability to separate your
		feelings from the job, are important skills a purchaser should
		possess, in my opinion. I hope we can agree with each other on
		this subject. (M3)
Complimenting		I am really excited about the role and the work that I as a
		purchasing would do and I would love to join the team. (M5)
Showing		-
appreciation		
Thanking		I would like to thank you in advance for your response (M3)
		First of all, I would like to thank you for your fast response.
		(M3)
		Thank you for the pleasant negotiation. (M3)
		Thank you so much for the offer and opportunity! (M5)
		Thank you for your counter offer. (M5)
- 1		Ok, thank you very much for explaining. (M5)
Distributive		
social		
behaviours		

Fear of social	-
repercussions	
Demanding	-
Disagreeing	-