Master thesis

Biology Assessment

on the feasibility of anticipating Synthetic Biology

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Under the supervision of
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

> ”It is not down on any map;
> true places never are.”
>
> *Moby-Dick, or, the Whale*
> *Herman Melville*

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What a fascinating journey we've had.

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I dedicate this work to my parents, who taught me the virtues of compassion and curiosity.

Until we meet again,

Wietse

Contents

1 Introduction

What are the differences between living and non-living systems? What are the implications of these differences on our ability to anticipate the future? To better understand said differences and their impacts on anticipation, this thesis focuses on two specific anticipatory practices found in Technology Assessment and a novel field of research, Synthetic Biology, to explore how the former assess the latter. Technology Assessment is hereby understood as a practice and a field of research that aims to anticipate the ethical and societal impacts of technologies and make explicit those aspects that should be subject to democratic decision-making (Grunwald, 2019). Synthetic Biology is hereby understood as a field of research that focuses on the modification or creation of novel living systems with the aim of harnessing the self-organization power of nature for technological purposes (Schmidt, 2016). Challenging well-known anticipatory practices by exploring how they currently assess a hybrid between technology and biology, purposely pushing for its limits, enhances our chances of laying bare Technology Assessment's current shortcomings.

Existing research Various publications explore the implications of synthetic biology in connection to Technology Assessment (De Vriend & Walhout, 2006; Rerimassie et al., 2015; Grunwald, 2016; Stemerding et al., 2019), but most of them remain ambiguous regarding notions such as complexity, anticipation and the role both play for living systems. Inspired by theoretical biologist Robert Rosen's work on complexity and how it relates to life itself (Rosen, 1991) and Roberto Poli's subsequent work on anticipatory systems (Poli, 2017), this thesis explores the implications of both Rosen and Poli's ideas for our ability to anticipate the future of living systems such as those resulting from Synthetic Biology. Attempts at integrating Rosen's ideas into anticipatory practices remain sparse, but these first attempts are promising (Marinakis et al., 2018). Due to the many interesting questions this research raises, political, ethical, existential, to name a few, a clearly defined scope was necessary to keep this research achievable. Therefore, what follows is an investigation into the implications of a specific theory of complexity, Rosenian Complexity, for two specific anticipatory tools, formal modeling and scenario building, used in Technology Assessment. This means that the political, ethical, and existential implications, although they are at least as important, are left mostly unaddressed.

Urgency Anticipating what might happen is a crucial skill for any actor: from a single individual organism to a whole nation-state. Motivations for anticipating future dynamics emerging from living systems are multifold: ranging from future risk assessment to organizational planning. The role of anticipation is not only to prevent possible ecological disasters but also to inspire ethical debates, identify all relevant stakeholders to include in such debates, and finally inform corporate investment strategies. The need for a rich understanding of 'the nature' of living systems becomes apparent because the recognition of both characteristics (complexity and anticipation) greatly determines the perceived plausibility of selected scenarios regarding the future of synthetic biology. That is to say: when we miscategorize a phenomenon as 'more of the same', we run the risk of being surprised by its novel dynamics.

Problem statement and main research question This thesis is centered around the following research question: "To what extent are two common anticipatory tools found in Technology Assessment, formal modeling and scenario building, able to anticipate the future of living systems?". From this main research question, various sub-questions sprung forth that each connects to their own dedicated chapter. How has Technology Assessment, both as a field and a practice, evolved in the last 50 years? How do existing TA reports deal with the challenge of anticipating a novel technoscience such as Synthetic Biology? In what ways is anticipating the future impacts of non-living systems different from anticipating the future impacts of living systems? What are the implications of these newfound differences between non-living and living systems for Technology Assessment? Are there potential venues to explore to potentially overcome the current limitations found in Technology Assessment?

As part of this research, I've surveyed various existing Technology Assessment reports written about synthetic biology. What stands out in these reports is the large chasm between those optimistic and those skeptical about the positive effects this new and emerging science and technology might bring. I propose this chasm is there because of two very different anticipatory assumptions regarding living systems, which can be summarized as follows: 1) optimists believe living systems are 'more of the same' with some added complexity, meaning existing approaches suffice, while 2) skeptics believe living systems are something (very) different that require a plethora of novel approaches. All reports on synthetic biology mention this chasm, but none of the reports take a clear side in this debate, which, although understandable, is potentially dangerous.

Main claim In this thesis, I claim that due to the transition from mechanical technologies to living technologies, Technology Assessment requires a thorough understanding of the 'anticipatory nature of nature' for it to adequately perform functions in its new role as 'Biology Assessment'. Without a good grasp of the difference between living and non-living systems, current assessments are lacking with regard to their ability to anticipate and evaluate the future dynamics of synthetic biology. The reason that Technology Assessment is unable to anticipate these dynamics is due to 1) a lack of a clear definition of complexity within TA literature that is useful for understanding living systems such as synthetic biology and 2) a limited understanding regarding the implications of this specific type of complexity on our ability to generate formal models and determine the appropriate plausibility of future scenarios.

Overview At the beginning of this thesis, I introduce a specific field of research, Technology Assessment (chapter 2), after which I go into the specific characteristics of synthetic biology (chapter 3) to eventually merge both topics together in a chapter exploring existing assessment reports written about synthetic biology (chapter 4). This chapter brings both topics together through a survey of existing assessments of synthetic biology, with the aim of getting a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of these assessments. After this, I delve deeper into the notion of complexity, and more specifically, how it relates to living systems (chapter 5). This chapter aims to give clarity with regards to the seemingly convoluted notion of complexity, especially how complexity relates to living systems. By exploring a specific theory of complexity (Rosenian Complexity), I bring to the fore the crucial difference between the living and the non-living, between organism and mechanism. In the subsequent chapter on anticipation (chapter 6), by moving from the reactionary paradigm into the anticipatory paradigm, I make visible the novel limitations we are confronted with when formalizing living systems. In chapter (7), I explore the various implications of my findings for both formal modeling and scenario building. In the second to last chapter (8), I go over various recommendations on where to go from here, to finally conclude the thesis with a general summary of my findings, as well as limitations and possibilities for future research (chapter 9). The readers I had in mind while writing this thesis belong to the following groups: Technology Assessment practitioners, Engineers, and Biologists in the field of Synthetic Biology, as well as Philosophers of Technology.

“The world of the future will be an even more demanding struggle against the limitations of our intelligence, not a comfortable hammock in which we can lie down.”

(Wiener, 1950)



FIG. 4.—*Governor and Throttle-Valve.*

The centrifugal **”fly-ball” governor**: the balls swing out as speed increases, which closes the valve, until a balance is achieved.

2 Technology Assessment

In this chapter, I aim to unpack what is meant when one uses the term Technology Assessment (TA). I start by going over the history of TA, its foundations, and the various definitions of TA. To conclude with an exploration of various forms of TA as well as tracing how these forms evolved throughout the years. The goal of this chapter is to better understand Technology Assessment, both as a research field and as a practice, to provide the necessary context for the upcoming chapters.

2.1 History

The first theories and practices resembling what is today known as Technology Assessment (TA) started emerging in the United States around 1960. At the very start, the growing calls for early assessments of possible societal impacts of technology were politically motivated: with a broad number of technologies having a noticeable effect on everyday life, politicians felt it important to play an active role in regulating the rollout of technologies within society.

At the beginning of the 20th century, preceding the emergence of TA, American sociologist William F. Ogburn proposed the term *cultural lag* to describe his realization that culture and technology could be out of sync with each other. According to Ogburn, culture seemed to be always playing a game of catch up with technology (Ogburn, 1957). Although he is seen as the conceptual father of Technology Assessment, Ogburn never used the term himself: it was U.S. congressional representative Emilio Daddario who formally introduced the term (Bimber, 1996). After the second world war, various think tanks were formed, the most well-known one being the RAND corporation. RAND did not merely think ahead with regard to military technology but also dealt with themes such as spaceflight, computing, and artificial intelligence (Abella, 2009). The practice today known as *scenario building* was the most influential invention to come out of the RAND Corporation, eventually becoming a much-used prospective instrument used in Technology Assessment.

The first forms of institutionalized TA were born within the political realm as parliamentary TA, incarnated in 1972 as 'The Office for Technology Assessment,' or OTA in the United States. It took more than 15 years, around the second half of 1980, before the first European offices of parliamentary TA were founded. Although parliamentary TA is still very much alive outside of the United States, the Office for Technology Assessment was shut down in 1995 due to various political reasons and has not returned since.

2.2 Foundations

Around the second half of the 20th century, Norbert Wiener introduced the neologism *Cybernetics* in a book by the same title, defining the term as describing "the scientific study of control and communication in the animal and the machine." (Wiener, 1950). Through the use of his concept of feedback loops, Wiener described the "circular causal" relationship between various parts of a closed (mechanical) system. A common example is a way in which a steam engine uses a 'governor' to keep the speed of the engine within bounds (Kline, 2015). Cybernetic thought grew far outside its initial engineering scope, evolving into a perspective applied to biology, psychology, and sociology. The school of Cybernetics provided fertile ground for the emergence of *systems thinking*: the idea that we should look at the world through a systems perspective, understanding phenomena as interactions between systems, each composing out of various subsystems (Pickering, 2011). Technology Assessment leans heavily on a system view of the world; how this initial influence of Cybernetics on TA is of special interest to this research will become apparent in chapter 5 on Complexity.

Technology Assessment not only finds its roots in Cybernetics but also in American Pragmatism. In John Dewey's pragmatist model of a democratic society, regulating the indirect consequences of human action is "the main business of politics" (Grunwald, 2019, p. 198). Furthermore, each citizen should be involved in this process and regarded as "capable of co-deciding about a regulation of such indirect consequences." (Dewey, 1927, p. 147). This model of a democratic society is crucial to the legitimization of Technology Assessment, as it provides a strong case for government and citizen interference in the process of embedding technology in society. The broader political history of Technology Assessment, although certainly interesting, lays outside the scope of this thesis[1].

2.3 Definition

To better understand what is meant by Technology Assessment, we need to unpack the various meanings of the term. Although there is no clear widely agreed on definition for Technology Assessment, it is characterized in the literature as "an array of policy analytic, economic, ethical, and other social science research that attempts to *anticipate* how research and research-based technologies will interact with social systems [emphasis added]" (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002, p. 941). There has been strong conceptual work done to map out the scope and moving parts of TA, most recently by Armin Grunwald (Grunwald, 2019). Grunwald wrote extensively on the subject of TA and saw the ambiguity with regards to the meaning of TA as a potential strength: "The vagueness of the notion, when interpreted as openness, has perhaps been a strength for creative exploration of the field over the past few decades." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 21-22).

It is a common misconception that the whole of Technology Assessment can be captured by defining it as a collection of tools and methods: "the methodology of technology assessment cannot consist of a kind of toolkit or of a set of methods simply to be applied." (Grunwald, p. 31). What gets closer to the core of TA is a description of its end goal: to make explicit those aspects, both ethical as well as societal, which "should be made subject to political reasoning and democratic decision-making." (ibid, p. 23). With this goal in mind, TA came to function as an interface between technology and society, described by some as *the honest broker* between both (Sarewitz, 1996). To what extent TA can ever function as a truly 'honest' mediator between technology and society is still up for debate (Pielke Jr, 2007), it is clear, however, that having some form of overseeing reflexive instruments might be useful. The motivation

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[1] For further reading on the topic, I recommend Hennen & Nierling, 2019.

to have such a reflexive instrument is twofold: "(1) to take care to keep open, or to open up, the spaces for shaping technology, and (2) to ask, in cases of adaptation needs, about the forces and interests behind them, and to make them transparent." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 47). Grunwald identifies the following conceptual dimensions of TA: (1) *anticipation*, (2) *inclusion*, and (3) *complexity*. It is the first and the last dimension that I will focus on in chapters 5 (complexity) and 6 (anticipation). Although relevant, the inclusion dimension lies outside the scope of this thesis.

2.4 Types of Technology Assessment

After a mostly theoretical account of Technology Assessment, the picture would not be complete without looking at various forms of TA in practice. Assessments of technology are not done according to a commonly accepted template, as there is still no "common understanding of which steps the TA assessment process must include and how these steps should be composed." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 169). As became clear in the previous section, traditional TA takes shape as various forms of research that span political, economic, ethical, social dimensions that are then combined into reports that are subsequently used to inform policymaking. In the case of assessments done with the goal of informing political decision making, these are done either within governmental agencies or carried out by external institutions, such as the Rathenau institute in the Netherlands.

An often-cited conundrum found in TA literature is the so-called 'Collingridge dilemma' (Collingridge, 1980). David Collingridge pointed out how societal implications of technology can only be fully understood post-factum (after the fact), while the interventions in the technology based on these implications are the most effective ex-ante (before the fact). For this reason, over the course of the evolution of TA, various voices pressing for participation during the initial development phase of technologies could be heard (Hennen, 1999). One of the consequences of this movement was the development of so-called *participatory approaches*, such as Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA). In the following section, I go over some of the most common derivatives of TA, starting with CTA. The motivation for choosing these specific forms of TA is based on their frequency of application in recent years and the nature of the specific technologies they were applied to.

Constructive Technology Assessment In traditional Technology Assessment, the technology "is taken as given, and thus seen as a static entity (Schot et al., 1997, Rip et al., 2008). Constructive Technology Assessment aims to involve a broad number of actors, not merely governmental ones, at the very beginning of the development process, with the end goal of infusing Feedback of TA activities into the actual construction of technology" (Schot et al., p. 252). CTA embraces the notion of *co-production* and sees the various actors are working together to create technologies and their accommodation societal impacts. This includes the notion of *anticipation*, as technological change is based on the "historical experience of actors, their views of the future, and their perceptions of the promise or threat of impacts which will change over time." (Schot et al., p. 257). CTA is based on three strategies: (1) *technology-forcing*, (2) *strategic niche management*, and (3) stimulation (or creation) of *alignment*. In the case of technology-forcing, governments prescribe certain specifications, for instance, limited toxicity levels in car exhausts and requiring them by law. Strategic niche management amounts to helping the development and introduction of new technologies through setting up experimental niches in which "actors learn about the design, user needs, cultural and political acceptability" (Schot et al., p. 261). The stimulation of alignment is done by actively involving the relevant stakeholders in dialogue workshops, consensus conferences, and other forums. In summary, the overall aim of CTA is "feeding TA insights back into technological development and adoption" (Schot et al., p. 254). Constructive Technology Assessment can be described as a form of participatory TA.

Real-time Technology Assessment The proponents of Real-time Technology Assessment (real-time TA) claim that CTA does not go far enough *upstream* in the development of technologies: according to them, TA should be "embedded in the knowledge creation process itself" (Guston et al., 2002). The main idea is to build a reflexive capacity into the research and development phase, significantly further upstream than earlier TA approaches went thus far. One of the tools Real-time TA uses is 'research program mapping', a practice that identifies "key R&D trends, major participants and their roles, and organizational structures and relations" (Guston et al., p. 102). The idea is to create a map of the various actors involved in the research and development phase and understand the individual progress they made.

Furthermore, real-time TA includes the notion of 'communication and early warning' (CEW), a collection of activities that allow for the identification of potential risks and public attitudes about these risks so that they might be taken into account early on in the development process. One of the challenges of real-time TA is how stakeholders should be identified while the project is still in its 'embryonic state,' making it so that the stakes are barely visible. One of the proposed solutions is to select pilot projects that are of the same nature as the technology in question, with the aim of finding the "latent but potentially motivated stakeholder groups may already exist" (Guston et al., p. 107).

Prospective Technology Assessment As with CTA, some practitioners feel that even real-time TA is still too late in the process of technologies in the making. The last type of Technology Assessment I discuss here is Prospective TA, or ProTA (Liebert et al., 2010). One of the main tenets of this addition to the field of TA is an emphasis on the notion of *prospective knowledge*. This type of knowledge could be explained as 'knowledge about the future'; that is to say; knowledge claims about phenomena that do not yet exist. This future knowledge can be derived from "the state-of-the-art in techno-sciences, from the analysis of declared intentions, (visible) preferences and purposes in current research, and from future scenarios." (ibid, p. 106). The central elements of ProTA are *1)* early-stage orientation - the temporal dimension, this involves getting involved "during the early phases of agenda-setting and the development of research corridors" (ibid, p. 105) and *2)* intention and potential orientation - the knowledge dimension, this involves considering and assessing "alternative paths and other research trajectories" (ibid, p. 106) and finally *3)* shaping orientation - the power/actor dimension, which involves shaping the trajectories of research and development programs. Those who developed ProTA are motivated by the *precautionary principle*: derived from Hans Jonas' insight that when we try to foresee certain outcomes, we should give precedence to "the bad over the good prognosis" (Jonas, 1984, p. 31).

Conclusion

It became clear that Technology Assessment is a diverse and ever-changing field of research that aims to anticipate the impacts technologies might have on society, with the end goal of making explicit those aspects that should be subject to democratic decision making. Throughout the history of Technology Assessment, a strong push emerged for assessments to take place more and more upstream in the development process of new technologies. This resulted in the development of Constructive TA, Real-time TA, and, eventually, Prospective TA. With this last form of TA, the role of prospective knowledge was made more explicit, showing how important knowledge about the future is during assessments. The next chapter looks into a technology that poses its own unique challenges for TA practitioners: synthetic biology.

"In fact, if synthetic biology as an activity of creation differs from genetic engineering as a manipulative approach, the Baconian homo faber will turn into a creator."

(Boldt/Müller 2008, p. 387)



Drawing of a **Prokaryotic cell**,
by *Vaike Haas*, University of Wisconsin-Madison

3 Synthetic Biology

This chapter describes the origins of synthetic biology, as well as definitions, methods, and various applications, in particular the creation of synthetic organisms. The goal of this chapter is to provide the necessary groundwork for the subsequent chapter (4), in which I explore various existing Technology Assessment reports on synthetic biology.

3.1 Background

We find various interesting combinations of words in scientific nomenclature, with *synthetic biology* being a curious combination of the words 'synthetic,' conjuring up associations like *artificial* and *made*, as well as the word 'biology,' commonly associated with *nature* and *growth*. The first reference to the word 'synthetic biology' came from French professor of medicine, Stéphane Leduc, in his 1912 book La Biologie Synthétique. While Leduc was mostly interested in the various forms and shapes biological entities could take, sometime later, a young physicist named John Butler Burke wanted to understand the nature of life by posing the intriguing question: could life be produced from non-life? (Schmidt et al., 2010, p. 9). The synthesis in synthetic biology quickly became more than just mimicking life "now it had been marshaled to help explore the more fundamental properties of life including its history and origin." (ibid, p. 10). Around the same time, German American physiologist Jacques Loeb aimed to create a technology of the living substance by having "full physiological and developmental control over it, developing new forms at will and as needed." (ibid, p. 10).

These first pioneers in synthetic biology spurred a lot of controversy at the time, including many skeptical critiques claiming what they were doing was interesting but had nothing to do with biology (Bather et al., 1928). The first man-made biological parts recognized as such were developed by Litman and Szybalski in 1963, through their *in vitro* (in the glass, outside the body) synthesis of biologically functional DNA molecules (Litman and Szybalski, 1963). Today, synthetic biology has matured a lot, growing into various research areas ranging from DNA-based device construction, Genome-driven cell engineering, and Protocell creation (O'Malley et al., 2008). It must be stressed that, as is the case for the history of any phenomenon, the true story of how synthetic biology came to be is a lot messier and involves a far greater number of actors and factors then the scope of this thesis allows to give credit: "There is, in fact, no single history of synthetic biology to be written, no single vantage point that can be favored." (Meyer, 2013, p. 374).

3.2 Definitions

Throughout its evolution, various definitions of synthetic biology have been proposed (van Doren et al., 2014). Jan Cornelius Schmidt, in his work on Prospective Technology Assessment, partly described in the previous chapter, proposes three different definitions of synthetic biology: (1) the 'engineering definition,' (2) the 'artificiality definition' and (3) the 'extreme biotechnology definition' (Schmidt, 2016). According to the *engineering* definition, synthetic biology brings an engineering approach to the scientific discipline of biology. This definition implies that the existing demarcation between biology as an academic discipline (with a focus on theorizing) and engineering as a science (with a focus on development) is blurred. In the *artificiality* definition, the weight is put on the artificial nature of the biological systems that emerge from synthetic biology. It used to be the case that the notion of a biological system always implied a system 'created by nature,' but with synthetic biology, it might be that this system is purposefully created by humans. This definition deals mainly with the question of the *origin*s of a specific biological system. According to the *extreme gene/biotechnology* definition, there is nothing really new about synthetic biology: it is merely an expansion of biotechnology. This definition puts weight on the methods used in synthetic biology and claims that no radically new methods are involved.

Schmidt concludes that all these definitions are too narrow and eventually proposes the *systems or self-organization* definition; according to this definition, synthetic biology "harnesses, or at least aims to harness, the self-organization power of nature for technological purposes" (ibid). With this last definition, Schmidt follows Alfred Nordmann (Nordmann, 2008), who claims that synthetic biology ''seeks to exploit surprising properties that arise from natural processes of self-organization.'' (Nordmann, 2008, p. 175). This definition echoes the notion of *autopoietic systems* developed by biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1980). For now, it suffices to say that I agree with Schmidt that synthetic biology is not merely an extension of biotechnological methods, or that it can be summarized as applying engineering practices to biology, or by focusing on its origin. Synthetic biology is all of the above, but most importantly, it allows for the creation of novel forms of biology, opening up the possibility of creating and modifying *living systems*. To prevent further confusion: when using the term synthetic biology, I'm referring to the modification and or creation of living organisms with the overall goal of harnessing the unique characteristics of life itself.

3.3 Methods

Synthetic Biologists use various methods when they create or modify biological systems. Here I shortly survey these methods using the three-fold categorization found in O'Malley et al., 2008, which allows for a greater understanding of what synthetic biology entails both inside and outside the laboratory environment.

DNA-based device construction This category of synthetic biology overlaps with the engineering definition described in the previous section. The overarching goal of DNA-based device construction is "to make biology into an engineering discipline" (Endy, 2005). The idea is to reduce the complexity found in Biology by building a system of standardized parts and describing them in an open-access library: The Registry of Standard Biological Parts (see Galdzicki et al., 2011). These parts or 'BioBricks' can be used to build more complex biological devices, such as oscillators. The use of a concept such as an oscillator (found in electrical engineering) shows the strong influence of an engineering approach in the BioBricks framework. Building on the BioBricks framework, an annual competition titled 'International Genetically Engineered Machine' (iGem) is held, where teams make new BioBricks and add them to the Registry of Standard Biological Parts so that they can be used by other teams (Smolke, 2009).

Genome-driven cell engineering The second category matches with the extreme gene/biotechnology definition described by Schmidt in the previous section. By using both top-down strategies (starting with the genome) and bottom-up strategies (starting with nucleotides), Genome-driven cell engineers modify an existing cell's genome or add new genomes to an existing cell (O'Malley et al., 2008, p. 58-59). One of the goals of the top-down approach is to create a standardized host cell or 'chassis' that could function as a platform for later device implantation (ibid, p. 59). In the bottom-up approach, the aim is to synthesize an entire genome that can replace an existing 'natural' genome through transplantation between cells.

Protocell creation This third category fits closest to the systems or self-organization definition described in the previous section. The creation of protocells is close to the bottom-up approach found in Genome-driven cell engineering, with the main difference that the end goal of protocell creation is to synthesize all basic molecular components needed to construct a fully self-replicating biological system (O'Malley et al., 2008, p. 59). That is to say, protocell creation could be seen as a bottom-up approach with the aim of creating living systems (Zepik et al., 2001). What it means to be alive and what is required to be able to speak of a 'living system' is further explored in chapter 5.

3.4 Applications

Although most laypeople might categorize synthetic biology as science fiction, the reality is that real-world applications of synthetic biology are multifold (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2010; Vidali, 2001). This section goes over some of the applications in use today, and those in future development, starting with a survey of Synthetic Organisms (3.4.1).

Synthetic Organisms The true potential of synthetic biology comes to the fore with the creation of (fully) synthetic organisms. The goal is to create, or modify to a great extent, synthetic organisms so that one ends up with a new and novel living system that nature itself was unable to directly produce. The first team to create a bacterium with a fully synthetic genome was led by the biotechnologist and entrepreneur Craig Venter (Gibson et al., 2010). While recognizing that (to this day) the work done by Venter and his team is surrounded by controversy, the fact that it garnered as much attention as it did outside the common scientific discourse did spur a much-needed debate on the implications of 'synthetic life.'

More recently, in a 2019 paper, researchers describe how they 'compressed' an E. coli bacterium by removing unneeded parts without changing its 'functional output' (Fredens et al., 2019). This is possible because natural evolution does not necessarily result in the most efficient configuration of a living system: most organisms contain redundant parts that do not add to the overall functioning of the system. In the commercial space, Boston based biotech company Ginkgo Bioworks claims the ability to develop synthetic organisms according to specs provided by their clients (Molteni, 2018).

Materials & Fuels Materials readily available in nature are known to possess physical properties exceeding the strongest materials made by traditional methods. One of those materials is the dragline silk used by spiders to build their webs. Various methods have been developed that modify Escherichia coli bacteria (currently the organism of choice for Synthetic Biologists) so that they start producing large quantities of spider silk, used to create mixed polymers that have substantially more strength than purely synthetic polymers (Xia et al., 2010). Optical materials are materials that build upon the various characteristics that organisms possess to manipulate light propagation (e.g., structural color, anti-reflection, light focus, and chirality) (Le Feuvre et al., 2018).

A different application of synthetic biology is the creation of synthetic (bio)fuels using microbial engineering (Peralta-Yahya et al., 2012). These biofuels are made to replace conventional petroleum-based fuels such as diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel, mostly without the need to modify the engine. Synthetic biology is used to maximize the production of biofuels by creating metabolic pathways using modified bacteria, making it economically viable to produce these fuels without the need for crude oil (ibid, p. 322).

Bioremediation Conventional remediation is the process of cleaning the natural environment from toxins introduced by (for example) heavy industry. This form of remediation can be summarized as digging up the contaminated soil and transporting it to a landfill or enclosing the contaminated areas (Kensa, 2011). Bioremediation has the same goal but uses natural biological activity to do the cleaning up (Vidali, 2001). For example, in the case of environmental contaminants resulting from the chemical and petroleum industries, the process of bioremediation involves using microorganisms to transform harmful contaminants into harmless products such as CO2 and H20 (Singh et al., 2004).

There are two main bioremediation strategies: *in situ* bioremediation and *ex-situ* bioremediation. The in-situ variant is to be preferred, as it provides “treatment in place avoiding excavation and transport of contaminants” (Kensa, 2011, p. 165), while the ex-situ variant involves “the excavation or removal of contaminated soil from the ground” (ibid, p. 165). An example of using a genetic engineering approach in bioremediation is the modification of the bacterium Deinococcus radiodurans (the most radioresistant organism known) to consume and digest toluene and ionic mercury from highly radioactive nuclear waste (ibid, p. 166).

Conclusion

What became clear in this chapter is the potential richness and depth of synthetic biology. First mentioned in 1912 and made a reality in 1963, synthetic biology spurred a lot of controversy throughout its lifetime. We ended up at the *systems or self-organization* definition of synthetic biology, with a strong emphasis on the ability to live systems to self-organize. Furthermore, I made clear that when discussing synthetic biology in the remainder of this thesis, I’m referring to the modification and or creation of living organisms. We learned about three methods used in the field of synthetic biology, with the last method being closest to the definition we choose earlier due to its aim: constructing a fully self-replicating biological system. Finally, an overview of applications of synthetic biology was given, from synthetic dragline silk to repairing ecosystems using bioremediation. With the intricacies of both Technology Assessment and synthetic biology addressed, we are now ready to put them together in the next chapter, where I survey various assessments of synthetic biology.

“I believe that it can only help science if the younger investigators realize that experimental abiogenesis is the goal of biology.”

(Loeb, 1906)



Drawing of the structure of a **Eukaryotic cell**,
by *Vaike Haas*, University of Wisconsin-Madison

4 Reports

The previous two chapters introduced the notion of Technology Assessment (TA), as well as synthetic biology. This chapter brings both topics together through a survey of existing *assessments of synthetic biology*, with the aim of getting a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of these assessments. This chapter starts by going over various parliamentary assessments done in The Netherlands, Germany, France, at the pan-European level, and within the United States. At the end of this chapter, I reflect on what stood out to me as relevant in these reports and why I think these topics require further investigation. It is important to note that although not all assessments of synthetic biology are performed under the explicit banner of 'Technology Assessment,' this does not mean that they cannot be seen as implicit forms of TA. As became clear in chapter 2, Technology Assessment is not just a collection of instruments, but a broad type of research aimed at finding those aspects of emerging technologies that "should be made subject to political reasoning and democratic decision-making." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 23).

While surveying the various reports, I paid close attention to the way the authors decided to frame synthetic biology, specifically the way they dealt with the possible need for an ontological break with earlier (non-living) technologies, and what this break entails for questions concerning complexity: are living systems inherently more complex than non-living systems? This focus on complexity is motivated by the possibility that this notion might play a significant role with regards to our ability to anticipate the future dynamics of living systems. Furthermore, I aimed to discern the reasoning the authors used when making (and not making) specific claims about the future, the various sources they consulted, and the type of anticipatory methods they applied when making these claims.

Before we delve into the various reports, it is necessary to explain my motivations for choosing these specific reports and why I omitted other reports on synthetic biology. To surface any existing Technology Assessment reports on synthetic biology, I performed a systematic search that started by querying various academic search engines (Scopus, Google Scholar, and WorldCat). These initial searches resulted in a shortlist of key assessment reports on synthetic biology that were subsequently mined for references to other reports, relevant articles, and seminal works on the matter. Furthermore, I found that helpful meta-research was performed by Virgil Rerimassie (formerly at the Rathenau Institute), who I subsequently contacted to discuss his work (Rerimassie, 2015). I identified 12 reports in total; the reason that specific reports were omitted is either due to overlap with better, more detailed reports or when the methods used in these reports drifted too far from a 'TA inspired' approach for the reports to be seen as true TA reports. The overlap between other reports was the case for the 2008 report titled 'Towards a European Strategy for synthetic biology' (Gaisser et al., 2008) and the report by de Danish Technology Assessment board titled *Syntesebiologi* (Rasmussen et al., 2011). Too much drift from TA was the case for the report titled 'Ethical and regulatory challenges raised by synthetic biology' (Gerotto et al., 2011).

4.1 The Netherlands

The Rathenau Institute, the Dutch office for Technology Assessment, takes a fairly autonomous and independent stance towards the Dutch parliament, in notable contrast to the German (T.A.B.) and French (O.P.E.C.S.T.) Technology Assessment entities, which are both closely monitored by their respective parliaments. Rathenau addressed synthetic biology early on in its development process. In 2006, the Institute published its first report on synthetic biology titled "Constructing Life" (De Vriend et al., 2006), in which they present "a picture of the characteristics, key players, (potential) applications and future expectations, as well as the possible ethical, legal and social implications of synthetic biology." (ibid, p. 63).

Paradigm shift As was seen in the earlier chapter on synthetic biology, there is a lively debate between practitioners regarding the scope of this new technology. Being very much aware of this tension, at the beginning of their report, the authors question to what extent synthetic biology should be considered to be a true 'paradigm shift.' They provide a tentative answer, recognizing that the use of "engineering language, and the practical approach of creating standardized cells and components like in electrical circuitry suggests a paradigm shift" (ibid, p. 26). To better understand what this paradigm shift might entail, the authors collected various insights from a group of scientists who consider themselves to be synthetic biologists. With regard to *complexity*, one of those scientists pointed out how the reductionist view of biology as a 'machine' implied by the engineering approach misses the inherent complexity of living systems, noting that we should not see these systems "materialistically, as machines, but as (stable) complex, dynamic organizations" (ibid, p. 27). The authors stress that engineers do recognize the underlying complexity of living systems but are just "convinced they could simplify it and make it work by design" (ibid, p. 27).

The reductionist approach of most engineers on the one hand, and the more holistic approach of biologists on the other, is pointed out by the authors as an important tension between the various actors in the field of synthetic biology: "A biologist goes into the lab, studies a system and finds that it is far more complex than anyone suspected; He's delighted an engineer goes into the lab and makes the same finding. His response is: 'How can I get rid of this?" (Brown, 2004). There is a visible gap between those scientists that believe the inherent complexity of synthetic biology will eventually be overcome given enough time and understanding and those scientists who believe there is truly something different about biology and that it requires a new (currently undeveloped) approach towards dealing with complexity.

Expert knowledge The type of Anticipation used in this report is mostly future expectations put forth by scientists during the 2nd International synthetic biology Conference held in Berkeley, California" (De Vriend et al., 2006, p. 10). The authors tried to estimate the probability of the various expectations based on what they heard overall from the various scientists (ibid, p. 29). Due to the complexity of the technology under assessment, the authors restrain themselves from making concrete claims about the future. With regards to the unification of the inherent complexity of synthetic biology and the possibility of providing useful expectations of the future, the authors conclude that most of the bold claims made in the field of synthetic biology are “more talk than reality” (ibid, p. 34). Regarding future predictions, the authors recognized that synthetic biology was at an early stage of development, “which makes it hard to predict how and to what extent the technology will be applied in the (near) future.” (ibid, p. 64). At the same time, they recognized that it might be within ten years, from the time of writing (2006), that the first synthetic biological systems that can operate in contained environments are created. It became clear to the authors that the point where synthetic biology stood at the time meant it could be of interest to involve more stakeholders early on its development cycle, echoing the sentiments made by proponents of contemporary forms of Technology Assessment (see chapter 2 of this thesis).

Sources of claims about the future The authors frequently mention a 2006 webcast by Synthetic Biologist Craig Venter, in which he provided a visualization of various ‘Predictions for application of synthetic biology’. At other times Craig Venter is quoted indirectly using other sources (Pennisi, 2005). In addition to Craig Venter, synthetic biologist Drew Endy of MIT is cited numerous times throughout the report while discussing the future of synthetic biology and nascent fields (Endy, 2005). The authors cite a large number of academic articles (Carlson, 2003; Cello, 2002; Tumpey, 2005; Voigt, 2005; Herper, 2006), in which their authors make specific claims about the future of synthetic biology. Another important source cited at different times throughout the report is the ‘Committee on Genetic Modification’ (COGEM), a biosafety expert body to the Dutch Ministry of the Environment, that wrote a 2006 report (COGEM, 2006), which included guidance with regards to synthetic biology.

4.2 Germany

In 2011, the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (T.A.B.) published a report titled “synthetic biology: the next phase of biotechnology and genetic engineering” (Sauter et al., 2011). A shorter English summary of this report was made available four years later (Sauter et al., 2016). The following survey is based on both the English summary, as well as a machine translation of the full German report.

Biosecurity and Biosafety The authors clearly state at the beginning of their report that the question regarding the *nature* of synthetic biology “shall not be dealt with too academically” (Sauter et al., 2016, p. 3). The motivation for this less academic approach results from the primary mission of the report: advising the German Bundestag. The report surveys various earlier reports commissioned by the Committee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment (ABFTA), with the aim of translating their findings into policy advice. Throughout their report, the authors choose to frame the possible future societal implications of synthetic biology around two concepts: *biosecurity* and *biosafety*. To the authors, it is apparent that there could be a difference between the technologies that came before and the applications synthetic biology might bring; they, therefore, stress the importance of investigating to what extent the current regulations for relating (bio-) technologies such as GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms) still cover future developments such as SMOs (Synthetically Modified Organisms). The main question the authors try to bring to the fore is to what extent “existing procedures of the risk assessment will be sufficient for dealing with products of synbio (in the broad sense) in the years to come.” (ibid, p. 16).

Tremendous complexity The authors mention the complexity of living systems several times throughout the report. For instance, when questioning if the German R & D funding of synthetic biology is sufficient or needs to be improved, they claim: "Even simple biological systems have one tremendous complexity that has hitherto has not been achieved by replicating or modeling, despite all the advances in information technology and data production by far." (Sauter et al., 2011, p. 267). In a chapter where the authors define future questions and possible fields of action, they stress the importance of "modeling possibilities for testing or prediction of the behavior of novel organisms in complex environments (even natural ecosystems)" (Sauter et al., 2011, p. 272).

The level of analysis the authors apply is less obvious when they mention the inherent complexity of living systems. For example, when discussing one of the potential applications of synthetic biology, agriculture, and biomass utilization, the authors describe how synthetic biology both is and will become *part of* 'highly complex systems', without defining what this complexity entails (Sauter et al., 2011, p. 85). When comparing differences between the European and North American variant of DIY bioethic codes, the authors explain how the European code defines 'responsibility' as recognizing "the complexity and dynamics of living systems and our responsibility toward them." (Sauter et al., 2011, p. 205), unfortunately, the report seems unable to provide an explicit definition or description of the complexity and or dynamics of living systems. Although the report itself does not contain a detailed discussion on the complexity of living systems, one of their key references (Giese et al., 2015) does contain various articles that discuss complexity and how it relates to synthetic biology in great detail.

Sources of claims about the future At the beginning of (the English summary of) their report, the authors make clear that their project does not include "in-depth presentation of primarily speculative visions or scenarios of future applications and impacts of synbio;" (ibid, p. 3). The reason for this lack of speculation about possible futures is that the "development and application of synbio are still at an early stage and ... cannot be seriously assessed yet" (ibid, p. 5). The whole idea of a synthetic organism, which they call synthetic biology 'in the narrow sense, is so far out into the future that the authors claim there is no valid reason to try to make predictions about the future of narrow sense synthetic biology. With regards to synthetic organisms, the authors note that the absence of a substantially similar reference organism may pose a serious problem for possible future risk assessment. The authors base their claims about the future on market research studies as well as a synthetic biology patent analysis (Doren et al., 2014). Furthermore, the author's source from different earlier reports written by T.A.B., including a 2015 'Innovation Analysis' (Aichinger et al., 2016; Schiller et al., 2016).

4.3 France

In 2012, the French Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices (O.P.E.C.S.T.) published their report titled *Les Enjeux de la Biologie de Synthèse* (The Challenges of synthetic biology) (Fioraso, 2012). In their report, members of the Parliamentary Office summarize the insights they gathered at a scientific symposium focused on the various questions surrounding synthetic biology. In the spirit of Participatory Technology

Assessment, the goal of this symposium was to allow for a dialog between the scientific community and the public. The following survey is based on a machine-translated English version of the original French report.

Complexity and unpredictability of life The authors of the report are aware of the fact that synthetic biology might pose different challenges than the similar biotechnologies that came before. This insight is one of the motivations for setting up the symposium in the first place: the possibility that synthetic biology might have a serious impact on society that is potentially far larger than existing biotechnologies had. When listing their definitions, the authors mention how synthetic biology differs from molecular biology because one of its applications, the robotization of organisms, should eventually make it possible "to apprehend the biological complexity at the level of the cell and the molecule unique." (ibid, p. 75). This idea that the complexity might be apprehended is echoed near the end of their report, when the authors summarize the various practices under the umbrella of synthetic biology as "practices that aim to eliminate the unpredictability of life, in favor of a design of organized systems to perform technological functions." (ibid, p. 82). It is less clear to the authors if this end goal of 'apprehending complexity' might be achievable, as each scientist that takes part in the debates has a different outlook on the possibility of 'taming life.

This ambiguity becomes especially visible during the first roundtable that focuses on the topic of industrial challenges, when Dr. Thomas Heams, a Genomics Research Professor, specifically mentions the complex nature of living organisms and insists that large parts of the characters of complex organisms "are the product, not small metabolic chains, but a large number of gene networks that intervene with small effects cumulative." (ibid, p. 27). During the second round table on the possible societal challenges of synthetic biology, Professor Jean-Michel Besnier, a philosopher, points out that it is the vague notion of *complexity* that might become a future driving force for public intervention, as he proclaims that "[in] the craze for the sciences of complexity, which highlight the unpredictability of the systems, we have a whole context that is likely to justify the vulnerability of the public" (ibid, p. 36).

Sources of claims about the future The type of Anticipation used in this report is mostly expert knowledge, in this case, based on the future expectations put forth by scientists during a scientific symposium on the theme of synthetic biology. (ibid, p. 7). Just as with the report done by the Rathenau Institute, the French Parliamentary Office believes that synthetic biology, although still mostly confined to the laboratory, should be made a topic of public discussion before it starts to have large scale effects on society, proclaiming that synthetic biology "has not yet emerged in France at the level of the general public or the media. Therefore, it's a good time, I believe, to anticipate this issue." (ibid, p. 57). They see the field of synthetic biology as "susceptible of evolutions unknown and difficult to anticipate to date." (ibid, p. 10). The authors make clear that although various scientists have told them synthetic biology poses no greater risk than existing genetic engineering, this cannot be accepted as such and should be investigated further: "we, therefore, have the duty to anticipate this evolution, by training of the public [and] provide appropriate guidance to a positive and virtuous development in this area." (ibid, p. 63). When attendees make statements about the future of synthetic biology, these are mostly informed guesses based on their own experience and direct knowledge of the field. At the end of their report, the authors synthesize the insights gathered during the symposium into various sub-sections, dealing with definitions, possible future challenges, and proposals for the further development of synthetic biology. The authors base their report on existing reports by The J. Craig Venter Institute as well as at the European level (Garfinkel et al., 2007; Gaisser et al., 2008).

4.4 Europe

From December 2010 to September 2011, the collaborative project 'Making Perfect Life' was carried out by the Rathenau Institute, together with the Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA) from Vienna, the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (Fraunhofer ISI) from Karlsruhe, and the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) as members of the European Technology Assessment Group (ETAG). This project was summarized into a report counting roughly 250 pages titled *European Governance Challenges in Bio-engineering* (Stemerding et al., 2012). The extensive report references a smaller 'Monitoring Report' by the same name published earlier (van Est et al. 2010). The stated goal of the report at the time was to "inform and stimulate further political debate in the European Parliament" (ibid, p. 23).

Complexity levels The report contains (a short) section titled *Recognizing life's special characteristics*, in which the authors point out the "special characteristics of life itself, like its complexity, flexibility, autonomy and emerging properties" (ibid, p. 31). The authors are fully cognizant that it is crucial they understand these special characteristics, as it might be that "biology is too complex to be fully understood, standardized or engineered at will." (ibid, p. 164). What are the authors referring to when they use the terms *complex* and *complexity*? Later on, in their report, it becomes clear that the complexity the authors might mention can be linked to the various abstraction layers used by synthetic biology practitioners. In a table listing the various 'Complexity levels,' ranging from less complex to more complex, the levels are defined as follows: 1) Biochemistry, 2) Genes/parts, 3) Biological systems and 4) Organelles, single-cell organisms. Why it is that the complexity increases between these levels are not fully explained, complexity seems to relate to the number of parts and the number of inter-party dynamics at play. By proposing that there is an *amount* of complexity, the authors seem to hint at a quantifiable notion of complexity: "there is still a long way to go to master the unprecedented amount of complexity in biological objects." (ibid, p. 164). Furthermore, the authors seem to conflate *epistemic complexity* and *ontological complexity*, notions I explore further in an upcoming chapter (5) that deals with complexity.

Sources of claims about the future When making claims about the future, the authors use monitoring reports done at the European level, as well as popular science articles from BBC news and MIT Technology Review. In a section titled 'Time horizon of developments,' the authors provide several visual aids when making claims about the future. They plot different application areas into a graph where the y-axis moves from established, exploratory to emerging, and the x-axis shows the time scale moving from the present, 5 - 10 years, towards plus ten years. Furthermore, the report includes a number of predictions based on upcoming technological artifacts. In their report, the authors develop various future scenarios which they recognize may "currently be considered 'science fiction' " as well as "uncertain and speculative." (p. 18). They base these scenarios on various sources, including academic articles related to synthetic biology, interviews with a large number of experts and different works found in popular culture, exemplified by the inclusion of Bill Joy's pamphlet *Why the future doesn't need us* (Joy, 2000). Based on these scenarios, the authors identify a broad range of societal issues that require attention, categorized into buckets of near future and more distant future issues (long term visions). Within a chapter that is part of the smaller 2010 monitoring report, two of the authors (Schmidt and Torgersen), make the important distinction between three different scenarios: *1)* synthetic biology will not really radicalize biotechnology (synthetic biology equals biotechnology), *2)* synthetic biology might possibly revolutionize biotechnology (synthetic biology might extent biotechnology) or, *3)* synthetic biology will be a real game changer (synthetic biology is some very different than biotechnology). The authors claim no preference for any of these three scenarios, as they believe it is "currently impossible to judge what the future of synthetic biology will look like." (ibid, p. 230).

4.5 The United States

In 2010, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues published a report titled "New Directions: The Ethics of synthetic biology and Emerging Technologies" (Gutmann et al., 2010). With the Office of Technology Assessment shutdown in 1995, the report was written at the request of then sitting President Barack Obama, who asked the commission to map the possible implications of synthetic biology.

Artificial life and complexity In their detailed report, the authors point out at various times how state of the art with regards to synthetic biology was not as advanced as popular media was presenting the field at the time. While several journalists were claiming that scientists had been able to create *artificial life* in the laboratory, the truth was that relatively simple parts of a well-known bacteria (Mycoplasma mycoides) were replaced with synthesized surrogates. Nonetheless, the authors felt that it was reasonable, from a precautionary perspective, to engage with this emerging technology even before it was able to live up to the hype, as it would be harder to shape its trajectory at a later stage. With regard to complexity, the authors recognized that our "understanding of complexity and variation in natural and synthetic parts and systems is far from complete" (ibid, p. 50). The authors saw a strong link between the notions of variation, complexity, and predictability, claiming that *1)* complexity and variation are intrinsically linked (ibid, p. 49) and *2)* with increasing complexity, the "predictability of the properties of microorganisms will be more complicated" (ibid, p. 50).

In their report, the authors explicitly claim that currently "the behavior of synthetic biological systems remains unpredictable." (ibid, p. 50). The purposefully use the word *currently*, as they remain open to the idea that the future might provide for ways to formally model these systems in a way analogous to modeling electronic circuits: "Although biological systems are not nearly as easily modeled as an electronic circuit or a bridge, at least at this time, sophisticated simulations, mostly in single-cell systems, are contributing to improved computer modeling of synthetic biological systems" (ibid, p. 43). In the context of biosafety (protecting people, plants, animals, and the environment from accidental adverse effects), the authors point out that it is extremely difficult "to anticipate with confidence how a synthetic organism will react to and interact with a novel natural environment" (ibid, p. 49). In a chapter dedicated to the possible applications, benefits, and risks of synthetic biology, the authors provide a fictional scenario in which a synthetic biology-derived organism spreads, displaces other species, and robs the ecosystem of vital nutrients, eventually harming the ecosystem (ibid, p. 63). They claim that although this scenario is fictional, it is valuable as it motivates the development of appropriate precautions, such as built-in self-containment mechanisms in the form of "terminator" genes or "suicide" switches. The members of the commission asked us to remain cautious and aware of our own hubris, reminding us that humans "are far from being proficient speakers of the language of life, and our capacity to control synthetic organisms that we design and release into the world is promising but unproven." (ibid, p. 22).

Sources of claims about the future The authors based their claims about the future of synthetic biology on the input gathered at three separate meetings in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Atlanta, as well as input from experts (some of them part of the commission). On top of this, the commission consulted with relevant federal agencies and private entities active in the field of synthetic biology. A number of previous risk assessment reports are cited, such as a 2007 report titled "Genome synthesis and design futures: Implications for the U.S. Economy," as well as a 2010 report titled "Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to synthetic biology" by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. As with the earlier reports, the Venter Institute is mentioned extensively throughout this report, pointing towards a potential problem with the strong reliance on the future predictions made by an institute with an obvious commercial interest in the success of synthetic biology.

Conclusion

While surveying these various reports on the same subject, several larger patterns became visible, and various key shortcomings were identified, both of which can provide fruitful input for the upcoming chapters. First of all, most authors in some way or the other recognize the difference between synthetic biology and the non-living technologies that came before; what is harder to pinpoint, however, are the characteristics that make this difference. An often-mentioned term is complexity, which raises the question: what makes complexity such a crucial notion when describing synthetic biology? Furthermore, there is a large difference between those overly skeptical of the promises that synthetic biology might fulfill and those highly optimistic about its possible future uses. Why is there such a big disagreement between both groups?

“Life, in short, is a movement of opening, not of closure.”

(Ingold, 2002)



The **Canard Digérateur**, or Digesting Duck, automaton
by *Jacques de Vaucanson* unveiled in 1739 in France.

5 Complexity

One of the words frequently invoked in all reports found in the previous chapter is the term *complexity*, without further explaining what the word entails. By using the term complexity in an almost colloquial sense, the authors unintentionally conceal an important characteristic of living systems that begs to be explained in more detail. In the reports, some authors claim that complexity correlates with unpredictability; if this is the case, this means the complex nature of living systems has a strong effect on the ability to predict[2] future states of said systems. This unexplained correlation between complexity and unpredictability results in potentially important implications for anticipatory practices done with regards to synthetic biology. This chapter aims to give clarity with regards to the seemingly convoluted notion of complexity, especially how complexity relates to living systems. This chapter starts by going over the origins of the systems approach (5.1), followed by a clarification of the difference between complicated and complex systems (5.2) to end with an exploration of Rosenian Complexity.

5.1 Origins of Systems

Why is a systems approach needed in the first place? Before exploring the complexity and complex systems, a minimal understanding of the origins of the systems approach is helpful. The main insight that drives the systems approach is a general rule that each individual phenomenon, say a single human being, a tree in a forest, or a part of a machine, should always be considered as being part of a larger 'system.'. Each individual part has a relationship to other parts, both inside and outside, and to gain a more detailed understanding of a single part, these relationships should be considered. There is a far larger ontological debate that lurks underneath when discussing parts, wholes, and their relationships, which will be explored later on in this chapter.

The systems approach took serious shape during the Second World War and gained real momentum when the various scientists discussing 'the dynamics of regulation' came together after the war at the now-famous Macy conferences. It was at these conferences where an important sub-field of Systems Theory got its name: *Cybernetics* (Pickering, 2010). The cyberneticists found that "feedback, the behavior of self-organization and chains of circular causality ... appeared again and again in the basic processes they described." (Leonard & Beer, 1994, p. 2). Instead of (relatively) easy to grasp linear causality (A causes B), the processes described by the cyberneticists could be better described using circular causality (A causes B causes A).

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[2] It is important to stress that the goal of most anticipatory practices is not to predict the future, but to be better prepared for a variety of plausible futures. A richer discussion regarding this nuance can be found in chapter 7.



Figure 1. Linear causality and circular causality.

A key concept in cybernetic thinking that was derived from circular causality is the notion of *feedback loops*: circular and recurring signals between different parts of a system. In the case of a positive feedback loop, signals from one part of a system result in increases in the signals in other parts of the system. An often-cited example of a positive feedback loop is the spread of panic in a herd of cows; as each cow (audible and visible) panic affects other cows, the whole herd eventually ends up in a state of panic. With a negative (or balancing) feedback loop, the inverse happens: signals from one part of a system result in decrease and or stabilize signals in other parts of the system. An often-used example is the 'fly-ball governor' that was invented to make sure a steam-engine never builds up so much pressure as to explode: the governor controls the opening of the release valve based on the current speed of the engine, essentially creating a feedback loop between the amount of pressure in the boiler and the opening of the release valve.

The influence of cybernetic thinking today is clearly visible in a large number of fields, and the wide implications of the cybernetic way of thinking are still explored today (Pickering, 2011). Connecting this to the previous chapters: with the clear parallels between systems for governing machines and systems for governing societies, it should come as no surprise to the reader that cybernetics provided one of the seeds for what eventually grew into Technology Assessment. To what extent are we able to 'tame' complex systems? In the next section, I survey some of the existing approaches towards governing and understanding systems.

5.2 Complex Systems

When does a system become a complex system instead of a simple system? To understand how we might demarcate between simple (or merely complicated) systems and complex systems, we need to survey various definitions found in the field of complex systems Studies. As was the case in the previous section on systems, there is a great variety of ways to define complexity (Schmidt, 2011). Before exploring notions of complexity, it is important to point out the crucial difference between *epistemic complexity* and *ontological complexity* (Dan-Cohen, 2016). In the case of the former (epistemic), the reason for the complexity is attributed to the models and analytic approach used, while with the latter (ontological), the complexity is "independent of knowers and their models, theories, or analytics." (Dan-Cohen, 2016, p. 5). For example, when applied to the phenomenon of synthetic biology, some practitioners are convinced that the complexity involved with the engineering of biology is mainly due to their epistemic approach and not due to the inherent ontological complexity found in biological systems.

Definitions of complexity can be found in the fields such as brain science, computer science, and chaos theory (Kaneko et al., 2013). These definitions vary; for example, according to Louie and Poli, a key characteristic of a complex system is the emergence of "novelties, things that are surprising, unexpected, and apparently unpredictable." (Louie et al., 2017). In the same vein, Neil Johnson describes the study of complex systems as "the study of the phenomena which emerge from a collection of interacting objects" (Johnson et al., 2011). Close to the latter definition, in her book on complexity (Mitchell, 2009), Melanie Mitchell describes complexity as an interdisciplinary field of research: "that seeks to explain how large numbers of relatively simple entities organize themselves, without the benefit of any central controller, into a collective whole that creates patterns, uses information, and, in some cases, evolves and learns." (Mitchell, 2009, p. 4). It is clear that complexity has many definitions and that it greatly depends on the field of what type of answer you will receive.

To provide some clarity regarding complexity, the philosophers James Ladyman, James Lambert, and mathematician Karoline Wiesner wrote a 2013 article containing a list of properties commonly associated with the idea of a complex system (Ladyman et al., 2013), some characteristics that stand out from this list are: *1)* Nonlinearity: a system is linear if one can add any two solutions and obtain another and multiply any solution by any factor and obtain another, while nonlinearity means that this superposition principle[3] does not apply. 2) Feedback: a part of a system receives feedback when the way its neighbors interact at a later time depends on how it interacts with them at an earlier time. *3)* Spontaneous order: a type of order in a system's behavior that arises from the aggregate of a very large number of uncoordinated interactions between elements. *4)* Emergence: objects, properties, or processes exhibit downwards causation: a causal relationship from the higher-level parts of a system to lower-level parts of a system (Christiansen et al., 1999).

These concepts should not be taken as a simple checklist that, when all the above are present, automatically results in a complex system. All of the above are part of a constellation of characteristics related to the notion of complex systems. Complexity is akin to Wittgenstein's *cluster concept*: none of the above criteria is either necessary or sufficient for a system to qualify as a complex system. If we now connect this back to synthetic biology: what about living systems? Is each living system equivalent to a complex system? Does this mean we can apply the same approaches towards living systems as we do for complex systems? To understand the relationship between complexity and life, we need a better understanding of life itself. In what follows, I claim that living systems are inherently complex and portend that it might be nearly impossible to 'tame' this inherent complexity, at least when applying reduction and compartmentalization. Furthermore, the complexity of living systems has consequences for our ability to anticipate future dynamics in and emerging from them, and this subsequently

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[3] The superposition principle states that, for all linear systems, the net response caused by two or more stimuli is the sum of the responses that would have been caused by each stimulus individually. In nonlinear systems this is not the case: the change of the output is not proportional to the change of the input (see Dirac, 1981).

affects the generation and selection of plausible future scenarios regarding these systems. The upcoming section focuses on the first characteristic that makes living organisms different from machines: their inherent entailment structure.

5.3 Rosenian Complexity

Theoretical Biologist Robert Rosen spent his career working on questions related to his lifelong research interest: life itself. In particular, Rosen tried to find an answer to the question: "If organisms are composed of atoms, why are organisms and atoms so different from each other, as systems?" (Rosen, 1991, p. 401). Rosen's question goes straight to the heart of our endeavor, all the more reason to further explore his ideas.

Before we do this, however, it is important to react to the reasonable critique that Rosen's theory is just one of many theories of life; why not choose one of the other available theories? (see, for instance, Cornish-Bowden & Cárdenas, 2020). The scope of this thesis does not allow for a large philosophical discussion regarding the explanatory power of theories founded on relational and/or process ontologies, suffices to say that theories based on these ontological foundations have proven to be of great value in other fields such as Sociology (e.g., Latour, 2013), Psychology (e.g., Slife, 2004) and Mathematics (Dipert, 1997). Furthermore, Rosen is the only theoretical biologist whose ideas have such an explicit connection to the notion of anticipation, allowing for a strong overlap between his ideas and the practice of Technology Assessment. Although Rosen's ideas are still regarded by many as controversial, if his ideas are right, they might prove to be important for those wanting to say anything about the future of living systems.

In his 1991 book 'Life Itself,' Rosen spends the first part of the book explaining the specific modeling relation between our 1) formal models of the world and 2) the 'real' world[4] said models aim to describe. He was particularly interested in the different forms of *entailment* at work in natural systems (what is out there in the world) versus the entailment found in formal systems (how we describe the world). In case the word entailment is unfamiliar to the reader: entailment is akin to causality but should be understood to be more fundamental. That is to say: common causality is a type of entailment but not a synonym for it. Helpful to better understand the term is the definition of entailment found in the domain of linguistics, where it describes relations between propositions. A common example is the proposition "*if A then B*," clearly meant to convey that if A is true, B must also be true. It is precisely this *syntactic* form of entailment that is taken for granted to be the same type of entailment at work in natural systems. According to Rosen, the idea that systems might have a different form of entailment should be further investigated; it is naïvely taken for granted that the entailment inherent in our models of the world corresponds to the entailment inherent in the 'outside' natural world. In contrast to the commonly held assumption of there being a single and corresponding entailment structure, Rosen proposes two forms of entailment: *1) casual entailment* as found in natural systems and *2) inferential entailment* as found in formal systems (Figure 2). Connecting this back to our question concerning the complex nature of synthetic

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[4] Rosen prefers the term 'ambiance' for describing what I would label as 'the outside world'. To keep the text as readable as possible, I chose not to confuse the reader further and therefore decided to omit Rosen's terminology.

biology, according to Rosen, life itself is a "consequence of the complex organization of a certain type in a material system" (Rosen & Kineman, 2005, p. 399). What is this specific *type* of 'complex organization' Rosen is referring to?



Figure 2. Forms of entailment (1 & 2) in natural and formal systems.

Rosen's book starts by exploring what happens when we model the natural world, in other words: when we try to 'synchronize' between two entailment structures. He explains how the modeling process consists of both an encoding and a decoding step: we *encode* a natural system into a formal system, and then (using this model) we infer new knowledge and decode this knowledge back into claims about the natural system and vice versa (Figure 3). In a way, by 'walking through' our formal model by following the entailments inherent in it while using the variables of our choosing, we are able to simulate and possibly anticipate future dynamics in the natural system the formal system describes. These seemingly simple processes of encoding and decoding form the basis of modern science, and Rosen believed it to be crucial that we understand the assumptions regarding the compatibility of both entailment structures. That is to say: we should question the assumption that both forms of entailment are one and the same.



Figure 3. The processes of encoding (3) and decoding (4) between systems.

Are these steps of encoding and decoding lossless? In other words, during encoding and decoding, are all 'entailment dynamics' transferred from the formal system to the natural one and vice versa? According to Rosen, it depends: if both systems, formal and natural, inherently contain the same entailment structure, it should, at least in theory, be possible to create a formal system that 'perfectly' matches the natural system it aims to describe. This begs the question: what if the entailment structures inherent in natural systems are not always the same as the entailment structures inherent in formal systems?

Rosen proposes that most *casual entailment* structures found in natural systems do indeed correspond to the *inferential entailment* structures found in the formal systems, but there is a catch: not all systems found in nature are casually entailed in the same way. Although there exist a large number of natural systems that are indeed casually entailed, still even the most complicated of these systems can only be categorized as a mere *mechanism*. It is a special type of natural system, the living *organism*, that has its own peculiar entailment structure.

Rosen describes two different ways of modeling living systems: 1) the *Newtonian model*, and 2) the *Relational model*. In the first model, living systems are treated like any other physical system, and therefore can be understood to be founded on the same low-level interactions described by physicists on the level of the atom and smaller. Although biology is different from physics, they are both bound by the same physical laws. The implicit assumption in the previous statement is the belief that when levels build on top of each other, each subsequently higher level is limited by the possible dynamics of the underlying level. That is to say, because biology is made out of physical matter, it is taken for granted that anything impossible at the physical level is, by definition, impossible at the biological level. Taking it even further: one might say that to understand the dynamics of biology, it suffices to understand the dynamics of physics. Characteristic of this purely 'mechanistic' view is the famous philosophical conundrum of the fully predetermined universe: the claim that one could determine the future state of all matter in the universe based on the current state of all matter, therefore implying a chain of causal interactions all the way back to the big bang and all the way forward into a predetermined future. In other words: at the fundamental level, the whole universe is a mechanistic state machine[5], and with a full understanding of the current state, all past and future states could be calculated, at least in theory. The implications of this view for our ability to foresee and anticipate the future of (living) systems are comprehensive, and if this was the end of our story, the only thing left to do would be to create more complete models, using more information, more computing power, resulting in more and more accurate models of the future. Not surprisingly, according to Rosen, the universe is not equal to a giant state machine.

According to Rosen, living systems should be seen "as the manifestation of a certain kind of (relational) model. A particular material system is *living* if it realizes this model." (Rosen, 1991, p. 251). He builds this relation model on ideas found in the relational theory pioneered by his guiding professor, theoretical physicist Nicolas Rashevsky. In a single credo, Rashevsky's theory could be summarized as: "throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization." (ibid, p. 119). It must be stressed that this theory does not imply that life only exists in some 'ideal nonphysical realm,' it just means that to learn about biology, and there-

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[5] State machines are mathematical models of computation that represent an abstract machine that can be in exactly one of a finite number of states at any given time (see Wright, 2005).

fore living systems, their distinct organization plays a larger role than their physical building blocks. Putting less weight on the underlying material substrate and putting more weight on the influence of the distinct organization of a system has a number of provocative consequences. First of all, due to the distinct relational dynamics in biological organizations, these systems exhibit dynamics previously unencountered at the physical level. This breaks with a root assumption in the Newtonian worldview: the belief that dynamics on the physical level limit dynamics on the biological level. At this point, the reader might suspect the implicit reintroduction of some mystical life force only available to living systems, no need to worry; there is no need to reintroduce a form of *élan vital*[6].

As alluded to earlier in the section describing the Newtonian model, in a mechanistic universe, one could hypothetically 'stop time,' look at the current state of all matter in the universe, and (with enough processing power) compute all subsequent states. What Rosen claims, however, is that creating a living system as a state machine obscures essential dynamics because their organization is structured according to "modes of entailment that are correspondingly inaccessible from state transition sequences alone." (ibid, p. 117). To understand how one might approach 'entailment without states,' it is helpful to have a minimal understanding of Rashevsky's relational theory of systems. We will return to relational theory soon, but first, we need to explore Aristotle's ideas on causation, and especially the reason why his final cause was omitted from the Newtonian worldview.

From the 17th century onward, the last of Aristotle's four causes[7] (the final cause) is absent from the Newtonian interpretation of living systems. The reason most scientists were (and mostly still are) skeptical towards any finalistic description of living systems is because for there to be a final end, to have the ultimate answer to the question of *why* all living systems exist, there needs to be a future goal, a plan, towards which these systems evolve. This is what is at the center of a debate known under the banner *Biological teleology*: that revolves mainly around the controversial claim that biology is goal-driven (it has a function, a *telos*) and is not just an 'aimless' system without a future goal. The reason most scientists have mostly tried to avoid teleological accounts of biology is that these accounts inadvertently lead to the reintroduction of a grand plan, setting up a slippery slope towards a grand planner, or in Rosen's own words: "any shred of function or finality, any manifestation of semantics, is mysticism." (ibid, p. 279).

One of the root axioms in the Newtonian worldview is the belief that any current state can only be entailed by a *preceding* state. Subsequent states always happen 'later' in (linear) time than present states. Therefore, (re)introducing the notion of final causation should logically result, at least in the Newtonian worldview, in the (to some) absurd conclusion that *future* states can act on present states. All of this being wildly incoherent with one of the main Newtonian axioms, which states that "causes must not anticipate effects" (Rosen, 1991, p. 133). The way in which this is solved in contemporary thinking with regards to living systems

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[6] Élan vital is a notion proposed by French philosopher Henri Bergson in 1907, when he tried to address the question of self-organization and spontaneous morphogenesis of things in an increasingly complex manner (see Linstead & Mullarkey, 2003).

[7] The material cause: "that out of which", e.g., the bronze of a statue. 2) The formal cause: "the form", "the account of what-it-is-to-be", e.g., the shape of a statue. 3) The efficient cause: "the primary source of the change or rest", e.g., the artisan 4) The final cause: "the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done".

is through the lens of Darwinian evolution: there might be the appearance of an external watchmaker at work; in reality, natural selection is without future goals except for the drive for survival found in each individual organism. However, more recent work on the topic of purpose in biology claims that blaming Darwin for removing teleology from biology is misguided, as he actually "vindicated teleological explanations by showing how they could be grounded in selection processes." (Garson, 2016, p. 37). Still, according to Rashevsky and others (see Woodger, 1930), the approach that resulted from Darwinian evolutionary thinking is unable to account for the novel dynamics found in living systems.

Relational theory, as proposed by Rashevsky, describes models that function without states or subsequent state transitions. To understand how this might work, we must shortly return to our prior discussion regarding substance or process ontologies. Rashevsky's relational theory of systems might be categorized as process-relational theory: these are theories that describe the world as being made out of processes that are mainly defined by their relationships (e.g., Overton, 2014). The fundamental shift in thinking in an ontology that puts emphasis on *relations* is to be found in the different ways of defining the essence of the various 'things' that interact with each other. To illustrate this abstract idea: in the case of a 'billiard ball ontology' (analogs to Newtonian mechanistic thinking), one might imagine a universe filled with billiard balls, with each individual ball having its own essence that remains largely unaffected by its specific context. Although there are definitely different colored balls, with different internal dynamics that result in various behaviors, each ball can be understood and described individually. The main claim is that with an understanding of all the individual billiard balls, you have an understanding of the whole system they together form. In contrast, in the case of a 'chameleon ontology' (analogs to relational thinking), the color of each chameleon depends on their specific surroundings: to understand each individual color-shifting chameleon, you need to understand their relationship to their environment.

The main take away one should gain from this analogy is as follows: when questioning the *locus* (answering the 'where' question) of a thing's *essence*, the emphasis in the chameleon ontology is put on the relations between its surroundings and all other chameleons, instead of a static essence than can be found somewhere in the individual chameleons themselves. The empirical adequacy of the relational approach becomes visible in the way it allows us to account for the strong evidence that various 'components' of living systems are able to change form and function based on the specific relationships they have with surrounding systems. For example, the ability of embryonic stem cells to become a variety of specific cells based on the signals they receive from their surroundings, described as a stem cell's *pluripotency*, is an example of clear relational dynamics in living systems (De Los Angeles et al., 2015). That is to say: the cell has the potency to become a plurality of cells, but what it ends up becoming is based on the relations the cell has to its specific environment.

Rosen used Rashevsky's insights with regards to relational dynamics in biology to propose novel forms of entailment. As became clear during our discussion of Rashevsky's relational theory, without there being clearly defined states that deterministically follow each other subsequently on a linear timeline, the idea of allowing there to be some notion of final causation becomes less controversial. Reminding ourselves of the two types of entailment structures introduced earlier (casual and inferential), it is now time to introduce a third entailment structure. Rosen gives this hypothetical variant of 'entailment without states' the name *functional entailment*, a type of final causation that has (and is, therefore, relevant to our inquiry) "no encoding into any formalism of contemporary physics;" because there is "simply not enough entailment in these formalisms to encompass biology" (Rosen, 1991, p. 134). Throughout the last 50 years, both Rashevsky and Rosen have been criticized for straying too far into the ideal realm with their theories, to such extent that the connection with the material systems they aim to describe is lost (Wells, 2006). For this reason, it is important to remind the reader of the fact that there is, according to Rosen, "nothing in the relational strategy that is unphysical, in the sense of 'ideal' physics" (ibid, p. 119).

As discussed in the earlier section on systems thinking, the first step in any systems approach is defining the rules that provide a way for us to demarcate between systems, their components (subsystems), and their environment (the systems they interact with are embedded in, or both). Rosen chooses to repurpose some of the more well-known terminologies from Newtonian mechanics, such as atoms, particles, and molecules, to allow for some subtle remapping of existing intuitions to concepts onto the sometimes quite foreign realm of relations. First of all, to have the greatest chance at grasping this novel form of entailment, we need to get acquainted with some Rosenian jargon, such as *1)* function, *2)* component, and *3)* organization. The word 'function,' which lends its name to *functional entailment*, is an expression of the relation of components to systems and each other. A 'component' could be thought of as the "particle of function; it plays the same kind of role in relational modeling that particles play in the reductionistic or Newtonian modeling" (ibid, p. 120). In a superficial sense, the term 'organization' describes the specific way in which all components are organized; more importantly, the organization is analogous to the most basic *thing* in Rosen's relational ontology. With these mostly abstract terms, we run the risk of staying too far from more concrete examples of these notions 'at work'; therefore, to illustrate how this new form of entailment might be applied, Rosen proposed a minimal model (visible in figure 4), representing the rudimentary dynamics at play. This model puts some flesh on the bones of the still mostly unintuitive form of *functional entailment* by allowing us to see some of the concepts just introduced in action.



Figure 4. A living system embedded in a corresponding environment.

Shown in the figure above are a living system (Ω), a specific component of the said system, and the environment surrounding the living system. Made visible by arrows ① and ② are the dynamics (for example, impressed forces) that affect both the living system and the component that is temporarily 'lifted' out of the living system. In the case of arrows ③ and ④, they show the dynamics of the component that affect the environment of the living system and vice versa. The important take-away from this representation is that the function of the component depends entirely on these arrows: if the living system is changed, the arrows will change, and with that, the function of the component itself (ibid, p. 123). As with the embryonic stem cell described earlier, change the larger system, and you change the function of the cell. A component of a living system is clearly not the same as a part of a non-living machine; if you remove the alternator from a car, it is still an alternator.

This is still a minimal description of Rosen's work, but the reason it is included in this discussion with regards to synthetic biology will become more apparent in the coming chapter. As hinted earlier, living systems contain forms of entailment that are not made visible by classical mechanistic approaches towards systems. For example, if we return to the conundrum of the fully predetermined universe, the relational approach has some interesting implications. The results of relationships between components in living systems are non-deterministic: a specific component of a living system might react in a certain way, but this is not always the case. As Rosen himself proclaims: "finality is allied to the notion of possibility, while the other causal categories involve necessity" (ibid, p. 140). For this reason, instead of using deterministic math, relational biology makes use of probabilistic math[8] when modeling living systems (Millstein, 2014). This change to probabilistic math will affect our ability to anticipate the future states of living organisms, at least with the same tools as before. That

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[8] In a deterministic mathematical model, providing the model with the same parameters will always result in the same outcome. In a probabilistic mathematical model however, due to the random (or stochastic) nature of some of its components, outcomes are allowed to vary (see Capasso & Bakstein, 2005).

is to say: we are confronted with a range of possibilities, not a predetermined path into the future. Furthermore, the relational approach not only allows for components in a living system to react to signals from their environment in real-time but might also react to signals coming from other components that are actively anticipating *future* dynamics. Not all components in a living system are merely reacting to the present; some are actively anticipating the future. This allows us to move to the next chapter: we need one more characteristic to get a complete picture of what sets living systems apart from merely complex systems: the capacity of living systems to *anticipate* the future.

Conclusion

This chapter made a case for two claims. The first is that complexity is not about merely counting the sum of interacting parts; a recourse to a reductionist lens to understand biological organisms restricts our ability to fully appreciate the complexity of the underlying system. The second claim I made is that a system or holistic, rather than reductionist, approach will bear more fruit when one is trying to grasp the complex dynamics at play in and around living systems. A related claim is that linear and circular causality differs from each other. Furthermore, complex systems show the emergence of organizational qualities and novel dynamics that are hard to foresee. At the end of the chapter, in a section on living systems, it became more apparent that there might be a connection between complex systems, living systems, and anticipation. In the upcoming chapter, I explore this connection by delving deeper into the notion of anticipation to understand why it plays such an important role in living systems.

"Evolution-based anticipations are difficult to change [although] they may evolve, and this raises the question as to whether we can eventually contribute to bending evolution."

(Poli, 2017, p. 267)



Synthesized Mycoplasma mycoides, bacteria with a genome containing one million base pairs. Watercolor by *David S. Goodsell*, 2011

6 Anticipation

Say you have been working with sticks for a long time, for the sake of argument at least fifty years. You have been using sticks to build small contraptions, as support structures, as part of larger artifacts, etc. Surely, in those fifty years, what passes as a 'stick' has changed; for example, new materials were introduced, resulting in plastic sticks, metal sticks, and carbon fiber sticks, all with their own qualities, characteristics, and peculiarities. With all these changes, however, the general notion of how a stick behaves under certain conditions, where sticks should be used and where they should not, did not change that radically. The intuitive 'stick theory' you have developed for several years serves you well and allows you to make well-educated guesses about what to expect and what not to expect from sticks. Until one Monday, something unexpected happens: having just finished building a small contraption using sticks found in the nearby forest, the whole thing suddenly falls apart. After going over the build plans multiple times and concluding they are solid each time, the unexpected culprit is identified: what seemed to be a stick was actually a phobaeticus chani, the second-longest stick insect in the world! Although it presents itself as a normal stick, is this living stick different enough from all the sticks that came before that it warrants a novel stick theory? In other words: should we approach living sticks the same as non-living ones?

As it became clear in the previous chapter, there is still a characteristic missing that sets living systems apart from non-living systems, in addition to complexity. To better understand what it is that is missing, we need to take a step back and further explore the notion of anticipation. What is meant by anticipation? Is anticipation a quality exclusive to humans? To answer these and other questions, this chapter starts by investigating the notion of Anticipatory Systems (6.1). It continues by exploring Biological Anticipation (6.2), as well as the difference between implicit and explicit anticipation. After this, various levels of anticipation are introduced (6.3), ending with the notion of impredicative systems (6.4).

6.1 Anticipatory Systems

In the previous chapter, we became acquainted with various definitions of complexity, especially related to complexity as proposed by Robert Rosen. The main takeaway should be that Rosen's definition, from here on referred to as Rosenian Complexity, starts with a distinction between simple and complex systems[9]. For Rosen, *1) simple systems* are those systems for which "organization contributes a minimal impact on system behavior. Such systems are, or can safely be treated as, 'the sum of their parts.' An example would be any human-made machine." (J. Rosen & Kineman, 2005, p. 401). In contrast, *2) complex systems* are those systems for which "far more of the causal entailment and system potential come from *organizational* impact than from attributes inherent in the material parts themselves [emphasis mine]" (ibid, p. 401). More generally, it can be said that for simple systems, a reductionist approach remains adequate when aiming to understand their dynamics.

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[9] In 2005, Judith Rosen (Robert Rosen's daughter) and John Jay Kineman wrote an article (J. Rosen & Kineman, 2005) that aims to provide an overview of Rosen's ideas in a more comprehensible manner. I refer to this article in tandem with Robert Rosen's original works, as together they paint a richer picture of his ideas.

For complex systems, however, this approach proved to be less adequate, and a *relational* approach was preferred when aiming to provide descriptions of the dynamics at play in these systems. Complexity is not the whole story: living systems are not merely complex systems, but a specific kind of complex systems. By opening up the realm of possible forms of entailment and removing the requirement of linear progression between states, relational biology gave birth to the notion of *anticipatory system*, defined by Rosen as: "a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or its environment, which allows the system to change state at an instant in accord with the model's predictions pertaining to a later instant" (Rosen 2012, p. 8). The innovation introduced by Rosen's notion of the anticipatory system is that it allows us to account for the ability to live organisms, thus including synthetic biology, to anticipate the future.



Figure 5. Robert Rosen's model of an Anticipatory System.

Shown in figure 5 are the various components that make up a minimal anticipatory system. To start, at the bottom right, we find the system $\boxed{\text{S}}$ under investigation, for example, an individual organism or ecosystem. At the top right, we find a predictive model $\boxed{\text{M}}$ that represents the system $\boxed{\text{S}}$ at a future state. Between both, we find the effector system $\boxed{\text{E}}$, which converts the input information from the predictive model $\boxed{\text{M}}$ into a specific modification of the dynamics of the current system state of the system $\boxed{\text{S}}$. Furthermore, the effector system $\boxed{\text{E}}$ is able to update the model $\boxed{\text{M}}$ according to the outcomes of its future projections. Furthermore, the effector system $\boxed{\text{E}}$ influences the way in which the system $\boxed{\text{S}}$ receives input. Lines make visible how the system's models are influenced by said input. For a living organism, the input comes from its environment, while the output is its behavior within its environment.

Each component of the Anticipatory System requires further clarification, to start with the predictive model. The idea that an intelligent agent, such as a human being, functions (at least in part) based on explicit predictions of the future is largely uncontroversial. That is to say: the notion that (at least some) mammals with a sufficiently large brain do not merely react to external stimuli but have the ability to plan ahead and anticipate their future is seen as one of the pinnacles of intelligence. What Rosen claims, however, is that *all* living systems are (in varying degrees) anticipatory systems. This begs the question: what does the predictive model $\boxed{\text{M}}$ of a simple organism, such as an amoeba, look like? More importantly, due to the fact that amoebae function without a brain, where exactly does this model reside?

6.2 Biological Anticipation

Why is it that the idea of an amoeba possessing a predictive model of the future feels intuitively off? It might be because most readers equate the term 'model' with some explicit representation, usually represented by concepts that form other types of signs. The way in which Rosen thinks about models, however, requires us to expand our semiotic realm[10] to include living organisms that would normally be seen as mute or voiceless, so far as they are believed to be able to make meaning through the use of signs.

On this topic, Poli's demarcation between *1)* implicit anticipations and *2)* explicit anticipations provides a helpful start. As expected, while a system is aware of its explicit anticipations, it remains unaware of its implicit anticipations, as these "work below the threshold of consciousness." (Poli, 2017, p. 267). An example of implicit anticipations is a living organism's schemata[11]: preconceived patterns that categorize the information from surrounding systems based on a specific expectation of how said systems are structured. Mathematical biologist Aloisius Louie, who studied under Rosen as his mentor, uses the example of anticipatory preadaptation in plants, pointing out how the autumnal shedding of leaves is based on day length and not ambient temperature, proposing this preadaptation "constitutes a predictive model exploited for purposes of adaptive control." (Louie, 2010, p. 27). Another example he gives is the way in which non-photosynthetic organisms move away from light, while darkness has no intrinsic biological significance for said organisms. According to Louie, the reason these organisms are inclined to move away from the light is that they anticipate finding things in the dark "that are not physiologically neutral, such as moisture and the absence of sighted predators" (ibid, p. 27). In short: when days get shorter, plants anticipate the temperatures to drop; when there is more darkness, non-photosynthetic organisms expect the absence of predators. Both organisms have internalized things about their environment, gaining feedforward[12] control, eventually resulting in a specific ability to anticipate: these organisms react *before* the fact. We will further explore the notion of Biological Anticipation in an upcoming section; before we do so, however, we need a better understanding of the role time plays in Rosen's work.

Time is a problematic concept, as it has spawned a rich philosophical discussion going on till the present day. As alluded to in the previous chapter, in which we dealt with the 'complexity of complexity,' the entailment structures found in living systems cannot be adequately

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[10] The realm where semiosis (meaning making) happens through the use of signs (see Barbieri, 2008).

[11] In psychology and cognitive science, a schema describes a pattern of thought or behavior that organizes categories of information and the relationships among them. It can also be described as a mental structure of preconceived ideas (see Stein, 1992).

[12] In contrast to the reactionary dynamics found in feedback relations (past and/or present events causing future events), the anticipatory dynamics found in *feedforward* relations are based on future events causing present events.

described as basic linear state machines because of their ability to react to present not only events but also possible future events. This difference, marked by Rosen as the transition from the *reactive paradigm* to the *anticipatory paradigm* (Rosen, 2012, p. 8), subsequently entails the introduction of, at minimal, two different forms of 'time': "anticipatory behavior, by definition, involves multiple encodings of time" (J. Rosen & Kineman, 2005, p. 399). The idea that (at least some) organisms, now by definition anticipatory systems, contain two different 'clocks' begs further explanation. To get a grasp of this idea, we return to Rosen's model of an anticipatory system, but this time we put some flesh on its bones to make it more comprehensible.



Figure 6. The difference between real-time state and future state.

What figure 6 shows is *1)* a living organism in place of a system $\boxed{\text{S}}$, and *2)* a future state of the organism in place of a predictive model $\boxed{\text{M}}$. In addition to this, two distinct clocks, ①, and ② indicate the time difference between both states. These clocks should be seen as analogies for the different 'times' an organism is able to operate in. According to Rosen's model, it is possible for living systems to operate at different speeds due to the several internal clocks at work: "some very fast (at nanosecond speed); others in the domain of the "gravitational" clock; and yet others are very slow." (Nadin, 2012, p. 46). This idea is in some way self-evident: when an organism employs a predictive model, this model should 'outrun' the parts of the organism reacting in real-time; otherwise, any advantages that would be gained by 'living ahead' are lost due to the fact that future implications simply arrive too late. Furthermore, made visible in figure 6, there are multiple possible futures an organism might 'consider,' once again showing how living systems differ from a deterministic linear state machine: instead of moving from state to state, reacting to whichever input is received in real-time, living systems react not only to present stimuli but also to inputs originating from their inner predictive models. The word 'might' at the beginning of the last sentence requires careful consideration: the anticipatory paradigm implies a realm of possible futures, a realm of possible *choices*, not just predetermined outcomes.

Conclusion

In this chapter, it became clear that the notion of anticipation deserves special attention. Robert Rosen's description of anticipatory systems (6.1) provided an understanding of the anticipatory qualities of various systems, including living systems (6.2). What sets living systems apart from complex systems is their ability to anticipate, either implicitly or explicitly, a change signified by Rosen as the move from a *reactionary-* to an *anticipatory* paradigm. Living systems are able to anticipate either by 1) being a predictive model, in the case of simple organisms such as bacteria, 2) employing a predictive model such as some mammals, or by 3) employing a combination of both. In light of our inquiry, it is important to uncover the effects the anticipatory qualities of living systems (in the form of biological anticipation) have on our human ability (in the form of psychological anticipation) to say something about the possible future dynamics of these systems. In what ways does saying something about the future of non-living systems differ from doing the same for living systems?

“Art without engineering is dreaming.
Engineering without art is calculating.”

(Steven K. Roberts)



7 Implications

The question underneath what was presented thus far was the following: what makes biology different from technology? This chapter aims to answer the subsequent question: how does this difference make a difference when assessing synthetic biology? It is time to explore the further implications of both Rosenian Complexity and Anticipatory Systems on existing anticipation practices, in our case, *formal modeling* and *scenario building*, both used in Technology Assessment. In chapter 2, I made explicit what Technology Assessments' two functions are: *1)* to anticipate the impacts technologies might have on society (hereby F_1) to make explicit those aspects that should be subject to democratic decision making (hereby F_2). Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the focus of this chapter is to understand the implications the approach towards living systems as presented in the previous chapters (regarding their complexity and anticipatory qualities) has on the ability for Technology Assessment to adequately perform function F_1, leaving function F_2 (regarding democratic decision making) for future research.

7.1 Socio-technical ensembles

At first glance, it might seem that the 'something' under assessment is a specific technology itself: the machines, structures, or any other man-made artifacts. This view is limiting for a variety of reasons, starting with the idea that no technology, physical or non-physical, exists in a vacuum. As discussed in the earlier chapter on complexity, in which we learned about systems and parts, to tell the fullest story about a part, one should take into account its context. For Technology Assessment, this has resulted in the view that the object being assessed can never by 'just' the artifact: "the object of TA cannot be technology as such but only technology embedded in society and the environment" (Grunwald, 2019, p. 139). Due to the intimate interplay between user and artifact, society and infrastructure, maintaining a strong dualism between both is unhelpful when the overarching goal is to understand how future technology might shape society and vice versa. In short, when assessing a technology, this is always a technology 'in use'; a hybrid socio-technical ensemble unable to be separated from its environment (e.g., Latour, 2013).



Figure 7. The difference between the two types of ensembles.

However, although hard to distinguish, part of this socio-technical ensemble is still the 'technology', in the sense that it depends (in part) on some materiality in the form of artifacts, mechanisms, and other physical infrastructure. The question of interest to us is what happens when not only the social side of the socio-technical ensemble is a living system, but the other side is one as well. In other words, how is anticipation impacted when we are dealing with a *socio-biological* ensemble made out of two living halves? (Figure 8). Let us start with the impacts this novel ensemble might have on modeling.

An interesting consequence of Technology Assessment being inherently future-orientated is the fact that the objects being assessed do not (fully) exist yet. As described in chapter 2, if assessments would take place *after* a specific technology is embedded in society, the limited window of time available during which technology might be steered in a certain direction might have already passed. As became clear when discussing anticipatory systems, the objects under assessment primarily exist in *models of the future*, not as concrete artifacts in the present moment: "The object of TA is not technical hardware but language, imagination, communication, and deliberation processing those "ideas" around technology." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 140-141). Some of these ideas are the formal models described in chapter 5 on the complexity that use a broad selection of mathematics to capture the dynamics of a system on the syntactic form. The upcoming section explores the implications Rosenian Complexity, and Anticipatory Systems have for formal modeling.

7.2 Formal modeling

A substantial part of the scientific endeavor revolves around *1)* creating models, subsequently using them to *2)* predict outcomes, with the overall goal of *3)* controlling, some part of, reality (Simon, 1997). The fact that synthetic biology modifies and/or results in a *living* system requires futurists to recognize the limitations of the formal models that are employed by both engineers and theorists, as this might otherwise result in overconfidence regarding their ability to fully capture and control their own creations.

The terms *predicative* and *impredicative* were introduced by Bertrand Russel in 1907, making it possible to demarcate between formal systems free from self-reference (predicative) and those unable to function without self-reference (impredicative). As Rosen showed in his Relational Biology, living systems are rife with various forms of self-reference and should therefore be categorized as impredicative systems. In contrast to man-made artifacts, organisms "generate the parts of which they are made" (Poli, 2018, p. 7); for this reason, mechanical artifacts can be *fully* captured by corresponding formal models, while organisms (such as synthetic biology) can only be *partly* captured by said models. While the futurist's intuitive knowledge of complexity should not be underestimated, the idea that complex systems contain not only feedback- but also *impredicative* loops adds another important piece to an already complex puzzle.

For an example of the far-reaching ramifications with regards to anticipation caused by self-reference loops found in living systems, we need not look further than these systems' own ability to anticipate. As with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, which describes the problem of infinite regress that shows up when axioms require axioms that require axioms *ad infinitum*, Rosen's anticipatory systems reveal a similar issue for living systems. In short: when trying to anticipate a living system, one is essentially trying to anticipate the future of an anticipatory system, which is, in turn, anticipating its own futures (shown in figure 9). As pointed out earlier, this results in the necessary 'open-endedness' of formal models aimed at capturing the dynamics in living systems: "the former relies on first-order systems, while the latter includes second-order systems, that is, systems able to observe themselves – which is one of the sources of their complexity." (Miller et al., 2018, p. 61).



Figure 8. Recursion during the anticipation of anticipatory systems.

The idea that living systems have the ability to employ a model of themselves results in a system containing second-order dynamics. These 'meta' dynamics, because they are inherently self-referential, can never be fully captured using predicative science. Understanding these anticipatory systems and how they differ from merely complicated systems is vital for those trying to assess living and, therefore, anticipatory systems. Or, as Robert Rosen put it more succinctly: "I have come to believe that an understanding of anticipatory systems is crucial not only for biology but also for any sphere in which decision making based on planning is involved." (Rosen, 1979, p. 11). The difference between *predicative-* and *impredicative* science shows how unawareness of the difference between said sciences might result in the naïve assumption that techniques adequate for the former translate flawlessly to the latter, which is (at most) partly true as long as "one clearly acknowledges that these techniques provide partial, fragmented models of aspects of the encompassing impredicative system." (Poli, 2016, p. 7). The use of predicative modeling techniques for something such as living systems can be "deeply dangerous if they are believed to capture the nature or intrinsic complexity of an impredicative system." (ibid, p. 7). Now that the limitations of formal models' ability to foresee the future dynamics of living systems are, at least in part, recognized, it is time to turn our focus towards another widely used technique to anticipate said systems: the creation of future scenarios.

7.3 Scenario building

Through the process of scenario building, multiple scenarios of alternative futures are created that allow various interest groups (both public and private) to anticipate a number of possible outcomes. A scenario has been defined as "a story with plausible cause and effect links that connects a future condition with the present while illustrating key decisions, events, and consequences throughout the narrative." (Glenn, 2006). Scenarios should not be mistaken with forecasts; rather, they are descriptions of what might happen in the future, with the goal of *1)* opening up the mind to relevant future possibilities not usually anticipated, and therefore of broadening the overall discussion; *2)* preparing us for multiple plausible futures. During a scenario building exercise, a number of scenarios are created with relevant stakeholders. Those involved in guiding the creation of scenarios take a systems approach as their default starting position, visible by the fact that typical scenarios contain a broad selection of systemic dimensions, such as political, economic, and environmental. The starting point of the process is often a systems analysis, and the future alternatives are fleshed out by considering how different components of the system might interact. The inherent complexity of the dynamics between these different dimensions and components of the system is well known and being able to create user scenarios *despite the fact that* this complexity is seen as the main challenge for scenario builders. To what extent are future scenarios and the process of qualifying them as possible, plausible and probable, affected when the novel characteristics of living systems are taken into account?

Since the realm of imagination has a limitless scope, in theory, we might end up with an infinite number of scenarios. The way this is dealt with in scenario building practice is through the use of specific *scenario qualifiers* that allow practitioners to separate between useful and less useful scenarios. A scenario set's usefulness is judged, inter alia, based on its power to 'open up the future' through improving reflexivity in the present and on its relevance to the problem at hand. In other words: scenarios are useful when they allow considering relevant and challenging futures otherwise invisible to us. Basing the quality of a scenario set on its ability to open up the future allows practitioners to break away from the need to accurately predict the future (as meteorologists would), giving them the creative freedom to imagine a large variety of scenarios. A common way to visualize how different qualifiers limit the scope of possible futures is through the Futures cone (figure 10).



Figure 9. The futures cone (Voros 2003a, Hancock and Bezold 1994).

At the outer edge of potential futures, we find futures qualified as 'preposterous'; those visions are taken to be truly impossible. Notice how *preferred futures* are not always within the scope of any of the other categories, clearly showing the limits of our ability to shape the future to fit all our demands. When we continue moving closer to the center, we find possible, plausible, and eventually probable futures. For example: how does one determine if a future scenario is possible? A scenario that has built-in logical contradictions is seen as impossible; in the same way, a scenario that does not accord with the (generally agreed on) laws of nature is categorized as less physically possible than scenarios consistent with those laws.

There is an active debate regarding the differences between the various qualifiers, to such extent that in recent scenario building literature, the current state of scenario qualifiers is described as a "jungle" (Van der Helm, 2006). For this reason, Sergio Urueña aimed to provide much-needed clarity in an article investigating the "three main general methodological-limiting criteria: possibility, probability, and plausibility" (Urueña, 2019, p. 20). Urueña proposes that of these three criteria, the *plausibility* criterion requires special attention. In short, while the *1)* possibility criterion limits useful scenarios by demanding that they do not contain internal contradictions (deductive reasoning), and the *2)* probability criterion limits its scenarios by determining their probability based on the likeliness of them occurring with everything else staying the same (inductive reasoning), the *3)* plausibility criterion demands scenarios to be reasonable based on expectations, assumptions, evidence, feelings and/or values (abductive reasoning). This latter list of items greatly determines which scenarios are deemed plausible, and this makes a list especially interesting to us when investigating the possibility for Technology Assessment to anticipate the future of living systems such as synthetic biology.



Figure 10. Negotiation of plausibility (Urueña, 2019, p. 17).

The above figure superimposes a 'scenario cone' on top of the future cone that depicts multiple plausible future scenarios, the selection of which is modulated by a set (a – e) of assumptions, beliefs, ideas, feelings, and values (ibid, p. 16). In this set of modulating factors, we can locate both 1) implicit notions of *complexity*, as well as 2) the possible unawareness of the *anticipatory characteristics* of living systems. The need for a rich understanding of 'the nature' of living systems becomes apparent because the recognition of both characteristics (complexity and anticipation) greatly determines the perceived plausibility of the selected scenarios regarding synthetic biology. That is to say: when we miscategorize a phenomenon as 'more of the same', we run the risk of being surprised by its novel dynamics. To be clear, although common notions of complexity are well recognized within futurist circles, the problem is that Rosenian Complexity and the accompanying *impredicative*, as well as *anticipatory* characteristics of living systems this theory implies, are less widely recognized (Lane, 2018).

How might this affect scenario building, especially the selection of plausible scenarios? If the width of the scenario cone determines the number of plausible future scenarios, and the number of scenarios is directly correlated to the usefulness of the scenarios, could it be that synthetic biology weakens the usefulness of scenario building? Further research is needed to give a definitive answer to this question; however, we can already say that the implications of Rosenian Complexity will mean that some scenarios deemed implausible become plausible, but at the same time, it is just as valid to expect that some scenarios deemed plausible become less plausible or implausible. What is clear is that the set of assumptions, beliefs, ideas, feelings, and values that modulate the selection of plausible future scenarios are affected by the implications of Rosenian Complexity. This does not necessarily mean that the quantity of scenarios will increase, but that the scenarios deemed plausible enough to be taken into consideration will prove to be more useful. In the upcoming chapter, we will explore examples of 'Rosenian scenarios' to get a first glimpse of how these scenarios differ from existing scenarios.

Conclusion

During this chapter, we learned that due to the transition from mechanical technologies to living technologies, Technology Assessment is in need of a thorough understanding of the 'impredicative and anticipatory nature of nature' for it to adequately perform function F_1 (anticipating the impacts technologies might have on society) in its new role as Biology Assessment. The inherent limitations of formal modeling, especially regarding their inability to fully capture living systems, showed a clear need for more awareness of these limitations. An example of the specific problems which might undermine a Technology Assessment was given by describing the impacts of self-reference loops and how they create novel dynamics not commonly seen in purely mechanistic systems. The *plausibility* criterion used during scenario building proved helpful as it laid bare the importance of working with a well-developed notion of complexity and the recognition of life's anticipatory qualities when selecting useful scenarios. The chapter that follows goes over a number of recommendations regarding where Technology Assessment might go from here.

"You never change things by fighting the existing reality.
To change something, build a new model that makes the
existing model obsolete."

(Buckminster Fuller)



Rhombic segmentation of prototype of Woods Hole Dome,
top view. Patent by Fuller *3,203,144*,

8 Recommendations

Do living systems differ so much from the non-living systems that they are beyond what Technology Assessment can adequately anticipate? One way we could go is to simply abandon trying to anticipate living systems. As formal modeling is unable to capture living systems and as choosing between possible, plausible, and probably turns out to be very tricky for these systems, we might conclude that non-mechanical systems are forever beyond the reach of (human) anticipatory practices. Put, in other words: does synthetic biology foreshadow the end of Technology Assessment? This final chapter goes over different strands of research that could be helpful when trying to 'save' Technology Assessment, starting with the hermeneutic approach by Armin Grunwald, moving on to the notion of Futures Literacy as proposed by Poli & Miller, to conclude with an exemplar of the potential usefulness of future scenarios informed by Rosenian Complexity.

8.1 Abandon Anticipation?

The use of prospective knowledge, or knowledge about the future, to anticipate *consequences* of technology is categorized as the 'consequentialist approach' within Technology Assessment, and according to Armin Grunwald, new and emerging science and technology (NEST), including synthetic biology, "cannot be assessed in consequentialist terms." (Grunwald, 2019, p. 4). Due to the lack of reliable prospective knowledge, none of the futures we could envision using models or scenarios will allow us to shape and prepare us for a still-emerging future. When dealing with new and emerging science and technology, Grunwald proposes we should focus less on trying to anticipate the future and instead focus on what is being said and written about these phenomena today, shifting our attention "from the anticipatory question of what the future could bring with new technology, to our current and contemporary stories and narratives about these possible futures." (ibid, p. 6-7). In this way, with a *hermeneutic* extension of Technology Assessment, Grunwald proposes we stop looking for prospective knowledge and focus on contemporary hermeneutic knowledge instead.

In summary, Grunwald's approach can be interpreted as the abandonment of anticipation in the case of emerging technologies (such as synthetic biology), which is believed by some to be a step too far. There might still be ways for us to 'use the future', even when we acknowledge the challenge living systems provide us with due to their inherent complexity. For example, another option could be to embrace the chaos found in non-linear impredicative systems and learn to 'dance with them', as is proposed by those championing Futures Literacy.

8.2 Futures Literacy

In his article describing Rosen's anticipatory systems, A.H. Louie ends with the following call to action: "our society and its institutions can no longer function effectively in a cybernetic or reactive mode; it must somehow be transformed into a predictive or anticipatory mode. That is, it must become more like an organism, and less like a machine" (Louie, 2010, p. 27-

28). Heeding this call, various scholars, including Roberto Poli and Riel Miller, developed the *Futures Literacy* framework. Inspired by the notion of Anticipatory Systems, Futures Literacy aims to take Robert Rosen's ideas and instrumentalize them into a framework that allows for second-order anticipation, or 'anticipation of anticipation' (ibid). In short, a person who is Futures Literate "has learned how to consciously and deliberately "use-the-future" for different reasons and in different ways depending on the context." (Miller & Sandford, 2019, p. 2). Specific emphasis is given to the idea that this form of anticipation is performed *consciously*, as not all forms of anticipation are. This relates back to chapter 6, in which the claim was made that simple living organisms such as bacteria perform a type of anticipation; this is, in turn, is categorized as non-conscious anticipation in the Futures Literacy framework.

Part of the shared language used within the Futures Literacy Framework is *anticipatory assumptions*. This notion aims to lay bare the various tacit and explicit assumptions influencing us when imagining possible futures. For this reason, a less abstract description of a person being Futures Literate is for this person to have "the capacity to identify, design, target and deploy [anticipatory assumptions]." (Miller, 2018, p. 24). Mirroring the insights described in the previous chapter when discussing the set (a – e) of assumptions that modulate the selection of scenarios deemed *plausible*, these assumptions should be heavily scrutinized due to their potential of blinding towards certain futures. The first step towards becoming Futures Literate is identifying the tacit anticipatory assumptions one holds and subsequently turning these into explicit assumptions. Returning to the example of the stick insect: it was the tacit assumption that the stick would display the same dynamics as the other sticks found in the forest up to that point.

Connecting this back to our overarching inquiry regarding Technology Assessment and the extent to which it can adequality anticipate synthetic biology, it is crucial to lay bare the anticipatory assumptions of the various actors involved when assessing these living systems. Standing out in the various existing Technology Assessment reports written about synthetic biology is the great chasm between optimists on the one hand and skeptics on the other. I propose this chasm is founded on two very different anticipatory assumptions regarding living systems, which can be summarized as follows: *1)* optimists believe living systems are 'more of the same' with some added complexity, meaning existing approaches suffice, while *2)* skeptics believe living systems are something very different that require novel approaches. All reports on synthetic biology mention this chasm, but none of the reports take a clear side in this debate, which, although understandable, is potentially dangerous. The *Futures Literacy* framework is built on the premise that existing anticipatory practice is still "in the deepest fog about how to build up anticipatory structures able to organically deal with complex problems and systems" (Miller, 2018, p. 61). Although Futures Literacy does an important job of mapping the various differences between forms of anticipation, what it does not (yet) provide, however, is a more concrete way in which we might instrumentalize Rosen's insights, using his particular conception of life to say something useful about what is still to come. For this reason, in the next and last section of this chapter, I look at ways in which scenarios could be informed by Rosen's ideas.

8.3 Rosenian Scenarios

What would happen if we *do* take aside and embrace the idea that synthetic biology is 'the modification and creation of functionally entailed stateless systems' that require novel forms of impredicative science? In other words, what would happen when we take Rosenian Complexity seriously, and thus its implications for scenario building?

Important first attempts have been made at trying to include Rosen's insights in anticipatory practice (Fuller 2017; Marinakis et al., 2018), and while these examples are rare, they do provide an interesting first glance of what might become a form of 'Rosenian Scenarios'. In 2017, Marinakis et al. published research describing a 'Participatory Technology Assessment of cyborged ecosystems' in which they provided participants (two resident ecology professors, six management graduates as well as interested laypersons) a scenario revolving around the idea of a hypothetical 'cyborged ecosystem': a bio-technical ensemble containing, for instance, cyborged plants, fungi, and bacteria. The main characteristic of this hypothetical ecosystem was the fact that this novel living system is Rosenian Complex, which in the context of the article meant the system "is not simulable or computable." (ibid, p. 103). The authors made this last characteristic explicit to make sure their participants understood that these novel systems are impossible to (fully) model and, therefore, hard to control or anticipate.

As scenarios are deemed useful when they allow for us to 'open up the future' especially when a prediction is impossible, and uncertainty is high, the authors specifically tailored their scenario to generate a broad reflexive discussion that is helpful to "stimulate thinking, or for explaining or exploring the consequences of some decision" (ibid, p. 101). It is worth mentioning that the reason the authors came up with this specific scenario was their belief that cyborged ecosystems can be "constructed from technologies that mostly already exist in basic forms, such that their extension and convergence into a more complex form is *plausible*." (ibid, p. 101). I speculate that what seemed plausible at the time to the scenario's authors might be seen as far less plausible by those participants still unaware of Rosenian Complex systems. An explanation for this difference is that the participants assume the implicit models of non-living and living systems are one and the same, while for the scenario's authors familiar with Rosen's ideas, this is clearly not the case.

To understand how scenario-building practice might be enhanced, we need not look further than a finding that stood out during research: the fact that laypersons and the experts "both demonstrated the same lack of conceptual clarity regarding Nature." (ibid, p. 102) and the fact that this conceptual confusion stimulated "precaution in both laypersons and experts." (ibid, p. 102-103). For this reason, the authors suggest "modifying the scenario planning approach by preceding scenario exercises with educational activities that present all sides of the issues in focus." (ibid, p. 103). More importantly, they recommend scientific as well as literary guidelines that "ensure the comprehensibility to the general public of potentially Rosennean-complex technologies" (ibid, p. 103). While echoing the call for Futures Literacy, the authors ask us to focus on the Rosennean-complex technologies themselves than aiming to convey the more abstract notion of anticipatory systems. That is to say: laypersons and the experts require an understanding of the impredicative nature of life to oversee its repercussions regarding formal modeling as well as the selection of plausible futures.

What might be other ways in which scenario building practice might be enhanced? Let us look at a more concrete example by imaging the following two medical technologies: the first is a nanobot in mechanical form, a *machine* at nanoscale made using methods found in Nanotechnology, while the second is a nanobot in organic form, a synthetic *life form* made using methods found in synthetic biology. Both nanobots are built with the intent of seeking out, as well as destroying, cancerous cells within a human body. In contrast to broad-spectrum attacks such as radiation therapy, these bots allow for a 'clean' and targeted removal of cells of a specific type. The following table shows the characteristics of each nanobot, based on what we have learned thus far regarding the difference between living and non-living systems:

Mechanic nanobot	**Organic nanobot**
Non-living system	Living system
Predicative	Impredicative
Deterministic (state machine)	Non-deterministic (relational)
Context independent	Context-dependent
Closed system	Semi-open system
Fractionable	Non-fractionable
Reversible	Irreversible

The point I want to drive home here is this: if and when we create future scenarios for each of these technologies, the scenarios involving the mechanistic nanobot *should* be inherently different from those involving the organic nanobot. Both bots serve the function of entering the human body and identifying and destroying cancerous cells. However, lessons about the former do not automatically translate to the latter; it would be a dangerous category mistake to think otherwise. In scenarios involving the mechanistic nanobot, one can expect to have a sufficient amount of confidence when needing to decide between plausible scenarios due to the narrow range of plausible behavior the nanobot can exhibit in as well as outside the human body. These decisions can be made based on lessons learned from earlier mechanical interventions and known chemical interactions with the nanobot's substrate (metal, plastic, and other polymers). For the organic nanobot, however, caution should be taken, as we are now dealing with a context-dependent impredicative system. Based on its new context, the organic nanobot might show dynamics that are unaccounted for in the necessarily incomplete formal models. Furthermore, due to the fact that we are now dealing with a *socio-biological* system as described in the previous chapter, the interactions between two living systems will be different than between a living and non-living system. This is the case for the inside environment of the human body, as well as the outside environment of the larger natural ecosystem: it is easier for a living organism that speaks the language of biology to disturb larger ecosystems than it is for a non-living mechanism that speaks the language of technology. That is to say: it is easier for a native Japanese to spread lies in Tokyo than for a native Welshman to do the same in São Paulo. This last insight can be described as the 'ontological distance' between two systems; although almost always embedded in living systems, non-living artifacts are further separated from 'life itself' than living organisms are. Although this insight might seem trivial, this means that an organic nanobot might not only jump from host to host but also from host to environment.

Finally, let us take a step back and return the various assessment reports surveyed in chapter 4: I propose that to be able to give a thorough assessment of the future impacts of living systems emerging from synthetic biology, those writing reports should be aware of the significance of the categorical change between non-living and living, for example, the limitations of available modeling techniques. Rosenian Complexity provides us with the much-needed demarcation between the living and the non-living, as well as possible implications of this categorical shift. As Robert Rosen himself puts it best: "The very neatly predictable mechanistic world, where "the future" is imagined as the one and only possible outcome of the past, cannot be preserved if there are systems that anticipate, for anticipation involves symbolizing multiple unrealized possibilities and selecting from those choices." (Rosen, 2012, p. 415). By transitioning from the non-living to the living, we leave the realm of accurate predictability and enter the realm of multiple *possibilities*. Questions any assessor and scenario builder should be asking are: what is meant by the term complexity in the realm of the living? Why is there such a difference between the optimist and skeptic with regards to their outlook on the future of synthetic biology? What insight does the skeptic have that the optimist lacks? It might be that the skeptic works with a different notion of complexity than the optimist; the former lives in a world of prediction and fine-grained control, while the latter lives in a world filled with chaos and constant surprises. Those writing assessment reports should become aware of their own anticipatory assumptions, that is to say: really try to understand what theoretical biologists such as Robert Rosen mean when they use the word complexity. Any source that is used to make claims about the future, be it formal models, (plausible) scenarios, or an analysis of future narratives, should be further scrutinized with the goal of revealing the implicit anticipatory assumptions regarding living systems that inform them.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we learned that this is not the end of Technology Assessment, but that it is clearly in need of *1)* a demarcation between Technology and Biology that accounts for the categorical difference between non-living and living systems, *2)* a definition of Complexity that accounts for *impredicative* as well as *anticipatory* dynamics of living systems, and *3)* understanding of Anticipation that results in awareness of *anticipatory assumptions* during the creation and selection of (plausible) future scenarios. This understanding can be fostered by applying the insights from Rosenian Complexity, which can be both done in a theoretical and practical sense: *1)* in theory by developing Futures Literacy based on lessons learned from the various forms of anticipation, *2)* in practice through the creation of future scenarios informed by Rosenian Complexity.

“May God us keep
From Single visions and Newton’s sleep.”

(William Blake, 1802)



9 Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis, I introduced a specific anticipatory practice, Technology Assessment (chapter 2), after which I went into the specific characteristics of synthetic biology (chapter 3) to eventually merge both topics together in a chapter exploring existing assessment reports written about synthetic biology (chapter 4). What became apparent from these reports was *1)* the lack of a clear definition of *complexity* that adequately describes living systems (such as synthetic biology) and *2)* the lack of a proper understanding of the implications this complexity has for our ability to adequately *anticipate* these living systems. As both insights require further clarification, I delved deeper into the notion of complexity, and more specifically, how it relates to living systems (chapter 5). By exploring a specific theory of complexity (Rosenian Complexity), I brought to the fore the crucial difference between the living and the non-living, between organism and mechanism. Important differentiators between both systems turned out to be *1)* their *relational* nature and *2)* their embedded ability to *anticipate* the future. In the subsequent chapter on anticipation (chapter 6), by moving from the reactionary paradigm into the anticipatory paradigm, I made visible the possible limitations we are confronted with when modeling living systems.

In chapter (7) in which I explored the various implications of the findings thus far, I concluded that due to the transition from mechanical technologies to living technologies, from predicative to impredicative systems, Technology Assessment requires a thorough understanding of the 'anticipatory nature of nature' for it to adequately perform its functions in its new role as Biology Assessment. In the final chapter (8), I concluded that those writing assessment reports should be fully aware of their own anticipatory assumptions. For Technology Assessment to perform its function adequately, any source that is consulted to make claims about the future, be it formal models or plausible future scenarios, should be further scrutinized with the goal of revealing the implicit anticipatory assumptions that inform them. Understanding synthetic biology to be 'less of the same', allows us to become humbler about our abilities to model, control, and anticipate these living systems. The realm of the living is full of surprises, and *expecting* these surprises is the first step towards a minimal ability to anticipate living systems.

Research limitations My aim with this thesis was to warn practitioners of the dangers of working with an impoverished notion of complexity, or at least one that does not adequately account for the intricacies of living systems. As with all research, each method, approach, or theory has its stronger and weaker points. First, what makes Robert Rosen's theory of living systems powerful is its ability to clearly demarcate between living and non-living systems. At the same time, Rosen's strict binary between simple and complex leaves no room for gradual steps from simple towards complex, which makes it harder to integrate with other theories based on spectra or levels. Furthermore, there still remains a substantial explanatory gap between concrete anticipatory practices on the one hand and Rosen's abstract theory of life on the other. Both the limited scope of this thesis and my unfamiliarity with the literature has resulted in a work filled with interesting ideas that will require further research to truly live up to the claims being made.

Second, although I expect TA practitioners will feel the need to learn more about living systems after reading my work, where to start, and what sources to consult remains to be seen, some form of 'living systems literacy' would be of great use. Although Rosen himself made it clear that his ideas can be understood without a strong mathematical background, their highly abstract nature makes them hard to grasp and harder to connect to real-world scenarios. Concrete scenarios based on Rosen's insights are still sparse, and the clear lack of narratives based on his account of complexity makes it hard to prove their usefulness.

Third, there is still the open question of to what extent Rosen's account of life is bound to biology. Not all Rosenian Complex systems are alive, but no living systems are not Rosenian Complex. In the same sense, not all anticipatory systems are alive, but no living system is not also an anticipatory system. If we could create a purely artificial system that has all the characteristics Rosen ascribes to life, would this then be a living system? According to Rosen, as long as the formal models used to build our contraptions are based on a mechanistic form of entailment that is too 'poor' to fully describe living systems, we will merely build simulacra of life. This is not a limitation of the material used, however, but merely one of the relations between all 'parts' of the system.

Future research If Rosen is right about life, and there is indeed a categorical difference between machines and organisms, a difference in large part based on the fact that organisms can never be fully formalized without including their environment(s) *ad infinitum*, any formal models will be inherently incomplete and non-computable. Although some preliminary work has already been done with the specific aim of disproving the non-computability of living systems in the Rosenian sense (e.g., Zhang et al., 2016), more research is needed to better understand the true limitations with regards to both computing and modeling living systems. Furthermore, it remains to be seen to what extent Rosenian living systems can never be realized as a human-made artifact; this seems to remain true as long as said artifacts rely on limited mechanistic entailment.

The field of Complexity Studies, as well as the available theories of life, have matured a lot in the last 50 years, and the specific focus on both Rosen and Rashevsky's work might seem less justified. However, the reason I still believe a focus on Rosenian complexity *is* justified is due to the link between anticipation on the social level and the biological level, as pointed out in the works by Roberto Poli. An interesting avenue of research would be to further explore the connection between Rosen's work and the field of *biosemiotics* (e.g., Barbieri, 2008). In his seminal book, Life Itself, Rosen proposes that 'natural language' might be at the heart of a living organism: "to say that an organism, in a sense we are employing the term, is itself like a little natural language, possessing semantic models of entailment [not found] in any formal piece of it" (Rosen, 1991, p. 248). The idea that what constitutes living organisms is a process of semiotics in the Peircean[13] sense has the potential to open a rich new avenue of research. The field of biosemiotics combines "the concepts of biology, as a scientific field of inquiry, and semiotics, as the study of signs, to generate a route to a better understanding of the properties of living systems." (Cottam & Ranson, 2018, p. 127). Biosemiotics describes a natural world rife with information, communication, interpretation, closely related to ideas

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[13] For a good introduction to biosemiotics and its Peircean roots see Romanini & Fernández, 2014.

first posed by Weiner, von Neuman, and Shannon, describing a realm of communication far exceeding what is normally expected to be within the taken-for-granted semiotic threshold (Higuera & Kull, 2017). For example, recently, researchers have shown how squirrels eavesdrop on bird chatter and use various auditory cues as indicators of safety (Lilly et al., 2019). This raises a plethora of fascinating questions: how does information traverse the various levels of reality? How might we bridge the boundaries between the various semiotic realms? If living systems have anticipatory capabilities and are able to communicate with other living systems to form larger anticipatory systems, how do they communicate, in what form, and how and where do they store this information?

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