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Trust, in the Mission Area.
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Management Summary

This study focuses on the trust relationship, between the force protection team of the Battle Group and the mission team of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, within a Smallest Unit of Action (SUA). Soldiers from both units sent to Uruzgan (Afghanistan) in Task Force Uruzgan 1 and Task Force Uruzgan 2 were asked to participate.

For this study, interviews were conducted and a short survey was sent to members of the two units to be filled out. The interview sessions were semi-structured by an interview protocol and the questions asked in the survey were based on a theoretical framework. This theoretical framework had provided several research themes that are important in trust relationships in an organizational context. The themes to the main theme trust were: cooperation, group dynamics, and the context (in this study called 'the mission area').

The units within the SUAs were positive about trust and cooperation, especially between units that were familiar with each other and left together for patrols. Trust and cooperation between elements of units that stayed on camp during the entire mission and those leaving camp was evaluated more negative. After the units had spent more time together in the mission area the feeling of belonging to the SUA and the other unit's team grew, but a team spirit was hard to create because the units were not really familiar with the other unit. This had for example to do with the fact that the teams in the SUAs were not coupled. The way the units perceive the mission area is passable similar: they both perceive the situation as dangerous and the people as not trustworthy. Members of the PRT are more positive though about cooperation with the Afghan domestic population than the Battle Group, which as a group is more kinetic and aggressive than the PRT.

Acknowledgements

About two years ago I had my first experience with the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces. Unsure about what I was going to be confronted with I joined the senior class of the Royal Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) where young officers-to-be got their education. Being the only girl in my class and the only civilian, I suppose nobody really expected me to stay. But I liked it a lot and got completely embedded in this group of people from which some would turn out to become my closest friends.

I was very pleased when one of my former teachers asked me to become part of his research team at the NLDA about a year ago. Then I had to decide what my object of study would be. After some discussions with my friends from the NLDA the Provincial Reconstruction Team and situation in Uruzgan caught my eye. I was lucky to find my supervisors just as excited about the topic like myself, so the study could start.

During this past half year I have met many people who were a source of inspiration to me. I heard many stories that were shocking and many that were enchanting. I saw the longing in the eyes of 'my guys' to really make a difference in the world and saw the struggle they had to go through to reach this goal. I am very grateful that I had this life-time experience.

I want to thank my supervisors of my University who were willing to 'think-out-of-the-box' and let me do things my own way. Thank you Doctor De Vries for giving me advice and for reviewing my paper many times. I also want to thank Professor Seydel who, as my second supervisor, gave me the opportunity to use an 'odd' research method: qualitative analysis of interviews was not commonly used at the University of Twente.

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Content

1   Introduction

Camp Punchak, December 2006. 'The one thing I'm not going to miss about Uruzgan? Securing the Provincial Reconstruction Team!' This sentence written on a toilet wall in Punchak (Afghanistan) by a member of the Battle Group could be interpreted as distrust and a lack of understanding of the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The Dutch soldiers of Task Force Uruzgan II have just arrived in Afghanistan for their mission. A small group with members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Battle Group was sent from the headquarters in Tarin Kowt to the small base in Punchak.

Although their mission is to gain trust of the civilians in this part of the province of Uruzgan, the soldiers are under great strain because of enduring attacks by hostile individuals and small groups. Getting in contact with the locals and initiating reconstruction projects is according to the soldiers 'a hell of a job and almost impossible to perform.' The Battle Group is needed to provide security and safety for the other members of the Smallest Unit of Action (SUA). But why should they want to put their lives at stake for - as some of them put it -: 'some soldiers who only chat a bit, and drink cups of tea with the locals'. Until now this has not lead to major conflicts or disasters but these might occur in the future when the Battle Group soldiers forsake their duty of defending the other members of the SUA simply because they do not like them and see them as a useless part of the SUA.

In today's war fighting situations the strategic focus of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces is on expeditionary missions. An expeditionary mission is a mission in which the Dutch forces can be deployed all over the world for a long period of time and where all units can operate logistically independent (Gelijns, 2005). In this kind of military operations the mission goal is a humanitarian one: the missions are peace missions and not war fighting missions. There are different kinds of peace missions: commonly known are peacekeeping missions and peace enforcing missions. Peacekeeping missions are missions in an area where peace is already established but is very fragile and needs to be maintained. Peace enforcing missions focus on bringing a conflict to an end. Peace missions focus on maintaining the region peaceful, bringing safety and security and helping local authorities with rebuilding the country and keeping it peaceful after times of war or terror (Van der Kloet, 2006; Kramer, 2004).

Since there is no immediate threat to the Netherlands, the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces focus on peace missions outside the Netherlands. The Dutch form coalitions with allied countries of the United Nations (UN) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This poses an organizational difficulty for the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces: units are formed out of a variety of components and different companies. So although the design of

the armed forces has not changed fundamentally over the last few years, the 'lay-out' of the units in the mission area varies with every mission (De Waard & Kramer, 2007). A battalion doesn't comprise the same units every time it is formed for a new mission. The reason for this is the need for flexibility: every mission is different, every country is different, and even mission areas at the size of a region are different every time. The lay-out of the smallest operational units (in Afghanistan called Smallest Unit of Action or SUA) changes as well, for example in a hostile environment more units of the Battle Group and Engineering are submitted in these small operational units, while in a permissive environment less 'real' armed forces in these teams are needed. So the expeditionary units need to be 'tailor-made'.

This changing lay-out every mission may cause problems between the units. The units might have a lack of knowledge about each other's way of working, and a lack or a low level of mutual trust. Uncertainty and taking risks that are unnecessary might be the consequence of this situation. This, in turn, might pose a problem for the successful completion of the mission. When the level of trust between the units is low, a barrier is created preventing good cooperation in the compiled SUAs, resulting in unnecessary risks. When trust is low it is harder to take good decisions, and indispensable information might not be exchanged, both making it problematic to complete the mission.

1.1   Trust between military units

In a mission area the different levels and types of trust is omnipresent. One can think for example about trust between allied countries supposed to work together, trust within units of one army, trust between the forces and the locals, and trust between two individuals (e.g., a commander and his soldier). The different types of trust are influenced by the context and the people taking part in the interaction. It would be too complex to investigate all these different kinds of trust, therefore the main theme in this research is (social) trust[i] within the military forces between units. The concept of social trust refers to the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the social relationship both parties have formed (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).

1.1.1   Relevance of this study

The problems mentioned earlier – that is to say issues of trust and cooperation – will always be relevant, but in the current type of operations the arising problems differ from those in earlier operations. In countries such as Afghanistan, where the emphasis of the expeditionary operation is on peacekeeping and reconstructing the country and where the

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[i] Trust can be divided into three different types: general, social and interpersonal trust. These concepts will be further explained in chapter 2.

situation is very complex, the previously noted problems might arise. In this kind of complex military operations, the different components present in the mission area have differing tasks, and so their mission goals differ. In the Afghan province Uruzgan a Battle Group is present to take care of safety and security of both the Afghan people and the soldiers of the Task Force. A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is present to help rebuilding the country. To complete the mission in Uruzgan these two units should cooperate well. Trust is known to be of much influence on the cooperation between teams within organizations and organizational components (Mayer et al., 1995; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Therefore, it is relevant to investigate these tailor-made units on the level of trust. This study focuses on the trust relationship between Battle Group soldiers and PRT-members in SUAs, because it is vital for the mission in Afghanistan that these two cooperate well.

An important assumption in this study is that trust is strongly related to the unit's perception of the environment. Perception of the environment (including risk perception, opinions about the local population, civil humanitarian aid organizations, and Afghan officials) is thought to influence trust between the units and is therefore an important research aspect in this study. Probably the tailoring of units affects the level of trust between the units and may also result in cooperation problems between Battle Group soldiers and PRT-members.

1.1.2 Goal of this study

This research[ii] focuses on trust in the Royal Dutch Armed Forces; trust between PRT members and Battle Group soldiers in SUAs in Uruzgan[iii]. By using academic theories of trust the situation in Uruzgan will be analyzed. The situation will be explained by using the existing theories instead of creating a new theory on how the situation should be. Several concepts are taken from this academic research on trust, creating a frame of mind on how to perceive the situation. Goal of this study is to obtain insight in the trust relation between the Battle Group's force protection team and the Provincial Reconstruction Team's mission team participating in SUAs in Uruzgan, in order to distinguish possible threats to the cooperation of the two units. This study will contribute practical implications on how trust and cooperation problems in a mission area can be improved and theoretical implications on how existing academic literature is appropriate to use for the military environment.

To investigate the trust relationship between Battle Group and PRT, several research questions are formulated. The main question in this research is the following:

[ii] This study was commissioned by the Netherlands Defence Academy – department Military Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy – and was part of a larger research area after crisis management in conflict situations.
[iii] It must be noted that the results of this study can only be applied to this specific case, and therefore should not be seen as a ´law´ for any future military operation or tailor-made team. This study can be used as a guideline, but one should always be aware of the specificity of the situation in question.

- How can the trust relationship between Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team participating in Task Force Uruzgan's SUAs, and its relevant aspects, be characterized?

In the trust relationship between the two units several aspects are of influence. In this study the most important aspects (as expected by the researcher) are categorized in the following themes: 1) the mission area (including the perception on the environment and perceived risk), 2) cooperation, 3) group dynamics (including grouping issues like stereotyping and group identity).

1.2 Analytical framework & expectations

The objects of this study are the Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces within the Smallest Units of Actions. Existing trust theories are used as a theoretical framework. In this study trust between two groups is the main focus, therefore theories on social trust are most relevant. The level of trust depends on several dimensions, mentioned in the previous paragraph, which will be explained in the following chapters.

The image of the other party, based on familiarity, stereotypes, knowledge, and previous interactions, is thought to be of much influence on trust and cooperation between the two parties. An explanation of trust or distrust between the two units may be found in the (lack of) knowledge about each others actions. When one does not know what the reasons for certain actions are and one sees no use in the presence of the other unit in the mission area, dislike and distrust might arise. The units should be aware of each other's function and should share the information and knowledge they have on the situation in the mission area to create an environment where trust is the leading component.

Another antecedent may be the interactions one has with the other unit: when one is familiar with the other unit because more interactions have taken place (for example because of previous missions, social interactions on camp, or intensive contact before they are deployed to the mission area) the levels of trust on group level will be higher. Group dynamics are important to acknowledge too, because PRT and Battle Group are two distinct parts of the Armed Forces. Therefore grouping issues like stereotyping might occur. Stereotypes about the other unit may exist leading to in-group favoritism and maybe even to out-group derogation (Horenczyk & Bekerman, 1997). This might, for example, lead to members of the Battle Group perceiving members of the PRT like people from a different group, and not as team-mates. Not being part of the same team creates distance and lowers

the level of trust between the units. A lack of trust is not preferable because it might lead to bad decision making, a lack of cooperation and hesitance to share information (Langfred, 2007; Van der Kloet, 2006). Also can the way one perceives the environment be used as an indicator for the level of trust between the units. As noted earlier, one may expect that the perception of the environment differs between Battle Group and PRT. This might lead to the two units acting differently in the mission area, reacting differently towards similar situations, which might cause a lack of understanding of the actions of the other unit and in turn leads to, as proposed above, distrust or a lower level of trust between the two of them.

As noted earlier, being part of a military unit and taking part in a mission in a country at war is of much influence on the way one sees the world. Perception of the surrounding world depends on aspects such as context, knowledge, attitude, or one could say: perception of the mission area is in the eye of the beholder. This implies that perceptions are individual and thus not the same for anyone: sensations of the external world lead to subjective perceptions of this world.

Although both are sent to the same area, Battle Group military units and PRT members may hold a different view of their surrounding when placed in a mission area. Perception of their environment may for the soldiers also depends on their interactions with the local people, their training and the kind of mission they are in. The Battle Group is more often confronted with hostility because these soldiers also leave camp when force protection is needed for other units or when the coalition is under attack. PRT members do not join the Battle Group on these patrols or missions. So for the two units of the Task Force this means that their perceptions of the environment, the mission area, may fundamentally differ since they do not share the same training and do not have the same intercultural encounters.

This paper describes the results and conclusions of the research into the trust relationship between Task Force Uruzgan's Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team within a SUA. The second chapter describes the context of Task Force Uruzgan in the mission area. A short description of the political, cultural and military background of Afghanistan will be given. This chapter gives insight in the Royal Netherlands Forces – including an introduction into the Task Force Uruzgan – and her mission as well. In the third chapter the concept 'trust', the main focus of this study, will be explored. The most important academic aspects of trust will be analyzed in order to get a general idea about the concept trust. This chapter specifies the aspects of use in this particular research. The third chapter deals with group dynamics as well, because to understand trust, the influencing factor grouping should be taken into account. The fourth chapter deals with the method used in this research. The procedures, respondents, instruments, and operationalization will be described. For this research a case study was worked out: members of both PRT and Battle Group were

interviewed and asked to fill out a short survey. The fifth chapter handles the results of the analyses. The sixth and final chapter gives a conclusion and discussion about the entire research. One can find a glossary in Appendix I to facilitate reading this paper.

2   Task Force Uruzgan

This chapter deals with Task Force Uruzgan and the situation in the mission area. First a brief introduction in Afghanistan's history and current situation, as well as in the ISAF mission will be given. The second part of this chapter zooms in at the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Battle Group working together in a SUA in Uruzgan. This chapter is meant to be descriptive in order to develop a better understanding of the context in which the units operate.

2.1   Afghanistan, background

Afghanistan is a country with a roaring history. Many invaders – among them Alexander the Great – have tried to get control over this inhospitable country full of mountains and caves. Many failed. A reason for these failures may be found in the differing ethnical backgrounds of the inhabitants – and therefore a lack of cohesion amongst the Afghan people – leading to many crises and wars between the different groups. Another reason for the problem to get in control over Afghanistan may be found in the geological properties of the country[iv].

The country was confronted with many (civil) wars. Three Anglo-Afghan wars were fought against Great Britain since 1838. After the last Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, Afghanistan received an independent status (Barakat, 2004; Ewans, 2002). But this did not have a diminishing effect on the hostility in Afghanistan. In the following years of chaos and instability many kings and military leaders were aggressively deposed by their rivals. In 1979 the former Soviet Union invaded the country, but failed to get in control. They withdrew at the end of the 1980's leaving the country ungoverned so that the Mudjaheddin could take over control (Barakat, 2004; Rogers & Elworthy, 2002; Ewans, 2002). From 1992 until 1996 a civil war was fought between the four different Mudjaheddin groupings[v]. Kabul was ruined and the country, especially the southern parts, were left in anarchy (Barfield, 2005).

Illustration 1 Afghanistan fought many (civil) wars. One can still find the remains of the Soviet War everywhere.

Many groups of Afghan people (such as the Shiite community and those who had fled the country during the Soviet war) were in this period excluded from taking place in the government (Barakat, 2004). In 1994 Taliban warlords put the Mudjaheddin-goupings aside, and reigned the country hard-handed. In 2001 the Taliban

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[iv] In Afghanistan six different ethnical groups are present, such as the Pashtun and the Hazara. They all have their own language, culture and traditions. The one thing that binds the Afghan people is their religion; most of the inhabitants are Muslim. All Afghans are part of a clan. Many conflicts exist between and within these clans (Barakat, 2004; Goodhand, 2004).
[v] The Mudjaheddin can be divided in four different groupings with their foundation in the ethnical (and religious) background of the members: 1) the Pashtun, 2) the Sunni (also called Tajiks), 3) the Hazara, and 4) the Uzbek (Barfield, 2005).

controlled almost the entire country, especially the Pashtun areas like Uruzgan, reducing, with her repressive regime, the chaos left after the war against the Soviet Union. Music, games and television were banned, and women were prohibited to emancipate themselves by means of employment or education (Barakat, 2004; Rogers et al., 2002). Humanitarian aid programs were in this period not possible because of the Taliban edicts and international concerns about drugs and terrorism. After the 9-11 attacks, the US and other Western countries sent a force to Afghanistan, and deprived the Taliban of their power.

A problem arose because of the lack of unity in the country: no central leader nor administrative capacity and no collective culture was present. This brought power back to the local (clan) leaders and power brokers (Barfield, 2005). Opium production became more and more important for the economical wellbeing of the Afghan people. The amount of international troops then present in the area was thought to be too small. So when Hamid Karzai, earlier a Pashtun leader, was placed in the position of interim-president of the country in 2001, his influence did not reach any further than Kabul the capital of the country (Barakat, 2004; Barfield, 2005). In October 2004 Karzai won the elections of his country and is since then officially the president of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan, now a parliamentary democracy (Barfield, 2005; CMO, 2006). Karzai did get many votes from outside his own political and ethnical group as well: he received for example many votes from non-Pashtuns and fugitives. Many women participated in the elections: 40 percent of all voters was female. Only in the southern Pashtun areas merely a few women voted: in Uruzgan less than 12 percent (Barfield, 2005). Although Karzai is now installed in Kabul as the first (both nationally and internationally) legitimized president, his influence beyond Kabul's borders is small. Local leaders and warlords still have much power in the rural areas of the country (Barfield, 2005).

2.2   The ISAF-mission in Uruzgan

After the terrorist attacks on the United States at September 11th 2001, the US made a start with eliminating terrorist groups throughout the world, calling it 'the war on terror' (Rogers et al., 2002). They started deploying a force to Afghanistan to make sure that groupings like the Taliban, the leaders of Afghanistan in those days, and Al Qaeda (a radical Islamic paramilitary movement) would disappear. Ironically, many of Al Qaeda's military training camps were once established with Western assistance to support the Mudjaheddin against the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Barakat, 2004). Since 2001 the United States tried to form (and did form) a coalition with other countries such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan

and with the Northern Alliance[vi]. The mission was called *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*. After the Taliban regime was removed, the main goal of the military presence in Afghanistan was no longer getting rid of terrorist groups. The mission changed into a more humanitarian one: helping the Afghans to rebuild their country.

After a conference of the United Nations and representatives of the Afghan people in Bonn (Germany) on December 5 2001 it was decided to give the *International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)* a central role in rebuilding Afghanistan (ISAF, 2007). ISAF was formed by several European countries including the Netherlands. ISAF was allowed to use all military force necessary to reach the goal of supporting the interim-government in keeping the country safe. Not only maintaining safety and order in the country but helping Afghanistan and its inhabitants getting their autonomy back as well, was the reason for ISAF to get involved in Afghanistan (De Waard et al., 2007; ISAF, 2007; Homan, 2007). The official ISAF-mission states:

'Mission: Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.' (ISAF, 2007)

Illustration 2 Map of Uruzgan. The pyramids represent Dutch military camps.

On March 14 2006 the first group of Dutch soldiers left for one of the southern parts of Afghanistan: the province of Uruzgan (see illustration 2). The official ISAF operation in Uruzgan started - for the Dutch - in August 2006[vii], after participation in ISAF in other parts of the country. The Royal Netherlands Army was from now on responsible for the province Uruzgan, working next to Australian troops. *Task Force Uruzgan* (TF-U) is part of the larger *Regional Command South* (RCS) where also the British, Americans, and Canadians[viii] are located and work with PRTs (see figure 1 for a global organizational chart of the situation in Uruzgan). In Uruzgan the Dutch military was (and still is) located in two places: Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. Camp Holland, the largest detachment, is located in Tarin Kowt, the principal city of this province.

[vi] Northern Alliance: military-political organization uniting various competing Afghan groups to fight the Taliban since 1996 in the northern provinces of Afghanistan.
[vii] In July 2007 about 1400 Dutch soldiers, in total, had been deployed in Uruzgan. Total costs of the Dutch mission: 600 million Euro (KVBK, 2007).
[viii] The British are involved in the province Helmand, the Americans in Zabul and the Canadians in Khandahar where Dutch military forces are placed as well (De Waard et al., 2007; ISAF, 2007). In Uruzgan the Australians are also present with their *Reconstruction Task Force* (ISAF, 2007).

As can be seen in figure 1, PRT and Battle Group are two independent components of the armed forces. Both get their directions from the Task Force Commander. One should notice the fact that because of this design Battle Group and PRT are complementary, so one does (formally) not overpower the other. This means that in decision making compromises must be made by both units about responsibility and mission goals. More military units are present in TF-U, but because of the focus on PRT and Battle Group in this research only these two (and their position in the hierarchy of TF-U) are presented in figure 1.

COM ISAF

RCS

TFU

TF- Staff

BG   PRT

COM ISAF	Commander ISAF
RCS	Regional Command South
C-TFU	Commander Task Force Uruzgan
TF- Staff	Taskforce Staff
BG	Battle Group
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team

Figure 1: Organizational chart of Task Force Uruzgan (De Waard & Kramer, 2007)

Since 2006 the (safety) situation in Uruzgan worsened: an increase in incidents is reported. Taliban still reigns in this province, where terrorist attacks are main concern of the coalition troops. Reconstruction is the main goal in this province, where hostility leads to the presence of both Provincial Reconstruction Team and Battle Group.

2.3   Smallest Unit of Action

The Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Battle Group perform their duties working next to each other in a Smallest Unit of Action (SUA). SUAs, in which the Battle Group force protection team is the largest component, are formed to perform several operational tasks (De Waard et al., 2007) such as conducting a PRT patrol (see illustration 2).

Illustration 3 Battle Group and PRT form together with other units a SUA when on patrol in the mission area.

SUAs can be seen as tailor made units. They are formed from mixed sections of the Task Force to perform one specific task. A SUA can for example consist of soldiers from the Battle Group, PRT-members, medical support, and engineers. When this task is finished the SUA breaks up again and 'the participating units return to their original places in the functionally grouped task force.' (De Waard et al., 2007, p.16). When on a PRT-patrol, a PRT mission team and a Battle Group force protection team, leave camp in order to get in contact with Afghan people or to conduct PRT projects. Battle Group soldiers take care of safety and security by guarding from an over-watch sight and by accompanying the PRT mission teams in the villages. Sometimes a PRT patrol takes several days, which means that during this period of time the soldiers do not return to the camp and have to sleep outside.

It is important to take notion of the rotation procedure within the Armed Forces, because it affects the SUAs and therefore could also influence the way the units cooperate and trust each other. The Provincial Reconstruction Team does not rotate simultaneous with the Battle Group. When the Battle Group rotates (after four months) a new group of soldiers comes from the Netherlands to replace the old group whereas the PRT stays unchanged, and vice versa. The PRT changes after six months. The purpose of this way of organizing the Task Force is that experience and knowledge the troops have acquired in the mission area are not lost. Although, a problem might well arise, because both units need to cooperate with two unfamiliar units instead of one when the rotation would be carried out simultaneously. The current rotation procedure gives the troops less time and possibility to get familiar with each other well, which could be problematic for the trust-relationship.

2.4   The Provincial Reconstruction Team

In 2002, after the Afghan war fighting mission was over and it became time for *Counterinsurgency* (COIN), a *Provincial Reconstruction Team* (PRT) – teams of military personnel who support the local governments in hostile environments – was formed for the first time. An initiative that still changes everyday in implication, output, goal and so on. Counterinsurgency on the other hand, exists already a long time. In the end of the Colonial days of the European countries, the British soldiers performed counterinsurgency in Malaysia and the Dutch in Netherlands East Indies, when they were confronted with a guerrilla war (Brocades Zaalberg, 2007).

Counterinsurgency is also called the *'hearts and minds' campaign*. This makes clear what the goal of this kind of military involvement is: 'gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the insurgent' (Aylwin-Foster, 2005; p.4). A counterinsurgency operation focuses on neutral and by insurgents harmed minorities in order to achieve two goals:

- Evoking support from the domestic population by gaining their trust
- Injure the morale of the insurgents (Van Amersfoort & De Moor, 2003b).

This can be done by providing the population with better alternatives than the insurgents give them (Kilcullen, 2006). According to Kilcullen the operational art of counterinsurgency remains 'fundamentally concerned with displacing enemy influence from social networks, supplanting insurgent support within the population and manoeuvring to marginalize the enemy and deny them a popular base.' (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 117). In the Netherlands Royal Armed Forces counterinsurgency is a government directed operation in which political, economical, social, and military measures are complementary (Van Amersfoort et al., 2003b; Brocades Zaalberg, 2007). COIN-operations are easily confused with *Search and Destroy* missions, such as the Americans performed in Vietnam. Searching and destroying the opponent is a significant task but not the only task of the COIN-operation. In counterinsurgency the armed forces mainly give military assistance to the (civil) authorities when a government is under attack of armed militia, using both military and civil means to compete with the insurgents (Brocades Zaalberg, 2007).

In classical counterinsurgency the insurgents are one group of revolutionaries with one goal and only one agenda. In contemporary counterinsurgency like in Uruzgan there is no united front and the insurgencies include many 'diffuse, competing insurgent movements.' (Kilcullen, 2006, p.116). This makes them a complex enemy resulting in a shifting approach, adopting the measures to suppress the insurgents (Kilcullen, 2006). In Afghanistan the insurgents are all Taliban-like groupings, warlords and drug traffickers, who act by discrediting and undermining the government. They do not necessarily wish to replace the current government but seek to expel the foreigners (Kilcullen, 2006), using guerrilla tactics to reach this goal (Broccades Zaalberg, 2007).

Nowadays in counterinsurgency-operations in Uruzgan the emphasis is on Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The first formed PRT's in Afghanistan (then called Joint Regional Teams) were constituted by the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Southern-Korea. The teams included twelve to thirty people, most of them Special Forces and CIMICs[ix]. ISAF liked the concept of PRTs and transformed them into teams with an aim on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the coordination of different actors such as the Afghan authorities and humanitarian aid organizations (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2006). This means that by establishing a safety department (for example by recruiting and training police officers) the insurgents will

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[ix] CIMIC; civil-military cooperation. NGOs & PVOs are supported and protected by military personnel. The troops also give humanitarian aid, in PRTs special CIMIC-officers are present. The advantage of using non-military CIMICs in missions is that the non-military corporations have knowledge of the local circumstances and culture, and members are mostly trusted by the domestic population.

(hopefully) be undermined and the domestic population can return to their homes and live there in peace.

There is no standard design and compilation of a PRT. One could say it is the prototype of a tailor-made unit because with every mission the lay out and compilation of PRTs change. Because the Provincial Reconstruction Team is an abstract concept, every country gives form to specific PRTs in its own way. This makes it a problem to give a clear definition of a PRT, and it's lay out and mission goals. Overall, one can say a PRT is a team of military subdivisions operating more socially than the classical fighting units. According to ISAF the main goal of PRTs should be constructing good relationships with civil actors, especially with the domestic population of the region[x]. Because of the continual threat in the environment the PRTs are minimally armed.

In a PRT several countries can take part but there is always one 'lead nation'. The lead nation provides the guidelines for the design of this particular PRT. In the Afghan province Baghlan the Netherlands was lead nation in the period from October 2004 until September 2006. Not only do different countries need to work together in the mission area, also different parts of the armed forces need to work together in a PRT as well (for example Navy and Army Infantry). As already noted, this can lead to many problems through differences in culture, a lack of understanding and miscommunication. In Uruzgan the Royal Netherlands Army is the main component in the PRT, but also Air Force, Navy, and Military Police are present.

In general, one can divide a Provincial Reconstruction Team into three different groups: the operational group, the supporting group and the reconstruction group. In this study the emphasis is on the PRT mission teams. The mission teams are part of the larger Smallest Unit of Action (SUA) in which also a detachment of Battle Group is present providing a force protection team. These PRT mission teams are constituted with soldiers of the operational group (for example for force protection) and the reconstruction group (mostly staff officers or CIMIC-officers). In charge of the entire PRT is the PRT commander, assisted by the chief of staff and several staff officers. A political advisor and a national intelligence support team is externally available to advice the PRT commander.

2.4.1 Reconstruction

As noted above, reconstructing Uruzgan is a main item on the Dutch political and military agenda and it constitutes the main task of the PRT mission teams. But what is this reconstruction? One easily thinks about visible projects, such as the Canadian PRTs perform: when a road is broken, soldiers arrive to reconstruct it, making the work of the PRT

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[x] In Uruzgan the 3-D approach is inserted by the Dutch government. This means that the three pillars of the mission are: defence, diplomacy and development (Homan, 2007). The mission is led by three ministerial departments: defence, foreign affairs and the ministry of development co-operation (Homan, 2007; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2006).

visible and clear. According to Barakat (2005b) this short term reconstruction is of no real help to the local population. Reconstruction should not be seen as rebuilding only but as development: 'helping people recover [from war]: economically, socially, politically and psychologically' (Barakat, 2005b, p. 269). Another problem arising with reconstruction is that very often local capacity is forgotten and is left unused. According to Barakat (2005b) using local capacity should be priority one for the reconstruction projects to be beneficial. Other than most countries the Dutch soldiers try to get the Afghan people involved in the reconstruction projects. The Dutch try to find Afghan workers to construct the road and help them by giving advice and financial support. 'Put an Afghan face on everything' is a frequently used slogan in the Dutch forces. This way of dealing with the situation is beneficiary to get the regional economy started but has as a disadvantage that nobody really sees what the Dutch do because they remain at the backside. The Afghan people do not see what the Dutch armed forces are doing because it is abstract and not directly visible, also many Dutch people (including politicians) are not aware of the actual function and actions of the Dutch forces in Uruzgan. Another problem occurring with reconstruction includes the vision on how the future situation should be. Locals mostly do not share the vision on their needs as those giving aid. This does not mean that therefore the influence of aid-givers is small. On the contrary: the influence of international powers is huge because of their financial support given to those who share the western liberal democratic vision (Barakat, 2005a).

According to Barakat (2005a) a reconstruction project needs to be aiming on both surface as deep-rooted problems, otherwise a stable situation will not be achieved '[…] reconstruction is by definition a long-term, developmentally driven process. If it is to be effective and sustainable, it first of all requires long-term political commitment to the process from both international and national actors.' (Barakat, 2005a, p.11). The transition from war to peace is never smooth, old conflicts prevail and new ones emerge. In Afghanistan one can not speak of 'the Afghan conflict'. Several conflicts together form a system of conflicts at regional and national level (Goodhand, 2004). Expecting Uruzgan to change from a war-torn society into a peaceful democratic society in two years is therefore not realistic.

2.5   The Battle Group

Working next to the PRT mission team in a SUA is a Battle Group force protection team. The entire Battle Group exists of units of combat forces. Its primary focus lies on force protection: taking care of the safety and security of the entire mission area and thus also of the PRT. Sometimes the Battle Group platoons perform tasks similar to those of the PRT members. The reason for this is simple: it is impossible for the few PRT members available in Uruzgan to take care of the entire region. Therefore, the help of Battle Group leaders (the platoon

commanders) is needed to keep in contact with the people in the villages when the PRT's are not present at the time. So although their functions differ, Battle Group and PRT also perform similar tasks. There is a difference though. PRT members operate with Afghan authorities at a local and provincial level, while the Battle Group on the other hand is not confronted with Afghan authorities. The soldiers of the Battle Group are confronted with the ordinary people in the mission area. For example when they are on patrol with a PRT mission team and they get in contact with the villagers when the PRT mission team is having a conference with the village elderly.

The entire Battle Group is formed by a battalion of 800 to 1000 men. Like the PRT a Battle Group is flexible in structure because it needs to be able to adjust the unit to the requirements of the mission area. Five elements are always present in a Battle Group to perform some tasks, but differ in size every deployment. The size of the included elements depends on the situation in the mission area. Manoeuvre (e.g. infantry and cavalry) is the leading element, next to command & control, logistics, battle support (e.g. engineering), and fire support (e.g. Panzer Howitzer or Apache) (Van Amersfoort, et al. 2003a).

3 Trust

Trust is said to be the key ingredient in today's peace missions (Van der Kloet, 2006; Aylwin-Foster, 2005): to reach the mission goals it is relevant to gain trust from the domestic population (the so called: *Hearts and Minds-campaign*) and as well to make sure the different military units maintain trust in each other and in their environment to improve their cooperation and effectiveness. In this chapter the concept of trust will be explained. In every mission area several groups are present: there are different units, but also different ethnical groups (in Uruzgan the Dutch, the Afghan and many more). It is important to understand the group dynamics because as trust is a component of social structure, it is an expectation about the roles of other group members: without trust these groups will not survive (Weber & Carter, 2003).

Trust is a complex multidimensional concept. One can acknowledge this for example because of the wide range of various definitions, see for example Weber & Carter (2003), or Van der Kloet (2006). The definition of trust used in this article is based on the frequently used definition proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995):

> *'[trust is] the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.'* (Mayer, et al., 1995, p. 712)

It is very important that people trust each other. Firstly, because trust reduces feelings of uncertainty (McAllister, 1995; Mayer, et al., 1995). It makes sense of the world because trust makes trustors believe they can predict future consequences of actions and will not be the victim of any harm. Secondly, trust leads to more collective power by means of cooperation (Mishler & Rose, 1997). When people trust each other they are more likely to cooperate: share information, knowledge, and power (Mayer et al., 1995; Morgan et al., 1994; Van der Kloet, 2006). A government for example needs her citizens to trust her so there is no need to ask the people for agreement every time a decision is made. A manager, in any organization, needs his employees to trust him for the same reason. So trust also creates a certain state of mind in which people are not afraid to take risks. They are willing to take risks, because they are not afraid to be vulnerable themselves to the actions of another party (Mayer et al.,

1995). When someone thinks he[xi] knows what the outcome of the other party's actions will be, he is willing to take more risk compared to when there would only be uncertainty about every aspect of the situation (McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995). This risk taking gives an opportunity for an individual, an organization, or a country to perform well or even better than others do in the same situation (Uslaner, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). Trust is not always justified though. Sometimes a party is wrongly trusted because of positive judgments made on trustworthiness using insufficient information in order to reduce uncertainty (Van der Kloet, 2006; De Vries, 2004).

3.1   Types of trust

In academic, mostly psychological, literature three main forms of trust are distinguished: general trust, social trust, and interpersonal trust. General trust is about the kind of trust people have in most other people (in general) and is seen as a stable characteristic of groups as well as a stable characteristic of individuals (Uslaner, 2007).

Social trust is based on the social relationships people build with each other. Relationships are built by people who feel connected because of shared values, but can also vanish when people drift apart because of differing values (Soeters, 2004; De Vries, 2004). Even in a country where there is a mainstream culture, several different subcultures can be found. In the Netherlands, for example, one can find a Western culture. But when one takes a better look, a difference can be found between values of atheists, protestants, Muslims, and Catholics, or between people from the south, the Randstad, Friesland or any other region in the country. This makes clear that in social relationships shared values and a shared culture are not easy to define, also because these are, like trust, situational. But because the Dutch have commonalities as well, they perceive themselves as members of the same group, and they think they know how the other will react. Therefore a certain amount of trust between the different citizens arises, increasing when more commonalities are found.

The last type of trust, interpersonal trust, involves interaction. When people interact they usually have expectations about how the other individual will act, what kind of behavior he will display. When the level of trust is high feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty are reduced (Mayer et al., 1995). Interpersonal trust focuses on the expectations on the behavior of one individual or of small groups instead of a large group of others. In this study interpersonal trust was not thoroughly investigated, because the situation in Uruzgan is analyzed at a group level and not at an individual or personal level. Most important to understand trust between the units is social trust, because the relationship between the two units is the focus of this study. General trust is also relevant in the mission area where differing groups of people are confronted with each other and (probably) use stereotypes to

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[xi] In this paper the male personal pronoun (*he*) is used where the female (*she*) could have been written down.

make sense of the world. Interpersonal trust is of influence because it takes interactions into account. In the mission area interactions with the local population might be relevant for the risk perception and interactions with the other units probably are relevant for good cooperation and the development of other types of trust.

3.2   Foundations of trust

Clearly, trust is important for organizations, and therefore for the armed forces as well. But how does trust get established? McAllister (1995) gives two foundations of trust. According to him trust is based on *cognition*: evidence (or knowledge) about what will happen in the future and rational reasoning. Knowledge about what is going to happen constitutes certain confidence in the situation: the belief in expected future events based on experience and evidence (Mayer et al., 1995). The second foundation of trust according to McAllister is *affect*: the emotional bonds between people. When people hold the belief that the emotional sentiments of a relationship are reciprocal they place trust in each other (McAllister, 1995). So trust, in this matter, is about social relationships, positive social relationships that are created through group membership based on shared values and previous encounters. A person belonging to the same group, holding the same values as oneself will be thought of more trustworthy than a person part of a group of people holding different or even opposite values as important (Brewer, 1999).

3.2.1 Group membership and social categorization

Humans want to be part of a group because as a group member the goals they want to achieve are easier to reach (Forsyth, 1999). They also need a group to survive, especially in times of conflict or scarcity, because one is much more vulnerable as an individual than as a group (Brewer, 1999). Forsyth (1999) describes six functions a group fulfils for its members: 1) *belonging*, providing a sense of security and inclusion, 2) *intimacy*, providing support, 3) *generativity*, helping to reach goals, 4) *support*, providing help in crisis situations, 5) *influence*, the larger the group the more influence the individual has, and 6) *exploration*, providing an opportunity to learn. Thus, being part of a group is beneficial for an individual.

According to Brewer groups are founded on a depersonalized or general kind of trust (Brewer, 1999). This means that within your own group you trust every one in principle when you did not have any (positive nor negative) experiences with this person. When a group is formed the members of this group perceive this group of people as 'us', everyone who is not a member of this group is seen as an 'outsider'. This is called the in-group and out-group phenomenon (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Brewer, 1999; Hutchison, Jetten, Christian & Haycraft, 2006). A group is formed when people recognize something in the others: they share the same values and beliefs and have common goals (Brewer, 1999). But even when the goals are the same two parties may not trust each other. According to Langfred (2007) the level of

trust is lowered when one thinks the other party does not use the right way of managing the situation.

Hogg et al. (1985) propose two approaches one can use to understand how groups develop. The traditional social cohesion approach states that groups form through interpersonal attraction: when the others seem more attractive (for example because of similarity) one is more willing to join them in a group, moreover does one feel more comfortable with these others. The second approach, the social identity approach, is based on cognition. According to this approach, group membership does not depend on attractiveness but is determined by social categorization. Social categorization is about classifying people into groups: the group one is originally placed in will become the in-group although other groups might be more attractive (Hogg et al., 1985). Categories can be for example nationality and gender. Reasons for people to use self-categorization are 1) the need for coherence, and 2) gaining or maintaining a positive self esteem (Hogg et al., 1985). But when one does not belief oneself to be categorized into a group, one identifies oneself with the people one likes (Hogg et al., 1985).

Besides the commonalities between groups of people the level of trust in the other party also depends on the context of an event (Lapidot, Kark & Shamir, 2007). When an event takes place in a complex or dangerous situation where the consequences can be large for the trusting party, he or she will probably be more anxious to trust the other party than when the same event takes place in a peaceful and harmonious context. The context of an event is formed out of several aspects: the extent to which independence between the two parties is present, the kind of relationship that already was constituted, and the presence of conflict in the situation (Lapidot, et al., 2007). When groups compete over power or territory a conflict arises. Even though there is no conflict at the individual level, when joining a group the individuals engage in this competition. Competition increases between groups because of the anonymity one has being part of a group, and because 'all the others are doing it too' (Forsyth, 1999). According to Forsyth (1999) one, when confronted with unknown groups, shows more distrust than when one looks at an unknown individual. Forsyth (1999) gives three reasons for this: one is afraid of the other group, one is competitive with the other group or one simply belongs to another group.

3.2.2 Stereotyping

As noted earlier people form groups to have a better chance of surviving and of reaching their goals. To survive one has to battle certain obstacles. Not only individuals, but also groups can be threatened. When this happens group members may act in two different ways. The members with the highest degree of identification (who feel part of the group most

strongly) show most solidarity and commitment with their group members whereas others start to pursue their own goals and leave the group (Hutchison et al., 2006). These actions can also be found in the way one judges other groups. Noel, Wann and Branscombe (1995) found that out-group derogation is expressed especially in situations when the in-group is under threat. Because self esteem and self definition are depending on the perception of group membership, one is more favorable for the in-group, whereas out-groups are derogated (Kunda, 2000; Noel et al., 1995). For example in civil wars one sees this out-group derogation towards members of other ethnical or racial groups living in the same country as happened for instance between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. In-group and out-group distinctions are easily made, but according to Noel et al. out-group derogations are not as easily expressed as in group favoritism. According to Noel et al. (1995) an out-group is only negatively criticized when the in-group, with which one highly identifies, is publicly threatened (Noel et al., 1995).

> *'[…] an individual who ties his or her identity closely to a particular in-group will use derogation to defend that group from threats posed by out-groups and by in-group members who appear to be disloyal; this derogation, in turn, appears to protect the collective self-esteem of the highly identified individual.'* (Noel et al, 1995, p. 128)

Out-groups are also derogated more strongly by peripheral group members: those members who do not match the prototype group member as much as the core group members. For the peripheral group members out-group derogation can be used as a strategy to acquire the core group member status. Benefit of being a core group member is receiving more status, acquiring more security and having more power than other members of the group (Noel et al., 1995).

When distinctions are made between in-groups and out-groups, the group members often think in stereotypes. Stereotypes are social frames or conceptions about all members of a certain other group (Soeters, 2004; Kunda 2000). Kunda defines stereotypes as '[…] cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs and expectations about a social group.' (Kunda, 2000, p. 315). Knowledge and exemplars are mixed into a stereotype, which determines the way one sees other people. Stereotypes have an effect on the way one sees the world and thus on the way one judges the actions of other individuals. This means that identical behavior may be interpreted completely differently when performed by individuals who belong to differently stereotyped groups (Kunda, 2000).

Stereotypes have several characteristics: they give meaning and structure to what you see and are therefore also called a mental efficiency tool. An advantage is that because of these expectations one can predict future behavior of people from other stereotyped

groups. Negative stereotypes are, on the other hand, a disadvantage, because they can lead into a spiral of negativity. A negative approach of a group can lead to negative reactions by this group which might lead to an even more negative approach of the first group and so on (Kunda, 2000; Soeters, 2004). In this way stereotypes can lead into a self-fulfilling prophesy. Another characteristic is that stereotypes only exist between groups with a social identity and supply a subjective feeling of 'brotherhood' (Soeters, 2004).

Stereotypes can be categorized in three groups. In the first, stereotypes are a product of culture. In the second stereotypes arise from the personal longing to be part of something. In the third group stereotypes emerge through categorization and covariation (Kunda, 2000). The process of categorization mentioned above, emerges from culture. What seems to be a category for some might not for people from another (organizational) culture. An example is for instance religion: in most Western countries, the distinctions between the Islamic groupings is not clear to people who were raised in a Christian culture. To them they all are Muslim and see for example no differences between Sunite an Shiite. In turn many Muslims view the people raised in Western countries as identical, regardless of the differences in religious background. Thus the culture in which one is raised is a very important influencing factor on actions, perception and stereotyping. Culture can be seen as a mindset of a group of people who share the same fundamental values about life (Soeters, 2004). One could say people who share a culture have commonalities in lifestyle because they live by the same rules and values. Knowledge of a certain other culture can therefore be of help by predicting and understanding the behavior of people of this other culture.

3.3   Antecedents of trust

Understanding other cultures and groups is an aspect of relevance for inter group trust relationships. This study is focused on trust between units of the armed forces and the trust they maintain in the mission area. Social trust is applicable in this study, because differences in group identity might be present, and the study is focused on relationships between small groups of people of differing organizational cultures. Earlier the foundations of trust were noted but in interpersonal trust several other personal characteristics are perceived as foundation of trust as well. Although they are presented on an individual level, these characteristics can also be applied to groups and are therefore mentioned in this section.

Lapidot et al. (2007) and Mayer et al. (1995) describe three characteristics someone is supposed to have to be noted trustworthy. The first characteristic is *ability (or competence)*: all those aspects such as skills enabling a party to influence a specific domain (Mayer et al., 1995). This means: how competent is the other party in general, but also in this specific situation? The groups' competence depends on the domain in which decisions need

to be made and actions have to be taken: every group has its own expertise (Lapidot et al., 2007). One can trust another in general, but not trust his competence in this particular situation because it is not his expertise (Mishler et al., 1997). This is the same for groups: in a situation in which expertise is needed that a group cannot give, this group will not be trusted to do this particular job. A consequence might be that the two parties do not cooperate although when they would their goals would be easier reached. In the Armed Forces this could present itself when cavalry is supposed to do infantry skills and drills: although they are good soldiers they will not be trusted with a job where infantry skills are needed, simply because they have another specialty.

The second characteristic of trustworthiness made notion of is *benevolence*: 'the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor aside from a self-centered profit motive.' (Mayer, et al. 1995, p. 718; Ladpidot et al., 2007). Benevolence is about the intention a trustee has to act in a specific way and to do the job well (Van der Kloet, 2006).

The last characteristic is *integrity*, this characteristic involves the perception the trustor has about the principles the trustee holds. Are both party's values comparable, or does the trustor at least think the principles of the trustee are acceptable? Within the armed forces the fundamental principles and values will be more or less comparable. So the units will score high on integrity. Perception about the integrity of the Afghan people might be very low because the Dutch soldiers and the Afghan people have fundamentally different values and principles, and it is most likely that because of the cultural differences they don't think the other party's principles are acceptable.

3.4   Trust in the mission area

As already noted, in a conflict situation trust is of great importance to end the mission, but trust is also the hardest thing to gain in times of conflict. Trust and distrust are asymmetrical: it is easier to lose trust (and thereby creating distrust) than to build it (Lapidot, 2007). When the level of trust is low, or in situations of distrust, the need exists to reduce the feelings of uncertainty in order to gain some trust. For the soldiers in Uruzgan it is important to know they have their 'buddies' to rely on.

It is almost always uncertain what is going to happen in these turbulent environments. Soldiers therefore also need a certain level of distrust regarding the mission area, as noted earlier: when trusting everyone and everything the level of vigilance will be extremely low. With no distrust the soldiers are posing themselves and locals at great risk. Risks are supposed to have much influence on trust between groups, according to Langfred (2007) reductions in risk help build trust whereas a higher level of perceived risk undermines trust.

Previously it was noted that in peacekeeping missions a primary concern is gaining trust from the local population towards the soldiers. But do the soldiers trust the locals themselves? The soldiers are supposed to show their good intentions, for example by being aware of cultural traditions and knowing how to communicate with the domestic population. An arising problem in this kind of operations is the short period the Dutch soldiers spend in the mission area: they are leaving just when they start to get a clue of how things work. It might be possible that because of this problem the Dutch experience much uncertainty about the locals (they are not sure about what they can expect) and vice versa (the locals are continuously confronted with people who don't understand them). Logically one would think this is not beneficial for the level of trust between the armed forces and the domestic population. How much distrust and uncertainty there is between the soldiers and the locals also depends on the hostility in the region and task of the unit in the mission area. This can be explained by the following: when units are located in a more hostile environment there is more dependability between the parties, there is less time to consider decisions and therefore less opportunity to gain trust, and above all the parties are more vulnerable for the consequences of negative actions of the other party.

Because of the specific situation of interest in this study, general literature about trust is used as a theoretical framework and refined into three themes of relevance for trust between the units. In this study social trust is studied by focusing on the following themes: 1) *the mission area* – including risk perception, perception of the Afghan people, and the mission itself –, 2) *cooperation* – including information sharing and decision making as well –, and 3) *group dynamics* – including group identity and stereotyping.

4   Method

This chapter describes the methodological structure of this study: it describes the chosen research strategy, the methods used for the data collection and analysis. Finally, different relevant issues concerning validity and reliability issues are discussed.

4.1   Design – Case Study Uruzgan

This study focuses on one specific case: the trust-relationship within a SUA. The objective of this study was to capture circumstances and conditions in the mission area in which the trust relationship between Battle Group and PRT participating in a SUA is part of everyday life of the soldiers. Core element of case studies as research strategy is the study of the impact of social processes in the life of an individual or group of persons (Yin, 2003; Swanborn, 1996).

Yin (2003) describes four types of case-studies: 1) holistic single case design, 2) holistic multiple case design, 3) embedded single case design, and 4) embedded multiple case design. Holistic means that in the case study the studied cases consist out of only one unit of analysis. In an embedded case design every case is formed by more than one unit of analysis. This study can be categorized as an embedded single case design because the third rationale Yin proposes[xii] is applicable to the situation in the mission area, and because there are several units of analysis. A case study, thus, may involve more than one unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). In this study the two units of analysis were the Battle Group soldiers and the PRT members participating in a SUA.

Trust is a very relevant subject, but it is too complex to take all aspects of trust and all aspects of the military units into account in one study. Therefore the specific trust relationship between Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team was selected, because this relationship is vital for the mission to succeed. The methods of data collection were standardized which made it is easier to give an explicit view on the situation. In this study multiple sources of evidence (interviews and survey responses) were used in order to deal with validity and reliability. In paragraph 4.4 these aspects of the study will be further described.

[xii] The third rationale of Yin is the following: 'Here, [in a typical case] the objective is to capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation.' (Yin, 2003, p. 40)

4.2 Data collection

To investigate the situation in the mission area, interviews were conducted and a survey was sent to fill out by members of the Battle Group and PRT participating in a SUA. In the following paragraphs the respondents and the procedures of data collection will be discussed.

4.2.1   Respondents

The case study is focused on trust between Battle Group soldiers and Provincial Reconstruction Team members participating in a SUA of Task Force Uruzgan. It was decided tot focus on these two units because both groups leave the base together and are in direct contact with Afghanistan's domestic population. These two groups were expected to have differing interactions with the locals and were therefore expected to have differences in perception of the mission area leading to a lower level of trust between the two units and between the units and their environment. Since these units are working on the operational level it is vital that trust and cooperation between these units is high.

The Battle Group was designed out of one entire unit, located on one base in the Netherlands. In TF-U1 was the Battle Group formed by an airmobile brigade, in TF-U2 was this an infantry anti-tank battalion. Soldiers from both airmobile brigade and infantry were asked to participate in this study. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are tailor-made teams, therefore the members originate from differing parts of the armed forces. In this study only soldiers of several subdivisions of the Royal Netherlands Army were asked to participate. Twenty-one persons participated in the interview sessions from which eleven from the Battle Group and ten from the PRT. One respondent of each unit was part of the staff and did not participate in the SUAs, they were interviewed though because they were thought to have a more objective view on the situation within the SUAs than the soldiers within the SUAs. Nineteen respondents returned the survey completely. And two soldiers, one of the Battle Group and one of the PRT, were asked to perform a member check on the results of the analyses.

4.2.2   Procedure

In this study existing theories about trust and social interaction were used to formulate the dimensions which gave direction to the research techniques. The interviews were structured by a interview protocol (see Appendix II) to ensure all subjects responded to the same topics. These topics are discussed further in paragraph 4.2.3. The interviews were semi-structured by using key question, but leaving the respondents total freedom in answering these questions. This is an advantage because aspects not yet formulated in theories – maybe simply because it never was of relevance in non-military situations but nevertheless

important in this situation – could be taken into account when noted by the respondents. The respondents were told they were participating in a study on the mission of Task Force Uruzgan in scope of a large study on crisis management in mission areas. The respondents were assured that all given information would be used delicately and would be presented anonymously. The interview sessions were taped and took approximately one hour each. A narrative analysis was applied on the interviews, which will be further described in paragraph 4.3.

The second way of data collection was through a short survey. The intention was to verify the conclusions drawn from the interviews this way. Respondents were confronted with statements about their mission in Uruzgan. Respondents who had participated in the interview sessions, and other soldiers who had been in Uruzgan but had not participated in the interview sessions were asked to fill out the online-survey. They were contacted by their senior officers and asked to participate. The responses were statistically analyzed, and the reactions of the two groups were compared.

To standardize the interviews, a protocol was made to ensure the main themes and questions were asked every interview. In Appendix II one can find the interview protocol. The research questions of this study were divided into four main themes: cooperation, trust, perception of the mission area, and group dynamics.

Participants were not informed about the exact goal of this study, in order to receive reactions as completely as possible. The respondents were asked to identify themselves and to describe an 'ordinary' day in Uruzgan. The four themes mentioned above were discussed by the answers given by the participants.

4.2.2.1 Operationalization of the short survey

After analyzing the data collected with the interviews, a short survey was made based on statements of the interviewees on the dimensions mentioned above, to compare with the results of the interviews in order to account for the validity of the study. In this survey fifteen items were presented in which (subjective) statements were formulated. The respondents had to rate their agreement with each item on a five-point scale (1: 'not at all agree' to 5: 'absolutely agree'). Positively and negatively worded items were formulated. The survey was sent to the respondents directly or provided by their senior officers by an email-link. They were asked not to deliberate with other respondents, so the answers would be entirely their own. The total survey included 40 items.

After a section of questions about background variables, items were presented about several important constructs that were part of the themes of this study mentioned earlier: 1)

trust in the other unit, 2) risk perception, 3) perception of the mission area, 4) the mission, 5) cooperation and contact with the other unit, 6) information sharing, and 7) group identity. An example of an item about risk perception is: *'The situation in Uruzgan -during my mission- was very dangerous'*. An example of an item about trust in the other unit, is: *'I trusted the other unit was professional'*. Perception of the mission area was measured by items like: *'The Afghan people I came in contact with could be trusted.'* and *'During the mission my level of trust in the Afghan people decreased.'* Judgments about the mission were measured with items like: *'The mission was successful.'* About cooperation and contact items were formulated like: *'I had social contact with people of the other unit.'* and *'The cooperation between PRT and Battle Group went well.'* An example of an item after information sharing is *'I was often not informed about our goals when we went on patrol.'* Items about group identity dealt with in-group and out-group aspects. An example of an item of this construct is: *'One could say between Battle Group and PRT a feeling of team spirit was present'*.

After the data of both the interviews and the survey was analyzed, one member of both units was approach and asked to perform a member check. The conclusions drawn from the results were put to their evaluation. Distinctions between their opinion and the conclusions were compared with the knowledge available from other academic researches. Additions to and explanations of the findings were noted as well.

4.3   Data analysis

After the interview sessions, the recordings of the interviews were completely transcribed for the narrative analysis. A narrative analysis can be used to understand transcripts of in-depth interviews. The emphasis is on interpretation of what is said and the context in which it is said, or as Patton (2002) formulates: '[narrative analysis is about] understanding lived experience and perceptions of experience.' (Patton, 2002, p.115). According to Patton interpretations of narratives can help understand and illuminate the life and culture that created the respondent's narrative (Patton, 2002).

To ascribe meaning to the stories told, all that was said during the interview sessions was recorded and transcribed afterwards. Subsequently, the stories were segmented, interpreted and coded. These codes were placed in matrices, to compare the answers of the participants and to draw conclusions out of the interviews. The codes are no literal responses but were filtered from what the respondent had said and what he had meant with it. Some of the codes were used for more than one respondent, which means all these respondents made a similar remark. Appendix III and IV contain the matrices regarding the responses of

PRT members and members of the Battle Group respectively. In the matrices the codes were analyzed and categorized on the following themes:

- Background, containing remarks about rank, Task Force and function;
- Trust, containing remarks about the evaluation of trust and its determinants;
- Cooperation, containing remarks about the evaluation of cooperation with the other unit, the determinants, and remarks about information sharing;
- The mission area, containing remarks about risk perception, the mission and the Afghan people;
- Group dynamics, containing remarks about group identity, and stereotypes of PRT and Battle Group.

The data collected with the short survey were statistically analyzed, however, since the size of the sample was small, the data were only analyzed on differences in means between Battle Group and PRT. Although the independent sample T-test might suggest a significant difference between the two units one should be careful with interpreting these results. The main research method in this study was the narrative analysis of the interviews from which the result may or may not be supported by the findings from the survey.

After the analysis of the data, collected by the interviews and the survey, the results and conclusions were presented to a PRT mission team commander to verify the conclusions drawn from the data collection.

4.4 Validity and reliability

This study, like any other academic research, needs to confront validity and reliability issues. The quality of the results depends on the quality of the observations. The quality of the observations, in turn, depends on the quality of the operationalization of the study variables. In this paragraph reliability and validity in respect to this study are discussed. First the distinction between reliability and validity will be made, after which these two issues will be discussed in more detail in regard to this specific study.

Reliability deals with the replicate-ability of the study. To test reliability one can ask the following question: will the same results be found by other researchers when the study is repeated? This means that random errors are prevented from occurring in a study which is qualified reliable, which does not mean they are entirely excluded from the study. Reliability refers to the 'extent to which a measure reflects systematic or dependable sources of variation rather than random error.' (Dooley, 2001; p. 350). In qualitative research the term

imitation is often used instead of replicate-ability, as the study can not be performed exactly the same by other researchers, since interviewing respondents a second time is different because there was a first time already (Wester & Peters, 2004). To account for the reliability of the study (meaning it can be imitated by other researchers), transparency about all research aspects is necessary. Thus, the study was conducted in a way it can be repeated easily by other researchers, and to account for transparency the procedures and methods used in this study were described.

Validity refers to the 'extent to which a measure reflects the intended phenomenon.' (Dooley, 2001; p. 352). Therefore systematic errors are the main issue regarding the validity of a study. In this study internal and external validity were important to consider because other types of validity (construct, and statistical inference validity) are not appropriate in qualitative research. Internal validity refers to threats within the study that may have effected the outcome whereas external validity refers to the generalization of the results (Dooley, 2001; Wester, 1987; Smaling, 1987).

In this study certain threats to internal validity must be acknowledged. In a qualitative research the researcher easily gets involved in the situation, which by some is seen as a threat to the validity because the researcher might become biased (Dooley, 2001). Others, on the other hand, believe this involvement and naturalness to reduce disruption of the setting and group under study, and is therefore positive to reach non-reactivity (Dooley, 2001). A threat of involvement is 'going native': a researcher leaves his role of neutral observer and becomes a committed member in the setting, meaning he has become immersed in the setting and may well adopt the perspective of the key informants although it is important for the validity for him to hold on to outsiders skepticism (Dooley, 2001). By being aware of this possible problem, a large part of the problem is dissolved. To dissolve this problem even further other researchers were asked to verify the conclusions drawn from the results.

Since this study focuses on one case, generalization of the findings is restricted. This, in turn, does not have a positive effect on the external validity. While the case is very specific, the same results will not be found when this study is conducted in another situation. However, the results also reflect more general problems regarding trust in organizational contexts. This means that analytic generalization – generalization by means of theory – is possible: when the preconditions are similar the outcome of this study can be used in other situations (Swanborn, 1996). Therefore are the results of this study useful for other military missions as well. The description of the situation will never be exactly the same in regard to other mission areas, but the fundamental aspects relevant for trust in the mission area are applicable to other mission areas as well.

To confront other validity threats various remedies were used. One threat was the size of the sample: not every member of all PRT mission teams and all force protection teams of the Battle Group could be asked to participate, so a smaller group had to be selected. This sample of respondents needed to be representative for the entire population, so the respondents were randomly chosen. Triangulation was used as a research strategy to provide for the validity of the results. Three forms of triangulation can be distinguished: data triangulation, method triangulation and researcher triangulation (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). In this study more than one method was used and the data was collected and interpreted by different researchers[xiii].

In this study a theoretical framework was used, based on relevant literature, in which sensitizing concepts were formulated. Sensitizing concepts are used in order to gain insight in the objectified inner perspective of the respondents on the social reality (Wester, et al., 2004). These concepts result in a selection of relevant aspects that can be complemented by other aspects during the study, instead of sticking to the dogmatic rules like those formulated in quantitative research before the data collection takes place. This means that during the entire research period aspects can be added or removed when they seem no longer useful in regard to answering the research question of this study. The sensitizing concepts in this study were explicitly described in chapter three, and formed together a theoretical framework for this study.

[xiii] In some interview sessions more than one researcher participated. During the process of analyzing the data other researchers were asked to give their opinion about the remarks of the respondents, and they were asked to review the results and conclusions drawn from the analyses. The conclusions drawn from the results were put to a member of the PRT, who had been present in the mission area, to conduct an expert check.

5   Results

In this chapter the results of the interviews and survey will be discussed. Several research themes and (sub) research questions were formulated for this study. The results of this study are described by relating the data to these themes and questions.

Both the analyses of the interviews and of the survey responses are described. Because the member check did not render new insights in the situation (both checks yielded nothing but additions and illustrations of what was already recognized from the interviews and survey), its results are not explicitly described in this chapter.

The interviews were transliterated, after which the reactions of the participants were coded. In Appendix III and Appendix IV one can find the matrices containing the codes of the reactions of the participants. In this chapter the reactions are summarized and categorized into the themes that were drawn from academic theories. The responses of the survey were statistically analyzed[xiv], and are presented integrated in the different themes as well.

This chapter is structured in the following way: in the first section of this chapter the respondents of both the interviews and the survey are described. Subsequently the different themes are analyzed on a group level which means the reactions of the respondents are grouped in sections separating the Provincial Reconstruction Team from the Battle Group. By separating PRT from Battle Group one can see how the two units differ in their opinion about the different topics.

5.1   Respondents

Twenty-one soldiers participated in the interview sessions (twenty male, one female). All participants were soldiers of the Netherlands Royal Army. Ten participants had been part of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, eleven of the Battle Group. Of the PRT, six participants joined Task Force Uruzgan 1 (TF-U 1), four were in Uruzgan during TF-U 2. Of the Battle Group four participants were in Uruzgan during TF-U 1, six participants were in Uruzgan during TF-U 2.

The survey was returned by nineteen soldiers (eighteen male, one female). The respondents were all members of the Royal Netherlands Army just like the respondents of the interview sessions. Ten respondents were member of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, nine were Battle Group soldiers. Most respondents had been in Uruzgan during TF-U 2: fourteen (73.7%) against five (26.3%) during TF-U 1.

[xiv] Because there was only a small amount of respondents who returned the survey, significant differences between Battle Group and PRT should not be interpreted totally reliable. The analyses gives a possible outcome which supports – or not – the outcome of the interviews.

5.2 Cooperation

Trust is needed to cooperate but cooperation is also needed to reach a higher level of trust. Without cooperation between Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team the mission in Uruzgan can not be completed. So cooperation is an important factor in the mission area. One research question formulated was *'What opinion do the soldiers have about the cooperation and interactions with the other unit?'*. A second aspect of much importance in cooperation is the way information is shared between the two units. Sharing information is important to take the right decisions and to cooperate well. As well, sharing information can be seen as an indicator of trust: when the other party is trusted more information will be shared. The second research question formulated concerning this theme was: *'Do the units share the information they have?'*

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Overall the opinion of the respondents was positive about cooperation with the Battle Group. As can be seen in the matrix none of the interviewees evaluated the cooperation negatively. According to them synergy between Battle Group and PRT emerged especially during patrols. One of the respondents claimed: *'…synergy was optimal during the patrol missions, when PRT and Battle Group went out together. During the days they were away from the base they where constantly confronted with each other. So they have no choice but to fine-tune their wishes with each other, and share their information. […] Everyone knew about each others doings and plans.'* This probably has to do with the effect of intense experiences (for example an encounter with suicide bombers, or an ambush) and the uncertainty of upcoming danger both units share when they are off camp.

According to the respondents good cooperation was determined by several conditions. For one, good cooperation was more or less secured when Battle Group and PRT were located on the same base in the Netherlands and therefore had known each other already before taking part in the mission. This can be concluded because respondents who had known the other party on forehand seemed more positive about cooperation than those who had to learn the other party in the integration training period and during the mission. This influence can be explained by the familiarity[xv] effect, which is found in other academic studies as well (see for example: Horenczyk et al., 1997). Because the soldiers had known each other already from before the mission, they were aware of each others skills and drills and had known each others 'culture' and background. This becoming familiar accounts for the improving cooperation when time passes and when the SUAs do not change of structure much. Because of this familiarity, mutual understanding gets established leading to better

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[xv] Familiarity refers in this study to the units knowing each others skills and drills, to being aware of each others (organizational) culture, and to knowing 'who is who', which means they know the faces and people of the other unit and are aware of personal habits and way of working.

cooperation. The familiarity effect was mentioned by all PRT respondents, although some gave different examples on how to become familiar with the other unit. Familiarity was not present between all parts of the different units in the beginning of the mission. One of the respondents told he had spent much of his time in the initiation phase of the mission explaining to soldiers of the Battle Group who 'those PRT-guys' were and what their task was. The time the two units had spent together in the training weeks previous to the mission thus seems insufficient to entirely develop familiarity. Familiarity seems insufficient for especially the low ranking officers and the soldiers, because they did not spend much time in the mission area and during the training weeks together at all. The same issue regarding familiarity appears between the soldiers coming from different military bases in The Netherlands. Positive determinants for developing familiarity seem to be the same original base location of both units in The Netherlands, the integration training period, interaction during the mission, and intense contact and shared experiences for example during a patrol. Besides the positive effect they have on familiarity do life threatening situations lead into better cooperation, simply because of the fact that teamwork is important for the survival of the unit members. This effect of life-threatening situations on cooperation can be found in much academic literature (see for example Forsyth, 1999). When the units were sent of together on patrol, the low ranking officers and soldiers did not have much contact with soldiers from the other unit in the SUA.

Another important condition in cooperation is information sharing. One of the respondents put it like this: *'Information and communication are motivation.'* This means that only when PRT and Battle Group are aware of each others plans, when they agree on responsibility issues and share the information they get from their own intelligence sections they will cooperate well and will be more motivated to complete the mission. The interviewees agree information was well shared between the units, for example in briefings and planning meetings: six respondents say information was well shared, the remaining four are positive about meetings, briefings and contact.

A problem concerning information sharing seemed to be the organizational structure of the intelligence cells in the Task Force. According to the respondents of both Battle Group and PRT there were too many different cells providing an information overload. Half of the PRT members mentioned this problem which made it difficult for the commanding officers to filter the right information and this lead in some cases to mistakes and wrong decision making, fortunately with no disastrous endings. Although this problem is related to information sharing, the core of the problem lies in the organizational structure and has nothing to do with the evaluation of information sharing between the two units. Nevertheless this problem should not remain unnoticed.

The PRT members mentioned several conditions of direct influence with a negative effect on cooperation: they had bad experiences with the rotation procedure (see paragraph 2.5) because of this procedure Battle Group and PRT did not rotate simultaneously. So PRT and Battle Group did not spent the same amount of time in the mission area[xvi], therefore both units needed to cooperate with two different units during one mission. Four respondents mentioned the rotation procedure being a negatively influencing determinant of cooperation. Another problem occurs because mission teams are not permanently coupled to the same force protection team, so even when the units would rotate simultaneously problems regarding cooperation would still occur because the structure of the SUA changes permanently. Only three respondents did not mention this changing structure of the SUA being a barrier for cooperation in the interview sessions. Both aspects, the rotation procedure and changing structure of the SUA, are not beneficial for familiarity and cooperation with the other party, because one does not learn to know any group really well. The respondents of the PRT suggested to work with standard SUA's in which PRT mission teams and Battle Group force protection teams are coupled, and so the same teams work with each other almost every time.

Battle Group

Most respondents from the Battle Group were positive about cooperation with the Provincial Reconstruction Team. As can be seen in the matrix only one of the respondents responded negatively. The soldiers said cooperation, like trust, depends on which PRT mission team they had to work with in a SUA: in one SUA the soldiers work smoothly together but in the other they do not. This is caused, according to more than fifty percent of the Battle Group, by the way one is familiar with the other unit. The level of familiarity is higher when the units' original location in the Netherlands was the same for both units. In addition do the training weeks, and the intense contact which is present during patrols increase the level of familiarity even more. According to Horenczyk et al. (1997) intensive contact provides a solid ground for inter-group processes yielding positive results (Horenczyk et al., 1997). High ranking officers of the Battle Group acknowledge this by saying there were more problems in cooperation in the beginning of their period in the mission area than just before leaving for home. According to the Battle Group working with the PRT is very difficult at first, because the soldiers are not yet totally familiar with each other's skills and drills. But after a while the two units can cooperate well. A problem arises when a new group of PRT members arrives: the whole process of learning to work together starts al over again.

[xvi] In TF-U1 en TF-U2, the PRT spent six months in the mission area whereas Battle Group was present in the mission area for four months.

Like the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team the soldiers of the Battle Group were positive about the communication with one another. Nine of the respondents declared information was well shared, and that they were well informed about the whereabouts and plans of the PRT. During a patrol they had access to intelligence provided to the mission team and were well informed about the goals of the mission team during that patrol, this was especially the case for the high ranking officers, but according to the low ranking officers and soldiers they knew all they needed to know. One of them noted: *'In general we were well informed and had all the information we needed to perform our duties. After all, we didn't need to know more, because knowing more would be dangerous for ourselves and would jeopardize the mission.'*

Six respondents were negative about the way information was provided. Battle Group soldiers agree with the PRT that the structure of the intelligence sections was too complicated, making the information flow chaotic for the commanding officers. Sometimes the Platoon commander had to go 'shopping' down seven intelligence cells, to receive seven different reports about the situation in the mission area, making it hard for him to filter all the important information from the irrelevant and redundant information. One of the respondents of the Battle Group claimed: *'Intelligence was badly organized for such a mission. There were to many cells working next to each other but not with each other. This led to very unsafe and risky situations. Why this happened? Miscommunication, in my group anyway. The information was available but it simply didn't get to us: the guys who needed it on patrol. Well, that almost cost me my life, I took the bullets for this.'*

Thus, comparing the two units, both say they cooperated well, although the Battle Group seems less positive about cooperation than the PRT. This does not mean they do not believe in working together with the PRT members: the Battle Group soldiers just acknowledge the fact that because of the organizational structure in the mission area it becomes difficult to really know the other unit. From the statistical analyses of the survey one may conclude the same thing: the Battle Group is less positive about cooperation than the PRT but both units evaluate cooperation positive ($t(17)=3.45$; $p < 0.01$)[xvii].

Both units agree the most important factor influencing cooperation is familiarity. This familiarity is created through intensive contact, the location the units originally came from in the Netherlands, and the training weeks before the mission. Problematic for familiarity and therefore for cooperation were the changing structure of the SUAs and the rotation procedure; both made it hard for the units to really become familiar with the people they had to work with because these people were never the same.

[xvii] Table one at the end of this chapter reports the survey-construct scores of both units.

Both units are positive about information sharing, see table one (t(17) = .415; p = .683). They say they were informed adequately about the function and goals of the other unit and in the briefings information about the mission and the (upcoming) patrol was shared. Both units were negative about the way the intelligence sections worked and were placed in the organizational structure: every unit had its own intelligence section. So when going on patrol the commanding officer had to go to all of these sections to obtain all available information. This caused an information overload from which the important information had to be filtered. This problem does not influence cooperation directly but the problem was mentioned by both units and was judged very badly.

5.3   Group dynamics

Group dynamics are important to understand a trust-relationship between two different groups. In the SUAs several groups can be distinguished of which the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Battle Group. Two aspects of group dynamics were studied: group identity and stereotyping. Both are described in the following paragraphs.

5.3.1   Group identity

The feeling of belonging to a larger group of people who share your values and with whom you have much in common is important to build a trust-relationship. Regarding group identity the following research question was formulated: *'Was a feeling of group identity and team spirit present between the two units?'*

Provincial Reconstruction Team

It is interesting to see that in the stories of the soldiers the definition of 'we' changes when the context changes. When the respondents refer to the entire mission, 'we' signifies all Dutch soldiers, but mostly 'we' refers to the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. When going on patrol with the Battle group the PRT members feel a bit excluded from the group because they get the feeling the Battle Group does not understand the actions of the PRT. These feelings change and disappear over time: when time passes PRT members feel the Battle Group is aware of the function and mission of the PRT.

On patrol a certain kind of team spirit, according to the PRT members, emerges but on camp the distinction between PRT and Battle Group is sharper as can been seen in the matrix. One of the PRT members said: *'When you are on patrol there is less feeling of difference. Because you can not do anything else but work together. When you are on camp, you have your own group of people, having the same function like that of yours, with whom you need to cooperate, so then you do not see much of the other unit.'*

Battle Group

The members of the Battle Group perceive the members of the PRT being members of another group. For most soldiers of the Battle Group 'we' means the Battle Group itself: six of the respondents refer to the Battle Group when they mention 'we'. The Battle Group perceives itself to be very important: many members say it is necessary for outsiders, like PRT, to maintain good contact with the Battle Group because this is the largest group, and because the Battle Group decides who gets to go along on patrol. According to the respondents the different units work closely together in a team when on patrol, but a real team spirit does not originate because there is too little time. One of the respondents claimed: *'Temporarily you form a team. […] It is impossible to develop a team spirit because on every patrol the SUA is differently designed. So Battle Group and PRT are never a real team. Not because we don't want to be, simply because in this situation it is not possible.'*

From the survey, see table one for the results, one can conclude the following: PRT members are far more positive about the presence of a team spirit (t(17) = 3.02; p < 0.01) than the soldiers of the Battle Group. This could mean the members of the PRT feel they are welcome in the Battle Group team where the Battle Group soldiers are more focused on the differences between the two units leading to a lower score on team spirit. It is interesting to acknowledge that when both mission team and force protection team in a SUA are Manoeuvre elements (e.g. Infantry or Cavalry) problems seem less likely to occur between the two, than when the SUA is designed comprising different parts of the Armed Forces. Some of the Battle Group respondents, for example, told about a Naval officer who was part of a PRT mission team. Although they had great respect for him and he seemed very competent to them, he was not really part of the group. This had to do with the fact that he was not completely familiar with Army drills and skills and *'had never held a Diemaco in his hands before, let alone used one in a shooting.'* Mishler et al. (1997) mentioned this situation, in which someone does not belong to the group but is trusted though, too. Mishler et al. (1997) explained this situation by referring to expertise: according to them the other party is not generally distrusted, but trust is low in this specific situation which is not the other party's expertise. This probably accounts for the fact that the Naval officer was less part of 'the group' than the PRT commanders who were officers in other Army elements and therefore resembled the Battle Group soldiers more.

5.3.2 Stereotyping

Group identity is important for people to cooperate and to build a trust-relationship. Groups consist of people sharing some characteristics. Characteristics that are also used to

stereotype persons who belong to this group. People only want to belong to a certain group when they identify themselves with the other members (and therefore with the shared characteristics and existing stereotypes) of this group. Stereotyping persons, and therefore categorizing them in a certain group, can have a bad influence on working with other groups or trusting other groups of people (Forsyth, 1999). Therefore it is interesting to investigate if stereotypes about each other exist among the two units. The following research question was therefore formulated: *'How do Battle Group and PRT stereotype each other?'*. In the following section the evaluation of the other unit, the existing stereotypes and expected stereotypes of both units are described.

5.3.2-I Perception on the Provincial Reconstruction Team

Provincial Reconstruction Team

According to half of the group of respondents of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, a PRT should be formed of people who are socially and culturally competent because they need to deal with cultural differences and maybe even with a cultural shock when they cooperate with the domestic population. The focus of PRT is on giving aid to the local population, gathering information and initiating aid projects, by some respondents referred to as 'soft approach'. The respondents of the PRT were asked to describe the imago of the PRT they believed to be vivid amongst the soldiers of the Battle Group. Three respondents believe the Battle Group might perceive the PRT being vague and soft - although according themselves they are not -, and being a burden for the soldiers of the Battle Group.

All respondents believe the intentions of the PRT are good but some of them also believe the unit may be a burden to the Battle Group. This is caused by their lack of knowledge of the procedures of the Battle Group and its so called skills and drills. One of the respondents even believed the PRT members are not trained well enough to do this non-fighting task and calls themselves *'well willing amateurs'*. According to some respondents civilian humanitarian aid workers can do the job better. All respondents believe the task they perform is a very important one, but they also mention the fact that the situation in the mission area is often too unsafe for them to go along with the Battle Group on patrol, and that when they do they form a risk for the Battle Group's own safety. So although the PRT members perceive their function and image positively, they feel less positive about their competences as soldiers in comparison with the soldiers of the Battle Group. Four respondents believe the Battle Group soldiers have a negative image of the PRT as well.

Battle Group

The respondents of the Battle Group were asked to describe their perception on the Provincial Reconstruction Team. According to many soldiers of the Battle Group the PRTs' main focus is on establishing contact with the Afghan people and initiating projects. One can see in the matrix that this was mentioned to be the main focus by seven respondents. One of the respondents believes that many simple tasks now performed by PRT officers could be done (better) by the officers of the Battle Group, because the commanding officers of the Battle Group are well know in the mission area by the civilians because they spent more time over there than the PRT mission team. Especially on locations where the situation is non-permissive, Battle Group soldiers believe PRT should better stay away and *'leave the talking to the Platoon Commander of the Battle Group.'* They perceive the PRT necessary for the in-depth (village) assessments though. The respondents do not seem to be very positive about the PRT when it comes to their tasks and the benefit the mission has from them. Five of the Battle Group soldiers suggest it is too early to initiate projects in the mission area with the PRT; they say the situation is too dangerous and the Provincial Reconstruction Team does not have the right risk perception *'they are floating on a pink cloud'*. On the other hand is the Battle Group positive about the PRT as part of the armed forces, as can be seen in the matrix half of the group of soldiers perceives the PRT members as fine soldiers. Although they do not know all the skills and drills the way the Battle Group does, the Battle Group does not see this as a problem: *'We take care of their security. They are well trained competent soldiers, and we know how to handle in risky situations. As long as they let us do our job, their lack of routine in our skills and drills is no problem.'* Mishler et al. (1997) found this phenomenon, in which the overall view on a certain group is positive and the group is trusted although its expertise is not in the area were actions are needed, as well as mentioned in the previous paragraph regarding group identity.

5.3.3-II Perception on the Battle Group

Provincial Reconstruction Team

According to all respondents of the PRT, Battle Group's main task is securing the mission area. They say without them the mission can not be completed. Many members of the PRT agree that the easy PRT tasks, now carried out by PRT officers, can also be carried out by Battle Group commanders. When it comes to complex situations or projects the respondents think the mission team is needed though. One of the respondents claimed: *'One could say we both are already doing PRT tasks, on a different level though. The mission team speaks with the village elderly when at the same time the Battle Group has contact with ordinary people while they secure the area.'*

PRT members have a positive opinion about the Battle Group, but they perceive members of the Battle Group as fundamentally different from themselves. They see the Battle Group as a close group of people, that is more kinetic orientated, more aggressive in its actions and that sees more Taliban-warriors in the local population than the PRT members do themselves. In the matrix this can be found in codes defining the Battle group soldiers like 'fighters'. That the soldiers of the Battle Group are highly respected becomes clear in several reactions of the respondents of which the following is an example: *'They are proud. But they deserve that honor; they didn't get their red baret for nothing.'*

Battle Group

The respondents of the Battle Group agree with the members of the PRT that they are vital for the completion of the mission. One of the respondents called the Battle Group the wheelbarrow of the mission: without safety and security in the mission area which is provided by the Battle Group is it impossible for the other units to finish their tasks. Seven interviewees support this view. All decisions on safety should, according to the interviewees, be made by the commanding officers of the Battle Group in the SUA. According to the respondents their main task is providing security but adjacent tasks, like some PRT tasks, can be performed as well. All interviewees say skills and drills are performed and known better by members of the Battle Group than by any other group of soldiers, but they do not see this as it were a problem. The soldiers of the Battle Group do not believe other units hold certain stereotypes about their group. Though four respondents believe that they are more aggressive than the members of the PRT (see the matrix).

5.4   Perception of the mission area

Perception of the environment is an important factor influencing perceived risks in the mission area. Because of their differing functions the Battle Group and PRT were thought to have different perceptions of the environment and therefore also a different risk perception. The following research question was formulated: *'Do the units differ in their opinion about the mission area on the following aspects: risk perception, trust in the Afghan people, and image and stereotypes regarding the Afghan people?'*. In the following paragraph these three aspects will be discussed.

5.4.1   Risk perception

Provincial Reconstruction Team

All respondents seem optimistic: they all agree risks are present in the entire area, but how much they believe to be in danger depends on the location of the unit and the period of time it already spent in the mission area. According to the respondents the situation on camp is considered relatively safe, but when they are going further away from camp they perceive the environment more risky. According to the members of the PRT there is a real threat, but they think this threat is acceptable. When they have spent more time in Uruzgan, the respondents say they are more used to this level of risk: *'At the start everyone is hyper alert. But after a while you start to recognize risky situations and you are therefore less occupied with risks than in the beginning of the mission. This does not mean though that the threat is no longer present. No, you are just more used to it and know how to deal with it.'*

According to four members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team there is a difference in risk perception between Battle Group and PRT. They think this is because they have different responsibilities and do not have the same knowledge about the environment and Afghan culture. This is because the units do not get the same training before they are deployed into the mission area: PRT gets more lessons to improve cultural awareness whereas Battle Group gets more training in fighting and dealing with aggression and hostility. These differences in training are caused by the differences in responsibility in the mission area: the PRT has a social and humanitarian task as opposed to the protection task of the Battle Group.

This difference in responsibility also accounts for differences in risk perception because Battle Group and PRT are confronted with different situations (because the Battle Group also leaves camp in a SUA without PRT members). One of the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team explained it the following way: *'Of course they react the way they do. They are responsible for our safety. We may think some situations to be safe when they are not, but what do you think: they get in much more shitty situations than we do. They are taught to distrust because otherwise they are not likely to survive.'* According to the members of the PRT they themselves have a more positive view on the mission area but they also acknowledge the fact that they are confronted with less problematic and dangerous situations than the Battle Group which may account for this difference.

Battle Group

According to the entire Battle Group (see matrix) risks are everywhere and the soldiers perceive the situation in the mission area as being dangerous. They say they are suspicious of all Afghans because Taliban fighters can not be distinguished from ordinary Afghan citizens. As another problem the Battle Group soldiers mention the fact that they are never certain about the role of the Afghan people: someone can be friend and enemy at the same time (this will be explained in the paragraph about the Afghan people). The respondents

declared they look for certain signs to make a calculation of the risks in a certain situation. For example children and women being absent or leaving the village is a bad sign. The interviewees also say they pay much attention to the reactions of the interpreters, whom the forces do not trust because they do not know to whom the interpreters are loyal to, but who can be seen as indicators of upcoming danger: when the interpreters do not want to enter a certain area one should be more alert because it is very likely the opposing military forces (OMF) are about to undertake actions against the troops here.

Illustration 4 Perceived risk reduces when women and children are present.

The respondents, like the members of the PRT, say that when they have spent more time in the mission area they start to know how to deal with the risks and feel less unsafe. They agree with the PRT this does not mean that the situation has become less dangerous. When further away from camp the situation becomes more risky because the situation there is unknown. As well, according to five respondents, some areas are more dangerous than others. The members of the Battle Group claim they are always alert because the attitude of the people towards the Dutch soldiers can change any minute.

The conclusions drawn from the interviews are also supported by the responses of the survey. Both units agree the situation is not safe at all, but the members from the Provincial Reconstruction Team seem in general a bit more optimistic. They perceive the environment less risky than the Battle Group ($t(17) = 2.47$; $p < 0.05$) and are more positive about the situation in the mission area in general ($t(16) = 2.23$; $p < 0.05$), as is shown in table one. This could be explained by the fact that the Battle Group gets involved in more dangerous and hostile situations which may have influenced their perception of the entire mission area.

5.4.2 The Afghan people

Provincial Reconstruction Team
According to the members of the PRT it is never quite clear who is OMF or an 'ordinary' civilian. This uncertainty is created for example because of clothing: OMF does not wear uniforms, and therefore cannot be distinguished from 'ordinary' civilians. Another identification problem arises because the Afghan National Police does not always wear their uniform, making it difficult for the allied forces to distinguish, between full garmented people, OMF from Afghan National Police. To distinguish the Afghan soldiers and policemen from ordinary people and the opponent in battle they were asked to wear red-white striped ribbons around their arms.

According to the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team one can cooperate with the Afghan people, but one should not entirely trust them because one never knows their possible hidden agenda. The members of the PRT rely on the hospitality of the people and all the acts featuring this hospitality as a result of the rules of the Pashtunwhali. One of the respondents described the influence of the Pashtunwhali the following way: *'When I enter a house, I ask for hospitality. A Pashtun is obligated to give me that and is thereby responsible for my safety. So as long as I am on his property he will serve me tea and nothing bad will happen. But, when I am leaving his property he could betray and even harm me. Then I am no longer his responsibility and he is no longer obligated to follow the rules of the Pashtunwhali in order to keep his honour.'*

According to the respondents the Afghan people have become the way they are because of the history of the country. The people have become harsh, and they choose the side of the winner or the strongest because they want to survive. One of the respondents said: *'One can not trust anyone. […] I believe that even though they are friendly you should never trust them. You should always wonder, "why are they this friendly?". But sometimes it is simply impossible to not work with someone you don't have a good vibe about, the local leaders for example, carrying a Kalashnikov and escorted by a small private army. You can not not work with them. You start with small projects, to see how he acts. Then you can find out if he is only helping his own kin or if he also cares to help the people outside his inner circle.'* According to the members of the PRT their clan and family is most important to the Afghan people, and that is where their loyalty is. This can also be found in literature about Afghanistan; see for example Ewans (2002).

The respondents state that it is possible to cooperate with the Afghan people but only when one is aware of the other's interests and background. According to five PRT members the Battle Group sees in the Afghan people more an enemy than the PRT does, especially when the units had spent more time in the mission area and were involved in TICs[xviii]. One of the respondents said: *'One notices more aggression when a platoon has encountered trouble several times. This shouldn't occur, but it is natural after four months. Everyone gets more numb. Myself included; the first time I saw a child walking around in dust with no shoes on I thought it was very sad. After a few months I didn't even notice it anymore.'* The Afghan officials are not positively evaluated by the PRT: according to the interviewees the officials do not represent the role model they are supposed to; four of the respondents describe the Afghan army and police as badly trained, corrupt and aggressive. Cooperation with officials is like with the ordinary civilians, according to the members of the mission teams, difficult because of the possible hidden interests of the other party. All respondent think cooperation

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[xviii] TIC = troops in contact, such as an ambush or other manors of confrontation with hostility

is doable when one is aware of the possible problems one may encounter in this cooperation.

Battle Group

All members of the Battle Group do not trust the Afghan people at all, as noted in the matrix. Where the PRT believes in the goodness of the people and believes the people are trustworthy because they live by the rules of the Pashtunwhali, the Battle Group has a more negative view on the Afghan people. For example: five respondents of the Battle Group said the contact with the Afghan people creates a strange feeling: only when the Dutch can help them the Afghans pretend to be their friend. Like the members of the PRT mission teams do the Battle Group soldiers say one never knows where the loyalty of the people, and not even of the Afghan National Police or soldiers of the Afghan National Army, lies. According to the Battle Group the people are not interested in their country and only live for their own wellbeing, according to six of the respondents are corruption and hidden interests examples of this. Three of the respondents on the other hand said they were mainly positive about cooperation and contact with the Afghan people, but they acknowledged the fact that this is hard to reach in the current situation of corruption as well. According to one of the respondents the ordinary people want the system to change. This was declared as well by Barakat (2004), Barfield (2005) and Ewans (2002). One of the respondents gave the following example to explain the complex situation the people and the armed forces are in: *'One day we were in a village talking to a very friendly man whose son was member of the Afghan National Police. The next day we had to search a house, because a young man was suspected of being a Taliban recruit. The young man turned out to be one, but what surprised us was that his house was owned by the man we had talked to the day before. The nice man was the father of this Taliban recruit. We didn't understand how this could be, but the father explained the situation to us. He said he didn't want to lose both his sons, so because only one of the parties can win he had spread his chances on both sides: one on the side of Karzai and one on the side of the Taliban. This way he would always keep one son alive.'* The soldiers of the Battle Group say they understood the actions and the way of living of the Afghan people better when they had spent more time in the mission area, simply because they had gained more experience with them.

In sum, both units note the difficulty they have to determine who is friend or opponent amongst the Afghan people. This is not a new problem occurring in warfare: for example Van der Kloet (2006), described the same problem in which ordinary civilians could not be distinguished from the opposing forces. In Uruzgan this has to do with the fact that the opposing forces do not wear uniforms and are therefore not recognizable as such. But they

are not the only ones not wearing uniforms: the Afghan National Policemen do not wear their uniform all the time either. So someone walking around in full garment could be a Taliban warrior or a policeman.

Interestingly most of the interviewees do not like the way the Afghan people act, but they also say that they understand their reasons to act the way they do. Both units refer to the system and history of the country accounting for this situation. One of the respondents even said: *'Of course it is not nice when the Afghan people cheat on us, but I understand why they do it. Probably, I would have done the same.'*

5.4.3   The mission

Provincial Reconstruction Team

All respondents of the PRT mention reconstruction or helping the Afghan people to be the goal of the mission. As shown in the matrix all respondents are positive about how the mission is carried out, although they acknowledge the fact that there is hardly any progress: the situation in Uruzgan changes very slowly. The lower ranking officers are more unsure about the completion of the mission will be completed successfully eventually: they mention the fact that the only successes made are short-term projects and that even these successes can be used to have a negative effect on the outcome of the mission. E.g., it sometimes happened that after a project was ended successfully the OMF demolished it during the night.

Battle Group

Soldiers of the Battle Group agree with the PRT members about what the mission goal should be: reconstructing the country, as one can see in the matrix. All respondents, but two, said progress is very slow, and some of them thought it is too soon to start with reconstruction. One of the respondents declared: *'It worked, in some places. But we hardly made any progress. […] To the city, that was where we could bring the PRT. But more up north… it's not the right time yet. The people are more Taliban-minded over there. We were being shot at over there, so no place for a PRT mission team to go to. That was absolutely useless.'* Another remarked: *'I completely support the mission. Even though progress is hard to find. We really made a difference. Even when during the entire mission only one family is helped, or only one school is rebuilt giving the children a chance for a better future, our mission helped the reconstruction of the country. That's my opinion. […] I definitely believe I was there reconstructing.'* The respondents agree that the situation is too instable to bring all

PRT tasks to an end, they acknowledge that the Battle Group was more important than it should have been.

One can conclude both units are positive about the tasks they have completed and goals they have accomplished. Both agree that they have done everything possible to complete the mission successfully. Although some small projects worked out well, none of the respondents believe this mission can be completed soon, when possible to complete it at all. Most of the respondents believe this mission needs more than ten years to come close to completion. One of the respondents concluded: *'You can use construction as a metaphor for reconstruction: but in Afghanistan we are not yet placing the fundament of the house, we are still busy mixing the cement.'*

5.5 Trust

The main theme of this study was trust between the two units of Task Force Uruzgan. The research question posed in chapter one was the following: *Do the dimensions, cooperation, perception of the mission area and group dynamics, have an effect on the trust relationship between Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team participating in Task Force Uruzgan?* Having the dimensions explored in the paragraphs above, leaves trust for the final analyses.

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Almost all respondents of the PRT are positive about the trust relation with the soldiers of the Battle Group. In chapter three, three antecedents (ability, benevolence and integrity) of the trustworthiness of an other party were discussed. The respondents mention several determinants of trust which can be grouped into one of these three antecedents. Ability seems to be an important determinant in the mission area: four respondents refer to this one by mentioning professionalism or competence. All respondents believe the Battle Group is well trained competent and professional. So the ability-factor is a difficult point to intervene in order to reach a higher level of trust between the units because the perception of the PRT on the Battle Group's ability is already fine.

The second antecedent: benevolence, referring to the good intentions of the other party, seems to be available and important in the mission area as well. This means members of the PRT believe the members of the Battle Group want to do good. On integrity, the third antecedent, the respondents also scored high: they believe the values of Battle Group and PRT to be alike. None of the respondents referred explicitly to the second and third antecedent, but they mentioned determinants necessary to establish an opinion about

benevolence and integrity. For example familiarity was mentioned by eight respondents as an important determinant of trust. Familiarity gets established by social contact, the location of the original bases in the Netherlands of the two units, the training period, and intense shared experiences on patrol such as an attack. This means that when no interactions take place and when there is little social contact, familiarity is not established and the PRT members can not form an opinion about the benevolence and integrity of the Battle Group, making it hard for them to trust other unit. Because trust is evaluated positive and the respondents say they were familiar with the other unit, one might expect benevolence and integrity to be high. A barrier to establish familiarity was, according to eight respondents, the changing structure of the SUA which also influenced cooperation badly. The respondents believe consistency in the structure of the SUAs is better to become familiar with the other unit leading to better cooperation and to a higher level of trust.

Battle Group

Most respondents evaluated the trust-relationship positive while the rest was more neutral. The respondents believe the PRT members to be professional. This was mentioned explicitly by five respondents, but they also acknowledge the fact that the PRT has another expertise making them less familiar with the skills and drills that are needed in times of trouble, like during an attack. Just like for the PRT, familiarity with the other unit seems to be the most important factor for interpersonal trust according the Battle Group. Six members refer to this determinant regarding its influence. According to the respondents the level of trust gets higher when more intense contact takes place and the units share the same intense experiences (for example during a patrol in a hostile and dangerous environment). The changing structure of the SUAs is seen as a barrier for familiarity to establish according to two members of the Battle Group. Problems in trust occur when personalities do not match, but not because the entire other unit is distrusted.

In sum both Battle Group and PRT evaluate trust between them positively, saying familiarity is the most determinant for trust. Familiarity gets established by intense and social contact, for example during a patrol or on the base in The Netherlands. One may also conclude trust gets higher when time passes. This happens because after the units have spent more time together they are more familiar with each other while they had more moments of interaction. From the survey one may conclude that trust in the ability of the other unit is evaluated positively as well, the results show the PRT members are more positive than the soldiers of the Battle Group.

Table 1 Scores of PRT and Battle Group on survey-constructs

	t-score	p-score	PRT Mean	PRT SD	Battle Group Mean	Battle Group SD
Cooperation	3.45 **	.003	4.30	.33	3.33	.82
Group identity (existence of a team spirit)	3.02 **	.008	4.00	.47	2.89	1.05
Perception of the mission area	2.23 *	.04	3.36	.42	2.64	.88
Perceived safety (absence of risks)	2.47 *	.02	2.73	.63	1.97	.70
Information sharing	.415	.683	3.95	.72	3.83	.45
Trust in ability	2.51 *	.01	4.30	.15	3.22	.40

The scores go from 1: demonstrating a bad evaluation, to 5: demonstrating a positive evaluation.

* $p < .05$ / ** $p < .01$

	t-score	p-score	PRT Mean	PRT SD	Battle Group Mean	Battle Group SD

6   Discussion

This research focused on the trust relationship between units deployed in the Afghan province of Uruzgan. Several dimensions of influence on trust relationships in a mission area have been investigated: cooperation, group dynamics and perception of the mission area. The previous chapter described how both Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team evaluated these dimensions and how the two units differed in their opinion. This chapter focuses on the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. This chapter also discusses what the limitations of this study are and what restrictions may exist in the data set.

6.1   Conclusion & implications

The goal of this study as formulated in chapter one was to obtain insight in the trust relationship between the Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan participating in a Smallest Unit of Action, in order to distinguish possible threats to the cooperation of the two units. This study was meant to render practical implications on how trust and cooperation issues in a mission area can be improved, and to contribute theoretical implications on how existing academic research can be applied in the military environment.

One can conclude that the units share a positive opinion about each other in general. The force protection team of the Battle Group and mission team of the PRT maintain a high level of trust between them. The units conclude that the trust relationship is better when they have spent more time together having (intense) contact. This corresponds with the so called 'contact hypothesis' which proposes that contact with members of another group will lead (in certain circumstances) to the growth of liking and respecting for the other group (Horenczyk, et. al., 1997). Conditions in which people are more vulnerable and risks are high (like on patrol in the mission area), lead eventually to more cautious and preventive behaviour but also to a higher level of trust between groups when combined actions had positive consequences (Lapidot, et. al., 2007). Thus, the dangerous conditions on patrol are likely to cause the high level of trust within the SUA.

Another conclusion is that trust within the SUA is higher than the level of trust between the members of the SUAs and the members of the so called *'base-tigers'*: the soldiers staying on camp during the entire mission. According to the members of the SUAs more conflicts exist between them and the 'base-tigers', than between force protection teams and mission teams, because they do not have a similar view of the environment and do not have the same risk perception. This conclusion can be supported by what is described by De Sitter, (2000) about commitment and involvement to persons of another group. Although the formal tasks of Battle Group and PRT distinguish themselves, the roles of the soldiers out on patrol are more or less similar: both units need to fulfill both PRT and fighting tasks be it with

a difference in intensity. De Sitter (2000) claims this task integration enlarges the commitment and involvement between two groups. This changing of roles not only explains why the perception between SUA-members does not fundamentally differ, but also how it can be possible that the so called base-tigers and the SUA-members differ in their perception of the mission area. Since the base-tigers do not share the same experiences as the SUA members and do not switch in role, a larger distinction evolves between them and the soldiers of the patrolling units than within the SUAs themselves.

Problems occurring within the SUAs are mostly related to interpersonal problems between members who do not like each other and therefore do not want to cooperate. According to the units conflicts are not present on a group level. Causes for interpersonal problems may be the ranking of the soldiers and the desire to be promoted to a higher rank. Forsyth (1999) claims competition which is caused by the pursuit of personal goals leads to conflicts that are counter productive for cooperation. Responsibility, as well, seems to be one of the major issues for arguments between – the commanding officers of – the two units. According to the soldiers of the Battle Group they are responsible for the safety of all soldiers in the Task Force when they are not on camp. The Provincial Reconstruction Team does not completely agree with this assumption though: according to the members of the mission team they are responsible for their own safety upon arrival on the location were PRT tasks are supposed to be carried out, meaning they can make their own decisions regarding safety. Although they admit they are not as well trained in the skills and drills like the Battle Group soldiers, the members of the PRT mission teams believe their risk perception is correct and they are therefore allowed to make decisions regarding the responsibility for their own safety. The commanding officers of the force protection teams of the Battle Group disagree on this matter. This disagreement only poses a problem when both commanding officers perceive risks differently (for example: the platoon commander of the Battle Group wants to leave the location because he thinks it is not safe and the PRT mission team commander wants to stay because according to him there are no real threats). This could pose a problem since the commanding officer of the force protection team has a lower rank than the mission team commander but is officially in charge of the entire SUA. As most of the respondents argue: it is best to make agreements about safety and responsibility issues before the SUA leaves camp. This clears the situation for everyone, thereby reducing the chance of developing risky situations, in which commanding officers argue about each others competence. Another benefit of these agreements on forehand is the fact that a higher level of trust is assured, while the two parties agree on each others methods of operation (Langfred, 2007).

An important factor of influence in the mission area seems to be familiarity. Because of familiarity the units cooperate better, perceive each other as being part of the same group, and trust each other more. Most researchers believe expectations of the other party's actions are important in a trust relationship and therefore too in cooperation. These expectations are formed by previous encounters both parties had and lead into a certain amount of familiarity (Mayer et al., 1995; Van der Kloet, 2006). The Royal Armed Forces organize an integration training period before the units leave for the mission area to improve familiarity between the units and to let them learn each others skills and drills. This integration training period is much needed because the organizational structure of Task Force Uruzgan is completely different from the organizational structure of the Dutch Armed Forces. Therefore, the units need to train with each other to get acquainted with each other's skills and drills. This period is too short however, to really get familiar with each other. So when already present in the mission area the units need to continue building on familiarity and trust as well. Only when the units trust each other cooperation will be nearly flawless.

Familiarity is not easily developed in the mission area. It is influenced by the amount of contact the units have, which was already referred to, regarding the contact hypothesis mentioned above (Horenczyk et al., 1997; Lapidot, et al., 2007). In TF-U 1 there was little contact because of the geographical location of the PRT on Camp Holland (Tarin Kowt): both units were placed far off each other, which prohibited social contact and made it difficult to attend each others meetings and briefings. Besides geographical location the structure of the SUA is important as well. In TF-U 1 and TF-U 2 the structure of the SUA changed with every patrol: mission teams and force protection teams were not coupled, so in every patrol the soldiers had to deal with different people. In Deh Rawod only one mission team was present, causing it to be known by all Battle Group soldiers and making it easier to become familiar. According to the units resulted this situation in Deh Rawod in good cooperation and trust because they were familiar with each other, each other's way of working and each other's habits. This corresponds with findings from previous studies (what was found in other studies) on trust in an organizational context (Mayer et al., 1995; Langfred, 2007). Many respondents argued that for Tarin Kowt the structure of the SUA should also be consistent, keeping mission teams and force protection teams coupled. To reach this consistency both units should also adjust their geographical classification of the area to each others classification.

It is best to adjust this geographical classification of the mission area to one another. In TF-U1 and TF-U2 the geographical boundaries of the mission teams did not match the boundaries of the force protection teams which meant both units had to cooperate with several different teams of the other unit instead of one. This may have caused problems regarding familiarity: the units were not permanently coupled with the same teams making it

it difficult to become familiar with each other and the individuals had to deal with more different personalities, habits and ways of working than necessary.

It was supposed that because of their differing functions and their differing tasks, the units would not agree on the mission goal and would not have the same perception concerning the environment, letting this disagreement lead to distrust (Langfred, 2007). Although the tasks of Battle Group soldiers and PRT members are different, distrust was not experienced within the SUAs. This may be explained by the fact that the units spent much time together away from the camp, in a hostile environment, where they both were confronted with the same complex and terrifying situations. Another explanation can be found in the theory of De Sitter which states that when tasks are integrated (which happens when PRT and Battle Group are on patrol) both parties will become more committed and involved with each other and therefore will bear resemblance in their perception of the surrounding (De Sitter, 2000). This commitment and involvement with persons of the other unit occurred within the SUAs, which is shown for example by the fact that the internal organization capacity between PRT and Battle Group commanders increased.

Although there are some small differences in their perception of the mission area, it is interesting to note that both Battle Group and PRT say the situation is not secure and that the domestic population can not be trusted completely. Though they both believe the other unit perceives the mission area completely different. The Battle Group for example says the members of the PRT members do not have a realistic perception because they are *'floating on a pink cloud'* and therefore do not see the risks surrounding them. The PRT members, on the other hand state that the Battle group is more aggressive and does not understand the behavior of the Afghan people. It is interesting to see that the members of the Battle Group say they do not like the actions undertaken by the Afghan people but understand why they are undertaken.

The units agreed the way the Task Force is structured is not beneficial for the mission: the organizational structure, as already noted, totally differs from the way the Armed Forces are organized in The Netherlands. One of the respondents noted: *'I think, the way the organization is structured is very strange to start with. It is very artificial. I oppose to the separation of Battle Group and PRT. […] We are there to reach the same goal and need to work together to get there, so why split us up and make the situation more complex?'* Keeping PRT and Battle Group integrated possibly makes decision-making easier, reduces the responsibility problems that could turn up between the commanding officers, and makes the chaotic information flow from the different intelligence sections into one stream of information from one section. Benefit of an integrated unit would be that – besides the

commitment that emerges to both tasks (to both securing and reconstructing) as claimed by the respondents and supported by organizational theories (De Sitter, 2000) – familiarity is easier to reach, it is profitable for the logistics, and redundant functions can be removed giving the possibility to assign more people to the units that are needed most and have to deal with problems of filling all jobs (for example the force protection teams are in need for more members).

Integrating the two units into one, could also create several problems though. First, the distinction between the units might be necessary. When the soldiers are involved in both securing and reconstructing the mission area, a situation is created in which the soldiers do not achieve expertise in one area but are only generally trained to perform tasks. Second, when both units are integrated a problem arises in regard to the time spent in the mission area. Because of the physically demanding tasks they perform, the Battle Group spends four months in the mission area whereas the PRT spends six months in the mission area. Integrating the two units into one, would mean that all soldiers need to rotate after four months because doing otherwise would not physically be possible. This would become a problem however, because in this situation the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces do not have enough troops to deploy in the mission area and the troops available are sent more often to the front, leaving them less time to recover well.

A third problem involves the trust relationship and cooperation with the domestic population. When two units are present (one for fighting and one for reconstruction) the domestic population may have gained certain expectations which are profitable for the relationship between them and the soldiers: they know the faces of the soldiers and understand to what group of soldiers they belong. The categorization in groups in the current situation is clearer for the domestic population: there are soldiers for reconstruction projects and soldiers for fighting. This 'thinking in faces' reduces uncertainty for the domestic population making it easier for them to find their way in the organizational structure of the SUA making it easier for both parties to cooperate.

Integration of one section of the armed forces might be profitable nevertheless. Integration of all existing intelligence sections seems necessary and an improvement for internal communication: commanding officers of both units do not have to go 'shopping' along all the different intelligence sections leaving them with an information overload, too much details and redundant information. By integrating these intelligence cells, instead of keeping up the cold-war-mentality, the commanding officers can be provided with exactly that information they need because the information flow is tailored after the specific need.

At first glance the organizational structure may seem the best place to initiate changes for improving the situation in the mission area: to create a higher level of trust and to improve

cooperation. But as mentioned above it is not necessarily better to integrate both units into one and changing the existing rotation procedure might not turn out to be useful at all. The rotation of units in TF-U1 and TF-U2 was not simultaneously which caused problems to gain familiarity. On the other hand, the current rotation procedure assures the continuity of the mission by having a unit present which is acquainted with the situation and people in the area. Another benefit is the fact that because of this rotation procedure the domestic population also keeps some 'familiar faces' and the units do not need to ask the same basic questions because the information is still available within the Task Force. Asking the locals the same basic questions over and over again is not supposed to happen because the forces loose their credibility and trustworthiness for the locals because of this. So this also means that when a new unit arrives into the mission area it needs to be trained well, to prevent mistakes of this kind from happening.

What are the implications of the conclusions drawn from this study for the Task Force and for the theoretical framework used and described in chapter two? The results of this study on the Battle Group and the PRT, endorse the theoretical framework as it was described in chapter two. All aspects thought to be of relevance in the trust relationship between the two units were examined. In cooperation and trust the same aspects were found as mentioned in academic literature and found in other studies in organizational contexts (see for example: Mayer, et al., 1995; Horenczyk et al., 1997): intensive contact, familiarity (by previous encounters and the integration training period for example) and good communication were found to be vital.

The research theme group dynamics was not easily measured in this study. Because of the differing tasks and the expected differing perceptions on the mission goal, the two units were expected to perceive each other as two different groups, leading the units to stereotype each other and making it hard for a team spirit to evolve, like Forsyth (1999), Hogg et al. (1985) and Soeters (2004) would have predicted. These problems of stereotyping and a lack of team spirit did not occur though, especially not within the patrolling units. This can be explained by the fact that both units were supposed to work closely together, they had the same idea about the mission goal and they had to rely on each other to complete the mission and even to survive which is according to Langfred (2007) important in trust building. So it was vital to not have stereotyping and other grouping problems, therefore one may even argue if the two units represent two different groups: especially when on patrol both units feel the unity of the SUA and the PRT members (although participating in different tasks in the SUA) feel embedded in the group of soldiers of the Battle Group. Another point is the changing of roles for SUA-members which may have reduced the differences in their tasks

(the tasks were more integrated) leading to more commitment and acceptance of the other unit.

About cooperation one can conclude it will improve when the units are more familiar with each other. Therefore it is important to improve the integration training period to ease cooperation even in the beginning of the mission. Overall, both units seem positive about cooperation: they share information well, they are aware of each other functions and plans, and going on patrol together or initiating (reconstruction) projects is evaluated positively. The challenge for the Task Force lies in keeping cooperation at least at this level. Important to consider in maintaining this level of cooperation and familiarity, are the organizational structure discussed earlier, the geographical location of the two units on camp, and the units' original base location in the Netherlands. Cooperation is more or less forced in life-threatening situations, but one may conclude as well that intense experiences lead to better cooperation too. This finding is supported by other studies after group dynamics (Forsyth, 1999).

About the trust relationships one can also conclude that both units trust each other. The relationship betters when the units have spent more time together and when they have noticed they can rely on each other (for example when they had been through intense experiences on patrol). Preferably is of course to have an optimal relationship during the entire mission, including the initiation period. The integration training period, deploying units from the same base in the Netherlands and making the units work in coupled SUAs, are aspects which can provide for this relationship. In establishing trust, communication is an important factor as well: the commanding officers need to deliberate and share their available information with the other unit. As well do they need to agree on responsibility issues before the SUA leaves camp to prevent discussions and disagreements from occurring in risky situations. Overall one can say the units maintain a high level of trust in the other unit, although their tasks, experience, and expertise differ. But, like they say themselves: *'We are all professionals.'*

6.2 Critical remarks & future research

Some critical remarks can be made about this research. In the following section the considerations for the choices made will be given. A choice had to be made about the orientation of the study: two kinds of studies were possible. A quantitative study could be conducted, which because of standardization has few problems with subjective interpretation of data by the researcher (Stake, 1995). In a quantitative study the researcher can measure with high accuracy the characteristics which, a priori, seem important (Wester, 1987). Qualitative studies, on the other hand, have to deal with the issue of subjectivity, but a qualitative study is a research method which can lead to a 'richer view' on the specific

situation studied as well. The view will be richer because the respondents can add whatever seems important to them, without being restricted by the characteristics and variables defined on forehand by the researcher (Wester, 1987; Stake, 1995). Sensitizing concepts are used to give direction to the study. In a qualitative study are firstly the independent variables thought to behave unexpectedly, meaning one can not have directive hypotheses, and second the dependent variables experimentally en non-operationally defined (Stake, 1995).

Qualitative research sometimes gets labeled to be subjective and of little scientific relevance (Dooley, 2001). Benefit of this approach, however, is that by using sensitizing concepts as a guideline in the study relevant aspects in this specific research situation could be found and complemented with other aspects found while the study was carried out. This minimized the risk of missing important information. A disadvantage of this kind of study is the earlier mentioned subjectivity: the researcher may be bothered by expectations and personal feelings (biases) which cause him to see the world through a framework leading him into seeing only the things he wants to see (supporting his hypotheses) and missing other important aspects. To deal with this subjectivity in this study semi-standardized methods were used. Triangulation, using different research methods next to each other, was used to demonstrate all aspects of 'reality' and to give a more complete view than a study in which only one research method is used would have given (Wester et al., 2004). Using multiple methods was important to confront validity and reliability issues as well.

In this study it was important to gather a rich view because no hypotheses were to be tested and not all characteristics and variables of the mission area were known beforehand. Therefore a narrative analysis was most appropriate. As noted earlier, a narrative analysis is about 'understanding lived experience and perceptions of experience.' (Patton, 2002, p.115). The complexity of the study objects is reduced by narrative analysis: aim is not to copy reality, but to use the relevant aspects in reality to answer the research questions (Wester et al., 2004; Wester, 1987). Reality is analyzed in three steps: first one registers the story told, second one interprets what was said by using the theoretical framework (in this case, the academic research on trust and group dynamics), and third one selects the important aspects by means of the research questions (Wester et al., 2004). One might think this way of analyzing – by means of interpretation – has problems with methodological objectivity, because in qualitative research interpretations are the central issue. This is not a problem though. For this kind of research the same norms – reliability, validity and generalization – are relevant compared to quantitative studies (Smaling, 1987). Reliability was not at stake in this study: by recorded registration, cooperation with other researchers, and the used interview protocol reliability was kept high because the study can be repeated by other researchers. In validity one may ask the question: does the research justify the results? One may positively answer this question: by using the theoretical framework for the interview

sessions and the survey, and by analyzing the interviews in a data matrix (see Appendices III and IV) subjectivity and biases were minimized. The codes placed in the data matrix supplied a holistic view of the data on which the results are based. A data matrix is useful to obtain insight in the comparison of all respondents on all themes (Wester, 2004). Reactivity of the respondents on the interviewers was minimized by assuring them all answers would be analyzed and presented anonymously. The results can not be generalized to other missions or Task Forces though because the results demonstrate an interpretation of the reality in TF-U1 and TF-U2 between Battle Group and PRT, and are therefore too specific to even say anything about the trust relationship between other units in these Task Forces. The results do show general problems in trust that can occur during a mission, and are therefore useful to keep in mind for other missions though.

The size of the sample used in this study may seem too small to pass judgment about the situation in the SUAs in Uruzgan. But even though the group of respondents was small, it is likely similar results will be found when a larger or a different group is studied because the results are supported by findings of other studies on this matter.

In this research the participating soldiers were supposed to describe the situation in Uruzgan holistically: through systems and institutes. Forsyth (1999) claims when people speak of another group they actually speak of one group member they have disaffection for. This might have influenced this study as well, for one of the soldiers remarked: *'You ask about Battle Group and Provincial Reconstruction Team… To us that does not exist. We soldiers don't think in terms of institutes, we think in faces.'* Because of 'thinking in faces' the soldiers might have responded considering the situation in Uruzgan at a personal and individual level and not in the holistic way this research requires. This does not mean the responses are of no use. On the contrary: they show what aspects are of great importance in a mission area: although the respondent might point to an individual or specific situation, this 'small' thing might have influenced the actions of this particular soldier (and maybe even the actions of others) and therefore have effect on the completion of the mission. When mentioned by more than one respondent this aspect might have had much influence on the mission and might also pose a problem in other missions. One can for example think of the disagreements on safety and responsibility between two officers. On the other hand could an aspect, mentioned by only one or few respondents, be of much influence in the mission area too, therefore qualitative research was necessary to conduct.

Future research may focus on more Task Forces to make it possible to find a pattern of aspects important for trust relationships between units in all kinds of missions. In this study only members from the Royal Army were asked to participate, a result might be that that the

outcome of this study may not be applicable to Navy, Air Force and Military Police. This might pose a problem because these elements do participate in the same Task Force and even in the same SUAs as Army soldiers (the Battle Group contains only Army elements). So in the so called joint operations, cooperation and trust between all of these soldiers needs to be present as well. One might expect the differences between soldiers from different elements to be larger and therefore more problematic than the differences between soldiers from the same military element (such as was the case in this study in which Cavalry and Infantry were examined). According to Forsyth (1999) fewer conflicts occur between groups that are more homogenous which will no longer apply to the SUAs when all elements are participating. It is therefore necessary to bring in other military elements in following studies after this subject.

In future research it is also necessary to distinguish the respondents from Deh Rawod from those from Tarin Kowt, because differences between these two locations might have blurred the results. The situation in Deh Rawod is very different from that in Tarin Kowt: firstly because the organizational structure of the armed forces over there is not similar and second because the level of hostility is very different in both places.

In the theoretical framework used in this study three antecedents of trust were mentioned: ability, benevolence and integrity. It seems these three academic antecedents are not equally important in every situation in the mission area. It seems for example that ability is more important when the troops are on patrol than when they are on camp. Since the respondents mentioned professionalism often when they referred to patrolling, whereas benevolence was mentioned more when the respondents referred to a permissive environment. This assumption should be investigated more deeply though, to provide valid conclusions on this aspect of trust in the mission area.

This thesis finishes with the following conclusion: trust within the Smallest Unit of Action is extremely important in the mission area and for the completion of the mission. The soldiers do acknowledge this, one of them said: *'The first time you go on patrol your trust in the other SUA-members is blind, but eventually you learn to know them and you will experience this trust in them is justified.'* Although trust is important this does not mean though that trust will solve all trouble the soldiers encounter. *'We may believe we have organized things perfectly: that all units perform well on cooperation, in general and in underlying matters. But all that did not entirely account for the outcome of our mission. We were just damn lucky too; I am convinced we had an army of 293 guardian angels on our shoulder!'*

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Appendix I   Glossary

This glossary gives an overview and explanation of in this paper frequently used terms and abbreviations.

Al Qaeda

Radical Islamic paramilitary movement with ties to the Taliban. Nowadays is its operational base in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was commenced in the Gulf region, after the Iraqi war opposing the western military presence.

Battle Group

The unit which provides safety and security in the mission area. Most soldiers of the Battle Group are part of the Army element Infantry of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces.

CIMIC

Civil Military Cooperation, cooperation with national civil and military authorities and NGOs in the mission area. Aim of the CIMIC projects is acquiring operational advantages and security and gaining trust. CIMIC officers are integrated in several units and do not form a unit on their own (Koninklijke Landmacht, 1998).

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)

International force in which all the allied forces are united. All the missions conducted by the countries of the allied forces are on responsibility of ISAF. The emphasis of ISAF lies in peace keeping and rebuilding a safe Afghanistan.

Northern Alliance

Officially called: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF). This organization, created by the Mudjaheddin in 1996, unites various each other competing Afghan groups in order to defeat Taliban. The military-political organization controls many of the northern Afghan provinces, such as Parwan and Qunduz and is supported by Pakistan and the United States.

Opposing military force (OMF)

Groupings such as movements within the Taliban, fighting against the Afghan authorities and the presence of the allied forces. Often referred to as Taliban, this is however incorrect.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Unit which emphasis is on reconstructing the country by intensive contact with locals and initiation of projects in the mission area.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Emphasis on bringing back security and safety in a certain area by for example installing and training a police force and supporting the government.

Smallest Unit of Action (SUA)

Small unit with Battle Group soldiers as main component. Smallest group of soldiers capable of working independent from other units or groups in the mission area. SUAs leave camp including members from several different units such as PRT, Battle Group, Medical Support en Engineering. For every patrol a new SUA is composed out of the present units in the area, taking the goals of the patrol and the situation in mission area into account.

Taliban

Originally does 'Taliban' refer to a way of life, and not to the military movement it is nowadays associated. In the media is this military movement, which is covertly supported by Pakistan, meant when referred to the Taliban. The Taliban put the Mudjaheddin groupings aside and gained control over Afghanistan since 1994. The Taliban movement was developed as opposition against the Northern Alliance. Taliban fighters were drawn from Pashtun youths who had lived their entire lives in Pakistani refugee camps. They were given little education and live after the conservative values of the Sunni faith of the Islam.

Task Force Uruzgan (TF-U)

The Armed Forces present in the mission area in Uruzgan including all Dutch units. TF-U1 was in 2006 the first task force present in Uruzgan. The locations of the Dutch camps in Uruzgan the Dutch camps are Tarin Kowt, and Deh Rawod (see illustration 2 for a map with the location of both camps).

Appendix II   Interview Protocol

Interviewhandleiding

Onderstaande topics MOETEN aan bod komen bij ieder interview.

- Achtergrondgegevens: naam, rang, functie in de missie, lid van PRT of van Battle Group, wanneer in Uruzgan

- Korte (!) beschrijving van een alledaagse dag op uitzending: hoe kijkt de militair er op terug? Komt hij/zij met allemaal negatieve zaken op de proppen of is hij/zij over het algemeen positief?

    Vanuit het 'dagboek'-verhaal doorgaan op de onderstaande thema's.

- Risk-perception:
    - o Perceptie => Hoe gevaarlijk was het over het algemeen in het uitzendgebied? Was er sprake van een permissive environment (dus goed klimaat voor PRT acties) of juist van een hostile environment (veel acties van BG nodig)?
    - o Onderlinge verschillen => hebben BG en PRT onderling een verschillend beeld over de situatie?

- Vertrouwen in de Afghanen *(burgers, politie, wetsdienaren, humanitaire hulpverleners, Afgh. militairen)[xix]:*
    - o Previous intercultural interaction => vragen naar het soort ontmoetingen (alleen professioneel of ook buiten diensttijd?), of er stereotyperingen binnen de eenheid en bij de militair waren, het soort situatie waarin de ontmoetingen plaats gevonden hebben, welk gedrag van de andere partij is typerend? Wat doet afbreuk aan de samenwerking, en welk gedrag bevordert de samenwerking juist?
    - o Mate van onderlinge afhankelijkheid => hadden de twee partijen elkaar nodig of liepen ze elkaar juist in de weg
    - o Vulnerability to consequences => wanneer de burgers op een bepaalde manier handelen in hoeverre heeft dat dan direct consequenties voor de eenheid in kwestie en zijn uit te voeren missie? Wat schaadt de missie?

- Vertrouwen in de andere militaire eenheid (dan wel PRT, dan wel Battle Group):
    - o Samenwerking => is er sprake geweest van samenwerking met de andere eenheid, hoe is dit verlopen, voorbeelden van ervaringen, zijn er stereotyperingen. Is er verandering geweest in het beeld van de ander in de loop van de tijd?
    - o Interaction => naast de zakelijk samenwerking is er ook sociaal contact geweest buiten diensttijd? (bijvoorbeeld samen sporten, kaarten, etc.)
    - o Mate van onderlinge afhankelijkheid => hadden de twee partijen elkaar nodig of liepen ze elkaar juist in de weg
    - o Kennis & information sharing => waren beide eenheden van elkaars handelen op de hoogte, heeft de militair enig idee wat de andere eenheid nou aan het doen was, was de militair op de hoogte van de informatie die de andere eenheid vergaard had?[xx]
    - o Vulnerability to consequences => wanneer de andere eenheid op een bepaalde manier handelt in hoeverre heeft dat dan direct consequenties voor de militair in kwestie en zijn uit te voeren missie?
    - o Trustworthiness => in hoeverre wordt de andere eenheid gezien als een groep met eigen doelen en eigen waarden en normen, en in hoeverre worden zij ingeschat op competentie, integriteit (prinicpes) en benevolence (goed willen doen)?
    - o Mate van overeenkomsten => zagen de militairen uit de verschillende groepen elkaar als 'teamgenoten' of juist als mensen waar ze niets mee gelijk hebben?[xxi]

[xix] Zou dit een voorspeller kunnen zijn voor de mate van vertrouwen in de andere eenheid? Is hiertussen samenhang te vinden?
[xx] Alleen toepasbaar op (onder)officieren

- Missie:
  - Missiedoel[xxii]
  - In hoeverre vindt de militair de missie geslaagd te noemen?
  - Had de militair vertrouwen in de missie terwijl hij/zij in het uitzendgebied was? Waar hing dit vertrouwen van af?

[xxi] Is hier een verschil waar te nemen verklaard door de soort omgevingssituatie, en door de mate van samenwerking (meer samenwerking dan ook meer similarity)

[xxii] Let op! Zijn er op dit punt fundamentele verschillen te vinden tussen PRT'ers en BG'ers?

Appendix III   Matrix Provincial Reconstruction Team

Code	Corporal	Warrant officer	Private	Major	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant	Warrant officer	Major	Major
Background	TF-U 2 Function: chauffeur / sniper	TF-U 2 Function: 2nd commander mission team	TF-U 2 Function: chauffeur	TF-U 1 Function: 1st commander mission team	TF-U 1 Function: commander PRT	TF-U 1 Function: chauffeur / sniper	TF-U 1 Function: CIMIC officer	TF- U 1 Function: Intelligence officer	TF-U 1 Function: 2nd commander PRT	TF-U2 Function: Commander mission team
Trust										
Evaluation of…	Positive	Positive Not everyone is competent enough	Positive Group present longest is most trusted	Positive	Positive	Neutral There is little known about the others	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
Determinants	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA	Competence Professionalism Familiarity Compatible drills Social contact Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA	Intensive contact Familiarity	Competence Professionalism Familiarity Cooperation Training Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Training	Professionalism Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Agreements Intensive contact Social contact Changing structure of SUA	Professionalism Familiarity	Changing structure of SUA
Cooperation										
Evaluation of…	Neutral Not well anticipated	Positive	Positive With 2nd Group cooperation was more difficult	Positive	Positive One should match personalities for commanders	Positive	Positive	Positive	Neutral At start difficult	Positive
Determinants	Familiarity Training Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA Rotation procedure Original base NL	Familiarity Knowledge about each others tasks Both from the same military element Rotation procedure Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Relations on personal level Experiences Training Understanding Original base NL	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA Clear agreements Understanding Knowing each others drills	Familiarity Information PRT should adapt to BG Knowing each other's drills	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA Clear agreements Training Understanding Original base NL	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA Training Rotation procedure	Familiarity Intensive contact Geographical location on camp Experiences Relations on personal level	Familiarity Intensive contact Experiences Changing structure SUA Rotation procedure

Code	Corporal	Warrant officer	Private	Major	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant	Warrant officer	Major	Major
Information sharing	Positive Briefings were ok Battle Group and PRT know about each others plans	Neutral Good contact all ranks Change of TF-U information was lost S2[i] sharing of information chaotic for commander	Positive Briefings were ok Battle Group and PRT know about each others plans	Positive Planning together with Battle Group S2 sharing of information chaotic for commander	Positive Information was well shared S2 sharing of information chaotic for commander => S2 is success factor Appointments necessary for decision making	Neutral Information was well shared Information is crucial To little information accessible	Positive Information was well shared S2 sharing of information chaotic for commander	Positive Information was well shared S2 is success factor Battle Group units badly informed about function PRT	Positive Information was well shared Briefings S2 sharing of information is chaotic => PRT and BG different information	Positive Battle Group and PRT know about each others plans S2 sharing of information is chaotic => PRT and BG different information
The mission area										
Risk perception	Safety depends on location Situation gets more unstable PRT sees fewer problems than Battle group	Safety depends on location Practicing drills reduces risk Situation gets more unstable PRT and Battle Group have same perception of risk but a difference exists between on base and on patrol	At start one feels very unsafe Threat is acceptable	Threat is acceptable Risks are everywhere You do not think about the risks all the time	Safety depends on location It is safe because of Pashtunwhali PRT sees fewer problems than Battle group	Safety depends on location Uncertainty about who is who of the Afgh. People PRT sees fewer problems than Battle group	At start one feels very unsafe You do not think about the risks all the time PRT sees fewer problems than Battle group	At start one feels very unsafe Risks are everywhere Situation gets more unstable	Risks are everywhere Perception is not different	Uncertainty about who is who of the Afgh. People Risks are everywhere
The mission	Mission = reconstruction Positive about achievements Most projects worked out but effect is not directly visible (long term) Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction Positive about achievements Most projects worked out but effect is not directly visible (long term) Effect can also be undone	Mission = helping the Afghan people Positive about achievements Progress is slow	Mission = helping the Afghan people Positive about achievements Organizational structure has a contrarily effect on achieving the goals	Mission = reconstruction Positive about achievements 'On the way but not there yet' Progress is slow	Mission = bringing peace Positive about achievements Unsure if goals will ever be reached	Mission = reconstruction Positive about achievements Made a good start Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction Positive about achievements Not ready yet once and a while relapse Made a good start Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction Negative about achievements => too soon	Mission = reconstruction Progress is slow Positive about achievements Projects worked out

Code	Corporal	Warrant officer	Private	Major	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant	Warrant officer	Major	Major
The Afghan people	Trust in locals disappears when more TICs[ii] happen Not all locals are bad ANA is badly trained	Cannot trust them all => level dependent ANAP is corrupt Determining trust: behavior and complying appointments	Cannot trust them Double interests they only do what's best for themselves Survivors OMF and ordinary are not easy distinguished	Cannot trust them Locals start trusting soldiers Battle Group sees Muslim fundamentalist where PRT sees ordinary people in need of help Determining trust: know who you're talking to and cooperation	Cannot trust them all Afghans are badly educated PRT more optimistic Determining trust: know who you're talking to	Cannot trust them all Determining trust: behavior and education	Cannot trust them all In more permissive environments more trust PRT more optimistic Double interests Corruption Survivors	Cannot trust them all PRT more optimistic Double interests they only do what's best for themselves Survivors Determining trust: behavior, interests and accessible information	Cannot trust them all PRT more optimistic Double interests they only do what's best for themselves Corruption Fighters Proud & honor Who is who?	Cannot trust them all Only cooperate with those you know Locals start trusting soldiers Hospitality Fighters
Grouping										
Group identity	On patrol one group, on base PRT is 'we'	On patrol one group, on base PRT is 'we'	'We' are chauffeurs PRT is group	Sharp line between PRT and BG	On patrol one group, on base PRT is 'we' Team spirit present	Sharp line between PRT and BG Integration should get more attention	All Manoeuvre so one team	On patrol one group, on base PRT is 'we' Integration mission teams is fine	-	-
Stereotyping PRT	Soft approach No negative view with Battle Group In origin fighting unit Important task Good intentions	In origin fighting unit Amateurs in task Negatively viewed by BG Important task Good intentions	Socially and culturally competent / aware Important task Good intentions Negatively viewed by BG	Soft approach Out-of-the-box thinkers Battle Group thinks it's vague Important task Good intentions	Important task Good intentions	Socially and culturally competent / aware Important task Good intentions	In origin fighting unit BG thinks it's vague and too soft Socially and culturally competent / aware Important task Good intentions	Soft approach Development aid-worker Are a milestone around the neck of the Battle Group Important task Good intentions	Socially & culturally competent Not really 'one' unit Life experience needed Important task Good intentions	Socially & Culturally competent Important task Good intentions

Code	Corporal	Warrant officer	Private	Major	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant	Warrant officer	Major	Major
Stereotyping Battle Group	Like PRT Very close group Security	Fighters Can also do PRT tasks Security	Fighters Like PRT Cannot do PRT tasks Security	Fighters Without BG no mission Security	Fighters Proud Aggressive Can also do PRT tasks Think differently about Afgh. People Security	Self-confident Proud Security	Like PRT Can also do PRT tasks Security	Fighters Think differently about Afgh. People Security	Fighters (more thrill seeking) Security Can also do PRT tasks Kinetic	Security Think differently about Afgh. People Kinetic

i S2 = Intelligence section
ii TIC = troops in contact (for example an ambush or attack)

Appendix IV   Matrix Battle Group

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
Background	TF-U 2 Function: Group commander	TF-U 2 Function: Group commander	TF-U 2 Function: Company Commander	TF-U 1 Function: commander platoon	TF-U 2 Function: 2nd commander Battle Group	TF-U 2 Function: sniper	TF-U 1 Function: 2nd commander Battle Group	TF-U 1 Function: chauffeur / medic	TF-U 1 Function: commander TF-U staff	TF-U 2 Function: commander platoon	TF-U 2 Function: medic

Trust

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
Evaluation of…	Positive	Positive	Neutral	Positive Depends on the team	Positive TK[i] could be better DR[ii] was ok	Neutral	Neutral	Positive	Positive Depends on the team		Positive
Determinants	Familiarity Professionalism Intensive contact	Familiarity Professionalism Experiences	Intensive contact	Problems depend on personality	Familiarity Professionalism Cooperation			Changing structure SUA Familiarity Intensive contact	Professionalism Problems depend on personality Situation	Familiarity	

Cooperation

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
Evaluation of…	Positive	Positive	Positive At start problems	Positive At start problems	Positive At start more difficult TK more problems than DR	Positive	Negative Friction about focus Battle Group better prepared	Positive	Positive Especially synergy on patrol	Positive	Positive
Determinants	Training Familiarity	Training Familiarity	Familiarity Changing structure of SUA	Familiarity Original base NL Personal interests officers (ranks)	Original base NL		Material Briefings Training	Training Familiarity	Intense experiences Briefings Original base NL Geography on camp Afghanistan	Training Coupled in SUA Familiarity Professionalism Original base NL	

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
Information sharing	Neutral Not always enough information in SUA although it was available in TF-U Noncommissioned officers and soldiers are not used enough Too many intell-cells	Neutral Not always enough information in SUA although it was available in TF-U More information sharing can be dangerous Too many intell-cells	Positive Good appointments were made PRT had more detailed information Too many intell-cells Battle Group and PRT know each others plans	Negative PRT used Battle Group information badly No similarity in intelligence Too many intell-cells Battle Group and PRT know each others plans Arguments about responsibility	Positive To much talking Higher rank = more information = better understanding situation Good sharing of information Too many intell-cells	Positive Little contact Enough information available Battle Group and PRT know each others plans	Positive Bad in changing period Battle Group and PRT know each others plans	Positive Battle Group and PRT know each others plans Enough information available	Neutral PRT had different focus Information unclear Too many intelligence sections	Positive Battle Group and PRT know each others plans PRT has to come to BG More information sharing can be dangerous	Positive Too many intelligence sections
The mission area											
Risk perception	Safety depends on location Risks are everywhere Uncertainty about who is who of Afgh. People	Safety depends on location Risks are everywhere Uncertainty about who is who of Afgh. People	Risks are everywhere Depends on interactions with Afgh. Uncertainty about who is who of Afgh. People	Safety depends on location Situation is dangerous	Situation is very dangerous Taliban is everywhere	Situation too dangerous for reconstruction Situation is very dangerous Depends on your own actions how risky it is	Risks are everywhere At start more unsafe	Same for Battle Group and PRT At start more unsafe because unfamiliar Risks are everywhere	Uncertainty about who is who of Afgh. People Risks are everywhere Safety depends on location Risk analysis getting better	Situation is dangerous Risks are everywhere Difficult mission Many unexpected events Safety depends on location	
The mission	Mission = helping Afgh. People Did what we could Progress is slow	Mission = helping Afgh. People Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction No progress	Mission = supporting Afgh. Govern., the same for Battle Group and PRT Made a start Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction Progress is slow	Mission = reconstruction but is too early: 1st securing	Mission = supporting Afgh. govern., Progress is slow Made a start	Mission = getting back safe	Mission = reconstruction is main point should not be on fighting	Mission = reconstruction but is too early: 1st securing Progress is slow No use for reconstruction yet Dutch Approach is no good	

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
The Afghan people	Cannot trust them all Learned to distrust them Double interests they only do what is best for themselves OMF and friend are hard to distinguish	Cannot trust them all Learned to distrust them Double interests they only do what is best for themselves OMF and friend are hard to distinguish	Cannot trust them all Double interests they only do what is best for themselves Fighters OMF and friend are hard to distinguish Uninterested	Cannot trust them all Double interests You get a double feeling You never know who their loyal to	Honorable Fighters Mainly positive contact	Cannot trust them all Dutch soldiers were trusted by Afgh. People OMF and friend are hard to distinguish They are reckless and unpredictable	Cannot trust them all More contact = higher trust	Cannot trust them all Cooperation was positive	Cannot trust them all Double interests they only do what is best for themselves Ordinary people want a change Corruption Fighters	Cannot trust them all Be aware of their culture Double interests OMF and friend are hard to distinguish	
Grouping											
Group identity	One goal but all different units	One goal but all different units	We = Battle Group When cooperating one team	No group feeling We = Battle Group When cooperating one team	-	-	No in- or out-group We = Battle Group Individual rows	When on patrol one team With PRT less contact than with other 'exotic' units We = Battle Group	SUA = one team because both maneouvre	We = Battle Group All different units	We = Battle Group
Stereotyping PRT	Contact Afgh. People Soft approach	Contact Afgh. People Soft approach	Contact Afgh. People Reconstruction No effect yet Couldn't do much all the time Fine soldiers	Contact Afgh. People Reconstruction Battle Group can do many things better Amateurism Dangerous when in a crucial role on patrol Good soldiers	Contact Afgh. People Reconstruction Floating on their pink cloud	Reconstruction Has nothing to do there yet	Battle Group better soldiers 'exoot' Less familiar with drills	Fine soldiers Couldn't do much all the time Social	Fine soldiers	Fine soldiers Socially & culturally competent	

Code	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Lieutenant	Major	Private	Major	Corporal	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant	Sergeant
Stereotyping Battle Group	Security Not for thinking but for doing Can not do without them Better in skills and drills	Security Not for thinking but for doing Can not do without them Better in skills and drills	Security Need to keep as a friend Makes all decisions in safety Better in skills and drills	Security Need to keep as a friend Can not do without them Makes safety decisions Can do easy PRT tasks Better in skills and drills	Security More aggressive Can not do without them Wheelbarrow Better in skills and drills	Security More aggressive Better in skills and drills	Security Makes all decisions Wheelbarrow Better in skills and drills	Security Makes all decisions More aggressive Better in skills and drills	Security Can do easy PRT tasks Better in skills and drills	Security Need to keep as a friend Better in skills and drills	Security More aggressive Can not do without them Better in skills and drills

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[i] TK = Camp Tarin Kowt
[ii] DR = Camp Deh Rawod

Appendix V   Survey

1. Introductie

Bedankt dat u deze online vragenlijst even wilt invullen. De vragenlijst heeft betrekking op uw uitzending naar Uruzgan, en is onderdeel van een groter onderzoek van de NLDA naar uitzendingsproblematiek. De vragenlijst bestaat uit 40 vragen. Het invullen duurt maximaal 10 minuten.

Alle gegevens worden anoniem verwerkt dus geef vooral uw eigen mening. Er zijn bovendien geen goede of foute antwoorden. Geeft u alstublieft op alle vragen antwoord.

Hartelijk dank!

2. Achtergrond

De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op uzelf. Klik het antwoord aan dat op u van toepassing is.

1. Wat is uw geslacht?

- ⃝ Man
- ⃝ Vrouw

2. Voor welk Krijgsmachtonderdeel was u in Uruzgan?

- ⃝ KL
- ⃝ KLu
- ⃝ KMar
- ⃝ KM

3. Wat is uw wapen/dienstvak?

[   ]

4. Wanneer was u in Uruzgan?

- ⃝ Met TF-U 1
- ⃝ Met TF-U 2
- ⃝ Met TF-U 3

5. Wat was uw rang toen u in Uruzgan was?

[   ]

6. Hoeveel jaren bent u al in dienst? (a.u.b afronden naar gehele jaren)

[   ]

7. Bent u al vaker uitgezonden uitgeweest?

- ⃝ Ja
- ⃝ Nee

8. Was u al vaker op uitzending in Afghanistan?

- ⃝ Ja
- ⃝ Nee

9. Van welke eenheid maakte u deel uit in Uruzgan?

ʝ Van het PRT

ʝ Van de Battle Group

ʝ Anders namelijk:

10. Wat was uw functie gedurende de uitzending? (Meerdere antwoorden geven is mogelijk.)

functie 1

functie 2

functie 3

functie 4

11. Op welk kamp in Uruzgan bevond u zich?

ʝ Tarin Kowt

ʝ Deh Rawod

ʝ Anders namelijk:

3. Stellingen I

Het volgende onderdeel van de vragenlijst bestaat uit stellingen. Geeft u alstublieft aan in hoeverre u het met de stellingen eens bent.

Wanneer er in de vraag staat vermeld 'de andere eenheid' dan wordt er voor PRT'ers de Battle Group bedoeld, en voor de Battle Groupmilitairen het PRT.

12. De samenwerking tussen PRT en Battle Group verliep goed.

ʝ Helemaal oneens   ʝ oneens   ʝ Noch mee eens noch mee oneens   ʝ Mee eens   ʝ Helemaal mee eens

13. Afghanen zijn niet te vertouwen.

ʝ Helemaal oneens   ʝ oneens   ʝ Noch mee eens noch mee oneens   ʝ Mee eens   ʝ Helemaal mee eens

14. Uruzgan was gedurende mijn uitzending een onveilig gebied.

ʝ Helemaal oneens   ʝ oneens   ʝ Noch mee eens noch mee oneens   ʝ Mee eens   ʝ Helemaal mee eens

15. Ik onderhield sociale contacten met mensen van de andere eenheid.

ʝ Helemaal oneens   ʝ oneens   ʝ Noch mee eens noch mee oneens   ʝ Mee eens   ʝ Helemaal mee eens

16. Ik was vaak niet op de hoogte van wat we gingen doen als we de poort uit gingen.

ʝ Helemaal oneens   ʝ oneens   ʝ Noch mee eens noch mee oneens   ʝ Mee eens   ʝ Helemaal mee eens

17. De missie is geslaagd te noemen.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

18. De aanwezigheid van de andere eenheid had geen nut.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

19. Wij Nederlandse militairen liepen veel risico in het gebied.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

20. De Battle Group moest steeds het vuile werk opknappen.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

4. Stellingen II

Ook het volgende onderdeel van de vragenlijst bestaat uit stellingen. Geeft u alstublieft aan in hoeverre u het met de stellingen eens bent.

Wanneer er in de vraag staat vermeld 'de andere eenheid' dan wordt er voor PRT'ers de Battle Group bedoeld, en voor de Battle Groupmilitairen het PRT.

21. Voordat we op patrouille gingen hadden we voldoende informatie gekregen over de situatie.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

22. De peletonscommandant van de Battle Group is altijd de eindverantwoordelijke tijdens patrouilles.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

23. PRT en Battle Group hebben hetzelfde beeld over de risico's in het gebied.

jn Helemaal oneens jn Oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

24. Afghanen hebben allemaal een dubbele agenda: het ene moment zijn ze pro-ISAF en het volgende pro-Taliban.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

25. Tussen PRT en Battle Group werd beschikbare informatie goed uitgewisseld.

jn Helemaal oneens jn oneens jn Noch mee eens noch mee oneens jn Mee eens jn Helemaal mee eens

26. Ik kijk positief terug op de uitzending.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

27. De Afghanen die ik gezien/gesproken heb waren best te vertrouwen.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

28. De aanwezigheid van het PRT had (toen) geen meerwaarde voor het bereiken van de missiedoelen.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

29. Het is goed om in het opwerktraject PRT en Battle Group intensief samen te laten werken zodat de band onderling sterker wordt.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

30. Ik had vertrouwen in het kunnen van de andere eenheid.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

31. Samenwerken met de ANA en ANAP ging prima.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

32. Naarmate de missie vorderde werd mijn vertrouwen in Afghanen minder.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

33. De samenwerking met Afghaanse overheden verliep goed.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

34. Wanneer beslissingen genomen moeten worden tijdens een patrouille, moet de Battle Group altijd de doorslag geven.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

35. Mijn mening over de andere eenheid is gedurende de missie in positieve zin veranderd.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

36. Naarmate ik langer in het gebied was werd ik minder gefocust op mogelijk gevaar.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                                      noch mee oneens   eens

37. De Battle Group is meer gefocust op risico's terwijl het PRT meer kijkt naar kansen.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                           noch mee oneens   eens

38. Eigenlijk kan ook de Battle Group PRT-taken uitvoeren.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                           noch mee oneens   eens

39. Er was sprake van groepsgevoel tussen PRT en Battle Group.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                           noch mee oneens   eens

40. Naarmate ik meer ervaringen had opgedaan kreeg ik meer vertrouwen in de Afghanen.

jn Helemaal oneens   jn Oneens   jn Noch mee eens   jn Mee eens   jn Helemaal mee
                                           noch mee oneens   eens

5. Einde

Dit was de laatste vraag. Bedankt voor het invullen van de vragenlijst!