Bachelor Thesis

Food justice for whom?

To what extent does global food policymaking enhance global food justice?

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Abstract

Food security became one of the targets of the UN Sustainable Development Goals aiming to eradicate hunger and malnutrition by promoting a sustainable transformation of food and agriculture systems to guarantee the global demand on food (UN, n.d.–a). However, prevailing policies embody and intermingle resilience, security, and development while enforcing neocolonial and neoliberal practices, and as such, they are critically analyzed regarding their ability to deliver on the aim to strive for food justice in global policymaking by focusing on food policies between the AU-EU. Hence, the thesis aims to critically analyze 'To what extent does global food policymaking enhance global food justice?'. By conducting a critical discourse analysis, data in the form of policy documents extracted from the official sites of the AU and EU are analyzed to examine the main research question and sub-questions posed in the theoretical framework. Literature from the Global South is integrated by specifically targeting regional publications. By drawing on Lukes's three-dimensional approach to power, power dynamics in the discourse around food within food policymaking are examined. Evaluating the power discourse in the AU-EU relations, neoliberal tools fostering neocolonial dependencies are investigated. By marginalizing Global South knowledge and expertise in the AU-EU food policymaking, African countries' integrity is undermined. Dependency structures that long-term harm African countries by emphasizing EU leadership on African countries' development enforce neocolonial structures embedded in neoliberal policies. While neocolonial and neoliberal practices are detected in the AU-EU food policymaking, the goal of global food justice cannot be achieved.

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1. Introduction

Due to the rise of the global population, food vulnerability will be one of the central global challenges faced in the upcoming decades. Covid-19 presented new economic, social, and political implications amplifying food vulnerabilities. Though many people argue that the virus does not discriminate, the '135 million acutely food-insecure people in need of urgent humanitarian food and nutrition assistance [which] are the most vulnerable to the consequences of this pandemic' (FSIN, 2020, p. 4) suggests otherwise. To tackle food vulnerability, Western-dominated organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), or the European Union (EU) and countries, adopted the aim to strive for food security by enhancing food resilience.

Hence, resilience has become a major driving concept and aim in policymaking. Resilience is defined 'as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis' (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, p. 414). It 'is a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach that integrates many social and territorial elements, both tangible, such as critical infrastructure, buildings and so on, and intangible, such as cultural aspects' (Heinzlef & Serre, 2020, p. 2). Resilience is now an important concept in sustainability policymaking. For instance, it is one of the main approaches of the UN's objectives as outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the New Urban Agenda, or the Paris Agreement. Moreover, under Frederica Mogherini as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), resilience was introduced and implemented as the EU's new leitmotif regarding the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) by connecting resilience to security. Resilience as the EU's external action leitmotif focuses on the establishment of resilient states featuring democracy, human rights as well as sustainable development to ensure security, peace, and consistency of the values of the Western-dominated world order (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Thus, resilience provides a middle ground between diverse perspectives and interests 'and is ambiguous enough to be acceptable to everyone' (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, p. 414).

In 2015, the FAO stated that economic growth is essential to ensure food security and promoted a strategy stating that with development comes security (FAO, 2015, p. 27). The FAO considered inclusive growth as one of the 'most effective tools for fighting hunger and food insecurity, and for attaining sustainable progress' (FAO, 2015, p. 4). It advises food vulnerable countries to invest in its economy by '[e]nhancing the productivity and incomes of smallholder family farmers [as the] key to progress […] [that is] inclusive and provide[s] opportunities for improving the livelihoods of the poor' (FAO, 2015, p. 3). Implementing an approach that promotes economic growth as the guarantor for food security is a Western-dominated concept that may trigger countries of the Global South's dependence on countries of the Global North. Therefore, a Westernization approach to tackle global challenges has to be assessed critically.

The UN and FAO became aware of this problematic approach and shifted to arguing that a country and its society should become resilient. In the light of the threat that climate change poses to food security, resilience is a new approach promoting that a country can recover from external shocks and can also stabilize in terms of food security. In 2015, the UN introduced the SDGs formulating 17 goals to end poverty while simultaneously 'improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth – all while tackling climate change and working to preserve our oceans and forests' (UN, n.d.–b). Hence, food security is one of the targets of the SDGs which symbolize the UN's key ambition to ensure food security globally. The EU, seeing itself as a global actor and a guarantor of human rights and sustainability, follows the implementation of the SDGs promoting them in food policymaking internally as well as externally.

The second goal of the SDGs 'Zero Hunger' (SDG2) aims to eradicate hunger and malnutrition to 'achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture' (UN, n.d. - c). However, since 2014 the number of people suffering from starvation and undernourishment has increased rather than decreased (UN, n.d.–a). Today over 800 Million people suffer '[e]xtreme hunger and malnutrition' (UN, n.d.–c) while Covid-19 produced new food provision challenges (Nchanji & Lutomia, 2021). Since African countries are in the focus of international organizations to provide tools and aims to secure food demands, the sub-Saharan area (SSA)[1] is the most food-insecure region in Africa (WFP, 2020). People living in the SSA, where undernourishment has been a long-standing challenge' (OECD & FAO, 2016, p. 60), are most vulnerable to severe food insecurity (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.–b). Hence, global food policymaking is particularly directed towards the SSA aiming to improve undernourishment by enhancing food security. At the same time, African countries' food security has been 'affected by adverse effects of climate change, pests, and diseases before the pandemic' (Nchanji & Lutomia, 2021, p. 1). Thus, the desirability of resilience as an overarching concept is put to the test when considering complex policy issues, like food security.

Resilience as a policy narrative states a policy image that is extremely controversial. On the one hand, it moves away from arguing that countries of the Global South should imitate Western development and directs attention to the local level. On the other hand, resilience is an ambiguous concept which naturalizes a state of crisis by promoting a state that is able to recover from shocks instead of solving the causes of the shocks (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Hence, introducing resilience as a catch-all term to enforce food security has to be examined critically since food security connects food policies to security, which is originally a military concept enhanced by resilience. Aiming to strive for global food justice as a normative concept, implementing resilience as a food policy is controversial since it may enhance rather neocolonial than sustainable structures by imposing Western

[1] The sub-Saharan Africa Region (SSA) 'is defined by the United Nations Statistical Division and is used to indicate all of Africa, except Northern Africa, with Sudan included in Sub-Saharan Africa' (OECD and FAO, 2016, p. 94).

solutions on non-Western problems, shifting the responsibility from a global to a local level, and marginalizing scholarship from countries affected by food vulnerability.

The thesis aims to analyze the interface of resilience, security, and development as competing and complementing policies and approaches in the context of global food policymaking which are introduced in agendas, goals, or agreements by institutions and countries of the Global North to enhance the sustainable transformation of countries of the Global South. Food resilience, food security, and development are approaches that are discussed in the scientific literature and by policymakers to adapt countries to reduce the impact of climate change on food provision. Thus, development implemented as a strategy to enhance countries' growth fostering a resilient and sustainable transition may strengthen 'inequities between North and South' (Martins, 2020, p. 136) by disguising and not addressing the reinforcement of 'power imbalances resulting from complex histories of colonialism and current-day neo-colonial practices' (Martins, 2020, p. 136). Hence, mainstreaming Western interests may create structures of dependence (Broberg, 2020). Therefore, the question *'To what extent does global food policymaking enhance global food justice?'* will be examined.

To analyze the leading research question, first, the thesis's theoretical frame is introduced posing relevant sub-questions to answer the main research question. Second, the research design to examine global food policymaking is presented which focuses on the policy discourse between the AU and EU as an example of global food policymaking. Afterward, policy documents extracted through transparent inclusion and exclusion criteria are examined by applying Steven Lukes's three-dimensional approach to power to detect neoliberal and neocolonial practices within the AU-EU food discourse. Further, the thesis's limitations and benefits are discussed. Policy recommendations to improve future food policymaking are extracted from the analysis. Finally, the sub-questions and main research question are answered and implications for future research are presented.

2. Resilience and food security: comparable or competing concepts?

Food (system) resilience is introduced by Western institutions and countries to reach food security in the Global South by arguing that resilience encourages the achievement of resilient states that feature democracy, human rights, and sustainable development (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Accordingly, resilience as a people-centered approach aligns with the WFP's conceptual shift from food aid towards food assistance to prevent a 'unidirectional, top-down' (WFP, n.d.) approach since resilience as a new policy shifts responsibility from the global to the local level (Wagner & Anholt, 2016).

Food system resilience can be defined as the 'capacity over time of a food system and its units at multiple levels, to provide sufficient, appropriate and accessible food to all, in the face of various and even unforeseen disturbances' (Tendall et al., 2015). At the same time, resilience addresses different factors such as poverty reduction or food systems' transformation into sustainable and

efficient systems to provide food to all. E.g., resilience is also used as an approach in development to enhance growth and reduce poverty by connecting it with development. Upton et al. (2016) introduced the development resilience nexus as a policy to reduce poverty to enhance food security. Development resilience is defined as 'the capacity over time of a person [or] household […] to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks' (p. 140). It conceptualizes resilience as a bottom-up approach focusing on coping with negative impacts rather than preventing them.

With resilience, the focus from promoting development to achieve food security is shifted towards promoting resilience as a security mechanism to create development achieving food security. The focus on security in the discourse around food emphasizes the threat to food production and de-emphasizes the need for more equitable and sustained access to healthy foods. Hence, international organizations that want to achieve food security recognize resilience, efficiency, and sustainability as the key drivers and solutions to eradicate hunger (FAO, 2015). However, these concepts and goals are challenged by other concepts put forward by scholars who criticize the approach of resilience as a mechanism for sustainable food systems in the Global South.

In discussing different approaches to achieve sustainable food and agriculture systems, the most important aim is forgotten: sustainable access to food by all peoples. To uncover capitalist and neocolonial practices, 'the ongoing integration of agriculture into the world market economy, access to arable and habitable land has become an urgent issue within current transnational debates on environmental (in)justice' (Fladvad et al., 2020, p. 80) which has to be contextualized and integrated into the assessment. Béné et al. (2014) criticize the approach of resilience claiming that it 'is not a pro-poor concept, in the sense that it does not exclusively apply to, or benefit, the poor' (Béné et al., 2014, p. 598). Therefore, 'resilience building cannot replace poverty reduction' (Béné et al., 2014, p. 598) since the poor who are most vulnerable to food insecurity are not reached by implementing resilience, restraining the UN's aim to ensure food security worldwide (UN, n.d.–a). Accordingly, the 'geography of emerging rights' (Fladvad et al., 2020, p. 80) aims to uncover injustices since research paid too little attention in the past to legal solutions whereby legal geography aims 'to analyze dimensions of law and social order within deteriorating environments' (Fladvad et al., 2020, p. 80) to meet the global demand on food by simultaneously enforcing food justice. This proposed approach focuses on sustainable transformation and 'local self-sufficiency and decision-making autonomy' (Martiniello, 2015, p. 509) through food sovereignty enabling a sustainable bottom-up approach by legal means in the Global South. But shifting responsibility from a global to a local level reinforces these problems.

2.1 The North-South power nexus

The North-South power nexus describes the unequal distribution of power between the Global North and the Global South. The question of how power is distributed in global food policymaking sets the ground for the examination of neocolonial and neoliberal practices regarding the policy process

between the AU and EU on food and agriculture. This thesis draws on the three-dimensional approach to power known as the three faces of power introduced by Steven Lukes (1974), to critically examine food policymaking given the AU-EU relationship.

Lukes (2005) argues that 'how we conceive of power makes a difference to how we think and act in general, and especially in political contexts' (Lukes, 2005, p. 477). He defines power as 'the capacity to bring about outcomes' (Lukes, 2007, p. 59). By defining power as a capacity to influence outcomes, not actors, Lukes (2007) rejects two common fallacies about power. The first, the exercise fallacy, assumes that power can only be evaluated through observable actions which can be measured in terms of the gain of one party in the policymaking process compared to the other party's loss (Lukes, 2005). Hence, power only manifests when it succeeds in prevailing over others to win in decision making. The second fallacy, Lukes (2007) discusses, is the vehicle fallacy 'which occurs when we equate power with the means or resources of power' (p. 59). This implies 'that power must mean whatever goes into operation when power is activated' (Lukes, 2005, p. 478). Thus, power is expressed through resources measured in wealth and statues or military forces and weaponry of an actor. However, Lukes (2005) argues that 'observing the exercise of power can give evidence of its possession and counting power resources can be a clue to its distribution, but power is a capacity, and neither the exercise nor the vehicle of that capacity' (p. 479).

Generally, power is the 'capacity to advance one's interests and affect the interests of others, whether negatively or positively' (Lukes, 2007, p. 60). Thus, Lukes (2007) stresses that power can also be viewed and perceived positively by being 'transformative, increasing others' resources, capabilities, and effectiveness' (p. 60). The first face of power: power over describes asymmetrical power distribution whereby 'power is power over another or others' (Lukes, 2007, p. 60). It is connected to dependency, control, and oppression what one part does to the other part. It identifies power as domination in the sense of Weber. The second face of power, according to Lukes (2007), is a critique on the first face ignoring 'the power to shape political agendas: the power to keep potential issues from becoming actual by determining which are to be the key political issues, preventing existing grievances from entering the political arena and contributing to the "mobilization of bias" in various ways (such as co-opting potential opponents and manipulating voting rules), through what they called "non-decision-making"' (Lukes, 2007, p. 60). Hence, the second face of power is the power to keep certain topics that would interfere with the interests of an actor off of the agenda or influence the agenda to reach no policymaking in this field at all. Lukes (2007) proposes a third face of power mainly drawing on Gramsci's concept of hegemony. The third face of power emphasizes 'that power can also consist in the securing of consent to dominant power relations through the shaping of desires and beliefs' (Lukes, 2007, p. 60). Power in this third face is not intentional. However, one actor can unintentionally influence the other actor to work against their genuine interest which upholds the domination of the actor with more power capacities.

Lukes (2007) stresses that all three faces complement each other exist in policymaking. While power can manifest negatively or positively, it still can create dependencies and reinforces neoliberal or neocolonial structures. Lukes's faces of power help to identify power processes in the food policymaking process to unmask neocolonial or neoliberal practices. This thesis thus **examines the claim that the North-South power axis is in play as a basis for neocolonial or neoliberal food policies.** Identifying the first sub-question (SQ1) to answer the main research question is: *To what extent do hegemonic power imbalances favor neoliberal practices leading to dependencies enforcing neocolonialism?*

2.2. Neocolonialism

The question of power is particularly visible in the implementation of neocolonial practices in global policymaking regarding various policy fields. Neocolonialism, introduced and defined by Kwame Nkrumah (1965), seeks to uncover the asymmetrical distribution of power that enables the Global North to oppress the Global South through the power domination of Western-oriented institutions and countries. By establishing structures of dependence, power imbalances are implemented in vulnerable countries. Nkrumah (1965) argues that neocolonialism replaced 'colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism' (p. 3). Neocolonialism stands in contrast to postcolonialism, a more dominant lens, which 'deals with the effects of colonization on cultures and societies' (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 168). Postcolonialism was used to describe former Western colonized states that gained independence before, during, or after the Second World War, implicating that colonialism is over. Although postcolonialism initially 'appeared to be the decoloni[z]ation's triumph over Western hegemony' (University of Porto, 2015, p. 2) but evolved into a disguised new colonial area in which formerly colonial structures were reinforced by maintaining the asymmetrical power distribution between Global North and Global South by creating structures of dependence through economic means.

In contrast to *post*colonialism, the term *neo*colonialism defines the last state of Western imperialism which transforms 'former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable States which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for [defense] and even internal security' (Nkrumah, 1965, p. 6). Thus, the thesis examines the extent to which countries of the Global North implement neocolonial practices by exercising power over independent and mostly former colonialized countries by influencing the development and policies from outside through economic and monetary means in the area of food policy (Ashcroft et al., 2007; Nkrumah, 1965).

To reach the second goal of the SDGs which targets food insecurity, the UN argues that the 'inter linkages among supporting sustainable agriculture, empowering small farmers, promoting gender equality, ending rural poverty, ensuring healthy lifestyles, tackling climate change, and other issues' (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.–a) have to be addressed to reach the SDGs.

However, by promoting the development of sustainable food and agriculture systems and simultaneously reaching other objectives of the SDGs, the development paradigm may enforce neocolonial structures and strengthen the North-South power nexus by promoting development modeled after the Western industrialization. Hence, the nexus between development and food security in global food policymaking has to be critically analyzed.

This thesis addresses this need by examining the extent to which **neocolonial practices and structures are present in the discourse around food policies influencing global food policymaking.** Since mostly Western knowledge is used to evaluate food policies, scientists of the Global South are marginalized in the process. Hence, global policymaking is based on Western-centric knowledge production. While policymakers today 'routinely rely [on] scientific expertise in their decision making' (Douglas, 2007, p. 122), neglecting African expertise and knowledge Western knowledge and solutions are applied to non-Western problems which reinforce a Western-centric lens in policy processes.

These critical assessments in the North-South cooperation lead to the second sub-question (SQ2): *'To what extent is the North-South power nexus mirrored in the global food security policymaking?*'

3. Methods

Departing from the assumptions that policymaking may be biased in favor of neoliberal and neocolonial ideologies thereby marginalizing non-Western scholarship and expertise on food policies, leads to the need to identify these assumptions in the discourse within food policymaking. Examining how these concepts are reoccurring and used in policy papers, can reveal patterns of social and political discourses and their replication in global policymaking.

3.1. Focus on food policymaking between the AU and EU

The Task Force for Rural Africa (TFRA) was initiated in the aftermath of the second AU-EU agriculture ministerial conference, held in July 2017 in Rome, and the fifth AU-EU summit, held in November 2017 in Abidjan, which created a partnership between the AU and EU in the fields of food and agriculture. In May 2018, the TFRA was set up 'to advise the Commission on how best to contribute to sustainable development and job creation in Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy' (European Commission, n.d.–a). Hence, The TFRA was tasked to strengthen the AU-EU partnership in the field of food and farming and to 'provide expertise, advice and possible recommendations in relation to enhancing the role of the EU agrifood and agroindustrial sector in the job-creating economic, sustainable development of the African continent' (European Commission, n.d.–c).

While the policy process of the AU-EU food policymaking has been accompanied by the TFRA since 2018, the TFRA comprises 'eleven members with a first-hand knowledge of the agri-food

sector in Africa' (European Commission, n.d.–a). By applying expert knowledge to the policymaking process, the TFRA seeks to contribute to the AU-EU partnership. In March 2019, the TFRA published its first report 'setting out strategies and recommendations for the transformation of Africa's rural areas' (European Commission, n.d.–a). While the TFRA was set up for a limited scope of time, the TFRA published an updated report in 2020 on the global pandemic that reconsiders its initial policy recommendations. To identify neocolonial and neoliberal practices, the policy process has to be examined since neocolonialism is not only to be found in text and content but also in context (Fairclough, 1992). As a committee consisting of experts on African agriculture open to everyone to apply who fulfills the criteria, the TFRA holds only two members from African countries assisting the policymaking process. Hence, the reinforcement of neocolonial practices has to be investigated.

3.2. Data

The data in the form of policy documents were extracted from the official sites of the AU and EU. Several criteria of inclusion and exclusion were imposed on the policy papers. First, all policy documents or other sorts of documents that are concerned about food policymaking between the AU and EU are considered. Since the SDGs were implemented in 2015 and resilience was introduced as the leitmotif of the EU's CSDP in 2016, only policy documents published in or after 2015 were incorporated. While the TFRA compromises 'high level expertise and experience in agriculture, agri-business or agroindustry, trade, development policy or migration related issues and first-hand knowledge of the agri-food sector in Africa' (European Commission, 2018, p. 2) from civil society, scientists, and economic interests, the TFRA plays a central advisory role in the AU-EU relation. Hence, only policy documents concerning the policy process between the AU and EU since the introduction of the TFRA in May 2018 will be included. Additionally, literature by scientists of the Global South, especially local African scientists, will be incorporated to assess food policymaking critically.

3.3. Data analysis

This thesis aims to examine existing concepts and power dominations in policy processes to identify problems in global food policymaking to develop new concepts and solutions e.g., suggesting new policies and strategies to overcome identified problems and close gaps in the literature. Hence, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) is applied to analyze written texts in the form of policy documents 'to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias' (Sheyholislami, 2015, p. 1). Thus, the CDA as a subcategory of discourse analysis is centered around language to unmask ideology and power domination reinforced by language shaping the policy discourse (Traue et al., 2014). Since 'language is an integral part of social process' (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 189 as cited in Sheyholislami, 2015, p. 2), language reinforces power and ideology which form a discourse

influencing policy processes. Hence, connecting text and context in research, a CDA, according to Fairclough (1992), is three-dimensional involving the analysis of text, the analysis of context, and the analysis of processes of text production and interpretation since '[p]ower relations are produced, exercised, and reproduced through discourse' (Sheyholislami, 2015, p. 13) visible through language. However, a CDA 'does not solely interpret texts, but also explains them' (Sheyholislami, 2015) which is crucial when analyzing neocolonial and neoliberal practices since the CDA aims to establish 'critical language awareness' (Fairclough, 1992, p. 212) which is central to overcome neocolonial practices.

By systematically exploring how discursive elements 'are maintained and reproduced within specific social, political and historical contexts' (Sheyholislami, 2015, p. 1), a CDA connects a text analysis with intertextual and contextual dimensions of research. Hence, a CDA 'aims at making transparent the connections between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures' (Sheyholislami, 2015, p. 1) enabling the uncovering of neocolonial and neoliberal practices which are socially embedded as well. While the CDA is considered a historical method, a CDA aims to explain phenomena of the present by analyzing the historical process which shaped the current situation (Traue et al., 2014). Thus, the analysis of knowledge and expertise over a limited timeframe forming discursive practices which influence a policy process is central to a CDA (Traue et al., 2014). To uncover neocolonial and neoliberal patterns, a CDA is applied to identify power dimensions of inequality not only textual but also contextual to recognize the main concepts and approaches which contribute to the current discourse of people's right to food. Using CDA, the three-dimensional approach to power defined by Lukes (2005, 2007) is applied to examine the discursive elements around the EU's food policies towards African countries to unmask neocolonial and neoliberal practices.

The CDA became an accepted method in the scientific community enhancing the quality of scientific research by evaluating e.g., policy documents textually, intertextually, and contextually. Moreover, a qualitative CDA allows the researcher to discover latent meanings in policy documents and to interpret them according to the socio-cultural context. It is a transparent method and therefore intersubjectively verifiable enhancing the validity and reliability through reproducibility and transparency (Mayring & Fenzl, 2014). Following the scheme of a CDA, first, a relevant puzzle has to be identified leading to formulating a research question allowing a CDA to be used as a method to analyze discursive elements in a policy process to make gaps and power structures visible to answer the question. In a second step, data in the form of policy documents will be collected and evaluated leading to the inclusion or exclusion of documents based on transparent assessment criteria.

To minimize bias partially, a second review is chosen ensuring the reflection of the analysis by being aware of applying an interpretive lens 'to recognize when idiosyncratic values are influencing scientific reasoning or methodology when the values in question are different from one's

own…diversity is likely to cause the scientific community as a whole to see existing limitations with how research questions are framed and with existing models, the range of alternative hypotheses and explanations considered, as well as faulty background assumptions' (Intemann, 2010, p. 782 as cited in Owens, 2016, p. 16). A peer-review by fellow bachelor circle students is conducted to evaluate the application of the CDA and theoretical framework to the examined policy process to avoid biases. By being aware of the interpretative lens I as a researcher apply to the analysis, these influences can be reduced in the research process. According to Donna Haraway, diversity in the process of research is essential to overcome 'situated knowledges [since] all knowledge is partial and should be derived from as many embodied social locations as possible' (Haraway, 1989 as cited in Owens, 2016, p. 16).

4. Critical Discourse Analysis

The context of the policy process is examined by analyzing the historical, social, and political context as well as identifying the main actors in the process. Afterward, the main policy documents in the policy process will be scanned to identify dominant and reoccurring narratives which are used to legitimize neocolonial or neoliberal practices by applying Lukes's three-dimensional approach to power. Simultaneously, discourse narratives convicted to be neoliberal or neocolonial will be criticized by drawing on oppressed discourses in the policy field.

To identify neocolonial practices, neocolonialism can be unmasked when 'former large united colonial territories [are transformed] into a number of small non-viable States which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for [defense] and even internal security' (Nkrumah, 1965, p. 6). Neoliberal practices can be detected when economic measures such as privatization and decentralization as solutions to non-economic problems are applied.

The thesis will examine policy texts for key concepts including resilience, food security, and power since food resilience is used to ensure food security. As discussed above, food security itself achieved by food resilience is convicted to enforce neoliberal and neocolonial structures since food is connected to security striving to quantitate food to limit hunger. Nevertheless, food security is not centralized around people since food shall be secured and not the livelihoods of people enhanced. Food production and food systems are central in food security without the emphasis on the human aspects of food vulnerability.

The analysis of the policy discourse between the AU and EU is crucial to identify neoliberal and neocolonial patterns and structures in previous policy documents and discourses to overcome them in the future to enable the creation of a just partnership and solutions which benefit African countries by simultaneously enhancing food justice rather than neoliberalism or neocolonialism.

4.1. Context of the policy process

The relationship between the EU and African countries 'grew out of the 1975 Lomé Convention' (European External Action Service, n.d.) and was implemented in 2000 with the Cotonou Agreement. These agreements contributed to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) which was adopted in 2007 framing the multilateral political relations between African countries and the EU to equally and 'jointly tackle issues of mutual concern' (European External Action Service, n.d.). Thus, the relationship between both continents dates back centuries and is marked and shaped by imperialism and colonialism. After many African countries gained independence, the relationship with European countries was mainly based on economic means. Since the EU started to see African countries as 'the global powerhouse of the future' (AU, n.d.), the EU engages in a deepening relationship with African countries by stating 'Europe and Africa have close historical, cultural and geographical ties' (European External Action Service, n.d.) which have to be enhanced. Since the AU's Agenda 2063 was presented in 2015 to endure the 'Pan African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena' (AU, 2015, p. 1), the AU strives for an African continent which realized its 'full potential in development, culture and peace and to establish flourishing, inclusive and prosperous societies' (AU, 2015, p. 2). The EU by recognizing Africa as its 'twin continent' (JOIN(2020)4 final, 2020, p. 1) aims to be involved in African development leading to tensions and different interests affecting the process. Hence, power dynamics are shaped by these different propositions regarding the future of African countries.

The policy process between the AU and EU to strengthen their partnership in the field of food and agriculture to contribute 'to the sustainable development of Africa's agricultural sector and rural areas' (European Commission, n.d.–a) started in 2016 with the first AU-EU agriculture ministerial conference. This political dialogue is considered as 'the forefront of the Africa-EU partnership on agriculture' (European Commission, n.d.–a). After the second ministerial conference in 2017, the TFRA was established to advise the European Commission (EC) 'on how best to contribute to sustainable development and job creation in Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy' (European Commission, n.d.–a). However, the TFRA was not only tasked to advance and contribute to food and farming policies but also to have expertise on migration in Africa (European Commission, 2018). Arguing that people fleeing their country of origin are one of African countries' most important development resources, justifies investments in capacity building and readmission programs that prevent migration, which is a reoccurring narrative in the EU's foreign policies as well as European politics.

With the emergence of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, the EU's border management shaping asylum and security policies shifted from a migrant-centered approach to a detention approach (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). In 2005, the EU introduced the Global Approach to Migration and

Mobility (GAMM) to conduct 'policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU countries, […] including development cooperation' (European Commission, n.d.–b). In 2011, the GAMM addressed for the first time the concept of 'irregular migration'. Even though the EU applied a migrant-centered approach to ensure the 'well-being of migrants' (COM(2011) 743 final, 2011, p. 5), in light of the refugee crisis, the EU started to frame refugees as illegally accessing the EU. Vaughan-Williams (2015) refers to this approach as the 'securitization of migration' (p. 3) whereby the GAMM connects security to asylum to legitimize the enhancement of border securitizations. With the paradigm shift in the EU border management, migrants were classified as a threat to Europe by being dehumanized. Consequently, the EU mainstreams its interests concerning migration into DevCo agreements with third countries (TC) such as African countries to prevent 'irregular migration' and keep refugees which are seen as a threat outside of EU borders (Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Zaiotti, 2017). Therefore, the EU has been convicted in the past to implement treaties with African countries to build capacities and enhance development in African countries to prevent migration and force readmission onto TC in return for trade and 'aid'. This practice has to be unmasked as neocolonial since Western interests are mainstreamed (Broberg, 2020) dominating trade and EU's DevCo agreements with TC.

The EU considers SSA countries as 'important origin and transit countries of irregular migration to the EU and for this reason, they are priority countries for the EU regarding migration cooperation' (European Commission, n.d.–b). Hence, migration policies are mainstreamed into the framework and cooperation on food policies with the AU and the task of the TFRA. With the implementation of the TFRA and the focus on migration expertise, neocolonial practices through the mainstreaming of Western interests before African interests are to be suspected (Broberg, 2020). Further, migration included in the JAES, the GAMM, or the Pan-African Program states a central pillar of the relationship. As policies to minimize or prevent migration flows, 'knowledge transfer to regions of origin, most notably Africa, through sharing of good practices and enhancing strategic policy cooperation and dialogue with the Africa Union (AU) on issues related to agriculture, agri-food economy and rural development' (European Commission, 2018, p. 1) is seen as key.

The main actors in the policy process are the AU, the EU whereby the EC is the most involved EU institution setting up the TFRA which shapes the policy process. While the TFRA was designed to consist of eleven members, only nine members were mentioned to have contributed to both TFRA reports. The initial TFRA group included four African voices, whereas the TFRA presenting the 2019 and 2020 reports only consisted of two African experts. However, since the TFRA is a group of experts with first-hand knowledge about food and agriculture in Africa states, African scholars should have been considered the experts when it comes to first-hand expertise about African agriculture and food systems and therefore, state the majority of the group's members. However, most of the members e.g., Baudouin Miche, Bruno Losch, or Kees Blokland, are agro-economists tasked to enhance environmental and social sustainability in terms of food and agriculture. Thus, hegemonic and unequal

power dynamics can be evaluated by analyzing the composition of the TFRA. Since the TFRA gives recommendations that are considered in the policy process between AU and EU, African rooted knowledge and expertise is eliminated from the panel instead it is blocked with European-centric knowledge which is applied towards African countries.

4.2. Neoliberal, neocolonial, and power narratives

Analyzing power dynamics is indispensable in order to detect neocolonial and neoliberal practices. Power cannot be analyzed isolated from neocolonialism and neoliberalism. Thus, the implementation of neoliberal and neocolonial practices is examined by simultaneously assessing the power discourse due to Lukes's three-dimensional approach to power.

4.2.1. The Declaration

The declaration of the 3rd AU-EU Agricultural Ministerial Conference which took place in 2019 is the latest policy document in the cooperation between the AU and EU. In it, foremost economic measurements such as the promotion of trade between the AU and EU, intra-African trade, economic integration, and the improvement of market accesses are chosen to tackle food insecurity. Hence, neoliberal solutions in the policy discourse around food and agriculture can be detected by examining the declaration. Here, food security is connected to improve livelihoods by stressing the 'importance of the agriculture sector in fighting' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 1) food insecurity and poverty with the instrument of job creation. However, the tool's limitations to provide food to all is not discussed and job creation is assumed to ensure food security by applying a neoliberal approach. Further, the enhancement of 'agriculture production and productivity' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 1) in African countries is framed as a solution to environmental and social sustainability applying economic means for socio-environmental goals. Throughout the declaration economic measurements are considered to solve all issues related to food insecurity. This includes the proposal to improve private financing and to increase the 'use of existing market accesses opportunities in the EU' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 2) visualizing neoliberal patterns wherein the lack of nutritious food is addressed with the enhancement of private sector involvement and investment which decentralizes responsibility. In the TFRA (2020) report and policy recommendations, sustainability and governance are underlined and food in terms of agriculture is not referred to until Article 3 (4) of the declaration. When agriculture is mentioned, it is connected to economic measurements e.g., the financing of small- and medium-size agriculture businesses through EU cooperation instruments. Although food and agriculture gain little attention in the declaration (even though the theme of the deceleration is 'promoting sustainable regional agriculture food value chains' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 1)), Article 3 (4) creates dependence of African countries on European support.

Further, Article 5 promoting to strengthen the capacity of African businesses through enhancing 'existing market access opportunities in the EU' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 2), implies a neoliberal measure. Though other companies which are not involved in the agriculture and food sector could benefit, too, it is striking that a conference talking about tackling food insecurity and poverty suggests selling more products of any kind to the EU to address an identified lack of capacity in African countries to provide enough food to its own people. Thus, the focus to overcome food insecurity is on the enhancement of the AU-EU trade which creates interdependencies while self-reliance and bottom-up solutions are left out of the discourse. Moreover, it is unclear who gains by opening and improving market accesses. While the EU profits through trade, the AU's benefits from this policy to tackle food insecurity seem unclear. Since economic growth enforced through trade is considered the solution to foremost non-economic problems, this approach can be unmasked as neoliberal.

Another neoliberal implementation is the suggestion to launch an AU-EU agribusiness platform as an 'overarching framework of the Sustainable Business for Africa (SB4A) platform' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 4) to bring the AU's and EU's private sector into dialogue. Although an equal partnership is promoted by establishing an African-European farmer's exchange program where 'African and European framer [can] enhance their skills in operating an agri-business through interactions, targeted seminars and selected training that will expand their knowledge as well as create new networks' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 6), the power dynamics are questionable. Since economic measures are used to transform the agricultural sector of African countries into a sustainable sector, the focus of the declaration is on African countries rather than European countries. While EU member states are bound to the EGD, member states are not considered to be referred to in the declaration even though it is framed as an equal partnership. These concerns are not discussed or challenged in the context of the AU-EU partnership. Hence, the partnership's equity is questionable since the legitimacy to include European knowledge into a one-sided transformation process has to be seen critically. Drawing on the power discourse, it has to be assessed if European farmers take the lead in the knowledge exchange or if this exchange is, in fact, two-directional to overcome neoliberal and neocolonial implementations forced by the EU's power domination.

Drawing on Lukes's third face of power, neoliberal measures such as the enhancement of private sector investment and involvement or the enhancement of the AU-EU trade are implemented since the EU has the capacity to shape outcomes by influencing the AU's desires and beliefs channeling European interests onto the agenda concerned about which issues to tackle and which not. Neoliberal approaches are promoted and supported by the AU since the desire to achieve economic prosperity is formed by replicating the narrative that with development enhanced through the security mechanism resilience comes food security. Thus, developmental resilience is believed to solve all related issues connected to food security and beyond.

By evaluating the implementation of neoliberal policies, the first identified narrative in the declaration is the promotion of enhancing Pan-African trade (Article 5) which can also be interpreted as a sanitized narrative. Since the EU examined that African countries with the establishment of the AU deepened Pan-African relations, the EU wants to be part of the evolvement by referring to Africa as the EU's 'twin continent' (JOIN(2020)4 final, 2020, p. 1). However, according to Onyebuchi Eze (2013), 'Pan-Africanism as an ideological quest for unity among people of African origins all over the world is simultaneously a socio-cultural movement aimed at rescuing the African subjectivity from an imposed misrecognition, abuse, exploitation and domination within history' (pp. 677-678). While Pan-Africanization could empower African countries eliminating exploitation of the Global North to enable the African continent to transform into the powerhouse it could be, the EU claims the narrative of Pan-Africanization by making it a fundamental part of the EU's comprehensive strategy towards Africa. Enabling Pan-Africanization under European leadership creates interdependencies preventing the independent development of African countries.

Further, neocolonial structures creating dependencies can be detected since the application of EU investment tools and the enhancement of private-sector corporations to tackle food insecurity might be tied to requirements reinforcing interdependencies. It is evident in the text that the EU has the power to influence the discourse around food by mainstreaming European interests as pointed out by Broberg (2020). Article 3 (6) stresses the importance of bringing together 'European and African expertise for agriculture and rural development' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 1). By assuming that African countries need the EU's 'help' to enhance agriculture, the discussion about alternative approaches from European cooperation instruments and expertise is silenced, implying that there is no alternative other than relying on EU support. This indicates Lukes's third face of power since the EU as an actor has more capacity to persuade the AU to implement measurements even when these policies undermine African states' integrity. Hence, dependency structures are established enforcing neocolonial practices.

The second face of power is visible since the implementation of EU financing and investment tools is not challenged in the face of reaching an independent African development. Alternative African-centered and based approaches are excluded from the discourse by assuming that the EU must help African countries. Hence, the second narrative of the policy document can be identified. The EU is framed as Africa's savior although the question of what do African countries need to be saved from is left out of the discourse. The second discourse narrative is centered around the belief that economic development shall enhance security since it is believed that issues can be tackled through economic enhancement forced through monetary and financial means. Further, the development narrative applied in the discourse on food is a sanitized narrative. While the development paradigm seems new, it embraces the same mechanisms as monetary investments of Western-centered global players such as the EU in African countries as the narrative of aid did before. Development enhancing security and

tackling all other issues is in comparison to aid just dismantling the implied power structures since aid was criticized and convicted of applying hegemonic and neocolonial structures which shaped the relationship between the AU and EU in the past. By continuing to frame the EU as African countries' savior, neocolonial narratives are applied and implemented which are supported by the power discourse mainstreaming EU interests as well as dominating the agenda-setting while dismantling these structures keeping African critical discourses off of the agenda.

A partnership in research and innovation around climate change adaptation strategies in African countries (Deliverable 2 of the Action Agenda) is promoted in the declaration. However, while European countries are not included in the deliverable, the actions should take place 'under the EU's climate-resilient Development-Smart Innovation through Research in Agriculture (DeSIRA) initiative' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 4). Simultaneously, the private sector should be involved to improve the research on sustainable food systems. It remains unclear why the discourse assumes that African countries would benefit from EU-led and based research. These power structures can be classified as hegemonic since the EU presents itself as a leader and expert in climate change mitigation applying an African-centered objective although the EU lacks climate change adaptation mechanisms itself. The expressed EU-led research on climate adaptation strategies in African countries reflects uneven power distributions. This deliverable is not only neoliberal by outsourcing the responsibility onto the private sector but also neocolonial since the EU has the capacity to hegemonically influence the AU to implement policies that enforce neocolonial patterns and harm the independence of African countries while portraying the EU as a progressive actor which must 'help' African countries in sustainable transformation even though the EU itself is not sustainable. Additionally, the EU mainstreams its own policies and progresses such as the EGD onto African countries even though the African continent 'is the continent least responsible for climate change' (Chikanda, 2009, p. 80) while countries of the Global North and uprising BRIC states push global gas emissions.

Further, the EU tries to transfer European-based programs to African countries by promoting Western-based solutions in these non-Western communities. In the EU, the LEADER program empowering local communities 'is a local development method which has been used for 30 years to engage local actors in the design and delivery of strategies, decision-making and resource allocation for the development of their rural areas' (ENRD, n.d.). The implementation of similar programs to the LEADER program's principles is promoted to allow 'African countries and local communities to test and adapt them to their local needs' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 6). Though it seems like a local multisectoral approach promoting bottom-up empowerment, development modeled after Western development applied to non-Western solutions is proposed to fit European models to African communities even though needs might differ. Westernization approaches have been criticized in the past and convicted to enforce neocolonial practices. E.g., 'Bretton Woods institutions are a contemporary example of how economic institutions play a Westernizing disciplinary role, by structuring international power

relations through structural adjustment program[s]' (La Branche, 2005, p. 228) on African countries to create neocolonial imperialism.

NGOs have also criticized this regarding the new EU initiative NaturAfrica aiming to reverse biodiversity losses in African countries. Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK and Forest Peoples Programme (2020) criticize the 'top-down conservation restrictions and heavy-handed enforcement' (p. 2) by the EU towards African countries regarding the implied NaturAfrica initiative introduced in the EGD. The new initiative 'says it can build on the Natura 2000 experience in the EU itself, implying without a credible basis that the same approach could be transposed to Africa' (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 2). Since it is criticized that the EU-based program Natura 2000 aiming to extend the network of protected areas in the EU is taken and applied to African countries without adjusting it to African political, social, economic, and historical conditions, 'entrench[es] a flawed and unsustainable conservation model that has led to serious human rights abuses and dispossession of some of the world's most vulnerable people while doing little for ecosystems in Africa' (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 1). The NGOs stress that '[t]he concept relies on a patchy analysis of the root causes of biodiversity loss in pilot areas and makes several seemingly unsubstantiated claims, implying that 'population' is largely to blame risks further scapegoating some of the world's most vulnerable people' (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 2). Although NaturAfrica neglects and ignores a rights-centered approach to protect the most vulnerable people and African resources from exploitation, 'past failures and expanding rights-abusing 'fortress' conservation measures across vast areas of the continent' (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 3) are enforced again. While the declaration supports sustainable initiatives as the Regreening Africa program to 'incorporate trees into croplands and pastoral areas, communal lands and other suitable areas' (AU & EU, 2019, p. 7), there is no reflection on what causes biodiversity loss and the role that Western companies play in deforestation and environmental degradation. Hence, the EU ignores past failures by not addressing corporations' influence. The second face of power can be identified since addressing these failures is silenced in the discourse because it would harm the EU's interest if the EU's responsibilities in exploiting African resources would be addressed. E.g., Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK and Forest Peoples Programme (2020) detect that 'evidence mounts that strictly protected areas, including those funded by the EU, have led to serious human rights abuses, and that securing land rights and devolving management power to local communities leads to more equitable and sustainable conservation, the time is ripe for a radical rethink of how conservation is done in Africa' (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020, p. 3) to not enforce neocolonial and neoliberal practices anymore.

Evaluating the declaration's power discourse, it can be determined that some issues connected to food and agriculture are not mentioned. Land loss through land grabbing and land degradation is not addressed perhaps because Western companies often cause land loss by planting oil palms or other monocultural plants exploiting the land. Further, the concept of food security which has been critically accessed by scientists (Fladvad et al., 2020; Wald & Hill, 2016) in the past is implemented and used as a narrative without even considering the neocolonial or critical aspects of it. Instead of introducing new empowering concepts such as food sovereignty to tackle food vulnerability, old narratives replicating the development-security nexus are reinforced and promoted as empowering approaches.

To summarize the declaration which is supposed to be fundamental in the policy process around food pays little attention to food and agriculture while being highly concerned about EU leadership in African countries through the enhancement of economic measurements. Overall, the policy document does not address the reasons for food insecurity taking the situation of food insecurity as given by leaving its causes unchallenged. While the focus is on African countries' access to the global market, the proposed solutions might raise food insecurity. However, as stated above, the narratives framing the EU as Africa's savior by bridging trade and research promoting EU leadership in African countries and Pan-Africanization claimed and sanitized by the EU through Europeanization it, is convicted to be neocolonial as well as neoliberal which has to be overcome. Further, the extent to which economic development enhancement leads to environmental injustice has to be challenged and integrated into the policy discourse. Since social and environmental justice is not addressed in the declaration, the question remains who benefits and who loses, and approaches criticized by NGOs (2020) and other scientists have to be examined due to reinforcement of neocolonial practices through neoliberal means.

4.2.2. TFRA report

Since the declaration of the 3rd Agriculture Ministerial Conference (2018) refers to the TFRA report of 2019, the TFRA revised its policy recommendations considering the implications and consequences of the global pandemic and the new EU climate policy (EGD) influencing the AU-EU relationship. Since the EGD aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050, it 'will have implications for Africa – Europe relations' (TFRA, 2020, p. 2). In the new report, the suggestions of 2019 are reviewed drawing on the original propositions, and renewed policy recommendations are added endorsing the 'four strategic areas of action [which] should underpin the transformation of Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy' (TFRA, 2020, p. 6). These are: A territorial approach for income and job creation; sustainable land and natural resources management, and climate action; Sustainable transformation of African agriculture; and Development of the African food industry and food markets. In these areas, the TFRA proposed policies that are amended due to the current implications.

Food security is one of the main concerns addressed in the revised policy proposal. The renewed report also focuses on the EU's contribution 'to sustainable development in Africa's agri-food sector and rural economy' (TFRA, 2020, p. 5). Since the focus shifted towards food security, the TFRA presents reasons for food insecurity. On the one side, the global pandemic is convicted to have an impact 'disproportionately on low income workers, particularly in urban areas, and in countries with the weakest healthcare and social protection systems and the most fragile food systems' (TFRA, 2020, p. 8), which is partly true since Covid-19 caused significant risks to vulnerable countries. However, the current focus on neoliberal policymaking and economic development rather than strengthening social protection systems and vulnerable communities is a leading cause of this vulnerability. On the other hand, challenges and issues African countries are facing are blamed on African countries' 'unachieved demographic transition, resulting in a massive youth bulge and demand for job creation' (TFRA, 2020, p. 9). Hence, population growth is identified as the main cause of food insecurity, malnutrition, and environmental degradation replicating the narrative of the declaration. This leaves other causes such as corruption, no protection programs, capitalist, and neoliberal structures left out of the discourse which draws on the second face of power. Deriving from this assumption, the TFRA (2020) demands sustainable transition: 'Africa requires a decisive shift towards sustainable food systems' (p. 9). According to the TFRA, the EU is engaged in international cooperation and external relations where 'the EU will pursue the development of Green Alliances on sustainable food systems with all its partners in bilateral, regional and multilateral fora' (TFRA, 2020, p. 9). Though sustainability is an aim which the AU strives for, too (AU, 2015), channeling green environmental policies in food agreements with TC, sustainable transition is forced onto African countries which has to be seen critically in the light of neocolonial structures.

Since the EU dominates the power discourse, sustainability transformations of African countries visible in neglected African leadership and independence have to be assessed critically drawing on the third face of power since the EU hegemonically mainstreams its interest in its partnership with the AU. Hence, the short-term goal introduced by the TFRA to establish an Africa Europe Climate Alliance emphasizing that 'African countries should work closely with the EU to ensure that their interests are fully represented and their voices properly heard at the Summit' (TFRA, 2020, p. 9), is unmasked as implementing neocolonial dependencies. The TFRA implies that African countries need to partner with European countries to get their voices heard which implies a struggle for power regarding leadership. The TFRA frames the AU-EU partnership as 'a partnership of equals, sharing experience of political and economic integration, developing joint answers to climate change and migration, as well as innovation in new pathways for economic and social progress' (TFRA, 2020, p. 6). However, challenges such as climate crisis, violent conflict, or a global pandemic are just seen as challenges that have to be addressed in African countries since European countries are capable and resilient enough to do it without African countries' support. Moreover, the TFRA (2020) stresses the

engagement of Africa and Europe ‘with wider multilateral and international processes’ (p. 6) which does not properly reflect the dependencies global actors and players have created in the past. Hence, influences of uprising nations such as the BRIC states or Global North countries are left out of the discourse framing global engagement as a solely positive contribution to African development. The revised proposal of the TFRA is a top-down driven suggestion about determining the development of African countries by creating neocolonial dependencies.

Other implemented neocolonial structures channeled through the second and third face of power are revealed in the report’s (2020) propositions concerning African food and agriculture systems and how to transform these systems into sustainable entities. While African food and agriculture production contribute only to a small percentage to global emissions, other countries are the main polluters. E.g., ‘[t]here are five countries which each contribute more than 5% to global emissions: China (13.8%); Indonesia (8.8%); United States (8.2%); Brazil (7.4%); and India (6.3%)’ (Our World in Data, 2015) regarding the global gas emissions resulting from food[2] in 2015. Hence, there is ‘a large gap between the top five and the rest’ (Our World in Data, 2015). E.g., the Central African Republic accounts for just 0.1 % of its emission to global gas emissions while Zambia – the African country having the highest emission when it comes to food production in 2015 contributes only 2.56% to the global emissions (Our World in Data, 2015). Hence, foremost countries of the Global North and the BRIC states account for global emissions due to their food production. However, it is implied that African countries shall shift towards sustainable food systems even though the African continent ‘is the continent least responsible for climate change’ (Chikanda, 2009, p. 80) but it most vulnerable to its effects. The severe impacts of climate change on African countries ‘range from reduced agricultural production, worsening food security and growing malnutrition, to spreading disease, more humanitarian emergencies, growing migratory pressures and increased risk of conflict over scarce land and water resources’ (Chikanda, 2009, p. 80) while they are ‘least able to meet the costs of adapting to these impacts, with the greatest need to develop its energy sources, and also with the potential to contribute to global efforts to reduce emissions through its forest resources’ (Chikanda, 2009, p. 80). Hence, ‘African countries find themselves entangled in a web of poverty as the impacts of climate change further reduces their capacities to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner’ (Chikanda, 2009, p. 80).

Mkandawire and Arku (2009) examine ‘that key environmental policies adopted by sub-Saharan countries do not only amplify environmental discourses from rich countries, but also that they in many ways serve strategic interests of rich nations’ (p. 95). This links to the first and fourth propositions of the report (2020), which could enhance exploitation and environmental degradation. However, these risks in connection with European private investment and involvement or African

[2] ‚Food system emissions include agriculture, land use change and supply chain emissions (transport, packaging, food processing, retail, cooking, and waste). Emissions are quantified on the basis of food production, not consumption. This means they do not account for international trade.‘ (Our World in Data, 2015)

companies are not mentioned. Moreover, by promoting the acquisition and integration of the private sector, the state delivers the conditions for neoliberal marketization. Framing poverty as leading to exploitation and unsustainability, '[e]merging evidence suggest that the poor do not initially or directly degrade the environment' (Chikanda, 2009, p. 81). Thus, poor and vulnerable groups are the victims as well as the agents of environmental degradation, however, the 'activities by the rich and powerful are the primary contributing factors forcing groups living at the margins into poverty' (Chikanda, 2009, p. 81). Even though environmental degradation is one of the main issues in African countries as well as climate change, it is framed as a consequence of population growth while other factors influencing and causing deforestation, degradation, or land loss are neglected.

African countries' development and environmental policies are directed by powerful nations of the Global North such as European countries which 'tend to militate against the livelihoods of poor communities in developing countries' (Mkandawire & Arku, 2009, p. 95). Thus, key policies in many African countries mainstream European interests revealing the third face of power. Since European interests are convicted of being channeled into the AU-EU partnership, African countries' interest to promote independent African development (AU, 2015) is neglected due to the EU's capacity to dominate the power discourse which leads to the implementation of neocolonial dependencies.

Since new objectives and targets shall be reached in African countries as set out by the declaration, '[t]hese objectives are often pursued at the expense of poor communities' (Mkandawire & Arku, 2009, pp. 107–108) who are framed as the sole cause of environmental degradation and food insecurity. Mkandawire and Arku (2009) argue that 'while environmentally deleterious practices of corporations remain unchecked, poor communities often face state violence when they attempt to assert their rights to livelihoods' (p. 108). The livelihoods of the poor are discriminated even though they are the most vulnerable group to the climate crisis, environmental degradation, and food insecurity in order to uphold 'the global political will to revisit the existing mode of production and patterns of consumption' (Mkandawire & Arku, 2009, p. 108). Poverty reduction enhancing the wellbeing of poor communities is traded off for development achieving food security. This power imbalance shifts responsibility and blame onto the individual through concepts such as resilience while not touching upon the consequences of corporations' actions by trying to fulfill the narrative. The EU, presenting itself as a global guarantor for human rights, amplifies vulnerabilities of poor communities by mainstreaming its neoliberal interest in agreements with African countries despite known human rights violations and rising vulnerabilities caused by Western-based and led programs. Thus, EU leadership and approaches such as resilience are criticized to neglect the Global North's power domination.

By implementing resilience as an empowering approach, Joseph (2013) emphasizes that resilience is 'a form of governance that emphasi[z]es individual responsibility' (p. 38). This shift towards individual responsibility is to be understood as 'neoliberalism's normative way of

mobile[z]ing social agents' (Joseph, 2013, p. 38). This can be seen in the discourse on the transformation into resilient food and agriculture systems. Although there are scientists e.g., Wagner and Anholt (2016), who challenge the concept of resilience since it is criticized instead of being an empowering bottom-up approach to push the responsibility from a European and Western level to local levels of vulnerable countries, resilience convicted to increase food vulnerabilities is not challenge in food policymaking. Nations causing anthropogenic climate change which mostly burdens countries of the Global South are nowadays addressing these consequences in the Global South by implementing resilience to impose that food security cannot be reached because a country or region is not resilient enough. Instead of creating sustainable food and agriculture systems, land loss enforced by Western companies is not problematized, and the quantitative nourishment of food instead of investing in regional fitting and sustainable food systems. Thus, sustainability may be traded against security enforcing capitalism and neoliberalism. However, resilience remains unchallenged in supranational or global policymaking about food since the declaration nor the TFRA report critically challenge the concept of resilience leaving no room for alternative concepts.

To summarize, the second face of power is visible by identifying issues and problems which are left of the agenda since it would hurt EU interests that are mainstreamed in the relationship with the AU. Moreover, hegemonic power can be examined since policies are suggested in the TFRA report 2019 and included later in the declaration shaping the AU-EU relationship which harms African countries in the long-term. Trends such as vulnerability through Covid-19 did not just occur since the global pandemic but have been in place before due to the neo-liberalization and economic pushing of African countries. The suggestions and proposals of the TFRA are top-down driven since e.g., the NaturAfrica concept proposed by the EU is uncritically included in the advisory towards the EC legitimizing the EU to decide about African countries land use since the concept 'aims to consolidate the biodiversity in large landscapes in Africa, through the promotion of the 'Green Economy' with a high degree of inclusiveness with the local communities' (TFRA, 2020, p. 9). Although NGOs criticized the NaturAfrica initiative to neglect human rights and pose a threat to indigenous people, these critiques are silenced, and neoliberal and neocolonial practices mainstreamed.

4.2.3. Public consultation

Since the TFRA drafted its first report in 2019, a public consultation was launched 'seeking the views and opinions of the stakeholders on the report and the recommendations of the TFRA, to better plan and implement future actions vis a vis to Africa for deepening the new Africa – Europe Alliance for sustainable investment and jobs' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 5). The TFRA states that the report 'contributed to the formulation of a Political Declaration […] [and the] Action Agenda in the 3rd AU-EU Agriculture Ministerial Conference' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 5).

The public consultation included various participants from European and African countries since it was opened to respondents from both continents. Even though the majority of the 248 participants are citizens of African countries, the legitimacy of including European stakeholders and the European public to evaluate the report of the TFRA is questionable. The inclusion of the European public is framed as legitimate although it remains unclear why the European public without expertise on agriculture and food production in African countries has to be involved in policymaking that is directed towards African countries since inclusiveness and openness were not considered important enough to include various African voices as members into the TFRA. Though the consultation report presented critical voices on the TFRA report, they were not included in the revised report. Thus, there is a clear gap between what is considered valid concerning policymaking in the EU and what is valid regarding EU policymaking towards African countries.

The representative nature of the consultation has to be questioned since the availability and transparency of the report to the African public are not clear. It is striking that out of the 198 respondents from African countries, 101 responses came from West African countries, whereas only 21 responses have been received from countries located in Central Africa or South Africa. Since Central African countries face severe food insecurity and are foremost addressed by AU-EU policymaking, the consultation of the public and stakeholders in these countries would have been crucial. Although the TFRA states that 'the validity of the answered is enhanced, given that most institutes and [organizations], which participated in the survey, are active in Africa' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 13), only 65 respondents are classified as individual farmers working in the domestic food and agriculture sector or as workers in '[p]rivate enterprise[s] active in the agri-food sector' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 12). While many respondents are part of the private sector which is not directly involved in primary food and agriculture production, the interest of companies and enterprises are channeled in the consultation report undermining the needs and interests of small- and medium-size individual farmers. The European respondents involved are mainly from Germany and Belgium representing European agricultural economies that are not producing to secure food rather to export it. Hence, these different interests and concerns determine the perception of the TFRA report.

The consultation survey is categorized along the TFRA's four strategic areas of action.

A Territorial Approach for Income and Job Creation. This approach emphasizes that the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period of African countries marked by 'European [colonization and exploitation] deeply shaped Africa's spatial infrastructure' (TFRA, 2019a, p. 27). Nevertheless, by introducing a territorial approach which 'goes beyond existing administrative boundaries, […] a clear break from the legacy of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial history in Africa' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 16) has to be made. Locating Western colonialism and exploitation in the past, a partnership that moves beyond postcolonial implications is promoted which eliminates the EU's responsibility regarding damages of European colonization. E.g., presenting neoliberal measures such as enhancing

trade or ‘aid’, amplifies neocolonial structures by separating power from responsibility is emphasized (Chandler, 2006). Since European countries want to guide African development, African demands to hold European countries responsible for colonial and postcolonial damages, which still impact African countries today, are oppressed. Aid replaces reparation which deepens interdependencies while neglecting responsibility and independent development. Presenting aid as a form of reparation is critical and clearly dismantling neocolonial implications. This discourse is silenced in the AU-EU policymaking.

While most participants consider a territorial approach as more inclusive, the participants disagreeing with the approach are worried that ‘[r]ural inhabitants in Africa are not able to get involved to complex procedures and collective actions, because of the high rate of illiteracy’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 17). Moreover, these respondents are stressing that the governance structures in African countries are not developed enough excluding marginalized groups from the process. Although these are important concerns, illiteracy and the participation of marginalized groups are barely addressed in the declaration or the renewed report. Though the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) intending ‘to provide a framework for responsible tenure governance that supports food security, poverty alleviation, sustainable resource use and environmental protection’ (Asian NGO Coalition, n.d.) and the NaturAfrica initiative were mentioned in the declaration and the revised report, both are criticized to hurt indigenous people and marginalized communities (Minority Rights Group, Rainforest Foundation UK & Forest Peoples Programme, 2020). Thus, these initiatives are not sufficient implementations to address these concerns.

Sustainable Land and Natural Resources Management and Climate Action. Most of the respondents agree with the pillar’s strategy ‘giving incentives to land users, such as farmers and pastoralists in order to adapt and continue sustainable land management practices, through policy measures and other mechanisms, while ensuring their ownership and access to land’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 20). Nevertheless, ‘[r]especting international conventions and establishing adequate and independent national climate policies’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 21) is suggested as an alternative way to mainstream sustainability and climate action while it is stressed that agri-business’ influence shaping national climate policies should be limited. Moreover, the goal of fair trade is proposed since ‘establishing fair trade conditions could avoid, according to some respondents, situations where European agro-industrial products are perceived to be flooding and destroying the African markets’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 21). Even though fair-trade states a fundamental pillar of an equal partnership, the neoliberal framing of the 2019 report and the EU domination in this process is amplified in the declaration and the renewed report excluding fair-trade as a new policy.

Sustainable Transformation of African Agriculture. Agriculture especially in SAA countries ‘remains a critical component of livelihoods’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 24). The development of the

agricultural sector in the SSA region is, according to OECD and FAO (2016), crucial to ensure food security since it contributes to a higher percentage to the region's GDP compared to other regions. The OECD and FAO (2016) argue that this 'high contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP also underlines the limited diversification of most African economies' (p. 60). While the agriculture sector accounts for 3% of Botswana's GDP, Chad's GDP is determined with over 50% by agricultural production. Hence, economic and agricultural structures vary among the countries stating different challenges in the aim to strive for food security. Besides food insecurity, the countries of the SSA are shaped by future megatrends such as 'demographic change, the rise of the African middle class, growing access to new information and communication technologies, rapid urbani[z]ation and consequent shifts in food demand' (OECD & FAO, 2016, p. 60) influencing the provision of food to people. Hence, the TFRA 'proposes measures to achieve rapid inclusive agricultural growth, using and preserving the full potential of ecological resources to co-design with local actors a new development paradigm' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 24). While agricultural transformation is seen as key, some respondents argue that sustainable transformation 'could represent a threat to the African biodiversity and environment' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 24). This is underlined in the critique from various NGOs emphasizing the danger of the EU's biodiversity strategy towards African countries enforcing land grabbing, threatening indigenous people and biodiversity, and fostering environmental degradation. Moreover, respondents worry about the increase of 'inequities between farmers, since it would make it more difficult for small and poor ones to access to land and capital. Another main fear is that transformation of the sector risks favoring and facilitating land grabbing' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 24). The concern that European agri-food products are dominating the market is stressed suggesting the '[d]umping of European agri-food products, which outcompete the local production, should be avoided. Some respondents argue that preferential treatment given to African producers should be maintained in order to protect them from unfair global competition' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 26). However, land grabbing, land loss, or the domination of EU agri-food products are barely addressed in the declaration and the new report. Eliminating root causes of food insecurity instead of solving problems through neoliberal means such as market orientation which contributed to land grabbing and deforestation, is not addressed.

Development of the African Food Industry and Food Markets. The creation of 'major employment and livelihood opportunities both in the agri-food sector and across the rural economy' (TFRA, 2019b, p. 30) is considered a key element for decreasing food insecurity supported by neoliberal arguments such as: the food industry can offer many jobs and generate growth, or the evolvement of food chains leads to globalization which provides opportunities. However, some voices 'consider[] the development of African food industry and food markets as unsuitable for creating employment and livelihood opportunities include[ing] the fear that the food industries will push for the intensification of the production, with disastrous consequences for the environment' (TFRA, 2019b,

p. 30). Moreover, pushing the development of the food and industry and markets could ‘destroy local markets and local production, where small structures and informal economy continue dominating because of their flexible character’ (TFRA, 2019b, p. 30).

By examining the revised report and the declaration, the accusations and concerns expressed by participants have not been included. Due to the power domination coming from European and AU actors in the policy process, neoliberalism visible in resilience and trade policies is seen as key to overcome food insecurity. Even though worries about neoliberal trends are presented in the consultation, these are neglected in the declaration and renewed report. Moreover, the suggestion to exclude European food trade to improve African development and economy without European interference is silenced.

4.3. Summary

Resilience as an approach to tackle food insecurity replaced the UN approach to promote development modeled after Western industrialization. However, as discussed above, food security itself achieved by food resilience is convicted to enforce neoliberal and neocolonial structures. Hence, food security in connection with resilience is a limited concept showing weaknesses by applying Western solutions to non-Western problems and marginalizing non-Western scholarship on these issues. Policymaking and science must engage in a new discourse to implement approaches and goals that are inclusive and reject imperialist and capitalist interdependencies. Enabling new concepts to take the lead in global food policymaking fostering sustainable solutions that are centralized around peoples’ demands contributes to food justice.

Hence, resilience eliminating the responsibility of Western nations by simultaneously enhancing power structures shifting responsibility to a local level and food security as an approach which ‘mainstream[s] views of (neoliberal) economic development through capitalist investment, growth and international trade’ (Wald & Hill, 2016, p. 203) have to be challenged to prevent neocolonial and neoliberal dependencies. Wald and Hill (2016) suggest a shift towards food sovereignty ‘as an alternative paradigm with strong sentiments against corporate-led globali[z]ation and with emphasis on local-level democratic control over production’ (p. 203) to provide sustainable practices in alternative food networks. Wald and Hill (2016) argue that food security as the common approach is ‘inadequate for the ongoing task of ensuring a just and sustainable economy of food’ (p. 203). Since food security is criticized to be ‘based on the imperative of progressively increasing the quantities of food produced through large-scale plantation systems and agribusiness technologies’ (Martiniello, 2015, p. 510), food sovereignty challenges the current approaches and can enrich a multi-scalar approach towards ensuring sustainable food systems (Wald & Hill, 2016). Martiniello (2015) argues that the ‘power of food sovereignty as a concept lies in its promise to integrate a wide range of important issues, from the quality, quantity and availability of food, to the identity of producers, style

of farming, democratic representation and sustainability […] to shift emphasis away from national self-sufficiency to local self-sufficiency and decision making autonomy' (pp. 509-510).

Fladvad et al. (2020) present a new approach to achieve food justice, too, by focusing on 'analytical entry points from legal geography, legal anthropology, and political theory to bring these disciplines into dialogue with empirically grounded research on movements struggling for land and sovereignty' (p. 80). Thus, legal geography has to be further explored to examine its compatibility to reach food justice.

Hence, the aim to achieve food justice should be central in science and policymaking and implemented as the new objective to enable sustainable solutions. In the light of the upcoming conferences, food security as a concept convicted to be neocolonial and neoliberal should be banned and empowering concepts such as food sovereignty or other approaches promoting sustainable solutions to provide food to all by being people-centered should be embraced to deliver on the aim to achieve food justice. Thus, policy recommendations are suggested below to create just and sustainable policies empowering African communities.

5. Discussion

Before policy recommendations can be presented and the sub-questions and main research question can be answered, the thesis's benefits and limitations have to be discussed. While neocolonialism rooted in international relations is culturally, historically, and contextually embedded, a CDA as a historical method connecting context to content to detect neocolonialism and neoliberalism evaluates historical and current narratives shaping the policy discourse. To unmask neocolonial and neoliberal practices, the context as well as the content had to be examined.

The thesis aims to improve global policymaking by overcoming neoliberal and neocolonial patterns to enhance just and equal partnerships. Since a qualitative research design was chosen to examine the research question, targeted examination by analyzing the AU-EU policymaking as an example of global food policymaking is enabled. Thus, implications to improve global food policymaking can be drawn from the analysis, although the results are not generalizable to all North-South partnerships. Since hegemonic power dynamics are unmasked in the AU-EU relation, current and future global food policies can be (re)examined through a critical neocolonial and neoliberal lens. Examining the application of the North-South power nexus or the implementation of neoliberal measurements enforcing neocolonial practices, the context of the discourse has to be analyzed to draw conclusions from it. By evaluating bigger samples, more generalizable outcomes can be extracted.

Drawing on further limitations of the thesis, interviews with participants involved in the AU-EU food policy process could have been conducted to ground the analysis and findings on extended qualitative data to improve the validity of the research. However, evaluating the consultation report (2019) and the NGO's critique (2020), the policy process's agenda-setting was examined giving an

indication of internal policy procedures and silenced discourses. To further evaluate internal processes in food policymaking, Schmidt's (2013) concept of legitimacy could have been included to assess the policy process's throughput legitimacy.

6. Policy Recommendations

Considering the upcoming FSS and the sixth AU-EU Summit in 2021, new policy recommendations regarding future food policymaking are suggested. Analyzing food policymaking between the AU and EU, neoliberal and neocolonial discourses creating dependencies structures have been evaluated in past policy documents. Thus, the following policy recommendations are presented to overcome and prevent neocolonialism and neoliberalism channeled into global food policymaking and discourses.

First, new approaches such as food sovereignty or legal geography have to be adopted by policymakers to embrace African countries' leadership to balance power dynamics. By drawing on oppressed discourses, dominant discourse narratives such as food security or developmental resilience have to be overcome, while creating inclusive and diverse discourse practices and dynamics fostering scientists and policymakers to implement empowering approaches.

Second, African knowledge and expertise have to be included in global food policymaking directed towards African countries. E.g., African universities and scientists should take the lead on problems that concern African people and not rely on EU leadership and expertise. Since diversity trumps ability, best policy outcomes can be guaranteed including different perspectives and foremost African perspectives to solve African countries' problems. To overcome neoliberal and neocolonial structures, Amo-Agyemang (2021) suggests the adoption of an Afrocentric epistemology that offers 'critiques and alternative to neoliberal discourses of resilience' (p. 1). By enriching the scientific and political discourse via 'indigenous forms of ''knowledge''' (Amo-Agyemang, 2021, p. 1) including a diverse perspective on reaching food demands of people globally, 'indigeneity can enhance the ability of local actors to navigate the uncertainties of a globali[z]ed world' (Amo-Agyemang, 2021, p. 1).

Moreover, marginalized communities who are most exposed to climate change and food vulnerability have to be included in policy processes to prevent the adoption of policies harming indigenous people since food policymaking is particularly directed towards poor and vulnerable groups and consequently, affecting them the most.

Instead of promoting regreening initiatives or the NaturAfrica initiative trying to decrease the consequences of environmental degradation, food vulnerability, or poverty, the causes rather than the consequences of these issues should be prevented. Eliminating root causes such as climate crisis, exploitation through mainly Western-based companies, or neo-liberalization, empowering solutions are implied stating a sustainable approach to people's right to food as a long-term solution (Rosenzweig & Solecki, 2018).

Finally, African countries' independence and integrity should be enabled by enhancing a fair and equal partnership, preventing the mainstreaming of EU interests onto African countries by limiting EU leadership. Being conscious about these practices, the AU and EU can drive towards a partnership that is based on equal and just grounds.

7. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to identify neocolonial and neoliberal structures and practices in global food policymaking to examine if global food justice is enhanced in the current discourse on food. Driving from the assumption that food policymaking is biased by overshadowing and marginalizing non-Western scholarship in favor of capitalist and neocolonial implications is critically assessed in the AU-EU partnership regarding food and agriculture. Since policy obstacles to guarantee people's right to food are influenced by marginalizing non-Western knowledge and expertise, the ability of real problem-solving is reduced. By detecting neoliberal and neocolonial practices in policy discourses around food, current policies such as resilience, security, or development have been evaluated in terms of their power to reinforce neocolonial structures. Observing that the second and third faces of power are present in the policy discourse between the AU and EU, contributes to answering the sub-questions as well as the main research question.

SQ1: To what extent do hegemonic power imbalances favor neoliberal practices leading to dependencies enforcing neocolonialism? In the AU-EU food policymaking, hegemonic power imbalances have been detected. Since the EU has the capacity to shape the AU's desires and beliefs by promoting prosperity and development, neoliberal measures such as the AU-EU trade or the implementation of EU private investment tools are applied through the EU's domination of the power discourse shaping policy outcomes. While the EU influences the policy discourse, European interests are mainstreamed by marginalizing African interests which undermine African countries' independence and integrity. While neoliberal tools and EU leadership foster African countries' dependencies on the EU, African countries might benefit in the short-term by enhancing AU-EU trade leading to increased economic growth. However, the relationship can be unmasked as unequal harming African countries in the long-term. Answering the first sub-question, hegemonic power dynamics are identified in the AU-EU relation enforced by the EU's capacity to shape African policymaking and interests by channeling EU interests and policies onto African countries. Dependence structures are reproduced in the AU-EU partnership fostering neocolonial patterns.

SQ2: To what extent is the North-South power nexus mirrored in the global food security policymaking? The food policymaking between the AU-EU emphasizing the aim to strive for food security undermines African countries' independence reinforcing the North-South power nexus. The EU by embracing global leadership aims to guide and demand the development of African countries. Thus, the EU as an institution of the Global North centered around European and Western interests

hegemonically influences the power discourse e.g., by marginalizing African knowledge in the TFRA or channeling its interests onto African countries by promoting Westernization or resilience-based approaches. While Western companies' and organizations' impact on African countries is silenced in the discourse, population growth is claimed to be the sole cause of food insecurity which masks Global North influences. Blaming environmental degradation and food insecurity on population growth and unachieved economic and demographic development disguises Global North countries' exploitation of African countries. This symbolizes neocolonial practices which reinforce an unequal partnership. The TFRA applying European-centric knowledge by marginalizing and neglecting African expertise and knowledge visualizes the Global North domination when it comes to food policymaking between the AU and EU. Hence, Western influence and domination are not addressed while discourses such as the critiques of NGOs, African scientists, and respondents in the public consultation are oppressed. To answer the second sub-question, the North-South power nexus is detected in the AU-EU food policymaking, since the EU dominates the policy and power discourse by mainstreaming its interest onto African countries oppressing African countries interests.

To summarize, hegemonic power dynamics and the enforcement of the North-South power nexus are detected in the food policymaking between the AU and EU. Neoliberal approaches emphasizing EU leadership are implemented enforcing neocolonial practices.

By examining the sub-questions, the thesis's main research question '*To what extent does global food policymaking enhance global food justice?'* can be answered. Since neoliberal measurements are implied to solve socio-environmental issues, narratives such as resilience and food security, which enforce neocolonial dependencies of African countries, are enhanced. Sustainability as a central pillar of the AU-EU relationship is tried to be achieved through neoliberal means enhanced by resilience building. Thus, sustainable long-term solutions should be concerned about cause detection rather than consequence prevention. By detecting the application of neocolonial and neoliberal discourse practices between the AU and EU, hegemony is emplaced which eliminates food justice since justice is traded off when neocolonialism is emplaced. Thus, the AU-EU food policymaking does not contribute to enhancing global food justice.

To conclude, global policymaking has to evaluate its current strategies to decrease food vulnerability. Since policymaking is embracing and reinforcing European-centric knowledge by replicating the implementation of Western-based solutions on non-Western issues and the reinforcement of neocolonial policy discourses, science and policymaking have to be decolonialized by including diverse oppressed voices. While science influences policymakers, its blind spots are replicated in policymaking. To overcome these blind spots, new decolonialized approaches have to be discussed and embraced. E.g., including African expertise into scientific discourses, African-based solutions can be applied to African issues emphasized in global policymaking to overcome biases and blind spots. Moreover, new approaches such as food sovereignty have to be examined to evaluate if

these approaches enhance food justice. Further, intersectional food justice as an aim to strive for has to be analyzed reading its implementation in global food policymaking as a new aim channeling sustainable solutions preventing neocolonial and neoliberal practices. Since women are structurally discriminated and oppressed, the connection between food justice and gender equality has to be examined indicating to what extent improving gender equality would enhance global food justice.

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Data Appendix

List of Consulted Documents for the Discourse Analysis

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