

Community Policing Officers and Their Ability to Formulate a Problem-Oriented Policing Approach Towards Local Soft Drug Nuisance in Local Executive Safety Networks

A case study in the city of Enschede on the influence of network formalisation.

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, program Public Administration, University of Twente

2021

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Wordcount: 40147

Ethical Approval Number: 201471

Defended on the 17th of August 2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Conducting research and writing a thesis has always been the ultimate challenge at the end of a student's educational career. While working on this project, the current COVID-19 crisis turned the world upside down and a drastic adaption to the current situation was required.

I would like to thank Guus Meershoek and Ariana Need for their guidance and help during the process, but also for their patience. Due to circumstances, it has been a rather lengthy project and I am grateful that they have supported me nevertheless. It should be acknowledged that the COVID-19 situation has not only been challenging for me as a student, but I can imagine that this has also impacted the educational staff in more ways than I can imagine. I am grateful that despite that, we have had the opportunity to meet online via Teams regularly. This has helped me a lot to stay motivated while working from home.

Next to that, I would like to thank Bennie Beuvink as my contact person within the Policing Organisation. Your willingness to help me and your enthusiasm for the project made it possible for me to execute the research as such. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the respondents for their valuable contributions during the interviews that were conducted in the course of this research. It has been a pleasure to have spoken to you and my admiration for the work you do has grown ever since.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family that have supported me along the way. Especially my roommates, who have been stuck with me in our apartment for the past year.

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ABSTRACT

In the Netherlands, the community policing officers are of great importance in the National Policing organisation. They are tasked with handling safety problems in their communities. In doing so, instead of incident-driven policing, a more preventive tactic is desired such as problem-oriented policing. Next to that, our society has become more and more networked over the years. This resulted within the practice of policing that the community policing officers find themselves more often in positions that require cooperation with other parties and organisations. They often do so in executive local safety networks if safety problems are complex and have a rather integral character. Although this preventive and networking strategy seems credible, according to community policing officers in practice this cooperation often encounters obstacles and problems. In this research it is studied to what extent network formalisation of the local executive safety networks affects the ability to formulate a problem-oriented approach by the community policing officers and in what ways. In order to explore this, a case study was conducted in the city of Enschede, studying the community policing officers that are engaged with executive local safety networks in combating the local drug nuisance. It should be noted that no uniform effect of network formalisation on the ability to formulate a problem-oriented policing approach was found, however this effect was more complex and situational per type of network formalisation and not all types of network formalisation are perceived as obstructive for the ability to come up with a problem-oriented approach. Next to that, a range of additional influencing factors have been proposed by the respondents that are listed in this research concerning policing organisation specific factors, network-specific factors and problem-specific factors. The research concludes with several policy recommendations that resulted from the insights of this research. These include recommendations with regard to knowledge on the problem-oriented policing approach, the benefits of covenants to facilitate the cooperation in the networks and for example the structuring of the coordination in the networks.

Keywords: *Community Policing Officers, Safety Networks, Network Formalisation, Problem-Oriented Policing, Local Soft Drug Nuisance, Case Study, Netherlands, Network Governance*

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Here the abbreviations and acronyms are listed. As the Basis Team and the Operationeel Expert Wijk are specific for the Dutch Policing Organisation, a short explanation of the concepts is added.

BT = Basis Team (Base Team)

The national policing organisation in the Netherlands consists of regional entities. These entities are divided in different districts. In turn, the districts are divided in different entities that are called the Basis Teams (Rijksoverheid, n.d.).

CPO = Community Policing Officers

GDPR = General Data Protection Regulation

LESN = Local Executive Safety Network

OEW = Operationeel Expert Wijk (Operational Expert Neighbourhood)

The national policing organisation in the Netherlands consists of neighbourhood teams in which the community policing officers operate. The management of this local entity lies with the Operational Expert Wijk.

POP = Problem-Oriented Policing

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1. INTRODUCTION

'*Prevention is better than cure*' is a quote that is well known in all corners of our global society nowadays. Also in the Netherlands, this mindset has been present for several ages with its well-known system of dikes (Dutch Dikes, n.d.). The fact that a large share of the Dutch territory is under sea level and part of the lower reaches of several European rivers, made that the territory was particularly prone to flooding. Instead of ad hoc symptom control, they created a system of dikes that would directly take away the cause of the floods, namely that high waters could flow into low-level unprotected lands. One should note that other prominent facets of society that aim to adopt this method in their operating procedures are for example the health care sector, fire departments, and the policing sector. In the health care sector, one can see that their marketing is highly focused on eating healthy, staying in shape, and avoid unhealthy habits in order to prevent illness. The same holds for fire departments and policing organisations: if there is an incident, they will help you, but preventing the incident from happening has become more and more important.

Policing is a concept that emerged in France during the 15th century which was mainly concerned with maintaining societal order on the streets in a highly decentralised manner. Nowadays, the concept of policing encompasses a much broader range of tasks that are daily executed by policing officers. In the Netherlands, the tasks of policing are foremost the concern of the Nationale Politie (Dutch National Policing organisation) which is centrally organised in the Netherlands. Over time, the concept of policing has been subject to change with regard to the type of organisation, the range of tasks, but also regarding the operating procedures. One of these changes concerned the introduction of POP (Problem-Oriented Policing) in both the academic and practical realm of policing. Goldstein (1979, as cited in Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010, p. 140) called for a paradigm shift in policing that would replace the primarily reactive, incident-driven policing with a model that required the police to be proactive in identifying underlying problems that could be targeted to alleviate crime and disorder at their roots. This approach was brought about due to criticism on the operating procedures of the police, also in the Netherlands during the periods of protests and riots in the second half of the 20th century. It was claimed that the operating procedures were ineffective in solving root problems that endangered public safety because during that period they were highly reactive, which implies that they were mostly focused on incidents happening. This led to the belief that these operating procedures led to systematic symptom control instead of focusing on solving the problems that were causing these incidents and in the long run, preventing these incidents from happening. This line of thought can be explained through a simple example of a hypothetical neighbourhood that is known for its armed robberies. Each time a robbery occurs the police are called, and they rush to the scene. When they arrive, they find the victim traumatised and the robber(s) fled. This hypothetical scene is repeated several times in the neighbourhood with each time the same results. The critique is that the question should be asked much more often why these incidents occur in the neighbourhood. If it is uncovered what is causing the armed robberies, for example, the number of dark areas in alleys and streets, the possible solution might be as obvious as a simple increase in streetlights. This implies that in the future, these types of robberies in the neighbourhood might be prevented since there are no more areas without streetlights. Subsequently, preventing crime also implies that the officers that were rushing to these robbery scenes each time an incident happened, now can spend their time differently. One of the most famous implementations of POP is the SARA model developed by John E. Eck and William Spelman in 1987 (Weisburd et al., 2010, p. 141). In this model, POP is executed in a four-step sequence of scanning, analysis, response, and assessment, that is aimed at finding solutions to the root problems of crime so that incidents in the future can be prevented. Other implementations of POP that are used in the daily practice of the Dutch police are for example the negen ijkpunten (nine reference points method) and the zes-stappen-model (six-steps-model) ("Probleemgericht Werken," 2013).

In 2013, the police organisation in the Netherlands changed its organisational structure. Before 2013, the police organisation was decentralised, divided into regional forces that enjoyed a large amount of autonomy. Nowadays, the current structure, which is called Nationale Politie (National Police), contains a more centralised organisational structure in which the focus is on standardisation and uniformisation. However, one should note that even though the police organisation itself has become centrally organised, many of the day-to-day practices are played out in a much more decentralised setting. An example of this is that within the organisational structure of the National Politie, the CPO (community policing officer) and gebiedsgebonden politiewerk (area-based policing) gained a

prominent role (Terpstra & Evers, 2019, p. 11). As the name indicates, CPOs are to be specialised in handling local communities and their local problems. According to the *Besluit Wijkagenten* (Decree on Community Policing Officers) that was introduced in 2012, the CPOs should contribute to the enforcement of public order and the safety and liveability in society (Terpstra & Evers, 2019, p. 13). Their tasks are mainly focused on observation and maintaining relationships with local citizens.

Another change in policing coincided with the increasing networked society we live in. In light of the general notion of the 'post-regulatory state' as mentioned by Crawford (2006), including a shift from centralised government to a more pluralistic notion of governance, the execution of policing tasks has also gained a less monopolistic character which, as one should note, is in sheer contrast with the introduction of the Nationale Politie. Next to that, it should be noted that the perception of the police being the only organisation responsible for public safety has been subject to change. Nowadays, the responsibility for safety and security has been partly transferred to other participants in society for example companies, non-governmental organisations, and citizens, resulting in a perception of shared responsibility for public safety (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004, p. 25). Furthermore, the notion of this shared responsibility coincided with the gained popularity for community policing and POP, and subsequently was integrated into the new operation procedures of CPOs. This implied that in order to effectively solve complex safety issues in their local communities, CPOs have to pool their resources with other actors and consequently making use of a rather integral and diverse approach (Weisburd et al., 2010).

In line with the operating procedures within the Nationale Politie, the CPOs should observe a specific crime problem in their community, decide which partners should be involved, and then jointly try to solve the problems by using a POP approach. These partners can range from for example social workers, organisations that provide care and treatment for drug addicts, shops, and the municipality, to organisations that provide help to victims and other non-governmental organisations. Policing in cooperation with other additional partners is often seen as a network that is focused on local safety. In this research, it concerns local safety networks that are executive of nature. This implies that the cooperation is directly involved in street-level problem-solving. However, in practice it is voiced that the results of the LESNs (local executive safety networks) are limited and that often problems occur within the network (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004). In conversation with an OEW (Operational Expert Neighbourhood), it is mentioned that the CPOs cannot, for example, sufficiently complete their tasks due to the administration, rules, and other protocols. Also, it is mentioned that the commitment in the networks differs greatly which can also result in problems among the different network partners. In an article written by Dozy (2012, p. 3) it is stated that the police and other partners involved in the cooperation often encounter problems such as 'too much talking, too little results', not fulfilled action points and initiatives that die an infamous death. In theory, CPOs are to follow the procedure of the POP approach which is a rather structured protocol that consists of rules on how to proceed the work. However, network partners in the LESNs indicate that it is the rules, the protocols, and the bureaucracy that prevents them from effectively coming up with solutions to the root problems in their communities, failing to successfully apply the POP approach. What thus can be identified is that there is a tension between the call for a POP approach which embodies rules and protocols that structure the work in the network and on the contrary, the need for limited rules and more flexibility in the network to be able to actually apply the POP approach since it is voiced that for networks to function targeted, one requires a high degree of informality and flexibility in a network (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004).

In this research, the focus lies on this tension between the rules and regulations that are necessary for the LESNs to function, and how this is affecting the ability of the CPOs to formulate a POP approach. Next to that, the methodology of this research is structured in such a way that besides the focus on network formalisation as an explanatory factor, there is room left for a more explorative focus. The city of Enschede is central in this research. Enschede is located in the eastern part of the Netherlands and divided in 5 districts: North, East, South, West, and Centre ("Wijken in Enschede," n.d.). Each district has its own district committee (stadsdeelcommissie) that is tasked with district-specific issues and that is responsible for the representation of the different districts in the municipal council (Gemeente Enschede, n.d.). Each district has at least one police station from which the CPOs work. One of the problems in the city of Enschede is drug nuisance. According to RTV Oost (2018), Enschede has struggled with drug nuisance for a long time. In this study, several CPOs from Enschede that are engaged in LESNs will be interviewed on their ability to come up with a POP approach in such cooperation.

1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the previous section, the following question will be central in this research:

To what extent can the ability to formulate a problem-oriented policing approach by community policing officers that are part of local executive safety networks on local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede be explained by the degree of formalisation in the network?

From this question it can be identified that the dependent variable is the ability of a CPO, in a local executive safety network, to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance. The independent variable in this research can be identified as network formalisation. These concepts will be further specified in the theoretical chapter of this research. Before formulating an answer to the central research question, it is of crucial importance to provide answers to the following sub-questions:

- a. *What is the background and the current situation with regard to the LESNs, local soft drug nuisance, and the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of the CPOs in Enschede?*
- b. *To what extent is the functioning of the LESNs formalised?*
- c. *To what extent are the engaged CPOs able to formulate the different steps of a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede?*
- d. *How does the degree of formalisation in a network influence the implementation of the POP approach?*

The first sub-question concerns a description of the LESNs, the context of the local soft drug nuisance, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this question is to provide the reader with more detailed information on the background and the current situation. The second sub-question (b) is a descriptive question that aims to identify the degree of formalisation of the network in which the CPO is engaged. The third sub-question (c) is a descriptive question that aims to explore the ability of the CPOs to formulate a POP approach within the LESN. The fourth sub-question (d) draws from the analyses of the first two sub-questions, differentiating between the different phases of the POP approach to explore the influence of formalisation on these. Combined, the sub-questions are aimed at providing an answer to the central research question.

1.2. RELEVANCE

As mentioned in the introduction, problems with soft drug nuisance are present in the city of Enschede. These problems often pose a threat to the public safety of citizens, evoke feelings of fear among citizens and distort societal order. This is due to the fact that soft drug nuisance often goes hand in glove with other types of crimes such as violence, fraud, exploitation, theft, and oppression. But also, despite the fact that soft drug use is tolerated in the Netherlands, to produce it and to sell it as a dealer is considered an illegal activity by law. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that the local government and the police organisation, both as responsible entities for public safety, find solutions to prevent these offenses from happening by making use of a POP approach. However, causes and solutions to these problems are often not entirely within the scope of the policing organisation and therefore cooperation with other partners is needed and LESNs are created. Next to that, one could argue that by distributing the responsibility to solve the problem among more partners, and by using the POP approach that is aimed at more long-term and structural solutions, the policing organisation might be able to relocate human resources to other, more pressing areas, in the organisation. Also, Herman Goldstein (as cited in Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 8) exemplifies that the problems with budget cuts and human resource capacities within the policing organisations in the United States and subsequently the pressing understaffing was forcing them to look for alternatives such as POP. Although the practice of LESNs is perceived as business-as-usual, studies on this matter are limited in the context of the Nationale Politie. Research on the effects of formalisation within a LESN on the ability to formulate a POP approach to solving problems regarding soft drug nuisance is therefore an important focus. Next to that, in other public organisations, where cooperation within networks on specific problems is necessary, this research can serve as a starting point.

It is important to note that this research draws from insights in public governance, namely network theory. However, research on networks in local safety and security are not numerous in the case of the Nationale Politie (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004, p. 53). Next to that, insights from former research cannot be generalised without

caution to other cases due to differences in subjects, context, time, and places. Therefore, this research tries to incorporate and explore known insights in the specific case of LESNs in Enschede. Some critical remarks, the study focuses on one specific city, namely Enschede, and specifically LESNs, namely those focused on soft drug nuisance. Therefore, the research outcomes cannot be generalised to all LESNs in the Netherlands. Also, as this research is limited to the perception of the CPOs in the networks, no general remarks can be made on the LESNs as a whole because its scope of analysis does not include data on the other partners in the networks. However, it could provide insights for cities and organisations that are in a similar position. Next to that, it should be noted that this research does not assess whether the POP approach arrived at in a network actually solves the problems. The focus of this study is on the ability of CPOs to formulate a POP approach within the LESN, in accordance with the SARA model, but not on assessing the effectiveness of the POP approach itself.

In chapter 2, the general literature on the concepts of network governance, local safety networks, formalisation, and POP will be introduced that provide a theoretical basis for this research. Next to that, the conceptual framework and the conceptualisation will further specify how the theoretical basis relates to the subject of the research by providing a framework, specify the concepts that play a central role and applying the general theory in the context of the CPOs in the city of Enschede. The second chapter concludes with a section on the expected results based on the academic literature. In chapter 3 the methodology is described including the research design, case selection, data collection, and data analysis. In chapter 4 the first sub-question is addressed by providing an overview of the background and current situation with regard to the LESNs, local soft drug nuisance, and the COVID-19 situation. In chapter 5 the data is analysed, and the second sub-question is answered with regard to the network formalisation. The following chapter, 6, analyses and answers the third sub-question that concerns the ability to formulate a POP approach. In chapter 7, the influence of network formalisation is discussed in light of the POP approach. Subsequently, chapter 8 will provide an answer to the research questions central in this research and in chapter 9, a discussion with regard to the research is included. Additionally, there are appendices that include the interview questions and the list of participants.

2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a literature review aims to provide the reader with a better understanding of the theories that are at the base of this research. Here, a general theory on network governance, formalisation and POP is guiding. Next, the conceptual framework introduces the subject of this research in the context of the general literature by making it more concrete and case-specific. Furthermore, in the conceptualisation, the concepts LESN, network formalisation and POP are described. This chapter concludes with placing the concepts in the conceptual framework and formulating the expectations of the research.

2.1. NETWORK GOVERNANCE

2.1.1. THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH AND TYPES OF GOVERNANCE

In an article by van Heffen and Klok (2000, p. 160) it is identified that in governance structures, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, as proposed by Elinor Ostrom, can be utilised. This framework identifies an action arena that consists of action situations and actors. Consider for example a group of students that are deciding on a project at the local library. In this example, the students are the actors that, according to Ostrom, each have their own preferences, information processing capabilities, selection criteria and resources (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 160). Action situations refer to the social space where the students interact: “they involve participants in positions, who must decide among diverse actions in the light of information they possess about how actions are linked to potential outcomes and the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes”(van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 160). The action area is the umbrella over the actors and the action situation. In describing and analysing the action arena, three factors should be taken into account: 1) the characteristics of the physical world, 2) the culture in which the arena occurs and 3) the rules that are set to organise the interactions (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 160). It should be noted this framework as proposed by Elinor Ostrom is not only successful in providing abstract insights in network governance, but also in other types of governance such as hierarchies and markets. By making use of this framework, one can analyse different governance structures such as hierarchies, markets, and networks.

In public administration research on governance, different types of governance models can be identified. One of the more traditional models concerns a hierarchical model of governance. This model is mostly characterised by the fact that it concerns governance in a unicentric manner in which decision-making power is held by one organisation, for example, the authorities and that the citizen should obey, implying that policy arrives in a top-down manner (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 161, 162). These characteristics can often be found within companies or other rather traditional bureaucratic organisations. Considering a completely different model of governance is the market model. This governance model is based on the economic philosophy of the invisible hand, which ultimately finds the perfect balance between supply and demand in which there are no restrictions for actors to enter the market. In this model, there are, unlike in a hierarchy, multiple actors (sellers and buyers) involved, therefore this model can be characterised as multicentric (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 161, 162). What can be derived is that market governance is in many aspects the opposite model of hierarchical governance.

A model that has gained a prominent place among the different state models is network governance. According to Klijn and Teisman (2000, p. 331), this approach goes beyond the traditional dichotomies of markets and hierarchies, and public and private. The institutional approach, as introduced above, can also be helpful in understanding networks and is concerned with the relationship between the structure of the network and the actions of the actor in the network (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 159). This implies that a network should be seen as an organised whole in which the behavioural rules in the arena influence the behaviour of the actors in the network. The conceptual notion of ‘rules’ should not be taken too strict but should concern the notion of rules being a set of established norms, values, relations, interactions and procedures that can be either in writing or verbally agreed upon (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 159). It is important to keep in mind that the relationship between structure and action can be interpreted in both directions, this implies that the rules structure the behaviour of the actors in the network but also the behaviour of the actors can also influence and alter the structure, rules, that are set in the network. This is also exemplified by Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 10) arguing that the network

structure is a dialectical relation with network interactions. The concept of network governance will be discussed in the next section.

2.1.2. NETWORK GOVERNANCE

In this section, the concept of network governance will be further explored. One should note that in academic literature, there are several different concepts that refer to an either similar or identical phenomenon. Although ‘network governance’ will be used throughout this study, insights on the same phenomenon that are labelled differently, such as collaborative governance, public-private partnerships, interactive policymaking and interorganisational cooperation will also be explored (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Choi & Choi, 2012; Dozy, 2012; Esselbrugge, 2000; Klijn & Teisman, 2000). Interorganisational cooperation implies a cooperative type of governance between different organisations in pursuit of common goals. According to Dozy (2012, p. 6), who wrote an article on Cooperation Among Police and Partners, interorganisational cooperation can be characterised by the absence of a centre of power that can make decisions, actors with partly joint interests and partly self-interests and actors with divergent goals and standards. Another terminology similar to network governance is interactive policy-making in which new forms of participation should result in better government, both in the sense of providing better policies and in bridging the democratic gap between government and society (Esselbrugge, 2000, p. 301). Bekkers et al. (1996, as cited in Esselbrugge, 2000, p. 302) conceptualise interactive policy making as follows: ‘a process to form a common conception, towards a collective policy practice in a network of mutually dependent participants.’ Klijn and Teisman (2000, p. 334) indicate that partnerships in public-private partnerships are ‘a commitment between public and private actors of some durability, in which partners develop products together and share risks, costs and revenues which are associated with these products. In a large meta-analysis on collaborative governance Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 554) define the concept as: ‘A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative, and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets’. In successfully conceptualising network governance, it is important to take notes on the above-mentioned definitions of similar or identical concepts.

In further elaborating on network governance, it is important to note that the conceptualisation of the term might not be surprising to many since networks are present in much more facets of society. However, one should note that despite its fame, it is important to identify what is meant by network governance in this research. The alternative concepts that are presented above are already fairly complete in explaining what network governance entails. However, it should be noted that there is no static definition of networks in network governance since there is no uniform format. Even networks that appear rather similar cannot be treated as similar since there are many variables that determine the network and its functioning.

According to Brodeur (2010, p. 297), with regard to the relationship between public police and private police, “The word “network” has a wide meaning. It can refer to a patchwork of agencies loosely in contact to perform an ill-defined task, or it can refer to an integrated partnership working toward a common goal. The fact that one can draw lines between small circles where names are written is not in itself indicative of the existence of a network”. In this line of reasoning, Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 231) argue that their narrow conceptualisation of network is limited to groups of three or more legal autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their goals but also a collective goal. In the words of Wood and Dupont (2006, as cited in Shearing & Johnston, 2010, pp. 497,498) the concept of a network refers to continuous, iterative and more or less temporary processes carried out by a range of actors (nodes) according to different positions of power.

Sydow and Windeler (2003, p. 3) argue that the network logic implies cooperation and commitment among distinct and, at least to some degree, autonomous collective actors. This conceptualisation is fairly similar to the one that Terpstra and Kouwenhoven (2004, p. 47) propose: networks as ‘a whole of more or less interdependent actors’ that are in a durable way involved in a certain policy, program or approach to solve specific issues. In a study on exchange conditions in network governance, Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997, p. 914) conceptualise network governance as follows: “Network governance involves a select, persistent and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and

open-ended contacts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially – not legally- binding.” One of the matters that sets the conceptualisation of Singh and Prakash (2010) apart from other quoted in this section is that their perception is that network governance should be voluntary. However, one should note that especially among publicly funded organisations, cooperation might not always be voluntary but sometimes demanded by legislation.

In network governance, one might find rather loosely connected networks but also strongly cohesive networks. According to Marsh and Rhodes (1992, as cited in van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 155), policy networks with strong cohesion are often characterised as having comparatively limited memberships, sharing values and interaction frequently, exchanging resources, group leaders that regulate the exchange and balanced power among the network partners. On the contrary, Marsh and Rhodes (1992, as cited in van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 156) argue that less cohesive policy network are often recognized as being large and diverse, fluctuating levels of contacts and lower level of agreement, various resources that are not deemed as collective due to the inability to impose rules and unequal power relations between the actors. Especially in the loosely connected networks, problems of institutionalised non-commitment can emerge (Dozy, 2012, p. 6).

A network consists of multiple actors, however often a selected number. Therefore, a network could be characterised as pluricentric, implying that decision-making power lies not with one, nor with the many but with a selected group of actors. The position of an actor in network governance therefore constitutes either a member or not a member of the network, in which the decision-making power lies with the members of the network (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 162). Although network governance in this research is concerned with public safety, this is not always reflected in the memberships of a network. Klijn and Teisman (2000) argue that the members can originate both from the public sector and the private sector. This implies that network governance challenges the traditional distinction between the public and the private sphere, being able to come up with a rather hybrid form in which both public and private actors are represented. However, one should note that in network governance concerned with public issues and decision-making, often at least one actor from the public sphere is required.

One of the questions remaining is why the actors would become a partner of a network. One of the most prominent reasons concerns resource interdependency. Individually, network partners have a selected, often limited, set of resources to accomplish their desired goals. Klijn and Teisman (2000) argue that partnerships emerge in situations in which neither one single actor possesses the full set of resources to complete the tasks. However, combined they might just have the resources that are necessary. Within the network, this often results in a pooled set of resources that contributes to relations of interdependency among the network partners (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, as cited in van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 166). This implies that the network partners are each dependent on the resources that other network partners bring to the network to ultimately fulfil the goal that is set in a network. One should note that this pooling of resources implies that the network partners desire to address a goal that is similar for each of the network partners or that produces other benefits desired by the network partners. This implies that the actions within a network can often be characterised as mutual benefits. What should be noted is that network partners should experience a state of mutual benefits in a network for the network partners to decide to be part of a network (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 164). As Provan and Milward (2001, p. 420) rightly state, it is important to recognize that individual network partners and their managers are still motivated by partly self-interest. The network partners thus aim to fulfil the goal that is set in the network but also aim to satisfy their own organisational needs. In that sense, a culture of ‘give a little, take a little’ is often present within the networks.

It is important to note that network governance requires a structure. As seen in the institutional framework by Ostrom, there is a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, the rules of the network arena and the actions that the actors can engage in. Actors require rules to structure the interactions and simultaneously, rules require actors to determine the desired structure. The structure of a network can thus be seen as the regulations, the institutional design or as annotated in this research, the network formalisation, that structures the interactions and the partners in a network. Regulations can be defined as intentional activities that seek to control, direct or influence the behaviour and the flow of events (Black, 2001, as in Crawford, 2006, p. 452). Institutional design, as conceptualised by Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 555), refers to the basic protocols and ground rules for collaboration. The rules in a network can be analysed through different categories that correspond to the

institutional framework by Ostrom (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 160). First of all, position rules establish positions, prescribe which positions are to be distinguished in a particular arena; boundary rules prescribe how the various positions in an arena become occupied; authority rules prescribe the allocation of rights and obligations to every position; scope rules prescribe the possible outcomes of decision making in a particular arena; aggregation rules prescribe how collective decision and other outcomes in an arena are being made on the basis of the contributions of different position holders; information rules prescribe which information is available to the various position holders; and finally, pay-off rules prescribe the costs and benefits generated in the arena, how these are divided among network partners and what the consequences of the decisions are (Klok & Denters, 2002, p. 4). Among networks, there are large differences in the type of rules that are set, the number of rules and the strictness of the rules that are influencing the functioning of the network. However, it should be noted that the framework of rules, in combination with the physical world and the culture in the network, determines the action arena. And that, as stated by Provan, Veazie, Staten, and Teufel-Shone (2005, p. 605), structure alone provides only a partial understanding of why a network may or may not be effective.

In line with the structure and the rules in the network, is the coordination of the network. In fairly strict networks that have a lot of rules, also the coordination of the network might be set in stone. However, in other networks it might be that the coordination is arranged in a much more informal manner. In network governance, one can identify several types of network coordination. A network can be coordinated by all partners (participant governed), a network can be coordinated by one selected network partner (lead organisation), but a network can also be coordinated by an organisation that is not a network partner at all (network administrative organisation/network administrative entity) (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2001).

2.1.3. NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE EXECUTION OF LOCAL SAFETY

As indicated, network governance has entered a wide range of areas, including the safety provision. Next to the fact the globalisation of crime requires networks of nation-states and non-governmental organisations to work together, also the on the local level network governance in safety provision has gained a prominent role. It is argued that despite the fact that nowadays policing is often still considered through a state-centred view, in practice many other agencies are nowadays involved in local safety provision (Shearing & Wood, 2003, p. 402). Here, one could consider for example police cooperation with victim-support organisations, local authorities, health services, the fire department, youth services, mental health organisations, housing corporations, schools, but also businesses and local communities for the sake of local safety provision (Crawford, 2006). For these actors to become involved in a specific network, they are often seen as having a stake at the safety problem that is put central in the network or in the geographical area that is highlighted (Brodeur, 2010). Next to that, the problems that the CPOs encounter are often very complex and require an integral approach to be solved. It can thus be noted that these networks are mainly focused on the executive side of policing instead of the governance side, speaking of LESNs. Also Crawford (2006, p. 460) argues that in linking multiple partners, new horizontal relations are forged that cut across the traditional hierarchies in local safety provision.

Next to the argument that actors should be included in LESNs because they are considered stakeholders to the problem, also from the perception of sharing responsibility, networks are widely implemented in local safety provision. Terpstra and Kouwenhoven (2004, p. 261) argue that the position of the police being the only organisation responsible for safety and security has been changing to a more shared responsibility with other organisations, both public and private. One could argue that in this view, it logically follows that this shared responsibility results in interorganisational cooperation, thus networks. This implies that the responsibility lies not only with the CPOs but also at the other partners involved (Wiebrens, 2004, p. 80).

But also, a more pragmatic argument is proposed. Terpstra (2008b, p. 245) identifies that the police are not always able to find a solution for problems that occur in a neighbourhood by themselves. Next to that, in an essay on collaboration between police and other organisations it is stated that, in the realm of local safety provision, organisations initiate working together in a network because they are not able to reach the goals by themselves, creating interdependency between the police and other partners. This implies a sense of mutuality; contributing and benefitting from the network, in which strategic behaviour to satisfy the self-interest/organisation-interest of

certain actors is by far not uncommon (Dozy, 2012). In the Dutch context, local governments are formally responsible for the coordination of the Local Safety Policies, of which LESNa are a visible element (Terpstra, 2008a, p. 219). This also implies that the local government is often included in the networks due to their resources such as manpower, information but also formal competencies such as legislative powers (Terpstra, 2008b).

Since the introduction of network governance, there have been several scholars assessing its impact on policing. In the study by Terpstra and Kouwenhoven (2004, p. 223) on local safety networks, it can generally be concluded that the partners have a positive perception of the goals and the existence of the networks. Although it should be noted that it took some time for this positive perception to develop. In a study by Choi and Choi (2012) it is shown that collaborative partnerships are effective in crime prevention. They argue that this effect is specifically stronger in disorganised communities. In their research, Choi and Choi (2012) thus identify that if a police organisation enters a network to address a certain complex and integral social problem, this has a positive effect on crime prevention. However, it should be argued that their results cannot be generalised without caution to other cases of police organisations in other countries. Next to that, there is also literature that contests the actual impact of networking on the general tasks of the police. According to Helsloot, Groenendaal, and Warners (2012) due to the fact that society is changing into a network society, it is important that the police as organisation keeps up with these developments. However, they also conclude that their observations led to no reason to believe that networking does contribute to the execution of basic police tasks (Helsloot et al., 2012, p. 12).

Although the effects of the implementation of LESNs have not been widely debated, studies have also been focused on the actual cooperation and the desired outcomes in the networks and the problems that are encountered. In a large study on local safety networks in the Netherlands, Terpstra and Kouwenhoven (2004, p. 264) wondered whether the networks actually result in a targeted approach towards problems or that, on the contrary, these networks only make the problem-solving more complicated, being a complex system of links and actors. Here, they rightly touch upon the tensions arising from the conflicts between the concepts of large open networks, that makes the network more diverse and integral, but also more complicated due to the number of involved actors, versus small, restricted networks, that might be more efficient due to the limited number of actors, but might also encounter problems of non-representation, missing stakeholders, and limited resources. Next to that, when a network has been in place for a longer period of time, the cooperation can become rather structured (Dozy, 2012, p. 11). This process is often defined as a process of institutionalisation. This institutionalisation is not in all cases always stimulating for the cooperation in the LESNs because it can come hand in hand with losses of flexibility and accessibility (Dozy, 2012, p. 11). Thus, also in the case of LESNs tensions between formalisation and flexibility arise.

In the logic of cooperation, phenomena often discussed are free-rider behaviour, non-commitment and other obstructive behaviour that can be attached to one or more actors (Dozy, 2012). For the sake of putting a stop to this behaviour, networks often resort to rule-setting, making the cooperation more based on formal rules than voluntary behaviour. As Crawford (2006, p. 461) indicates, in relation to networks in safety provision, that it has been the continuing use of central government command and direction, together with financial inducement, rather than mutual trust and reciprocity or game-like interaction, that has largely held them together. "Demands for such legislative obligations emerged precisely because network partners were not deemed to be playing their part" (Crawford, 2006, p. 461). However, also contradictory statements are also voiced in literature. In order for networks to remain targeted, it is the informal character such as trust, personal relations and frequent informal contact that is more stimulating than formal rules enforcing commitment and cooperation (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004, p. 268). Having a not-too-structured network, resulting in a higher degree of flexibility in the network, would prove very helpful in the network for it to remain targeted (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004, p. 268). One should note that in cases where local safety networks consist of a large number of network partners, formalising the network with regard to the coordination can be seen as helpful in order for the network to remain targeted (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004, p. 269).

2.2. FORMALISATION OF NETWORKS

2.2.1. GENERAL NOTION OF FORMALISATION

In society, in order to structure the behaviour of legal entities, organisations use their legal capacity to provide a set of rules, also known as structure, that both emphasize restrictions and rights that the legal entity is entitled to. Andrews (2010, p. 93) argues in an analysis on public organisations that: “The formalisation present within an organisation its structure reflects the extent to which it relies on rules to achieve its goals. Typically, such rules pertain to the roles of organisational members and the procedures by which their standards of conducts are supervised”. In a public organisation, this can be manifested in the number of rules for workers resulting in for example degree of autonomy, role specificity and procedures to follow. In turn, the actions of the workers might lead to changes in the rules, thus adjusting the organisational structure. In light of the institutional approach that was introduced at the start of this theoretical chapter, the set of rules in the action arena and the actions of the actors are influencing each other dynamically in both directions (van Heffen & Klok, 2000). Closely linked to the concept of formalisation is the notion of institutionalisation, however this concept encompasses a broader scope. “Institutionalisation is often described as a social process in which a construction of reality is accepted by a certain group of people” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, as cited in van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 166). According to van Heffen and Klok (2000, p. 167), institutions can be conceptualised as rules that refer to a class of actions that is not specified in the time/space dimensions. The conceptual notion of ‘rules’ in the case of institutions should not be taken too strict but should concern the notion of rules being a set of established norms, values, relations, interactions and procedures that can be either in writing or verbally agreed upon (van Heffen & Klok, 2000, p. 159). Institutionalisation is thus a process of emerging institutions in decision-making. The process of formalisation is similar to institutionalisation; however, it encompasses a narrower definition of rules, mostly agreed upon in writing. It should be noted that for these rules to influence behaviour, interpretation of the rules plays a crucial role in determining the actual behaviour (van Heffen & Klok, 2000). For example, misinterpretation can result in unintentionally disobeying the rules, and in some cases, actors might choose to willingly disobey the rules. Formalisation is thus a process in an entity that contributes to the degree of formality in an organisation. Although one could argue that there are different reasons for organisations to either formalise or de-formalise, but more importantly, the effects of formalisation in an organisation should be discussed. It should be noted that literature on the effects of formalisation in public organisations on performance is rather diverse.

As indicated above, highly formalised organisations operate on the basis of detailed rules that both provide information on the roles and the procedures in the organisation. One of the often voiced effects of having detailed descriptions on each of the social positions occupied within the organisation and a large number of rules prescribing the operational procedures appropriate for each of those positions, is that the members of the organisation will probably experience lower levels of job autonomy and greater levels of performance monitoring and supervision (Andrews, 2010, p. 93). This implies that in organisations that are less formalised, the members will experience more job autonomy and less top-down control. On the one hand, literature suggests that the implementation of detailed descriptions of the roles in the organisation can counter the effects of role ambiguity, which implies that the member has a clear picture of what its tasks are and how he or she should fulfil them (Andrews, 2010, p. 96). However, it should be noted that in taking away the ambiguity of a specific role in an organisation, its freedom to acts will subsequently be constrained by these rules. One of the effects that Andrews (2010, p. 96) highlights is that this job codification makes it hard for organisation members to act on their own initiative, increasing rigidity.

On the other hand, Dalton et al. (1980) as cited in Andrews (2010, p. 96) argues that there are both diverse and even contradictory effects of formalisation on performance that it might even be a non-linear relationship, implying that the positive effects of formalisation on performance might have a turning point. This implies that there is an optimal level of formalisation and once that is exceeded, the negative effects emerge. Although this hypothesis is untested, one could argue that the phenomenon of red tape can be illustrative in that sense. Red tape can be defined as rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purpose the rules were intended to serve (Bozeman, 2000, as cited in Brewer & Walker,

2010, p. 110). One could argue that over-formalisation, thus when the effects of formalisation start to negatively affect the performance of an organisation, can be seen as one of the symptoms of red tape.

2.2.2. NETWORK FORMALISATION

“Networks involve the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour. They are organisations which shape attitudes and behaviour. They simplify the policy process by limiting actions, problems, and solutions”.

(Marsh & Smith, 2000, p. 6)

It is important to note that up to this point, formalisation has been discussed in this research as a trait of a single entity. However, one should note that in a network, this entity is not a single organisation but a network that consists of multiple organisations. Formalisation in a network is thus the number and the nature of the rules (red circle in figure 2.1), as part of the *action arena* of a network, that structures the behaviour of the network partners.




Figure 2.1. The Action Arena as introduced by Elinor Ostrom in 1994. Reprinted from *an institutional analysis of CULCI* by Klok and Denters (2002, p. 2).

In this research, strictly speaking, the focus lies with network formalisation, relating to the number of rules that are set in the network itself and construct the structure of the network by which the network partners should obey. One could argue that in a network, the actions are not only constrained by the internal structure of rules, but also by the rules that each individual network partner should obey, originating from their organisation. However, Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 9) argue that a distinction between internal and external formalisation that influence policy outcomes can be misleading due to the interpretations of the external rules by internal actors that are bounded by the internal structure, in which one could ask whether the factors can still be deemed external. Therefore, this study focuses solely on network formalisation as experienced by the network partners with drawing conclusions on whether the rules originate from outside or inside the network.

There are great differences among networks in the degree of formalisation, some networks have limited rules in place that structure the behaviour of the network partners and the cooperation is largely driven by personal, informal ties that are based on trust and commitment, while other networks structure the behaviour of their network partners by large sets of behavioural and monitoring rules such as signed contacts, covenants, treaties and agreements (Singh & Prakash, 2010). In that sense, it is argued that networks that function with limited number to no rules but with personal ties, trust and voluntary commitment can be considered a network with an informal structure. On the other hand, networks that function based on a set of rules that structure the behaviour of the network partners, can be considered a network with a formal character. One should note that the variable is not mutually exclusive. A network can have both informal and formal characteristics, so one does not strictly exclude the other.

As Terpstra (2008a, p. 217) identified, in the cooperation between different organisations in networks, both informal and formal characteristics are present. Formally, many networks are constituted in documents or treaties that is agreed upon by the network partners, however other research shows that local safety networks are largely based on mutual trust, informal agreements, and personal acquaintance (Terpstra, 2008a, p. 217). Network governance in general, according to Jones et al. (1997, p. 925), overcomes problems by using social mechanisms rather than authority, bureaucratic rules, standardisation, or legal recourse. Next to that, Crawford (2006, p. 453) expresses that traditional methods of command and control, backed up with the threat of coercive sanctions, are inefficient, ineffective and inappropriate under the current conditions of governance and that ultimately voluntary compliance and self-regulation are preferable. In that line of reasoning, one could argue that networks generally prefer to resort to structures with informal characteristics. Networks that have formal structure are often less receptive to change. This is also highlighted by Provan and Milward (2001, p. 422), who argue that the organising dilemma is that networks often comprise of well-established programs and organisations that may be highly resistant to change or dismantling. This implies that the structure halts adjustments to the network and obstructs the network from being flexible. Another way of assessing the degree of formalisation in a network might be to look at the institutionalisation of the ties between the network partners. However, Provan et al. (2005, p. 608) argue that the absence of a strong institutionalised relationship does not necessarily mean that the link is weak. They explain that especially the informal relationships might enhance the commitment. However, one should note that in mature networks it would be useful to strive for institutionalisation of the network ties for the sake of sustainability and durability of the network.

One could argue that, in line with the above-mentioned explanation on what constitutes either an formal or informal network, the coordination of a network can also be seen as a trait of the formalisation in a network. One of the types of coordination is that the network is participant governed, which implies that there is no external entity that is tasked with the coordination of the network but that at least one of the network partners is to do so (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 234). In this type of coordination, shared participant-coordinated networks depend exclusively on the involvement and commitment of all, or a significant subset of the organisations that comprise the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 234). Depending on the size of the network, at one point it can become more efficient to appoint a single organisation from the network to become the lead organisation. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 235) argue that by the implementation of a lead organisation, the network becomes highly centralised and brokered, with asymmetrical power. One could argue that this decision would imply that the network will become more formalised since there is no freedom to act as leader for the organisations in other positions. Next to the participant-governed forms, one can identify a third form which is the network administrative organisation that is a centralised entity that is not a network partner and is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 236).

In networks that are mainly informal, one could assume that there is no network partner appointed to coordinate the network since there are no authority rules on the coordination of the network, but that this is a joint effort based on the network partners commitment. It is therefore not very likely to find an informal network that is coordinated by a lead organisation or a network administrative organisation. In the case of a more formalised network, this hypothesis is less clear. It can be for example set in the authority rules of the network that either all network partners coordinate the network together, one or more lead organisations are appointed or that a network administrative organisation is appointed.

One should note that there is a significant tension in network governance between on the one hand a formal structure and the creation of sustainability and durability but on the other hand an informal structure that incorporates the flexibility and adjustability a network might need to survive. As Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 245) argue: “The most obvious mechanism for maintaining stability is the formation of a formal hierarchy. However, governing networks as bureaucratic entities would mean destroying the intent and purpose of the form, as well as alienating most participants.” It is the flexibility of a network that makes it preferred over a hierarchy but also makes it able to respond rapidly to changes within but also outside of the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). According Provan et al. (2005, p. 608) informal ties between organisations in a network can render trust but the complementary formal ties can make the ties more durable and stable, especially with organisations that have a high personnel turnover. Next to that, Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 245) identify that developing a governance structure that is both stable and flexible is not possible. However it can be argued that characteristics of both the formal and informal structures can co-exist, for example Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 245) argue that to find the optimal level, the network structure requires frequent reassessment of the structural mechanisms and procedures in light of new development, and a willingness to make needed changes even if they are disruptive.

Next to the tension between stability and flexibility, there is also the argument on the costs that are paired with the cooperation in a network. According to Feiock (2007, p. 56), it is the existing structure of agreements that reduces the costs of the cooperation due to the availability of information about the conduct of the other network partners and their commitment. This implies that if the network structure is only based on informal characteristics, it might be that the costs of the cooperation are much higher. Furthermore, it is argued that entering in contractual agreements can mitigate opportunism (Feiock, 2007, p. 57). In that sense, organisations that take part in the network ought to feel more obliged to commit if there are formal agreements, and the possibility of free-rider behaviours will diminish. In this line of reasoning, one would argue that next to the fact that the informal structure characteristics are important for the functioning of a network, to some extent a formal structure is also necessary. However, in practice it is often voiced that it is the formalisation is more obstructing for the cooperation instead of stimulating. Therefore some networks tend to adhere to a strategy of informalisation (Terpstra, 2008a, pp. 217, 218). However, there are some unintended consequences to this strategy of informalisation according to Terpstra (2008a, pp. 217, 218) namely; informal information exchange might be illegal in light of privacy regulations, if there is personnel turnover the continuation of the network might be endangered, role ambiguity in the network might increase, and next to that, the legitimacy of the network might decrease.

Regarding role ambiguity in networks, in a study by Bradford (1998) as cited in Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 557), it is argued that lack of formalisation with regard to the positions, resulted in network partners not knowing their responsibilities and expectations and subsequently affecting the functioning of a network. To take away this role ambiguity, formalisation of the network structure is deemed appropriate. Next to that, one of the aspects of the legitimacy of a network is its clear ground rules and process transparency which when consequently applied assure a fair, equal and open process (Ansell & Gash, 2008, pp. 556, 557). One should note that having such a process, this might increase the network partners trust and strengthen the informal ties between the network partners. However, as Sydow and Windeler (2003, pp. 7, 12) argue, this relationship between trust and a structure of control is dialectic, implying that control can render trust, but that control can also decrease the trust between the network partners and thus create a more distrusting environment in which interactions are based on formal relationships instead of informal relations.

It is known that when networks grow, consultations, deliberations and decision-making become complicated (Provan & Milward, 2001; Provan et al., 2005). On the one hand, it is argued that formalisation with regard to coordination by appointing a lead organisation or a network administrative organisation might offer possibilities for the network, thus increasing the power asymmetries. However, on the other hand Singh and Prakash (2010, p. 851) argue that for networks to be an effective way of governing, it is important to reduce the power asymmetry between the partners, and rely more on formal mechanisms of coordination and trust, and develop horizontal coordinated and social capital in these networks. Next to the question of how the network will be coordinated, it is voiced that the willingness to coordinate a network is not always at an optimal level. According to Terpstra (2008a, pp. 220, 221) in the Netherlands the local safety networks struggle with the question who is ultimately responsible for the coordination task.

2.3. PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

At the end of the 70s, Herman Goldstein identified that the police was not able to function effectively due to their means-oriented focus instead of their ends-oriented focus (Weisburd et al., 2010, p. 140). He criticized the American police forces for not taking advantage of the knowledge and experience of patrol officers in policy formulation (Vaughn, 1992, p. 348). This resulted in a new approach towards policing, namely POP. In an article by Weisburd et al. (2010, pp. 139, 140), a systematic review of studies on POP indicated that there is an overwhelmingly positive impact of this policing strategy.

This type of policing was to be characterised as rather proactive than reactive and was focused on identifying underlying problems that could be targeted to alleviate crime and disorder at their roots, mostly problems embedded in communities (Weisburd et al., 2010, p. 140). In this light, Vaughn (1992, p. 345) says that in Goldstein his view, the police must respond to community needs and facilitate community dialogue. One might argue that this resembles another approach that is widely used in policing, namely community policing, which was preceded by POP. In Goldstein his view, policing officers must be familiar with the social, economic and cultural variables of a community but how to do so highly differs among scholars. Some argue that participation in the community is engaging in social activities, while others argue that policing officers should actually live in the community (Vaughn, 1992, p. 346). Vaughn (1992) indicates some critics argue that the definition of POP by Goldstein is still open for improvement. It is argued that Goldstein does not present a definition of POP but rather set out a six step inquiry (see list below) (Vaughn, 1992, p. 344).

1. Go beyond 'handling incidents'.
2. Each problem must be scrutinized under a rigorous systematic inquiry (origin, characteristics, and factors).
3. Problems must be dissected and defined.
4. Analysed within the operational realities of police work and rank in accordance with importance.
5. Developing an effective proactive and tailor-made strategy to address the problem.
6. Continuing review process in which police responses are evaluated and improved.

After that, the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) was developed for the implementation of POP by John E. Eck and William Spelman in 1987 (Weisburd et al., 2010, p. 141). Problem-solving using the SARA model was incorporated into community policing in the early 1990s and nowadays, the SARA model is the most familiar process for doing POP (*Encyclopedia of Police Science*, 2006, pp. 1155, 1156). One should note that the SARA model is not the only implementation of POP, also other models have been designed and used over the years. However, in this research, the SARA model will be put central due to its popularity and wide use.

The first phase of the SARA model is the scanning phase. This phase entails the scanning of the environment for problem selection through for example looking at data, talking to people and observing the community (*Encyclopedia of Police Science*, 2006, p. 1155; Sherman, 1991, p. 692; Weisburd et al., 2010). The next phase, the analysis phase, in which an analysis is conducted to provide detailed descriptions of the problems and explanations why the problems might occur (*Encyclopedia of Police Science*, 2006, p. 1155). Furthermore, after completing the analysis, it is aimed to proceed to the response phase. This phase entails searching for a wide range of solutions, specifically tailored to the identified problem, and then choosing and implementing the ones with the most promise, which is often characterised by a rather new and different response than usual should be the case in more incident-drive policing (*Encyclopedia of Police Science*, 2006, p. 1155; Sherman, 1991, p. 692; Weisburd et al., 2010, p. 146). Finally, after the proposed solution has been implemented, its results should be assessed. One should note that if there are no sufficient results, the SARA model can be used to evaluate whether the lack of results had to do with the problem definition, the analysis or for example the implementation of the proposed response.

One of the noted shortcomings of the SARA model is that it implies a linear process while in practice this might not be the case and next to that, the SARA model does not imply cooperation with the community (*Encyclopedia of Police Science*, 2006, p. 1156). In an assessment on POP, Borrión et al. (2019, p. 227) argue that crime reduction strategies should be designed to balance the needs of all relevant stakeholders. Subsequently, the proposed

solution should not only make use of traditional means of the policing organisation but also explore the means that the other network partners might bring to the table (Terpstra, 2008b, p. 285). Therefore, it is argued that in this research, POP is conceptualised as the completion of the four phases namely scanning, analysing, response, and assessment, preferably in that specific order, although minor deviations are allowed, in cooperation with other network partners in a LESN.

Despite the introduction of POP in the international realm of policing, the dominant strategy in the United States, but also in the Netherlands, is still characterised by unfocused surveillances to scare off possible criminals, quick responses to citizens' demands, criminal investigation and other control tasks that are almost never specifically focused on persons, places, times and situations involved (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 18). In a study by Terpstra (2008b, p. 288) on local safety networks, it became clear that the gap between the POP approach and the daily reality of the policing officers is big, due to the fact that CPOs sometimes view elements of the SARA model as needless paperwork and just a formality. This for example includes making a neighbourhood scan, making a problem analysis and writing a safety plans (Terpstra, 2008b, p. 288). As such, POP constitutes a procedure that has to be followed and it can be argued that its implementation could therefore be a way of formalising a network.

2.4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, the conceptual framework will be presented. Generally, this research is concerned with the relationship between the degree of formalisation in a network and the ability of the engaged CPO to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance. This is visualised in figure 2.2. Here the boxes represent the different concepts from the central research question and the arrow indicates the relationship that is to be explored.



Figure 2.2. Conceptual Framework

In the sections above, the abstract theoretical basis of the central theorem was introduced and explained, however it is important to clarify this further in the context of the LESNs. As indicated, the central unit in this research concerns LESNs in the city of Enschede that are concerned with local soft drug nuisance. Therefore, one could argue that the arrow and the boxes from figure 2.2 could be placed in a circle that represents the LESN. Network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach can thus be considered as attributes of the LESN. The composition of the LESNs in the city of Enschede is varying which implies that each network might constitute different members that work together on a problem with regard to local soft drug nuisance. In these LESNs, it is aimed to jointly address the encountered problems with the POP approach, implying the scanning for the central problem that is at the heart of the local soft drug nuisance; the analysis of the central problem to identify possible causes and remedies to the local soft drug nuisance; the intervention and the assessment of whether the local soft drug nuisance has been solved or decreased by the intervention of the LESN. One should note that in this process, the network partners might find that additional stakeholders should be included. Therefore, one could argue that the LESN, its degree of network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach, might not be as static as abstract literature might suggest.

One should note that to fully explain the ability to formulate a POP approach is much more complex than this visual representation suggests. Therefore, the aim is not to fully explain the relationship but to examine the possible influence of the degree of network formalisation. To do so, it is important to also take into account the context in which this hypothesized relationship is situated. The framework representation of the concepts in their context can be found in figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3. Conceptual Framework in the context of the Local Safety Network

In the concrete case of the LESNs in the city of Enschede, it is important to keep in mind that the size and the maturity of the network might explain some of the variations in both the network formalisation concept and the ability to formulate a POP approach concept. As indicated by a local policing officer, some networks have been in place for years while other networks are just developing. It could be argued that in some networks, the local policing officer might include someone from the housing corporation because they are personally acquainted while in other networks the municipality, as being responsible for the safety and security, formally constitutes a network that is based on more formal ties in the beginning. Next to that, deliberations in LESNs become more complex if there are more partners at the table that can have conflicting ideas with regard to the root problems of the local soft drug nuisance but also on the desired interventions.

2.5. CONCEPTUALISATION

2.5.1. LOCAL EXECUTIVE SAFETY NETWORKS

In this research, LESNs will be conceptualised as follows: In a LESN, a group of more than two, more or less independent actors, work together in a more or less structured and durable setting to collectively address problems related to local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede that require a joint effort. By identifying a group as a network, it is implied that the network can be seen as an entity consisting of specific features. It is argued that the group should consist of more than two actors, which implies that in this definition a relationship between two actors cannot be called a network. It is also important to note that the actors involved should be independent. It is this part of the conceptualisation that requires a network to have a more or less integral input and not only actors involved from the same organisation. In differentiating between integral groups that require a one-time cooperation and those involved in more structural cooperation, this definition implies that at least some structure and durability is required. Finally, the actors are dependent on each other to address certain policies, problems, or goals. Without one another, the collective visions cannot be fulfilled.

2.5.2. PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING APPROACH

In this research, the concept of the POP approach is narrowed down to the implementation of the phases of the SARA model, namely scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. One should note that this concerns the CPOs their ability to implement the approach. This implies that they might aim to do so, but the actual implementation of the POP approach might be lacking. To assess whether the local soft drug nuisance is dealt with by using the POP approach, each phase of the approach is treated separately but also the cyclical nature of the POP approach is taken into account. The cyclical nature of the approach implies that the CPOs of the LESNs have the freedom to return to one of the phases in the cycle, as presented in figure 2.4. This could imply that when assessing whether the intervention had an impact on the problem, it might become clear that for example they scanned for the wrong problems, they selected the wrong causes or left out another significant cause or the interventions selected were inappropriate or not successfully implemented. In the POP approach, it is then required to go back to one of the earlier phases of the cycle in order to make sure that the subsequent interventions lead to the desired outcomes.




Figure 2.4. Cyclical nature of the SARA-model from *probleemgericht werken en de role van criminaliteitsanalyse in 60 kleine stappen* by Eysink Smeets et al. (2010, p. 26)

Next to that, it is important to clarify what is meant by the different phases in this research. The first phase, scanning, is aimed to provide clarification on the nature of the problem (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 120). This implies scanning for safety problems. Next to that, the analysis phase is to shed light on the possible causes of the problem (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 120). For this, often in-depth analyses are used to uncover the drivers of the problem. Furthermore, the question of what should be done in order to solve the problem is central to the response phase (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 120). In this phase, practical solutions and measures are selected that counter the uncovered drivers of the problem and these are implemented. The assessment phase is to explore whether the response to the problem led to a significant decrease in the problem (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 120). This taxation is done by evaluation of the interventions and the effect on the problem.

2.5.3. FORMALISATION IN LOCAL SAFETY NETWORKS

In the literature review in this section, several theories on formalisation, either in a single organisation or in networks, were put forward. To sum up, theory suggests that the degree of formalisation is to be found in the structure of the network, the set of rules, the degree of autonomy, the role specificity, the procedures to follow, the extent to which rules are written down in a treaty or document, the extent to which the performance is monitored, the amount of red tape in a network, the extent to which the relationship ties are institutionalised and the type of coordination in the network. One should note that in the above-mentioned indicators, four main categories could be constructed namely, the nature of the rules, the nature of the ties between the organisations (formal or informal, institutionalised or not institutionalised), the degree of autonomy (little, through specific role descriptions and top-down monitoring, or much, through little to none role descriptions and little to none top-down monitoring), and the nature of the network coordination (shared governance, lead organisation or network administrative organisation).

It can be argued that the nature of the rules can be described by looking at whether there are rules in the network that structure the actions, for example procedures that ought to be followed by the network partners. Networks can consist of a fairly limited number of rules, which leads to networks being rather unstructured. However, if a network has many rules, it might in turn be perceived as red tape, being overly burdensome and unnecessary. The more of such rules in a network, the more formal the network is deemed. Furthermore, one could argue that the nature of the rules can also be identified to the extent to which rules are written down in documents, treaties, or other contracts, or verbally agreed upon. One could argue that if rules are laid down in writing, it is more formal than a structure that consists only of verbally agreed upon rules.

Next to that, the nature of the ties between the participating organisations is also seen as an indication of the degree of formalisation in a network. A tie between the networking organisations, in this case, can be viewed as the relationship between them. In a network with a low degree of formalisation it is expected that these relationships are based on informal characteristics such as mutual trust, personal relationships and frequent informal contact (Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004) while a network that is more formalised, these relationships are, in turn, also more formal. This implies that these are not based on trust and personal contact but on formal meetings, formal agreements between the organisations and a structure in which all relationships between the organisations are set. Furthermore, in fairly mature and stable networks, the ties between the organisations are often institutionalised which implies that they become more stable and durable due to repeated interactions. In networks that have just been set up, this institutionalisation is not yet present. One could argue that institutionalisation of a network tie is in a strict sense not limited to formal characteristics, but also trust, which is a rather informal characteristic of a relationship, can become institutionalised. However, it should be noted that if such informal characteristics become institutionalised, the flexibility and changeability of the relationship is traded for stability and durability. One might thus argue that this trade-off would suggest that more institutionalised relationships are more structured and rigid, consequently, more formalised.

Another indicator of the degree of formalisation in the LESNs is the degree of autonomy that the individual partners experience. If a network has strict role descriptions for the partners either originating from the network itself or the corresponding organisations, their freedom to act on their own initiative is often limited. The specification of role descriptions is thus a process of the formalisation. On the other hand, if there is limited role specificity, the scope to act for the partners increases significantly, which subsequently enhances the capacity of the network to be reactive and flexible. Another factor that is linked to the degree of autonomy is the monitoring of the network partners. One should note that this variable is very much based on the perception and the feelings of the individual network partners. This is due to the fact that every individual perceives monitoring differently, implying that two individuals might experience the monitoring of a manager rather differently. However, the general tendency is that when monitoring increases, the degree of autonomy of the monitored individual becomes more restrained. Therefore, in this research it is assumed that high levels of monitoring should be seen as a formal characteristic of a network.

The final dimension that will be used in this research to explore the degree of formalisation is the type of coordination in the network. In an informal network, it is unlikely that structures such as a lead organisation or a network administrative organisation are set in place to coordinate the network. It is argued that in these networks either no agreements are made on the type of coordination or there is a form of shared governance among all participants that is not in rules or regulations. One should note that shared governance can also be adhered to in more formal networks, however the difference is that in the formal network there is a set of rules that prescribes that shared governance is the agreed upon type of coordination.

	Low degree of formalisation (informal network characteristics)	High degree of formalisation (formal network characteristics)
Nature of the rules	Verbally agreed upon Limited number of rules	Agreed upon in writing Many rules (possibly red tape)
Nature of ties between organisations	Based informal characteristics None institutionalised	Based on formal characteristics Institutionalised
Degree of autonomy	Limited role specificity Limited top-down monitoring	Specific role descriptions Top-down monitoring
Type of coordination	Not agreed upon Shared governance	Shared governance Lead organisation Network administrative organisation

Table 2.1. Values corresponding with high degree and low degree of formalisation with regard to the four dimensions of network formalisation: Nature of the Rules; Nature of Ties; Degree of Autonomy; Type of Coordination, and their corresponding values.

2.6. EXPECTATIONS

In this section, the expectations will be explained that will be guiding in this research. It should be noted that these expectations are not structured as hypotheses but as expectations. The difference lies with the fact that hypotheses are generally tested against the data and subsequently accepted or rejected. However, in this research one cannot simply accept or reject hypotheses due to the scope of the research but also it is deemed that too limited in-depth understanding can be reached by simply assessing the hypotheses. Therefore, in this section the expectations of the research will be presented that are guiding in uncovering a deeper understanding of the phenomena. Before that, it is important to clarify how the theory connects to the concrete situation of the LESNs in the city of Enschede that are concerned with local soft drug nuisance. The LESNs in the city of Enschede consists of several partners, working together in different compositions, depending on the specific problem at stake. It should be noted that since this research is focused on the ability of the CPO to formulate a POP approach, the networks selected at least incorporate the police organisation as one of the partners.

First of all, it should be noted that the LESNs in the city of Enschede can be considered network governance. This is due to the fact that a hierarchy is considered too rigid but also too limited to tackle the problems that the city of Enschede encounters with local soft drug nuisance. As indicated earlier, the police organisation, as a hierarchy, is too limited in its resources to be fully responsible for solving these problems. Next to that, it could be argued whether the police organisation is able to keep up with the constantly changing context. Therefore, also in the city of Enschede, the police organisation aims to target problems with local soft drug nuisance in cooperation with other partners that have a share in the problem or that might possess the tools to address the problem. However, it should be noted that this cooperation is often not open-to-all but limited to a set of partners that are deemed crucial in targeting the problem. If the CPO encounters problems in a neighbourhood, it might be highly beneficial to start to work together with the housing corporation in that neighbourhood since they manage the houses in question, but also the municipality that possesses certain legislative powers that are needed if measures are to be taken. Another example of the pooling of resources in the local safety provision is the making use of the Veiligheidshuizen (Safety Houses) that are set up in the Netherlands to enhance the cooperation on safety and care provision (*Landelijk kader Veiligheidshuizen: vóór en dóór partners*, 2013). In practice, the cooperation between the CPO and other partners on the local safety provision is restricted by national and European laws. For example, there are restrictions on sharing information of specific individuals to the other organisations in the network. Here, the LESN can engage with the Veiligheidshuis Twente. This provides the network with a framework in which there is legal space created to allow information exchange between the network partners. Therefore, by including the Veiligheidshuis Twente, the LESN is pooling legal resources that they otherwise would not possess. Local safety provision in the Netherlands often is considered a public affair, however, the LESNs in the city of Enschede are not strictly considered public. There is the freedom to enter into cooperation with for example local shop owners, companies in industrial areas, bars and restaurants and other private partners. In a hypothetical situation when a certain area in the city centre is known for its drug nuisance, citizens might evade these areas. The bars, restaurants and shops would experience the number of visitors in their establishment decrease and subsequently miss out on revenues. These private actors thus feel the urge to address the problem and next to that, they might possess tools such as cameras in the establishments that in turn might help in solving the problems with the drug nuisance.

In the context of this research, it is expected that the higher the degree of formalisation in the LESNs in Enschede, the higher the ability of the engaged CPO to formulate a POP approach to the problems with local drug nuisance. It is thus expected that if the network partners, including the CPO, have rules that guide their interactions, it is easier to come to a POP approach. The rules not only structure the interactions of the CPO and the other network partners, but also provide that the network maintains its stability and durability. However, as it is voiced in practice among CPOs, when a certain point of formalisation in the network is reached, additional rules become rather burdensome instead of stimulation for a POP approach. This can be identified as red tape incorporating a loss of flexibility which is in turn an important feature in POP. Here a tipping point is expected that thus changes the proposed relationship from a positive influence to a negative influence (see figure 2.5). It should be noted that this figure is a simplistic representation of the expected relationship. Therefore, the location of the tipping point

in the figure provides no indication of the location of the actual tipping point. It is simply included to indicate that a tipping point is expected.




Figure 2.5. Parabola of expected relationship with tipping point.

However, one should note that, as identified in the conceptualisation, both network formalisation and the POP approach consists of different dimensions that might interact differently than the general expectation presumes. Therefore, since there is limited theoretical basis to expect certain interactions for the different dimensions, a rather explorative stance will be taken here.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the methodological framework of this research will be explained. First, it will be explained what type of research design is selected. Next to that, it will be explained what the criteria are for the respondents that were selected for conducting this research. In the operationalisation, the interview questions will be introduced that were guiding in the semi-structured interviews. Here, it will also be shortly touched upon the measurement criteria. Following, the next section is concerned with the data collection method and certain rules of conduct concerning the privacy of the respondent. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an explanation of how the data was analysed.

3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

The central question in this research is concerned with an in-depth understanding of the ability to formulate a POP approach in the context of CPOs in LESNs. It is not aimed to provide evidence for a relationship that might exist between the variables under particular circumstances but to uncover and understand how these variables might interact in the specific case of this research. Therefore, a qualitative research design is most appropriate. As Trochim (2020, p. 3) explains, ‘I believe that qualitative research has a special value for investigating complex and sensitive issues’. In the context of this research, if one is to arrive at an understanding of the complex situation within the LESNs and to explore why things happen, one cannot simply rely on quantitative data, but extensive and detailed data on the subject is required.

What can be identified from the first chapter of this research is that the questions are empirical. This implies that in order to answer the research question and its sub-questions one requires means of observation. The central research question in this research is concerned with a possible causality between the variables network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach. Therefore, this question can be categorised as an explanatory question due to its aim to explain a certain phenomenon, which implies a causal research design. It should be noted that the first three sub-questions are descriptive of nature since they address descriptions on the context and the two central variables network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach. Descriptive questions are questions that provide information on the cases without addressing causal links (Dooley & Vos, 2008, p. 7). In the fourth sub-question, the relationship between network formalisation and the different phases of the POP approach is central and therefore this constitutes an explanatory question.

Next to the testing nature of this research design, it is aimed to also maintain a rather open and explorative focus. This implies that this research is not strictly focused on network formalisation as the explanatory variable, but also aims to explore other variables that might influence the ability to formulate a POP approach. This research aims to provide conclusions that are mainly context- and case-dependent and therefore provides more concrete and in-depth knowledge. An appropriate research design in this research can be therefore identified as a case study design in which one specific case is placed centrally. It should be noted that, when one selects a research design, a tension between generalisability and detail arises (Trochim, 2020). Subsequently, a case study design is focused on details and specific characteristics of a case. Therefore, one should note that one of the limitations of the chosen research design is the limited generalisability of the results. It is therefore important to indicate that the aim of this study is not to provide a theory that can generally be applied but to provide an account of these specific cases of which possible insights can be used in future research.

3.2. DATA COLLECTION

As stated before, this research concerns an empirical study. This had implications on the data collection method that was chosen. To answer the research question and the sub-questions, very specific and in-depth information was to be retrieved on the subject by the data collection method. Next to that, the explorative focus of the study also required the data collection method to provide the respondents with a certain degree of freedom in answering the questions and if necessary, the researcher to pose follow-up questions. Taking this into account, a data collection method of semi-structured interviews seemed most appropriate.

Next to that, if one is to compare the answers that the respondents provide, it is of utmost importance that the data collection method is similar for all respondents. However, to maintain the explorative focus, it is important to uncover additional information through additional questions. This will result in the fact that the interviews might not be similar in the exact sense. The interviews take place both physically and via an online medium. The interviewer asked the respondent whether he or she allows the interview to be recorded. This question was repeated when the recording started in order to record the respondent its compliance with the recording. The interview data was transcribed, and the transcripts were subsequently be analysed. After the transcription of the interviews was completed, the transcripts were sent to the respondents for confirmation. The data gathered in this study was handled anonymously. This implies that only the interviewer is aware of which label is attached to which respondent.

It is important to note that this method of data collection is both verbal and obtrusive (Dooley & Vos, 2008). This might influence the reactivity of the unit of analysis, in this case the respondents. Therefore, it must be taken into account that this can have a substantive influence on the answers to the questions and thus the results of the research. Next, one should take into account that the answers that the respondents will provide will be both constrained by time and cognitive limitations. This implies that the answers given might not be covering all grounds, only those that the respondent is to recall within the limited time.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Netherlands had been in a lockdown since the 14th of December 2021. This lock-down was still in place while the interviews were conducted. This implied that individuals were highly urged to work from home and that university facilities such as meeting rooms were closed. However, it should be noted that the respondents operate in a field that was stipulated by the Dutch government as a vital profession¹ which in essence implied if they are not able to execute their job-related activities, this might result in severe societal consequences. Since a large share of the job-related activities of policing officers cannot be performed from a home location, this implied that during the time of the interviews, most policing officers were still executing their job in a physical environment. Also, the researcher was provided with access to the Service Centrum West in Enschede in case a COVID-19 proof location was required for the conduction of an interview. Therefore, the researcher asked the respondents whether they preferred the interview taking place in an online or in a physical environment.

3.3. CASE SELECTION AND SAMPLING

As stated in the first section of this chapter, this research concerns a case study design. The case that was subsequently selected was the city of Enschede and the LESNs in that context. This case was selected due to the fact that the request for this study partly originated from individuals that were affiliated with this case. Next to that, access with regard to interviewees for this case was provided. Next to that, it is voiced by a local policing officer that in solving drug-related problems a POP approach is deemed highly appropriate. In practice the terminology CHEERS is used to determine whether incidents can be considered a problem by looking at its impact on the community, whether it is harmful, what are the expectations of the public of the appropriate police reaction, what are the specific incidents, are the incidents recurring and are there similarities (Eysink Smeets et al., 2010, p. 40). One should note that especially with local soft drug nuisance, many of the incidents fit the CHEERS criteria and therefore it can be seen as a problem that is might be effectively addressed by using the POP approach. With regard to the different networks, one should not be misled into believing that the LESNs in which the selected CPOs and other respondents are engaged, are the same or to a certain degree similar, since although aiming to control for several variables, no LESN is an exact duplicate of another.

In order to conduct this research, a sample of 9 respondents of the Dutch National Police was selected who either have knowledge on or are engaged in different LESNs in Enschede. A list of the respondents can be found in the Appendix 3. It should be noted that this was not a random selection of individual respondents but rather a selection of individuals that was agreed upon in consultation with the contact person within the policing organisation. Next

¹ <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/vitale-infrastructuur/overzicht-vitale-processen>

to that, one of the respondents was selected based on recommendations of one of the other respondents. The respondents were at the time of the interviews working in the BT Enschede in different functions: CPOs, tasks holders, OEWs, and BT management.

3.4. OPERATIONALISATION

In this section, the operationalisations of the concepts will be presented. The concepts were explained in the conceptualisation chapter of this research. In the first sub-question of this research, the situation with regard to the local soft drug nuisance, the LESNs and the COVID-19 pandemic is to be described. To identify the respondents their connection to local soft drug nuisance and what it entails for them, it was asked what their daily work consists of and what connection that has with local soft drug nuisance. Next to that, to gather information on the LESNs, it was asked whether they could tell something about the cooperations that they have with other partners with regard to local soft drug nuisance (for example who the other partners are, what their experiences are and how long they have been involved). Furthermore, each respondent was asked to what extent the COVID-19 pandemic affected their day-to-day tasks in order to uncover a description of the COVID-19 situation of the CPOs and the networks.

In order to identify whether the respondents were able to formulate a POP approach it was first of all asked how they distinguish between a POP approach and more incident-driven policing in their daily work. Next to that, it was asked to what extent they are able to define the problem, to do in-depth research on a problem, to find and implement a solution, and to evaluate the solution. Also, it was asked whether the respondents were able to utilise the cyclical nature of the POP approach by being able to take some steps back. With regard to network formalisation, questions were posed to what extent the nature of the rules (the number of rules and the verbal versus written rules), the nature of the ties (the characteristics and the maturity of the relationships), the degree of autonomy (the degree of freedom in their daily work and the degree of top-down monitoring) and the coordination (the type of coordination in the LESN) were stimulating or obstructing in formulating a POP approach in the LESNs. Next to that, to uncover additional information on possible influences of network formalisation in the LESNs but also to uncover additional influencing factors, the interview concluded with a question on an example of a best practice with regard to a POP approach that has been successful in cooperation with other partners with regard to local soft drug nuisance.

Because there is a difference between the respondents with regard to their function within the policing organisation, therefore two different interview protocols were set up. One for the CPOs and one for the other respondents. It should be noted that the operationalisation of the concepts in both interview protocols is the same, but rather the formulation of the questions is different. The interview protocols of both the CPO respondents and non-CPO respondents can be found in appendix 1 and 2 of this research. One should note that the interview questions are posed in Dutch since the interviews were held with Dutch respondents.

3.3.1. CRITERIA OF MEASUREMENT QUALITY

In this section, it is shortly touched upon the validity and reliability of the measures that are introduced in the operationalisation. It should be noted that in qualitative research the application of these criteria is different. Whereas in quantitative research these should be applied in a strict sense, in qualitative research one could use them as guiding but not necessarily obligatory. With concept validity, the question is asked whether we are actually measuring what we want to measure. In the case of this study, the operationalisation is tailored to the extent that it aims to explore the full theoretical construct as conceptualised. However, what must be noted is that it might be that the respondents are not able to provide full information on the subject, due to cognitive limits and time constraints. Also, even though the same questions are asked to the respondents, their interpretation of the questions might differ but also in qualitative research one enjoys the freedom to ask additional questions based on the answers given. This allows for measuring what we want to measure, but also to uncover other in-depth knowledge on the matter. Next to that, one could argue that more tailored questions would provide better insights. However, one should weigh up the length of the interview on the one hand and the depth of the interview on the other hand. Therefore, it is aimed to find a balance between the right number of questions and their depth.

The other measurement of quality is the reliability of the measure. In this case it is the question of whether the same questions yield the same results at the same units. With regard to this study, it can be assumed that the respondents that will provide answers to the questions, will be reliable in answering the questions. It is important to identify that when a certain amount of time has passed and the questions are asked again, it is possible that the answers are different. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the answers to the questions are highly dependent on the timing, the context, and the specific situation the respondents find themselves in.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

After the data was collected and full recordings of the interviews were available, the recordings were transcribed. In order to do so, the program Amberscript, provided by the BMS-lab from the University of Twente, was used. When the transcripts of the interviews were available, the gathered data was analysed. To analyse the transcripts, the documents were printed and seven main categories were set up as a basis for the coding of the documents (see table 3.1).

<i>Main label</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Additional Labels</i>
1	COVID-19 situation	1.1 Current Situation 1.2 Influence on Daily Work
2	LESNs	
3	Local Soft Drug Nuisance	
4	Network Formalisation	4.1 Nature of the Rules 4.2 Nature of Relationship Ties 4.3 Degree of Autonomy 4.4. Type of Coordination
5	Ability to Formulate a POP Approach	5.1 Scanning 5.2 Analysing 5.3 Response 5.4 Evaluation 5.5 Cyclical Nature
6	Obstructive Influencing Factors	6.1 Network Formalisation 6.2 Organisation Specific 6.3 Network Specific 6.4 Problem Specific
7	Stimulating Influencing Factors	7.1 Network Formalisation 7.2 Organisation Specific 7.3 Network Specific 7.4 Problem Specific

Table 3.1: Used Codes to label the transcripts.

For the explorative nature of the research, the coding was done via a three-step process namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Tubbing, 2019). First of all, a process of open coding was used to categorise interview data according to the different themes (see table 3.1: main labels 1 to 7). It is important to note that the themes such as the dimensions of network formalisation and the POP approach are known beforehand since these are expressed in the expectations of the study in chapter 2.4. However, this process stimulated an explorative view on additional factors that might explain the phenomena. Next to that, with axial coding the assigned codes were compared, adjusted, and aggregated if necessary (see table 3.1: additional labels). In selective coding, the links between the different codes were identified in order to identify whether it supports the theory, but also to explore whether additional, yet unknown, links could be identified. This final step was especially suitable for identifying the factors 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 since those were not covered by the theoretical framework that was presented in this research.

First, it was important to describe the situation with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the local soft drug nuisance and the LESNs. Next to that, a description was provided of the degree of formalisation in the different networks. The answers by the respondents were analysed and a general overview was provided on the degree of formalisation of the network according to the respondents. Since they belong to different networks it is important to take into account that it is a general indication of network formalisation. Next, in order to identify whether the CPOs were able to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance, the answers from the interviews on the questions on POP and the different phases were selected. The data was presented in a general overview per phase of the POP approach. To answer the central research question, one had to use the labels 6 and 7 from table 3.1 and the answers to the third sub-question to describe the overall tendency of the phases of the POP approach and the networks combined.

3.6 ETHICAL REVIEW

The BMS Ethics Committee reviewed and approved the proposal of this research. The research proposal has been given the number 201471.

4. BACKGROUND AND SITUATION

4.1 DATA ANALYSES

In this chapter, the analyses with regard to the local soft drug nuisance, the LESNs and the COVID-19 pandemic are presented. It is aimed to provide an answer to the following question: *What is the background and the current situation with regard to the LESNs, local soft drug nuisance, and the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of the CPOs in Enschede?* It should be noted that analyses will give the reader a more detailed description of the context in which the expected relationship between network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach is situated.

4.1.1 LOCAL SOFT DRUG NUISANCE

This section will discuss the nature of the local soft drug nuisance as indicated by the respondents of this research. The aim is to provide an idea of their perspective on local soft drug nuisance as they encounter in their daily work. It should be noted that this section is not a complete overview of local soft drugs nuisance, however it is based on information that is provided by the respondents.

When talking about local soft drug nuisance, what types of drugs are considered? As indicated by the respondents, soft drugs are used as a container concept. This implies that various types of drugs are seen as soft drugs by the CPOs, backed up by Dutch national legislation on soft drugs. Thinking about soft drugs, many individuals rightly think of cannabis, hemp, and weed. However, there are also other types of soft drugs that the policing officers encounter in their daily work for example mushrooms and prescription drugs that cause individuals to become mentally confused such as tranquillizers or sleeping pills.² It should be noted that this is not a complete list of soft drugs considered under Dutch legislation, however the list is limited to the drugs mentioned by the respondents in this research. Next to that, it should also be considered that Dutch legislation has a toleration policy with regard to the use of some types of soft drugs.³ One should consider that the respondents in this research predominantly spoke of soft drugs in the sense of weed, cannabis and hemp.

In the research, the respondents argued that there are three types of nuisances that are most dominant with regard to local soft drug nuisance that they encounter in their daily work namely the use of the product, the dealing in the product and the production of the product. As stated by one of the respondents, the use of soft drugs is not a large cause of nuisance in itself. He/she argues that the individual that is under the influence of soft drugs often become rather languid instead of producing a lot of noise or being active in a sense that it leads to nuisance to other individuals.⁴ In the city of Enschede, this problem is also prominent among German citizens that cross the border to buy and use soft drugs on Dutch territory.⁵ However, the use of soft drugs can come hand-in-glove other types of nuisance. It is directly linked to the dealing and the production of the products, as will be discussed subsequently. Next to that, the use of soft drugs among individuals can often be seen as a step towards other types of drugs on the long term that might indirectly cause more nuisance.⁶ Another type of local soft drug nuisance concerns the dealing behaviour in soft drugs.⁷ When this takes place in domestic areas, neighbours can often experience nuisance due to the users visiting the house that is dealt from.⁸ However, it should be noted that since soft drugs can be legitimately purchased in the coffeeshops, also the dealing of soft drugs at these places is often combined with hard drugs. These houses are sometimes referred to as so-called 'junk hollen'.⁹ Also, there is a lot of dealing behaviour around the train stations due to the incoming German citizens that visit the Netherlands to buy drugs.¹⁰ One of the major problems with regard to local soft drug nuisance in the city in Enschede is, as stated by many of the respondents, the production of the product. In this case this mostly concerns hemp plantation in domestic areas and industrial areas in and around Enschede.¹¹ In the domestic areas it can be the case that citizens

² Respondent B [29-33] [35-38] Respondent I [141-144]

³ Respondent C [43-48]

⁴ Respondent C [36-39]

⁵ Respondent H [355-357]

⁶ Respondent B [100-104] [106-107]

⁷ Respondent I [141-144]

⁸ Respondent B [59-61]

⁹ Respondent F [161]

¹⁰ Respondent H [355-357]

¹¹ Respondent H [47-50] [51] Respondent C [24-26] [36-39] Respondent G [39-42]

rent out parts of their property for purposes of hemp plantations, which results in plantations in the middle of the neighbourhoods.¹² This often leads to increased risks of fire hazards in neighbourhoods and increased electricity use.¹³ One of the more recent insights is that the organisations behind these hemp plantations are undermining with possibilities of extreme violence and escalation such as the quadruple murder that occurred in Enschede in 2018.¹⁴ It is therefore often the case that these more prominent individuals in the organisations remain off the radar because they position so-called ‘geld ezels’ between them and the plantation.¹⁵ As one of the respondents stated, it is often the case when we clear up a plantation, that the individual present is a rather pitiful individual that is often indebted or addicted, and not one of the bigger fish from the undermining organisation.¹⁶ This often results in the fact that the main suspects cannot be persecuted.

“It is a pain. With regard to soft drugs, hard drugs, it just as the processionary caterpillars does not seem to go again. It is a constant. Then it occurs here and then there and then here again. And it has been this way for quite some time.”¹⁷

Soft drug nuisance is a problem that many areas in the Netherlands are confronted with.¹⁸ Enschede in that sense is no exception.¹⁹ Especially some neighbourhoods have been more prone to local soft drug nuisance than others.²⁰ It is often the case that those neighbourhoods are not solely confronted with local soft drug nuisance, but it is a part of the bigger issues at play.²¹ Regarding the production of soft drugs, hemp plantations can often arise in such neighbourhoods but also in the industrial zones of the city.²² Local soft drug nuisance in the form of the use of soft drugs is also found in for example several neighbourhoods, the city centre, playing grounds, schoolyards.²³ Also, one of the respondents argued that he/she experiences a lot of nuisance with regard to dealing in soft drugs in the Glanerbrug area and around the train station, partly due to customers from Germany.²⁴ One of the fundamental questions in dealing with local soft drug nuisance is when and why it arises. The nuisance with regard to the use of soft drugs is facilitated by the fact that soft drugs can be legally sold in the Netherlands so it is easy to get at the coffeeshops.²⁵ Next to that, the demand for soft drugs will remain due to the fact that there are individuals that are addicted to those substances.²⁶ Also, since German legislation differs from Dutch legislation with regard to soft drugs, the flow of German individuals that will come to the Netherlands to use or buy soft drugs will remain the same.²⁷ With regard to the production of soft drugs, one of the reasons that it arises is that individuals require revenue.²⁸ Some people rent out parts of their houses to producers or start a hemp plantation themselves.²⁹ This is especially visible in neighbourhoods that are on average more deprived.³⁰ Another reason why local soft drug nuisance arises is due to the fact that there are large and powerful organisations that drive the production of drugs. These large organisations, often the ones that receive the benefits from production, often target vulnerable target groups to do the actual production. In some of these cases, it evolves to the standard of serious crime due to the fact that the organisations behind the plantations are undermining.³¹

Local soft drug nuisance affects society in many different ways. Below some examples are given that were provided by the respondents in this research on different ways the local soft drug nuisance affects organisations and individual citizens. First of all, it should be noted that the use of soft drugs such as weed and hemp are limitedly disturbing on the street since it provides the users with a rather numbing effect.³² However, other types of soft drug use can lead to disturbances on the streets that are felt by citizens. One of these is exemplified by

¹² Respondent B [77-80]

¹³ Respondent F [182]

¹⁴ Respondent C [43-48]

¹⁵ Respondent C [238-240]

¹⁶ Respondent F [132-135]

¹⁷ Respondent C [95-98]

¹⁸ Respondent C [77-79]

¹⁹ Respondent A [156-157] Respondent B [113-115]

²⁰ Respondent G [39-42] Respondent F [150-153]

²¹ Respondent I [284-286]

²² Respondent B [77-80] Respondent C [24-26]

²³ Respondent A [616-618] Respondent B [100-104] [106-107]

²⁴ Respondent H [355-357] [349-353]

²⁵ Respondent A [128-135] Respondent C [105-107]

²⁶ Respondent F [172-175]

²⁷ Respondent A [27-29]

²⁸ Respondent C [105-107] Respondent F [172-175]

²⁹ Respondent B [77-80] Respondent F [172-175]

³⁰ Respondent F [150-153]

³¹ Respondent B [196-199] Respondent D [47-48] [49-58]

³² Respondent C [37-39]

mentally confused individuals due to prescription drugs on the street.³³ The police organisation indicated that they find themselves dealing with mentally confused individuals a significant amount of time. If local soft drug nuisance is located in a domestic environment, there is a possibility that neighbours find themselves affected by the nuisance. One of the CPOs explained that he/she recently invited citizens that had a major problem with drugs-related nuisance next door.³⁴ Next to that, in the case of hemp plantations, those are often constructed in a way that there is a high risk of fire. This implies that in especially domestic areas, some plantations pose a threat to the safety of the individuals living next to or close to the plantation.³⁵

One of the parties that is affected by local soft drug nuisance are the social housing corporations that find that their properties are being used as so-called 'junkhollen' for the use and dealing in, among other things, soft drugs. Next to that also properties of social housing corporations are used to facilitate the production of soft drugs, for example hemp plantations.³⁶ Another party that is especially affected by the production of the local soft drugs is Enexis, the network operator of the energy grid in Enschede. The electricity that is required to facilitate a hemp plantation is often acquired illegally.³⁷ It should be noted that it is not only citizens and organisations that are affected by the local soft drug nuisance but also individuals that participate in the process are affected in a sense. This implies that vulnerable individuals are often prone to be dragged into the criminalised process due to various reasons. It is often that these individuals are not ultimately responsible for the production of the soft drugs but are rather just used as facilitators.³⁸

Dealing with local soft drug nuisance is complex due to the fact that it is often related to networks that exceed the local boundaries, but its consequences can be felt in a rather local setting. It is felt that early response towards local soft drug nuisance is desired due to the fact that a response will gain a more preventive character. If local soft drug nuisance for example develops into a hemp plantation, the administrative burden of clearing such a site is significant. A more preventive approach would therefore lower the administrative burden on the policing officers.³⁹ For this, the CPOs require to stay in close contact with citizens that provide them with signals of possible local soft drug nuisance.⁴⁰ It should be noted that in order to deal with local soft drug nuisance, one requires a rather multidisciplinary approach since the complex problems related to the local soft drug nuisance are often outside the scope of the policing organisation and its competencies. This was also felt in the collective response towards the drug nuisance problem in the city centre of Enschede.⁴¹ One perception on dealing with local soft drug nuisance with regard to the use of the product is that you provide individuals with means that will make them less prone to find their happiness in drug use.⁴² For example providing for housing and providing for care. This often goes hand in glove with investments upfront but leads to fewer costs in the end due to its preventive nature.⁴³ Another way to deal with local soft drug nuisance is to identify an area in which drug use is legally prohibited and in which a zero-tolerance policy is applied. This is for example applied on a schoolyard in the neighbourhood of one of the CPOs.⁴⁴ As a reactive response towards the production of soft drugs, it is possible and agreed upon that the municipality is in a position to close the property for a certain amount of time.⁴⁵ Next to that, the individuals that rented that property are put on a blacklist of tenants for some time. In a way, this policy also has a preventive character since it aims to make having a plantation less appealing. Another approach that is more preventive in local soft drug nuisance is to start a conversation with the possible users, dealers and producers in order to warn them beforehand. If youth is prone to soft drug use, it might be clever that a youth worker or a youth policing officer initiates preventive talks with this specific individual.⁴⁶

³³ Respondent B [29-33] [35-38]

³⁴ Respondent B [59-61]

³⁵ Respondent F [182]

³⁶ Respondent B [29-33] [35-38]

³⁷ Respondent H [70-71]

³⁸ Respondent D [47-48] [49-58]

³⁹ Respondent B [236-237] [239-241]

⁴⁰ Respondent B [59-61]

⁴¹ Respondent E [189-190]

⁴² Respondent E [234-237]

⁴³ Respondent E [237-240]

⁴⁴ Respondent A [616-618]

⁴⁵ Respondent H [85-89]

⁴⁶ Respondent B [100-104] [106-107]

4.1.2 LOCAL EXECUTIVE SAFETY NETWORKS IN ENSCHEDE

In this section, a description of the LESNs in which the CPOs are engaged in their daily work is explained. This is based on the interview data as provided in this research by the respondents. It should be noted that this does not fully cover the concept of LESNs but is only centred on the information provided by the respondents.

First of all, it is important to consider the motivation to engage in LESNs. As stated by the majority of the respondents, working together in networks and cooperating with network partners is of utmost importance for the CPOs.⁴⁷ This is partly because the problems that the CPOs encounter in their neighbourhood are often broader than solely the safety aspects and often more complex. Therefore, it is important to understand that often problems related to local soft drug nuisance are not fully in the scope of the police organisation and therefore gathering more partners in a network and finding an approach in a multidisciplinary way is often highly appropriate.⁴⁸ Furthermore, it is often the case that other network partners have specific information with regard to cases or problems and that the police have information.⁴⁹ Working in networks therefore facilitates that this information is bundled if possible.⁵⁰ Next to that, as society is a highly dynamic environment in which changes can happen quite rapidly, it is important for CPOs to have short lines of communication with other partners that have a share in a certain problem.⁵¹ This facilitates an early and rapid response towards the problems that they face.

The subsequent question is who is part of the LESNs. As most respondents stated the social housing corporations in Enschede were one of their most important network partners.⁵² One of the CPOs indicated that in his/her neighbourhood at least three different social housing corporations rent out properties namely 'De Woonplaats', 'Domijn', and 'Ons Huis'.⁵³ Next to that, the municipality is also an important network partner either centrally or rather decentralised via the 'stadsdelen', service centres and neighbourhood coaches.⁵⁴ Also, Enexis is one of the network partners that comes into play with regard to the approach towards local soft drug nuisance.⁵⁵ One of the approaches is the 'smart measurer' that can detect divergent patterns in energy use.⁵⁶ This facilitates in detecting possible hemp plantations. Another important network partner for the CPOs are citizens.⁵⁷ If citizens are not reporting to the CPOs, they would be in the dark with regard to what is happening in their neighbourhoods. Their participation in the network is for example exemplified by the WhatsApp groups of which the CPO is a member. With regard to care organisations, Tactus is a network partner that is an organisation that is focused on helping individuals with addiction. If cases of local soft drug nuisance require assistance with regard to addict care, often Tactus is part of the network.⁵⁸ Next to that, on specific problems and cases the cooperation is sought with network partners such as 'Bureau Halt' and 'Kennis Centrum Weerbaarheid'.⁵⁹ It should be noted that since Enschede is an area close to the border and part of the local soft drug nuisance is cross-border, also cooperation with German colleagues, German Addiction Care is sought.⁶⁰ It should be noted that the network partners of CPOs are strictly speaking not only external but also internal in the policing organisation different departments and roles are part of the networks. As one of the respondents stated: "*Neighbourhood work is not something that you do on your own as a community policing officer. It is something that you work on with different network partners, but also*

⁴⁷ Respondent B [27-29] [68-69] Respondent E [183-185] Respondent H [15-17] [38-40] Respondent F [93-97] Respondent I [11-16]

⁴⁸ Respondent B [39-46] [48-50] Respondent E [183-185]

⁴⁹ Respondent H [38-40]

⁵⁰ Respondent G [42-44] [45-50]

⁵¹ Respondent B [55]

⁵² Respondent B [27-29] Respondent H [51-56] [82-84] Respondent G [42-44] [45-50] [53-58] [86-91] Respondent C [48-52] Respondent A [171-172]

⁵³ Respondent G [86-91]

⁵⁴ Respondent B [39-46] [48-50] Respondent H [51-56] Respondent G [42-44] [45-50] [53-58]

Respondent C [48-52] Respondent D [137-139] Respondent A [23-26] [132-142] [636-641] Respondent I [77-79] [22-31]

⁵⁵ Respondent H [51-56] [64-67] [68-70]

Respondent G [53-58] Respondent A [160-167]

⁵⁶ Respondent C [48-52]

⁵⁷ Respondent A [82-88] [636-641] Respondent I [11-16]

⁵⁸ Respondent B [39-46] [48-50] Respondent G [42-44] [45-50] Respondent A [23-26] [132-142] [189-194] [215-220] Respondent D [137-139]

⁵⁹ Respondent A [132-142] [215-220]

⁶⁰ Respondent A [46-49] [196-199]

with your colleagues in your team.”⁶¹ So your colleagues with other ‘taakaccenten’ or the detectives are also part of the network.⁶²

In addition, within the LESNs not all network partners are interconnected however the CPO can be seen as the linking node between the other network partners.⁶³ However, this highly depends on the network and the network partner. Next to that, the LESNs are mostly situated at the local level among the CPOs on the street. The OEW is therefore very important in linking the LESNs and its partners.⁶⁴ Only if covenants need to be drawn up and signed, or decisions on management level are required, the BT management comes into play.⁶⁵

4.1.3 COVID-19

During the time of this research, the Netherlands was faced with a global COVID-19 pandemic. This resulted in extraordinary circumstances in the Netherlands with regard to measures being taken to combat the COVID-19 crisis. In this section it is shortly touched upon the measures that have been in place and what the perceived effects of these measures were according to the policing officers.

4.1.3.A NATIONAL MEASURES

Here a brief overview is provided of the measures that were in place in the Netherlands during the time of this research. Please note that this list is not a complete overview, however the most general rules are mentioned. Next to that, during the research, these measures became either more strict or less strict, based on the national trends in the COVID-19 situation. For a specific overview of all measures, please consult the website of the National Government.

First of all, there has been a curfew in place that started at 21:00 and later at 22:00. Next to that, there has been, and still is, a maximum of people that you are allowed to receive in your residence. Furthermore, restaurants, bars, hotel restaurants, cafes have been closed for a significant amount of time. Also, stores that were not considered essential were closed for a specific amount of time. There were no social gatherings allowed, solely weddings and funerals with a maximum number of invitees. Also, events were cancelled such as festivals, soccer games et cetera. It was obligatory for individuals to remain one-and-a-half meters distance between them, excluding families and roommates. The national advice was to work from home. Only citizens that worked in the essential sectors or that could not work from home were allowed to go to their work. This implied that many individuals were bound to their houses. Next to that, educational institutions have been (partly) closed which also implied that children were also home.

4.1.3.B EFFECTS COVID-19 MEASURES ON POLICING WORK

In this section, it is shortly touched upon the effects that the respondents in this research perceived due to the measures in their daily work.

First of all, it was noted by many respondents that there had been an increase in capacity within the organisation.⁶⁶ As one of the respondents stated: *“This [more capacity] means that I can be present in the neighbourhood more and that is due to the fact that festivals and soccer games et cetera, in which policing efforts are required, are not taking place at the moment.”*⁶⁷ However, it should be noted that also implications of the measures taken require some police efforts such as the curfew⁶⁸, riots⁶⁹, absence of colleagues due to illness⁷⁰, illegal parties⁷¹, increase

⁶¹ Respondent H [15-17]

⁶² Respondent H [51-56] [64-67] [68-70]
Respondent D [61] [382-389] Respondent A [23-26] [160-167]

⁶³ Respondent A [23-26]

⁶⁴ Respondent E [26-31]

⁶⁵ Respondent E [26-31]

⁶⁶ Respondent B [14-15] [16-22] Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33] Respondent G [27-30]

Respondent A [71-79] [60-67] [39-46]⁶⁶

Respondent C [58-62]

⁶⁷ Respondent B [14-15] [16-22]

⁶⁸ Respondent B [14-15] [16-22] Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

⁶⁹ Respondent B [14-15] [16-22] Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

⁷⁰ Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

⁷¹ Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

of problems such as domestic violence⁷². Next to that, what was highly noticeable by the police was that other network partners were less inclined, during the COVID-19 crises, to do house visits et cetera.⁷³ This implied that the policing officers were one of the only network partners that could observe what was going on behind the front doors of many citizens.⁷⁴ However, it should be noted that these eyes behind closed doors, also for the police, has decreased significantly.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, domestic problems have increased due to the fact that many individuals are homebound.⁷⁶

Furthermore, there have been changes in the communication between the policing officers and the network partners due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As stated by one of the respondents: “[*maintaining good relationships between the network partners*] is difficult because everything is more distant. Everyone works from home.”⁷⁷ As more respondents endorse, it is the distant communication and not being able to meet up physically that makes the situation more challenging.⁷⁸ One of the things that was noticed, especially due to the curfew, was that criminality such as soft drug nuisance with regard to using, dealing and producing was sometimes more visible.⁷⁹ According to one of the respondents, this led to an increase in information that was provided to one of the taakaccenthouders.⁸⁰ However, on the contrary, this observation was not shared by all respondents.⁸¹

4.2 CONCLUSION

To conclude and to provide a description in line with the following question: *What is the background and the current situation with regard to the LESNs, local soft drug nuisance, and the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of the CPOs in Enschede?* It should be noted that the LESNs differ per CPO and case, however there are similarities such as the main network partners in these networks. These concern basically the municipality and the social housing corporations. Furthermore, the local soft drug nuisance that is experienced can be seen as three different types, namely the use, the dealing and the production of the products. Next to that, the respondents argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent measures affected their day-to-day tasks in several ways, both negatively and positively.

⁷² Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

⁷³ Respondent D [71-75] [81-83]

⁷⁴ Respondent B [50-52]

⁷⁵ Respondent H [18-19]

⁷⁶ Respondent H [21-24] [24-29] [31-33]

Respondent G [18-23]

⁷⁷ Respondent H [230-233]

⁷⁸ Respondent H [230-233] Respondent G [198]

Respondent A [314-318] Respondent F [68-70]

⁷⁹ Respondent A [71-79] Respondent D [117-124]

⁸⁰ Respondent D [103-113]

⁸¹ Respondent F [77-85]

5. NETWORK FORMALISATION

5.1. DATA ANALYSES

In this section, the second sub-question will be answered by analysing the interview data. This concerns: *To what extent is the functioning of the LESNs formalised?* This is done by differentiating between the different dimensions of network formalisation, as described in the conceptualisation chapter.

5.1.1 RULES AND REGULATIONS

One should note that this section provides a general understanding of the formalisation of the LESNs. Therefore, it should be taken into account that each LESN of the different CPOs might diverge from this general understanding due to individual exceptions and circumstances.

5.1.1.A VERBALLY AGREED UPON VERSUS AGREED UPON IN WRITING

From the data it can be seen that there are both rules that are verbally agreed upon and rules that are agreed upon in writing. It should be noted that the rules verbally agreed upon that were mentioned by the respondents were mostly on conduct in the cooperation in the LESNs. In that regard, those rules often emerge from the LESNs themselves. One should note that there is little information on the content of the verbally agreed-upon rules, therefore no specific statements can be put forward. One example that was given by one of the CPOs was on the rules of conduct between the CPOs and citizens in a WhatsApp group. *“I tell them, I am a member of the WhatsApp group chat, I read the messages, but I am a silent member in de group.”*⁸²

The rules and regulations that are agreed upon in writing are often externally imposed and internally interpreted. This implies that is, in several cases, it concerns rules and regulations that the network partners have to adhere to but have little influence on altering. These concern for example written rules and regulations on privacy and information sharing.⁸³ Next to that, especially with regard to local soft drug nuisance, there is the Opiumwet and Wet Victoria in the Netherlands that needs to be adhered to. These laws indicate when an offence is considered illegal and the competencies the policing officers or the municipality have in that case.⁸⁴ In case an incident occurs there are protocols and regulations for settling the case. These often concern protocols on who to involve⁸⁵ or how to proceed in interviews⁸⁶ with for example neighbours or witnesses.

Next to that, there are also rules and regulations that are set in covenants that exemplify specific alterations of legislation in specific circumstances for specific partners of the LESNs.⁸⁷ It should be noted that these covenants are considered as rules and regulations agreed upon in writing. There are for example covenants in the LESNs that deal with the limitations of the privacy regulations so that information among network partners can be shared.⁸⁸ In Enschede there is a covenant ‘Veiligheid’ that constitutes that in case of threats to safety, information can be shared among specified network partners.⁸⁹ Next to that, there are ‘Veiligheidshuizen’ that are basically covenants that enable different network partners to legally share information with each other on specific cases.⁹⁰ Another covenant that is in place is the RIEC-covenant.⁹¹ There is also a covenant with the municipality in circumstances where hemp plantations are discovered.⁹²

With regard to the network formalisation in the light of verbally or written agreed-upon rules, one could conclude that in general the LESNs both have rather informal and formal characteristics. There is too little information on unwritten rules and regulations. However, a large degree of the LESNs is structured by written rules that originate

⁸² Respondent A [89-93]

⁸³ Respondent B [172-180] Respondent E [99-101] [102-103] Respondent D [291-294] [296] Respondent H [40-42] [247]

⁸⁴ Respondent I [140-141]

⁸⁵ Respondent H [76-77]

⁸⁶ Respondent C [333-337]

⁸⁷ Respondent E [99-101] [102-103]

⁸⁸ Respondent B [116-118]

⁸⁹ Respondent B [172-180] Respondent D [291-294] [301-305]

⁹⁰ Respondent E [56-58]

⁹¹ Respondent D [363-365]

⁹² Respondent I [208-210]

from external rules and regulations that are interpreted by the network partners. Many of the networks have covenants in place. The more formal networks are often characterised by covenants that structure the cooperation.

5.1.1.B NUMBER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

In general, the LESNs are structured by a lot of rules of which many originate from external written rules and regulations or covenants that are set up between the different network partners. There are different types of rules and regulations that are mentioned by the respondents. Below an overview of the most obvious rules that were mentioned by the respondents is provided.

As most respondents explained, the LESNs are structured by rules on information sharing.⁹³ These rules and regulations are mostly imposed by external bodies such as the national government and European legislation. These rules and regulations do not only apply to the CPOs in the network but also to other network partners such as the municipality, social housing corporations, care institutions and all others that operate within the scope of the national and European legislation. As some respondents indicate: it is especially rules and regulations on information sharing between network partners.⁹⁴ Information sharing among other colleagues within the policing organisation is less structured in that sense.⁹⁵

It should be noted that with regard to rules and regulations on conduct in the LESNs little can be concluded on the number of rules and regulations based on the limitations of the data, but its presence in the LESNs is undisputed. However, the respondents provided some examples of rules and regulations on conduct for example in WhatsApp groups, or protocols when responding to an incident or a problem.⁹⁶ With regard to rules on competencies, such as wet Victoria⁹⁷ and the Opiumwet, they do structure a large extent of the scope in which the CPOs are allowed to act. It should be noted that those rules and regulations might differ per network partner since for example care institutions have a completely different set of competencies than policing officers.

During the interviews it became clear that many of the respondents were aware of covenants that structure their cooperation with the network partners in the LESNs. It was expressed that those were drawn up to facilitate the joint work of the network partners or should be drawn up in that case.⁹⁸ Numerous types of covenants were addressed such as covenant ‘Veiligheid’⁹⁹, ‘Veiligheidshuizen’,¹⁰⁰ covenants in cases of discoveries of hemp plantations,¹⁰¹ and RIEC.¹⁰² Despite the fact that covenants might provide exceptions to rules and regulations that otherwise should be adhered to, it still contributes to the structure of the LESNs and therefore should be considered as a type network formalisation.

With regard to the network formalisation in the light of the number of rules in the LESNs, it can be concluded that in general those can be considered being formal to a certain degree. There is a structure of rules and regulations that are externally originated, for example by national or European legislation, but this structure is supplemented with the rules and regulations that are made in the LESNs itself and the covenants that are set up between the network partners.

5.1.2. NATURE OF RELATIONSHIPS

In this section the nature of the relationships between the network partners in the LESNs will be discussed. It should be noted that this is a general image that is provided by the respondents, however individual ties between network partners but also different LESNs can deviate from the general description.

⁹³ Respondent B [116-118] [172-180] Respondent E [99-101] [102-103] [105-107] Respondent H [40-42] [247] Respondent D [296]

⁹⁴ Respondent D [291-294]

⁹⁵ Respondent E [132-134]

⁹⁶ Respondent H [76-77] Respondent A [89-93] Respondent B [240-241] Respondent C [333-337]

⁹⁷ Respondent I [140-141]

⁹⁸ Respondent E [99-101] [102-103]

⁹⁹ Respondent B [172-180]

¹⁰⁰ Respondent E [56-58]

¹⁰¹ Respondent I [208-210] Respondent A [171-174]

¹⁰² Respondent D [363-365]

5.1.2.A CHARACTERISTICS

Most relational ties between the network partners of the LESNs contain informal characteristics. This is exemplified by the comments that the CPOs and other respondents make on their relationships between the network partners. As one of the respondents argues: *“It is very important to have a table, with maybe an old-fashioned tablecloth, on which you exchange stories with each other. [...] And because you actually see each other, you create trust that facilitates to jointly tackle the problems”*.¹⁰³ It is in that sense this informal way of communicating with the network partners that is especially present in many of the LESNs. Another respondent explains that he/she has a lot of contact with one of the network partners on the phone, but also, since they are located only two doors away, he/she is able to simply walk up to them, drink a cup of coffee together, and being in touch about the problems at hand.¹⁰⁴ This closeness of the network partners, so that frequent and informal communication can take place, is also endorsed by other respondents. For example respondent G indicates that one of the social housing corporations is located in the centre of the neighbourhood which he/she visits almost every neighbourhood shift.¹⁰⁵ Also, the service centres in Enschede, such as Service Centre West, in which the neighbourhood coaches work from the same building, enabling the network partners to have frequent and informal contact.¹⁰⁶ It is these informal characteristics of the relationships that are argued to be essential for the work of the CPO in its LESNs.¹⁰⁷ However, it should be noted that the CPOs indicate that this proximity does not apply to all network partners and that some ties are more distance-based.

Another characteristic of the relationship between the network partners, that is expressed by some of the respondents, is having short lines of communication with the network partners and being approachable for them.¹⁰⁸ One of the respondents exemplifies this as follows: *“In my neighbourhood, there is a property that had our attention before. I informed the neighbours about that and past week they send me a message about strange individuals in and around the property, they are blinding the windows, and this is the license plate of the car.”*¹⁰⁹ Another argues that having contact with the network partners is easier due to the informal use of WhatsApp or simply talking face-to-face for a minute.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, one should argue that one of the most prominent informal characteristics of the relationships between the network partners is having a relationship based on mutual trust.¹¹¹ As respondent B states: *“by addressing the communality factor of the matter you can create trust among the network partners and from that the notion of ‘we’ arises.”*¹¹² However respondent B also indicates that this is not always the case in all LESNs and among the different network partners.

Another respondent argues that in the LESN knowing network partners personally and knowing their stories is very important.¹¹³ Especially in the working-class neighbourhood that he/she is located. Knowing for example citizens personally but also thanking them for their positive contribution on a case or problem, by for example bringing a thank you gift and having flowers sent to them, is one of the ways a respondent experiences the informality of the ties.¹¹⁴ One of the respondents argues that his/her contact person from the social housing corporation is currently unable to work and that another contact person is appointed for the time being. The respondent argues that working together with the new contact person is more challenging.¹¹⁵ One could attribute this to the fact that there is little formality in the ties, but a high degree of informality which is more individual-based than role-based.

Working together but also sharing more informal experiences with the other network partners can also be part of the LESNs. As one respondent indicates that sometimes when results were discussed, they enjoyed a dinner together with the other network partner or partners.¹¹⁶ Next to that, attending other social occasions where network

¹⁰³ Respondent B [181-186]

¹⁰⁴ Respondent A [315-319]

¹⁰⁵ Respondent G [91-94] [95-96]

¹⁰⁶ Respondent G [215-233] [224-227]

¹⁰⁷ Respondent B [230]

¹⁰⁸ Respondent H [126-128] [135-137] [226-228]

Respondent F [246-248] Respondent A [590-600]

¹⁰⁹ Respondent H [126-132] [133-135]

¹¹⁰ Respondent G [340-342]

¹¹¹ Respondent I [389-392] [201-203]

¹¹² Respondent B [208-214]

¹¹³ Respondent B [224-227]

¹¹⁴ Respondent A [97-102]

¹¹⁵ Respondent A [508-514]

¹¹⁶ Respondent C [429-432]

partners are also invited such as new year receptions and such, also enabled the CPOs to network¹¹⁷ and possibly build more personal and informal relationships.

In some cases, respondents argued that also the informal characteristics of the relationships between the network partners are to an extent too limited. This is exemplified in a situation in which care organisations are cautious in sharing information with the policing organisation on specific individuals or problems.¹¹⁸ One should take into account that also these network partners are bounded by legally set competencies. In other situations, that are characterised as being highly tensed, individual network partners might be inclined to clean their own path.¹¹⁹ Those situations might possibly be caused by a lack of mutual trust among the different network partners and a mutual feeling of responsibility.

Formal characteristics are in several cases not highly present in the LESNs. As one of the respondents indicates is that: *“I think that the informal relationship is very good, however the formal relationship might be missing a bit sometimes. The distance between network partners might fade a bit too much. [...] Yes, I also don’t like having an argument about something with the network partners, but you have to consider your work relationship apart from your personal relationship.”*¹²⁰ It should be noted that additional data on the formality of the LESNs is limited. One cannot assume that this implies that the networks simply cannot be characterised as formal. However, one of the respondents conducted research on ‘methodiek bondgenoten’ researching whether new CPOs take over the network of the former CPO or that he/she builds his/her own network in the neighbourhood. The research concluded that in most situations the latter was true.¹²¹ This might imply that the formal relationship, that is often more role-based instead of individual/personal-based, might be indeed less present in the LESNs.

5.1.2.B INSTITUTIONALISATION

It differs per network and per network partner to what extent the network is institutionalised. In general, the LESNs are institutionalised on a personal basis. This implies that if new network partners come to the table, the degree of institutionalisation decreases. If you know all your network partners, and you have been working together for a long time, you are more aware of each others roles and what you can expect from the other.¹²² As one of the respondents exemplifies: *“If you work together with a partner that you have known for a long time, it will be flawless. [...] If someone is new to the network it is often a bit more seeing which way the cat jumps”*¹²³ In that latter case, it requires more efforts to reach the same goal and new agreements will have to be made.¹²⁴

The institutionalisation of the LESNs of which the CPOs in this research are part might be predominantly determined by the fact that the CPO invest a lot of time in the maintenance of the relationships between the network partners.¹²⁵ Next to that, the time a network partner is part of the LESN also strengthens the institutionalisation. As respondent H indicates: *“When I just became a community policing officer and started to attend the meetings of the network, it is logic that you are less confident and present in that regard than I am now.”*¹²⁶

Informal characteristics with regard to the relationships that are to a certain degree present in the LESNs include having short lines of communication, informal ways of communication, trust among the network partners, personal contact and informal activities. However, it should be noted that some of the experiences indicate that sometimes the informal characteristics of the relationship might be limited in the LESNs. Formal characteristics of the relationships between the network partners seemed to be less present in the LESNs. With regard to the institutionalisation of the relationships in the LESNs, it could be argued that the LESNs are rather formal.

¹¹⁷ Respondent I [396-405]

¹¹⁸ Respondent B [130-136] Respondent I [383-387]

¹¹⁹ Respondent B [217-218] [220]

¹²⁰ Respondent D [270-277]

¹²¹ Respondent D [339-344]

¹²² Respondent A [487-494]

¹²³ Respondent I [396-405]

¹²⁴ Respondent A [508-514] [516-517]

¹²⁵ Respondent H [226-228] Respondent G [42-44] Respondent F [241-243] Respondent A [104-105]

Respondent I [491-492] [549-550] [389-392]

¹²⁶ Respondent H [315-319]

However, one should note that this is on a personal basis. So, this implies that individual relationships become more and more institutionalised over time.

5.1.3. AUTONOMY

In this section the autonomy of the CPOs in the LESNs will be discussed with regard to their role specificity and the degree of top-down monitoring.

5.1.3.A ROLE SPECIFICITY

From the interview with the respondents, it can be stated that generally the CPOs enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their daily work.¹²⁷ As one of the respondents explains: *“I really get the freedom and confidence to figure out what is happening in the neighbourhood together with my partners and prioritise based on those observations.”*

¹²⁸ As one of the respondents argues, it is also up to the OEW, how much autonomy is enjoyed, however in his/her experience the Operationeel Expert Wijk provides his/her CPOs with a large degree of autonomy.¹²⁹ Though, it should be noted that this differs for each individual Operational Expert Wijk. Also from management, it is stated that they get all the freedom required to do their work in the neighbourhood.¹³⁰

Within the policing organisation, a general rule has been set with regard to the role of the CPO. This rule includes that in general CPOs are able to spend 80% of their time on neighbourhood related tasks and 20% on other tasks that originate from the policing organisation.¹³¹ This implies that CPOs might be obliged to take up tasks that have little to do with their neighbourhood work such as first-aid shifts and et cetera.¹³² However, it should be noted that CPOs often voice that they would prefer to have more time available for their corresponding neighbourhoods.¹³³

One of the most prominent factors that might possibly decrease the autonomy of the CPOs in the LESNs is the constant pressure on the capacity of the policing organisation. Their autonomy on their work and prioritisation can be deemed largely limited by the fact that there is limited capacity in the organisation to address the number of problems and issues in the neighbourhoods.¹³⁴ As one of the respondents argues: *“In Enschede, but also in other Dutch cities, there are high pressures on the first-aid shifts, which are at the heart of the policing organisation, which subsequently results in community policing officers having to take up additional first-aid shifts. I also have to take up those shifts and that means that I have less time available for my neighbourhood.”*¹³⁵ This implies that limited capacity in other parts of the organisation has an effect on the work that CPOs have to do and the shifts they have to take up, for example taking up first-aid shifts.¹³⁶

With regard to the autonomy of the CPOs, it is stated that on the one hand, their role specificity is very low, so they enjoy a large degree of freedom in their daily work, however on the other hand, due to limited capacity in the organisation, this role specificity is becoming more elaborate due to the fact that CPOs are required to take up other shifts.

5.1.3.B TOP-DOWN MONITORING

In this section, it is touched upon the top-down monitoring as perceived by the respondents. It should be noted that most respondents indicate that there is little to no top-down monitoring, in the sense that they experience no

¹²⁷ Respondent H [360] Respondent G [351-356] [357-358] Respondent F [305-310] Respondent I [413-422]

¹²⁸ Respondent H [340-343] [346-349]

¹²⁹ Respondent C [525-529] Respondent D [312-315]

¹³⁰ Respondent E [138-144]

¹³¹ Respondent E [138-144] Respondent D [325-329]

¹³² Respondent A [346-348] Respondent C [276-285] Respondent F [289-295] [298-300]

¹³³ Respondent E [138-144] Respondent H [349-352] Respondent B [10-14]

¹³⁴ Respondent H [100-105] [274-279] [340-343] [346-349] [360] Respondent F [305-310]

Respondent A [528-543] Respondent B [96-99] [106-108] Respondent E [176-179] Respondent G [241-243] Respondent I [342]

¹³⁵ Respondent B [10-14]

¹³⁶ Respondent C [276-285] Respondent F [289-295] [298-300]

limitations in their daily work due to constant surveillance or control from above.¹³⁷ It is stated that they enjoy a large degree of trust and freedom from their supervisors to do their work properly without being monitored. Some of the CPOs indicate that the closest to ‘monitoring’ is the supervisory role of the OEW.¹³⁸ However, this does not imply that there is no monitoring at all. It might just be an indication that this is not perceived as such by the CPOs themselves.¹³⁹

5.1.4 COORDINATION

In this section the coordination of the LESNs is discussed. It should be noted that this differs per network and is highly dependent on the perception of the respondent and the other network partners. As presented in chapter 2, four types of coordination can be distinguished. The types are subsequently discussed below.

5.1.4.A NOT AGREED UPON

There is no data that suggests that the coordination in the LESNs is not agreed upon. This results in the fact that this can neither be considered present nor absent in the networks.

5.1.4.B SHARED GOVERNANCE

It could be assumed that most LESNs are coordinated jointly by several network partners while the perception on how the networks should be coordinated differs significantly from the actual coordination. Nevertheless, one should note that there is no evidence in the data whether this is agreed upon in writing or verbally. This becomes clear due to the fact that several of the respondents argue that the coordination, in an ideal situation, should be the responsibility of one of the network partners. Several respondents argue that successfully a lead organisation is appointed while others provide no such definite answer.

5.1.4.C LEAD ORGANISATION

There is limited data that suggests that the coordination of the LESNs on local soft drug nuisance is administered to a lead organisation. However, one should note that despite the fact that there is little evidence of its presence, some of the respondents argue that specific network partners should be considered as lead organisations. As one of the respondents argues, the agreement on who becomes the lead organisation should be considered jointly.¹⁴⁰ However, there is no evidence that suggests that this agreement is set in stone or whether it is verbally agreed upon.

First of all, data suggests that the policing organisation could be considered a lead organisation in several occasions. For example, if signals, via MeldMisdadAnoniem, come to the attention of one of the respondents, he/she takes the lead in the organisation on how to proceed.¹⁴¹ This can result in the CPO taking the lead in the network and remains in a coordinating role.¹⁴² However, it should be noted that the specific CPO can then decide whether the coordinating task should remain with him/her or whether it should be transferred to another network partner or colleague, such as the taakaccenthouders.¹⁴³

Another network partner that is often addressed as being the coordinator or that should be the coordinator of the network is the municipality. As one of the respondents indicates: “*As a matter of fact, it is a safety problem and in 90% of the safety problems the municipality should be coordinating. [...] Is the municipality managing to do so? No. Do they take up that responsibility? No.*”¹⁴⁴ However, it should be noted that this view is not shared by all respondents and several respondents indicate that in their experience the municipality acts as a lead organisation in several cases.¹⁴⁵ It is argued that especially the neighbourhood coaches, that are working for the municipality, should be executing the coordinating tasks of the LESN in the case of problems with regard to

¹³⁷ Respondent E [148-153] Respondent G [362-365]

¹³⁸ Respondent H [346-349] Respondent G [362-365]

¹³⁹ Respondent B [246-248]

¹⁴⁰ Respondent E [163-166]

¹⁴¹ Respondent H [63-64] Respondent C [62-65]

¹⁴² Respondent H [365-370]

¹⁴³ Respondent H [77-80] Respondent A [114-118]

¹⁴⁴ Respondent B [152-155]

¹⁴⁵ Respondent I [225-228] [476-481]

individual citizens, however larger problems, such as local soft drug nuisance, should be coordinated jointly by the police organisation and the municipality due to its criminal nature.¹⁴⁶ Next to the municipality, also care organisations are mentioned as organisations that should lead the coordination. As one of the CPOs indicates is that he/she aims to transfer the coordination to the care organisations so that he/she can withdraw from the case and the case will be picked up by organisations that might have more specific expertise on the case.¹⁴⁷

5.1.4.D NETWORK ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

There is no data that suggests that the coordination of the LESNs on local soft drug nuisance is administered to a Network Administrative Organisation.

Furthermore, the coordination of the LESNs can be seen as neither informal nor formal but a bit more in between since most LESNs are coordinated in a manner of shared governance or lead organisation. With regard to the coordination of the LESNs, the absence of network administrative organisations might indicate that the networks are not coordinated in a highly formalised manner. Next to that, since it is not clear whether the coordination is agreed upon or written down, makes it hard to draw any conclusions on the formality of the coordination. What should be noted is that most networks are coordinated in a shared manner or with the coordination of a lead organisation.

5.2. CONCLUSION

To answer the second sub-question of this research: *To what extent is the functioning of the LESNs formalised?* It can be concluded that the LESNs, in which the CPOs are engaged, are only partly formalised (see table 5.1). This implies that it differs per dimension. The formalisation in the networks is mostly caused by the rules and regulations and the covenants that are drawn up between the network partners. It is interesting to note that the rules and regulations that formalise the networks are often characterised by their external origin which are often rules and regulations that cannot easily be changed by the network partners themselves. With regard to the relationship ties, those are often based upon highly institutionalised personal-based relationships that are mostly characterised by their informal nature. One could identify that the presence of formal relationship ties is limited. Next to that, the autonomy that the CPOs enjoy in their work indicates that there is little formalisation. Within their role as CPO and with regard to the top-down monitoring, their behaviour is little structured. However, their role is structured a bit by the requirement from the organisation to take up other shifts next to their daily neighbourhood work. To conclude, the coordination of the network cannot be deemed as highly formalised since it is often characterised by shared governance, in which a lead organisation should be present but is not.

	<i>Degree of Formalisation</i>
<i>Rules & Regulations – Nature of the Rules</i>	High
<i>Rules & Regulations – Number of Rules</i>	High
<i>Relationship Ties – Nature of the Ties</i>	Low
<i>Relationship Ties – Institutionalisation</i>	High
<i>Autonomy – Role Specificity</i>	Average
<i>Autonomy – Top-down Monitoring</i>	Low
<i>Coordination</i>	Average

Table 5.1: degree of formalisation in the LESNs

¹⁴⁶ Respondent A [329-341] [384-389]

¹⁴⁷ Respondent A [148-153]

6. PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING IN A NETWORK

6.1. DATA ANALYSES

In this section a description is given on the extent CPOs are able to work according to the POP approach in the LESNs with regard to local soft drug nuisance. In order to do so, the third sub-question of this research will be guiding, namely: *To what extent are the engaged CPOs able to formulate the different steps of a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede?* First, it is touched upon the general notion of the POP approach and subsequently, the different phases of POP in the SARA model are discussed.

In general, a willingness is expressed to work according to the POP approach, however this is obstructed by several factors that will be discussed in chapter 7. One of the respondents indicates that many of his/her colleagues work solely incident-driven, which implies that there is an incident, and they respond to that incident.¹⁴⁸ For example, Taakaccenthouder Hennep is a function that is highly incident-driven.¹⁴⁹ It should be noted that incidents will not stop happening. However, it should be best if the CPOs are able to prevent those incidents from happening and that is something they try to do by trying to get in front of the problem.¹⁵⁰ As some of the respondents argue, they are often swayed by the issues of the day which is often characterised as highly incident-driven.¹⁵¹ It should be noted that there are several cases in which the POP approach has been applied in cooperation with network partners, for example the response to the drug nuisance in the city centre, the response to the hemp plantations in the Boswinkel neighbourhood and a program that is focused on prevention and resilience among youth provided at the schools in the neighbourhoods.¹⁵²

6.1.1 SCANNING

In general, most CPOs are able to scan for problems and signal the problems in their neighbourhoods.¹⁵³ For this, they often make use of the network they have.¹⁵⁴ As one of the respondents argues: *“It is our task. The signalling of problems in an area, but also advising and making others aware of the fact that we signal a specific problem and how we possibly could address this problem.”*¹⁵⁵ Signals of problems reach the CPOs via different channels. First of all, it is argued that CPOs are the eyes and ears on the street.¹⁵⁶ Another one of these channels is BlueSpotMonitor in which all information is stored regarding the messages and cases that the police receives.¹⁵⁷ The signals that the CPOs need to receive often originate from citizens.¹⁵⁸ With regard to the necessity to get signals from citizens, one of the respondents indicates: *“If citizens do not inform us about signals, we will be unaware of what is going on.”*¹⁵⁹ Next to that, signals on for example possible hemp plantations are often received from Enexis because they find deviations in the current draw.¹⁶⁰

6.1.2 ANALYSIS

In this part it is discussed to what extent the CPOs are able to analyse the problems that they scan in their neighbourhoods in the LESNs. It should be noted that the analyses phase of the POP approach is often challenging.¹⁶¹ As one of the respondents observes: *“Sometimes I notice that they occasionally respond to an incident instantly instead of opening all information channels and exploring what the actual problem is.”*¹⁶² In several instances the CPOs succeed in successfully analysing the problem at hand. However, this is often facilitated by CPOs putting in a lot of time¹⁶³ or the analyses get transferred to another part of the policing

¹⁴⁸ Respondent B [74-76]

¹⁴⁹ Respondent G [106-109] [110-111] Respondent F [130-133] [137-142]

¹⁵⁰ Respondent H [123-126] Respondent C [85-88] [125-131]

¹⁵¹ Respondent C [208-214]

¹⁵² Respondent A [207-236]

¹⁵³ Respondent E [38] Respondent F [163-166] Respondent G [135-137]

¹⁵⁴ Respondent A [148-153]

¹⁵⁵ Respondent B [192-194] [195-196]

¹⁵⁶ Respondent D [30-39]

¹⁵⁷ Respondent B [58-59] Respondent G [10-11] [11-13]

¹⁵⁸ Respondent B [80-89] Respondent H [59-61] Respondent F [28-38] Respondent A [13-16]

¹⁵⁹ Respondent A [82-88]

¹⁶⁰ Respondent B [80-89] Respondent F [28-38]

¹⁶¹ Respondent B [96] Respondent H [103-104] Respondent F [163-166]

¹⁶² Respondent E [38-42]

¹⁶³ Respondent H [368-372]

organisation such as taakaccenthouders or detective departments.¹⁶⁴ In a successful case on the flats in the Boswinkel neighbourhood, a brainstorm gathering was organised for the analysis of what was the cause of the hemp plantations emerging in the residential flats.¹⁶⁵ It should be noted that not only analyses are sometimes transferred in the organisation but also occasionally to care organisations if it concerns individual cases that require more specialised expertise for the analyses,¹⁶⁶ for example in cases where addiction or mental health issues might play a role.

6.1.3 RESPONSE

As described in the previous section, the analysis of the problem is not always conducted due to different circumstances. This implies that not always the causes are addressed in the response but rather the response is focused on handling the incident itself.¹⁶⁷ This could be for example clearing a hemp plantation that is found but no response toward the organisation that is behind the hemp plantation. This results in the fact that formulating a response with the network partners that addresses the root problem is challenging.¹⁶⁸ There are examples of responses that have been formulated in light of a POP approach in Enschede and that have the desired preventive character. One of those is the agreement to close properties that have been cleared of hemp plantations and to impose a rental ban on the individuals that the property was administered to, which was reached upon between the policing organisation, social housing corporation and the municipality.¹⁶⁹ In that way, it is tried to prevent individuals from deciding to have a hemp plantation by making the consequences more unattractive than the benefits.¹⁷⁰ Next to that, there are responses in development to approach users in an early stage when crossing the Dutch border at the train station¹⁷¹, but also less recent approaches such as the ‘schooladoptieplan’.¹⁷² However, there are numerous other preventive responses that cannot be used by the CPOs.¹⁷³

6.1.4 EVALUATION

After a response towards a problem or an incident, it is often the case that the response will be evaluated.¹⁷⁴ This can for example result in looking at the opportunities to change the response to get to the problem.¹⁷⁵ But also the circulation of the evaluation reports afterwards.¹⁷⁶ However, as stated in the previous section, if the response is rather focused on the incident and not on the root problems, the evaluation will subsequently be incident-driven.¹⁷⁷ As one of the respondents states: “*What you see at social services, at educational personnel, but also among hospital personnel, is that they engage a lot in intervision. But we as police do not. We call it debriefing but that always concerns how is the suspect taken into custody or did anyone get hurt, but never on the deeper meaning of how we work.*”¹⁷⁸ The respondent calls this the ‘action-focus’. An example of an evaluation that has been conducted and that has a more problem focus, is part of the drug nuisance approach in the city centre. The response is being evaluated with the network partners with regard to who were the target groups, how can the influence on this target group be extended?¹⁷⁹

6.1.5. CYCLICAL NATURE

In the POP approach, the cyclical nature is seen as one of its strengths. However, it should be noted that implementing this cyclical nature can be seen as challenging.¹⁸⁰ There are occasions that it is possible to go back

¹⁶⁴ Respondent E [48-51] Respondent G [65-67] [76-80]

¹⁶⁵ Respondent C [180-195]

¹⁶⁶ Respondent A [148-153]

¹⁶⁷ Respondent E [56-59]

¹⁶⁸ Respondent F [163-166] Respondent B [113] [115-117]

¹⁶⁹ Respondent H [92-97] [164-172]

¹⁷⁰ Respondent H [149-151]

¹⁷¹ Respondent A [33-39]

¹⁷² Respondent I [328-329] [331-340]

¹⁷³ Respondent G [151-155]

¹⁷⁴ Respondent G [196-198] [200-202] Respondent H [184-188] Respondent A [359] Respondent I [292-295]

¹⁷⁵ Respondent H [184-188]

¹⁷⁶ Respondent A [359]

¹⁷⁷ Respondent B [145-147] Respondent C [166-171]

¹⁷⁸ Respondent C [493-500]

¹⁷⁹ Respondent E [66-70]

¹⁸⁰ Respondent C [231]

to the figurative drawing table.¹⁸¹ One of the respondents indicates: “*It [making a few steps back] is possible [...] Only, it takes a lot of time. [...] Before you are there [looking into what could be done differently], it can take months.*”¹⁸² If you are being swayed by the issues of the day, taking some steps back sometimes can be challenging.¹⁸³ It should be noted that from management they are encouraged to utilise the cyclical nature of the approach and they are encouraged to figure out where to intervene next to eventually have a successful approach.¹⁸⁴

6.2. CONCLUSION

To answer the second third question of this research: *To what extent are the engaged CPOs able to formulate the different steps of a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede?* With regard to the POP approach by CPOs in the LESNs, it can be concluded despite the willingness that they express to implement the approach in their daily work, the ability to do so is limited. With the exception of some cases, it is often the case that the first phase, Scanning, is the only one that the CPOs are able to successfully complete (see table 6.1). To address the Analysis, Response and Evaluation, it is often deemed as challenging by the respondents due to the fact that the respondents argue that during the Analysis phase, the sequence of phases is often interrupted. This implies that there is too limited ability to successfully complete the Analysis phase that should provide the basis for the subsequent phases. Next to that, it is stated that to fully use the potential of the cyclical nature of the SARA model, CPOs often feel limited to do so. In the next chapter, possible factors that cause these limitations will be explored.

	<i>Ability to Formulate</i>
<i>Scanning</i>	Yes
<i>Analysis</i>	Limited
<i>Response</i>	Limited
<i>Evaluation</i>	Limited
<i>Cyclical Nature</i>	Limited

Table 6.1: Ability to formulate the different phases of POP approach in the LESNs

¹⁸¹ Respondent H [221-223] [402-403]

¹⁸² Respondent G [232-239]

¹⁸³ Respondent A [416-418] Respondent C [231]

¹⁸⁴ Respondent E [80-84] [85-88]

7. THE INFLUENCE OF NETWORK FORMALISATION ON PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

7.1. DATA ANALYSES

In this section, the fourth sub-question is addressed. This concerns: *How does the degree of formalisation in a network influence the implementation of the POP approach?* First, the factors regarding the network formalisation will be discussed in relation to the ability to formulate a POP approach. Next to that, additional influencing factors that are mentioned by the respondents are presented. Those are divided into three different categories namely: organisation-specific, network-specific and problem-specific.

7.1.1 RULES AND REGULATIONS

In this section the possible influence of network formalisation with regard to the rules and regulations in the network is explored by analysing the effects of the verbally agreed upon rules, the written rules and the number of rules in the LESNs.

7.1.1.A VERBALLY VERSUS WRITTEN AGREED UPON

As stated in the analysis on the second sub-question on network formalisation most retrieved data concerns rules and regulations that are agreed upon in writing. This also implies that there is limited information on the rules that are verbally agreed upon in the LESNs and their possible influences on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance. Therefore, it should be noted that there is no evidence to assume a specific effect of unwritten rules within the networks. However, as one of the respondents indicates, rules of conduct on for example the joint approach if a hemp plantation is discovered in a house that are either set in writing or not, abiding by those rules of conduct is generally of positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance (see figure 7.1).¹⁸⁵




Figure 7.1: Influence of Unwritten Rules on POP

With regard to the rules and regulations that are agreed upon in writing, more information is provided by the respondents. It should be noted that it has become evident that the influence of written rules is much more felt by the respondents either in a positive or negative direction (see figure 7.2).¹⁸⁶ Especially rules on information sharing are seen as highly obstructive in the LESNs since information sharing is one of the most crucial aspects in formulating a POP approach. As one of the respondents argues: *“If you can share information with your network partners from the start, the earlier you can address the problems. The earlier you address the problem, the easier it is to prevent it.”*¹⁸⁷ With regard to rules on competencies, as these can be avoided a bit in the LESNs due to the fact that network partners have other competencies, these are seen as highly obstructive especially in trying to get in front of the problem and prevent incidents from happening. It should be noted that most rules and regulations with regard to the competencies of the policing officers are based on incident-driven policing, with exceptions as set in covenants. This implies that policing officers are allowed to act if incidents happen or when they observe themselves that a specific incident is about to happen. However, in a POP approach it is crucial that the policing officers are competent to act before an actual incident is happening while rules and regulations restrict them to do so in many ways. However, it should be noted that there are also written rules that are not seen as obstructive but rather stimulating for formulating a POP approach in the LESNs namely covenants. In Enschede there is a covenant Veiligheid that facilitates information sharing among the included networks partners if there is a safety threat.¹⁸⁸ This covenant and other types of covenants often imply exceptions to the rules and regulations on

¹⁸⁵ Respondent H [164-172] Respondent F [237]

¹⁸⁶ Respondent F [237]

¹⁸⁷ Respondent B [190-192]

¹⁸⁸ Respondent B [172-180]

competencies and information sharing so that the network partners are less obstructed and can work together more effectively.




Figure 7.2: Influence of Written Rules on POP

7.1.1.B NUMBER OF RULES

First of all, it was voiced that the number of rules and regulations that need to be followed in the LESNs could be of influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. It was argued by several respondents that fewer rules and regulations would be beneficial in formulating a POP approach in the LESNs.¹⁸⁹ As quoted by Respondent B: *“The more rules, the less we get done. So basically, to settle the matter, there should be fewer rules. That is very important.”*¹⁹⁰ It could thus be concluded that as the number of rules increases, the CPOs experience an obstacle in formulating a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance (see figure 7.3). This is also exemplified by Respondent G, as he/she states that bending the rules or transgressing the rules is a necessity in some situations because it is in the better interest of helping individuals rather than to go against them.¹⁹¹ Another respondent argues as follows: *“What I used to say, and that might sound strange, but when you arrive there [where there has been an incident or problem], that is when you want to stop the world for five minutes. Simply thinking about nothing, no protocols, simply nothing. What do you see? [...] Who should I involve?”*¹⁹² This implies that there is the perception that having rules and regulations, in the form of protocols for example, decrease the ability to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance.¹⁹³ One of the respondents explained that he/she experiences that the cyclical nature of the POP approach and being able to go back to one of the previous steps is often challenging due to the procedures, systems and other rules and regulations that have been set in legislation.¹⁹⁴ However, it should be noted that these statements have not reached the managerial layer of the BT Enschede.¹⁹⁵

*“Sometimes these problems are more important than privacy, however we are obliged to stick to the law”*¹⁹⁶ It should be noted that most respondents argue that rules and regulations on information sharing among the network partners are perceived as one of the most obstructive factors that are influencing their ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the LESNs.¹⁹⁷ These obstructive rules and regulations mostly originate from the European Union GDPR (General Data Protection Regulations) and the WPG (Wet Politiegegevens) and could be defined as privacy regulations.¹⁹⁸ One of the respondents states that: *“If information sharing between network partners is possible in the beginning, the earlier we can start tackling problems. The earlier you are able to respond to a problem, the more likely that you can prevent it from happening.”*¹⁹⁹ This is also stipulated by respondent A who argues that the limitations on information sharing with network partners can be challenging during the signalling phase: *“Sometimes you just want to share information with the social housing corporations for example. That has become easier recently but sometimes you also want to pass on information because you feel like warning them because you know that the situation is prone to escalation. Sometimes that feeling is based on gut feelings or previous experiences. Naturally, there should be limitations, however it would be facilitating if more information could be shared among the network partners. Easier information sharing and faster information sharing.”*²⁰⁰ One of the respondents argued that he/she is currently working on a case regarding hemp plantations in a specific neighbourhood in Enschede. In analysing the problem, the CPO indicates that a specific target group is often involved in neighbourhoods that are confronted with problems of socially

¹⁸⁹ Respondent B [202-203] Respondent D [299]
Respondent G [241-243] [307-313]

¹⁹⁰ Respondent B [202-203]

¹⁹¹ Respondent G [307-313]

¹⁹² Respondent C [296-299]

¹⁹³ Respondent C [348-352]

¹⁹⁴ Respondent G [241-243]

¹⁹⁵ Respondent E [111]

¹⁹⁶ Respondent I [375-379]

¹⁹⁷ Respondent B [116-118] [172-180] Respondent G [295] [296-304] Respondent D [296] Respondent A [443-448] [451-457] Respondent E [99-101] [102-103] Respondent H [247-254]

¹⁹⁸ Respondent B [116-118] Respondent I [375-379] [197-203]

¹⁹⁹ Respondent B [190-192]

²⁰⁰ Respondent A [443-448] [451-457]

disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Being aware of this, the CPO could use this information to prevent the possible hemp plantations, however he/she is obstructed by rules and regulations to do so.²⁰¹

Information sharing among the network partners is seen as an essential part of the POP approach in the LESNs. It is stated that within the scope of the law, much information is shared among the network partners because it facilitates the process.²⁰² As respondent H explains: *“It is often the case that we have information that often can be seen as separate islands. If we only could merge those islands, we could do much more. Because if I have this information from you, and you had this information from me, we could have done so much more. And that is a challenge, to bring the information together because often privacy regulations are highly obstructive in those situations.”*²⁰³ This scope of the law is often stretched to its legal boundaries or the so-called grey areas. For example, specific information is shared by one of the network partners with the CPO. This information is often shared in the so-called grey areas of the rules and regulations because it is simply necessary to share the information. This information is then shared in a rather informal setting in which all network partners are aware that this information cannot be used or acted upon.²⁰⁴ If that barrier would be lifted and this information could be shared between the network partners on a legal basis, the CPOs could use this information to take a more preventive response towards the local soft drug nuisance by for example organising preventive talks with a possible target group.²⁰⁵

Formal information sharing, to the extent that it is put on paper and the other network partners are able to act on the information that is received, is a process that is sometimes characterised by being rather tensed.²⁰⁶ Another respondent agrees with the previous statement, indicating that when he/she was a CPO in function, formal information sharing had to follow several bureaucratic procedures.²⁰⁷ In case of formal information sharing: *“Contact had to be established with the privacy officer of the policing organisation, who in turn anonymised the data. Via that way information could be shared with them [municipalities and/or social housing corporations] in a formal manner.”*²⁰⁸ From the data, one could state that the effects of rules and regulations on information sharing are different for different network partners. One of the respondents argues that this is felt especially in working together with care organisations.²⁰⁹ Another respondent states that information sharing with the municipality if the case has a security aspect, is in many cases not problematic, however with other network partners this might be more complicated due to rules and regulations.²¹⁰ Next to that, it should be noted that some network partners are rather hesitant in sharing information due to the nature of their relationship with the individuals at stake.²¹¹ For example, neighbourhood coaches that visit individuals in their domestic environment might be cautious in sharing information with the CPO because they might feel that this may badly affect their trust-based relationship with the individual at stake. Also, care organisations such as Mediant and Tactus are much more restricted in information sharing on their clients due to the nature of their doctor-patient relationship.²¹²

In the LESNs rules and regulations on conduct are often seen as stimulating for the POP approach. This is stipulated by some of the individuals. First of all, one of the respondents argues that having agreed upon a specific approach within a LESN really helps in addressing the local soft drug nuisance with regard to hemp plantations.²¹³ Next to that, it is stated that if the agreements on each other their tasks and conduct are disregarded, this might result in the fact that the process is stopped while not having succeeded all the phases of the POP approach as formulated by the SARA model.²¹⁴ Respondent A argues that in the WhatsApp groups, which are especially important in the signalling phase, it is important to set rules on the responsiveness of the CPO in order to avoid diverging expectations among the network partners. He/she states that: *“If you agree on that beforehand, you won't get false expectations that citizens will start to feel like the community policing officer is not abiding by the*

²⁰¹ Respondent G [81-82] [120-122]

²⁰² Respondent H [40-42]

²⁰³ Respondent H [265-269] [270] [272-274]

²⁰⁴ Respondent G [140-144] Respondent D [301-305] Respondent I [354-361]

²⁰⁵ Respondent G [151-155]

²⁰⁶ Respondent E [105-107]

²⁰⁷ Respondent I [354-361]

²⁰⁸ Respondent I [354-361]

²⁰⁹ Respondent H [265-269] [270] [272-274]

²¹⁰ Respondent D [291-294] [301-305]

²¹¹ Respondent B [172-180]

²¹² Respondent I [363-370]

²¹³ Respondent H [164-172]

²¹⁴ Respondent I [476-481]

agreements.”²¹⁵ So it could be argued that rules of conduct are stimulating, however it is not clear whether there is a tipping point in which rules of conduct might become rather obstructive for the process.

It should be noted that the rules on the competencies of the CPOs are highly focussed on incident-driven policing. Much of the legislation on the competencies is based on reactive policing instead of preventive policing. In many cases, policing officers are allowed to ‘take action’ if they witness an incident or if they gathered information and they can ‘opplussen’. However, in the light of the preventive character of the POP approach, it would be appropriate to back this up with legislation that provides the CPOs with competencies that can be used in a more preventive way. One of the rules and regulations that highlights this is the competency to enter a property of an individual. As several respondents argue, it requires clear evidence and observations before they are allowed to enter a suspicious property.²¹⁶ This is set in the Dutch Opiumwet.²¹⁷ While often complaints from neighbours and gut feelings of CPOs are present, it is only when enough evidence is gathered, they are allowed to enter the property. With regard to the aimed preventive character of the POP approach, this implies that for example the entire plantation should be built already before actual action can be taken by the policing officers which is in essence the opposite of prevention. It should be noted that while working together with network partners it might be possible to avoid such limitations on the competencies by sending for example a network partner that is allowed to enter the property because he/she is not limited by those regulations.²¹⁸ So the number of rules on the competencies are rather restricting not only due to their numbers but also due to their incident focus.

One way of dealing with obstructive rules and regulations on for example information sharing among network partners is to come up with covenants between the network partners.²¹⁹ In the municipality of Enschede there is a covenant regarding ‘Safety and Security’ which establishes that information can be shared between network partners if safety and security is at stake.²²⁰ In that sense, the CPOs are more prone to sharing information due to the fact that they can establish whether the case might pose a threat to the safety and security. This effect is more limited for the other network partners since they are often not in place to assess the safety threat.²²¹ However, it should be noted that the POP approach is largely focused on prevention of cases that might be a threat to the safety and security. As respondent G states: “*But if it is not really a safety and security issue yet, but you do feel like you need to do something with it, it should be reported, or information should be provided to the neighbourhood coach so that he/she can take up the case.*”²²² In this statement sharing information between network partners finds resistance since it is not backed up with legislation or covenants. The effects of the covenant on ‘Safety and Security’ might be too limited for preventive information sharing that is more in line with the POP approach.

Also, the obstructive nature of the rules and regulations on information sharing among network partners is felt in the managerial level of the BT Enschede.²²³ It is stated that: “*If covenants can help in relieving the obstructions on information sharing between network partners, we should definitely establish more.*”²²⁴ Another formal covenant that facilitates information sharing among network partners that are part of the covenant are the ‘Veiligheidshuizen’ in which case-specific information can be shared in order to deal with the problem.²²⁵ Next to that, other covenants arise also at other levels such as the RIEC-covenant in which the policing organisation, the tax organisation, the social housing corporations, the municipality and the public prosecutor department. However, it should be noted that for the LESNs to get their case to that table, it requires more than just a simple suspicion.²²⁶ As the covenants that are mentioned by the respondents are mostly focused on facilitating the work and relieving some of the obstructive rules in specific situations it is likely that the covenants are positively influencing the ability to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance (see figure 7.3).

²¹⁵ Respondent A [95-98]

²¹⁶ Respondent H [151-153] [184-188] [213-216]
Respondent F [224-227] [228-231]

²¹⁷ Respondent F [224-227] [228-231]

²¹⁸ Respondent H [213-216]

²¹⁹ Respondent B [116-118] Respondent H [247-254]

²²⁰ Respondent B [172-180] Respondent G [295] [296-304]

²²¹ Respondent B [172-180]

²²² Respondent G [295] [296-304]

²²³ Respondent E [99-101] [102-103]

²²⁴ Respondent E [102-103]

²²⁵ Respondent E [56-58]

²²⁶ Respondent H [260-265]




Figure 7.3: Influence of Number of Rules on POP

7.1.2 NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS

In this section the possible influence of network formalisation with regard to the nature of the relationships in the network is explored by analysing the effects of informal relationship characteristics, formal relationship characteristics and the institutionalisation of the relationships.

7.1.2.A RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISTICS

The degree of formality of the relationship ties might influence the ability to formulate a POP approach in several ways. It should be noted that it cannot simply be concluded that the more formal or informal the network, the easier it becomes to formulate a POP approach with the network partners, however this influence is much more specific and diverse per situation. Next to that, it should be noted that from the data, it could be argued that there is not a continuum on which informal and formal are placed, making them rather mutual exclusive. However, data suggests that relationships can have both formal and informal characteristics at the same time. It should be noted that the degree of formality of the ties between the network partners can vary among the different network partners.²²⁷ Some ties are more formal while others are complemented also with more informal characteristics.

First of all, many of the respondents indicate that the informal characteristics of the relationships between the network partners have a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach in the network. As one of the respondents argues, it is the informal relationships that are essential in their work (see figure 7.4).²²⁸ Knowing the network partner that you work with well and having a relationship that is based on mutual trust, is very helpful in the cooperation in the network.²²⁹ One of the crucial factors in formulating a POP approach is information sharing among the network partners.²³⁰ Several of the respondents argue that personal, trust and informal relationships between network partners make that this information is shared more easily.²³¹ As one of the respondents argues: “*By emphasizing the notion of communality, you can create trust and from that the notion of ‘we’ arises.*”²³² However, this can also have a downside. As stated by one of the respondents, sometimes information is barely shared with the police because of a trust-based relationship between for example the care organisations and the individuals at hand.²³³ This subsequently might lead to less trust between the CPO and the care organisation.

Furthermore, having short and informal lines of communication between the network partners facilitates that CPOs might signal problems in their neighbourhood sooner²³⁴, which in turn is one of the first phases of the POP approach. These short lines of communication can vary from simple WhatsApp messages to visiting each other their offices and communicating face-to-face.²³⁵ One of the respondents argues that the short lines of communication he/she has with citizens in the neighbourhood facilitate him/her in getting information on what is going on with regard to a specific property.²³⁶ Next to that, having short lines of communication between the network partners and a lot of agreements on the matter, it is still often challenging to get sufficient results.²³⁷ Another type of informal short lines of communication can be seen as the physical closeness of the network partners that facilitates more frequent and informal contact. As some of the respondents argue, it is these close

²²⁷ Respondent A [508-514]

²²⁸ Respondent B [230]

²²⁹ Respondent I [389-392] [396-405]

²³⁰ Respondent G [42-44]

²³¹ Respondent I [201-203] Respondent B [181-186] Respondent C [429-432] Respondent A [487-494]

²³² Respondent B [208-214]

²³³ Respondent I [383-387] Respondent B [130-136]

²³⁴ Respondent H [135-137]

²³⁵ Respondent G [340-342]

²³⁶ Respondent H [126-132] [133-135]

²³⁷ Respondent F [246-248]

network partners that are essential for the cooperation.²³⁸ For example with regard to the social housing corporation that is located in the centre of the neighbourhood of one of the CPOs and he/she frequently visits them to drink a cup of coffee and have a talk.²³⁹ In the same line of reasoning, the closeness between the network partners in for example ‘Service Centre West’ also facilitates the cooperation in the networks significantly.²⁴⁰ As one of the respondents indicates in order to be able to address a problem: “*For me it [mutual trust, personal contact and informal relations] is important. In my neighbourhood, which is a working-class neighbourhood, it is essential to know and to be known.*”²⁴¹




Figure 7.4: Influence of Informal Characteristics on POP

With an absence of such an informal tie, the communal notion of ‘we’ might not be present which subsequently might lead to network partners being more hesitant in investing in this communal problem.²⁴² Next to that, network partners might be inclined to withdraw from the cooperation if it gets tense, if there is not a sufficient personal and trust-based relationship.²⁴³ It should be noted that also several respondents argue that a lack of formal characteristics might have a negative influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach (see figure 7.5). In the LESN, it is important that all necessary network partners are present. Therefore, some degree of formality in the ties between the network partners might possibly be necessary.²⁴⁴ Next to that, informal ties between network partners might lack formality in the sense that the relationships become too amicable that it is hard to see the work separated from the relationship and therefore network partners might be inclined to avoid conflict or disputing the contribution of a network partner.²⁴⁵ Also, too amicable ties that lack a degree of formality might be prone to inappropriate behaviour favouritism that is beneficial for the other network partner but not for solving the problem at hand.²⁴⁶




Figure 7.5: Influence of Formal Characteristics on POP

7.1.2.B INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS

With regard to institutionalisation, the same holds as with the relationship characteristics, that this differs per network partner.²⁴⁷ Some relationships are highly institutionalised and other relationships are not institutionalised at all.

As one of the respondents argues: “*It takes more efforts and new agreements have to be made*”.²⁴⁸ This applies to situations when there is a change in contact person for example in an organisation that is a network partner and subsequently a ‘new’ relationship is to be build up again.²⁴⁹ Therefore, one could say that having a low degree of institutionalisation is not stimulating in formulating a POP approach with the network partners (see figure 7.6). However, it should be noted that limited evidence is found to support this claim and therefore one should not simply assume this is also the case in other situations. During the interviews, several respondents argued that a high degree of institutionalisation has a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. This is especially expressed with regard to building and maintaining good relationships with the network partners over

²³⁸ Respondent A [193-196] [315-321] [590-600]

²³⁹ Respondent G [91-94] [95-96] [98-100]

²⁴⁰ Respondent G [215-233] [224-227]

²⁴¹ Respondent B [224-227]

²⁴² Respondent B [208-214]

²⁴³ Respondent B [136-137] [139-141] [217-218] [220]

²⁴⁴ Respondent C [270-274]

²⁴⁵ Respondent D [270-277] [281-284] Respondent C [416-425]

²⁴⁶ Respondent C [394-400]

²⁴⁷ Respondent A [508-514]

²⁴⁸ Respondent A [516-517]

²⁴⁹ Respondent A [508-514]

time.²⁵⁰ As one of the respondents explains: “*The difference is, you know each other, you know what to expect from each other, you know each other’s role better if you have spent more time working together as network partners.*”²⁵¹ It is also expressed that it takes time for those relationships to become institutionalised. As one of the respondents argues: “*When I started as community policing officers and came to meetings with network partners, I was much less confident and actively present than I am probably now. And that also holds for the other network partners. In that you have to grow.*”²⁵² The presumed effects of increased rigidity and therefore a loss of flexibility to formulate a POP approach finds no ground with regard to the data that was provided by the respondents.




Figure 7.6: Influence of Institutionalisation on POP

7.1.3 AUTONOMY

In this section the possible influence of network formalisation with regard to the autonomy the CPOs enjoy in the network is explored by analysing the effects of the specificity of their role as CPO and the degree of top-down monitoring they experience in their daily work.

7.1.3.A ROLE SPECIFICITY

As this freedom to act is partly limited by the rules and regulations on competencies of policing officers, it is also partly derived from the role specificity that is provided by the policing organisation itself. With regard to the question of whether the role specificity affects the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the LESNs, based on the respondents, one can conclude that the more the role of the CPO is specified, the harder it gets to formulate a POP approach (see figure 7.7). As one of the respondents explains: “*The more you precisely define [a role], the harder it gets.*”²⁵³ As a CPO, when assigned other tasks next to their role in the neighbourhood, this implies that he/she this is at the expense of their time in the neighbourhood.²⁵⁴ Having less time in the neighbourhood is also affecting the ability to formulate a POP approach according to respondent A.²⁵⁵ It should be noted that this notion is not only felt with regard to the POP approach but is perceived in a much broader sense with regard to the daily work of CPOs. It is therefore stated that having low role specificity and a high degree of role freedom is essential in their work.²⁵⁶ CPOs are often highly aware of the problems that occur in their corresponding neighbourhoods and therefore having the freedom to prioritise them as such might facilitate them in formulating a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance.²⁵⁷ Having the freedom to prioritise is one of the things that respondent I encountered during his/her time as a CPO, especially with regard to local soft drug nuisance, as this was never part of the national priorities thus something that was hard to act upon.²⁵⁸ As the role specificity of the CPOs is set in a 20/80% division, as explained in chapter 4, one of the respondents indicates that when asking a CPO, he/she prefers to be 100% in the neighbourhood. However, at the managerial level of the organisation, it is not perceived as such that the CPOs are unable to successfully execute their neighbourhood tasks due to the 20/80% division.²⁵⁹ It should be noted that respondent C is of a different opinion in that regard since he/she states that CPOs are promised to have the central role in a specific area, so they should not be bothered with other tasks.²⁶⁰ This increases their long-term presence in the neighbourhoods which leads to improved

²⁵⁰ Respondent H [226-228] Respondent A [104-105] Respondent G [42-44] Respondent I [389-392] [549-550] [491-492] [396-405] Respondent B [181-186]

²⁵¹ Respondent A [487-494]

²⁵² Respondent H [315-319]

²⁵³ Respondent B [235-236]

²⁵⁴ Respondent C [276-285]

²⁵⁵ Respondent A [528-543]

²⁵⁶ Respondent B [243] Respondent H [360] Respondent G [351-356] [357-358] Respondent I [413-422]

²⁵⁷ Respondent H [340-343] [346-349]

²⁵⁸ Respondent I [63-73]

²⁵⁹ Respondent E [138-144]

²⁶⁰ Respondent C [276-285]

connections with citizens²⁶¹ and possibly increased ability to signal problems in an early stage.²⁶² As one of the CPOs exemplifies that in specific cases and problems should be handed to other network partners because for the CPO it is not doable to manage all since he/she also works other shifts.²⁶³

However, as one of the respondents remarks, might there be a difference between the actual role freedom and the perceived role freedom? As he/she states that in the area in which he/she works, the CPOs can always request more time for a specific problem they deem important at their OEW, which is subsequently, if possible, granted without a doubt.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, one could argue whether this freedom is always perceived as such or whether they feel like more time for a specific problem is just not possible.²⁶⁵ Next to that, is there something as too much freedom? As one of the respondents argues, freedom on the one side provides an individual CPO with an opportunity to solve a problem as he/she desires. On the other side, guidance with regard to role specificity, for example by the Operational Expert Wijk, is also necessary.²⁶⁶ So it might be the case that lack of role specificity, for example prescribing to work according to the POP approach, might lead to the fact that fewer CPOs work accordingly.

One of the influencing factors that almost all respondents mentioned during the interviews was the negative impact of the lack of capacity within the policing organisation (see figure 7.7).²⁶⁷ This implies that CPOs need to take up other shifts such as first aid shifts and subsequently have less time in their neighbourhoods.²⁶⁸ One of the respondents states: “*It [the lack of capacity and taking other shifts] should not be falling on their [the community policing officers] shoulders. Nevertheless, those that are responsible for monitoring that, are often relieved that they can at least fill all the open shifts.*”²⁶⁹

As stated, soft drugs are often a lowkey way towards the use of other types of drugs, so it would be beneficial to tackle soft drug use, especially among youth, as soon as possible. However also this requires capacity at the front that, at the moment, is not available within the policing organisation.²⁷⁰ When aiming to formulate an approach for a specific problem, it is always the question of whether capacity within the organisation will be made available or whether there are other priorities that require more capacity, for example severe and violent incidents.²⁷¹ That is always something that needs to be assessed by the CPOs themselves but also by the policing organisation and its national priorities.²⁷² There are situations in which those two might diverge with regard to their opinion on the matter of capacity and priority.²⁷³ An example of the POP approach that has a highly preventive character that had been in place for some time is the ‘Schooladoptieplan’ in which policing officers went to a school that they had ‘adopted’ to provide ten lessons on all sorts of things, but also drugs. However, due to a lack of capacity, this approach is no longer executed as such.²⁷⁴ For example, in the POP approach it is required to formulate a clear definition of the root problem and to conduct analyses on the specific case. Another respondent argues that: “*If we would have more personnel from the policing organisation, then we would be able to address more problems and focus in the neighbourhoods much more on problem-oriented policing.*”²⁷⁵ However, as respondent B argues, there is just too little time to do that and that has to do with the limited capacity of the policing organisation, but also the limited capacity of other network partners of the LESNs.²⁷⁶ Another respondent argues that with regard to the cyclical nature of POP, it is often hard to take some steps back in the process due to lack of capacity among other things.²⁷⁷

²⁶¹ Respondent C [316-319]

²⁶² Respondent C [586-589]

²⁶³ Respondent A [346-348]

²⁶⁴ Respondent D [312-315]

²⁶⁵ Respondent D [318-322] [325-329]

²⁶⁶ Respondent I [413-422] [425]

²⁶⁷ Respondent B [119-120] [10-14] [96-99] [106-108] Respondent H [100-105] [274-279] [340-343] [346-349] [360] Respondent F [142-148] [305-310] Respondent A [346-348] [528-543]

²⁶⁸ Respondent B [10-14] Respondent F [289-295] [298-300]

²⁶⁹ Respondent C [276-285]

²⁷⁰ Respondent B [106-108]

²⁷¹ Respondent B [119-120] [124-126] Respondent E [118-122]

²⁷² Respondent E [118-122] [176-179]

²⁷³ Respondent H [274-279]

²⁷⁴ Respondent I [342]

²⁷⁵ Respondent A [528-543]

²⁷⁶ Respondent B [96-99]

²⁷⁷ Respondent G [241-243]

Next to that, it is not only that there is too little capacity, but also new incidents and problems keep coming up that makes the CPOs switch from cases in a short period of time.²⁷⁸ As one of the respondents explains: “*It used to be, and might still is, being swayed by the issues of the day. Something happens, you act on it and you continue.*”²⁷⁹ As several respondents argue that the limited capacity is one of the dealbreakers in the ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs, they also indicate that CPOs should not be solely responsible for working on the problems and that network partners and other colleagues in the policing organisation could take up some of the workload and therefore could possibly be part of the solution itself.²⁸⁰ In that way, the CPO can utilise its full capacity in the neighbourhoods. Part of the POP analyses could for example be transferred to the Taakaccenthouder, however as derived from the data, he/she argues that removing a hemp plantation takes up a significant amount of time. With only one dayshift during the week, it is rather impossible to analyse the case any further.²⁸¹ “*It requires much more research, much more money, much more people in order to formulate a problem-oriented policing approach towards that [hemp plantations].*”²⁸² This is not only the case for hemp plantations but also other types of soft drug nuisance requires significant resources to be solved that are often not available due to capacity.²⁸³




Figure 7.7: Influence of Role Specificity on POP

7.1.3.B TOP-DOWN MONITORING

In general, the respondents in this research did not experience high degrees of top-down monitoring in their daily work. Despite the fact that there is little top-down monitoring, one of the respondents argued that when it is present, it might have a negative effect on formulating a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the LESNs. “*Many individuals, also those at the top, are calling for problem-oriented policing. But in essence they are talking about incident-driven policing. They do not know what problem-oriented policing actually entails.*”²⁸⁴ This implies that if those at the top, who do the top-down monitoring, are do not fully comprehend the POP approach, how can they monitor those that actually have to implement it (see figure 7.8)?




Figure 7.8: Influence of Top-Down Monitoring on POP

When questioning the respondents on whether they perceived top-down monitoring on the work of the CPOs, they generally argued that there is little top-down monitoring and that this is not really an obstructive factor in POP.²⁸⁵ The top-down monitoring that is mostly received is originating not from management but from the Operational Expert Wijk.²⁸⁶ One of the respondents argues that there are differences in monitoring per Operational Expert, some monitor rather closely and provide the CPOs with much more guidance, while others provide the CPOs with much more autonomy and freedom.²⁸⁷ The data is too limited to draw any conclusions on this matter with regard to the ability to formulate a POP approach.

²⁷⁸ Respondent C [231] Respondent A [416-418] [577-586] Respondent D [234-236] Respondent I [31-39]

²⁷⁹ Respondent I [166-167]

²⁸⁰ Respondent D [234-236] Respondent I [425-433]

²⁸¹ Respondent F [142-148]

²⁸² Respondent F [142-148]

²⁸³ Respondent F [159-163] [305-310]

²⁸⁴ Respondent B [246-248]

²⁸⁵ Respondent E [155-159]

²⁸⁶ Respondent G [362-365]

²⁸⁷ Respondent C [525-529]

7.1.4 COORDINATION

In this section the possible influence of network formalisation with regard to the coordination of the network is explored by analysing the effects of the different types of network coordination namely: not agreed upon, shared governance, lead organisation and network administrative organisation.

7.1.4.A NOT AGREED UPON

Since there is little evidence in the data on which it can be concluded that the coordination of the LESNs is not agreed upon, no conclusions can be formulated on its influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance (see figure 7.9).




Figure 7.9: Influence of Coordination: Not Agreed on POP

7.1.4.B SHARED GOVERNANCE

What is the influence of shared governance on the ability to formulate a POP approach? It is stated in chapter 5 that much of the LESNs are coordinated on a shared governance base. However, as many respondents indicate, it should be agreed upon who takes the lead in the coordination in order to ameliorate the cooperation in the network.²⁸⁸ Therefore, one could argue that shared governance itself is not seen as having a positive influence on the cooperation (see figure 7.10). However, as one of the respondents suggested, shared governance could also be divided among for example the municipality and the policing organisation in which the municipality is the coordinator of the problem and the policing organisation of the operating procedure.²⁸⁹




Figure 7.10: Influence of Coordination: Shared Governance on POP

7.1.4.C LEAD ORGANISATION

As stated in chapter 5 of this research, the network partners often deem another network partner to be the coordinator. If that network partner takes up that responsibility and executes its coordinator tasks, this has a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESN (see figure 7.11).²⁹⁰ However, it should be noted that it is not always the case that the network partner takes the lead, which in turn might obstruct the cooperation in the network. Therefore, the CPO might be inclined to take the lead.²⁹¹ However, as one of the respondents argues, appointing another network partner to take the lead is often more appropriate since the CPOs have to work on too many problems and it is often that the other network partner has more expertise with regard to the problem.²⁹² Therefore, it can be stated that if the coordination lies with the CPO, this might make it more challenging to formulate a POP approach due to limited time and limited expertise in that specific field.

As some to the respondents argue, it is the municipality that should be the coordinator in 90% of the safety and security problems.²⁹³ However, this network partner is often unable to take up that responsibility due to lack of

²⁸⁸ Respondent E [163-166]

²⁸⁹ Respondent I [515-521]

²⁹⁰ Respondent G [374-375]

²⁹¹ Respondent H [365-370]

²⁹² Respondent H [365-370] Respondent A [550-552] Respondent B [161-163]

²⁹³ Respondent B [152-155]

capacity or simply because they do not possess the competences to do so.²⁹⁴ Next to that, it should be noted that the municipality might not be aware of the POP approach and it is therefore rather logical that they are then not able to steer the LESN to formulating a POP approach.²⁹⁵ So, one could argue, if the lead organisation would successfully take the coordination of the LESN this might positively influence the ability to formulate a POP approach. This also marks the tipping point in the relationship where the negative influence is changed to a positive influence (see figure 7.11).




Figure 7.11: Influence of Coordination: Lead Organisation on POP

7.1.4.D NETWORK ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

Since there is no evidence in the data that indicates that the LESNs are coordinated by a network administrative organisation, no conclusions can be formulated on its influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance (see figure 7.12)




Figure 7.12: Influence of Coordination: Network Administrative Organisation on POP

7.1.5 OTHER

This section provides an overview of other factors that were mentioned by the respondents that were, next to the network formalisation, of possible influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the LESNs in Enschede. These factors are assigned to three different categories namely Policing Organisations, Network, Problem-Specific.

7.1.5.A THE POLICING ORGANISATION

INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE ON PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

One of the factors that was expressed by some of the respondents in this research was that the knowledge on the POP approach should be improved in order to better implement the approach.²⁹⁶ This is not only visible in the actual application of the POP approach at the local level but also within other parts of the organisation that are mainly focussed on incident-driven policing or often interpret the POP approach wrongly as much more incident-driven.²⁹⁷

INTERNAL BUREAUCRACY

It is stated by one of the respondents that it is rather strange that an appropriate approach such as the POP approach was developed, the organisation adapted to this approach and the policing officers are trained in that way, but it is not fully implemented and executed up to this point. Rather incident-driven policing is highly relied upon.²⁹⁸ Next to that, the internal capacity is also stipulated of influence since this affects the possibility for cases to be transferred for example to the detective departments if more in-depth investigation is necessary or that the type of

²⁹⁴ Respondent B [152-155] [254-261]

²⁹⁵ Respondent B [268-272] Respondent C [556-558] Respondent I [515-521]

²⁹⁶ Respondent B [76-77] Respondent C [287-293] Respondent I [241]

²⁹⁷ Respondent B [150-152] [246-248]

²⁹⁸ Respondent C [509-514]

case is not prioritized sufficiently to be taken up by another department.²⁹⁹ Also, it is stated by some respondents that it took and still sometimes takes a lot of effort to get the organisation ‘moving’.³⁰⁰ Some argue that in order to get the organisation ‘moving’, one requires so much pre-knowledge and that you have to keep pushing for it.³⁰¹ Next to that, one of the respondents exemplifies that the process can be rather slow since it has to go via this table and then everybody has an opinion on the matter and before it finally continuous it has taken up so much time.³⁰²

OUTSIDE SCOPE POLICING ORGANISATION

It is possible that the problems that the CPOs are facing with regard to local soft drug nuisance lie outside their operating scope.³⁰³ This implies that the policing organisation might not have the expertise, competencies or the means to act in a certain case.³⁰⁴ Regarding expertise, the police organisation should acknowledge that some problems require specialists from other organisations instead of doing everything on its own.³⁰⁵ In that case, it might be beneficial to transfer the case to another organisation.³⁰⁶ If not, this might prevent that a POP approach towards a local soft drug nuisance is formulated in order to get in front of the problem. It should be noted, as indicated by one of the respondents, that the problems under criminal law always fall within the scope of the police, however problems with regard to social work often only partly fall within the scope of the police.³⁰⁷ Next to that, as one of the respondents argues, a stimulating factor to implement the POP approach is to look beyond one its own structure and to explore the possible competencies that the other network partners might have in that specific case.³⁰⁸ This implies that cooperating in a LESN and using each other competencies possibly has a facilitative effect on formulating a POP approach.

COMMUNITY POLICING OFFICER SPECIFIC

First of all, there might be a difference between the recently trained CPOs and the CPOs that had their training before the introduction of POP. Newly trained CPOs are trained in being more focused on the problem than on the incident at hand.³⁰⁹ Next to that, the preferences and capacities of the individual CPO influence their ability to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance. If the CPO has a strong focus on incidents and catching the bad guys, it might be that they are more prone to incident-driven policing instead of addressing the problems that cause the local soft drug nuisance and that are often rather socially rooted.³¹⁰

Also, it might be the case that the individual CPO its capacities are obstructive in successfully formulating a POP approach with the other network partners due to for example conflict avoiding behaviour that results in dreadful periods of deliberations and meetings.³¹¹ Furthermore, it is also dependents on the individual CPO its preferences in their daily work. Some CPOs are more interested in solving more social problems in their neighbourhoods while others are keener on solving the local drug problems. This highly depends on the individual CPO.³¹² So also the preferences and the individual capacities might be of influence on the extent to which a POP approach in the LESNs is formulated in the case of local soft drug nuisance.

ROLE OPERATIONAL EXPERT NEIGHBOURHOOD

Some of the respondents stated that currently the role of the OEW is not implemented as was intended and that would facilitate the POP approach. As stated by one of the respondents, it should have been the OEW that was to monitor and keep an eye on the work that the CPOs do and their ability to implement the POP approach instead of incident-drive policing.³¹³ However, the tasks that the OEW has in some cases shifted. To facilitate CPOs in working according to the POP approach, the OEW could fulfil a more monitoring role. Another respondent argues

²⁹⁹ Respondent E [52-53] [176-179] Respondent H [105-108] [406-407] Respondent I [64-69] [74-75] Respondent G [400-402] [404-406]

³⁰⁰ Respondent I [117-121]

³⁰¹ Respondent H [105-108] [279-281]

³⁰² Respondent H [105-108]

³⁰³ Respondent C [129-131]

³⁰⁴ Respondent F [159-163]

³⁰⁵ Respondent A [354-356]

³⁰⁶ Respondent A [550-552]

³⁰⁷ Respondent A [348-351]

³⁰⁸ Respondent H [391-393] [394-395] [400-401] [402-403] Respondent D [433-439]

³⁰⁹ Respondent E [117-123]

³¹⁰ Respondent C [432-437]

³¹¹ Respondent C [453-457] Respondent D [253-258] [263-266]

³¹² Respondent A [497-506]

³¹³ Respondent C [529-533] Respondent I [178-180]

that it would be beneficial for the OEW to have a clear overview of the larger problems within the neighbourhoods and coordinates the more complex issues to for example youth officers, taakaccenthouders or informatieknooppunten.³¹⁴ This results in more time for the community policing officers in their corresponding neighbourhoods to gather information or signals which is a crucial part in the POP approach.

POLICING ORGANISATION MORE OPEN TO EXTERNAL RESEARCH

One of the things that was stipulated by one of the respondents was the closed character of the policing organisation with regard to external research. He/she indicates that if you have an individual reflecting on the workflow from the side-line, it might be possible that interesting new insights arise.³¹⁵ Policing officers within the organisation are often invested in a specific case and the focus that is required might have as a consequence that other options in the workflow can be overlooked, such as the POP approach. By opening the organisation to more external research, also from educational and research organisations, this might provide insights that in turn facilitate the implementation of the POP approach in the LESNs.

7.1.5.B THE NETWORK

CAPACITY NETWORK PARTNERS

Regarding the network partners that are part of the LESNs, it is not only the policing organisation that experiences tensions with regard to the capacity, but also it is felt that the capacity of the network partners can become a bottleneck in formulating a POP approach. For example, it is stated that the neighbourhood coaches are often restricted by their capacity on the one hand and the amount of work on the other hand which makes it more difficult to involve them when new cases arrive.³¹⁶

PARTICIPATION NETWORK PARTNERS

Another aspect that is mentioned as obstructive in formulating a POP approach in the LESN towards local soft drug nuisance is the fact that there is a lack of participation from one or more of the network partners.³¹⁷ However, it should be noted that it cannot be identified whether this is an actual lack of participation or a perceived lack of participation.

AUTONOMY NETWORK PARTNERS

In formulating an approach towards local soft drug nuisance, often specific decisions have to be taken. As one of the respondents argues, it is sometimes the case that the network partners that are seated at the table do not possess this autonomy. The cooperation can be slowed down by the fact that for example neighbourhood coaches need to consult with their superiors while CPOs experience much more freedom in that sense.³¹⁸

FRAGMENTATION NETWORK PARTNERS

One obstructive factor that is mentioned by one of the respondents is the fragmentation of the network partners. This is exemplified by taking the municipality as an example. In smaller municipalities civil servants are much more often a type of chameleon while in larger municipalities in which the organisations are often bigger, this is much more fragmented. This implies that in order to find the appropriate network partner within the municipality to involve in the POP approach, it requires much more efforts.³¹⁹

LOCATION NETWORK PARTNERS

Another factor that might be of influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance is the location of the network partners. As one of the respondents indicates, many health organisations, social assistance organisations that are included in the LESNs on soft drugs are located in the city centre of

³¹⁴ Respondent I [438-445]

³¹⁵ Respondent C [148-153]

³¹⁶ Respondent G [184-187] [189-190] Respondent A [565-572]

³¹⁷ Respondent D [166-174]

³¹⁸ Respondent D [176-178] Respondent A [643-647]

³¹⁹ Respondent C [404-406]

Enschede. This implies that much of the nuisance is located there. This is not only challenging for citizens on the streets but also for the individuals themselves since they roam in an area full of temptations.³²⁰ One of the successful projects in Enschede is still the Paradijsvogel houses at the border of Enschede. In this project, individuals that used to cause nuisance in the city centre were relocated to the Paradijsvogel houses where they live, receive care and assistance that they require so that they have no need to go to the city centre again.³²¹

KNOWLEDGE ON THE OPERATING PROCEDURES

One of the fundamental questions that was raised by some of the respondents was whether the network partners in the LESNs are aware of the operating procedures of the CPOs such as the POP approach?³²² According to some, by making the network partners more aware of the POP approach, this might facilitate the formulation of the POP approach in the LESN.³²³

INTERESTS NETWORK PARTNERS

In cooperating in the LESNs, it is important that the interests of the network partners are to some extent aligned for them to formulate a POP approach. It is stated that there will be always diverging interests, however it is important that there are shared interests that overcome these differences.³²⁴ However, it should be noted that despite the shared interests of all the network partners, one of the respondents argues that, even then, it is still hard to tackle the problem at hand.³²⁵

INFORMING NETWORK PARTNERS

One of the most crucial factors that was stipulated during the interviews with the respondents was the sharing of information between network partners.³²⁶ Information sharing between network partners is likely to facilitate CPOs to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance. As indicated in the first section of chapter 7, it is this information sharing that is often obstructed due to various reasons.

COMMUNALITY

One of the aspects that is seen as highly stimulating the ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs is the feeling of communality among the network partners.³²⁷ The mutual feeling of urgency with regard to a problem and the urge to tackle it jointly where problem ownership is not perceived as attached to only one network partner.³²⁸ In that case, it is also easier to come up with an approach jointly.³²⁹

SELECTION OF NETWORK PARTNERS

One of the factors that might be of influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs is whether the appropriate and necessary network partners are seated at the 'table'. It might be, especially if for example local soft drug nuisance is cross-border, challenging to get the right partners in the cooperation.³³⁰

NETWORK ON BOTH MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTIVE LEVEL

As one of the respondents argues that there has been a situation in which there was a network on management level and a network on the executive level that resulted in more long-term policies since the two networks effectively communicated with each other and the monitoring of the results was much more implemented.³³¹ Such a structure, in which on management level questions with regard to the analyses, to get in front of the problem,

³²⁰ Respondent E [199-205]

³²¹ Respondent E [211-215]

³²² Respondent I [515-521]

³²³ Respondent C [361] [539-544]

³²⁴ Respondent H [292-297] [299-301] [311]

Respondent C [380-389] [392-394] Respondent F

[260-267]

³²⁵ Respondent F [246-248]

³²⁶ Respondent H [428-430] Respondent G [42-44]

³²⁷ Respondent H [226-228]

³²⁸ Respondent D [392] [402-407] Respondent F

[386-387]

³²⁹ Respondent A [625-628]

³³⁰ Respondent E [73-74] Respondent A [643-647]

³³¹ Respondent C [240-246] [256-258]

are asked and a network on the executive level could be beneficial in formulating a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance.

POLITICAL FIGURES AND STAKEHOLDERS

One of the respondents argued that it is not only the policing organisation but also other stakeholders and political figures that do not ask the right questions with regard to police work. It is stated that especially stakeholders and political figures are easily satisfied with solutions to single incidents rather they require the root problem being solved. Since there is no demand for justification in that sense, the police organisation is not asked to further investigate to get in front of the problems.³³² One example given is that at the Wilminckplein there are many stakeholders, not only citizens, but also restaurants and shops. “*Knightly behaviour stimulates grandstand behaviour. Hail the police is acting on the incident.*”³³³ However, the respondent argues that in that way the actual root problems with the target group are not solved, but still all the stakeholders are happy.

7.1.5.C THE PROBLEM

CROSS-DISTRICT PROBLEMS

During the interviews, some of the respondents argued that some of the problems with local soft drug nuisance were cross-district or just too big.³³⁴ Since Enschede is a border region, the CPOs have to take into account that the nuisance might have a cross-border character and also requires a more cross-border approach in order to solve the problem in a problem-oriented way. So, one of the respondents rightly questions whether this cross-border aspect is always or can always be taken into account in the LESNs with regard to the network partners.³³⁵ Next to that, one requires much more expertise and time to fully address the problems with soft drugs due to their size.³³⁶ One of the respondents argues that in order to successfully formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance, the CPO should source out the analyses and investigative tasks if the problems are really big and cross-district.³³⁷ If the CPO has to do that on his/her own, this would decrease the time that they have in the neighbourhood itself.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

It should be noted that the nature of the local soft drug nuisance also seems to influence the ability to come up with a POP approach in the LESNs. Getting in front of the problem can be quite challenging since it is partly an issue of demand and supply since addicted individuals and individuals with money problems can hardly be banned from society.³³⁸ Next to that, the benefits that can be gained in such a short amount of time with for example the production of the soft drugs is still attractive to engage in for many individuals.³³⁹ Next to that, sometimes problems can be too hard to get a grip on in a preventive manner that it might be a deliberate choice to let the problem escalate and thus deliberately choosing not to use the POP approach because it has proven useless in that specific case.³⁴⁰

KEEPING THE PROBLEM LOCAL

Two respondents argue that in order to formulate a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance, one of the facilitating factors to focus on the problem locally and to have an approach with a local focus.³⁴¹

³³² Respondent C [211-218] Respondent I [178-180]

³³³ Respondent C [544-553]

³³⁴ Respondent E [62-63] Respondent F [169-170]

³³⁵ Respondent E [70-74]

³³⁶ Respondent F [159-163] [185-188]

³³⁷ Respondent I [425-433]

³³⁸ Respondent H [141-145] Respondent F [170-174]

³³⁹ Respondent F [170-174]

³⁴⁰ Respondent H [430-432] [443-445]

³⁴¹ Respondent G [406-411] Respondent A [654-655]

7.2. CONCLUSION

To answer the fourth sub-question of this research: *How does the degree of formalisation in a network influence the implementation of the POP approach?* To answer this question, one should take into account that effects that were found in this research are highly diverse, complex and context dependent. It can be concluded that network formalisation with regard to Rules and Regulations and Autonomy in the LESNs has a limited but mainly obstructive effect on the ability to formulate a POP approach. While in the other types of network formalisation, namely the Nature of the Relationships and the Coordination this effect is less clear or rather reversed.

It can be concluded that a written rule both can have an obstructive and stimulating effect (see table 7.1). On the one hand, written rules are obstructive due to the fact that they structure the behaviour of the network partners in for example information sharing (A), while on the other hand, written rules in the form of covenants aim to take facilitate the behaviour by for example drawing up covenants between the partners (C). Unwritten rules, in turn, seem to facilitate the cooperation in the LESNs by making agreements on the cooperation which subsequently facilitates formulating a POP approach (D). It can be concluded that the number of rules and regulations in a LESN holds the same effect as with the nature of the rules (see table 7.1). A large number of rules, mostly from external origin legislation (B), is obstructing the CPOs, while covenants (E) in turn facilitate again. Next to that, it is stated that a low number of rules and regulations (F), for example external legislation, have a stimulating effect.

Next to that, it can be seen that the same holds for the effects of the degree of autonomy (see table 7.1). A high degree of formalisation is influencing the ability to formulate a POP approach negatively due to the fact that a high degree of role specificity with regard to being commissioned to take up additional shifts next to the neighbourhood work (N) and in the case that the individuals that are responsible for the top-down monitoring are not fully aware of the POP approach (P). However, it should be noted that the effect of a high degree of role specificity might also have a stimulating effect due to the fact that it can provide more guidance for COPs to follow the phases of the POP approach (Q). Next to that, it is stated that a low degree of role specificity, with regard to the freedom to execute and prioritise the work in the neighbourhood seems to be stimulating in that sense (R).

With regard to the relationship ties, the reverse effect is visible, whereas a high degree of formalisation actually seems to have a stimulating effect (see table 7.1). As the respondents argue, a low degree of informal ties, a low degree of formal ties and a low degree of institutionalisation seem to have an obstructive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. This can be translated to a lack of trust (G), a lack of rules that structure the relationship (H) but also having a new network partner to sit at the table (I). On the contrary, a high degree of informal ties (J), formal ties (K) and institutionalisation (L) seem to have a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. It should be noted that the effect of formal ties between the network partners (H & K) only applies if there is a significant informal tie between the network partners.

Additionally, the effects of the highly formalised manner of coordination are limited. It seems to be obstructive to coordinate the LESNs by shared governance since most respondents indicate that the responsibility lies with one of the network partners (S). This subsequently leads to the fact that having a lead organisation that is not taking its responsibility, that does not have the means to lead is also obstructive in that sense (T). Only when it is agreed upon who takes the lead as an organisation and this organisation executes this task sufficiently, it seems that it is stimulating in formulating a POP approach (U).

	<i>Obstructive</i>	<i>Stimulating</i>
<i>Rules and Regulations</i>	(A) Written Rules (Formal)	(C) Written Rules (Formal)
	(B) Large number of Rules (Formal)	(D) Unwritten Rules (Informal)
<i>Relationship Ties</i>		(E) Large number of Rules (Formal)
		(F) Low number of Rules (Informal)
	(G) Low degree of Informal Ties (Informal)	(J) High degree of Informal Ties (Informal)
	(H) Low degree of Formal Ties (Informal)	(K) High degree of Formal Ties (Formal)
	(I) Low degree of Institutionalisation (Informal)	(L) High degree of Institutionalisation (Formal)
<i>Autonomy</i>	(N) High degree of Role Specificity (Formal)	(Q) High degree of Role Specificity (Formal)
	(O) Low degree of Role Specificity (Informal)	(R) Low degree of Role Specificity (Informal)
	(P) High degree of Top-Down monitoring (Formal)	
<i>Coordination</i>	(S) Shared Governance (Informal)	(U) Lead Organisation (Formal)
	(T) Lead Organisation (Formal)	

Table 7.1: Influence of Network Formalisation on Ability to formulate a POP approach

So, to answer the question, as seen above, network formalisation has a diverse and complex impact on the ability to formulate a POP approach, however it should be noted that network formalisation cannot fully explain the variation in the ability to formulate a POP approach. Therefore, one should be aware that the other factors that were mentioned by the respondents also might account for a large share in the variation in the ability to formulate a POP approach. These concern other factors that are problem specific, policing organisation specific and network specific.

8. CONCLUSION

In the introduction of this research the following research question was presented: *To what extent can the ability to formulate a problem-oriented policing approach by community policing officers that are part of local executive safety networks on local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede be explained by the degree of formalisation in the network?* To answer the central question, four sub-questions were answered in the corresponding chapters, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6 and chapter 7 of this research. It should be noted that the first sub-question, chapter 4, is mainly focused on providing an explanation of the situational circumstances.

The second sub-question concerned: *To what extent is the functioning of the LESNs formalised?* In the analysis, network formalisation was viewed through four different dimensions of the concept namely the Rules and Regulations, Nature of the Relationships, Autonomy and Coordination. It should be noted that this conclusion provides a general indication of the network formalisation, but one should keep in mind that individual LESNs might differ from this general perspective. As stated in chapter 5.2, the formalisation of the LESNs differs to a large extent with regard to the different dimensions. Whereas the rules and regulations that structure the networks are rather formal, the coordination of the networks and the autonomy in the of the CPOs and the relationship ties are much more in the middle or more informal. So, it can be concluded that the LESNs are in some aspects highly formalised, but in other aspects more based on informal characteristics.

The third sub-question concerned: *To what extent are the engaged CPOs able to formulate the different steps of a POP approach towards local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede?* In general, there is a willingness among the CPOs to work according to the POP approach, but this is not always translated into the ability to actually do so, with the exception of several cases. The phases, as prescribed by the SARA model, provide guidance but it remains challenging to be fully able to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance in Enschede. While the scanning phase seems to be a phase that most CPOs can successfully accomplish, the subsequent phases turn out to be more challenging. Furthermore, the cyclical nature of the SARA model is known and also put to practice, however go back to a previous step in the process often faces some challenging aspects. So, it can be concluded that the CPOs in the city of Enschede, with regard to local soft drug nuisance, are limited in their ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs, in which the process is often interrupted after the scanning phase.

The fourth sub-questions concerned: *How does the degree of formalisation in a network influence the implementation of the POP approach?* The effects that the different types of network formalisation have on the ability to formulate the different phases of the POP approach are rather dual. This implies that several dimensions of network formalisation both stimulate the ability to formulate a POP approach but at the same time obstruct this ability. As this research provides more insights on the effects of the different types of network formalisation, it is less specified in the effects on the different types of phases of POP. However, it should be noted that from the third sub-question it could be identified that especially the step from the first POP approach phase, scanning, to the second POP approach phase, analysis, is often perceived as difficult. Based on this observation, one can conclude that network formalisation might have an influence on this interruption in the implementation of the POP approach. With regard to the types of network formalisation, it can be seen that unwritten rules of the LESN positively influences the ability to formulate a POP approach. With written rules and the number of rules the influence changes of direction, most written rules and regulations are viewed as being obstructive, however additional rules in the form of covenants that are put in place facilitate formulating a POP approach again. With regard to the relationships, informal characteristics seem to have both a positive as a negative influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach whereas this tipping point is activated when relationships become too amicable that favouritism might occur. It is the complementary formal characteristics that might in turn have a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. The institutionalisation of the relationships also has a positive influence on the ability to formulate a POP approach. The autonomy of the CPO in the network seems to have a mixed influence on their ability to formulate a POP approach. Their freedom to act facilitates them, however the additional shifts and top-down monitoring ought to be rather more obstructive than facilitating. At last, with regard to the coordination of the networks, data suggests that a lead organisation that takes their responsibility would be most beneficial for the ability to formulate a POP approach. So, to overcome the evident interruption in the POP approach between the scanning and the analysis phase, it is advisable that the networks

become more formalised by establishing covenants, formalising the informal relationships and arranging the coordination of the network, but also the networks should become more informal with regard to the autonomy that the CPOs enjoy which subsequently would lead to the CPOs having more time available for their neighbourhood work.

The different effects of network formalisation on the ability to formulate a POP approach are too differentiated to provide a simple answer to the central question of this research. It highly depends on the type of network formalisation and is highly circumstantial per situation and network. Also, many of the types of network formalisation, but also the other factors that were mentioned by the respondents, are not only affecting the ability to formulate a POP approach, but also are likely to have a large effect on each other. Next to that, it should also be noted that during the research the effects of a high degree of network formalisation seem rather limited and many other different factors were indicated by the respondents that had an effect on their ability to formulate a POP approach that were divided in three categories namely: The Policing Organisation, The Network and The Problem. Those additional factors could be used as an indication of direct for further research. So, concerning the central research question: *To what extent can the ability to formulate a problem-oriented policing approach by community policing officers that are part of local executive safety networks on local soft drug nuisance in the city of Enschede be explained by the degree of formalisation in the network?* It can be concluded that it can only partly be explained by the different types of network formalisation as mentioned above and that additional factors also explain a large share of the variation in the ability to formulate a POP approach.

As the LESNs highly differ and are highly situational with regard to the problem at hand, it is advisable to take the insights from this research as a starting point to investigate individual LESNs as a whole in which the analysed factors in this research could provide a framework.

9. DISCUSSION

In this chapter the research will be discussed. First, the data collection method and its implications will be discussed. Second, a brief explanation is provided on the strengths of this research. Next to that, it is discussed whether the results fit the expectations derived from the theoretical basis of this research. Furthermore, an overview will be given on what changes should be made to the research if it was to be conducted again. This chapter is concluded with a list of policy recommendations that aim at ameliorating the ability of the CPOs to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs.

One of the most intrusive decisions that was made during the course of this research was that it would rely on interview data rather than survey data. This implied that the research has significant limitations regarding the geographical scope of its concluding results. If a survey was used to gather data with regard to the network formalisation and the ability to formulate a POP approach, this could have been spread over the Netherlands and much more data could have been gathered on many more cases. This would have resulted in concluding results that could be assumed to be more generally applicable. However, having a large number of cases included, this limited the possibility to gather more in-depth explanations and to explore the complexity of the phenomenon. By choosing to rely on interview data, the strength of this research lies with the in-depth understanding of the specific case and the possibility to give attention to answers that deviate rather than the uncovering of a general trend.

Next to that, it should be noted that the position of the researcher in this research could be seen as a strength with regard to the objectivity of the research. Since the researcher is in no way affiliated, familiar or a stakeholder with regard to the policing organisation, this provided for an open-minded, blank view on the research in which foreknowledge of the organisation or specific interests played no role. However, one should note that if the researcher would be more familiar with the organisation and its dynamics, this could have in turn contributed to the research. Another strength of the research is the fact that the respondents that were interviewed in this research originated from different layers within the organisation. This provided the researcher with more complete and diverse insights with regard to the subject. However, this also resulted in a large degree of diversity in the answers, in some cases conflicting. This could be explained due to the fact that the individual respondents differ from each other with respect to function, preferences and experiences. Next to that, the areas in which the community policing officers work on the problems differ and thus the nature of the problems, the associated network partners and environmental circumstances could be seen as accounting for the diverse answers. Furthermore, it should be noted that the explorative character of the research also provided numerous insights with regard to the ability to formulate a POP approach by CPOs in Enschede. This exemplifies that the understanding is much more complex and the solution to enhance the ability to formulate a POP approach should be sought in a much broader sense than simply the different types of network formalisation. It is not only a strength for this research, but also might provide a framework for future research on the subject, where an in-depth understanding of these explorative factors is required.

In the second chapter of this research, expectations were formulated with regard to the expected results based on the existing literature and theories on the matter. It should be noted that it was generally expected that the network formalisation stimulates the ability to formulate a POP approach up to a certain point. After that, it was expected that any additional network formalisation obstructs the CPOs their ability to formulate a POP approach. This expectation, which is based on the literature on network formalisation, can be deemed as appropriate with regard to, for example, the effects of rules and regulations in the network on the ability. However, the results that covenants, as part of the rules and regulations, actually stimulate the opposite effect is something that was not covered by the literature. Another deviation from the theory that resulted in this research was the fact that the formalisation of informal relationship ties might positively influence the ability to formulate a POP approach and that institutionalisation is not necessarily obstructive but rather stimulating. One could therefore argue that the theories provided a proper basis for the framework of this research, but that in this case study deviations from the general theories are found that subsequently can enrich the existing theories on the subject.

It should be noted that there are several limitations of this research that could be addressed if the research would be executed again. Below is a list that could serve as a tool for future research on the subject. First of all, it should

be noted that this research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This implied that there were significant changes in the daily work of the CPOs. In the introduction of this research, it is aimed to provide an overview of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the daily work of the CPOs, however it cannot be assumed that this situation left the data unbiased. Therefore, it would be advisable to either better assess the impact of the COVID-19 situation on the data or redo the research during times that are not influenced by the pandemic. Next to that, in this research, the focus was on a large set of influencing factors. As one could deem this as a strength, this also limited the researcher in diving deeper into one or two specific factors. As the conclusion indicates that the answer to the research question is too complex to provide in a uniform manner, it would significantly strengthen the research if a set of limited influencing factors was selected to explore and fully comprehend. This would also be beneficial for those street-level bureaucrats that formulate advice and policy on the matter. Furthermore, one could argue that this research provides a biased conclusion due to the fact that the policing organisation is the only network partner that is included. Therefore, in future research it would strengthen the conclusions if also other network partners would be included in the research. As this research provides numerous insights on CPOs and their ability to formulate a POP approach in the LESNs, it requires further research to fully explore how tools can be set up to facilitate CPOs better in that sense.

With the results of this research, one can formulate several policy advices that might facilitate the CPOs in being able to formulate a POP approach towards the local soft drug nuisance in cooperation with the LESNs.

- First of all, it would be advisable to influence future legislation that applies to the LESNs and the CPOs that enables them to utilise their competencies in a more preventive manner than it is now. If the rules and regulations were to facilitate more preventive responses, in turn the formalisation of the network would not necessarily lead to a lower ability to formulate a POP approach.
- Next to that, to increase the ability to formulate a POP approach, it is advised to make sure that the CPOs can work primarily on their neighbourhoods and its corresponded problems, while not having to take up additional shifts. This would imply that there is subsequently more time available for further analyses of the problems in the neighbourhoods and more targeted and preventive responses.
- As the research stipulated that the use of covenants that provide additional competencies for the network or exclude them from general legislation in specific cases, it would be beneficial to formalise the network in the sense that covenants should be set up to facilitate for example information sharing, which is essential in the ability to formulate a POP approach.
- Next to that, increasing the knowledge on the actual implementation of the POP approach would also be advisable, not only within the policing organisation but also among the network partners.
- As many of the respondents in this research indicated that the informal relationships are very important, it is of crucial importance that these are maintained. However, it would be advisable to additionally formalise these relationships and make them more institutionalised for more stability and durability in the network that positively affects the ability to formulate a POP approach.
- Within the LESNs, one could argue that it would be beneficial to appoint one Lead Organisation that is aware of the POP approach and that is capable of effectively taking the lead.
- Finally, one could argue that for future improvement in operating procedures such as the POP approach, it is advisable to team up with educational and research centres that can provide insights on the matter from an outsider perspective.

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1. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (VERSION COMMUNITY POLICING OFFICER)

INTERVIEW VRAGEN

1. *Algemene introducerende vraag om het interview op te starten; e.g. hoe ziet uw dagelijkse werk eruit? Waar houdt u zich voornamelijk mee bezig als wijkagent in [.....]?*
2. *Kunt u mij wat vertellen over de samenwerkingen op het gebied van softdrugs overlast waar u als politieagent bij betrokken bent?*
 - a. *Hoe lang bestaan deze samenwerkingen al?*
 - b. *Hoe lang bent u al onderdeel van deze samenwerkingen?*
 - c. *Wie zijn de andere deelnemers van deze samenwerkingen?*
 - d. *Wat is het doel van de samenwerkingen?*
 - e. *Wat zijn uw ervaringen tot op heden in deze samenwerkingen?*
3. *In de samenwerkingen met de andere netwerk deelnemers:*
 - a. *Lukt het u om samen met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk het probleem te definiëren wat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied? Kunt u toelichten in wat voor situaties dit juist wel of niet lukt? Wat zou volgens u moeten/kunnen veranderen zodat dit wel lukt?*
 - b. *Lukt het u om samen met de andere deelnemer van het netwerk grondig onderzoek te doen naar de mogelijke oorzaken van het probleem dat ten grondslag ligt aan de drugsoverlast in uw gebied? Kunt u toelichten in wat voor situaties dit wil of juist niet lukt? Wat zou volgens u moeten/kunnen veranderen zodat dit wel lukt?*
 - c. *Lukt het u om samen met de andere netwerk deelnemers een oplossing/interventie te bedenken het probleem dat ten grondslag ligt aan de drugsoverlast in uw buurt en om deze gezamenlijk te implementeren? Kunt u toelichten in wat voor situaties dit wel lukt of juist niet lukt? Wat zou volgens u moeten/kunnen veranderen zodat dit wel lukt?*
 - d. *Na de interventie is het natuurlijk van belang dat interventie succesvol is geweest in het oplossen van de drugsoverlast in uw gebied. Wordt dit de interventie gezamenlijk geëvalueerd na de implementatie? Waarom wel/niet? Wat moet/kan er veranderen zodat het lukt om gezamenlijk te evalueren?*
4. *Komt u tijdens de samenwerkingen wel eens in een situatie dat de aanpak niet voldoende succesvol is geweest om de lokale softdrugs overlast op te lossen? Heeft u dan de mogelijkheden om dit te evalueren en een paar stappen terug te doen in het proces opnieuw onderzoek te doen en tot een nieuwe/aangepaste aanpak te komen?*
 - a. *Zo nee, kunt u toelichten waarom dit niet mogelijk is?*
 - b. *Zo ja, kunt u toelichten welke factoren er dan voor zorgen dat dit wel mogelijk is?*
5. *Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat opgestelde regels (de afspraken tussen de netwerk deelnemers) in de samenwerkingen u belemmeren bij het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak bij de lokale softdrugs overlast? Kunt u dit toelichten in wat voor situaties dit voorkomt en waarom?*
 - a. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke fase van het probleemgericht werken dit vooral belemmerend is? Waarom in deze fase?*
 - b. *Zo ja, wordt u dan belemmert door geschreven en/of ongeschreven regels en waarom?*
 - c. *Zo ja, is de belemmerde factor omdat er te veel of juist te weinig regels zijn en waarom?*
 - d. *Zo nee, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de opgestelde regels u juist stimuleren om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?*
6. *Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat de relaties tussen de deelnemer van de samenwerkingen u belemmeren bij het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak bij de lokale softdrugs overlast? Kunt u dit toelichten in wat voor situaties dit voorkomt en waarom?*
 - a. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke fase van het probleemgericht werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?*
 - b. *Zo ja, speelt in die situaties de leeftijd van de relaties tussen de deelnemers dan een rol en waarom wel/niet?*
 - c. *Zo ja, denkt u dat factoren zoals bijvoorbeeld vertrouwen, persoonlijke onderlinge relaties en/of informele frequentie contacten in die situaties juist belemmerend of stimulerend kunnen zijn voor het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak en waarom wel/niet?*
 - d. *Zo nee, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de relaties in het netwerk u juist helpen bij het tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?*
7. *Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat uw rol vrijheid of gebrek hieraan in de samenwerkingen u belemmeren bij het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak bij de lokale softdrugs overlast? Kunt u toelichten in wat voor situaties dit voorkomt en waarom?*

- a. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke fase van het probleemgericht werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?*
 - b. *Zo ja, zou het in die situaties helpen of juist belemmeren als uw meer of minder specifieke informatie heeft over uw precieze rol en waarom?*
 - c. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven of u in die situaties het idee heeft dat u 'van boven af' gecontroleerd wordt en waarom?*
 - d. *Zo nee, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties u voldoende rolvrijheid ervaart om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waar komt dat dan door?*
8. *Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat [in te vullen type coördinatie] van de samenwerkingen u belemmeren bij het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak bij de lokale softdrugs overlast? Kunt u toelichten in wat voor situaties dit voorkomt en waarom?*
- a. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke fase van het probleemgericht werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?*
 - b. *Zo ja, kunt u aangeven wat er volgens u aan de coördinatie van het netwerk moet veranderen zodat u wel in die situaties tot een probleemgerichte aanpak kunt komen?*
 - c. *Zo nee, kunt u uitleggen waarom?*

LIST OF QUESTIONS INTERVIEWER

Heeft u de informatie over uw deelname aan het onderzoek in de email gelezen en bent u akkoord met deze voorwaarden?

1. Hoe ziet uw **dagelijks werk** als wijkagent in Enschede eruit?
 - a. Is dit erg veranderd sinds de **corona uitbraak**?

De volgende vragen gaan over de samenwerkingen waar u als wijkagent bij betrokken bent. Dit betreft samenwerkingen in de uitvoeringspraktijk tegen lokale softdrugs overlast.

2. Kunt u mij wat vertellen over **de samenwerkingen** op het gebied van softdrugs overlast waar u als wijkagent bij betrokken bent?
 - a. Leeftijd?
 - b. Hoelang betrokken?
 - c. Andere deelnemers?
 - d. Doel?
 - e. Ervaringen?

De volgende vragen gaan over het probleemgericht werken in de net besproken samenwerkingen.

Hoe onderscheidt een probleemgerichte werkwijze zich in uw werk tot een incident gerichte werkwijze? Wat is het verschil?

3. **In de samenwerkingen** met de andere partijen:
 - a. Lukt het u om **samen** met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **het probleem te definiëren** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - b. Lukt het u om **samen** met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **grondig onderzoek te doen naar de mogelijke oorzaken van het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - c. Lukt het u om **samen** met de andere netwerk deelnemers **een oplossing/interventie te bedenken voor het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de softdrugs overlast in uw buurt en om deze **gezamenlijk te implementeren**?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - d. Na de interventie is het natuurlijk van belang dat interventie succesvol is geweest in het oplossen van de softdrugs overlast in uw gebied. Wordt de interventie **gezamenlijk geëvalueerd** na de implementatie?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?

4. Komt u tijdens de samenwerkingen wel eens in een situatie dat **de aanpak niet voldoende succesvol** is geweest om de lokale softdrugs overlast op te lossen? Heeft u dan de **mogelijkheden om een paar stappen terug te doen** in het proces, opnieuw onderzoek te doen en tot een nieuwe/aangepaste aanpak te komen?
 - a. Zo nee, kunt u **toelichten** waarom dit niet mogelijk is?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u toelichten **welke factoren** er dan voor zorgen dat dit wel mogelijk is?

De volgende vragen gaan over factoren die het probleemgericht werken in deze netwerken kunnen belemmeren en/of stimuleren.

5. Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat **opgestelde regels** (de afspraken tussen de netwerk deelnemers) in de samenwerkingen u **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - a. Kunt u dit toelichten in wat voor **situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in **welke fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is? Waarom in deze fase?
 - c. Zo ja, wordt u dan belemmert **door geschreven en/of ongeschreven regels** en waarom?
 - d. Zo ja, is de belemmerde factor omdat er **te veel of juist te weinig regels** zijn en waarom?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de opgestelde regels u juist stimuleren om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?
6. Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat **de relaties tussen de deelnemers** van de samenwerkingen u **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - a. Kunt u dit toelichten in wat **voor situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke **fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?
 - c. Zo ja, speelt in die situaties **de leeftijd van de relaties** tussen de deelnemers dan een rol en waarom wel/niet?
 - d. Zo ja, denkt u dat **factoren zoals bijvoorbeeld vertrouwen, persoonlijke onderlinge relaties en/of informele frequentie contacten** in die situaties juist belemmerend of stimulerend kunnen zijn voor het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak en waarom wel/niet?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de relaties in het netwerk u juist helpen bij het tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?
7. Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat uw **rol vrijheid of gebrek hieraan** in de samenwerkingen u **belemmert** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - a. Kunt u toelichten in wat **voor situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke **fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?
 - c. Zo ja, zou het in die situaties helpen of juist belemmeren **als uw meer of minder specifieke informatie heeft over uw precieze rol** en waarom?
 - d. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven of u in die situaties het idee heeft **dat u ‘van boven af’ gecontroleerd wordt** en waarom?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties u voldoende rolvrijheid ervaart om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waar komt dat dan door?
8. Belandt u wel eens in een situatie dat de **coördinatie** van de samenwerkingen u **belemmert** bij het toepassen van een **probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast in uw gebied?
 - a. Kunt u toelichten in wat voor **situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in **welke fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?
 - c. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven wat er **volgens u aan de coördinatie van het netwerk moet veranderen zodat u** wel in die situaties tot een probleemgerichte aanpak kunt komen?
 - d. **Zo nee**, kunt u uitleggen waarom?
9. Heeft u een voorbeeld van een softdrugs casus waar u succesvol probleemgericht heeft kunnen werken? Waarom denk u dat het juist bij die casus goed lukte en welke factoren speelden daar een rol? Wat was hier verschillend dan bij casussen waar het niet lukt?

INTERVIEW VRAGEN

De volgende vragen gaan over de samenwerkingen waar wijkagenten in Enschede bij betrokken zijn. Dit betreft samenwerkingen in de uitvoeringspraktijk omtrent lokale softdrugs overlast.

1. Kunt u mij wat vertellen over **de samenwerkingen** op het gebied van softdrugs overlast waar de (wijk)agenten in Enschede bij betrokken zijn?
2. **In de samenwerkingen met de andere partijen:**
 - a. Lukt het u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede om **samen** met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **het probleem te definiëren** wat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - b. Lukt het u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede om **samen** met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **grondig onderzoek te doen naar de mogelijke oorzaken van het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - c. Lukt het u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede om **samen** met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **een oplossing/interventie te bedenken het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast en om deze **gezamenlijk te implementeren**?
 - d. Na de interventie is het natuurlijk van belang dat interventie succesvol is geweest in het oplossen van de lokale softdrugs overlast. Wordt de interventie **gezamenlijk geëvalueerd** na de implementatie?
3. Als u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede tijdens de samenwerkingen in een situatie belanden dat **de aanpak niet voldoende succesvol** is geweest om de lokale softdrugs overlast op te lossen, hebben zij dan de **mogelijkheden om een paar stappen terug te doen** in het proces, opnieuw onderzoek te doen en tot een nieuwe/aangepaste aanpak te komen?
4. Merkt u dat u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden waar **opgestelde regels** (de afspraken tussen de netwerk deelnemers) in de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
5. Merkt u dat u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden waar **de relaties tussen de deelnemers** van de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
6. Merkt u dat u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden dat hun **rol vrijheid of gebrek hieraan** in de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
7. Merkt u dat u en/of de (wijk)agenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden dat de **coördinatie** van de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?

LIST QUESTIONS INTERVIEWER

Heeft u de informatie over uw deelname aan het onderzoek in de email gelezen en bent u akkoord met deze voorwaarden voor uw deelname aan het onderzoek?

1. Hoe ziet uw dagelijkse werk eruit
 - a. Hoe veel tijd ben je ongeveer kwijt?
 - b. Raakvlak met soft-drugsoverlast? Voorbeeld?
 - i. Wordt u altijd ingeschakeld?
 - c. Wat voor rol speelt de wijkagent in uw dagelijkse werk?
 - i. Bij het opplussen?
 - ii. Loop je hier tegen obstakels aan?
 - d. En met de huidige online **corona-situatie**? Voorbeeld?
 - e. Hoeveel **contact** heeft u met ze?

De volgende vragen gaan over de samenwerkingen waar agenten in Enschede bij betrokken zijn. Dit betreft samenwerkingen in de uitvoeringspraktijk omtrent lokale softdrugsoverlast.

2. Kunt u mij wat vertellen over **de samenwerkingen** op het gebied van softdrugs overlast waar de wijkagenten in Enschede bij betrokken zijn? Bent u hier zelf ook bij betrokken? Bent u bij andere samenwerkingen betrokken (partners bij het afhandelen etc)? Zo ja, wat voor?
 - a. Leeftijd?
 - b. Hoelang betrokken?

- c. Andere deelnemers?
- d. Doel?
- e. Ervaringen?

De volgende vragen gaan over het probleemgericht werken in de net besproken samenwerkingen.

Hoe onderscheidt u een probleemgerichte werkwijze zich in uw werk zich tot een incident gerichte werkwijze? Voorbeeld? En bij wijkagenten?

Wat zijn de ervaringen tot op heden met het probleemgericht werken?

3. **In de samenwerkingen** met de andere partijen:
 - a. Lukt het u/de wijkagenten in Enschede om samen met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **het probleem te definiëren** wat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - b. Lukt het u/de wijkagenten in Enschede om samen met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **grondig onderzoek te doen naar de mogelijke oorzaken van het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - c. Lukt het u/de wijkagenten in Enschede om samen met de andere deelnemers van het netwerk **een oplossing/interventie te bedenken het probleem** dat ten grondslag ligt aan de lokale softdrugs overlast en om deze **gezamenlijk te implementeren**?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
 - d. Na de interventie is het natuurlijk van belang dat interventie succesvol is geweest in het oplossen van de lokale softdrugs overlast. Wordt de interventie **gezamenlijk geëvalueerd** na de implementatie?
 - i. **Waarom** wel/niet?
 - ii. Welke **situaties** wel/niet?
 - iii. Wat **veranderen** zodat het wel lukt?
4. Als u/de wijkagenten in Enschede tijdens de samenwerkingen in een situatie belanden dat **de aanpak niet voldoende succesvol** is geweest om de lokale softdrugs overlast op te lossen, hebben zij dan de **mogelijkheden om dit te evalueren en een paar stappen terug te doen** in het proces om opnieuw onderzoek te doen en tot een nieuwe/aangepaste aanpak te komen?
 - a. Zo nee, kunt u **toelichten** waarom dit niet mogelijk is?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u toelichten **welke factoren** er dan voor zorgen dat dit wel mogelijk is?

De volgende vragen gaan over factoren die het probleemgericht werken in deze netwerken kunnen belemmeren en/of stimuleren.

5. Merkt u dat u/de wijkagenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden waar **opgestelde regels** (de afspraken tussen de netwerk deelnemers) in de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - a. Kunt u dit toelichten in wat voor **situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in **welke fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is? Waarom in deze fase?
 - c. Zo ja, wordt u dan belemmert door **geschreven en/of ongeschreven regels** en waarom?
 - d. Zo ja, is de belemmerde factor omdat er **te veel of juist te weinig regels** zijn en waarom?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de opgestelde regels u juist stimuleren om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?
6. Merkt u dat u/de wijkagenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden waar **de relaties tussen de deelnemers** van de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
 - a. Kunt u dit toelichten in wat voor **situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in welke **fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?

- c. Zo ja, speelt in die situaties de **leeftijd van de relaties** tussen de deelnemers dan een rol en waarom wel/niet?
 - d. Zo ja, denkt u dat factoren zoals bijvoorbeeld **vertrouwen, persoonlijke onderlinge relaties en/of informele frequentie** contacten in die situaties juist **belemmerend of stimulerend** kunnen zijn voor het toepassen van een probleemgerichte aanpak en waarom wel/niet?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties de relaties in het netwerk u juist helpen bij het tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waarom?
7. Merkt u dat u/ de wijkagenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden dat hun **rol vrijheid of gebrek hieraan** in de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van **een probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
- a. Kunt u toelichten in wat voor **situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in **welke fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?
 - c. Zo ja, zou het in die situaties helpen of juist belemmeren als ze meer of minder **specifieke informatie heeft over hun precieze rol** en waarom?
 - d. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven of u in die situaties het idee heeft dat u **‘van boven af’ gecontroleerd wordt of juist te weinig monitoring** en waarom?
 - e. **Zo nee**, kunt u aangeven in welke situaties u voldoende rolvrijheid ervaart om tot een probleemgerichte aanpak te komen en waar komt dat dan door?
8. Merkt u dat u/de wijkagenten in Enschede wel eens in een situatie belanden dat de **coördinatie** van de samenwerkingen hen **belemmeren** bij het toepassen van een **probleemgerichte aanpak** bij de lokale softdrugs overlast?
- a. Kunt u toelichten in wat **voor situaties** dit voorkomt en waarom?
 - b. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven in **welke fase van het probleemgericht** werken dit vooral belemmerend is en waarom?
 - c. Zo ja, kunt u aangeven **wat er volgens u aan de coördinatie van de samenwerkingen** moet veranderen zodat u wel in die situaties tot een probleemgerichte aanpak kunt komen?
 - d. **Zo nee**, kunt u uitleggen waarom?
9. Heeft u een voorbeeld van een softdrugs casus waar een probleemgerichte aanpak succesvol is geweest? Waarom denk u dat het juist bij die casus goed lukte en welke factoren speelden daar een rol? Wat was hier verschillend dan bij casussen waar het niet lukt?

3. LIST RESPONDENTS

In this section a list will be provided of the individuals that participated in this study by means of interview participation. It should be noted that the sequence of respondents in the list is a product of randomisation.

Respondent A: CPO in Enschede

Respondent B: CPO in Enschede

Respondent C: OEW in Enschede

Respondent D: Task Holder within the policing organisation in Enschede

Respondent E: BT Management in Enschede

Respondent F: Task Holder within the policing organisation in Enschede

Respondent G: CPO in Enschede

Respondent H: CPO in Enschede

Respondent I: Former CPO in Enschede