Task Characteristics and HRM Activities on Online Labour Platforms

MSc Business Administration: Human Resource Management

27-08-2021

Student: Jaap Cortjens (s1675117)

Committee Chair: Jeroen Meijerink

Committee member UT: Maarten Renkema

Acknowledgements

Firstly I want to thank Jeroen Meijerink for supporting and understanding me throughout the process of writing this difficult thesis in Covid-19 times. Secondly I want to thank Maarten Renkema for providing a fresh set of eyes that helped find the flaws I skipped over after going over the thesis too many times. I would also like to note my appreciation for my girlfriend's ever positive attitude and unwavering support while writing this thesis. Lastly I want to thank my friends, flat mates, and family who have helped me in any way towards finishing this thesis.

Abstract

Online Labour Platforms (OLPs) where gig workers complete often short tasks for payment are becoming a more common and established form of business where supply and demand of short-term labour are matched by the platform. Even though OLPs do not employ people to complete tasks via their platform, they however do use HRM activities to steer the behaviour of the people using the platform. Different types of OLPs have been identified by scholars as well as different HRM activities commonly used by OLPs. However, there are differences in the used HRM activities among platforms. It is a reasonable assumption that when different tasks are offered via OLPs the HRM activities to best facilitate these tasks are also different. This study set out to study the relationship between the different job characteristics and the different corresponding HRM activities by interviewing the representatives of 10 diverse OLPs operating in the Netherlands and analysing their responses, as well as conducting a netnography by signing up to those OLPs as a gig worker and as a client. As a result the task characteristics did have an effect on the HRM activities through the dependence they created between clients, gig workers, and OLPs. However, other factors such as the industry and life cycle stage of the OLP were also impactful on the HRM activities implemented by the OLPs.

Contents

Work Characteristics and HRM Activities on Online Labour Platforms 1
Acknowledgements 1
Abstract 1
1. Introduction 4
2. Theory 6
2.1. Online Labour platform typologies 6
2.2. HRM Activities 11
2.3. Resource dependence theory 17
2.4. Propositions 20
3. Methodology 23
3.1. Data Collection 23
3.2. Operationalization 24
3.3. Data Analysis 24
4. Results 26
4.1. General data set information 26
4.2. HRM Content 27
4.3. Client and Gig Worker Matching 28
4.4. Recruitment Activities 31
4.5. Selection activities 34
4.6. Training and Development 35
4.7. Compensation activities 37
4.8. Job Appraisal 39
5. Discussion & conclusion 42
5.1. Discussion and Implications for theory 42
5.2. Implications for practice 44
5.3. Limitations 44
5.4. Recommendations for future research 45
5.5. Conclusion 47
6. Acknowledgements 47
7. References 48
8. Appendices 55
8.1. Appendix 1: Detailed OLP typology retrieved from Schmidt (2017) 55
8.2. Appendix 2: Interview protocol (Dutch) OLP representative. 56
8.3. Appendix 3: Detailed interview structure 61

8.4. Appendix 4: List of a priori codes 63
8.5. Appendix 5: Power relations between actors on the interviewed platforms 65
8.6. Appendix 6: Overview of practices per actor per HRM domain per platform..... 67
8.7. Appendix 7: Elaborate philosophy per platform 76

1. Introduction

Almost everywhere on the world you can nowadays summon a cab via a mobile app, while hiring a web-developer on the other side of the world to build a website for you. Online labour platforms make it available for anyone to buy all kinds of goods and services at any time. Taylor and colleagues (2017) simply described this development of the workforce as "people using apps to sell their labour" (p. 25). But the labour platforms themselves that enable people to sell their labour digitally, are only possible because of the technological developments of the last decades (Gandini, 2018). These platforms connect labourers and consumers instantaneously, as a service, but also as a digital marketplace (Veen, Barrat & Goods, 2019). These platforms have taken the world by storm, are everywhere, and upset the established workforce (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). Because of its huge impact, and its disruptive (De Stefano, 2016; Kost, Fieseler & Wong, 2019) but also enabling (Kost, Fieseler & wong, 2018) capabilities it is important to understand how these labour platforms work. The use of these platforms is expected to grow annually by 24% (Kässi & Lehdonvirta, 2016), which makes it even more relevant. Besides the platform usage growing, the uses for platforms are also growing. The range of tasks completed through platforms is just as well growing (Duggan, Sherman, Carbery & McDonnell, 2019), as well as that tasks are created that did not exist before (Wong, Fieseler & Kost, 2020).

The conditions under which platform workers have to work, what challenges they face, and what the gig-worker population looks like is one strand of research already explored (Tran & Sokas, 2017; Ashford et al., 2018; Kost, Fieseler & Wong, 2019b; Wood, Graham, Lehdonvirta & Hjorth, 2019; Maurer, Mair & Oberg, in press.). This strand of research helps to better understand the type of people working on these platforms and how this type of working affects them. As a result of the HRM used on these people, the platform workers doing gigs are aligned with the strategic goals of the platform, with no or little contribution to the formulation of these goals (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019; Gegenhuber, Ellmer & Schüßler, 2020). Platforms try to steer their workers into serving the clients or end-users of the platform as well as possible. To exemplify this, Veen, Barrat and Goods (2019) showed how UberEATS in Australia uses algorithmic HRM to monitor job progress through an app, constrain worker choices through obscuring information, and appraise performance for further work assignment or consequentially fire underperformers.

Studies have also been done more specifically on what online labour platforms do in terms of HRM, to grow and to have platform workers stay with them. This research strand highlights the effects of algorithmic HRM, exposing autonomy paradoxes, workers' perceptions of fairness, and much more (Lee, Kusbit, Metsky & Dabbish, 2015; Duward, Blohm, Leimeister, 2016; Kost, Fieseler & Wong, 2018; Wu, Zhang, Li, Liu, 2019). While this gives more insight in HRM practices, these studies are mostly focused on the consequences of these HRM practices, but not why they have been implemented in their given context.

Additionally there are studies that typologize all online labour platforms along dimensions that help make sense of the differences and describe this part of the employment economy (Schmidt, 2017). Characteristics such as platform worker control and wages (Kalleberg & Dunn, 2016), or task-structure, dependence on other people, and commitment (Nakatsu, Grossman & Iacovou, 2014) are used. These typologies show what the differences between the task characteristics on the platforms are, but these typologies or taxonomies are then used to describe the differences and not to explain or predicts selected outcomes. This is striking, since

differences in types of platform tasks may result in differences in HRM activities adopted by online labour platforms. Based on this previous research, it is thus reasonable to suspect that the characteristics of the tasks offered on online labour platforms such as standardizability of tasks leads to different HRM activities. Therefore this research proposes to look into the effect that the characteristics of the tasks done on an online labour platform have on the implemented HRM activities, asking the following question: *"In what way do task characteristics influence the HRM activities practiced on online labour platforms?"*

What this research contributes to the literature is firstly a review of the different characterizations of the tasks completed via online labour platforms, as well as new insights in the different HRM activities implemented on online labour platforms. Ultimately, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of how different HRM activities come to be amongst online labour platforms. To do so the research about HRM in online labour platforms, platform typologies, and platform worker characteristics need to be combined, and ideally result in insights in the effect of work characteristics on HRM application in the platform economy.

2. Theory

To properly answer the question how the type of work determines the HRM used on online labour platforms, the involved concepts need to be specified and clarified. Firstly the characteristics of the tasks offered via platform are explained to understand how they differentiate from one another. Secondly the way HRM can be studied on online labour platforms is theorized.

2.1. Online Labour platform typologies

As described in the introduction, online labour platforms are defined as being firms that use technology to fill short-term labour needs with independent contractors (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). Jobs on online labour platform are typically short tasks that firms or individuals do not want to do in-house/themselves (De Stefano, 2016). The online labour platforms do not execute the tasks. Those platforms are a digital market place were supply (independent contractors) and demand (people or companies in need of a good or service) can find each other (Minter 2017). Online labour platforms are often not a place where supply and demand randomly meet. Most of the time, a key function of successful online labour platforms is appropriately matching of independent workers and clients to one another, and managing that relationship (Gandini, 2018; Jarrahi & Sutherland, 2018; Lehdonvirta, 2018). This means that on these labour platforms there are at least three actors involved in the transactions conducted.

As stated before, the supply of labour on the online labour platforms consists typically of independent contractors. According to Spreitzer, Cameron and Garret (2017) the status of independent contractors comes from changes in the macro-economic landscape: "*Short-term financial results drive decision making, firms seek flexibility through employment at will to meet changing demand*" (p. 476). Kalleberg (2009) described this as precarious work, with little protection or security the platform workers are more at the mercy of their employers. Individual contractors need to arrange their own insurances or take the risk. Besides this change in the macro-economic landscape, technological development also enables this working arrangement, making it possible to work in the cloud, and split up work into individual tasks for anyone to do, reducing the need for fixed employees (Dunn, 2017; Spreitzer et al., 2017; Lepanjuuri, Wishart & Cornick, 2018).

These individual tasks are typical for online labour platforms. Meijerink and Keegan (2019) described it as *"…the sourcing of tasks by a requester (which can be either a firm or an individual consumer), which are relatively short-lived and performed by independent workers who move from one assignment (or 'gig') to another."* (p. 6). Not all platforms have short-lived gigs of riding people for 5 minutes like Uber. Upwork for example usually has gigs that last several days to complete, but are still relatively short compared to conventional employment settings (Schmidt, 2017).

Besides the client and the independent contractors, the platform takes an active role in facilitating transactions occurring over the platform. Next to matching supply and demand, platforms often also set the tariffs of, set the requirements for, and monitor performance of work that traffics the platform (Wood et al., 2018; Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). When the platform controls either or several of these elements it is mediating the transactions, but when it is only enabling on a technical level, it is an infrastructure provider (Schmidt, 2017). Usually however, the platform is the mediator (Bonet, Cappelli & Hamori, 2013). Schmidt (2017) also explains how this three-way relationship leads to a power asymmetry. While the platform has

access to all data and information related to the interactions, the supply and demand side only see a small window with limited information. Additionally, the platform can easily and cheaply up- or downscale, while the other actors face more risk in doing so (Frenken, Vaskelainen, Fünfschilling & Piscicelli, 2018).

In conventional employment settings the job characteristics are often studied using the Job Characteristics Model (JCM) by Hackman and Oldham (1976). This model states that work should be designed to satisfy the five core job characteristics of variety, autonomy, feedback, significance and identity in order to enhance the psychological state of employees and improve performance (Parker, Morgeson & Johns, 2017). Although this model is often elaborated on with additional characteristics, the core five characteristics are well established in the job design literature (Parker, 2014). The next section will first elaborate on how the online labour platform literature has differentiated between platform types, and then abstract the common characteristics of tasks. Then these characteristics will be further explained using the OLP literature and the job design literature.

Several characterizations of the platform types have so far been contributed to the online labour platform literature (Cappelli & Keller, 2013; Nakatsu et al., 2014; De Stefano, 2016; Schmidt, 2017; Duggan et al., 2019). These are summarized in Table 1:

Author(s):	Platform types:
Cappelli and Keller (2013): online labour platforms as a branch of "contract work"	1. Subcontracting vendors 2. Sourcing arrangement
Nakatsu et al. (2014): a taxonomy of crowdsourcing	- Contractual hiring (structured, independent task) a. Low commitment: i. Human Intelligence tasks ii. Crowd sharing marketplaces b. High Commitment: i. Online employment platforms - Distributed problem-solving (structured, interdependent task) a. Low commitment: i. Geo-located data collection ii. Distributed knowledge gathering iii. Crowdfunding - Solo New Idea generation (unstructured individual task) a. Low commitment: i. Consumer-driven innovation b. High Commitment: i. Online problem-solving platforms ii. contests - Collaboration (Unstructured, interdependent task) a. Low commitment: i. Real-time Idea jams b. High Commitment: i. Open source/content development, design and projects

Kalleberg & Dunn (2016): based on common work types	1. Transportation Platforms 2. Delivery/Home Task Platforms 3. Crowd work Platforms 4. Online Freelance Platforms
De Stefano (2016): just-in-time workforce	1. Crowd work: completing a series of tasks through online platforms 2. Work on-demand via apps: this is when traditional tasks are completed through apps managed by firms that connect supply and demand and intermediate quality standards and prices.
Schmidt (2017): Digital labour	1. Cloud work (web-based digital labour) a. freelance marketplaces b. micro-tasking crowd work c. contest-based creative crowd work 2. Gig work (location-based digital labour) a. Accommodation b. transportation and delivery services (gig work) c. household services and personal services (gig work) (for a full overview see Appendix 1)
Duggan et al. (2019): app-work (building on Cappelli & Keller (2013))	1. Capital Platform Work (sell goods or lease assets through platforms) 2. Crowd work (geographically dispersed split up digital labour) 3. App-work (service providing on demand on location)

Table 1: Platform typologies in literature

These typologies have different numbers of categories, and focus on varying elements. When studying these typologies several task characteristics are used across online labour platform literature to distinguish between platform types. Those are abstracted into table 2 as a list of proposed dichotomies of characteristics of task on online labour platforms:

Characteristic dichotomies:	
Standardised work	Unstandardised work
High skill level required	Low skill level required
Online	offline
On-demand/short task	Ongoing process/long task
Individually tasked	Crowd tasked
High personal investment	Low personal investment

Table 2 Proposed work characteristic scheme based on existent literature

The first task characteristic that can be bought and performed through online labour platforms is whether it is standardizable or not. Kalleberg and Dunn (2016) described this as autonomy in work. Can the worker determine how to perform a task, or is there a pre-set procedure on how to do this. To exemplify, micro taskers encounter an explanation of the task when accepting the task on how to do it, and another way is not allowed (Pichault & Mckeown, 2019). But when an online freelancer is asked to develop a piece of software, the end-goal or

result is predetermined, but the process is up to the online freelancer. Nakatsu and colleagues (2014) called this well-structured and unstructured, basing their argumentation on whether there is a predetermined solution. If there is not, inventiveness is required to come to a solution. The example they gave is the developing of innovative ideas, or create a computer algorithm. Schmidt (2017) also used the term creativity to define the unstandardised tasks, and spoke of pre-set procedures, and routes to follow in the case of ride-hailing platforms. Logically standardizable tasks result in a more replaceable workforce than ones where the process is less defined (Bonet et al., 2013) This dichotomy uses both the task variety and task autonomy as explained in the JCM, the degree to which a job is repetitive and does not require different skills as well as the gig worker's lack of discretion about decisions in the work process lead to less fulfilled and motivated gig workers than gigs with tasks with more skill variety and work process discretion for the gig worker (Hackman, 1980).

The second dichotomy is about education or skill level that is required to perform a task. Although this characteristic is somewhat related to standardizability, they are not the same. Where standardizability or structuredness relates to the variety or lack thereof in the work, skill level relates to the capacities needed to complete the given task. It is often the case however, that more standardised tasks require less education or skill development (Kost et al., 2018). Schmidt (2017) gave the example of freelancers being specialists, who because of their education can negotiate higher pay, but micro taskers are generally unskilled and are paid what the requestor determines for the task. Kalleberg & Dunn (2016) added to this that home chores and delivery/transport platforms also offer tasks that do not require any special skills to complete. Thus being more educated in the gig economy, performing tasks that require special skills grants a more powerful position to those gig workers (Kost et al., 2019). Whilst this also relates to the job variety as explained in the JCM, this also relates to the moderator of knowledge and competences that needs to be satisfied to be able to achieve the psychological states and increased performance described by the JCM (Ploher, Noe, Moeller & Fitzgerald, 1985). When a gig worker possesses the necessary skills and knowledge to complete tasks they are more likely to experience positive emotions in their work (Parker, 2014).

Another characteristic so far not mentioned specifically, but presented in almost all literature on the gig economy is whether the work is online or offline. This characteristic refers to whether the job needs to be performed digitally or on a specific geographical location, the point of production as Gandini (2018) puts it. Terminology may vary on this matter. Literature speaks of online – offline, digital – local, real-life – digital, and gig – cloud work (Cappelli & Keller, 2013; Nakatsu et al., 2014; Dunn, 2017; Schmidt, 2017; Duggan et al., 2019). The benefit for requestors of online gig work, is that the pool of potential gig workers is world-wide. For offline work the gig workers need to be geographically nearby the client to be able to perform the task (Rosenblat, 2018). Another element that is more important in offline gig work is that social appearance, or public image, is more important for the success of the platform (Schmidt, 2017). Rosenblat (2018) explains that this exposure is important for the growth of offline platforms, and that the gig workers directly impact the reputation of the platform. Therefore the gig workers' performance is monitored in more detail. For example, Uber driver's phone shakiness during gigs is measured to see how safe the driver drives (Rosenblat, 2018). The online or offline dichotomy has no importance for the JCM, except for a minor effect on the job significance characteristic, where the public exposure of the gig worker during offline tasks may provide a slight feeling of job significance and identification with the OLP.

The duration of tasks performed on online labour platforms is the fourth task characteristic investigated. *"Jobs on ride-share platforms (Uber and Lyft) are typically less than ten minutes (the average ride is three to four miles long). Jobs from Handy and TaskRabbit typically can be completed within the same day, while jobs on sites like Upwork and Freelancer are commonly project based and tend to have longer durations"* (Kalleberg & Dunn, 2016, p. 12). For the platform this means that their approach to monitor the jobs fulfilled, is dependent on whether the jobs are so short or whether they take longer to complete (Schmidt, 2017). Nakatsu and colleagues (2014) called this characteristic commitment of time by the gig workers, but also uses this term for the sixth of these work characterizations. The JCM in this context focusses on job identity, whether the gig worker completes a job or merely completes a task contributing to a job or project, where the latter is less motivating for a gig worker (Parker, 2014).

Then the one but last characteristic is about who get offered the gig. Is the gig offered to a selected individual, or is the job offered to a crowd of people. Duggan and colleagues (2019) who divided gig work in app-work, capital-platforms, and crowd work said the following: *"In app-work, an algorithm quickly identifies and offers labour to one person, whereas in capital-platform work and crowd work, it is the customer or requester who decides and selects whose services to pay for"* (p. 8). This signifies whether select individuals are offered the task, or if the task is out there for anyone to take it on (Schmidt, 2017). Besides whether individuals get an offer, or whether it is offered to a lot of workers is one thing, but then there is also the difference between having to complete a task, or if these tasks need to complete by several people, as a virtual team (Nakatsu et al., 2014). For this research however, the focus is on whether individuals are offered a task, or whether it is available for anyone to accept. Because in this case the difference in task assignment is the intended characteristic, and doing jobs alone instead of in teams is most often the case on online labour platforms (Taylor, 2017). Whether the gig worker is chosen for a task or is able to choose the gigs they prefer is also strongly tied to he autonomy characteristic of the JCM where choices such as when to do tasks provide more motivation and performance according to the JCM (Parker, 2014).

Lastly, the investment a gig worker needs to make to start working through a specific platform also impacts accessibility to a platform. for ride-hailing you need a car, while for micro-tasking or delivering by bike the capital needed to start is much lower (Schmidt 2017). Similarly, Duggan et al. (2019) say that for crowd sourcing, a platform worker only needs a stable internet connection, while a ride-hailer needs to have a car, and is exposed to more risk in traffic. This risk is especially influential given the freelance status that these platform workers have. Nakatsu and colleagues spoke in this case again about commitment, where high-commitment is the case when more resources need to be expended to perform, where low-commitment tasks *"require crowd response, but not intensity"* (Duggan et al., 2019, p.832). Doing training/courses or purchasing software can also be seen as resources needed to be expended before being able to perform (De Stefano, 2016). The JCM considers this to be job resources that help to deal with the job demands. Being able to better cope with job demands increases the long-term motivation (Kopelman, 2006).

These characteristics all have in common that they say something about the scarcity of workers available. For example it is easier to find uneducated people to fulfil tasks than to find a specialist. It is also easier to find people who do not need to highly invest personally before

starting to work. When there is less scarcity, that means that there is wider access to resources. The significance of this will later be explained in section 2.3.

2.2.HRM Activities

2.2.1. HRM relevance

HRM is of vital importance for the sustained success of a firm, when it comes to creating, improving and maintaining value (Sparrow, Hird, Hesketh & Cooper, 2009). What this value may comprise is widely discussed among HRM scholars (Lepak, Smith, and Taylor, 2017). But in essence, HRM is practiced to improve the performance of a business in its core functions (Alewell & Hansen, 2012). The business models of online labour platforms differ, so assumingly so do the HRM systems they employ. Johnson (2019) Found that indeed HRM activities differ between platforms. In a traditional sense HRM is conducted by the firm employing a workforce (Lepak & Snell, 1999). But in the platform economy where employment relationships are actively avoided, so is the formal existence of an HRM structure (McKeown, 2016). However, HRM still occurs as noted before, and is especially necessary to commit or control the gig workers. This is because control and commitment cannot be achieved through the employment agreement otherwise in place. Unsuccessful HRM activities can lead to losing clients and/or gig workers to other platforms, or going out of business altogether (Duggan et al., 2019).

The scope of HRM in the platform economy is not as much aimed at facilitating the workforce, but more at facilitating the connection between requestors and gig workers. As Meijerink and Keegan (2019) define this scope: *"the multilateral exchange relationships among intermediary platform firms, gig workers, and requesters"* (p. 4). Besides the fact that HRM is not focused on the workforce in the gig economy, more dubious differences arise in HRM planning and implementation in the gig economy. the traditional structures do not apply in the gig-economy, creating paradoxical and exiting circumstances. Explaining how this paradoxical HRM circumstance occurs may be best explained using Ostroff and Bowen's (2000) division between HRM content and HRM process, to cover all bases where HRM differs so tremendously from the traditional setting.

2.2.2. HRM content

The content of HRM activities is what is intentionally employed by the firm to reach its organisational goals and values (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). Employing isolated HRM activities to direct and facilitate the work force on online platforms (or in any context for that matter) often lead to no, little, or negative results (Jiang et al., 2012). Therefore a consistent bundle, or system usually result in more fruitful performance (Zhou, Hong & Liu, 2013). Employing such a system is based on the HRM philosophy. A firms HR philosophy entails the guiding principles that characterize a firm's attitude towards employees (Kepes & Delery, 2007). Moreover Schuler (1992) described HR philosophy as a firm's statement on how human resources attribute to success. So philosophies are what guide a firm into employing a specific HRM system (Monks, Kelly, Conway, Flood, Truss & Hannon, 2013). In OLPs the human capital is not internal to the organisation, so the attitude towards it is different from that in conventional organisations to start off with. Gig workers, the human capital, are a much more uncertain entity than a workforce, and are approached with a different attitude.

With the notion of philosophies in mind, Lepak, Liao, Chung and Harden (2006) set out and defined different conceptual HR systems that are to be found in the literature, distinguished by the different philosophies they fundamentally serve. Even though execution of a system might not be the same in different contexts, the conceptual difference is what matters at this strategic level.

HR system for control is about setting clear goals, boundaries, and control in general. In this system, the philosophy values workers as replaceable cogs in the machine, and the impact on the labour process by workers should be minimized (Arthur, 1994). To do so tasks are made as standardised and procedural as possible, and the doing of tasks is separated from the thinking part of the work (Guthrie, 2001). Close performance monitoring is also a part of using a control HR system, in the context of platforms this is highly enabled by the use of technology (e.g. Uber driver rating system directly influencing how often a job is offered) (Good et al., 2019).

HR system for commitment was at first posed as the only alternative to control systems. The philosophy served by this system is that the workers are valued individuals who should identify and align with the organisational goals by their own choice. The firm attempts to have the employees identify with the organisational goals, so that they work hard to accomplish those goals (Arthur, 1994). To have them commit their effort towards the organisational goals, practices such as intensive training and development, but also high wages and promotion from within are practices seen in such a system (Whitener, 2001). In the platform context internal promotion is not viable since gig workers are not employed, but there are for example on Upwork possibilities to earn rising talent status, top rated status, and access to premium service when freelancers commit more of their effort towards improving their profile and performance (Upwork, 2020).

HR system for employee involvement is somewhat related to commitment systems, but in this system the firm attempts to empower employees through information flows, influence on decision-making, rather than having them commit to the pre-set goals by the firm (Zacharatos, Barling & Iverson, 2005). In this system the philosophy on the workforce is thus one where the human capital also fulfils strategic functions besides the core production functions towards success, human capital is the business. Practices like job rotation, employee problem-solving groups and product innovations thought of and implemented by employees are considered to fit with this system (Osterman, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995). In the platform context such decision-making power with the gig-workers is not common (Schmidt, 2017). Unless the platform is managed by the gig workers, but this tends to be less successful (Sriraman, Bragg & Kulkarni, 2017).

High performance work system (HPWS) is then again built up on commitment and involvement, focusing on the potential competitive advantage that a firms employees can bring to the table. This system uses a philosophy of human capital as the most valuable resource of the company, and a source for potential new competitive advantage. To make use of that potential workers are treated with respect, and trust between management and workers is essential (Huselid, 1995). Practices include wide varieties of benefits, individual and group incentives, work-life balance programs, and intensive training. According to Huselid (1995) this system attempts to combine a wide range of best practices to retain talent and weed out under-performers.

There were two more systems presented in Lepak and colleagues' (2006) work on HRM systems. HR system for Occupational Safety and HR system for Customer services are left out of this research, since they are more case specific adaptations of HPWS, but are not philosophically distinct from HPWS. Lepak and colleagues (2006) stress that there is no one best system that fits all organisations. Besides that, only the philosophy of a system stays the same when implemented. Focusing on economic or innovative factors may lead to the same HRM systems, but with entirely different policies and practices comprised within them (Alewell & Hansen, 2012). Looking at the OLPs, none of these systems are a perfect match, since the workforce is not internal, as said before.

To effectuate their HR Philosophy, organisations have HR policies in place (Schuler, 1992). "They are employee-focused programs that impact choices regarding HR practices" (Jiang et al., p. 75, 2012). According to Wright and Boswell (2002) firms communicate their intentions about HR processes that ought to be exercised in the firm through policies. Policies in turn can lead to practices guided by the policy chosen by the firm. Jiang and colleagues provided an overview of the policy domains existent in literature, which are supplemented with practices observed on OLPs described in table 3 below:

Policy domain	**Description**	**Example HRM practices**
Recruitment	Intentions regarding the hiring of employees. Employee characteristics, and employment strategies are included.	Referral schemes, internet advertisement
Selection	Intentions regarding appointing work to the members the workforce.	Algorithmic matching, Featured gigs and/or gig-workers
Training and development	Intentions towards developing the skills of the workforce further (or not)	Fourth party courses, suggest tips and tricks for gig-workers
Performance management	Intentions regarding the appraisal of work, and what is to be done with that judgement	Gig-worker performance rating, Client reputation rating, Job duration monitoring
Compensation	Intentions related to the payment for work done by the workforce	Payment algorithms, price setting
Incentive	Intentions towards ways of motivating the workforce	Surge pricing, Referral bonus
Involvement	Intentions towards involving the workforce in decision-making	Requesting gig-worker feedback
Job Design	Intentions towards what elements (and to what extend) to include in a job/function of the members of the (potential) workforce	Demarcate job boundaries, Gig-worker planning, Communicate task requirements

Table 3: Policy domains retrieved from Jiang et al. (2012) complimented with example practices seen on OLPs

To execute the policies as described before, the OLPs instigate HRM practices to fulfil them. Practices are the activities to achieve specific outcomes (Becker & Gerhart, 1996). The practices can be grouped by the policies that they are instigated for, but that does not mean they cannot also contribute to the other policies and OLP values. As the philosophy, system, and policy are communicated concepts of content, HRM practices are the most observable element. Even though all these policy domains are necessary according to Boxall & Purcell (2008), Platforms seem to focus more on several of these while neglecting others.

Since there is a high through-put rate of gig workers in a platform, finding new gig-workers is essential to match the demand (De Stefano, 2016; Kuhn, 2016). However, most of the time gig workers join platforms by themselves due to a lack of other options (Bellace, 2018; Veen et al., 2019). The recruitment policy of platforms is thus not strongly defined, and rather neglected most of the time. Most recruitment happens through informal networks of gig workers (Wood et al., 2019b). Platforms do have referral schemes in place to further draw in gig workers (Goods et al., 2019), as well as hold digital marketing campaigns (Ashford et al., 2018). On platforms where gig workers approach clients or clients approach gig workers Algorithms are still helpful in bringing gig workers or clients with a good reputation or set of skills to the foreground (Ettlinger, 2017; Schmidt, 2017).

Making sure that clients are adequately served is an OLPs core task (Schmidt, 2017). The platforms' selection policy is thus one of the more focused policies. Most platforms use the reputation scores comprised to accomplish the performance management policy to match higher reputation gig workers with clients (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Jarrahi & Sutherland, 2018). Gegenhuber and colleagues (2020) add to this that platforms usually have a core of gig workers that have the higher reputations and are available most often that are matched to most of the tasks, and the periphery is offered tasks when the core is unavailable. Platforms practice this with algorithms to match clients and gig workers as fast as possible (Lee et al., 2015; Lee, 2018).

From a study by Möhlmann & Zalmanson (2017) about algorithmic management in Uber, it seems that the platform opts to attempt to control gig workers through strict performance management policies, whilst also attempting to have them commit through compensation and incentive policies. Wu and colleagues (2019) showed the same happening in China, but added that incentivization is the most important policy for Uber, using practices such as surge pricing in busy areas, daily bonusses, and peak-earning guarantees. Wood and colleagues (2018) contributed that for online work the performance management is as strict, if not stricter, as Uber, employing practices such as screenshotting and registering average keystrokes while working on a gig, as well as the rating and reputation systems in place. Compensation is again more commitment based, which showed through payment-guarantee if all monitoring practices were enabled, and higher payment for more complex tasks. This paradox in their HR philosophy is hard to get around. On the one hand the platforms view the gig workers as entities that need to be controlled for firm performance, while on the other hand they need to be committed to achieve firm performance.

Training and development is a more neglected policy (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). This is because training would imply employment relationships. To ensure quality, OLPs advise gig workers to use the fora for gig workers to learn from one another, and/or follow fourth party courses (de Stefano, 2016; Kost et al., 2018; Goods et al., 2019).

Gegenhuber and colleagues (2020) studied the involvement policy in medium sized platforms in Germany. They show that while gig-workers are granted a 'microphone' (a way of expressing their attitude towards the platform), they are not granted a 'megaphone' (opportunity to broadcast their attitude to everyone). Gig-workers are compelled to stay when they can express their attitude, but platforms make sure they are not involved with the decision-making to still control them (Gandini, 2018; Kost et al., 2018; Gegenhuber et al., 2020).

The gig economy historically came about as a resurgence of early capitalistic precarious work: on-call, piece-work compensation, home work, and triangular contracting arrangement (Stanford, 2017). This means that job design is an important policy for the platforms. Attempting to define the boundaries of tasks performed through platforms is one of the core HRM activities. Rosenblat and Stark (2016) add to this that gig work is often characterized as offering freedom, flexibility and entrepreneurship, while actually crafting and limiting the tasks of gig workers in a shroud of information asymmetry. Kuhn (2016) adds to this that although this means that freelancers working in platforms are limited in their freedom, they are protected from debtors or client bullying through the designed working environment.

As mentioned before, practices are the most visible element of HRM activities, and are observable in the HRM process. The next section clarifies that part of HRM activities.

2.2.3. HRM process

Under HRM process the actually implemented HRM activities, how they are perceived, and who conducts them are intended (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). The most important objective for platform HRM activities is to align the strategic focus of the firm with the context and the workers (Ostroff & Bowen, 2000). Although platforms do not actually employ the workers, they practice HRM on and with the gig workers in the shape of -mainly- recruitment, training, remuneration, appraisal, and firing, among other activities (Lee, et al., 2015; Jarrahl & Sutherland, 2018; Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). However, how these activities come about are different in online labour platforms as opposed to more traditional work settings.

To understand this, academics often draw on the intended-implemented-perceived HRM concept (van Mierlo, Bondarouk & Sanders, 2018). Khilji and Wang (2006) showed that there is often a difference between the HRM as planned by top management, the implementation by line management, and the perception (in their research called satisfaction) by the workforce. They also showed that this difference results in reduced organisational performance. This model highlights why it is so different to study HRM in the gig economy, further explained hereafter.

2.2.3.1.Intended HRM processes

First off, the intentions of higher management is complicated because online labour platforms have no formalized HRM department/manager or strategy, because that would imply an employment relationship (Schmidt, 2017; Meijerink & Keegan 2019). Furthermore, the most important difference is that there is no head of a HR department setting a strategy for the platform, but marketeers and programmers are in charge of developing the intended HRM activities (Lee, 2018). This means that the intended HRM activities are set by financially focused professionals, that may hold different ideals than HR professionals.

2.2.3.2.Actual HRM processes

Furthermore, there are no middle and line managers to implement the HR practices, but all actors in the gig economy are responsible for conducting 'actual' HRM activities. Normally the employees perceive HR and react accordingly, but now they are executives as well as receivers of HRM. This is not necessarily a complication, because Trullen, Bos-Nehles and Valverde (2020) show that implementing HRM is a dynamic process that requires several actors to work on an implementation for it to be successful. But what does complicate matters

is that the classical line manager – employee relationship does not exist in the gig economy. As said before, in the gig economy the HRM activities are executed by all involved actors. Below an overview per main actor, what HRM activities they typically implement:

Platforms are besides connecting gig workers with clients also providing them with a way of communicating problems, or on the contrary praise about that connection through rating systems for the gig workers. This either leads to more gigs or to disconnection from the platform for the gig worker. Platforms can also offer incentives both to the clients and gig workers. Clients are given the option to tip the gig worker for his/her performance through the platform (Fiverr, 2020). While the platform can incentivize gig workers to work on certain times or in certain areas to fulfil the higher demands on those times and/or in those areas (Wood et al., 2018). Lastly the platform is also responsible for offering the gig workers a way of communicating with one another and the platform for feedback, learning, and communication of concerns. Learning is sometimes also offered through 4th parties, to not insinuate training and development that an employer would offer (Ettlinger, 2017). In short the platforms thus participate in training, and remuneration, while facilitating appraisal, recruitment, and firing activities. But most of these activities are executed by an algorithm, that makes real-time decisions based on the data it is fed, and the rules it receives from the marketing officers and programmers (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). The algorithmic management implemented by platforms often leads to negative perceptions among gig workers, given the impersonal nature (Shin & Park, 2019)

Gig workers as the human capital of the platforms are active participants platforming HRM processes too. They primarily work to the best of their abilities through platforms, but by doings so they interact with the algorithms that match them to clients, so that clients keep coming back the platform. If or when they come across clients who are not requesting or behaving by the rules of the platform, the workers can negatively appraise clients to make sure they are banned from the platform (D'Cruz & Noronha, 2018). Besides that many platforms work with referral schemes to attract more gig workers (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019), but without the participation of gig workers using those schemes no extra gig workers will come through that channel. Aside from bringing in new gig workers, the more experienced gig workers can also help and socialize with their colleagues over the online forum belonging to the platform. This way newer gig workers bring better quality work to the table sooner than when they would have to figure things out for themselves. So from the base practices, mentioned before, the gig workers actively participate in recruitment, training, and appraisal.

Clients are also active contributors to the HRM structure of platforms. Gegenhuber, Ellmer and Schüßler (2020) described in detail how clients review gig workers' performance through the rating systems in place. This helps expel ill-performing gig workers from the platform, but also opens the gig workers up to liability outside of their control (e.g. on Uber a client wanted to get to the airport before a certain time, but that is not possible given the time it takes to drive there, but yet the client reviews the gig worker for not performing well (Wu et al., 2019)). Besides appraisal the client also pays for the work delivered to them. This can go through the platform, where the platform takes its cut in some way. Lastly, by requesting a task the client brings demand onto the platform, helping in continuity and planning activities of the platform (e.g. on the meal delivery platforms, gig workers need to be available around the local meal times, because then many requests will logically flow in). Clients thus participate in remuneration, appraisal, workforce planning, and firing activities.

Fourth parties, lastly, are connected to platforms to provide training to the gig workers, to heighten the work performance (Ettlinger, 2017). To avoid the employment relationship this goes via fourth parties, and is often not called training, but 'tips and tricks' (Uber, 2020), or 'additional learning' (Upwork, 2020).

2.2.3.3.Perceived HRM processes

When platform workers receive HRM it is often through an app, usually by an algorithm, which is received varyingly by the platform workers (Lee, Kusbit, Metsky & Dabbish, 2015). This means that the perceived HRM may also be more distant from the intended HRM activities because it is often delivered impersonal. The bigger the gap between intended and perceived HRM, the more HRM performance may be impacted (Piening, Baluch & Ridder, 2014).

All-in-all, there are enough factors that make the HRM seen on OLPs so complex. On some platforms the algorithm matches supply and demand, on others the clients approach the gig workers, or the other way around. Besides that, on some platforms the gig workers can set their own prices, but on others gig workers have to accept the prices set by the platform or the clients. OLPs thus differ in content and process of HRM. This paper suggests that this can be traced back to the task characteristics, and proposes that platforms offering jobs with task-characteristics that are harder to come by, have to focus their HRM more on keeping the workers with those characteristics. On the other hand clients that request work from workers with more rare characteristics have to reward better too in order to obtain their service/product. The next section explains that in more detail.

2.3. Resource dependence theory

Organisations make decisions to adapt to their changing environments all the time, in order to grow and ultimately survive (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). OLPs are based on cutting edge technologies and are in a turbulently changing environment. HRM decision-making just as well as other strategic decision-making occurs to respond to the environment (Tyskbo, 2019). This is what this research is mostly interested in. The Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) takes decision making based on the environment as the starting point for explaining the behaviour that firms display. Therefore the resource dependence theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) can be used to explain why OLPs make different HRM decisions.

Perhaps the clearest description of the RDT is the book review by Reitz (1979). Reitz reviewed Pfeffer & Salancik's work, and first introduced the theory, and summarized the process predicted by the theory as a cycle of three steps:

1. All organisations in the environment need resources to survive, and this leads to interdependence between organisations and actors in their environment;

The first thing to note is that this theory places the organisation in an open-system environment. This means that an organisation is not a closed entity closed off from the outside world, but as an interacting part of the environment, influencing and being influenced by its surroundings (Nienhüser, 2008). An organisation rarely has all the resources it needs to perform all its business functions already present internally. Therefore, organisations turn to other, external actors (e.g. suppliers, potential workers) in their environment that can provide them with resources they need, but do not possess themselves. Resources are not per se raw materials and other assets. People, intellectual property and even affiliations can be seen as resources (Boyd, 1990). Because organisations trade resources to access them, dependencies amongst one

another occur. As such, to operate effectively, organisations are dependent on external parties that possess necessary resources. For this study dependency is referred to as the influence of external factors on organisational behaviour (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009).

2. This interdependence lead to uncertainty, because of this organisations start to look for ways to reduce these uncertainties;

Then the first thing that happens after establishing the interdependency is assessing the risks (and opportunities) to the business that this presents. Here, it is important to note that an organisation's level of dependence on a resource (and thus the risk to losing access to that resource) is dependent on the resource's importance, abundance, and ownership.

The importance, or criticality, of a resource (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Nienhüser, 2008; Drees & Heugens, 2013) is determined by how valuable the resource is to the performance of the organisation. As an example, the website of a platform that all clients and gig workers see and use is important for the success of a platform, but the quality of the jobs posted and the work delivered matter more. The availability of labour is thus a more important resource than the infrastructure of the website, even though that is valuable too. As such the dependence of an organisation on a resource is greater when it is more valuable/important to an organisation .The abundance refers to the availability of the resource (Stern, 1979). For example Uber allows anyone with a car to be an Uber driver, whereas professional freelance-platforms such as GigNow can only make use of consulting professionals, of which the availability is lower. As such the dependence of an organisation on a resource increases when the resource is more scarcely available. Lastly, the ownership is about who controls the access to the resource. The owner of the resource has power over the organisation in need of it, equal to that organisation's dependence on the resource. Power is defined as "*the capacity to influence other people, that it is conferred by the control of resources (positive and negative outcomes, rewards and costs, information, etc.) that are desired, valued or needed by others and which make them dependent upon the influencing agent for the satisfaction of their needs or reaching their goals*" (Turner, pp. 2, 2005). Given that dependence on a resource increases the level of power by the owner of the resource, RDT places a strong emphasis on the study of power dynamics (Hillman, Withers & Colins, (2009).

Namely if a firm comes to the conclusion that the critical resource is not widely available, and owned by another organisations, that means there is an extremely uncertain position, where another organisation has power over the firm. Therefore the firm will start to look for ways to reduce this uncertainty and limit the power that external actors have over the firm's activities.

3. To reduce uncertainty the organisations engage in activities such as forming coalitions, pooling resources, and/or other survival strategies.

Natural responses of firms are to attempt to resolve their dependence or power deficit, and increase their power over others. Activities to do so are to merge, acquire, form alliances with, and interlock with other firms that have some form of power over them (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Although strategies such as interlocking might reduce autonomy, they increase validity towards their environment (Hillman et al., 2009; Drees et al., 2013).

In the context of online labour platforms, a complicated power struggle can be seen between the platforms, the gig workers, and the clients. This occurs since these three platform actors are interdependent (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019).

Platforms exist because they can connect supply and demand of gig work better, faster, or cheaper than the actors in the environment could on their own (Schmidt, 2017). Losing access to either the gig workers or the clients will result in the demise of an OLP. Most often platforms do not lack gig workers, but they still need to treat them in a way that they will not join a competing platform. The access to timely and qualitative gig workers determines the attractiveness to clients, who will only use the platform if it fulfils their needs (Ettlinger, 2017). As such, OLPs are dependent on gig workers and requestors that supply the platform with a key resource: labour.

Gig workers are dependent on the infrastructure a platform provides. Because of this the resource dependence theory advices gig workers to diversify into other fields to increase their power (Dill, 1981), but gig workers are often active in the gig economy because traditional labour markets have no place for them (Goods et al., 2019), sealing their dependence. As such, for generating an income, gig workers are dependent on OLPs that provide them with a key resource: access to work.

Clients can usually fulfil their needs outside the gig economy, by internalizing the resources they need (e.g. recruit creative talents or programmers), but this is more time and cost-intensive than acquiring goods/services through platforms. Platforms are convenient because they can deliver the short-term needs of clients timely (de Stefano, 2016). Here clients are however dependent on both platforms and workers. That is, without them, clients are not able to outsource work and therefore, are dependent on OLPs and their freelance workers to access a key resource: labour.

However, some of the traditional responses to dependence do not pan out in the platform economy. Because of this, platforms engage in HRM activities to deal with the power balance. Through HRM activities platforms attempt to manage the supply of human resources and the demand for human resources. This is a different approach than the RDT prescribes in the following ways.

Firstly, gig workers are not organisations that can be merged or acquired by the platforms, and the platforms also do not want to, as they would lose the freelancer-structure they need to keep costs low. Secondly, gig workers may be searching for ways to (re)gain power, but as they are individual contractors -and not a united workforce- they do not own the collective bargaining capacity to change the status quo, even though unions and worker organisations have arisen over the years (Johnston & Land-Kazlauskas, 2019). Platforms on the other hand can tweak their algorithms and acquire other platforms to change the circumstances to their favour, and increase their power (Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2020). Bowman (1979) adds to this that determining how to use resources is also part of the power over resources. In the case of gig workers they can decide to work via one platform, the other, or both, but that is the extent to which they control the usage of their resource. Platforms have the power to deny gig workers the access to their network, and depending on the offer of suitable gig workers, can do so as they desire. Clients in that equation can visit several competing platforms to fulfil their need, making them relatively powerful, unless they require a product/service that is not abundantly available, but merely on a single platform.



Figure 1: Interdependencies visualized

2.4.Propositions

This research paper attempts to find out whether task characteristics determine who has the power and what that means for the HRM activities. This will be done by posing two propositions, as the OLP context is highly complex and exploring whether they hold any sway is on a conceptual level.

The power interrelationship thus depends on the criticality, abundance, and the ownership of a resource. This paper argues that the combination of task characteristics impacts the criticality, abundance, and ownership of gig work, and therefore which actor is most powerful. To illustrate, a platform offers tasks that are standardised, require a low skill level, is performed online, is short of duration, crowd tasked, and requires a low personal investment. This means that any gig worker with an internet connection could perform the task, so gig workers are in abundance, the platform controls access to the resource, and the criticality is assumed low, since it does not seem like a specialized task. Based on this reasoning, (granted it includes some assumptions) the Platform would look like the most powerful actor based on the task characteristics. Now if a platform would intermediate tasks that are unstandardised, requires a high skill level, is performed offline, is of a longer duration, is individually tasked, and requires a high personal investment. The abundance of gig workers capable of performing the task is drastically lower, and is also the owner of the resource. The criticality to the platform is assumed to be higher to the platform, so in this situation the gig worker is assumed to be the most powerful actor. This reasoning leads to the following proposition:

P1. *The power relations between the platforms, the clients, and the platform workers depend on the different task characteristics performed by platform workers.*

This paper argues that the HRM activities observed on the OLP reflect this power distribution. When reviewing criticality, abundance and ownership of the labour resource, and the resulting power distribution, it is expected that the HR philosophy of OLPs reflects this.

As an example, when the skills of gig workers are critical to the business operations, the HR philosophy is expected to be more preservative of those gig workers, and less controlling (Ashford et al., 2018). This is because finding other skilled gig workers can be a challenging process, so they do not want to lose their current workers. It is expected that appraisal, payment and incentive policies are implemented to motivate gig workers to remain with the platform, with practices such as loyalty bonusses, and reputation building through reviews and endorsements.

Whereas an abundance of labour is expected to result in a more controlling philosophy in which human resources are considered less precious and more as replaceable parts, so they do not mind a high turnover rate (Wood et al. 2018). This means that it is expected that strict performance management and job design policies are implemented, with strict rating/evaluation practices to root out under-performers, and clear communication of task requirements to ensure standard quality results.

In a third example, where the client is the most powerful actor it is expected that the philosophy of platforms is to use the gig workers as best as possible to suit the clients' wishes, through job design and performance management practices, using practices such as job duration monitoring, client protection, gig-worker planning, client price-setting (Kuhn, & Maleki, 2017).

Because of the different task characteristics offered on platforms it is expected that the power balance is different, and therefore also the HRM. This leads to proposition 2a:

P2a. *The HRM content on online labour platforms depends on the power relationships between the platforms, gig workers, and clients.*

When the power relationship and the resulting HR philosophy are established, the consequential HRM processes would then also be clarified. Based on the power relationship that occurs the OLPs may choose to make other parties responsible for certain HRM activities.

As an example, when the client is the most powerful actor, it is to be assumed that the client sets the prices for the gigs, the clients gets to select who get the gig they are offering, and the clients get to determine the quality of the delivered work.

On the contrary, when the gig worker is the most powerful actor on the platform, it is expected that the gig worker can set their own price, determine which gig to take on, and are offered opportunities to develop their qualifications with 4th parties.

Lastly, when the platform is the most powerful actor, it is expected that the platform regulates, the matching of gig worker and client, determines the payment that stands for the tasks, determine what requirements the task comprises, and who has to review who after the gig is completed.

So the HRM process and who performs what HRM activities leads to proposition 2b:

P2b. *The HRM process on online labour platforms depends on the power relationships between the platforms, gig workers, and clients..*

Below figure 2displays the conceptual model of the propositions:



Figure 2 Conceptual model for the propositions

3. Methodology

3.1. Data Collection

Since this research is exploring whether and in what way task characteristics influence the HRM activities seen on online labour platforms, the task characteristics and HRM activities on online labour platforms need to be investigated. In order to retrieve this data in a reliable fashion, a qualitative investigation is held among OLPs through several methods. Interviews asking questions about the core concepts: criticality, abundance, ownership and the resulting power, followed by questions about the content and process of the HRM activities should provide insight into that relationship.

Primarily interviews with ten individuals representing ten OLPs operating in the Netherlands contribute to that goal. The OLP representatives are interviewed with regard to the power relationships they perceive, and the HRM activities they exercise as well as perceive. The OLPs have access to all the data crossing the platform, therefore they are expected to know the answers to most questions. The OLP representatives are approached through an invitation sent to their platform's contact address or existing contacts between the University of Twente and the platforms. Initially it was planned to sample OLPs based on expected work characteristics, to provide diversity. But most OLPs were unwilling to cooperate or respond. Initially it was also planned to interview gig workers and clients using the OLPs too, but these were not findable or willing to participate during the research. However, in order to triangulate findings, and provide validity, these perspectives need to be represented. Therefore a netnography was also conducted. A netnographic analysis is an ethnography of the internet (Kozinets, 2015). The auto-netnography approach is used, where the focus lies on personal perceptions of a process or digital environment, and the researcher collects data through their own identity. This type is used when a researcher is the subject of perceptions. This is done to gain extra insight especially in the power relationship in place, as well as the recruitment and selection processes in place. Additionally, platform representatives may find certain elements self-explanatory. Therefore the netnography can register those aspects that are assumed obvious by the representatives.

Only on the platforms where it is possible to join freely the researchers of this study participated in the OLP environment. This is only done for the platforms where it does not pose risks for the researchers whilst participating. danger regarding participation in traffic, the Covid-19 pandemic, or otherwise are intended with risks. Registering the results of the netnography will be done through making field notes and taking screen captures of the steps in the process, to allow for a rich record of the auto-netnography.

The interviews are conducted online via skype, google meets, and Microsoft teams depending on the interviewee preference due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. These interviews are semi-structured, and conducted in Dutch to allow participants to express themselves as well as possible. Participants are firstly informed about the research goal, and secondly about what the interview will be used for. The studied concepts will be explained, and then asked questions about. The interviews are recorded and transcribed verbatim. The participants are then asked to verify the transcripts. They are also informed that they are anonymized in the results.

Initially OLPs were sampled purposefully to reflect a diversity of expected task characteristic compositions, in order to explore the research question and propositions. But after contacting the sampled 20 OLPs, with only four participating, 91 OLPs operating in the Netherlands were

contacted. This ultimately resulted in a less diverse sample of 10 OLPs. The studied OLPs, and individuals interviewed are anonymized to protect their privacy as well as improve the honesty of participants. Below in table X is an overview of the interviewees in the order that they were interviewed in:

Platform and their name hereafter:	**Interviewee:**
Pl-1: Consultancy platform	Talent acquisition manager of the mother company
Pl-2: Service trading platform	Co-founder, currently the Chief Operations Officer
Pl-3: Design platform	Co-founder, currently does development and marketing
Pl-4: Local guide platform	Co-founder, currently the Chief Operations Officer
Pl-5: Catering platform	Co-founder, currently the Chief Operations Officer
Pl-6: Repair and building platform	Co-founder, currently the managing partner
Pl-7: Legal platform	Co-founder, currently mostly does marketing
Pl-8: Marketing platform	Co-founder, currently manages the whole platform except for development.
Pl-9: Elderly care platform	Co-founder, currently co-owner and manager
Pl-10: Care platform	Co-founder, currently Chief Financial Officer

Table 4: Platform representative information

3.2. Operationalization

During the interviews the concepts used to answer the research question will first be explained to the interviewees, and then asked questions about. The full Dutch interview protocol and more elaborate English interview structure with examples can be found in appendix 2 and 3.

The structure of the interview begins with introductory questions to understand how the interviewee became involved with the platform they represent in order to judge their knowledge about the platform. Then the dichotomies from table 2 are discussed to create a profile of the platform's task characteristics configurations. Then the resource dependence theory concepts are discussed, first asking directly who the most powerful actor is and why. Followed by questions regarding the criticality, abundance, and ownership of the relevant resources. Then the HRM domains are discussed regarding the content and process.

Once all these concepts are discussed with the different actors, a profile of task characteristics, power relationships, HRM content, and HRM process should be known to the researcher.

3.3. Data Analysis

The coding of the interview data is started using a priori codes based on the task characteristic dichotomies, RDT concepts, HR content concepts, and HR process concepts. This led to the directed content analysis described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005), using pre-created codes that were expected to be used, while remaining open to emergent codes from the data. Examples of

pre-created codes include: ”Standardized work”, “Ownership of resource”, and “compensation”. Whilst emergent codes for example for the training category include: “content training”, “FAQ reference”, “knowledge exchange promotion”. The codebook can be found in appendix 4. Atlas.TI is the program used to perform the coding and analysis. Besides the coding of the interviews, the results of the netnographic field notes and screen captures are added to the analysis. These are used to verify the interview data as well as discovering additional findings regarding HRM activities on OLPs.

Based on the coding and netnographic field notes firstly an overview per platform was created of the power balance between the actors (Appendix 5), as well as an overview per platform containing all the practices per HRM domain including which actor performed them (Appendix 6). These overviews helped establish a profile per platform, which were then compared for common and contradicting themes as described in the results section hereafter.

4. Results

Firstly some general information about the data is described. Then the HRM activities seen on the OLPs are compared with the propositions in mind.

4.1. General data set information

After interviewing representatives of ten platforms and conducting a netnography by joining the platform from the gig worker and where possible from the client perspective a profile per platform is established. During the interviews the platform representatives mostly elaborated on the HRM process and less on the content. However, this still provides insight in the different activities on the OLPs. Table 5 describes the core services offered and requested on the OLPs.

Platform and their name hereafter:	**Description:**
Pl-1: Consultancy platform	Serves as an extension for a consultancy company (Co-1). Most gigs are IT consultancy related, for companies and governments. Gig workers can take on consultancy tasks for the consultancy company and in general do not interact with the client, with some exceptions. The gig workers are usually seen as an external specialist team member to the company's employed consultants.
Pl-2: Service trading platform	A philanthropical platform where any service can be offered or requested by gig workers and clients alike. The most common services vary from doing grocery shopping to painting a wall, or providing a coaching session. The currency to pay for gigs is time on this platform
Pl-3: Design platform	the clients requests designs for logos, corporate identities, banners, etc. they advertise these by opening a contest. Gig workers can participate by delivering concepts, ideas, and preliminary designs.
Pl-4: Local guide platform	Connected tourists of cities with local guides in the destination cities, based on preferences of the tourists. Additionally, an online call between future tourist and local, to prepare the trip, and answer questions related to that trip is offered
Pl-5: Catering platform	Restaurant service and kitchen staff are the most requested services on the platform
Pl-6: Repair and building platform	Connects homeowners with a problem or a wish with their home to a suitable handyman, gardener, contractor, or otherwise home-related professional
Pl-7: Legal platform	Connect legal freelancers in their network with the network of clients in need of legal services
Pl-8: Marketing platform	specializes in matching specialists in certain types of marketing content creation to the demand for it
Pl-9: Elderly care platform	A care-taking platform specifically aimed at the practical care for elderly, to allow elderly people to live on their own longer than they would be able to without this care

Pl-10: Care institute platform	focusses on care institutions with personnel shortages. Pl-10 than supplements that shortage with freelancers with the capabilities to work in those institutions

Table 5: Platform descriptions

Besides the gigs offered on the platforms the work characteristics also became clear after conducting the interviews as well as the netnography. Table Y provides an overview of the task characteristics seen on the platforms in the dataset.

platform	**Standardisation**	**Online offline**	**skill-level**	**Individually/ crowd tasked**	**short/on-going**	**personal investment**
Pl-1	unstandardised	online and offline	high	Individual and crowd	on-going	High (education, diplomas)
Pl-2	unstandardised	online and offline	low	crowd	short and on-going	None
Pl-3	unstandardised	online	high	crowd	on-going	Design software required
Pl-4	unstandardised	offline	low	individual	on-going	no
Pl-5	standardised	offline	low	crowd	on-going	car required
Pl-6	unstandardised	offline	high	(mostly) individual	on-going	High (training, equipment)
Pl-7	unstandardised	online and offline	high	Semi-crowd tasked	on-going	High (education, diplomas)
Pl-8	unstandardised	(mostly) online	high	individual	mostly on-going	Design software required
Pl-9	unstandardised	offline	low	Crowd and then individual	on-going	None
Pl-10	unstandardised	offline	high	Crowd	on-going	High (education, diplomas)

Table 6: work characteristics per platform

Due to the eventual sampling results, the participating platforms host more similar work characteristics than intended. In the table above it shows that most platform interviewed facilitate unstandardised and longer/on-going tasks, as opposed to the more commonly studied platforms offering instantaneous/short and standardised tasks. First apparent observation from this table is that platforms with high-skilled work also requires more personal investment than the platforms with low skill levels, most often in the form of education or training.

4.2. HRM Content

On the OLPs the HRM content is a less researchable part of HRM, as having an intended HRM strategy implies having a workforce to apply it to. Therefore the studying of philosophies, policies, and practices is a less applicable conceptualization of HRM on OLPs. However, the philosophy OLPs have towards gig workers were still explained by the platform representatives. For most platforms the philosophy reflected the reasons the platforms were

founded. For example the consultancy platform was founded to save costs in headhunting specialists and increasing the number of projects the mother company could bid on by having the platform: "*besides having to pay wages you have to pay a fee of 15% or in some countries 35% to head-hunters, which we can cut because we do our own recruitment with the platform. Additionally we have the advantage that we can now bid on projects that we normally could not bid on. Now we can, and we can participate on projects where we did not have the expertise before*" (platform representative). Therefore the consultancy platform views the gig workers as added value to the mother company. Another example is the local guide platform that sees the gig workers as the most valuable resource, as they strive towards the goal of sustainable tourism, and try to achieve that through their local guides platform: "*I think that in the end the locals are the most important element, because, yeah, they are the platform… If you start with clients, who book tours, you will definitely find locals willing to host tours, but that is very money-driven. Currently it is more passion-driven, with people who enjoy showing their city*" (platform representative). For an overview per platform, which philosophy they follow and why see appendix 7.

In addition to the fact that the platforms use several of the theorized philosophies for different parts of the platform, the philosophy a platform uses changes over time for several of the platforms. According to the representative of the local guide platform, when they were just starting up they were happy with any new gig workers signing up. But since they are more established they have started to curate the content of the platform more. As the platform became less dependent on singular gig workers, and had a larger pool, their philosophy shifted. Another example is the design platform, where at first anyone was welcome to participate, but the platform has started to battle low effort mass-submissions by gig workers now that the gig worker pool is larger. This means that the dependence of the platform on gig workers changes with the progression through life cycle stages, and with that the HRM philosophy. In early stages the platform needs many new gig workers to serve the demand they face, but once the platform is more established, and the platform becomes less dependent on individual gig workers, they start controlling or guiding the behaviour of the gig workers more in their desired direction.

4.3. Client and Gig Worker Matching

The connection of supply and demand of quick and quality labour is the primary function of OLPs. This HRM selection activity of which gig worker will complete the gig for the client is crucial for the success of a platform.

On the platforms in this dataset two forms of matching were apparent. For one marketplace matching was visible. This means that the platform provides the infrastructure for clients and gig workers to find one another without the platform taking an active role in the matchmaking process. This was seen on the service trading, design, local guides, catering, and care platforms. The other type of matching seen is where the platform proposes several gig workers to the client to choose from, either based on those gig worker's online profile, pitch, or both. The consultancy, repair/building, legal, marketing, and elderly care platforms used this type of matching in one way or another. The main difference for this choice is that for the market infrastructure platforms anyone with the necessary skills could do the gig, but for the matching platforms there needs to be a fit between gig worker and client or gig beyond simply getting it done.

Reasons for choosing the type of matching seen differ between the platforms. The marketplace matching seen on the service trading platform is because the platform needs an offer and a demand, requests and offers of gigs to function, as the currency for the gigs is time. This means that in order to gain currency to pay for gigs, platform users also need to complete gigs. Therefore gigs are offered and requested by users who are both gig worker and client on the platform. As the users of the service trading platform are not motivated by money but because they see merit in the service trading system and want to choose the gigs they like, matching by the platform is not a suitable system. Additionally, most gigs cannot be completed online, and are therefore limited to local users, which are too variable to match with an algorithm: "*Well it really is more of a marketplace, I don't have to do much anymore. People really can search for the gigs they enjoy doing and offer gigs they would like to offer"* (platform representative). This means that the platform is not only reliant on the gig worker but mostly on the clients to see merit in the platform and participate actively. So this platform tries to find as many suitable gig workers/clients to participate, as they are currently mostly dependent on finding more clients: "*Here in the Netherlands there is something called "vraagschaamte". Because we grew up in a culture where it is normal to get paid money for all the things you do, therefore people feel conflicted to ask for things that seem to be for free"* explained the platform representative. The design platform has chosen for a tournament style. The platform representative described the process as follows: "*someone needs a logo or corporate identity. They start a contest, or more like an advertisement as you would see on other marketplaces. Anyone who is interested can participate and upload their design, from which the client can chose a winner. Then when the designs are send to the client they can direct the designer directly, and have them arrange the final changes to the design, then we pay out the winning gig worker".* The design platform uses this type of matching because there are many more gig workers than clients, and this way clients are offered a visual and wide range of results for their gig. The platform uses the abundance-based power imbalance between gig workers and clients to complete open gigs. Most gigs are thus done by many more gig workers than are eventually paid for the completion of the gig. The local guides platform has no active matching activities in place for another reason. The platform offers tours by locals, but is not yet in the stage where algorithmic matching would show merit according to the platform representative: "*We are still in the more early stages. Because if you only have 10 available guides in Bucharest, it is not that useful to rank them".* A platform representative explained that they do not have an endless number of guides per city, and it would make more sense to let the client compare the available guides for themselves "*You can just scroll through the profiles of available guides and choose one. The client has full control"*. The catering platform allows client restaurants to place gigs and has gig workers freely pick and choose which gigs they respond to. This platform was founded to solve the personnel shortage in coastal southern Netherlands. A representative emphasizes that the intention of the platform is to enable freelancers to pick and choose which gigs they do, when to do them, and for which hourly rate: *"In that sense we won't direct gig workers in where to work and when, we don't have that control. It is a free choice of the gig worker to choose where they want to work and where not".* Because of the catering personnel shortage the gig worker is a very powerful actor on the catering platform and cannot be controlled by matching algorithms. The care platform connects gig workers and clients in care institutes with one another, but not by algorithmically matching. The platform deals with high volatility in gig availability, and has no insight in the planning availability of gig workers according to the platform representative: "*gig workers are continuously planning their work*

also on other platforms, because of that their agendas are no always up-to-date. Therefore they want to be in the lead about when and where they work. That is one of the reasons for the existence of care freelancers, that they want to be able to choose when and where to work". Therefore the platform has chosen to let gig workers chose from the available gigs, as long as they meet the qualifications: "*the care institutes can indicate which qualifications and certificates they deem important and which ones are not relevant. They can provide their own checklist that gig workers need to meet before they can work for that client. Or that the gig workers fill out a list of questions before being accepted"* (platform representative). The care platform distinguishes themselves from similar organisations by integrating the platform with the administrative software packages of care institutes, making transactions easier and smoother via their platform, and creating preference or even dependency of the clients on the platform-service based on that. Due to this this platform leans more towards a staffing and administration company, as they do not match but arrange smooth administration of the labour contracts.

On the consultancy platform the platform is also the client, as gigs on this platform are vacancies on the projects of Co-1. Co-1 is the company that owns the platform, and does projects for their clients, but needs gig workers to supplement their workforce. This occurs either in expertise or in size. The platform uses an algorithm to find the gig workers that are suitable for the gig, and has job interviews for each gig. Gig workers can find the gig posted and apply proactively too. The platform sees its gig workers as independent professionals who chose to do gig work: "*they are specialized who 100% consciously chose to earn more in certain sectors than they would be able to in employment for a company, as they are specialists"* (platform representative). In line with this they see the gig workers as a talent pool, and uses that as a starting point for matching. In the end the mother company choses which gig worker will work on the gig. The legal platform has a similar view. As this is a platform for independent legal professionals, they propose gig workers to its clients, contrary to the consultancy platform not based on an algorithm, but based on extensive knowledge of the connected professionals: "*It's all in the heads of the people here. If Pietje is successfully working there than Jantje will probably fit too, and Evelientje. They are similar people, with the same education, and have worked for similar clients, lets propose them to that client. We may not be high tech, but we are high touch"* (platform representative). Gig workers however can request to be introduced to the clients proactively as is possible on the consultancy company. The gig workers have to bid against other gig workers for the gigs with clients after having been accepted by the client, as is the industry standard for legal freelancers. The repair/building and marketing platform both select several gig workers with the necessary skillset who can then pitch on the available gig. The gig workers on these platforms cannot openly solicit for gigs, as these platforms seek to guarantee quality by only selecting the gig workers with the most suitable skillsets, as well as searching for a fit with the client: "*Our algorithm can display a top-5 of most suitable gig workers that have the necessary specialized skillset for setting glass, but on spot 12 there is a gig worker with a strong preference and competence for stained glass setting, just an example, you can propose them manually so that the client can see that too"* (platform representative). Proposing several gig workers that pitch against one another is chosen by these platforms as it is common in the industries they are active in. A representative of the repair/building platform explicitly explains that there needs to be a connection between the gig worker and client aside from the gig workers' capabilities, and that they therefore use their chosen matching practices: "*suppose you have three houses*

next to each other which all need a new doorbell. You would think that this can be facilitated by one person. But yet the homeowners are not the same. So it goes further than just get it done. It needs to click, there needs to be trust, it needs to fit". Just as the legal platform, the elderly care platform engages in matching based on human knowledge of the gig workers. As their clients are elderly in need of care, they have established local hubs that arranges the matching in a personalized manner, as their clients are most often not digitally active: "*So there is an offline client meeting where the client expresses their wishes. We contact the local gig workers that can show interest, and we offer the interested gig workers to the client to choose from"* (platform representative). The elderly care platform has thus chosen their matching strategy based on the client characteristics, and not based on the task characteristics.

None of these platforms directly match a singular gig worker to complete a gig for a client, as is seen on other platforms outside the dataset. Although these reasons seem to not include task characteristics as theorized in this paper, the online/offline characteristic has a more underlying consequence for the chosen type of matching. The service trading, local guides, catering, and elderly care have all chosen their matching activities based on the offline availability of gigs, clients, and gig workers. Opposing this approach the design and marketing platform have chosen their matching activities based on the gig availability fully online. Additionally, some platforms tailor their matching practices to the clients' needs such as the elderly care and repair/building platform, because the qualifications of the gig worker are not enough to establish a good match. The knowledge of the platform about their gig workers is necessary to create suitable matches. The legal and marketing platform use their system as it is the industry standard, but also in order to find the most specifically specialized gig worker for the gig. The platforms that match do so as the gig or client requires more than get it done by any available gig worker.

4.4.Recruitment Activities

In order to match gig workers and clients properly, enough active gig workers to choose from are required. In order to attract enough gig workers the OLPs engage in recruitment and activities to provide clients with enough gig workers.

All platforms use some form of social media marketing. Remarkable is that the OLPs where a high skill level is required tend to focus more on LinkedIn whereas platforms where lower skills levels are required Instagram and Facebook are the preferred channels: *"We started out with everything, LinkedIn, Facebook, Google, and eventually we noticed the majority signed up via Instagram through a simple advertisement: become a local guide!"* (representative local guide platform). Platform's such as the consultancy, legal, and care platforms tend to favour LinkedIn as these platforms are highly professionalized, and potential gig workers are more

likely to use LinkedIn than Instagram. On the consultancy platform gig workers can sign up using their LinkedIn profile, instead of their email address.



netnographic result 1: LinkedIn sign up option consultancy platform

Some OLPs are directly contacting potential gig workers outside of the regular marketing channels. The local guide platform directly contacts individuals if they want to expand their service to an additional city: "*so if we need guides fast in a city, then we do that through the internet, or in co-working places, universities, Facebook-groups, Instagram direct messaging etc.*" (platform representative). The legal and marketing platform directly contact individuals if a client has a request that none of the current gig workers can fulfil. This type of recruitment activities are necessary to satisfy client requests that the current gig worker network cannot fulfil, and are not based on the task characteristics but rather the scarcity of gig workers in certain areas of expertise or offline locations: "*The talent is out there somewhere. You just have to go looking for a bit, and that is some work, but once you find them and connect them to the platform the algorithm will find them in the future. For example I had a request from an Italian wine exporter who wanted to have their label created completely in Italian. Well then I had to find someone who could, through LinkedIn and such*" (marketing platform representative). This direct recruitment thus occurs when gig workers are scarce. These platforms would approach the direct recruitment as a head-hunter or recruitment manager in that sector would.

Additionally, the service trading, design, local guide, catering, and care platform are actively trying to influence public opinion about themselves to attract more gig workers. The service trading platform uses a podcast to explain the services on the platform and attract more gig workers and clients: "*Yeah we host a podcast, the passion podcast, where people can explain what they like to do, to advertise a bit. That draws in new people who also would like to participate in the podcast*" (service trading platform representative). The design platform uses the positive media coverage to gain more gig workers and clients, the local guide platform

seeks media coverage to differentiate themselves from the vast amount of travel marketing. The catering platform seeks the local news coverage to spread awareness and attract more gig workers.



netnographic result 2 media coverage links about the catering platform

Pl-10 has only recently started to devise a strategy to promote Pl-10 in the news, and differentiate themselves from other care platforms. The design, local guide, and care platforms chose this recruitment activity to differentiate their platform from other platforms and companies they compete with as best explained by the representative of the tour guide platform: "*there is a lot of competition, not necessarily in our area with locals and tours. But there is so much happening in the travel industry, and they all advertise on the same buzzwords, whether they are hotels, or like a Tripadvisor. So paid advertisement is tough as we cannot compete with these big guys budget-wise So therefore we have become more creative, focussing on Influencers and travelblogs… going into partnerships with other tourism organisations etc.*". The service trading and catering platforms use this activity to create awareness for their brand, as they are relatively unknown players.

The different activities seen are most often explained by the challenges faced by the platform. Some platforms still need to grow or differentiate from other platforms and therefore spread awareness through the media, whilst others are already established but undertake recruitment activities to fill gaps of expertise and capacity by directly recruiting individuals through professional networks. Life cycle stage of the platform and the competitive context in which the platforms operate are reasons for different activities here. Most platforms have similar activities in social media recruitment, with some nuance based on the type of people they try to reach. Some examples are that local guides are targeted more through Instagram whilst consultants and lawyers are targeted through LinkedIn. The choice for activity is thus mostly based on life cycle stage of the platform, the type of gig workers they desire, and the availability of those gig workers. Here the skill level of the gig workers is a reason for different activities.

4.5.Selection activities

Additional to recruitment of new gig workers, and selection of gig workers for gigs, there is also a selection activity required to decide whether a potential gig worker is suitable to the platform and its clients.

Three main approaches are seen on the platforms. An approach where everyone is accepted onto the platform. Another is an onboarding call between a platform representative and the gig worker. Lastly the platform may review a CV, portfolio, reference, or chamber of commerce registration to check whether gig workers should be allowed on the platform.

The platforms where any new joiner can directly start performing gigs without any checks by the platform are the service trading platform, the design platform, and the elderly care platform. The service trading and elderly care platform simply want more participants, as they are still in a growth phase and are focused on growing their participant numbers: "*We have a system in place that blocks text that contains naughty words, but other than that everyone is welcome to participate!"* (service trading platform representative). On the elderly care platform however, the client has the final say in selecting a gig worker, meaning that in order to be selected for gigs the client still has to approve the gig worker. The design platform is simply open to anyone who can perform design tasks, and since they have the tournament-format gigs it is irrelevant to them who the gig workers are and with what backgrounds. New gig workers on the design platform however can request a portfolio and reference review to gain a higher starter status on the platform: "*Everyone can register for the platform, although some contests are only open to gig workers who possess a higher badge level. It can be that if you are a new designer who registered you cannot participate to the better paying gigs. But everyone can request such a badge, also as a new designer. And if you can proof that you deserve it, by showing your experience, in some sort of portfolio or CV, we can look which level badge suits that."* (design platform representative). Additionally, participating in the contests does not imply payment. The client choses a winner or winners to receive payment. This means that also on the design platform the client is involved in the selection activities.

Platforms where the gig workers perform design and/or development tasks their CV, portfolio or other references are important. On the consultancy and the repair/building platform their CV and references are an important part of the onboarding process, to check whether the skill level is suitable for the platform *"What is the shorts way to the best handyman? We have high demands of gig workers. They need to show experience for the areas of expertise they want to be matched on, by delivering a start set of references…we will call those references and have them score the gig worker on elements such as price-quality ratio, professionality, and whether they would recommend the gig worker to family and friends"* (repair/building platform representative). On the design and marketing platforms portfolio of previous work are necessary for OLP to estimate the skills and value of new gig workers. The care platform not only requires a CV but also other diplomas, certificates, and qualifications necessary to work in the care sector are asked of the gig worker before being able to do gigs. On these platforms the high personal investment in education and training definitely separates these platforms from the others in the dataset. Skill level is not the distinguishing element here, as the design and marketing platform also require high skill to be successful, but do not require high personal investments in training or education, only results. Pl-8 however distinguishes gig workers by screening their portfolio and expertise, in order to filter out individuals not in line with the platform's intended marketing content: "*when you sign up I always check what you have made,*

usually they have their own websites, all these marketing gig workers have a website with all their work on it. that way you filter the 'beunhazen' (incompetent people) very easily, and we simply do not allow them to join. There is a quality check that we do manually, sometimes we come across luck-seekers or those influencers that think they create marketing content. Well, taking a picture of yourself in front of a bridge over the Amsterdam canals is not creating content to us. Fine if you do, but that is a different market, that will not work on this platform" (marketing platform representative).

Before gig workers can start working via OLPs, some platforms conduct intake-interviews. The consultancy platform conducts these interviews to check whether they have the suitable skillsets, but more importantly whether they have a fit with the company: "*You need to fit with the mother company culture. You need a certain openness, and be a team player, which is weir as you are a gig worker not part of the team, but still an important aspect. Mostly that you possess the insight in the desired way of working of the company"*(consultancy company representative). The local guide platform conducts these interviews in order the check whether the new gig workers are capable of hosting tours, but mostly to check whether the potential gig workers understand the platform's vision of creating sustainable tourism: "*there are two hard criteria during the onboarding call, your English level and knowledge of the city… but it's also important that you show understanding of our vision, and that you understand and contribute to sustainable tourism"* (local guides platform). The repair/building platform conducts these interviews to discuss the gig workers capabilities and references, as this platform prides itself with offering the best quality gig workers. The catering platform conducts interviews to ensure potential gig workers are suitable for that work-status, and maybe should choose another career path: "*We always contact gig workers before they start doing gigs. We always leave the choice up to the new gig worker, but if I talk to someone who has doubts and questions about the financial aspects, we work together with an accountant for those questions, and we collaborate with someone who coaches freelancers, with whom we offer a free intake. We also say, that is something you may not consider us large enough to do, but we are very straight forward with potential gig workers in saying that the freelance structure may not be for them. We then offer them to contact a catering employment agency, if that can help them*" (catering platform representative. The legal platform conducts these interviews to gain better insight into the specific expertise of new gig workers, as they match based on knowledge within the platform, and not algorithms. Lastly, the care platform conducts these interviews to filter out "koekenbakkers", or incompetent people who somehow possess the right qualifications to start working via the platform.

The chosen selection activities are different based on the life cycle stage the platform is in, as newer/smaller platforms are more concerned with growing the number of gig workers than moderating the quality of gig workers. Other reasons for chosen activities are assessing the skill level, often based on personal investment in education. Additionally the organisation-gig worker fit is deemed important by several platforms, to ensure the gig workers act in line with the platform's vision. Only the catering platform conducting selection activities based on work status fit, as they consider that the platform's responsibility.

4.6. Training and Development

Part of the HRM activities seen in regular organisation is the training and development of employees. As stated before this is seen less in the gig economy, but not completely absent.

Some of the platforms like the consultancy and the design platform promote knowledge exchange among gig workers. The consultancy platform does so by organising exchange events, physical and digital "*We have like an online conference we created where you can join as a gig worker and ask for advice from gig workers who have been with the platform longer. Some representatives of the mother company also join with sort of digital market stands that the gig workers can visit, and exchange market trends and developments. So these are organised a few times a year."* (consultancy platform representative). The design platform has developed a Facebook-like social environment where according to a representative of the platform gig workers exchange tips and tricks, and even create friendships. Just like the legal platform the consultancy platform considers its gig workers as professionals responsible for updating their own skillset, but as the consultancy business is constantly evolving, they want to enable their gig workers to share trends. The legal platform explicitly said that they will not offer training in any way or form. When asked whether besides matchmaker they also offered training, the platform representative said: "*No we are not an educational organisation, we are purely the connection between clients and gig workers"*. The consultancy, repair/building, and legal platform also say they will not offer training as the gig worker have already invested in training and education, coming back to the personal investment work characteristic. The design platform created their social environment as one of the ways to retain and commit gig workers to their platform, instead of working with clients around the platform "*It is up to us to make the platform better and more fun to make sure that the clients and gig workers keep wanting to work through us instead of outside the platform, and with the community that is working quite well*" (design platform representative).

Only the elderly care platform offers actual trainings on the subject of care provision, but this is only possible because this platform employs the gig workers: "*we offer training in domestic aid and such… we offer that ourselves and it is up to the gig workers whether they want to follow those trainings"* (elderly care platform representative). This reduces the margins of the platform, but the platform is not created solely for monetary gain, but also to tackle a societal issue of elderly care shortages. They offer trainings such as coping with elderly diseases, suitable to the goals of the platform.

All other platforms refer to their FAQ they have on their website. The local guides platform strongly advises its new gig workers to read the guidelines for constructing a gig. The marketing platform refers to its articles on how to write a winning pitch. Sometimes using the terms tips and tricks, or articles to increase your gig chances. No fourth party training structures were observed among the platforms in this study, although several spoke of considering developing in that direction in the future.



netnographic result 3 tips and tricks on how to win a pitch on the marketing content platform

All platforms except the elderly care platform do not have formalized training and development practices as this would imply employment status, which is not a problem for the elderly care platform. The elderly care platform chose for an employment structure that best served the societal impact they want to make, which is why they can offer actual training, and want to do so. The design platform used their community for knowledge exchange as a ways of committing the gig workers to the platform, and the consultancy platform hosts their knowledge exchange events to enable their gig workers to keep up with the fast changing industry. Based on personal investment of gig workers several platforms chose not to offer training. The elderly care platform offers work content related training and the knowledge exchange organized by the consultancy platform is also related to the content of the work. On the contrary, the reference to the FAQ used by the other platforms is mostly aimed at understanding the platform better, or focused on how to best win the gig as seen on the marketing content platform.

4.7.Compensation activities

For the completed gigs the gig workers are naturally paid. The payment structure however differs per platform. The way the prices are negotiated vary between platforms. They are not as theorized based on the work characteristics specifically, but are based on the industry the platform operates in. For example the tour guide sets their price for a tour, the consultant and lawyer negotiates their own hourly rate (SOURCE), and the elderly care prices are based on the legal rates set for that type of work by the government "*We are actually between the client and the gig worker. We create an employment contract based on the home services provision*

set by the government. That is pretty different compared with other platforms. Eventually the client pays amount X to the gig worker and a fee on top to us" (elderly care platform representative). However surrounding the price setting are interesting differences in the compensation activities.

Most remarkable is that the marketing platform owner currently made the platform free to use for clients and gig workers, as he is not personally dependent on the platform for income. Therefore he made the pricing free for the duration of the Covid-19 pandemic "*as you might have seen I made the pricing for free on the platform, because those guys in this sector have it really tough nowadays. I just get my salary, and as long as I can keep this platform in the air for a few thousand euros, I gladly do it as a hobby, an expensive hobby ha-ha"* (marketing content platform representative). Otherwise the gig workers can choose whether they want to pay a fee per new client they get via the platform or a subscription paying a monthly 25 euros to use the platform. The representative of the marketing platform explained that this pricing is seen as the acquisition cost for the gig worker to find gigs, and therefore billed to the gig worker by the platform. Most other platforms view it similarly, and therefore bill the gig worker a commission, although the routing of payment differs. Some platforms receive the payment of the client and pay the gig worker minus the platform's fee. Others use a fourth party for billing. The consultancy, catering, and elderly care platform do so. These platforms do so in order to void the risk of having a gig worker's damages be the platform's or gig worker's personal responsibility. This serves as a form of a collective liability insurance: "*consider this: if a mistake occurs, the mother company has its terms and conditions with a standard liability clause of 10 million euros. But a freelancer's liability insurance often only covers up to 500,000 euros. So when you work with externals directly in contact with the client, they cannot cover a mistake up to 10 million euros. But when you use a payroll provider, they can grant the whole group of freelancers a liability insurance, moving the risk away from the mother company"* (consultancy platform representative). The consultancy platform needs this as liability lawsuits could run into millions of euros. Another reason why the consultancy platform uses a fourth party is to negotiate lower prices with the gig workers without damaging the relationship between the platform and the gig worker, as the gig worker is the most powerful actor in that relationship. The catering platform does so in order to retain gig workers, as an individual liability insurance for a freelancer is more expensive. The elderly care platform does so to save administration efforts, as the payment provider administrates the worked hours, receives payment from the clients, and pays the gig workers and the platform afterwards.

Additionally to asking for a fee from the gig worker, the legal and care platform also charge the client a subscription fee, as they provide a software proposition of managing and administrating a talent pool besides offering suitable gig workers for the gigs these clients have. This pricing is because they offer a software product besides the matching service of an online labour platform.

The design and marketing platform also instigate activities to prevent a race to the bottom in pricing for their gig workers, to retain them with their platform over others. The design platform has minimum prices on contests, whilst the marketing platform has blind auctions so that gig workers cannot see the bids of other gig workers. The repair/building platform also works with a subscription for their gig workers, that does not go up in price as long as the gig workers stay with the platform, the platform representative called it the we-hate-to-see-you-leave-policy.

The differences in remuneration practices seen in the dataset are not because of the work characteristics specifically, but mainly the type of work or industry. The RDT did explain why some decisions were made, such as the use of the fourth party billing partners, and the marketing platform's owner's decision to make the platform free for the duration of the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally platforms offered supporting services such as collective insurance, blind auctioning, and minimum prices for retention of talent reasons, as they would otherwise leave the platform.

4.8.Job Appraisal

After a job is completed a performance review takes place in all places of business. On OLPs these occur after every gig. Performance review should help to decide whether the gig worker delivers timely and quality work within the expectations of the platform and client.

On all platforms except for the service trading platform and the care platform only the client rates the gig worker after the gig is completed. On the service trading platform the client and gig worker rate each other, as they are the same actor fulfilling both roles, and ratings are individual-bound as a client and gig worker in one. On the care platform the two way rating helps future matching, by letting gig workers see new open gigs with their favourited clients before others as well as the other advantage best explained by the platform representative: "*when a client and gig worker worked together, the client can place the gig worker on their favourites list… at the moment a new gig comes up, the client can choose, with a checkbox yes/no whether gig workers on their favourites list can be automatically accepted. So when a gig worker is on the favourites list, is available, they are automatically accepted, which saves a lot of time, and grants continuity to the client and their patients*". This increases the gig workers and clients dependence on the platform, as this differentiates the care platform from other care matchmakers.

Furthermore the catering, repair/building and care platform collect objective data about their gig workers. The catering platform collects data about number of gigs worked and reliability. The catering platform describes in their FAQ how a better reputation, that becomes visible after completing several gigs, provides gig workers with access to better paying gigs, whilst providing better paying clients with more reliable gig workers.

Wat houdt 'mijn reputatie' in?

Jouw reputatie is belangrijk voor het platform, maar vooral voor jezelf! Door goede feedback van opdrachtgevers word jij sneller voorgesteld aan dezelfde opdrachtgever. Ook krijg je opdrachten te zien waar een relatief hoger uurtarief aan gekoppeld zit. Heel simpel dus, hoe beter je reputatie hoe meer je kunt verdienen. En dat heb je helemaal zelf in de hand!

Hoe kan ik aan mijn reputatie werken?

Jouw reputatie is opgebouwd uit een aantal elementen, onder andere de feedback van opdrachtgevers, betrouwbaarheid en het aantal gewerkte diensten.

Kan ik mijn reputatie inzien?

In het begin is jouw reputatie nog niet inzichtelijk, dit is aan de achterkant van het platform ingeregeld. Dit wordt nog verder doorontwikkeld waardoor het uiteindelijk wel zichtbaar zal worden.

netnographic result 4 reputation explanation from the FAQ of the catering platform

Ultimately the platform does so to improve the reputation of the platform. The repair/building platform tracks how long gig workers take before making contact with clients after they receive the contact details: "*every time we send out client details so they can pitch, but we never hear*

back whether the gig was completed that raises a flag. If we ask the client whether the gig was completed, and the answer is yes, something is not right. It does not have to be with bad intentions, but we do follow up on that, also to improve our algorithm by keeping track of our golden match percentage". In essence the platform trusts the gig workers, but there is always a chance the gig worker will start working with the client outside the platform. In order to minimize that risk and to improve their matching algorithm, the platform tracks this data. The care platform tracks data such as how long a gig worker has worked for the same client, and warns the client and gig worker if it starts to threaten the freelancer-status: "*We track the number of hours per month per client the gig workers work, since freelancers have to have at least three clients per work year. So we alert them when they have the same client for too long, and we alert clients if freelancers work too long for them"*. They do so to keep the gig workers out of legislative problems as well as to keep them active via the platform, instead of having to go into regular employment with care institutes.

The rating systems differ from stars, thumbs up, multi-criteria star ratings, 1-10 ratings, and textual feedback. Regardless of the method, all platforms follows up on subpar ratings albeit differently. As the repair/building platform offers a wide variety of gigs, malperformance can lead to gig worker exclusion from specific types of gig work, until they can deliver new references that prove they are capable to start doing those types of gigs again. The platform does this because they focus on quality, and promise the best gig workers to their clients, so as long as gig workers can prove they can live up to that promise they are allowed to take the gigs on. The catering and legal platform do not expel gig workers from the platform if they receive bad feedback, but recommends the gig worker and client not to work together anymore. They do so because they do not think bad performance means that the gig worker is not skilled enough, but that a mismatch occurred. The catering platform does so because of their dependence on the scarce gig workers, but also their believe in second chances and opposition against the trends of how one poor review can ruin a gig worker's career: "*we have a pretty basic model, that we want to expand on in the future… but for now if you were not liked by a client, you simply do not apply with them again, we do not expel from the platform for that, because maybe another client likes you a lot. So we do not use ratings for now, simply whether you are liked or not*" (catering platform representative). The legal platform knows their gig workers are the best, and if there was an unpleasant experience they let the client chose to remove them from their talent pool, but the gig worker can still work for the other clients: "*After a gig we ask the client: keep or discard? If it is keep they stay in the community, if it is discard they will not work for that client anymore, but they can still be in the communities of our other clients"* (legal platform representative). They thus do not get rid of gig workers over bad performance reviews as they trust in the capabilities of their gig workers, and are dependent on them for future matching. They will only not connect them with that specific client anymore. Both the catering and legal platform do not exclude the gig workers because they are too valuable to the platform. The gig workers are scarce, either for their talent or their geological position, the platform thus depends on them. The other platforms remove badly performing gig workers from the platform, but not before contacting them and hearing the other side of the story.

The reasons for different appraisal practices are first of all found in the dependence relationship between the gig worker and the platform and the client and the platform. The platform uses appraisal techniques to make the gig worker and the client more dependent on the platform.

Secondly the platforms use specific appraisal activities of objective data to increase the retention of gig workers on the platform. Other appraisal activities such as seen on the catering and lawyer platform are because the platform is dependent on the gig workers. The reasons for differing appraisal activities is mostly based on dependence relationships among the actors.

5. Discussion & conclusion

5.1. Discussion and Implications for theory

This study set out theorizing that the different configurations of task characteristics seen on online labour platforms result in different HRM activities using the resource dependence theory. The HRM activities of organisations can usually be characterized by an HRM philosophy resulting in HRM policies and practices, cleverly brought together in an HR system. However, what this study has clearly shown is that this conceptualization of HRM theory does not directly translate to the Platform economy. This conceptualization of the HRM content as described by Bowen and Ostroff (2004) assumes a clear employment relationship where an HRM strategy is intended for the workforce. With the OLPs studied in this and other studies, an HRM strategy is not formalized as this would imply an employment relationship. This study also showed that the philosophy OLPs hold towards gig workers changes over time, to suit the current needs of the OLP.

Beforehand the research question : *"In what way do task characteristics influence the HRM activities practiced on online labour platforms?"* was asked and studied using several propositions.

The first proposition assumed that the power division based on resource dependence between the platform, the gig worker and the clients is influenced by the task characteristics. The results showed that to some extent this was the case. Whether an OLP hosted gigs conducted online or offline influenced the matching, recruitment, and selection activities, as offline tasks decrease the pool of potential gig workers and clients, increasing the chance of scarcity of either and thus creating a power imbalance between the actors. Another case of how work characteristics influence the resource dependence of the client and platform on the gig worker is when the gig workers possess rare skills, meaning that platforms that require high personal investments of gig workers and high skill levels needed to perform gig make the gig worker more powerful over the platform and client. However, what this proposition lacks is a broader perspective of what may influence the power relations among the actors. Aside the work characteristics, the history or temporal condition of a platform also influences its dependence on the other actors. For example, the service trading platform is still growing and in an earlier stage of its life-cycle. This means that the platform is more dependent on gig workers and clients to come to the platform than a more established platform such as the legal platform. The work characteristics may describe the context of the work, but not the industry the OLP is active in. The industry characteristics also contribute to the power relations among the actors, as the competitors of the platform directly impacts the criticality of the platform for the client and gig worker. In short the results showed that only looking at the work characteristics to describe existent power relations among the actors on OLPs provides an incomplete overview, but does indeed influence the power relations between the actors.

The second proposition assumes the power relations to explain the differences in HRM activities used on the OLPs. Although many of differences in HRM activities were at least partially explained by power differences, again the life cycle stage of a platform and the industry they are active in were also necessary to explain the differences. The first part of this proposition assumed that the HRM content is influenced by the power relations. But as stated before, the current conceptualization of HRM philosophies, policies, and practices does not fit the OLPs since this requires a formalized HRM strategy. As described in the results the philosophy of the platform regarding HRM also shifted over time, based on the changing needs

of the platforms during their life-cycles. As the second part of this proposition the HRM process is influenced by the resource dependence of the actors. On many occasions this is the case, as a prime example the owner of the marketing content platform is not dependent on the income from the platform and has therefore made the platform free to use for the duration of the Covid-19 pandemic, as the gig workers are dependent and he wants to help them. Or the differences in price setting between platforms where the gig workers are more powerful than the other actors as opposed to the platforms where the platform or client is more powerful support this. But again the life-cycle stage and the industry, as well as the client characteristics and platform founding reason contribute to the varying HRM activities. In conclusion, the task characteristics influence the practiced HRM activities, but there are other, maybe more impactful, variables that also influence the HRM activities.

Based on the results this study contributes to the HRM literature in firstly offering insight in the HRM practices of OLPs other than ride-hailing and food delivery platforms by including care, consultancy, legal, local guide and other task-types in the research stream. These platforms that set out with other goals and use other HRM activities than the control oriented activities most often studied in the HRM literature specifically in the gig economy (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017; Wood et al., 2018; Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). Initially work characteristics were the focus of this study but the results have shown that other factors such as the life cycle stage and the industry also have a notable effect on the differences in HRM activities, as are in line with the literature concerning HRM on OLPs (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019; Frenken et al., 2020). This study also found that the matching activities of OLPs are based on more than just-get-it-done by the nearest highly rated gig worker, as there needs to be a fit between client and gig worker for different tasks, as opposed to the current literature surrounding ride-hailing platforms suggests (Ettlinger, 2017; Moehlmann & Zalmanson, 2017; Jarrahi & Sutherland, 2018).

In addition to that this research shows that selection activities of OLPs are not only based on finding enough gig workers, but can also be based on finding a fit between gig worker and company, gig worker and company vision/mission, or gig worker and freelancer status. As well as selection activities, the training and development on OLPs varies from work content related training, training on how to work with the platform, and training on how to get more gigs on the platform, additional to the fourth party and tips & tricks training the HRM literature often describes (Lee, Kusbit & Dabbish, 2015; Duggan, Sherman, Carbery & Mcdonnell, 2019; Meijerink & Keegan, 2019).

Moreover, this study shows that the recruitment activities of OLPs are based on the challenge currently faced by the platform, whether that is growth, competition from the industry, or local scarcity, and not only on attracting as many gig workers as possible as is commonly suggested by the literature (Lee, 2018; Wood et al. 2018). Similarly, incentives deployed by OLPs were up to now mostly viewed as ways of attracting enough gig workers to perform desirable behaviour (Wu, Zhang, Li & Liu 2019) or engaging gig workers with the platform long-term (Gegenhuber et al., 2020), but this research shows that OLPs also use incentives to mitigate financial risk. Lastly, appraisal activities are mostly seen as a way to control quality of the gig worker's performance, and consequentially rewarding or punishing gig workers (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017; Wood et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2019), but as the care platform representative explained, appraisal is also used to retain gig workers on their platform.

5.2. Implications for practice

Aside from the academic contributions this study can provide practitioners on OLPs with advice too.

For OLP owners it is advisable to gain an overview of the environment the OLP is situated in before implementing more or different HRM activities. Firstly gaining awareness of the life-cycle stage that the OLP is in is advisable, as this serves as an indicator of whether the platform should focus on fast growth, or rather on retaining the current gig workers and improving the working environment when the platform is more mature. It is also important to follow the industry trends, and see how those are threats or opportunities for a platform active in that industry. Platforms are typically more agile and adaptable to the changes in an industry, but also more vulnerable to sudden changes in the number of clients or gig workers. Lastly establishing what the power balance is between actors including the OLP, the gig worker, and the client can help the platform focus on where to reduce uncertainty with HRM activities, and which advantages to exploit.

For gig workers dealing with power deficits can be a challenge, but can be reduced by being active on several platforms, as seen on the care platform, or be active through other channels such as employment agencies or dispatching services as seen on the legal platform, to reduce dependence on a single platform, and increase the chances of finding gigs.

For gig workers active on newer, smaller, or younger platforms they have more influence than they would on a more mature platform. Newer platforms still need to grow and develop, and are much more willing to listen and adapt to the input of gig workers in that stage, although they may be lacking the resources to develop and implement such input.

5.3. Limitations

Since this is an exploratory research the fact that this study is solely conducted in the Netherlands should not pose a problem for reliable results. The fact that not the full range of task-characteristic-compositions of OLPs is included in this research is also not considered a limiting factor for the finding of this relationship. However, due to the change in sampling strategy the participating OLPs are similar, and this might limit the richness of the findings.

Whether gig workers are full-time, or part-time has a tremendous impact on their work-experience on OLPs (Ashford et al., 2018; Goods et al., 2019). Until now this study has not considered this dimension properly. Part-time gig-workers are considered to care less whether they have a poor power position, since this is not their only source of income. They will thus not or to a lesser extent attempt to better their positions, as prescribed by the RDT. This dimension however, may be seen as another variable in determining the power relationship seen on the platform, which .

Another issue for this research is that it is coded by a single researcher. Although the researcher has reflected on their personal biases regarding this study, a second opinion or discussion of the used codes would have improved the reliability and validity of the research.

As stated before this study shows a different side of the gig economy by studying different types of OLPs than the usual food delivery and ride-hailing platforms. But by not including those into this study a lot of the diversity in HRM activities is missed in this study. The aforementioned platforms usually have a more control-oriented set of HRM activities, with algorithmic matching and performance monitoring. The work characteristics on these

platforms are usually that tasks are short, standardised, offline, low in skill-level, individually tasked, and low in personal investment. This is a configuration not present in the dataset, and would have offered richer results section.

Additionally, this study's methodology also seriously lacked triangulation. Since only the platform representatives were interviewed and not gig workers or clients the reliability and validity of the study are less prevalent. However, the netnography helped understand the gig worker (and where possible client) perspective better. Nonetheless, it did not provide the richness of interviewing experienced gig workers and clients. As explained in the methodology section gig workers and clients were not included as these were not found willing given the limited resources of this study.

Lastly this study only considered OLPs, clients, gig workers and payroll/billing partners. However, the context of OLPs is larger, and also includes governments, labour unions, and competitors. Although some of these were mentioned, they were not included as actors exercising power on the actors in this study.

5.4. Recommendations for future research

The recommendations following this study are twofold. Regarding the research direction, focusing on the ecosystem that a platform is in, using the institutional logics perspective to describe HRM activity differences is looking promising based on this exploratory research. By doing so the relations between the actors shift from dependence to legitimacy, and the institutional work that the actors in the OLP environment undoubtedly undertake can come to light. Meijerink, Keegan and Bondarouk (2021) Already studied the HRM activities in the framing of institutional logics on two meal-delivery platforms. Building on their study with other OLPs such as in this study would offer an insightful avenue of HRM research.

Since the propositions used in this research could only explain the HRM activities to a limited extend, an alternative conceptualization is required. What the previous propositions showed was a lack of contextual factors such as the historical placement and the wider (business) context outside the three (and sometimes four) actors described in this study. Lewis, Cardy, and Huang (2019) brought together HRM research regarding the institutional theory that places organisations and people into an embedded environment, where they interact based on their institutional logics described as: "*socially constructed historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality"* (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). This theory includes the temporal element of the life cycle stage, the wider context, and the different actor's assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules that ultimately shape the HRM activities. This theory does not focus on power as the RDT does, but on legitimacy of one's logic and the complexity when logics of or within actors clash. The more powerful actor in a situation with institutional complexity can often impose their logic on the situation through institutional work, by creating, maintaining, or disrupting relevant logics. Frenken and colleagues (2018) have applied the institutional logics perspective to the gig economy to address the societal issues regarding OLPs, gig workers, and precarious work.

This study proposes that the institutional theory is used to describe the differences in HRM activities, with a new set of propositions.

Proposition 1: *OLPs and the participating actors are embedded in an institutional environment and have competing institutional logics, creating institutional complexity where some actors are more powerful than other actors based on the dependence on one another.*

This proposition forms the basis for this conceptualization. The actors involved have different logics with different assumptions, values, believes and rules in mind. These aspects of the actors may clash, leading to a complex situation where not all actors can satisfy their logic. The resource dependence theory can still be used to describe the interrelations among the actors in terms of power.

Proposition 2: *OLPs initiate and delegate HRM activities in accordance with their logic relative to the power of the involved actors and their competing logics.*

The OLPs create HRM structures that support their institutional logic, which according to Frenken and colleagues (2018) usually is a market and corporate logic as theorized by Thornton et al. 2012). When the OLP is more powerful than the gig worker and the client for example, the platform can exercise their logic over that of the other actors, and with that implement HRM activities that suit the OLP in the life cycle stage they are currently in and the industry they are active in. But when the gig worker is a scarce resource due to their training and skill level for example, the OLP has to implement HRM activities to satisfy the gig worker's logic as well as trying to satisfy their own logic. The platforms in this study provide another configuration of logics than described by Thornton and colleagues (2012). For example the legal platform's logic is based on professionalism, valuing expertise, within the platform organisation as well as in its gig workers. The service trading platform on the other hand has more of a community logic, valuing reciprocity and equality, as do their participants.

Proposition 3: *The differences in institutional logics and the differences in power between the actors explain the differences in HRM activities observed on OLPs.*

When looking at the results, the platforms were all created with a certain goal, and dependent on how much power they have over the other actors can strive to that goal by implementing and delegating HRM activities towards that goal. As an example from the results the elderly care platform's goal is to assist the elderly that the government can or will no longer care for. As gig workers do not have to be skilled or invest personally, but have to be found locally, they are moderately scarce to the platform. The platform has abundant clients, but grants them power, as serving them is the platform's goal. In order to find enough gig workers to serve these clients appropriately the platform pays well, and provides training to gig workers. On the other hand the consultancy platform is aimed at taking more market power for the mother company, using the corporate and market logic. Gig workers are specialists who chose to be a gig worker for more profit than employment could offer. Because the gig workers are specialists, and have power over the platform, the platform uses HRM activities to follow their corporate logic whilst serving the gig workers' market logic. Examples of these are using billing partners to negotiate pricing with the gig worker to not damage the relation, whilst maximizing the profit for both, and have the mother company's market share grow. These propositions are visualised in figure X below:



Figure 3: Conceptual model for future research

Regarding the methodology the recommendation for future research is to include gig workers, clients, and relevant fourth parties in the research too, whilst additionally still conducting a netnography to uncover the details gig workers and clients may find self-explanatory or that they cannot remember.

5.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study has not found the expected answer to the question: *"In what way do task characteristics influence the HRM activities practiced on online labour platforms?*" The results showed that the task characteristics influenced the power relations between actors and with that the HRM activities used by OLPs. However the research also found that the life cycle stage, industry, and other external factors were causes for differences in HRM activities on OLPs. Based on these findings a study of different OLPs than the ride-hailing and food delivery services, focusing on the institutional logics, provide an promising avenue of innovative HRM research.

6. Acknowledgements

Firstly I want to thank Jeroen Meijerink for supporting and understanding me throughout the process of writing this difficult thesis in Covid-19 times. Secondly I want to thank Maarten Renkema for providing a fresh set of eyes that helped find the flaws I skipped over after going over the thesis too many times. I would also like to note my appreciation for my girlfriend's ever positive attitude and unwavering support while writing this thesis. Lastly I want to thank my friends, flat mates, and family who have helped me in any way towards finishing this thesis.

7. References

Arthur, M. (1994). The boundaryless career: A new perspective for organisational inquiry. *Journal of Organisational Behavior, 15*, 295-306. doi:10.1002/job.4030150402

Ashford, S. J., Caza, B. B., & Reid, E. M. (2018). From surviving to thriving in the gig economy: A research agenda for indviduals in the new world of work. *Research in Organisational Behavior, 38*, 23-41.

Becker, B., & Gerhart, B. (1996). The Impact of Human Resource Management on Organisational Performance: Progress and Prospects. *The Academy of Management Journal, 39*(4), 779-801. doi:10.2307/256712

Bellace, J. (2018). Back to the future: workplace relations and labour law in the 21st century in the Asia Pacific context. *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 56*(4), 433-449. doi:10.1111/1744-7941.12183

Bonet, R., Cappelli, P., & Hamori, M. (2013). Labour Market Intermediaries and the New Paradigm for Human Resources. *The Academy of Management Annals, 7*(1), 341-392. doi:10.5465/19416520.2013.774213

Bowen, D., & Ostroff, C. (2004). Understanding HRM-Firm Performance Linkages: The Role of the "Strength" of the HRM System. *The Academy of Management Review, 29*(2), 203-221. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20159029

Bowman, R. (1979). The Theoretical Relationship Between Systematic Risk and Financial (Accounting) Variables. *The Journal of Finance, 34*(3), 617-630. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02129.x

Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate lingaes and organisational environment: A teest of the resource dependence model. *Strategic Management Journal, 11*(6), 419-430.

Cappelli, P., & Keller, J. (2013). Classifying Work in the New Economy. *Acadamy of Management Review, 38*(4), 575-596.

D'Cruz, P., & Noronha, E. (2018). Abuse on online labour markets: targets' coping, power and control. *Qualitative Research in Organisations and Management, 13*(1), 53-78. doi:10.1108/QROM-10-2016-1426

De Stefano, V. (2016). *The Rise of the "Just-in-Time Workforce": On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labour PRectection in the "gig-Economy"*. Geneva: International Labour Organisation.

Drees, J., & Heugens, P. (2013). Synthesizing and Extending Resource Dependence Theory: A Meta-Analysis. *Journal of Management, 39*(6), 1666-1698. doi:10.1177/0149206312471391

Duggan, J., Sherman, U., Carbery, R., & McDonnell, A. (2019). Algorithmic management and app-work in the gig economy: A research agenda for employment relations and HRM. *Human Resource Management Journal*. doi:10.1111/1748-8583.12258

Dunn, M. (2017). Digital Work: New Opportunities or Lost Wages? *American Journal of Management, 17*(4), 10-27.

Duward, D., Blohm, I., & Leimeister, J. (2016). Crowdwork. *Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58*(4). doi:10.1007/s12599-016-0438-0

Edwards, R. (1979). *Contested Terrain.* New York: Basic Books.

Ettliner, N. (2017). Paradoxes, problems and potentialities of online work platforms. *Work, Organisation, Labour & Globalisation, 11*(2), 21-38. doi:10.13169/workorgalaboglob.11.2.0021

Fiverr. (2020, August 20). *Buyers Help Center*. Retrieved from Providing Feedback: https://buyers.fiverr.com/en/article/providing-feedback#:~:text=Once%20an%20order%20is%20marked,after%20the%20order%20is%20complete.

Frenken, K. V., Fünfschilling, L., & Piscicelli, L. (2018). An Institutional Logics Perspective on the Gig Economy. doi:10.31235/osf.io/uqn9v

Frenken, K., Vaskelainen, T., Fünfschilling, L., & Piscicelli, L. (2020). An Institutional Logics Perspective on the Gig Economy. In I. Maurer, J. Mair, & A. Oberg, *Theorizing the Sharing Economy: Variety and Trajectories of New Forms of Organizing (Research in the Sociology of Organisations)* (Vol. 66, pp. 83-105). Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited. doi:10.1108/S0733-558X20200000066005

Gandini, A. (2018). Labour process theory and the gig economy. *Human Relations, 72*(6), 1039-1056. doi:10.1177/0018726718790002

Gegenhuber, T., Ellmer, M., & Schüßler. (2020). Microphones, not megaphones: Functional crowdworker vocie regimes on digital work platforms. *Human Relations*, 1-31. doi:10.1177/0018726720915761

Goods, C., Veen, A., & Barratt, T. (2019). "Is your gig any good?" Analysing job quality in the Australian platform-based food-delivery sector. *Journal of Insdustrial Relations*, 1-26.

Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research, 15*(9), 1277-1288. doi:10.1177/1049732305276687

Huselid, M. (1995). The impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity, and corporate financial performance. *Academy of Management Journal, 38*, 635-672.

Jarrahi, M., & Sutherland, W. (2018). Algorithmic Management and Algorithmic Competencies: Understanding and Appropriating Algorithms in Gig work. *Conference paper*, 13. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329336053

Jiang, K., Lepak, D., Han, K., Hong, Y., Kim, A., & Winkler, A. (2012). Clarifying the construct of human resource systems: Relating human resource management to employee performance. *Human Resource Management Review, 22*, 73-85. doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2011.11.005

Johnston, H. (2019). Labour geographies of the platform economy: Understanding collective organizing strategies in the context of digitally mediated work. *International Labour Review*, 25-45.

Johnston, H., & Land-Kazlauskas, C. (2019). Organizing On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective Bargaining in the Gig Economy. *Conditions of Work and Employment Series, 94*, pp. 2226-8952.

Kalleberg, A. L., & Dunn, M. (2016). Good Jobs, Bad Jobs in the Gig Economy. *Perspectives on Work*, pp. 10-13, 74.

Kellogg, K., Valentine, M., & Christin, A. (2020, January 15). Algorithms at Work: The New Contested Terrain of Control. *Academy of Management Annals, 14*(1). doi:10.5465/annals.2018.0174

Kepes, S., & Delery, J. (2007). HRM systems and the problem of internal fit. In P. Boxall, J. Purcell, & W. P. (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of human resource management* (pp. 385-404). London: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199547029.003.0019

Kost, D., Fieseler, C., & Wong, S. (2018, may). Finding meaning in a hopeless place? The constructuon of meaningfulness in digital microwork. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 101-110. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.01.002

Kost, D., Fieseler, C., & Wong, S. I. (2019). Boundaryless careers in the gig economy: An oxymoron. *Human Resource Management Journal*, 1-14.

Kozinets, R. (2016). Netnography: Understanding Networked Communication Society. In L. Sloan, & A. Quan-Haase, *The SAGE Handbook of Social Media Research Methods.* Toronto: SAGE.

Kuhn, K. (2016). The Rise of the "Gig Economy" and Implications for Understanding Work and Workers. *Industrial and Organisational Psychology, 9*(1), 157-162. doi:10.1017/iop.2015.129

Kuhn, K., & Maleki, A. (2017). MICRO-ENTREPRENEURS, DEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, AND INSTASERFS: UNDERSTANDING ONLINE LABOUR PLATFORM WORKFORCES. *Academy of Management Perspectives, 31*(3), 183-200. doi:10.5465/amp.2015.0111

Lee, M. (2018). Understanding perception of algorithmic decisions: Fairness, trust, and emotion in response to algorithmic management. *Big Data & Society*, 1-16. doi:10.1177/2053951718756684

Lee, M., Kusbit, D., & Dabbish, L. (2015). Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers. *CHI 2015* (pp. 1-11). Seoul: ACM. doi:10.1145/2702123.2702548

Lehdonvirta, V. (2018). Flexibility in the Gig Economy: Managing Time on Three Online. *New Technology, Work and Employment,, 33*(1), 13-29. doi:10.1111/ntwe.12102.

Lepak, D., & Snell, S. (1999). The Huamn Resource Architecture: Toward a Theory of Human Capital Allocation and Development. *The Academy of Management Review, 24*(1), 31-48. doi:10.2307/259035

Lepak, D., Liao, H., Chung, Y., & Harden, E. (2006). A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMETN RESEARCH. *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, 25*, 217-271.

Lepak, D., Smith, K., & Taylor, M. (2007). Value Creation and Value Capture: A Multilelel Perspective. *Academy of Management Review, 1*, 180-194.

Lepanjuuri, K., Wishart, R., & Cornick, P. (2018). *THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE IN THE GIG ECONOMY.* UK Government, Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/687553/The_characteristics_of_those_in_the_gig_economy.pdf

Lewis, A., Cardy, R., & Huang, L. (2019). Institutional theory and HRM: A new look. *Human Resource Management Review, 29*(3), 316-335. doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2018.07.006

Macduffie, J. (1994). Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: Organisational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry. *Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 48*(2), 197-221. doi:10.2307/2524483

Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. (2014). Lessons from Resource Dependence Theory for Contemporary Public and Nonprofit Management. *Public Administration Review, 75*(1), 14-25. doi:10.1111/puar.12181

Maleki, A., & Kuhn, K. (2017). Micro-Entrepreneurs, Dependent Contractors, and Instaserfs: Understanding Online Labour Platform Workforces. *Academy of Management Perspectives, 31*(3). doi:10.5465/amp.2015.0111

Maurer, I., Mair, J., & Oberg, A. (2020). Theorizing the Sharing Economy: Variety, and Trajectories of New Forms of Organizing. *Research in the Sociology of Organisations, 66*, 83-105.

Meijerink, J., & Keegan, A. (2019). Conceptualizing human resource management in the gig economy: Toward a platform ecosystem perspective. *Journal of Managerial Psychology, 34*(4). doi:10.1108/JMP-07-2018-0277

Meijerink, J., Keegan, A., & Bondarouk, T. (2021). Having their cake and eating it too? Online labour platforms and human resource management as a case of institutional complexity. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, published online. doi:10.1080/09585192.2020.1867616

Minter, K. (2017). Negotiating labour standards in the gig economy: Airtasker and Unions New South Wales. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 28*(3), 438-454. doi:10.1177/1035304617724305

Möhlmann, M., & Zalmanson, L. (2017). Hands on the wheel: Navigating algorithmic management and Uber drivers' autonomy. *International Conference on Information Systems*, *39.* Seoul.

Monks, K., Kelly, G., Conway, E., Flood, P., Truss, K., & Hannon, E. (2013). Understanding how HR systems work: the role of HR philosophy and. *Human Resource Management Journal, 23*(4), 379-395. doi:10.1111/j.1748-8583.2012.00207.x

NienHüser, W. (2008). Resource Dependence Theory – How Well Does It Explain Behavior of Organisations? *Management Revue, 19*(1/2), 9-32.

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. *The Academy of Management Review, 16*(1), 145-179. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/258610

Osterman, P. (1994). How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts it? *ILR Review, 47*(2), 173-188. doi:10.1177/001979399404700202

Ostroff, C., & Bowen, D. (2000). Moving HR to a higher level: HR practices and organisational effectiveness. 211-266.

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). *The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.* New York: Harper & Row.

Pichault, F., & McKeown, T. (2019). Autonomy at work in the gig economy: Analysing work status, work content and working conditions of independent professionals. *New Techonlogy, Work and Employment*, 59-72.

Reitz, H. (1979). Review: The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. *Academy of Management review, 4*(2). doi:10.5465/amr.1979

Rosenblat, A. (2019). Uberland: How Algorithms Are Rewriting the. In A. Rosenblat. Oakland: University of California Press.

Rosenblat, A., & Stark, L. (2016). Algorithmic Labour and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber's Drivers. *International Journal of Communication, 10*(27), 3758-3784. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2686227.

Schmidt, F. (2017). *Digital Labour Markets in the Platform Economy: Mapping the Political Challenges of Crowd Work and Gig Work.* Fredrich Ebert Stiftung.

Schuler, R. (1992). trategic Human Resource Management: Linking People with the Needs of Business. *Organisational Dynamics, 21*, 18-32. doi:10.1016/0090-2616(92)90083-Y

Sharif, P., & Yeoh, K. K. (2014). Independent Directors' Resource Provision Capability in Publicly-Listed Companies in Malaysia. *Corporate ownership and control, 11*(3), 113-121.

Shin, D., & Park, Y. (2019). Role of fairness, accountability, and transparency in algorithmic affordance. *Computers in Human Behavior, 98*, 277-284. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2019.04.019

Sparrow, P., Hird, M., Hesketh, A., & Cooper, C. (2016). *Leading HR.* London: Springer.

Sriraman, A., Bragg, J., & Kulkarni, A. (2017). Worker-Owned Cooperative Models for Training Artificial Intelligence. *CSCW '17 Companion: Companion of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing* (pp. 311-314). New York: Association for Computing Machinery. doi:doi.org/10.1145/3022198.3026356

Stern, R. (1979). The External Control of Organisations: A Resource Dependence Perspective - Book Review. *Contemporary Sociology, 8*(4), 612-613. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2065200

Suchman, M. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. *Academy of Management Review, 20*(3), 571-611. doi:10.2307/258788

Taylor, M., Marsh, G., Nicol, D., & Broadbent, P. (2017). *Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices.* UK Government. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627671/good-work-taylor-review-modern-working-practices-rg.pdf

Tran, M., & Sokas, R. (2017). The gig economy and contingent work: An occupational health assessment. *Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine*, 163-186.

Turner, J. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 35*, 1-22. doi:10.1002/ejsp.244

Tyskbo, D. (2019). Competing institutional logics in talent management: talent identification at the HQ and a subsidiary. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 1-35. doi:10.1080/09585192.2019.1579248

Upwork. (2020, August 20). *Create a 100% Complete Freelancer Profile*. Retrieved from Upwork help: https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/articles/211063188-Create-a-100-Complete-Freelancer-Profile

van Mierlo, J., Bondarouk, T., & Sanders, K. (2018). The dynamic nature of HRM implementation: a structuration perspective. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 29*(22), 3026-3045. doi:10.1080/09585192.2018.1443957

Whitener, E. (2001). Do “high commitment” human resource practices affect employee commitment?: A cross-level analysis using hierarchical linear modeling. *Journal of Management, 27*(5), 515-535. doi:10.1177/014920630102700502

Wong, S., Fieseler, C., & Kost, D. (2020). Digital labourers’ proactivity and the venture for meaningful work: Fruitful or fruitless? *Journal of Occupational and Organisational Psychology, 25*.

Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I. (2019a). Good Gig, Bad Gig: Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global Gig Economy. *Work, Employment and Society, 33*(1), 56-75. doi:10.1177/0950017018785616

Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I. (2019b). Networked but Commodified: The (Dis) Embeddedness of Digital Labour in the Gig Economy. *Sociology, 53*(5), 931-950. doi:10.1177/0038038519828906

Wright, P., & Boswell, W. (2002). Desegregating HRM: A review and synthesis of micro andmacro human resource management research. *Journal of anagement, 28*, 247,276.

Wu, Q., Zhang, H., Li, Z., & Liu, K. (2019). Labour control in the gig economy: Evidence from Uber in China. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1-23.

Zacharatos, A., Barling, J., & Iverson, R. (2005). High-Performance Work Systems and Occupational Safety. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 90*(1), 77-93. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.1.77

8. Appendices

8.1. Appendix 1: Detailed OLP typology retrieved from Schmidt (2017)



6: Schmidt (2017) elaborate typology of online labour platforms

8.2. Appendix 2: Interview protocol (Dutch) OLP representative.

Interview Protocol Platform vertegenwoordiger

Interviewer:

Gesprekspartner:

Datum - tijd:

Locatie/Medium:

Duur van het interview:

Introductie:

Dit Interview is om in mijn onderzoek de verscheidenheid aan platform werk en de implicaties die dit heeft voor het aantrekken, behouden en welbevinden van platformwerkers te kunnen uitvoeren. De platformeconomie bestaat immers uit meer dan alleen taxi- en maaltijdbezorgingsplatformen. In mijn onderzoek probeer ik te achterhalen op welke wijze het werk van platformwerkers verschilt en welke implicaties dit heeft voor de wijze waarop platformen omgaan met het aantrekken, behouden en betrokken houden van platformwerkers.

Daarom heb ik vandaag dit interview met u, maar wil ik voordat we beginnen nog een paar zaken duidelijk maken.

- In dit interview ben ik vooral benieuwd naar uw ervaringen, meningen, en **inzichten** die u heeft over de onderwerpen die we bespreken, er zijn dus geen goede of foute antwoorden.
- Het interview zal ongeveer een **uur** duren
- Het interview wordt **geanonimiseerd**, dus uw naam en dat van het platform zal niet te herleiden zijn in het uiteindelijke onderzoeksrapport / scriptie.
- Om het interview later verder te kunnen gebruiken zou ik het graag willen **opnemen**, vind u dat goed?
- Voordat ik het interview later ga gebruiken ga ik deze eerst **transcriberen**. Voordat ik er dan mee verder ga zal ik deze bij u verifiëren of alles klopt.
- Wanneer ik klaar ben met mijn onderzoek zal ik uiteraard **terugkoppelen** wat daar uit gekomen is.
- Alvast **bedankt** voor uw bijdrage aan mijn onderzoek.

Achtergrond informatie (komt niet in het verslag naar voren):

1. Wat is uw naam?
2. Hoe heet het platform?
3. Wat is uw functie?
    a. Hoe lang al?
    b. Daarvoor?

Taak eigenschappen

4. Welke taken / activiteiten voeren platformwerkers via uw platform uit? Kunt u deze taken omschrijven?
    a. Zijn de taken gestandaardiseerd? Kan de werker zelf bepalen hoe hij/zij de taak uitvoert? Zo ja, wat kan de werker zelf bepalen? Zo niet, wat wordt voorgeschreven?
    b. Zijn er bepaald vaardigheden of certificeringen nodig om de taken te doen?
    c. Worden de taken online of offline uitgevoerd?
    d. Zijn de taken kort of lang in duur? Hoe lang duurt de gemiddelde klus?
    e. Voert de werker de taak alleen uit, of doet zij dit samen met anderen (ofwel andere platformwerkers en/of werknemers van de opdrachtgever)?
    f. Wordt de aangeboden klus door één individu uitgevoerd of opgeknipt in deeltaken uitgevoerd door meerdere individuen?
    g. Over welke middelen dient de platformwerker zelf te beschikken cq. zelf te regelen om het werk uit te kunnen voeren? Welke middelen krijgt hij/zij van het platform en/of opdrachtgever. Voorbeelden van middelen zijn: vervoer, software, kleding, kennis, schoonmaakmiddelen, etc.
    h. Hebben de taken uitgevoerd door platformwerkers altijd deze kenmerken gehad, of zijn deze door de tijd veranderd?

Machtsverhoudingen

5. Wie/wat is/zijn de belangrijkste resources en stakeholders voor het implementeren van jullie business model en voor het succes van het platform?
6. Hoe waardevol/belangrijk zijn de platform werkers voor het welslagen van jullie platform? Waarom?
    a. Hoe belangrijk zijn zij voor het vervullen van de aanbodkant van werk?
    b. Hoe passen platform werkers in jullie business model?
7. Hoe waardevol/belangrijk zijn de opdrachtgevers voor het welslagen van jullie platform? Waarom?
    a. Hoe belangrijk zijn zij voor het vervullen van de vraagklant van werk?
    b. Hoe passen klanten in jullie business model?
8. Zijn er genoeg platform werkers beschikbaar voor het uitvoeren van de aangeboden taken/klussen cq. voor het welslagen van het platform?
    a. Is er een minimum / maximum aantal werkers dat nodig is?
    b. In hoeverre ervaren jullie uitdagingen in het aantrekken en behouden van voldoende platformwerkers? Voldoende om als platform succesvol te opereren. Welke uitdagingen? Waarom wel/niet?
9. Zijn er genoeg klanten om de platform werkers van genoeg werk te voorzien?
    a. In hoeverre ervaren jullie uitdagingen in het aantrekken en behouden van voldoende opdrachtgevers? Voldoende om als platform succesvol te opereren. Welke uitdagingen? Waarom wel/niet?

10. In hoeverre heeft het platform invloed op het gedrag/activiteiten van platformwerkers/opdrachtgevers, en vice versa? Waarom wel/niet? Op welke wijze wordt er invloed uitgeoefend? Als platform begint over freelance status: jullie gaven aan dat je afhankelijk bent van platform werkers – hoe zorgen jullie ervoor dat platformwerkers ook in lijn met jullie belang werken?

Recruitment

11. Op welke wijze proberen jullie ervoor te zorgen om genoeg platform werkers naar het platform te trekken?
    a. Wat doen jullie zoal om meer platform werkers te krijgen?
    b. Waarom doen jullie dat zo?
12. Wat is jullie plan om genoeg klanten naar het platform te trekken?
    a. Wat doen jullie zoal om meer klanten te krijgen?
13. Wie is er betrokken bij het aantrekken van meer platform werkers?
    a. Op welke manier?
14. Wie werkt er mee in het aantrekken van meer klanten?
    a. Op welke manier?

Selection

15. Welke criteria – if any – hanteert het platform in het besluit welke werker wel/niet toegang te geven tot het platform / online marktplaat?
16. Op welke wijze worden werkers en opdrachtgevers gematcht? Welke rol speelt platform daarin en welke rol werker/opdrachtgever?
17. Hoe veel vrijheid hebben werker en opdrachtgever om zelf keuze te maken met/voor wie te werken?
18. Waarom is voor deze type matching gekozen?

Training and development

19. Wat voor mogelijkheden worden er aangeboden voor platform werkers om zichzelf verder te ontwikkelen?
    a. Hoe past dit binnen jullie visie van de platform werker?
20. Wie voert/biedt de training en ontwikkeling activiteiten uit/aan?
21. Hoe is training en ontwikkeling terug te zien in het platform?

Performance management

22. Op welke wijze worden de prestaties van platformwerkers gemeten/beoordeeld? Welke rol spelen opdrachtgevers hierin? Waarvoor worden de prestatiegegevens gebruikt?
    a. Wat zijn de consequenties voor goede prestaties?
    b. Wat zijn de consequenties voor slechte prestaties?
23. Op basis van welke criteria worden platformwerkers beoordeeld (door de opdrachtgever)?
24. Welke 'objectieve' data (over daadwerkelijk gedrag) wordt verzameld over platformwerkers (bijv. acceptatie van klussen, snelheid, etc.)? Waarvoor worden de prestatiegegevens gebruikt?
    a. Wat zijn de consequenties voor goede prestaties?
    b. Wat zijn de consequenties voor slechte prestaties?
25.

Compensation

26. Wat is het verdienmodel van het platform?
27. Wat is de geldelijke vergoeding voor platformwerkers? Is deze vast (per klus) of variabel?
28. Wie bepaalt de hoogte van deze vergoeding? Het platform, werker of opdrachtgever? Waarom?
29. Welke actoren zijn verantwoordelijk voor de betalingen?
    a. Wie bepaalt de prijzen voor een taak?
    b. Verschillen de prijzen voor het zelfde soort taak?
30. Via welke routing komt geld van de opdrachtgever bij de werker terecht? Wie betaalt uiteindelijk de werker: het platform of de opdrachtgever?
31. Wordt er gewerkt met aanbetalingen?
32. Wat is de betalingsstructuur op het platform?
33. Hoe duidelijk is deze structuur gecommuniceerd richting de andere deelnemers op het platform?
34. Wanneer en hoe wordt de betaling voltooid?

Incentivization

35. Welke incentives/bonussen ontvangen platformwerkers bij een goede prestatie en/of een piek in vraag naar platformwerkers op te vangen? Wie bepaalt de hoogte hiervan? Wie betaalt dit uit?

Involvement

36. In hoeverre en op welke wijze hebben werkers en/of opdrachtgevers inspraak in het beleid van het platform cq. organisatie van de online marktplaats?
    a. Tot in hoeverre?
    b. Op welke manier?

c. Wie doen er mee?
d. Wie is ze gestart?
e. Lijken die tot meer betrokkenheid te leiden?

---

job design

37. In hoeverre is de platformwerker vrij om te bepalen hoe hij/zij het werk uitvoert? In hoeverre wordt dit door de opdrachtgever en/of platform bepaald?

Afsluiting

38. Kan ik jullie later nog bereiken als ik nog verdere vragen heb?
39. Hebben jullie nog vragen voor mij?

- In dat geval, bedankt voor het interview.
- Ik zal van mij laten horen wanneer ik het interview heb getranscribeerd, en dan nogmaals als ik mijn onderzoek heb afgerond.
- Jullie blijven anoniem in het onderzoek.
- En ontzettend bedankt.

8.3. Appendix 3: Detailed interview structure

With the task characteristics the dichotomies from table 2 are intended related to standardisation, required skill level, online/offline, duration, individually/crowd tasked, and personal investment. These characteristics form the basis for the rest of the interview and will be investigated with questions such as: ”A*re the tasks on this platform performed online*?” and “*Are the tasks on this platform performed by an individual or a group of gig workers*?”.

With criticality of a resource, the most important and valuable resource to the actor is intended. When a resource is vital to an actor they are more dependent on it. To find out what the critical resource is the interviewees are asked different questions per actor. To the platform representative example questions would be ”*What is the most important resource to your organisation*?” and “*What value do the gig workers have to the platform*?” as well as “*What value do the clients have to the platform*?”.

Abundance is the next concept, and relates to the availability or scarcity of the resource in question. When a resource that an actor depends on is scarce that means that the dependence is more severe, and the resulting power is greater. Finding out the abundance of the resources on the OLP will be done using questions such as: “*How easy can you find gigs to do*?”

Then the last determining factor of power is ownership. Ownership means who determines who has access to the resource, and consequentially influences those dependent on the resource. Asking who determines the access to the resource they most desperately need differs per actor. Platform representatives would for example be asked: “*Who influences your access to the offer and demand of labour that you can use on your platform*?”.

Once the Criticality, abundance, and ownership are determined, the power balance can be established. Power means the capacity to influence others by your control of resources that they need to reach their goals. Dependence and power are in a 1:1 ratio, and is highly emphasized in the RDT. Determining the power balance can thus be done using the previous three aspects, but are further investigated with direct questions such as: “*Which actor is the most powerful on the online labour platform*?”.

Once the power balance is established questions regarding the HRM activities will be asked. For this questions related to the policy domains are asked, because these allow the interviewee to go more in depth into practices used to the ends of those policies, as well as the bigger picture overarching themes. The questions will firstly be about the intentions of those policies (and practices) to investigate the HRM content, and later in the interview about the process. It is expected that process and content might mix during the interviews, as this theoretical distinction might not be as clear to the interviewees as it is to the researcher(s).

When it comes to recruitment, the ways in which gig workers and clients are attracted to use the platform are intended. The platforms is asked questions such as: “*how do you plan to attract (more) gig workers to your platform*?”. This should give insight into the policies and practices used on platforms. “*who did what to attract more clients and gig workers to the platform*?” is asked of the platform representatives in order to go more into the process.

Selection is the second policy domain, and entails the intentions regarding appointing work to the gig workers, or assigning gig workers to the clients, depending on the platform structure.

Platform representatives receive questions such as: "*what is the idea behind the connecting of gig workers and clients*?", "*Why is it arranged in that way?*", and "*How are the clients and gig workers connected on this platform?".*

The training and development policy domain entails the intentions towards further developing the skills of the workforce. Again the platform representative is asked questions regarding the HRM content with questions such as: "*What possibilities are offered to gig workers to develop themselves further*?".

Performance management means the judgement of quality of work and the consequences of said judgement. For platforms the questions regarding this subject include: "*what is the goal of performance appraisal on the platform*?" and "*what are the consequences of performance review*?". Regarding the process of performance management questions such as: "*who perform performance review*?" and "*how clear, or transparent are the consequences of performance review*?" are asked.

Compensation is the policy domain regarding the payment for completed tasks. For the platform representatives questions regarding the HRM content include: "*What is the payment structure on the platform*?" and "*How does the platform earn from the transactions over the platform*?". Regarding the HRM process questions are asked such as: "*who sets the prices for the gigs*?", "*do the prices vary for the same task*?" and "*how is the payment completed*?" are asked to all actors.

Often related to compensation is the incentive policy domain, about ways to keep the workforce motivated. Again the platform representatives receive questions regarding the HRM content such as: "*what programs towards increasing motivation do you employ (if any*?" and "*how do you determine when to apply motivation-increasing programs*?". The process of incentivization is addressed with questions such as: "*How are the gig workers incentivized*?", "*Who incentivizes the gig workers*?", and "*When are gig workers incentivized*?".

Involvement is a less common theme on online labour platforms, but nonetheless an area that platforms approach differently. Involvement means the intentions or programs towards including the workforce into decision-making on a strategic level. Platform representatives are firstly asked whether such programs exist, and "*if so how and to what extent*?". The representatives are asked on the process side: "*what involvement programs are there*?", "*who participates in them*?", "*who instigated them*?", and "*do they seem to work/get results*?".

Lastly, job design is the policy domain about the intentions towards shaping and demarcating tasks and requirements related to a job function. On online labour platform this means what elements are included in a gig, and how long it should take. Platform representatives are for example asked about this: "*What is supposed to be included in a gig on this platform*?" and "*how fluent or fixed are gigs on the platform*?". Regarding the process they are asked questions such as: "*who is responsible for job design of the gigs*?", "*is job design a recurring activity or are the gigs fixed?*", and "*are the gig boundaries negotiable, how?*".

8.4. Appendix 4: List of a priori codes

Code:	**Code categories:**
Crowd tasked	Task Characteristics
General task description	Task Characteristics
High Personal Investment	Task Characteristics
High Skill Level	Task Characteristics
Individually & Crowd tasked	Task Characteristics
Individually tasked	Task Characteristics
Low Skill Level	Task Characteristics
Low/No Personal Investment	Task Characteristics
Offline	Task Characteristics
On-demand/short task	Task Characteristics
ongoing process/long task	Task Characteristics
Online	Task Characteristics
Online & Offline	Task Characteristics
Standardized Work	Task Characteristics
Unstandardized Work	Task Characteristics
Client is the most Powerful Actor	Resource Dependence Theory
Ownership of Resource	Resource Dependence Theory
Platform is the most Powerful Actor	Resource Dependence Theory
Resource is Abundant	Resource Dependence Theory
Resource is Critical	Resource Dependence Theory
Resource is not Abundant	Resource Dependence Theory
Resource is not Critical	Resource Dependence Theory
Unclear who the most Powerful Actor is	Resource Dependence Theory
Worker is the most Powerful Actor	Resource Dependence Theory
Practices	HRM Content & Process
Compensation	HRM Content
High Performance Work System	HRM Content
HR system for Commitment	HRM Content
HR system for Control	HRM Content
HR system for Involvement	HRM Content
Incentivization	HRM Content
Involvement	HRM Content
Job Design	HRM Content
Performance Management	HRM Content

Recruitment	HRM Content
Selection	HRM Content
Training & Development	HRM Content
actual HRM: Client	HRM Process
actual HRM: Fourth Party	HRM Process
actual HRM: Platform	HRM Process
actual HRM: Worker	HRM Process
Intended HRM	HRM Process
Perceived HRM	HRM Process
Type of Gigworkers	

8.5. Appendix 5: Power relations between actors on the interviewed platforms

Platform	**offer of labour: criticality**	**offer of labour: abundance**	**access to labour: criticality**	**access to labour: abundance**	**demand of labour: criticality**	**demand of labour: abundance**
pl1	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant
	for the client: irrelevant	for the client: irrelevant	for the client: irrelevant	for the client: irrelevant	for the gig worker: irrelevant	for the gig worker: abundant
pl2	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant
pl3	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: not critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant
pl4	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant
pl5	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: not abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: not abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant
pl6	for the platform: critical	for the platform: seasonally abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant

	for the client: critical	for the client: not abundant	for the client: not critical	for the client: not abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: seasonally abundant
pl7	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: **complicated**	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant
pl8	for the platform: not critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: **complicated**	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: not critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: **complicated**
pl9	for the platform: critical	for the platform: abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: not abundant
pl10	for the platform: not critical	for the platform: seasonally abundant	for the gig worker: not critical	for the gig worker: seasonally abundant	for the platform: critical	for the platform: not abundant
	for the client: critical	for the client: seasonally abundant	for the client: critical	for the client: seasonally abundant	for the gig worker: critical	for the gig worker: seasonally abundant

8.6. Appendix 6: Overview of practices per actor per HRM domain per platform

Platform	HR Domain	Practices	actor(s)
Pl-1: the gig worker is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Visiting business fairs; Online advertising (mostly LinkedIn); Organizing knowledge exchange events; CV screening for new gig workers; On-boarding/intake call; Refer-a-friend scheme	The platform; The platform; The gig workers; The platform; The Platform; The gig worker
	Selection	CV screening for new gig workers; On-board/intake call; Pre-selection; Profile optimization nudging; Job interviews per gig; Open application for a gig	The platform; The platform; The platform; The platform; The platform & gig worker; The gig worker
	Training & Development	Knowledge exchange events; Tax and other support services; Advice to use FAQ page	The gig worker; The platform; The platform
	Performance management	Thumbs up or down	The client and/or platform
	Compensation	Prices are initially set by the platform, but negotiated over; Actual payment	Gig worker & platform (sometimes fourth party); Client to platform to Fourth party to gig worker
	Incentivization	Refer-a-friend scheme	The gig worker
	Involvement	Profile creation feedback; General feedback through the help-tab	The gig worker; The gig worker
	Job Design	Provide a briefing and desired iterations; Availability calendar; Pay and communication preference page	The platform or client; The gig worker; The gig worker
Pl-2: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Podcast; Social media outreach; Member-get-member scheme	Platform & gig worker; Platform; Gig workers/clients
	Selection	Filtering of categories; Offering gigs; Requesting gigs; Profanity filter; Actual selection decision	Platform; Gig workers; Clients; Platform; Gig workers or clients
	Training & Development	FAQ page with video, flow chart, and mission/vision statement	Platform
	Performance management	Written reviews;	Clients;

		Removal of malicious platform users	Platform
	Compensation	The poster of the gig determines the payment	Client/gig worker
	Incentivization	Member-get-member scheme; Nudging towards completing profile and posting a gig	Client/gig worker; Platform
	Involvement	-	-
	Job Design	Gig creating includes determining job boundaries	Client & gig workers
pl-3: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Social media outreach; Search engine findability; Network partnerships; Allowing importing portfolios to start on a higher level; Portfolios are checked before activation on the platform	Platform; Platform; Platform; Platform; Platform
	Selection	contests are open for all participants; Projects work with pitching/bidding; Winner of the contest is selected after closing the contest based on the sent designs/ideas; Project winner is chosen based on pitches/bids	Platform; Platform; Client; Client
	Training & Development	FAQ page; social network for knowledge exchange	Platform; Gig workers
	Performance management	Choosing a contest winner functions as quality control; Ratings of 1-5 stars and written review; Malperformance leads to more checks, and eventually expulsion	Client; Client; Platform
	Compensation	Contests offer a prize for the winner(s); Contests can be guaranteed or not; Projects have negotiated hourly or total prizes; Pay-out is biweekly, minus the commission	Client; Client; Client & Gig worker; Platform
	Incentivization	Badge system to give access to better gigs	Platform & gig worker
	Involvement	Focus group for feedback; Community feedback outreach; Gig worker initiatives	Clients & gig workers; Platform; Gig workers

	Job Design	The briefing determines the goal; Open communication during the design process for iterations	The client; The Client & the gig worker
Pl-4: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	General digital recruitment over Facebook, LinkedIn, Google, and Instagram; Targeted Facebook, Instagram and phone recruitment; Collabouration recruitment; Positive media coverage; English speaking and living in the guide-city long enough through on-boarding call	The platform; The platform; Fourth parties (travel organisations, influencers); Fourth parties (media); The platform
	Selection	English speaking and living in the guide-city long enough through on-boarding call; Filter options to select a gig worker; Gigs are reviewed before posting	The platform; Clients; The platform
	Training & Development	Guidelines for creating gigs and communicating on the platform	The platform
	Performance management	1-5 star and written review; Follow-up for low reviews	The client; The platform
	Compensation	For tours hourly prices are used; For the video call there is a fixed price; Commissions are communicated clearly beforehand and shown visibly; The payment is afterwards for tours; Payment is beforehand for videocalls	Gig worker; Platform; Platform; Client and platform; Client and platform
	Incentivization	Discount coupons for clients and gig workers; Granting influencers a commission for all traffic they generate	The Platform; Platform & Fourth parties
	Involvement	feedback per WhatsApp, phone, email, and online chat	Gig workers and Clients
	Job Design	Guidelines for creating gigs and communicating on the platform; Tours can be created on the platform in several categories; Clients can request tailored gigs; Gig workers are free to create	The platform; The gig worker; The Client; The gig worker

		gigs however they prefer otherwise	
Pl-5: the gig worker is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Digital advertisement; Visiting educational institutes with promotion teams; Find local media attention; Use gig worker success in attracting more gig workers; On-boarding call	The platform; The platform; The platform; The platform & gig workers; The platform & gig workers
	Selection	Gig workers can do 2 gigs before making freelancer arrangements; Clients post gigs with an estimated hourly rate; Gig workers bid on the gigs with their hourly rate and motivation; After the client has chosen a gig worker, they both can cancel 72 hours before the gig starts	The platform; The client; The gig workers; The clients and the gig worker
	Training & Development	Accountant and coach that help become a good freelancer; FAQ with videos	Fourth party; Platform
	Performance management	Written reviews; Reliability and number of shifts worked tracking	The client; The platform
	Compensation	Gig workers apply for gigs with their hourly rate; Clients pick gig workers and pay afterwards; A Billing partner pays out the gig workers and platform weekly	Gig workers; Clients & Fourth party; Fourth party
	Incentivization	Collective liability insurance	The platform
	Involvement	Open to contact and feedback through mail, WhatsApp, phone, and other chat; Questionnaires among platform users to ask for feedback	Gig workers and Clients; The platform
	Job Design	Determining job boundaries like duration and task description; Choosing which gig to do --> planning	The client; The gig workers
Pl-6: the gig worker is the most	Recruitment	Screening of potential gig workers; Online marketing to find new gig workers and clients; Member-get-member scheme	The platform; The platform; Gig workers

powerful actor	Selection	A client posts a gig online; The gig is proposed to gig workers; Gig workers can show interest; An algorithm and platform employee selects the most suitable gig workers from the interests pool; The client choses the gig worker to do the gig	The client; The platform; The gig workers; The platform; The Client
	Training & Development	Offers support services (accounting, debt collecting)	The platform
	Performance management	review by clients on several criteria; Malperformance leads to follow-up evaluation and possible exclusion; Tracking how fast gig workers respond; Three month trial period evaluation	The client; The platform; The platform; The gig worker and platform
	Compensation	Prices for the gigs are negotiated; The gig worker pays a 2% fee on the gig price to the platform	The client & the gig worker; The gig worker & the platform
	Incentivization	retention scheme; member-get-member scheme	The platform; The gig worker
	Involvement	Intensive contact with gig workers about development of the platform; Gig worker ambassadors represent gig worker interests	The platform; The gig worker
	Job Design	Nudging of gig workers towards working more in peak demand periods; Determining gig boundaries; Gig scheduling	The platform; The client; The gig worker
Pl-7: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	LinkedIn and network headhunting; Recommendations by clients; Open applications; On-boarding call to indicate specialism	The platform; The client; The gig worker; The platform

	Selection	The platform places gig workers in the client's communities based on suitable characteristics; The client accepts gig workers into their communities; Gigs are posted in the community; Gig workers can bid on the gigs posted; Clients chose the appropriate gig worker for the job	The platform; The client; The client; The gig worker; The client
	Training & Development	-	-
	Performance management	Verbal review of gig worker performance; Remark field to retain knowledge of previous collabouration	The client; The platform
	Compensation	The gig workers bid with an hourly rate; After/during the gig the client pays the platform; The platform pays the gig worker minus the fee; If the gig worker was from the client's network the fee is lower; Sometimes the client pays the gig worker's user-fee	The gig workers; The client; The platform; The client & platform; The client
	Incentivization	-	-
	Involvement	focus group feedback outreach; Checking with clients whether they appreciate the upcoming features; Minimal implementation of gig worker suggested features	The platform, client, and gig worker; The platform and the client; The gig worker
	Job Design	The client posts the job requirements in the gig; The gig worker does the other job design activities	The client; The gig worker
Pl-8: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Ensuring findability in search engines; Gig workers join the platform organically; Requested gig workers are headhunted through LinkedIn; New registries are checked whether they are in line with the goal of the platform	The platform; Gig worker; The platform; The platform

	Selection	A job briefing is posted on the platform; Multiple gig workers are matched on the briefing; Gig workers pitch on the gig; The client selects a gig worker to complete the gig	The client; The platform; The gig workers; The client
	Training & Development	Coaching in how to write a winning pitch; Directing to the FAQ page	The platform; The platform
	Performance management	Google form satisfaction evaluation; Follow-up evaluation with malperformance; Option to display references in pitches and on their profile	The client & the platform; The platform and the gig worker; The gig worker
	Compensation	Blind auction pitching; The client pays the gig worker directly; The platform trusts the gig worker to pay honest fees; There is only a fee on the first connection between gig worker and client, not on the following relationship; Currently no fees during the covid-19 pandemic; Subscription or fee option for gig workers	The platform; The client; The gig worker and the platform; The platform; The platform; The gig worker
	Incentivization	Portfolio “importability”	The platform
	Involvement	Feedback providing channels	The platform
	Job Design	During matching it is not mandatory to accept the gig; The client provides a briefing; All additional steps in the process are up to the gig worker, as long as it fits the briefing	The gig worker; The client; The gig worker
Pl-9: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Search engine findability; Online job board posting; Social media marketing; Offline outreach by franchise holders; Collabourations with care institutes	The platform; The platform; The platform; The platform; Fourth parties
	Selection	Clients post gigs with their franchise holder; Gig workers can show their interests for gigs the platform shows;	The client; The platform & gig worker;

		The platform proposes the interested gig workers to the client; The client choses the gig worker to do the gig	The platform & The client; The client
	Training & Development	Trainings about domestic aid are offered by the platform	The platform
	Performance management	Qualitative evaluation is conducted several times a year; Specific issues can be reported to the platform	The platform and the client; The client
	Compensation	prices are determined based on task complexity, region of the Netherlands and the CLA; A billing company bills the client and pays the gig worker and platform;	The platform; Fourth party
	Incentivization	pricing per region	The platform
	Involvement	Feedback surveys; Offline feedback given	The platform; The gig worker
	Job Design	Choosing gigs is up to the gig worker; The content of gigs is determined by the clients	The gig worker; The client
Pl-10: the client is the most powerful actor	Recruitment	Online marketing campaigns such as TikTok; Online job boards; LinkedIn campaigns; Professional networks; PR-campaigns in the media; Cold-calling; Make the platform desirable over other platforms through functionality to allow organic growth; Member-get-member scheme; Mandatory certification control; On-boarding call	The platform; The platform; The platform; The platform; Fourth parties; The platform & gig workers; The platform; The gig worker; The platform; The platform
	Selection	The client posts a gig; Gig workers can apply; The client reviews the gig workers and choses one; After having worked together before gig workers and clients can favorite one another, making future matching quicker/easier	The client; The gig worker; The client; The clients and gig workers

	Training & Development	Considering assisting gig workers to find fourth party training; Directs gig workers to FAQ with tips and tricks	(Fourth parties); Platform
	Performance management	Mutual evaluation; 5-star and written review; Ratings are visible on profiles of clients and gig workers; The platform tracks how long gig workers work for the same client to prevent exceeding freelancer contracts	Clients & gig workers; Clients & gig workers; The platform; The platform
	Compensation	The platform automatically generates bills based on gig worker hour administration and client planning systems; Clients pay gig workers directly; Clients pay the platform a separate fee	The platform, the client & the gig worker; The client; The client
	Incentivization	Active updates about gig supply, including recommendations to find work elsewhere while aiming at retention; Member-get-member scheme	The platform; The gig worker
	Involvement	allowing for feedback through several channels, using it when 80% of gig workers will use it; Account managers with clients	The platform & gig workers; The platform
	Job Design	the client determines the job characteristics; The gig worker shows interest in the gigs befitting their planning	The client; The gig worker

8.7.Appendix 7: Elaborate philosophy per platform

Platform and their name hereafter:	**Philosophy:**
Pl-1: Consultancy platform	The gig worker is added value to the mother company: "*besides having to pay wages you have to pay a fee of 15% or in some countries 35% to head-hunters, which we can cut because we do our own recruitment with the platform. Additionally we have the advantage that we can now bid on projects that we normally could not bid on. Now we can, and we can participate on projects where we did not have the expertise before*" (platform representative). The company no longer needs to pay head-hunters to find specialists, and they can bid on consultancy projects that they would not have the expertise for without the platform. Therefore the gig workers are seen as a competitive advantage to the company, and the platform as a way of saving costs. The gig workers are seen as specialists that cannot be controlled, but need to be trusted, like in an high performance work system.
Pl-2: Service trading platform	As the platform is philanthropical, and not intended to make a profit, the gig workers and client are the business of the platform. The gig workers must align with the goal of the platform if they want to participate, as they cannot earn money over the platform. The platform thus sees the gig workers as the business who should have the same ideals as the platform.
Pl-3: Design platform	The design platform considers gig workers as instrumental to reach the clients goals: "*the client makes a briefing of what they want and we assume that the designers will stick to the briefing*" (platform representative). The platform recognizes the variety in the gig worker population, and focusses on retaining the best quality and more committed gig workers: "*anyone can register, but we have for example contests that are only available to gig workers with a higher level badge"* (platform representative). The platform thus views the gig workers as replaceable cogs in the machine, but wants to retain the best cogs. This philosophy contains elements of a control oriented as well as a commitment based philosophy.
Pl-4: Local guide platform	The platform sees the gig workers as the most valuable resource on the platform: "*I think that in the end the locals are the most important element, because, yeah, they are the platform… If you start with clients, who book tours, you will definitely find locals willing to host tours, but that is very money-driven. Currently it is more passion-driven, with people who enjoy showing their city*" (platform representative) the gig workers are the resource best fit to achieve the platform's goals of sustainable tourism. But on the other side gig workers who are active are urged to follow the guidelines set for offering gigs and contacting clients. Therefore the platforms' philosophy is commitment-based, as the platform searches out gig workers who share the platform's goal, but has control oriented elements as well.
Pl-5: Catering platform	As the platform is founded to solve a personnel shortage the gig workers are valuable to the platform: "*We have a surplus of demand, well in Covid-times a bit less. But normally we have a demand surplus, which makes every gig worker valuable to us*" (platform representative). The gig workers are also considered valuable as individuals: "*I consider it the duty and the commitment of a platform to protect their gig workers a bit…. Gig workers are independent people seeking risk, but I believe in the desire to work*

	independent and on a free basis, but that they should be protected in the process" (platform representative). The platform's philosophy thus considers the gig workers as a competitively critical resource but also as a group of precarious individuals in need of protection.
Pl-6: Repair and building platform	As this platform markets itself with offering the best quality gig workers, the platform's philosophy reflects that by attempting to only attract the best new gig workers. As they value gig workers as their competitive advantage over similar platforms, they trust them and treat them with respect comparable to a high performance work system. But on the other hand the platform seeks a lot of control to guarantee the highest quality to the clients: "*we have high demands of our gig workers. They need to show experience in their areas of expertise by delivering a set of references before they can start working with the platform, and maintain good results*". So their philosophy shows elements of control as well as high performance work systems.
Pl-7: Legal platform	the legal platform considers their gig workers as a competitive advantage, not to other platforms, but to secondment agencies and temp agencies in the legal sector. The platform can offer more and better gig workers than those agencies can, and they are the only platform. These gig workers that they either know from personal relations, recommendations of clients, or active talent searching in professional networks has granted the platform with a widely specialized talent pool. The platform also does not consider the gig workers as a group that can be controlled, but can be collaborated with: "*the market is highly professionalized. These people have made their careers at large law firms and have deliberately chosen to work on their own, and not have a boss. They do as they please"* (platform representative). The platform's HRM philosophy is thus one where the gig workers are seen as the most valuable resource of the company, who can be guided but not controlled.
Pl-8: Marketing platform	The marketing platform considers the gig workers as specialists: "*Many companies make the mistake of searching a centipede (*someone who can do all types of marketing content). *At some point I found out that there is a specialist for every specialism you seek.* The gig workers are thus all specialists in the eyes of the platform. " *I have tried to build a platform that satisfies the needs of content creators, and satisfies the needs of marketeers. I assumed that if both are satisfied we will be satisfied*." The platform therefore tries to service the gig workers in such a way that they will service the platform in turn. As the platform is currently free of charges during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is clear that the platform values the expertise of the gig workers. The platform tries to cater the gig workers needs to do their jobs as well as possible.
Pl-9: Elderly care platform	The elderly care platform considers the gig workers as their core resource towards solving a societal problem: "*the government has pulled back from elderly care more and more… so some tasks in the elderly care are more in demand, and we have grown into that gap"* (platform representative). The platform seeks gig workers who want to help fill this gap, and not necessarily people who are dependent on this work: *"we see that people want to contribute to society, and that it gives a good feeling to help people… in general the gig work is done part time. It is not really the type of work to do full-time."* So the philosophy of the platform towards gig workers is that they are helping the platform solve a societal issue because they want to, and not because they need work. So the gig workers are important to the platform's

	success, and they should align with the platform's goals, similar to a commitment based philosophy.
Pl-10: Care institute platform	This platform acknowledges that the gig workers not only use this platform, but use other ways of finding work too. Therefore the platform uses a philosophy of commitment, that they want the gig workers to become loyal to their platform over other ways of finding gigs. "*When we have a shortage of gigs for the gig workers what we do -we need to keep both clients and gig workers satisfied- is that we need to make sure they return to our platform, and not go to other platforms without coming back. So we do several things to keep them enthusiastic about our platform over others"* (platform representative). So the platform mostly has a philosophy for commitment, but has some control elements too, where they try to streamline the matching process, and make transactions as smooth as possible, without much influence of the gig workers.