Government behavior in times of economic uncertainty: case study on the impact of Brexit on the economy and the measures taken by the EU and the Dutch government

by

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Abstract

The withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, in short: the Brexit, has been one of the most memorable and impact-full policy events in the history of the EU. This research is committed to look into the economic and social consequences of Brexit and the role a governmental institution can play. This by performing a content analysis that included official EU and governmental documents, news articles, speeches and recommendations provided to the government. Using the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect (EVLN) framework, their attitude will be determined. The research shows quite an active attitude of the EU, with certain topics being unnegotiable from their side, while at the same time the Netherlands is quite passive and doesn't show a clear opinion in the matter. Regardless of this passive attitude, the Netherlands did take certain measures. These mostly have been focused on informing companies, citizens and other stakeholders on what they can do themselves and small financial compensation for the transition. The EU has been taken complementary measures that, besides communication, were focused on legal matters, extra financial compensation and practical matters. Concluding, the research has shown a different attitude and approach for the EU compared with the Dutch government. This has to do with negotiation power, holding on to principles and a different focus of where they wanted and were able to support all the relevant stakeholders. This result supports previous research on the EVLN framework by confirming at the one hand that dissatisfaction can lead to exit, but also that when there are no reasonable alternatives it is difficult to voice this dissatisfaction. The research thus aims to provide more insight in the chaos Brexit has brought about, as well as general governmental and EU behavior.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction of topic

After World War 2, the whole of Europe knew that something had to change. The horrors of having to experience such a time of uncertainty, poverty and of course warfare of this magnitude made everyone think. It eventually led to the union of six European countries in the European Economic Community (EEC), enshrined in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and entering into effect on January 1st 1958. The British government first stayed out of this union, as it wanted to put its national interests first (Dinan, 2014). After the transition period of 15 years, as intended by the treaty, on January 1st 1973 the UK eventually joined the EEC among Denmark and Ireland. The EEC had been established as an economic cooperation in the first place as it resulted into the free movement of persons, services, capital and products. But besides that, it also aimed at contributing to the raising of living standards and the promotion of peace (Weil, 1965). Ultimately, in 1991, the Member States agreed in the Maastricht Treaty on even closer European integration and they officially named it the European Union (EU). Throughout the years the EU kept growing as different European countries also become members (Cini & Borrán, 2016). This changes in 2016 when the UK holds a national referendum on whether to leave the European Union. This would shortly be referred to as the "Brexit". Brexit represents a fundamental rejection of European integration, that is supposed to be inevitable. A member state is leaving, for the first time in the history of the EU (Dinan, 2019).

The EU Single Market and Customs Union for Member States of the European Union results in free trade and movement and therefore provides the deepest possible economic integration of a region (Felbermayr et al, 2017). The impact of Brexit was predicted to be big, as the economic integration of the UK with the rest of the EU falls apart. The rise of transaction costs is identified as the main "issue" Brexit will cause for the European economy. This rise is mostly seen in procedural complications at the border (Wenz et al, 2020) and includes both tariff- as non-tariff barriers (Dhingra et al, 2016). At the same time Brexit may also cause good things. While other crises such as the refugee problem seem to separate member states, Brexit at first created a surprising degree of unity and solidarity among the remaining Member States (Dinan, 2019).

The rise in extra costs will be felt through the whole of Europe and thus an important issue for the EU to tackle. At the same time, individual member states also have the responsibility to help their national economy. This research aims to look into how both the EU and the Dutch government handled the Brexit situation. What has been their attitude towards taking measures; why and how where they able to help the economy, and society, in the chaotic years leading up to the official withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Are they neglective, or did they have an active voice in tackling this problem? It is important to see what measures have been taken and what the intentions where with these measures.

1.2 Research question

As stated before, this research focuses on understanding how Brexit changed trade relationship between the UK and Europe and what both their attitudes where in the years leading to the actual Brexit. What did they do to prevent an unstable economy, have a sustainable trade future, and why did they do this? The main question of this research is as follows:

"What was the role and attitude of the EU and the Dutch government in reducing the impact of the changed trade situation on the economy and society as a result of Brexit?"

In order to be able to answer this correctly, the main research question encompasses the following sub-questions:

1. *What has been the predicted and real situation regarding Brexit and the European economy?*

This first sub-question contributes to answering the central research question in two ways. One, it answers in what way the previous trade situation exactly has changed between the UK and the EU. Secondly, it provides the first insight to what extent both parties could have been able to prepare for the different scenarios. This information can clarify how and whether a government or other institutional organization can act in such a crisis. This helps answering sub-questions two and three.

2. *To what extent did the EU and the Dutch government have a specific attitude or intention towards Brexit and the impact of Brexit on the economy and why?*

The second sub-question contributes to answering the central research question by explaining in how both governmental institutions have handled the Brexit situation in terms of reactions and opinions, in sum: their attitude towards the Brexit. It will be explained where this attitude comes from, for example in terms of certain pressure being there or the lack of alternatives.

3. *To what extent did the EU and the Dutch government take (additional) measures to prevent an unstable economy after Brexit and why?*

This third sub-question contributes to the central question by showing the measures that have been taken in order to (hopefully) minimalize the impact of Brexit. Besides giving an overview of the actual measures taken, it also shows the differences in tasks and responsibilities between a national government and a bigger institutional cooperation like the EU. A national government is a different institutional system than the EU and thus can have different options on how to handle a crisis as Brexit. By answering this question, not only the role of the Dutch government will be answered, but also the differences between such a national government and an institution like the EU will become clear.

1.3 Scientific relevance

Increasing globalization causes the process of trade policymaking to be more important than it once has been. This is because globalization can be linked to an increase of consumption, employment, imports & exports and foreign direct investments which all need to be managed in trade policies (UNCTAD, 2018). The same applies to the role of a National Government in such a massive change in policy. To understand decision-making, it is necessary to understand the conditions under which the government operates. According to Levin (2006), researchers can bring evidence and careful thinking into the messy process of public learning. He states that there is still a lot that can be improved in understanding policy processes and putting it into practice after. Almeida & Báscolo (2006) agree with this and state that it has even gained greater prominence in recent decades, because of major processes and changes in the world. This research can thus contribute to the general understanding of how governments work, which can help future policymakers and policy researchers.

Brexit can be seen as one of those major changes in the world. Little research has yet been conducted into the new trade situation that Brexit has caused between the UK and Europe. This is in line with the expectation, as the trade-part of Brexit only officially entered into force on the 1st of January 2021. This research can thus contribute to early research into the effects of Brexit while being fully into force. It will help other and future researchers understand the unsure but interesting time that Brexit has caused and how government institutions (can) react to this.

1.4 Societal relevance

Besides the scientific relevance, it is also a very important topic for society in general. Holmberg and Rothstein (2015) state that the quality of the well-being of citizens in a certain country is very much dependent on the quality of their government institutions. Unfortunately, there are still a lot of people who suffer from problems like lack of access to safe water, high infant mortality and poverty. This is largely due to the fact that these societies are dominated by dysfunctional government institutions. In order to change this, research is necessary. This research will thus contribute to more knowledge about how governments work, what their intentions are and how it is possible to notice these intentions. This can ultimately help to stop or prevent government dysfunction.

Alongside the relevance of the general topic of how governments work, it is also very relevant to do research on this topic with a specific focus on Brexit. As some predictions about the impact of Brexit have stated, the new trade situation could lead to a negative impact on particular branches. Sectors hit by the new trade situation are mostly those who export a lot of their products to the UK. One example is the Dutch flower industry. Within this sector the Dutch company "Dutch Flower Group" is the largest international trading company in flowers, bouquets plants and decorative cut foliage in the world. They account for more than 3,150 employees, mostly based in the Netherlands (Dutch Flower Group, n.d.). Another example is the Dutch fishing industry, that exports a lot of their fish to the UK. This sector generated about 6,200 fulltime jobs in approximately 300 companies in the Netherlands (Dutch Fish, n.d.). This shows that all these people, and their families, rely on these sectors to be able to maintain the trade with the UK on an effective, efficient and profitable manner. Because if this is no longer the case, there is a chance that companies will go bankrupt or are forced to fire employees, which means these people will lose their income. Gaining more insight on how governments can and want to help maintaining the trade between the Netherlands and the UK might help these companies, which also means these people keep their jobs. This makes the societal relevance of research into this problem high.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Brexit context

Before looking into the theoretical approaches used in this research, first the Brexit context will be made clear. As said before, Brexit is the historical event of the UK leaving the EU. In this context, there is a "before" and "after situation.

The "before" situation is all the years before January 1 2021, the date on which the UK officially left the EU. The rules and agreements about trade and any other important topics, that apply to all countries that are members of the EU, are described in the so-called *"Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*". The treaty provides a Single internal Market and a Customs Union. This means that because of this treaty, it this is not necessary to define and negotiate a trade agreement with every single country in the EU separately. Membership of this internal market entails the four freedoms: the movement of goods, services, capital and people free of border controls and other extra costs (Bulmer & Quaglia, 2018). These four freedoms make sure trade within the EU borders is very uncomplicated, fast and cheap.

The "after" situation applies since January 1 2021. Because the UK left the EU, a new trade agreement had to be established. The UK and the EU agreed upon this trade agreement on December 24 2021, officially called the "*Trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part".* The process of reaching this agreement was long and arduous. It started already in 2016, when UK held a national referendum about leaving the EU. 52% of the British citizens who participated in this referendum where in favor of the UK leaving the EU. According to Henderson et al (2017), this is mostly caused by the social phenomenon of national identity. The more someone felt an English identity, the more support someone got for leaving the EU because they felt the EU was jeopardizing this nationalistic feeling. In their eyes, EU had too much control over the UK, socially and economically. The same goes for immigration. People in favor of leaving the EU were in favor of reducing immigration rates because they believed these immigrants would endanger the British culture. The "Leave" campaign advertised this as "taking back control" (pp. 640). In March 2017, the British government officially invoked the Treaty on the European Union, starting the process and negotiations of UK withdrawal from the EU (Bulmer & Quaglia, 2018). As stated in the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement, the UK has ceased to be a member of the EU since the 31 of January 2020. This agreement also specifies a transition period until 31 December 2020, during which the UK remains subject to EU rules. This in order to be able to continue the negotiations on the new trade agreement. Ultimately, after years of negotiating, the UK and the EU reached the current trade agreement, just seven days before the transition period ended.

2.2 Literature review

Companies look towards internationalization as a tool for continuous operation, but to determine if and how a company chooses to operate in a foreign market they use several methods. Examples are the institutional theory, the resource-based view but also the transaction cost theory (Mroczek, 2014). Coase (1973) tries to explain the existence of firms with this theory. He states that it is profitable to establish a firm, because in that way you can use a mechanism that can be applied to each transaction. That mechanism can reduce the costs of transactions, because you don't need to negotiate and make a contract for each separate transaction anymore. Later on, he adds additional examples of transaction costs including the costs of searching for exchange partners and conducting inspections (Coase, 1960). Transaction costs can thus be a burden of operating in a particular market (Mrozek, 2014). The theory includes several uncertainties, including the so-called external uncertainty. This looks at unexpected changes in the legal and economic environment and the costs this entails (Bremen et al, 2010). Brexit caused a lot of uncertainty and a new trade policy, which also influences the attitude of the government.

As said before, the growing internationalization and globalization have led to the establishment of the EU. There are many theories that try to explain the existence of the European Union and the relationship of the EU with its Member States. One of them being intergovernmentalism. This theory emphasizes that the member states were the primary actors in the process of European integration. With this statement they are able to explain periods of radical change in the EU when the interests of the member states converge and when shared goals exist, compared to periods of slower changes when they cannot agree with each other. The neofunctionalism theory agrees that crises may delay or even retard integration, but over time the European Integration will always grow (Civitas, 2015). This integration has led to the fact that member states have to comply with the regulations, directives and decisions of the European Council and the European Commission. But because it is not possible to check the execution of all these rules, the Commission has more of a "regulatory" role and the member states itself are responsible for national strategies that are in line with these rules (Nicolaides, 1998). How a government of a Member State handles this responsibility can be very different, making the behavior of governments an important factor.

In this research the behavior of governments will be explained by the framework of Hirschman (in Hoffmann, 2008). This framework focuses on the behavior that can occur when facing a dissatisfying situation or behavior. Hirschman identifies three different options. First, “exit”. This is generally the act of leaving the situation permanently. This reaction occurs when one finds the circumstances completely disagreeable. “Voice” is the act of complaining or protesting to change the situation or behavior that is central, to a situation that is more satisfying. Third is “loyalty”, which is a very broad category and encompasses a spectrum ranging from unconditional loyalty to passive acceptance. This category essentially delays exit as well as voice. Important in this model is the difference in the occurrence of variations within a category. According to Hoffmann (2008), the category “exit” is a clear-cut dichotomous category: “One either exits or one does not” (pp. 13). In contrast, the category of voice is broad and allows variations from “faint grumbling” to real violent protest. Rusbult et al (1988) have added a fourth category to this theory, namely neglect. This refers to the act of passively allowing conditions to deteriorate. This means that there is reduced interest and effort, as well as chronic lateness or absences (pp. 601). Together, these four typologies form the EVLN framework.

Originally, this model has been used quite a few times to research job dissatisfaction with employees, for example the research of Rusbult (1988). Even though it has not been used very often in political research, a gap this research seeks to fill, it is not entirely new in political research. One example that shows that this model is suitable in political science is from Clark et al (2013), who apply the EVLN framework to the role of power in the relationship between states and their citizens. According to them, “power is involved whenever one cannot accomplish its goals without either trying to influence the behavior of others or trying to wrestle free from the influence exerted by others” (pp. 1). They conclude that when a citizen has no suitable alternative, and thus no credible exit threat, a state is likely to ignore the citizen. To be able to influence or “break free” from the power of the state, a citizen thus needs to use voice to do something about the things they are dissatisfied with (pp. 29). This can be about several political issues, such as inequality, foreign aid and economic performance. Another example is the research of James & John (2021). They have used the model to understand citizen and provider responses to decline in public health services. They state that Hirschman was interested in understanding perception, reasoning and reactions. Just like the research of Clark, they also emphasize that a key factor in this model is the extent to which exit opportunities exist. The greater the possibility for a reasonable alternative, the smaller the possibility exist that one is using voice instead of just choosing the alternative (pp. 380). Their research shows that there is clear evidence for the statement that responses by public organizations, in this example about service quality, boost satisfaction and reduces intention to exit. The same goes for loyalty; when a consumer receives a response from a provider there is a lower switching behavior and a reduction in their intention to exit (pp. 391). These examples both focus on the reaction of (dis)satisfaction by individuals, against another party. This research does not focus on individuals, but on governmental institutions and their perception, reasoning and reactions which means it can add to the theoretical gap and create a wider understanding of the theoretical model. The theoretical model will now be further explained.

Besides the attitude and behavior of a government, the kind of measures they can and want to take can also differ greatly. This mostly has to do with the general attitude of the government regarding their economy. According to the traditional theories on the political economy of trade, companies could either fit into the “label” of free trade or protectionism. Free trade is characterized by being a system in which the trade of goods and services between or within countries flows unhindered by restrictions and interventions. In the other hand, protectionism is an economic policy of intentionally restricting trade between nations with for example tariffs, quotas or other government regulations. These restrictions usually are designed and implemented to protect domestic industries from being take-over by the competition or foreign companies (Fouda, 2012). Milner & Yoffie (1989) argue that the current corporate trade demands no longer fit into this traditional dichotomy. The demands for businesses are no longer unconditional, meaning that the willingness of firms to support either free trade or protectionism now also depends on the behavior of foreign rivals and the local governments of these businesses. That is why they have added a third type of policy: a “strategic” trade policy of demanding trade barriers for the home market if foreign markets are protected (pp. 240). These theories on the political economy of trade provide a good starting point in understanding the (possible) intentions a government can have by implementing certain measures.

2.3 Conceptual framework

As introduced above, the relation between Brexit and the attitude of governments is central in this research. Brexit is a unique and impactful situation, and there might be differences in how a national government can handle this in comparison with the European Union. The measures taken by the EU and the Dutch government and their intention with these measures can influence the actual consequences of

Brexit for the economy. That means that in this relation the "attitude" of both the EU and the Dutch government influence what kind of measures they take or have been taken and thus are independent variables. These measures then influence the consequences of the Brexit for the economy, which is the dependent variable. This results in the following conceptual framework:



Figure 1: Conceptual framework

This research will mostly focus on the left part of the conceptual framework, as it looks at the attitude and measures taken in the years leading up to Brexit. The influence of certain measures and decisions on the consequences for the economy will be briefly discussed after. To determine the actual consequences of Brexit for the economy, who might or might not be there, further research is needed into the years after Brexit.

All the concepts and variables used in this research will be explained hereafter. To ensure that the definition used in this research is accurate, previous research and other literature involving this concept is examined. After comparing these definitions, the definition used in this study will be determined.

2.3.1 Attitude of governments

To examine the attitude of governance, the Exit, Voice, Loyalty theory of Hirschmann will be used, extended with the fourth category of Neglect that has been added by Rusbult et al. All four concepts will now be further explained.

Exit

This is the typology of leaving or looking to leave the situation because one finds the circumstances disagreeable. These circumstances are for example too much pressure, dissatisfaction with or in response to policy changes and many other changes and threats (Golden, 1992). Exit may even lead to externalization, because if one chooses the exit option it might be able to free itself from suppression or other conditions that did not allow him to voice its opinion (Hoffmann, 2008). Besides immediate exit, this typology can also occur in the behavior of actively searching for alternatives to the situation which may lead to a definite exit.

Voice

This is the typology of also being dissatisfied with the situation but instead of leaving, trying to improve conditions. It is different to exit, because instead of directly leaving the situation, the dissatisfaction and desired change will be voiced. This can be expressed in more ways than one. According to Golden (1992) there are four types of voice behavior:

- "Voice by argumentation": this is the act of expressing disagreements over a situation directly to the person(s) responsible.
- "Collective action": this is the act of joining together to improve the situation. Dependent on the type of situation, this can be by joining together with colleague's, other companies or even other countries.
- "Leaks": this is the act of attempting to create change by appealing to higher authorities or to use the public opinion via the media.
- "Sabotage": this is the act of forcing change by sabotaging. For example by obstructing productivity or normal functioning.

Loyalty

This is the typology of supporting the situation or optimistically waiting for conditions to improve. Loyalty creates an opportunity to stop the deterioration of the performance. When a person or institution is loyal, it is willing to give constructive criticism. The choice of the other party not applying this constructive criticism, can eventually lead to an exit after all (Szabó et al, 2015). This means that loyalty essentially delays exit as well as voice (Hoffmann, 2008). The difference between loyalty and voice is the tone of the critic. Voice is seen to be a “loud” action (Dowding et al, 2000), while loyalty is often less aggressive and does not call for immediate action.

Neglect

This is the typology of allowing conditions to become even worse because there is no attention given to the condition or the problem.

The four typologies have been placed in a figure ranking from destructive to constructive and active to passive. It is thus important to see first if the person, or institution in this context, wants to actively do something about the problem. Active responses include those where people raise their voices actively and provide solutions to issues (Akhtar et al, 2016). Having an active response can be in a destructive way by completely leaving the situation as well as in a constructive way by voicing its concerns. If the person or institution is more passive, it is not willing to continue with this situation or are fed up with frequent changes which reduces the intend to remain in the situation (Akhtar et al, 2016). Then the choice is to neglect the situation or to stay loyal. The figure below shows this.



Figure 2: EVNL framework

Reprinted from “Impact of exchange variables on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: an integrative model of responses to declining job satisfaction”, by Rusbult et al, 1988, p. 601.

For this research it means that this framework will be used to try and look at how this works for national and EU trade policy.

2.3.2 Intention of governments

The concept of intention is being described in many different ways in literature. Some literature looks specifically at intention as being a decision towards a specific end state. One example is Gollwitzer (1990), who defines intentions as “the goal state or desired outcome specified by the wish thus becomes an end state that the individuals feels committed to achieve” (pp. 57). Other literature looks more at intention as being a level of intensity in the determination to act in a certain way. Examples are the studies of Ajzen (1991) & those of Warshaw & Davis (1985). Both studies define intention as “the degree to which a person has formulated conscious plans to perform or not perform certain behavior”. This research will be more focused on the aims and goals linked to the certain behavior and thus intention will be defined as: “the motivational factors that influenced the behavior of the EU and the Dutch government in order to reach a particular desired outcome”.

2.3.3 Measures taken

This research looks into measures taken by the EU and/or the Dutch government to reduce the impact of Brexit. This can be seen as government intervention. According to (Boettke, 2012), government intervention refers to “discretionary acts by governments to intervene in the market economy” (pp. 38). Traditionally, government intervention started because of two important factors: crisis and the continuing world economic integration. Government interventions are mostly designed to deal with market failure. This can be the result of the absence of a market, or of the presence of externalities, increasing returns to scale or high transactions or information costs (Michi & Prendergast, 1998). Boettke (2012) argues that the most significant claim for state intervention into the economy in modern times is macroeconomic instability. This means that the market economy is unstable and suffers from periodic crises.

In the context of this research, Brexit and the change of trade policy that has brought about can be seen as a such a “periodic crisis”. Therefore measures in this research will be defined as: “measures or acts by the EU and Dutch government to deal with the macroeconomic instability, rise in transaction costs and other problems that Brexit has brought about”.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research strategy and design

The research question central in this research is descriptive and the number of units of analysis is specific and small, namely the EU and the Dutch government. This research will examine and compare what actions have or have not been taken regarding Brexit and the new trade policy. This means that this research will be conducted as a comparative and qualitative research. Flick (2013) defines this kind of research as “the classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) material to make statements about the meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it” (pp. 5). The aim of this kind of research is to focus on one case or compare different cases. In this research two cases about one central topic are central, namely the attitude and intention of the EU and the Dutch government regarding the economy and Brexit.

To start, the context of Brexit will be explained. Hereafter, the first sub question will be answered by looking into what kind of Brexit scenarios were possible and what the predicted impact of these scenarios have been, also compared with the actual situation. To do this, the method of realistic literature review will be used. The use of a proper review protocol will make sure that the right documents will be used. After examining the right documents, an answer can be given to the first sub-question of this research. This part of the research also makes it possible to start looking at whether governments have tried to prepare for these different scenario’s and if so, how they did this.

When the context and possible Brexit scenarios are made clear, the research will focus more on the attitude and measures taken by both the EU and the Dutch government. This will be done by content analysis. To visually present the measures taken, this is followed by a chronological timeline.

All the steps taken above will lead to answers to the sub-questions. Hereafter, the final conclusions will be made where the central research question will be answered.

3.2 Case selection

The Brexit situation is very unique: never before has a Member State left the EU. It caused a changed trade policy between the UK and Europe and a lot of new rules to comply with. The fact that the negotiations about this new trade policy took years, makes it even more historical and very interesting. While the Brexit is a unique situation, and thus a unique case, it can be seen as an example of an historical (political) event/case in the EU. Another example of such a case can be the fall of the Berlin

Wall in 1991, which causes Germany to be united again after more than 40 years. Or the economic crisis in 2008, which necessitated closer economic cooperation between EU countries (European Union, n.d.). It is interesting to see what kind of impact such an event has on the (dynamics of) the European politics and how this is the same, or different, to other impactful events: something that can be examined in follow-up research.

The choice to look at this from a Dutch perspective is because in this context it is the government that had to deal with a decision not made by them. It is extra interesting that while the Dutch government had no say over the decision, there is a lot for them at stake. For years now, the United Kingdom has been the second leading export destination for the Netherlands. In 2019, the Netherlands earned 28.3 billion in exports to the United Kingdom (CBS, 2020). It is interesting to look into how a government can and wants to respond to such an impactful decision that was not in their hands.

3.3 Data collection method

This paragraph describes the two specific kinds of analysis and data collection that will be conducted in this research:

3.3.1 Realistic literature review

A realistic literature review method will be used to answer the first sub-question. This method uses specifically searched literature to answer a certain research question. It focuses on the understanding of specific interventions or events that are the object of the research. In contrast to the more known method of systematic literature review, this method provides understanding of the complex situation rather than only trying to answer complex questions (Pawson et al, 2005). Kastner et al (2012) state that literature reviews are focused on gathering relevant information that provides context and substance to the author’s argument. It is a presentation of literature to support the overall topic of the research. This method is thus very relevant and useful for this research and this sub-question, because the aim is to make a general overview of the Brexit topic.

Clarification and literature selection process

The steps of this process are based on the template of Pawson et al (2005). Because of the scope of this research, not all steps of the template are relevant. This means the template is not exactly copied but adjusted to this research.

The first step is to clarify the review question and the purpose. First, the clarification. The review question is the question of what kind of predicted possible Brexit outcomes have been mentioned during the years. Second, the purpose of this realistic literature review. Most existing literature studies about the impact of the Brexit are focused on specific topics. These include studies about one specific country, one specific sector or one specific firm. This means that they address rather specific Brexit outcomes and research objects, instead of giving a general overview of the possible Brexit scenarios and their overall impact. Examples are the research of Milne-Ives et al (2020) about the impact of Brexit on the Pharamaceutical Supply Chain of the United Kingdom and the research of Sastry (2020) about the impact of Brexit on India's export business. As this research is focuses on process-tracing, it is very important to be able to get a clear idea of how the Brexit has developed in general. That is why the data from this realistic literature review is very relevant for this research and thus needs to be conducted.

The second step is to determine exclusion and inclusion criteria in order to select relevant literature. The first criterion was to pick scientific literature. It is important to have relevant resources, to be able to ensure the validity of this research method. The second criterion is the language of the literature. To avoid translation errors, the languages used are English and Dutch. The third criterion is a time frame based on the first signs of Brexit in 2015, up to and including the year 2020 when Brexit entered into force officially. The fourth and last criterion addresses the general view taken in the articles. As explained above, it is necessary that these articles are not zoomed in on specific topics but rather address the general (possible) impact of Brexit. The list of inclusion and exclusion criteria can be found in table 2 below.

Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for literature on possible Brexit scenario's

	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
1.	Scientific articles or papers	Newspaper articles, webpages
2.	Papers written in Dutch or English	Papers written in any other language
3.	Written between 2015 and 2020	Papers written in any other year
4.	Literature that addresses the general (possible) impact of Brexit	Literature about specific countries, companies or branches

After applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and considering the size of this research, six relevant studies have been selected for the analysis. By making this choice, selection bias is inevitable. But eventually, the most "general" speaking papers have been selected to avoid tunnel vision from one specific sector or perspective. From these studies the relevant data is collected and summarized, whereafter this data will be compared in order to get an answer to this sub question. This data analysis is described in chapter four.

3.3.2 Content analysis

The second and third sub-questions will be conducted by using content analysis. This method entails the analysis of secondary documents. These are documents constructed as a representation of an event (by others). This means that documents are versions of reality, with a particular purpose in mind (Flick, 2013). The content analysis will include all different types of documents that are known and to be found about the plans and actions of both the EU and the Dutch government regarding Brexit. In general, five types of documents will be used for this:

- Speeches by politicians
- Official documents from relevant ministries such as the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
- Documents and recommendations provided to the Dutch House of Representatives (de Tweede Kamer), for example by advisory boards/organizations.
- Official EU documents
- Previous research on the EU-UK negotiations

On top of these sources, the research will also look into press releases and news articles regarding Brexit. All in all, these documents have been selected because they analyze the situation from different perspectives. This is very important to create an unbiased and objective view of the situation. So, from official government parties themselves, as well as from third parties and from the media. An attempt was made to select as many different sources and opinions as possible for all documents, for example left-wing parties and right-wing parties and both foreign and national. By using these different types of documents from different sources, data triangulation is applied. Data triangulation is defined as taking several (theoretical) perspectives on an issue under study (Flick, 2013). To analyze the documents, keywords and phrases of measurements are used to determine which typology a certain quote or part belongs to. These are described in detail in the operationalization paragraph. Complementary, the overview of all the measurements and important events will be pointed out visually in a timeline.

3.4 Operationalisation

The following paragraph discusses how the variables of this research are measured. To obtain a good overview, table 1 will present all the theoretical concepts with its variables, keywords and phrases used for measurement and data collection method used.

For the concept of the attitude of governments, the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect theory will be used. Since there is no literature that is exactly focused on trade relations, it is not possible to exactly copy a definition in its entirety. The definitions of the four typologies are therefore drawn up by hand, based on the general definitions of the typologies as presented in paragraph 2.1. The final contextual definitions can be seen in table 1 below. Because there is no literature exactly focused on trade relations, it is not possible to exactly copy previous measurements or coding schemes. This means a new coding scheme/list needed to be developed. The following list explains the way of how particular information, quotes or sayings about Brexit and the actions of the EU and the Dutch government will be translated into either being exit, voice, loyalty or neglect.

- *Exit*: the act of leaving the trade relationship. For this typology, it needs to be clear that the situation is so disagreeable that it cannot be saved. The most radical option is immediate exit and implies an immediate (physical) displacement from the situation (Dowding & John, 2008). This means that EU and/or the Netherlands end the trade relation with the UK. They might move all their companies back to countries in the EU or even search for other trade relations outside of the EU. But exit can also occur in a less drastic way, by showing efforts to redirect trade elsewhere. This means that there would be an active search for other trading partners.

- *Voice*: this act can also be seen in a few different ways. Dowding & John (2008) describes voice as the democratic process of demand. This means that it is important that there is some sort of demand to be seen. This demand can be for improving quality, changing certain rules or making other agreements. As explained in chapter two, voice can be expressed in different ways. It can be directly voiced to the UK, as an individual country or collectively with other countries (collective action). In this situation the EU and/or the Dutch government would address their concerns directly to the UK, hoping they would change something. Collective action can also be taken in the form of pressure groups or lobbying (Dowding & John, 2008). According to the EU Working Paper of Lehmann & Bosche (2003), lobbying in the EU includes attempts to influence the process and output of certain decisions, from outside (pp. 4). These lobby groups could thus help to get the situation to a more desired state. The situation of "leaking" would probably occur through the media, by projecting the UK as a negative trade partner to also force change. In extreme, "sabotage" can also be used to force change and would involve threatening the UK with doing business with other countries or purposefully obstructing the trade, for example not letting products through at the border.
- *Loyalty:* occurs when one knows the situation is not ideal, but only gives constructive feedback or waits for conditions to improve. This means that in order to examine the typology of loyalty, it is important to look for indicators that there are certain thoughts and discussions about the new trade situation, but that these thoughts are relatively positive and that it does not seem necessary to take (or force) direct action. In this situation there are often certain ties that play a role (Dowding & John, 2008). In the context of Brexit, these ties may be certain other agreements, in addition to trade, which might be jeopardized when the trade relation is terminated. Loyalty can also mean that, despite the situation not being ideal, there will be efforts to making trade with the UK work anyway. Ling et al (2010) introduce the concept of "fearful" loyalty, which means that you stay loyal to the trade relation because there is anxiety about the consequences of cutting the ties. This might happen when the UK threatens with certain consequences, for example what happens with Dutch people working and living in the UK after Brexit.
- *Neglect:* in this situation nothing is acknowledged as "being bad" and no action is taken. Rusbult et al (1988) state this typology applies when there is diminished interest and effort, and

conditions are thereby passively being deteriorated. It also means that there would be no specific information or indications available that would aim in the direction of the other three typologies, where there is some type of action to be seen.

Table 1: operationalisation

Theoretical concept	Variables	Definition (in this context)	Measurement keywords and phrases	Data collection method
Attitude of governments	Exit	*The act of leaving the trade relationship*	Looking for indications that the trade relation is or will be ended: - Total dissatisfaction about the rules or practices in trade - Withdrawal from the trade situation - Relocation of companies - Actions that replace the trade: seeking for other trade partners or trade agreements that are already being made	Content analysis
	Voice	*The act of attempting to fix the trade relationship by notifying the dissatisfaction*	Looking for indicators that there is dissatisfaction and that this is voiced in some way: - Dissatisfaction about the rules or practices in trade - Individual action - Collective action - Demands (for change) - Lobbying - Leaking - Sabotage	Content analysis

	Loyalty	*The act of supporting the situation or optimistically waiting for conditions to improve with a possibility of giving constructive feedback*	Looking for indicators that there is loyalty to the UK and there are efforts to make the trade work - Constructive feedback - Ties: such as agreements outside trade - Fearful loyalty (afraid of consequences)	Content analysis
	Neglect	*The act of ignoring the situation and not taking any action*	Looking for indicators that nothing has been done - No actions taken - No specific interest in the new trade situation - Attitude of denying things	Content analysis
Measurements taken		*Measures or acts that have been taken to deal with the macroeconomic instability and other factors Brexit has brought about*	- Looking for specific actions and measurements, such as granting financial help to companies, training them etcetera in order to help them overcome the changes. - Sectoral investigations	Content analysis

3.5 Reliability

While the term reliability is a concept that is widely used in quantitative research, it is also very relevant in qualitative research. Pandey & Patnaik (2014) state that the reliability of a research demonstrates that the data collection procedures of a study can be repeated with the same results. Golafshani (2003) adds to this that reliability in qualitative research is testing whether the study is of a certain quality. Good quality research has a “purpose of explaining” and you need to ensure that this is done in a reliable way (pp.601).

In the context of this research reliability is thus about the question if the data is really going to reveal the actions taken by the government and their intention and if the data will be analyzed in a way that it can be reproduced. To do this, the four types of typologies of the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect theory have been used. This theory will characterize the attitude and the actions of the government. To avoid tunnel vision, this data analysis will be done from different perspectives. This entails that the opinion and information of different individual persons, different political parties and different (press) sources will be included in the research. This will help to increase the reliability of this research.

3.6 Validity

Validity is defined as the question to what extent a research truly measures that which it was intended to measure. This is mostly about how data is gathered, from where and whether the means of measurement are accurate (Golofshani, 2003).

To ensure that the research is comprehensive and well-developed, triangulation will be used. This means that multiple data sources are used to create a greater understanding of the phenomenon. This source triangulation makes sure that there is better support for the conclusions made of the data (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). On top of the different literature and governmental sources, this research will also look into press releases and news articles regarding Brexit. This will help ensure the validity of this research.

4. Analysis

4.1 Predicted versus real Brexit scenario(s)

This paragraph will look into the predicted possible Brexit outcomes and the actual situation. This "after" situation is now known and in effect, but it was very insecure for a long time. More insight in this process will eventually help answering why the EU and the Dutch government acted (or did not act) the way they did before-, during-, and after- the Brexit process. To answer this question, a realistic literature review has been used. After selecting the relevant literature, as described in chapter three, this paragraph will describe the analysis of this literature. It is important to articulate the entirety of categories behind the research question. Pawson et al (2005) call this programme theories. In this context, the four options identified by the UK Institute for Government (n.d) will serve as a starting point. Appendix 1 shows whether the four Brexit options are mentioned in the selected literature (X = this article mentions the particular Brexit option). The data synthesis is about identifying similarities and differences in how the selected papers describe the four Brexit options. These will be summarized in the next sub-paragraphs, with a final paragraph for the actual outcome of Brexit.

4.1.1 The four identified options

The first option for the UK is to join the European Economic Area (EEA). The UK institute for Government describes this as the Norway option. This means that the UK would remain to have full access to the Single Market, both for goods and services, but would leave the Customs Union. The EU would then be able to require the UK to abide by the EU 4-freedoms principle of free movement of goods, services, capital and people would remain applicable. At the same time, the UK loses the power to have a say on what those freedoms and rules look like (Ott & Ghauri, 2019). The Single Market lowers trade costs by for example eliminating border barriers and the need for adapting goods to different product standards in different countries (Sampson, 2017). Chang (2017) states that this Single Market represents a $12 trillion GDP, plus 31 external Free Trade Agreements (FTA's) that also have a $14.8 trillion GDP. At the same time, they UK would leave the Customs Union. As a result, non-trade matters will change, for example the UK can set up its own agriculture or fisheries policies, common foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs policy (Goodwin, 2016). But what remains is that the EU can oblige the UK certain rules of origin requirements to their export products. Joining the EEA would lead to the smallest increase in UK-EU trade costs, which is why it is seen as the preferable option for the EU (Dhingra et al, 2017).

The second option would mean that the UK would still leave both the EU Single Market and the Customs Union, but immediately create a new customs union with the EU. The UK institute for Government (n.d.) describes this as the “Turkey option”. Following this EU-Turkey model would eliminate both general tariffs as some checks and controls for industrial goods, but it still requires a lot of varied "behind-the-border” barriers. Also, the restrictions on services trade would remain (Sampson, 2017). For the EU, this option means that they charge the UK their common external tariff and obligate them to comply with the EU product regulations. The UK then does not have the ability to make new trade deals with individual EU countries. According to Chang (2017), the EU is very resistant to having this type of arrangement as the idea of having an “external” country in the EU Customs Union is not widely supported. On the other hand, Goodwin (2016), has stated that this option had some support amongst more moderate “Brexiteers”. Mostly because of the fact that this option would allow the UK to regain full control of their own immigration policy.

Thirdly, the UK could leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union and negotiate a new bespoke bilateral free trade and customs agreement with the EU. This third option entails creating a whole new “tailor-made” agreement between the UK and the EU. It makes it possible to redesign and negotiate everything, ranging from tariffs to free movement of people and issues going beyond trade such as security cooperation. It offers a “menu” of options, but it will most likely be focuses on lowering nontariff barriers and increasing market access in services (Sampson, 2017). It can involve access to the single market for whichever sectors are covered by the agreement, depending on the incentives for both the EU as the UK side (Goodwin, 2016). But it would most likely not involve free movement of people, as it does not provide the same passporting rights or the same degree of regulatory harmonization as exists within the Single Market (Dhingra et al, 2017). As stated by Goodwin (2016) such an agreement requires the agreement of all 27 remaining EU members. This is hard, because countries can have their own specific wishes when it comes to trade and agreements with the UK. In general, it is hard because the UK wants to retain as much as possible of the economic benefits while at the same time the EU does not want to give up the requirements of access to the single market (such as the four free movements) (Chang, 2017). This scenario is thus likely to involve lengthy and intricate negotiations, which makes this the most complex scenario to reach.

The fourth option was for the UK to leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union without a deal (WTO option). It was long feared that this scenario would become reality. When the negotiations would not lead to an agreement, the UK had to remain the trade with the EU on World Trade Organization (WTO) Terms. This means there would be no agreements that ease the flow of trade. At the same time, the UK would have the freedom to set its own policies as well as being able to agree individual trade deals with other countries. The British firms exporting to the EU would face the EU's external tariffs, as well as barrier controls, just like any other "third-party" countries (Chang, 2017). These tariffs differ per sector, but according to the calculation of Dhingra et al (2017) they will have a weighted average from 2.77 % to 8.31 %. This is a big difference compared to the zero-tarriff agreement of the Single Market of the EU. They also predict an estimated welfare effect of -0.75% for the Netherlands in this WTO option. Next to the effects in tariffs, and thus in trade, there are also a lot of other changes when this option would become reality. One example is the raise in costs of financial or legal services between the UK and the EU. It would not be possible anymore to use the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and licenses would not be applicable anymore (Dhingra et al,2017). It is hard to predict the actual effect of these situations, but it would certainly cause friction and more (administrative) work. Goodwin (2016) predicted this WTO option as being the most likely outcome, with the probability ranging from 15 – 55%. This due to the lack of common ground between the UK and the EU (pp. 10).

4.1.2 The actual situation

On 24 December 2020 the EU and the UK finally reached an agreement, just in time for the end of the transition period on 31 December. This "UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement" is a 1449-page document that consists of three main pillars: a new economic and social partnership, security for citizens and agreement on governance. For the economy, that is the focus in this research, the topic of trade is most important. The agreement provides for zero tariffs and zero quotas on all goods that comply with the appropriate rules of origin. The lack of such an agreement would be one of the most impactful changes for the economy, so this has worked out well. Both the EU as the UK have also committed to continue connectivity through air, road, rail and maritime. At the same time, the market access will not be the same as what the EU Single Market offers. This means that there will be more border controls and administrative work, which increases the time, and thus costs, it takes to exchange goods (European Commission, 2020). Focusing on Dutch trade especially, it resulted in rows and congestion at important border points such as the harbors in Rotterdam and Hoek van Holland. But this was eventually not as chaotic as expected. According to transport companies the first weeks after Brexit were quit all right, but this had more to do with extreme supplies in the last months of 2020 (before the new agreement officially entered into force) and the fact that the UK was in a lockdown because of the COVID-19 pandemic. They expect most of the problems to arise on the British side, showing that the EU and the Dutch government may be better prepared than the UK (De Ondernemer, 2021). A few months later, however, the first negative effects can be seen for Dutch companies that trade with the UK. According to the Dutch-British Chamber of Commerce (NBCC), no less than 80 percent of companies in the goods sector feel the negative impact of Brexit in some sort of way. While Dutch companies mostly experience hindrance because of delayed shipments, British companies experience more hindrance because of increased bureaucracy (Andersen, 2021). Eventually, 40% of all the companies saw an actual decline in turnover because of Brexit. In the services sector, the consequences have so far been less impactful (RTL nieuws, 2021). However, most food exporters are still exempt from the double checks on their products. From October 1st 2021, this changes and the checks will then be phased in completely. The NBCC therefore fears that the negative consequences of Brexit will increase in the future (Andersen, 2021).

But there have not only been negative effects of Brexit for the Netherlands, on the contrary. One of the biggest examples is the financial services market. London always has been the main "financial" capital in Europe, with the biggest stock-markets. But, due to Brexit, stock-markets in London are not allowed to serve European traders like they used to. In January 2021, the stock-markets in Amsterdam saw more than a fourfold increase in trades compared to December 2020, while the volume in London fell by 8.6 billion euro (Stafford, 2021). Traders have chosen Amsterdam because of the good IT-infrastructure, the sufficient English-speaking culture, and the geographical central location. The shift will not immediately lead to much more work in the Netherlands, but it is a big compliment for Amsterdam. Also, because most trade in Europe now takes place in Amsterdam, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) has become much more important internationally (Waaijers, 2021). This success on the financial market is a great addition to for example the success of getting the European Medicines Agency (EMA), after a long process of lobbying and voting, to relocate to Amsterdam in 2019. This was something that also created new jobs and opportunities (Niewold, 2019).

4.1.3 Answering the first sub-question

The first sub-question is as follows: *what has been the predicted and real situation regarding Brexit and the European economy?* All selected articles agreed on one thing in particular, the Brexit will either way have some sort of negative impact on the future (trade) relationship between the EU and the UK. But the extent to which this negative impact will be felt by different aspects of the (trade) relationship differs greatly between the four options available. They all agree that the fourth option, the UK leaving the EU Single Market and Customs Union without a deal, would have caused the most damage. The tariffs would have risen to an average up to 8.31% and both the British as the EU firms would have felt this raise in costs immediately. For the UK, this option would have the benefit of being able to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with all individual countries. Although this is time-consuming, it would mean they could voice their own demands; something that is very important to the UK. The third option of creating a whole new biliteral free trade and customs agreement is also a very time-consuming one, especially as the EU and the UK are not exactly aligned many topics. But if these negotiations did lead to an agreement, this document would be comprehensive and to the satisfaction of both parties. The articles make it clear that if it were up to the EU, option one would be the most beneficial, as it looks most like the previous trade situation and would cause the smallest increase in costs. For the UK, this option is not favorable as it requires too much compliance with current EU rules and standards, one of the reasons they choose to leave the EU in the first place. The same goes for the second option, creating a new customs union. While this option would give the UK the chance to draft for example their own immigration policy, there are still quite some EU (product) requirements they would have to meet. Obviously, all articles agree that Brexit will have some sort of impact, but there are certainly ways to try to make this impact as small as possible for both the UK as the EU. When comparing this to the actual situation, the EU and the UK agreed on a whole new bespoke bilateral free trade and customs agreement, we can see that the worst scenario's fortunately have not became truth. Especially the fact that the WTO option has been avoided is good news for both parties. For the economy especially, it means that it has been prevented those high tariffs would apply to trade. Given that the agreement was only concluded at the last minute after endless negotiations, the prediction that this totally new agreement has been very time-consuming has been confirmed.

The findings are in line with the previous theory on trade, as described earlier, as it confirms the transaction costs theory. This theory states that without a mechanism that can be applied to each transaction, the costs will be much higher. In this case, a no-deal means no standard and negotiated mechanism and a rise in tariff-costs and border-control costs. With a bespoke and bilateral free-trade agreement there can be agreement upon certain rules and tariffs, which will lead to lower costs.

4.2 Attitude and intentions regarding Brexit

This section describes the findings about the attitude and intentions of the EU and the Dutch government, regarding Brexit. To analyze this, the Exit, Voice, Loyalty & Neglect (EVLN) theory has been used. Content analysis has been used to identify the typologies in documents. Appendix 2 shows two tables with the exact codes found in each document, based on the conceptualization presented in chapter 3. Because multiple typologies can be found in one document, for example because there are mixed opinions in a debate, it is possible that the overall typology of a document is placed between two typologies.

4.2.1 The EU

For the EU, content analysis on 10 documents has been conducted. This resulted in a spreading of the EVNL typologies, which is presented in figure 3. The following paragraph shows an overview of the typologies found, with some concrete examples of documents.



Figure 3 : Results content analysis EU attitude

In 2017, on March 29, the European Council officially received the notification by the United Kingdom of their withdrawal from the European Union. From there on, the negotiation process has been started. The European Council bases itself on the principles that had already been set out in June 2016, by the Heads of all Member States, the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission (European Council, 2017). The following core principles have been set out: first, the overall objective of the European Council in the negotiations will be to preserve its interests and those of its citizens, its businesses, and its Member States. The Council respects the decision of the UK but wants to avoid that, in particular UK-, citizens, businesses or other stakeholders are being surrounded by uncertainty and disruption because certain rights or rules are not applicable anymore. Second, to be able to achieve the principle set above, any future agreement with the United Kingdom must be based on a balance of rights and obligations. The council is very clear about this, as they state that "a non-member of the Union, that does not live up to the same obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member". This means the four freedoms of the Single Market are indivisible and there can be no "cherry picking" by the UK. Last, the European Union is not a union for nothing. This means that the Union will maintain its unity and as act one and thus there will be no separate negotiations between individual Member States and the United Kingdom. The Union negotiates with the aim of reaching an agreement that is fair and equitable for every Member State and to have an orderly withdrawal. In the same guidelines, the European Council states that "*it welcomes and shares the United Kingdom's desire to establish a close partnership after its departure*". Strong and constructive ties will remain in both sides' interest and should involves more areas than just trade, such as fighting international crime and terrorism together (European Council, 2017). This statement suggests that the expected behavior of the EU could be labeled under the "loyalty" typology. The next section shows the analysis whether this attitude has also been seen in practice or not.

Starting with a scientific research of Frenhoff-Larsén & Khorana (2020) about the negotiating process of Brexit. This research steers the attitude of the EU in a more loyalty/voice approach. This is because they mention a lot of examples of the measurement "demands". To begin, they acknowledge that the EU negotiators aimed to understand and protect the interests of all Member States, but *they have a special (strong) support for the Irish concerns about the possibility of a hard border between the Republic and Northern Ireland*. (pp. 862). *The EU also strongly insisted on agreeing the official withdrawal, before discussing the future relationship*, while the UK wanted to start negotiating before the withdrawal was official (pp. 869). Both examples thus show the measurement "demands". At the same time, they also mention that the EU adopted an open approach and engaged in creative thinking to find a solution that would avoid this hard border while also recognizing domestic sensitivities in the UK (pp. 868). The latter is somewhat an example of loyalty and can be labeled as the measurement "constructive feedback". A publication of Schütte (2020), of the European Policy Centre, corroborates the scientific research explained above. In this article Schütte mentions that "*close partnership is the EU's long-term interest*", which shows that the EU must move somewhat in the direction of the UK to remain that close partnership. This is thus labelled as loyalty. At the same time, he also states that *"it cannot come at the expense of EU integrity"* and "*the UK exports much more to the EU in relative terms than vice versa, so the UK needs a deal more than the EU".* This shows demands and the latter a bit sabotage, which are both measurements of the voice typology.

Seven other documents even steer towards a total voice approach. Starting with the press. The article of Casert & Lawless (2020) puts the attitude of EU's chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, in the spotlight. They address that he made the following statement "*the UK wants Single Market access while at the same time being able to diverge from our standards and regulations when it suits them: you can't have your cake and eat it too*". This statement is labeled as the measurement "dissatisfaction" as it shows that Barnier is not happy with the attitude of the UK. He also shows the measurements of "demands" and even a bit "sabotage" by saying the following: "*if Britain wants vast access to the markets, it will have to keep its waters open to EU fishermen*". Another article of Walter (2018) again states that the EU is not prepared to make concessions on British access to the EU's single market. On top of that, the EU aims to have the bargaining power, because "*a bad breakup would be much worse for Britain*". This can be labelled as the voice measurement of "sabotage".

EU official statements and documents have conveyed much the same message over the years. They firmly hold on to the core principles, set in 2016. In a speech of October 2018, EU head negotiator Michel Barnier states that he believes that Brexit has no added value (European Commission, 2018b). *It is a negotiation with no positive outcome, a "lose-lose" game*. This shows his dissatisfaction with the situation. He also emphasizes that there are some points of divergence that are unnegotiable for the EU, for example the proposal of the UK that it would like to apply its own external tariffs while collecting European customs duties. This would mean the EU loses control over the collection of tax revenue. At the same time, he wants to maximize the chances of an orderly withdrawal, because there is a lot at stake. *In case of a no deal the costs will be very high, firstly for the UK but also for some sectors of the EU economy.* This has been labeled as the measurement "fearful loyalty", which results in a loyalty/voice approach for this document. Another official EU statement by Michel Barnier in October 2020 is as follows: “once again we recall that any agreement on an economic partnership with the United Kingdom requires 3 demands: solid and fair competition, an efficient governance framework and a stable, long-term agreement on fisheries” (European Commission, 2020b). This has thus ben labeled as fully voice.

4.2.2 The Dutch government

For the Dutch government, content analysis on 18 documents has been conducted. This resulted in a spreading of the EVNL typologies, which is presented in figure 4. The following paragraph shows an overview of the typologies found, with some concrete examples of documents.



Figure 4 : Results content analysis Dutch government attitude

First, the typology of neglect has only been found in one document. This has been a general consultation (“Algemeen Overleg”) in the House of Representatives (de Tweede Kamer) between the standing committees for European Affairs, Finance, Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This general consultation has been held in February 2018. Representatives of different political parties have expressed their dissatisfaction about the cabinet not taking any actions or measures regarding Brexit. Examples are these quotes of Pieter Omtzigt of the political party CDA: *“I would have thought that after six months of Brexit thought, there would be something like “well these are the treaties for which we must have an alternative...”.* and of Kees Verhoeven of the political party D66*: “the Cabinet is* *waiting for clarity in the negotiations before preparations for the UK's exit can begin. That seems like a bit of a wait-and-see attitude to us."* Both statements are clear examples of neglect, as act of doing nothing and waiting typifies this typology. Besides this document, the typology of neglect has not been found in the content analysis. This is as expected, because Brexit has had such a big impact, on various topics, that it seems almost impossible to do nothing.

Most of the documents are labeled between the typologies of loyalty and voice. Four documents are totally typified in the first typology. One is a sector-related article, namely about the future of the Dutch-UK cooperation in higher education and universities. This article from 2018 shows the fear of the big impact Brexit will have on this sector. According to the universities, the cabinet has not yet made an explicit statement on the interests of higher education while there are major interests at stake here. *They state that they hesitate too much because they don't want to break the ties and therefore don't take real action* (van der Wende & Rienks, 2018). Another one is a news article from the AD, regarding "prinsjesdag" 2018 (AD, 2018). This article states that if Brexit negotiations go wrong for the Netherlands, the whole budget plans presented on that day need to be rearranged. Something that, according to the article, is Mark Rutte's "biggest fear", mostly because "*there is no other country in the EU benefits as much from good relations with the UK as the Netherlands*". This is labelled as 'fearful loyalty'.

Five documents are labeled as loyalty/voice. This means the documents both have some measurements of loyalty as well as voice. Most of these documents have the combined measurements of "demands", which is a measurement of the voice typology, and "ties" & "collective action", which are measurements of the loyalty typology. The first example hereof is a letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of January 12, 2018 (*Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 23 987, nr. 208). In this letter *the cabinet first acknowledges the importance of a committed partnership with the UK, that is both socio-economic (such as trade, research, and innovation), but also for internal and external security in a broad sense* (pp. 3). This is a good example of the measurement "ties". But despite the importance of a good relationship with the UK, the parliament states that *an agreement must not affect EU policy to protect people, animals, plants, and the environment. Also, the four freedoms and the integrity of the internal market is very important to them* (pp. 3). Two years later, on October 5 2020, another letter of the Minister of Foreign Affair shows that this mixed feeling is still there (*Kamerstukken II*, 2020/21, 35 393, nr. 7). On the one hand, the cabinet states that for the Netherlands fishing is a core interest in the negotiations between the EU and the UK on the future partnership. For this reason, *the cabinet has always introduced* *and defended this subject in Brussels, in cooperation with other Member States that have the same strong interests in the fishing industry* (pp. 2). This shows the typology of voice, through "collective action". At the same time, the Dutch interests in a good agreement with the UK are very strong and very broad. *Therefore a parallel progress on the negotiating tables is crucial for the Netherlands, which is hopefully the best way to agree to a proper balance of rights and obligations* (pp. 1). The latter shows the measurement of "ties" again.

Then there are also five documents, that have been fully labelled as the voice typology. In all these documents, the measurement "demands" have been found. This means the Dutch government has shown some sort of demand in order to continue the (trading) relationship with the UK. There are two big demands that have been found multiple times in the documents. This is first, the importance of solving the border issue between Ireland and North Ireland. Second, the integrality of the European Union, and thus respecting the four freedoms, is not negotiable. In a 'notaoverleg' Mark Rutte emphasizes these demands again and also has the following statement: "*I urged my British colleague – I may say so here – to do everything in their power to make preparations for all kinds of scenarios*" (pp. 33). This has been labelled as individual action, as the prime Minister chose to confront his British colleague about the situation. In a publication of Clingendael, a Dutch institute for International Relations, the measurement of "dissatisfaction" has been found in a statement of Prime Minister Mark Rutte (Korteweg, 2020). He states that "*the net contributors in the EU, including the Netherlands, do not want to pay for the hole that the British leave behind*". According to this publication, Mark Rutte really put his foot down and did not want to make any concessions. This shows his dissatisfaction with the situation.

Then last, the typology of exit. This typology is the most extreme one out of all four and means that the Dutch government would have totally took distance from the UK as a partner in any type of way. This typology has not been (fully) found in a document, but there are three documents that have been labeled as being voice/exit. This is a logic combination, giving the fact that if the Dutch government is not satisfied with the (trading) relationship, it will probably first show its concern in a certain "voice" typology way, before totally leaving the situation (= "exit"). For two of these documents, the typology of voice has again been found in the measurement of "dissatisfaction" and "demands for change". But, one document also shows the measurement of "lobbying". This is in a debate in de 'Tweede Kamer' about the Dutch economy after Brexit (*Handeling II,* 2017/18, nr 70, item 12). Mona Keijzer mentions that there is a lot of consultation with the business sector. The cabinet claims to take the demands of this sector very seriously and tries its best to take these into account within the negotiations about Brexit (pp. 21). In the same debate, Jan Paternotte of the political party D66 has filed a motion, with the suggestion that the Netherlands should invest in attracting foreign companies that are now located in the UK. These companies want to keep continuing to benefit from the EU's internal market and therefore want to relocate, so the cabinet must make an effort to get them to the Netherlands. Not only is this beneficial for those companies, but also for the Dutch economy because of employment opportunities and cooperation with Dutch entrepreneurs (pp. 21). This typifies the typology of exit in the measurement of "relocation from companies". The documents also state that the cabinet is investing in a more structured coalition building with other member states, to replace the trade that the Netherlands used to have with the UK. An advisory document of the 'Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken' (AIV) about a new relationship with the UK for the Netherlands even specifically mentions that *the cabinet should make efforts to strengthen existing coalitions, for example with North-Western European countries and the Benelux* (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2017, pp. 55). They also advise the Netherlands to *actively seek out for new coalition partners such as Spain or the Baltic states* (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2017, pp. 57). This shows the measurement of "actions that replace trade" and thus the exit typology.

4.2.3 Answering the second sub-question

The second sub-question is as follows: *To what extent did the EU and the Dutch government have a specific attitude or intention towards Brexit and the impact of Brexit on the economy and why?* Based on the analysis, there can be concluded that the EU followed a voice approach and the Dutch government a loyalty/voice approach. The typologies neglect and exit have not been found in many documents. Brexit is such a unique situation and crisis, that it seems impossible to totally neglect it. At the same time, the EU, including the Dutch government, and the UK are such big (trading)partners that it is also not very easy to totally exit the situation. This is because, as previous research has confirmed, the choice of leaving the whole situation (exit) is very much dependent on the alternatives you can switch to. Nevertheless, the EU has stated several times that, although it respects the decision, the UK can't do "cherry-picking". This means it cannot have same rights and opportunities, without having the same obligations as other EU member states. The EU also knows they have a better negotiation position because for the UK, relatively speaking, much more depends on a sufficient agreement. Together, these circumstances lead to a voice approach. This shows that the aim of the EU with this attitude is to clearly set outs its standpoints and show that it does not want to get away from it. For the Netherlands, the UK is one if its biggest trade partners and thus a lot is at stake. This makes them way more loyal, compared to the EU. Also, because the Dutch government (or any individual Member State) is not allowed to directly negotiate with the UK, it is more difficult to clearly point out the demands. For this, they are dependent on the EU negotiators, which can explain the “wait-and-see” attitude of the Netherlands. It seems that with this attitude they aim to balance both the national interests of the Netherlands with the standpoints of the EU, which they must comply with. It shows that they are not sure enough of their position against the UK and the major interests at stake, and their alternatives for these interests, to take a harder stand in these negotiations. Together, this explains the difference in attitude between the EU and the Dutch government.

4.3 Measures taken regarding Brexit

This section describes the findings about the approach of the EU and the Dutch government, regarding the measures that were or were not taken in the years prior to Brexit. The paragraphs conclude with a visual representation of the key points, via a timeline.

4.3.1 The EU

As described in sub question two, in practice the EU has generally followed *a voice approach*. This approach can also be seen in the following measures. The European Commission has started with the first measures at the end of 2017, where it raised awareness through the publication of many technical notices in which the legal and practical implications of Brexit were explained, differentiated for several sectors. Hereafter, in the beginning of 2018, it started with mapping the actual consequences of the UK leaving the EU and the measures that can be taken to limit or prepare for these consequences. It distinguishes between two types of measures. At the one hand preparedness measures, which are necessary regardless of whether the EU and the UK reach an agreement. At the other hand contingency measures, that are necessary for the scenario of when the UK leaves the EU without a withdrawal agreement, which they call the “cliff edge scenario”. These contingency measures would, in principle, expire when long-term adjustments are in place. According to the European Commission contingency measures and planning are mostly the responsibility of Member States, as they need to determine the important topics and areas for themselves. The impact and consequences differ among the Member States, for example because of geographic or economic reasons. For EU measures, the European Commission has identified four “lines of action”. One being necessary legislative changes, such as visa- and motor vehicles requirements. Second, the publication of the first preparedness notices for relevant stakeholders, as a replacement for the technical notices. These notices map the consequences for each specific sector. Third, institutional and budgetary matters. This is mostly about the relocation or reassignment of tasks, for example tasks now performed by United Kingdom authorities need to be reassigned to EU27 authorities. Fourth, other more “practical” work strands. Examples are the disconnection and adaptation of databases, IT systems and other platforms to which the UK should no longer have access (European Commission, 2018a).

In November 2018, a second communication from the European Commission was published, announcing eight legislative preparedness proposals and several implementing and delegated acts about for example chemicals and medicines. It also states to have regular communication with relevant agencies, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and member states to discuss preparations for the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The member states can ask for technical and financial assistance in certain areas, such as the training of customs officials under the "Customs 2020 programme". Furthermore, they continue with informing stakeholders and contingency measures in different sectors such as financial services and air transport. The Commission also reiterates their priority in protecting EU citizens in the UK, as well as UK citizens in the EU. The responsibility for arranging this properly lies with the Member States themselves (European Commission, 2018c).

While the measures mentioned remain to be an ongoing activity for the European Commission, in September 2019 the Commission adopted two proposals regarding financial support for Member States. First, the European Globalisation adjustment Fund (EGF) is now available to support citizens that have lost (or will lose) their job because of Brexit. Second, they extend the scope of the European Solidarity Fund (EUSF) so that it can be used for State aid schemes for businesses and to ensure the functioning of border controls (European Commission, 2019). This budget is only available in a situation of a "no deal Brexit" and the European Commission will, if necessary, proportionate the available budget over the affected Member States (*Kamerstukken II,* 2019/20, 22 112, nr. 2824).

During the transition period in 2020, the Commission continued to provide training and guidance to Member States and stakeholders. It also replaced the Brexit preparedness notices for stakeholders with "readiness notices", as the final Brexit date approached (December 31, 2020). These readiness notices were gradually expanded and eventually the Commission reached a final amount of 102 different sectoral notices (European Commission, 2020).



Figure 5: timeline EU measures

4.3.2 The Dutch government

As described in sub question two, the Dutch government has generally *followed a loyalty/voice approach.* This approach can also be seen in the following measures. The first time the Dutch government considered measures that should or should not be taken, either as an individual country or as the EU as a whole, is in the beginning of the year 2018 in a general consultation council for economic and financial affairs (*Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 21 501-07, nr. 1483). Several people expressed their concern that the Dutch government seemed to be taking a very mixed approach to the EU and Brexit preparations. Bart Snels, of the progressive left party Groenlinks, even said "*Civil servants, EU parliamentarians or journalists, everyone wonders what role the Netherlands actually wants to play?"* (pp. 2). Hereafter, the first plans for the preparations for Brexit were set in motion. In February 2018 Mona Keijzer, stated that informing companies about Brexit and its consequences is a spearhead of the government, in that moment of time. They are working on a "Brexit Loket", where companies can go to with all their questions. They also want to launch a Brexit online tool for companies. This tool can be used to show which preparations are important for which type of companies. She also states that soon there will be a decision-making about increasing the capacity and inspection locations at the enforcement services, such as the customs and military police. (*Aanhangsel Handelingen II*, 2017/18, 1068). One month later, as an answer to a KPMG rapport in March 2018, the cabinet promises that the customs authorities, the NVWA (food & goods authority) and relevant agricultural related inspection services such as KCB, Naktuinbouw and COKZ, can immediately expand the recruitment and training of new employees. They can also start tendering processes for necessary material investments such as organizing housing for new employees (*Kamerstukken II,* 2017/18, 23 987, nr. 224). A week later, the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Carola Schouten, officially established the expansion of the NVWA with 143 FTE and the expansion of agricultural related inspection services with 48 FTE. She also emphasized once again that informing companies and helping them prepare for Brexit is a very important issue for the Dutch government. To this end, they have regular contact with relevant stakeholders such as employer organizations and industry associations *(Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 23 987, nr. 228). In April 2018, two other important measures have been announced and implemented. First, the Brexit Impact Scan has officially been launched. This is a digital tool that allows companies to, after answering some questions, become aware of the consequences of Brexit for each part of its business processes and have advices on how to prepare for this. This tool will be constantly adjusted, as a better picture emerges on the structure of the future relationship between the EU and the UK. Second, the government offers organizations that currently operate in businesses between the Netherlands and the UK to request support for seeking expert advice. This expert advice can be in terms of mapping impact on the logistics, free movement of workers, goods and services etcetera. These “Brexit Vouchers” allow the organizations to reimburse 50% of the costs of this advice, up to a maximum of €2500 compensation (*Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 23 987, nr. 231). The Ministry of Justice and Security is adding to these measures an increase of €3 million for the police. This is because for the police, Brexit probably means a downturn in opportunities to exchange information with the UK and increasing border controls. The extra funds will be used to achieve acceleration and simplification of legal aid traffic with the UK and increasing the presence of Dutch police there (*Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 34 960 VI, nr. 3). At the end of 2018, the Brexit Impact Scan will also be expanded so that it can also be applied to local authorities and executive government organizations (*Kamerstukken II,* 2018/19, 23 987, nr. 304).

In the following months, the information and communication with and for businesses keeps continuing to be one of the main topics for the Dutch government. One example of this continuation is that there has been launched an online campaign on LinkedIn and Twitter, to point out the Brexit Loket, Brexit Vouchers and Brexit Impact Scan to organizations in May 2018 (*Kamerstukken II*, 2017/18, 23 987, nr. 263). Next to that, eleven articles of law were amended or supplemented in March 2019. These laws needed to be amended or supplemented following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Together these amendments are called “Verzamelwet Brexit”. Articles that have been amended are for example about social security and the road traffic law (*Kamerstukken II*, 2018/19, 35 084, nr. 2). In the last year before the actual Brexit date, 2020, the Dutch government keeps its focus on informing and communication with everyone that will be affected by Brexit in some way. Business life, but also citizens, co-governments, and civil society organizations. In February 2020, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has started with sending invitation letters to UK citizens in the Netherlands for them and their family members to apply for a residence document. This document is required to be able to continue living, working or studying in the Netherlands after the Brexit transition period (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, 2020). Finally, customs is eventually expanded with 928 new customs officers at the end of 2020, to be prepared for the increase in border controls.

Figure 6: timeline Dutch government measures

4.3.3. Answering the third sub-question

The third sub-question is as follows: *To what extent did the EU and the Dutch government take (additional) measures to prevent an unstable economy after Brexit and why?* As the content analysis shows, the EU started with the announcement of first measures at the end of 2017 and the Dutch government quickly followed in the beginning of 2018. The EU has put focus on the preparedness measures, which needed to be done regardless of the outcome of the negotiations between the UK and the EU. They took a very serious approach and immediately identified four "lines of action", covering all legal, communicational, institutional, and other practical topics. The EU did this because of the fact that the Brexit was so unique and historical, it would have a huge effect on the whole European economy and they wanted to reduce this impact as much as possible. At the same time, the EU stated that the contingency measures and planning is mostly the responsibility of the Member States. This is in line with previous literature about the interaction of the EU with its Member States, that states that the EU mainly focuses on making regulations, policies, and guidelines while the Member States are responsible for the execution. The Dutch government took on this advice, although some government officials expressed concern about the mixed approach the cabinet took to the Brexit preparations and the EU in general. They started with information campaigns for companies, which eventually evolved in digital preparation tools and financial support. Later, they also extended these contingency measures with information for citizens. With all these measures, the Dutch government has tried its best to prepare companies, and therefore the economy, for Brexit. Although the Dutch government did not start this process very convincing, the increasing measures show that throughout the years leading up to Brexit they had a clearer vision of how they could support the economy to overcome this crisis.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Conclusion on the central research question

This research attempted to provide more insight in the unique situation that Brexit has brought about, and more specifically how governmental institutions can coop with this. This chapter provides an answer to the following research question that was central in this research:

"What was the role and attitude of the EU and the Dutch government in reducing the impact of the changed trade situation on the economy and society as a result of Brexit?"

This question has been answered by drawing up three sub questions. To be able answer these, a combination of two research methods has been used. The main method used has been content analysis, supported by a realistic literature review. By analyzing different documents and sources, this research has shown how different interests and (power)positions can shape the attitude a (governmental) institution can have against a changing situation. Next to that, it also shows that these attitudes have also influence on the steps and measurements being taken.

First, the literature review has given insight in which scenario's the stakeholders had to consider and what the consequences of each scenario could be. It has been made clear that it is in everyone's best interest that a no-deal Brexit has been prevented. The most outstanding finding is the difference in how hard the EU has entered the Brexit negotiations compared to the Dutch government. Based on previous research with the EVLN framework, expected was for both the EU as the Dutch government to be quite loyal. This is because, as previous research has confirmed, exit or voice mostly only occur when there are reasonable alternatives available, which someone can immediately switch to (exit) or use as a threat to voice their dissatisfaction. For the Netherlands, the UK is such an important trading partner that there were no reasonable alternatives available that could have been switched to. Because of this dependence, it has also been difficult for the Netherlands to really voice their dissatisfaction. They were able to do this in some way, especially as not only the Netherlands but also the UK itself relies a lot on this trade relation, as they export a lot to the Netherlands. Yet overall, the Netherlands have remained very loyal. The analysis shows these mixed signals, especially in the first years. Hereafter the cabinet has established some sort of strategy, which is mainly focused on informing companies and encouraging them to properly prepare for the changes that Brexit will cause. When comparing this to the strategic trade theory, the lack of a clear strategy means that the Netherlands don't show to be very protective of their own trade. Also, this research confirms the previous research on the transaction costs theory. All the predicted scenarios about Brexit agreed upon one thing: it will be harder and more expensive to trade with one another without the mechanism of the EU Single Market that used to be applied to every transaction. The worst-case scenario of a no-deal, which would cause the WTO rules to be applied, would have led to the biggest increase in transaction costs. While this scenario eventually has been avoided, the increasing border controls and bureaucratization did lead to turnover decreases for companies. This shows that without the use of a mechanism like the Single Market or any other Trade Agreement, transaction costs will rise and trading will be more expensive. In contrast to the Netherlands, the analysis shows a really clear strategy for the EU. They have established core principles and have adhered to these principles throughout the whole process, which shows they are protective of their own trade and morals. They are not afraid to speak up and, although they want a good and respectful process for both parties, they are not willing to compromise.

Over the years, both the EU and the Dutch government have taken various measures to ensure that there is as little change and impact as possible due to the disappearance of the Single Market mechanism. The EU was quick to declare that it would focus on preparedness measures, those measures that were needed regardless of an agreement. The contingency measures, those necessary to prepare for the no-deal scenario, were left to the Member States themselves. For the EU, this resulted in four lines of action. Following these lines of action, the EU has sought to support Member States and relevant stakeholders. Mainly through communicating information and raising awareness, but later in the process also through some financial support. The Dutch government took on this 'advice' of the EU and focused on contingency measures. For them again the focus has been on informing companies, citizens and other stakeholders about the upcoming changes and encouraging them to prepare themselves as good as possible. To do this, several tools and campaigns have been launched. The analysis thus shows that both parties tried to prepare as much as possible, but they also have been putting a lot of responsibility on the stakeholders itself. This confirms the theory about the overall "regulatory" role the EU wants to play in the field of politics: the execution of rules and the adjustment to policy changes are the responsibility of the Member States and their national governments itself.

To conclude, this research has shown a different attitude and approach for the EU compared with the Dutch government. This has to do with negotiation power, holding on to principles and a different focus of where they wanted and were able to support all the relevant stakeholders. It seems for both parties that it worked out quite all right, especially since a no-deal scenario was ultimately prevented. But stakeholders are afraid that it will become worse in the upcoming months. Firstly, because the world is opening again after being in a lockdown due to COVID-19, which leads to, for example, more trade and transport. But new and stricter rules on the British side for, among other things, veterinary transport will also apply from October 2021. Both will lead to more queues, checks and therefore more costs. This shows that the Brexit dilemma is certainly not over yet.

5.2 Limits of the study

Despite careful thinking and analyzing, there are some limits to be addressed. The first limit of this study is the fact that there were no existing coding schemes of the EVLN framework used, specifically focused on government behavior. The framework is usually used when looking into dissatisfaction in an organization, managing employee attitudes and job satisfaction. To adjust the model to governmental dissatisfaction, the previous studies and general definitions of the typologies have been used as an inspiration, but the codes are developed by hand for this research. These codes are thus not confirmed by any other research, and this makes it the biggest limit of this study. The same goes for the selection of the documents used. When selecting the documents, different sources, years, and kinds of documents have been used. This to give an as complete and objective idea of the situation as possible. Despite this careful selection, selection bias is inevitable. Due to the scope of this research, it was not possible to consider every document applying to this phenomenon. Certainly not considering the timeframe of five years. This is thus another limit of the study.

5.3 Suggestions for further research

This research has been focusing on the Dutch government, about how they have reacted to Brexit and all its implications. Due to the scope of this research the attitude and intentions of the UK in the whole Brexit process have not been fully included, while it is also very interesting to look at this from their side. Especially given that over the years leading up to Brexit, there has been a divide in the British government on whether it was a good idea to leave the European Union. For a while, there was even talk of a second referendum to see if a majority in favor of Brexit would be achieved again. This did not go through, but it shows that the UK itself was also very struggling with the whole Brexit crisis. Also, as this research has been focusing on the years leading up to the official start of the new Brexit trade agreement, a full impact-evaluation has not been given. This is first because it has been difficult to distinguish if certain changes have been caused by the Brexit only or also because of the whole Covid-19 situation, which had a huge impact on the economy. Second, the short-term changes have been described and explained, but the long-term consequences will only be known after a few years. That is why looking into the whole process from the UK side and measuring long-term consequences would be a great follow-up research to further increase the insight in this topic.

Next to that, the insights of this research can be used beyond the case of Brexit. It is interesting to examine if the difference between the approach and mechanisms of both the EU and a national government like that of the Netherlands, as seen in this research, can be confirmed with other cases/crises. One very relevant, but very complex, example can be the COVID-19 crisis. National governments have a great responsibility in how they tackle this problem, in terms of for example (lockdown) rules and vaccination strategies. But it is of course not something that the EU is not dealing with or not interested in is. Consultation with the EU is therefore important. Also, national governments need to consult with each other. One example are cross-border employees, which is a common phenomenon at the Dutch border with Germany. Do governments have a specific approach on this, do they voice their arguments, or do they just let it happen? More studies on other cases can increase the overall knowledge about government behavior in uncertain times.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: selected papers and the four Brexit options

	1: Joining EEA	2: creating new customs union	3: creating a new FTA	4: no deal, WTO option
Chang (2017)	X	X	X	X
Sampson (2017)	X	X	X	X
Ott & Ghauri (2019)	X			X
Goodwin (2016)	X	X	X	X
Ebell & Warren (2016)	X			X
Dhingra et al (2017)	X		X	X

Appendix 2: data collection

Table data collection EU

	Doc 1	Doc 2	Doc 3	Doc 4	Doc 5	Doc 6	Doc 7	Doc 8	Doc 9	Doc 10
Exit										
Total dissatisfaction										
Withdrawal from trade situation										
Relocation from Companies										
Actions that replace trade										
Voice										
Dissatisfaction				X						X
Individual action										
Collective action										
Demands (for change)	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lobbying										
Leaking										
Sabotage		X	X			X				
Loyalty										
Constructive feedback								X		
Ties (outside trade)						X				
Fearful loyalty				X						
Neglect										
No actions/interest										
Attitude of denying										

<u>Corresponding documents, in chronological order (see reference list for full reference)</u> :

1. 09-2018: Study European Parliamentary Research Service; “The future partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom”
2. 10-2018: Article Oliver Patel for UCL European Institute; “The EU and Brexit Negotiations: Institutions, Strategies and Objectives”
3. 09-10-2018: Article Walter, Washington Post; “This is why the EU is being so tough about Brexit”
4. 10-10-2018: Speech Michel Barnier at the closing session of Eurochambre’s European Parliament of Enterprises 2018
5. 10-2019: Scientific Article Jones; “The Negotiations: Hampered by the UK’s weak strategy”
6. 28-04-2020: Article European Policy Centre; “The next phase of Brexit negotiations”
7. 07-05-2020: Article PWC; “Fundamental differences between EU and UK obstruct Brexit negotiations
8. 23-05-2020: Scientific Article Larsen & Khorana; “Negotiating Brexit: a clash of approaches?”
9. 02-10-2020: Official EU Statement Michel Barnier
10. 21-10-2020: Article Casert & Lawless, APnews; “UK-EU trade talks back on after bloc offers olive branch”

Table data collection Dutch government

	Doc 1	**Doc 2**	**Doc 3**	**Doc 4**	**Doc 5**	**Doc 6**	**Doc 7**	**Doc 8**	**Doc 9**
Exit									
Total dissatisfaction									
Withdrawal from trade situation									
Relocation from Companies							X		
Actions that replace trade		X							
Voice									
Dissatisfaction		X							
Individual action	X		X						X
Collective action									
Demands (for change)	X	X	X	X	X				X
Lobbying							X		
Leaking									
Sabotage									
Loyalty									
Constructive feedback									
Ties (outside trade)				X	X				
Fearful loyalty									
Neglect									
No actions/interest						X			
Attitude of denying									

	Doc 10	Doc 11	Doc 12	Doc 13	Doc 14	Doc 15	Doc 16	Doc 17	Doc 18
Exit									
Total dissatisfaction									
Withdrawal from trade situation									
Relocation from Companies									
Actions that replace trade		X							
Voice									
Dissatisfaction						X			
Individual action									
Collective action		X	X	X		X		X	
Demands (for change)			X	X	X				
Lobbying									
Leaking									
Sabotage									
Loyalty									
Constructive feedback									
Ties (outside trade)			X		X		X	X	X
Fearful loyalty	X				X				
Neglect									
No actions/interest									
Attitude of denying									

Corresponding documents, in chronological order (see reference list for full reference) :

1. 31-03-2017 : “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”
2. 03-03-2017 : Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV) ; “Brexit means Brexit”
3. 21-06-2017 : “Plenair Verslag Tweede Kamer, 90e vergadering”
4. 12-09-2017 : “Verslag van een rondetafelgesprek, omtrent Brexit”
5. 12-01-2018 : “Brief van de Minster van Buitenlandse Zaken”
6. 08-02-2018 : “Verslag van een algemeen overleg tussen de commissie voor Europese Zaken, Financiën & Buitenlandse Zaken met de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”
7. 05-04-2018 : Debate ; “Nederlandse economie na Brexit”
8. 19-04-2018 : Article Scienceguide; “Onzekerheid troef na Brexit”
9. 04-07-2018 : “ Verslag van Notaoverleg”
10. 18-09-2018 : Article AD ; “Miljoenennota in schaduw van onderhandeling met Britten”
11. 24-09-2018 : “Brief van de Minster van Buitenlandse Zaken”
12. 14-03-2019: “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”
13. 05-07-2019 : “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”
14. 14-01-2020 : “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en de Minister van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking”
15. 09-03-2020 : Publication Clingendael ; “De gevolgen van de Brexit voor de positie van Nederland in de EU”
16. 23-06-2020: Speech Chris Buijink; “Financial services post-Brexit”
17. 05-10-2020 : “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”
18. 27-12-2021 : “Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken”