

***A Critical Analysis of the US Agenda towards a Sino-American
Arms Control Agreement within the Context of Evidence-Based
Policymaking***

Bachelor Thesis

Weeko Meyer

s2392356

28.06.2022

11,199 words

Management, Society & Technology
Faculty of Behavioral, Management and Social Science
University of Twente
Enschede, The Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH PROBLEM	1
Background	1
Research Question and Structure	2
THEORY	4
Evidence-Based Policymaking	4
US Foreign Policy Apparatus	4
Sino-American Conflict	5
Evidence-Based Policymaking in the Foreign Policy Apparatus	5
The Five Pillars of Evidence-Based Policymaking in Foreign Policy	6
METHODOLOGY	8
Research Design	8
Data Collection	8
Data Analysis	9
ANALYSIS	11
An Emphasis on Fact Finding	11
Code #1: Physical Facts	11
Code #2: Predicting Facts	11
Discussion on Pillar One	12
Citations of the Available Evidence for Various Options	13
Code #3 and Code #5: In Favor of an Agreement	13
Code #4 and Code #6: Against an Agreement	13
Discussion on Pillar Two	14
An Emphasis on Transparency of Decision-Making	14
Code #7: Openness in Decision-Making	14
Code #8: External Impacts on Policymaking	15
Discussion on Pillar Four	15
Applying the Findings	16
CONCLUSION	18
Answering the Research Question	18
Implications of the Study	19
LIST OF REFERENCES	20

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CMPR:	China's Military Power Report
EBP:	Evidence-Based Policymaking
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
INF:	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
NATO:	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA:	National Security Agency
NSC:	National Security Council
PRC:	People's Republic of China
ROC:	Republic of China
SIPRI:	Stockholm institute Peace Research Institute
START:	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
US:	United States
VCDNP:	Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The research is concerned with the question: *In how far is the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China in line with evidence-based policymaking?* In a time of “titanic shifts [...] in the international system” (Scheinmann, 2022), an assertive China pressures the global hegemony of the United States. Recently, China began to modernize and extend its nuclear arsenal much to the concern of Washington. As such, the US foreign policy apparatus aims for a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement. At the same time, the Biden administration outlines the use of evidence-based policymaking. Evidence-based policymaking itself can be defined as an approach which “helps people to make well informed decisions about policies, programs and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy development” (Davies, 2004, p.2). The thesis aims to investigate the application of evidence-based policymaking in the aforementioned concrete policy example. The application of pillars, after Spokojny and Scherer (2021), in this context is central for this research. The thesis finds that the agenda is only somewhat in line with evidence-based policymaking, verifying only one pillar: the emphasis on fact finding.

INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH PROBLEM

Background

In the first speech as Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken acknowledged that “China is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system – all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to, because it ultimately serves the interests and reflects the values of the American people” (2021). Words like this are unsurprising, the rise of the People’s Republic of China (China) in the past decades changed the global order. Since opening up to the world in 1979, China has enjoyed rapid economic growth. By now, its economy enjoys the global leading role in manufacturing and exports and its nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the second highest. The economy is expected to grow further in the coming years, eventually replacing the United States (US) as the economical leader in the world. As such, China cements its place in the global elite, turning the global order bipolar again. Following a grand strategy to displace the American order, as Rush Doshi (2021) argues, China aims to be the global leading country by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. For Washington, this development is frightening and ever since President Trump’s anti-China policies of trade tariffs among other, American hawkishness towards China is increasing. Next to the global order, China also claims to build a new regional order in East Asia and push the United States out of its backyard, including America’s military presence in Japan and the Republic of Korea (Rudd, 2022; Doshi, 2021). As such, next to a growing economy, China also stepped up its military spending, especially in its naval forces, and with it increased both the quantity and quality of its nuclear weapons. The issue of sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan) gained traction in the public discussion over the past months, with President Joe Biden vowing to defend the island in case the mainland decides to invade (Shattuck, 2022; O’Hanlon, 2022). A major conflict between the United States and China is a realistic possibility, a conflict which may include nuclear warfare as both countries possess such warheads: the United States has a stockpile of 3,750 warheads whilst China’s keeps (only) 350 warheads (US Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 2021; SIPRI, 2021).

Before the latest developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the last time the world experienced a real threat of nuclear warfare was during the Cold War with the Soviet Union as the American counterpart. In order to outdo the opponent both countries invested heavily in the research and development of weaponry, including nuclear weapons. The countries ultimately agreed to reduce offensive nuclear arms in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) on the grounds of reducing spending on weapons. “[I]t became clear to both sides that there was no “last move” in strategy, or any technology breakthrough, that would provide nuclear superiority relative to the opponent” (Cimbala & Korb, 2022). Within the framework of this nuclear arms control agreement, both parties agreed to put a cap on the deployment of nuclear warheads. Under the Trump administration, it was one of the goals to include China in a trilateral (with Russia) nuclear arms control agreement (Gramer & Detsch, 2020; Zhao, 2020a; Kimball, 2021). However, in 2021, the New START was only bilaterally extended to 2026, without China. No matter this setback, the current administration seeks to continue talks with Beijing about a nuclear arms control agreement with President Biden stating America’s intentions on a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2021 (Kimball, 2021, Nebhay, 2021). In a certain way, Biden’s persistence on a nuclear arms agreement with China is intriguing. The vast discrepancy between the two countries in terms of the number of nuclear weapons they hold offers little evidence for the urgency of an immediate agreement in this military domain.

Talking about evidence, interestingly, one of President Biden’s main administrative goals when he assumed office in January 2021, was to revive American politics by using evidence-based policymaking (EBP) in all policy departments, with an additional memorandum focusing on revitalizing America’s foreign policy (Biden, 2021a; Biden, 2021b). Pursuing policymaking in an evidence-based manner requires the use of “the best available research and information on program results to guide decisions” (Pew-MacArthur, 2014, p.2). This demands from policymakers that they are well-informed to improve soundness and backing of their decisions. In the past, American actions in foreign policy were often not

based in evidence, creating failures such as the Iraq invasion and the Yemen War (Parkhurst, 2017; fp21, 2020). Whilst today most US policy departments have adopted the use of evidence and proving good results, “the decision-making apparatus of the National Security Council and the Department of State [the responsible department for foreign policy] stand out as particularly resistant to change” (Spokojny & Scherer, 2021). Therefore, former American ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, describes this lack of adjustment as “[w]e [America] can’t reclaim our place at the head of the table if we’re dragging our grandfathers’ State Department behind us”, arguing that “American diplomacy has atrophied, public communications have become antiquated, and democracy promotion has produced fewer measurable results, as evidenced by fourteen consecutive years of global democratic recession” (2020).

The current global situation puts the main foreign policy focus on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context, there is an argument that under President Biden the State Department has started to adapt to evidence-based policymaking due its openness of sharing intelligence to the public and fellow countries, which as Lexington (2022) suggests, advocated a new dawn in America’s foreign policy. Meanwhile for the case at hand, it is important to recognize that officially, China pursues a no-first-use strategy of nuclear weapons, they are only used to deter nuclear aggression (Brown, 2021; Zhao, 2021). The numbers propose an increased danger, especially as China is expanding its quality and quantity of weaponry as the China Military Power Report 2021 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2021) states. Though, when studying the Chinese doctrine on nuclear warfare, one may start to suggest that a nuclear arms control agreement, first envisioned by Trump and continued by Biden, is not necessary. Actors within the State Department may severely skew the narrative, pushing for an agreement just based on their pre-existing hawkish opinion on China. This presents a tension between what evidence-based policymaking suggests, rational decision-making based on evidence, and what is actually the current political agenda of the United States for an arms control agreement with China. This thesis places this conflict at the center of attention.

Evidence-based policymaking is strongly advocated for foreign policy as the subjective biases of officials, on which the current foreign policy process relies, put a strain on the system’s efficiency (Spokojny & Scherer, 2021). Whilst foreign policy seems the furthest policy area away from the individual, it is also one of the most important arenas as it guarantees the security of the country and, as such, the individual citizens. However, there is a clear lack of research in the topic of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy. Whilst other policy departments such as education and health are rich in examinations, foreign policy has received low interest so far and thus presents a clear research gap. Scholars have so far only investigated the general functioning of the apparatus, as such establishing the lack of objectivity within, but studies on individual (real) cases have not been performed yet. As a result, research on evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy practice is non-existent. The thesis aims to fill this gap by examining in how far Washington’s agenda for a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement is in line with evidence-based policymaking. Ultimately, the goal is to initiate further academic investigations into foreign policy agendas within the evidence-based policymaking framework and to consequently improve the output of foreign policy in the future, as such the scientific and societal relevance of the thesis is determined.

Research Question and Structure

The novelty of the Sino-American situation in combination with the administrative push for evidence-based policymaking allows for the possibility to critically analyze policymaking in foreign policy. The following research question is central to the thesis:

In how far is the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China in line with evidence-based policymaking?

The research question aims to investigate the reasons for Washington’s agenda to strike a nuclear arms control agreement with Beijing and if these reasons are compatible with the idea of following evidence-

based policymaking. To answer the research question, the paper aims to build an argument by answering the sub-questions (SQ) below.

1. *What are the demands of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy? (SQ1)*
2. *What evidence is available for and against a nuclear arms control agreement with China in the context of evidence-based policymaking? (SQ2)*

SQ1 aspires to establish a framework in which evidence-based can act within the US foreign policy apparatus. SQ2 aims to gather evidence that would suggest the application of evidence-based policymaking in the US foreign policy apparatus in the case of the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China. In doing so, it is important to remember that this paper does not seek to act as a policy proposal on how the foreign policy apparatus should work, but rather aims to investigate the use of evidence-based policymaking in the context of the American agenda to seek a nuclear arms control agreement with China. The thesis aims to review the argument that Washington should pursue an agreement with Beijing.

The paper starts by introducing the reader to the theory. The concept of evidence-based policymaking is introduced first, then the thesis provides an overview of the US foreign policy apparatus and the Sino-American conflict. Afterwards, the introduced topics are merged by demonstrating how evidence-based policymaking can be applied in the foreign policy apparatus and the hypotheses get established. Finally, the subsequent pillars of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy are introduced. These pillars will be central for the development of the argument this thesis pursues. After the theory, the methodology is presented and the coding scheme on which the analysis is based gets visualized. The analysis is structured by the individual pillars and the findings around each pillar are discussed. At last, all the findings come together to form an argument and allow, if applicable, to reject the hypotheses. Lastly, the thesis summarizes the research and provides answers to the research questions and its sub-questions. The thesis ends by discussing the future implications it pursues.

THEORY

Evidence-Based Policymaking

Whilst the use of evidence and experience for designing policy is well-established, the notion of modern evidence-based policymaking gained traction during the Blair administrations in the United Kingdom in the late 90s, targeting a modernization of policymaking. Evidence-based policymaking aims to move policymaking away from ideological politics to a more rational decision-making which is informed by available evidence as the concept promises to make use of science. Science identifies problems, but science also offers solutions to those problems (Parkhurst, 2017). Evidence-based policymaking itself can be defined as an approach which “helps people to make well informed decisions about policies, programs and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy development” (Davies, 2004, p.2). The Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking further defines the EBP notion as “the application of evidence to inform decisions in government” (2017, p.11f.). Sutcliffe and Court suggest in a report that “[p]olicy which is based on evidence is seen to produce better outcomes” (2005, p.2), this may ultimately create an upward spiral of relations between the public and the government by the output of sound policies rooted in evidential data. This interplay can be seen as attractive for governments and as such the recent emphasis on evidence-based policymaking in politics may be explained.

That emphasis is visible in the United States as well. At the beginning of his administration, US President Joe Biden issued a memorandum on the use of evidence-based policymaking: “It is the policy of my Administration to make evidence-based decisions guided by the best available science and data [...] across every area of government” (Biden, 2021a). Today, evidence-based policymaking signals positive developments in the public sector across areas such as public health, economic policy, and education. Though, not all departments are happily making use of this new way of policymaking, especially the State Department continues to act outside this new embraced scope. It continues to rely on the established system of subjective judgment by officials (fp21, 2020; Spokojny & Scherer, 2021).

US Foreign Policy Apparatus

The American constitution (Article 2, Sections 1 and 2) establishes that foreign policy is a matter of checks-and-balances between the executive and legislative. Whilst the President’s window of action within foreign policy seems to be limited and the constitutional power being more reckoned to the legislative, it is generally accepted that the President is the dominant actor within the actual foreign policy decision-making nonetheless (Oldemeinen, 2012; Del Monte & Lazarou, 2017). Del Monte and Lazarou continue by arguing that “[a]lthough congressional involvement in foreign policy is important, it has multiple motivations and not always aligned goals” (2017, p.9), as backed by Fowler (2015). The relevant executive institutions are the State Department and the Department of Defense, as well as the National Security Council (NSC) and the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) (Siddiqi, 2013).

US foreign policy generally concerns “the goals and actions of the US government in the international system” (Carter, 2020, p.2). The framework of goals abroad include: (1) the protection of the United States and its citizens; (2) the advancement of global interests including democracy and human rights; (3) the international promotion of American values and policies (Bureau of Public Affairs, 2008). All those goals are challenged by the emergence of China as a global superpower. Strategic objective 1.4 of the Joint Strategic Plan (2018-2022), developed by the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, includes the deterrence of rogue nations. China, as stated in the report, “directly challenges an international order based on democratic norms, respect for human rights, and peace” (2018, p.29). The confrontational approach of President Trump’s China policy and the (to an extent) continuation of it by current President Biden, yielded in ever cooling relations between the two

countries and the development of distrust between both sides, both on political and public level (Haenle & Bresnick, 2022).

Sino-American Conflict

An opinion poll of Pew Research Center (2022) found that 82% of the American public have an unfavorable view of China, an increase of 6 percent points from 2021. The poll also shows that two-thirds of respondents view China as a major threat. The public dislike can be explained by factors such as China's *alignment* with Russia in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet and geopolitical tensions arising from Taiwan, among other. The history between China and the United States however is wide fold. There is a key development to understand in the context of this paper as this is central to the argument of the urgency to strike a nuclear arms control deal in a potential armed conflict between the two countries.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 following a win of the Communists against the Nationalists who in their defeat retreated to the island Formosa, to form the Republic of China (ROC), today known as Taiwan. Only 30 years later, in 1979, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC under the three communiqués. In it, the United States and the PRC agreed on a peaceful solution to the issue. At the same time, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 allows the US to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons whilst America stays strategically ambiguous. Since Xi Jinping became the Chinese President, the global order has changed dramatically. For Doshi, Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and the West's poor response to the Covid-19 pandemic are considered the trifecta that causes a more offensive approach of China – an approach that is based on the impression of a Western retreat on the global level (2021). For Xi, the territorial integrity of the motherland, which includes the island of Formosa, is essential and non-negotiable (Rudd, 2022). As such, the tensions around Taiwan heated over the past months with US President Biden reaffirming the US' commitment to defend the island if the mainland would decide to invade (Shattuck, 2022; O'Hanlon, 2022).

Whilst the Taiwan issue is not the only obstacle in the relationship, it may certainly be the powder keg to turn the conflict into a Hot War in the nearer future (Layne, 2020; Daly, 2021). The prospect of war between the United States and China is associated to the term *nuclear weapons*. Both countries possess nuclear weapons and continue to increase spending on their nuclear arsenals (Kimball, 2020; U.S. Department of Defense, 2021). A nuclear arms control agreement would make sense in so far that it would ensure mutual security and an end to the spending of resources (Schelling & Halperin, 1961; Acton, MacDonald & Vaddi, 2021).

Evidence-Based Policymaking in the Foreign Policy Apparatus

As established earlier, the State Department tends to continue acting outside the scope of evidence-based policymaking. In response, Spokojny and Scherer (2021) argue that policymakers in the field of foreign policy should start embracing evidence-based policymaking as its primary method. As such, the officials would achieve national security objectives whilst also reducing misperceptions and costs connected to inefficiency. The policy process usually relies on the individual assessments of officials, these are dangerous as predictable biases, such as hawkishness, based on personality and opinion may find their ways into the procedure (Kertzer, Holmes, LeVeck & Wayne, 2022). This causes foreign policy to drift further away from evidence-based policymaking as now the best available evidence is not the root of the decision but rather otherwise motivated grounds, such as populist notions or strategic deterrence. As recognized, the majority of the American public views China as a threat. This notion could trigger the argument that the Biden administration leaves the issue of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement at the top of its agenda to gain votes for the 2024 Presidential election. Though, the quantity of Chinese nuclear weaponries is by a significant factor smaller than the American and it is not expected

to reach American numbers any time soon due to the delta and the resources needed to bridge this gap. Nonetheless, Washington aims to reduce or limit Chinese capabilities, indicating a bullyish agenda towards their competitor and not one based in evidence.

America's global power is unravelling whilst challenges are increasing (Cooley & Nexon, 2020). In the past, American actions in foreign policy were often not based in evidence, creating failures such as the Iraq invasion (Parkhurst, 2017). To keep the lead, America must transform and change its approach of foreign policy. At the same time, pro-EBP in foreign policy think tank fp21 (2020) acknowledges that foreign policy is a complex field and that no policy will ever be perfect as "[e]thical questions, political pressures, and resources tradeoffs invariably complicate the pursuit of national goals" (p.22). Spokojny and Scherer argue five 'pillars' should nonetheless be included in an evidence-based foreign policymaking process: "an emphasis on fact-finding; citations of the available evidence for various options; metrics of success in all policy memos; an emphasis on transparency of decision-making; and an emphasis on learning from success and failures" (2021). These five pillars of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy will be explained in more detail below as they are central to the hypotheses.

The Five Pillars of Evidence-Based Policymaking in Foreign Policy

The first pillar, *an emphasis on fact-finding*, urges policymakers to establish a base for any policymaking process. Facts describe the landscape of the policymaking arena, with fact-finding being the way to collect information needed (Krebs, 2017a). One can distinguish between two kinds of facts: physical facts, in the case at hand this would include the number of nuclear weapons, and predicting facts, for example the assessments of risks (Krebs, 2017b). Think tank fp21 advocates for "the collection of policy-relevant quantitative data" (2020, p.8) and encourages actors in the foreign policy arena to focus on data gathering endeavors.

The second pillar, *citations of the available evidence for various options*, illustrates that the policymaking process is to be rooted in scientific evidence. Scientific evidence is required to support policy proposals and agendas. This is to ensure that the making of foreign policy moves away from the subjective views of officials, as evaluated above. The evidence "may come from historical or intelligence analyses, advanced analytic conclusion, social science research, or other sources" (fp21, 2020, p.13; George, 1993).

The notion of including *metrics of success in all policy memos*, the third pillar, aims to induce the probability of a successful policy proposal. A metric of success measures the performance of a policy, most probably in the sense of the question if the policy can bring the expected result (Hébert, 2021). Though, a policy memo should also include indications for when a policy proposal might be failing. This requirement ensures an increased likelihood of a successful policy implementation (fp21, 2020).

The fourth pillar, *emphasis on transparency of decision-making*, intends to provide a policymaking framework which supports critical evaluation from the inside and outside. By providing a framework, the decision-making body allows an insight into the decision-making process. As such, the process is open to critical reflections and thoughts of other actors, including scholars. Moreover, policymaking is a dynamic process, as such actions and words of the concerned, in this case Beijing, must be at all times considered too. A transparent decision-making process allows for a more open dialogue and eradicates risks of biases and or hidden agendas (Strauss, n.d.).

Finally, pillar five, *an emphasis on learning from successes and failures*, seeks to obtain lessons that can be drawn from alternative (or previous) policies. Reviewing a policy can lead to a better understanding of how different alternative compare. [F]p21 (2020) advocates to draw all gained data to predetermined criteria and to evaluate the strength and weaknesses of each alternative. Whilst "[f]oreign policy is goal-orientated" (Baldwin, 2000, p.173), the means to achieve that goal are often wide fold.

To narrow the window of failure, pillar 5 seeks to investigate if certain strong points (or weak points) of different alternatives can act as a lesson to other options.

The very nature of the case at hand, Washington's agenda to strike a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement, puts limitations on the research of this thesis. As the goal of this specific foreign policy agenda is already clear, i.e. to constrain China's nuclear capabilities, the analysis focuses on investigating the means to how Washington arrived at this policy intention and if this policymaking process is in line with the five pillars of introduced evidence-based policy. However, pillar three and pillar five are special in the context of this research. A nuclear arms control agreement in itself is already a success. The theory would be that the fewer nuclear weapons China possesses, the less of a threat it is to the United States. Though, the general perception is that every individual nuclear weapon a (hostile) country possesses is a threat. This paradox determines that a metric of success cannot be applied to the case at hand. Consequently, pillar three is disregarded in the analysis. Nuclear arms control agreements are very rare (Coe & Veynman, 2020). The longstanding and continuous bilateral engagement of START between the US and Russia signals the success and sense of a nuclear arms control agreement. It only makes sense for Washington to aim for more bilateral (or multilateral) treaties with its adversaries that limit the quantity of their nuclear weapons. "Past experience has taught us why meaningful arms control and risk reduction is worthwhile and can avoid unpredictable crises that could escalate to nuclear use", said Bonnie Jenkins, the current Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security on a NATO Conference in 2021. As such, the thesis assumes that the United States government has learned that nuclear arms control, in the form of START, yields successful results anyways as the United States acts from a position of power due to the number of weapons it has. As such, pillar five is disregarded in the analysis.

Using the remaining three pillars established by Spokojny and Scherer (2021), the following hypotheses are to be thought of in the context of the American agenda for a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement.

1. *American foreign policymaking is fully in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H1)*
2. *American foreign policymaking is partially in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H2)*
3. *American foreign policymaking is not at all in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H3).*

The three established hypotheses allow to answer the research question of *In how far is the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China in line with evidence-based policymaking?* The hypotheses are structured in the way of one positive expectation (H1) and one negative expectation (H3), with H2 acting in the sphere in between if either is to be rejected by the evidence gathered. To not reject H1, the data needs to suggest that all three pillars are evidently used in the foreign policymaking process for the case at hand. Vice versa, H3 is not rejected if none of the pillars occur in the policymaking process. The use of a pillar is verified when the evidence suggests that the requirements of an objective increased threat from China (pillar 1), of a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement among multiple scholars (pillar 2), and of a transparent development process for the agenda (pillar 4) are fulfilled, respectively.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This paper aims to provide a coherent argument in order to arrive at an answer for the posed research question: *In how far is the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China in line with evidence-based policymaking?* To answer that research question and the sub-questions, this research engages in qualitative content analysis of relevant textual data as this method displays reality as a story. Thus, the method of qualitative content analysis fits the descriptive nature of the research question.

To make use of qualitative data is feasible when investigating if the American agenda to seek a nuclear arms control agreement with China is compatible with the foreign policy principles of the evidence-based policymaking concept that President Biden envisions for the administration. With its vital role in society, there is a continuous interest in how the foreign policy apparatus performs and reasons its working, as an example there is a widespread consensus and number of published qualitative data available that suggest that the State Department, a key part of the foreign policy apparatus, lacks in applying evidence-based policymaking. The scrutiny on its mechanisms is likely to produce a widespread pool of perspectives and resources that can be analyzed in the context of the posed research question. Textual analysis allows for the investigation of such perspectives and to ultimately understand the foreign policy apparatus' interest in a nuclear arms control agreement with China, whilst also investigating the application of evidence-based policymaking internally.

Data Collection

The main textual resources that will be analyzed are governmental reports and expert documents. The focus is on establishing an overview if, and if so to what extent, evidence-based policymaking argues the direction of the American foreign policy agenda in the case of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement. The paper does not aim to investigate the internal processes of the organizations. The data is gathered within the framework of two categories.

1. First, to grasp the full scope of evidence available for possible use by the US foreign policy apparatus, textual data will be gathered from sources outside the policymaking arena. This includes scientific articles and advisory reports of external experts, scholars and think tanks that provide evidence on the matter. Journalistic articles are also regarded.
2. Secondly, the data collection process aims to gather qualitative data on the US foreign policy apparatus as it provides the argument for an agreement. These include the annual China Military Power Report, the Annual Threat Assessment amongst others. Further texts include additional (American) intelligence reports on China, but also statements made by US officials.

The selection of data for both categories was done by searching for publicly available information in the realm of the context of this thesis. The aim for category 1 was to select a diverse set of maximum 30 documents. One key requirement was that none should be older than from 2019 as this was the year the Trump administration announced the agenda to seek a nuclear arms control agreement with China. The search targeted specific key phrases: *US-China relations*; *US-China nuclear arms control agreement*; *(nuclear) arms control*; *China's nuclear buildup*; and *non-proliferation*. Also, cross-references between the documents were considered in the data collection process. The target was to include a diversity of papers, including scientific articles, journalistic articles and advisory reports of external actors. Category 2 focuses on official documents. The aim was to include a maximum of 25 reports that stem from the US foreign policy apparatus and the intelligence community with the key requirement being that the reports were published in 2018 or later. As established, the Trump administration started pursuing the agenda since 2019. Hence, comparing reports from 2018 to 2019 and later may lead to indications of an increased perceived threat from China. Again, the collection of data was done searching for publicly

available documents. Annual reports like the *China Military Power Report* are used multiple times over different versions. The thesis does not assume the list of documents be the complete list of intelligence reports on China within the American government. For the analysis it is important to recognize that all collected data is treated equally in the analysis, independent from the category it originates from. The division of the data collection process into two categories guarantees that data from different perspectives is collected. However, it does not aim to split the analysis into two parts. The main objective of the analysis is to establish a connection between evidence-based policymaking and the practiced actions of American administration in the context of a nuclear arms agreement by using qualitative data of the collected documents.

Data Analysis

Textual analysis in the form of content analysis is applied in the data collection process. Scholars applying content analysis make sense of the text in its context, focusing on the identification of what is the main narrative in the story. What researchers look out for are certain concepts, themes, and words to establish this narrative (Julien, 2008). For the context of this research, it means that the collected data can be analyzed using qualitative content analysis.

To make sense of the large quantity of data, the method of coding is utilized. Coding is, as Saldana puts it, “a word or short phrase that symbolically assign a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual” (2016, p.4). The coding in this research focuses on the previously established pillars of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy after Spokojny and Scherer (2021): (A) the emphasis on fact-finding policymaking process; (B) the citations of the available evidence for various options; and (C) the emphasis on transparency of decision-making. The coding is worked on in the research tool *Atlas.ti*, a software that allows for a qualitative analysis of a large quantity of data. Figure 1 below visualizes the coding scheme with which the qualitative content analysis was delivered.

Figure 1

Coding Scheme for Qualitative Content Analysis

Theory	Category	Code
EBP principles in foreign policy	A. Emphasis on Fact-Finding	#1 <i>physical fact</i> : number of nuclear weapons; past developments in number of weapons; #2 <i>predicting fact</i> : increased threat of China; decreased threat of China; expectations of rise in number of weapons;
EBP principles in foreign policy	B. Citations of the available Evidence for various Options	#3 <i>in favor without evidence</i> : arguing in favor of an agreement without evidence cited; #4 <i>against without evidence</i> : arguing against an agreement without evidence cited; #5 <i>in favor with evidence</i> : arguing for an agreement with scientific evidence cited; #6 <i>against with evidence</i> : arguing against an agreement with scientific evidence cited;
EBP principles in foreign policy	C. Emphasis on Transparency of Decision-Making	#7 <i>openness in decision-making</i> : offer insight into the decision-making process that makes critical evaluation from inside / outside the apparatus possible; how the US perceives China and its actions; #8 <i>external impacts on policymaking</i> : how China acts; what Beijing says;

Category A (emphasis on fact-finding) investigates the documents for the codes of physical facts and predicting facts (Krebs, 2017b). Physical facts include the number of nuclear weapons but also the developments of such over the years. Predicting facts contain the narratives of an increased or decreased threat of China on the United States, and the expectations on how future numbers will look like. The purpose of using these codes is to collect evidence that suggest an increased threat from China.

Category B (citations of the available evidence for various options) scrutinizes the data on dichotomous positions towards the agenda and if this position is supported with or without evidence. The evidence “may come from historical or intelligence analyses, advanced analytic conclusion, social science research, or other sources” (fp21, 2020, p.13; George, 1993). The purpose of using these codes is to collect evidence for a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement among multiple scholars.

Category C (emphasis on transparency of decision-making) explores the documents on the base of openness in the decision-making process. A transparent decision-making process allows for a more open dialogue and eradicates risks of biases and or hidden agendas (Strauss, n.d.). As such, the code aims to provide insight into the procedure so both inside and outside sources can critically evaluate and influence it and help to develop the policy. Moreover, external shocks on the policymaking process need to be regarded. As such, code eight looks to exhibit shocks stemming from China and its actions and words. The purpose of using these codes is to collect evidence that suggest a transparent development process for the policy is taking place.

ANALYSIS

The analysis was performed as a qualitative content analysis in which the individual documents were coded according to the coding scheme (see figure 1). By applying coding to 51 documents in total, answers to the research question, the sub-questions and hypotheses can be established. In the following, the results of the analysis are presented.

An Emphasis on Fact Finding

Code #1: Physical Facts

China does not publicly disclose the number of nuclear warheads it is possessing. As such, the estimates exclusively rely on American intelligence (Cunningham, 2021). In the China Military Power Report (CMPR) 2020, the Pentagon (America's Department of Defense) estimated the Chinese stockpile to be loaded with nuclear warheads in the quantity of low-200s. At the same time, it was expected that Beijing will double its warheads over the next decade in the realm of modernizing its forces. However, the successive CMPR 2021 revised the expectations. It states: "Since then, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion, which may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030" (2021, p.92). Moreover, as of January 2021, China holds 350 nuclear warheads (SIPRI, 2021; Isaacs, 2022), indicating an already considerable grown arsenal in comparison to the previous year(s). This rapid build-up and significant change in the projection is associated with the vast resources in finances and technology China can invest into a growing and modernized arsenal (Santoro, 2020). In comparison, the United States possessed 3,750 nuclear warheads as of September 2020 (Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 2021). Whilst the Chinese stockpile is by a factor smaller than the American, US policymakers are concerned about both the qualitative and quantitative Chinese growth (Kimball, 2021; Brown, 2021). What drives this concern is the impervious approach China pursues in its nuclear strategy. "Beijing has not been transparent about its modernization program, fueling speculations about its intent, particularly given that the Chinese leadership has adopted an increasingly assertive posture" (Santoro, 2020, p.11), especially as China has traditionally retained a small nuclear force (Cunningham & Taylor Fravel, 2021).

Code #2: Predicting Facts

There are multiple developments in China that support the notion of increased quantity and quality of their nuclear weapons. China is allegedly "in the process of building as many as 300 new missile silos" says former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd (2021), further supported by Zhao (2021) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2022). Moreover, Beijing officially increased its annual military budget by 6,8 percent, whilst its actual spending is likely to be higher (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Overall, there is an overarching agreement that China will increase its nuclear weapons arsenal in the coming years, though, there are disagreements about the extent of the growth. Whilst some documents suggest accordingly to the CMPR 2021 of minimum 1,000 Chinese warheads by 2030, still far under than the American arsenal, others mention the race to parity (Santoro, 2020; Cunningham, 2021; VCDNP, 2022). This idea would imply that China builds up its stockpile to the same number the United States possesses.

However, the Chinese nuclear doctrine needs to be considered too. As the only P5 country, the group of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council of which all possess nuclear weapons, China does pursue a no-first-use policy (Santoro, 2020; Bauer, Erästö & Smith, 2022). A no-first-use policy determines that nuclear weapons will only be used for retaliation if China is attacked by nuclear weapons itself. On this, Brown argues that Chinese nuclear forces have three objectives that are "[i]n peacetime, they seek to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war with China. In wartime, they constrain the scope of war, preventing a conventional conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange. If

war does escalate to nuclear conflict, they serve to conduct nuclear counterattacks” (2021). Therefore, China nuclear strategy can best be described as an effective deterrent. At the same time, China is the only P5 country that increases its arsenal. This is a critical development in a time of “titanic shifts [...] in the international system” (Scheinmann, 2022). Beijing is increasingly regarded as a major destabilizing factor to the global security (Jenkins, 2021). Most explicitly, these threats occur militarily in the Indo-Pacific region in disagreements with the United States and other countries over Taiwan and the South China Sea, or the Korean peninsula and the American military engagement with its allies in the region. Under Biden, the Pentagon announced it “will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor” (2022, p.1). The notion of a more hawkish view on China in Washington is further underlined by Isaacs: “no matter where you stand on the American political spectrum, the challenge China poses to U.S. national interests is very real” (2021a).

Discussion on Pillar One: Emphasis on Fact-Finding

The aim of category A, *emphasis on fact-finding*, has been to collect evidence that suggest an increased threat from China. Over recent years, the Sino-American relations have rapidly deteriorated and the distrust between Washington and Beijing has grown as a result. China’s ascendance to a global power, which has predominantly grown from its rapid economic growth, is now being underlined by a modernized, diversified and bolstered military. According to Zhao (2020a), Beijing believes to obtain military dominance to avoid American intervention within the First Island Chain, which includes Taiwan. The thought behind this belief is that it is guaranteeing China no American interference when it comes to core national interests. As a result, Beijing builds leverage over Washington who in turn “has no choice but to accept peaceful co-existence with China” (Zhao, 2022, p.1). Consequently, it comes to no surprise that Washington perceives China’s globally ascending presence coming at the cost of the United States. Rudolf coins this notion the “US-China conflict syndrome. [...] China’s growing power has awakened American fears over its status as the only international superpower” (2020, p.9). Next to a growing nuclear arsenal, China also expands its naval power (Paul & Overhaus, 2020), further fueling the threat that Washington is perceiving. Generally, “China’s military build-up stands increasingly in contradiction to the official rhetoric of a peaceful development path. Its military power enables Beijing to pursue a robust foreign policy that increasingly troubles its Asian neighbours and the United States” (Paul & Overhaus, 2020, p.20). In this context, the CMPR 2021 asserts an increase of diplomatic, political and military pressure from mainland China on Taiwan in 2020, in addition the report notes that the improved “military capabilities [are] to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan, South China Sea, or Korea contingency” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2021, p.81). Earlier, the Chinese nuclear doctrine and strategy were introduced. Washington acknowledges the Chinese policies, however there are doubts how this relates to the overhaul of the military. The Nuclear Posture Review 2018 states that “[w]hile China’s declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed, its lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p.11). Considering this report stems from 2018, the questions have likely intensified among China’s growth since then.

To summarize the arguments above, America clearly perceives an increased threat from China. Among a growing mistrust within the context of the “US-China conflict syndrome” (Rudolf, 2020, p.9), China’s lack of transparency concerning its nuclear program fuels this conception especially as it coincides with a modernized and increased nuclear arsenal and naval fleet, as well as with a more offensive foreign policy approach, including the subject of Taiwan. As a result, an increasing instability between the United States and China can be determined. The growing instability is the result of a more assertive China on a regional and global stage. Based on the rising instability, one can conclude that China poses an increased threat to the United States.

Citations of the Available Evidence for Various Options

Code #3 and Code #5: In Favor of an Agreement

The idea of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement is popular, though it is mostly found in public (scientific) documents and does not appear to be mentioned in government documents. Adam Scheinmann, the Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, defines nuclear arms control as “a cooperative endeavor to address problems of military insecurity and promote strategic stability, improve mutual trust and security, and reduce the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons” (2022). In times of strategic instability and general mistrust, as assessed in an earlier chapter, a nuclear arms control agreement between Washington and Beijing is reasonable in this context. Past events, i.e. the Cold War, have shown the importance of arms control and the risk reduction it provides, furthermore there is an argument that it helps to prevent unpredictable crises including nuclear warfare (Jenkins, 2021). For Zhao it therefore “appears less and less hopeful that the two countries can avoid a nuclear arms race” (2021), especially now that China is advancing its nuclear modernization efforts (Kimball, 2021). The general perception of arms control is it being a tool that limits arms competition, raises risk awareness and builds stability (Zhao, 2020b). Consequently, in sight of the increasing rivalry between China and the United States, it is argued that “it is precisely because mistrust remains high and is growing between the U.S. and China that the two should consider arms control out of mutual interest in averting war and minimizing the costs of war if deterrence should fail” (Vaddi & Panda, 2021). Another voice contends Washington should rather try and concentrate on deterring China militarily, not dominate it and to do so a nuclear arms control agreement would be the most appropriate tool (Isaacs, 2021a). Rudd (2021) claims that a Sino-America nuclear arms control agreement makes sense in so far that its eventual objective is to avert the slip towards a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific region and thus creating stability. Additionally, although a hot war is a real possibility both Washington and Beijing have a mutual interest of avoiding nuclear warfare (Zhao, 2020a). Whilst China is so far rejecting to agree to (preliminary) talks on this matter, Jenkins additionally fortifies the necessity of a dialogue to avoid misconceptions the Chinese side may have: “Arms control is not a trap designed to weaken China’s defenses, but a mechanism to reduce risk and the chance of unnecessary arms races” (2021). The integration of China in a nuclear arms control agreement and the consequent provision of stability is essential to proof arms control’s long-term viability as this would probably signal the reaffirmation of universal goals among global competition (Rose, 2020; Santoro, 2020).

Code #4 and Code #6: Against an Agreement

Whilst the presented claims provide grounds to the usefulness of nuclear arms control agreements, those arguments have failed to provide an appropriate reasoning for the reality. A Sino-American agreement is frankly very unlikely, partly because of the deep mistrust both governments feel but also due to the vast asymmetry the respective nuclear stockpiles demonstrate. China especially acts within its respective bargaining position, which essentially creates a deadlock for the current context (Cunningham, 2021). The United States want an arms control agreement, whilst China is unlikely to discuss an asymmetric agreement (Jenkins, 2021). Consequently, there is little to no room for any arms control measures as long as the mistrust between the countries is thriving (VCDNP, 2022). As a result of this deadlock rooted in asymmetry and especially the mistrust, scholars suggest that instead of aiming for a full nuclear arms control agreement already, Washington is better off to first engage in Sino-American conversations for crises management to concentrate on risk reduction and trust building (Logan, 2021; VCDNP, 2022). It is important to acknowledge that the coding has failed to provide for code #4, *against without evidence*, as no analyzed document has suggested non-evidential arguments against a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement. As a result, this code was not applicable.

Discussion on Pillar Two: Citations of the Available Evidence for Various Options

The aim of category B, *citations of the available evidence for various options*, has been to provide a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement among multiple scholars. However, the analysis has shown that there is in fact only a very low number of arguments on the matter have been made. Whilst the arguments in favor of an agreement, independent from if they are rooted in evidence themselves, can be accepted as reasonable points, they are rather general and according to arms control theory. In this way, the presented arguments do not recognize the practical obstacles and asymmetries in the US-China relation. In this very nature, a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement cannot be established. In contrast, the arguments that oppose the American agenda consider the reality of the Sino-American relation. They recognize the obstacles that stand in the way of an agreement and, whilst acknowledging the importance of arms control in the context of the current tense situation, argue that small steps need to be achieved first, i.e. mutual trust building measures. Also, the framework of asymmetry is considered, Cunningham (2021) lists a total of five asymmetries that stand in the way of managing the nuclear risk appropriately, including the nuclear asymmetry. For an agreement to be reached, symmetry in the number of nuclear weapons is one of the likely requirements as China would not bow to American bullying. This means that either the United States allows China to catch up, or that the United States destroys its current arsenal to match the Chinese level. Both of which are unlikely, especially as Russia, including the New START, need to be considered in this thought too.

To summarize the arguments above, there is no clear and coherent scientific argument for the case of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement made. The arguments that provided an agreement with the administrative agenda are too general and are disregarding the practical malfunctioning and asymmetry of the Sino-American relationship. In contrast, arguments against arms control are considering the reality of the unsettled relationship and provide a case for the need of trust building measures before an agreement can be discussed at the first place. The general lack of investigations into this matter needs to be highlighted. Based on the collected documents for the analyses, no argument for an arms control agreement can be established.

An Emphasis on Transparency of Decision-Making

Code #7: Openness in Decision-Making

Washington has grown full of anti-Chinese sentiments (Overhaus, Rudolf & von Daniels, 2020; Paul & Overhaus, 2020). This notion is strongly reflected in various statements on the issue of China's nuclear expansion. The overarching bipartisan agreement in Congress is to equal the Chinese nuclear modernization and expansion with a major novel threat (Kimball, 2021), as such it strongly supports a hard line on China (Overhaus, et al., 2020; Johnson, 2022). One of the ideas floating around in this context, is a substantial increase of military budget to deter China (Isaacs, 2021b; Spoehr, 2021). The Trump administration aimed to include China into a trilateral START agreement with Russia. Though, there is an argument that the strategy used by Trump of demanding China to join was a born to fail (Kimball, 2021). Whilst Biden continues the desire of arms control of China the tone changed to a "more pragmatic approach that takes into account China's concerns" (Kimball, 2021) as the administration views it as essential to limit the hazard of a more modern and growing Chinese nuclear arsenal (Cunningham, 2021; Jenkins, 2021; Acton et al., 2021). Biden faces two obstacles in this regard, first the "administration will inherit an arms control workforce that has been hollowed out" (Rose, 2020). Secondly, the hostile and diverging Sino-American relationship makes direct communication between the two sides more difficult, as such the construction of shared views on issues like arms control and climate change is likely to be strongly challenged (Zhao, 2021; Zhao, 2022). On this, Vaddi and Panda argue that "[t]hreat inflation tends to lead to poor policy outcomes. When it comes to China's nuclear arsenal, it's important for American leaders to accurately understand the nature of the problem" (2021).

Consequently, the Biden administration pursues pragmatism on the issue, it “will engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological developments that implicate strategic stability” (Biden, 2021c, p.13) and is likely to intensify the stance taken by the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 to “seek a dialogue with China to enhance our understanding of our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities; to improve transparency; and to help manage the risks of miscalculation and misperception” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p.7). On the matter of bilateral dialogues, former Australian Prime Minister Rudd argues that China “is clearly concerned about US capabilities, and therefore may be willing to begin with smaller-scale bilateral talks on strategic transparency and crises management” (2021). The United States, as well China, do convey their support for arms control however there is a widespread disagreement on the purposes and preconditions of it (Acton et al., 2021). As introduced before, asymmetry is one of the factors that are considered an obstacle and whilst Sino-American symmetry in terms of the quantity of nuclear weapons “is both unlikely in the near term and undesirable” (Cunningham, 2021), Washington and Beijing must get creative about the conditions of a nuclear arms control agreement.

Code #8: External Impacts on Policymaking

China does not aim for an asymmetric nuclear arms control agreement. However, it is important to investigate further reasons that can explain China’s reluctance to join bilateral talks on the issue. China’s defense white paper of 2019 states the goal of possessing a world-class military force by 2049 which would allow China to act globally from a position of strength and pursue military superiority (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020; U.S. Department of Defense, 2021; Cunningham, 2021). Beijing perceives the ever-increasing competitive Sino-American relationship as an American attempt to contain China’s rise (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021). Additionally, the novel US-led AUKUS pact which allows Australia to acquire nuclear submarines, is regarded by China as a provocation in the form of nuclear proliferation of the Indo-Pacific region as such it is concluded by Chinese officials that the strategic stress on China is deepening (Rudd, 2021). Cunningham (2021) argues that China has lost confidence in the United States as an arms control partner due to the American withdrawal from the bilateral *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (INF) with Russia. This adds to Beijing’s rejection of bowing to American pressure that would resemble the *Century of Humiliation* which an asymmetric arms control treaty would equate with (The Economist, 2020). Generally, Beijing is wary of arms control because there is an apparent trade-off between transparency and security (Vaddi & Panda, 2021). It is argued that “verification might undermine the survivability of China’s nuclear forces by revealing sensitive information about them –the location of individual weapons, in particular” (Acton et al., 2021, p.47). As such, China regards a Sino-American nuclear arms agreement as “part of the US playbook for strategic competition with great adversaries” (Cunningham, 2021, p.170) which undermines the mutual “trust in each other’s assurances about their defensive nuclear intentions and encourages worst-case interpretations of each other’s behavior” (Cunningham, 2021, p.161).

Discussion on Pillar Four: An Emphasis on Transparency of Decision-Making

The aim of category C, *an emphasis on transparency of decision-making*, has been to deliver a transparent development process for the agenda. The analysis has indicated a very low development process on the issue at hand. The main development that is to notice occurred when the Biden administration took charge over from the Trump administration. Whilst Trump (literally) demanded China to join Russia and the United States in a START-esque trilateral arms control agreement, the Biden administration changed the narrative to a bilateral pragmatic discourse. This step aims to recognize the Chinese interests in order to strike an agreement eventually by first holding bilateral dialogues. Here, one can recognize the overlap between category B and category C. There seems to be a shift in the way the foreign policy apparatus approaches the agenda researched in this thesis. Though, this shift is

overshadowed by the clear and strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Washington that comes with increased bilateral competition, i.e. the nuclear build-up. Congress was especially mentioned to have a hawkish stance on China as such the policymaking process is strongly constrained and no major development can be established based on the analysis. The supposed notion of ‘something needs to be done’ to contain China can be recognized in the push for an arms control agreement. Due to American superiority to China when it comes to the nuclear arsenal, America can allegedly act from a position of strength. As such, officials seem to believe that nuclear arms control is the *best* policy to restrain China and avoid further growth of its nuclear arsenal. However, as discussed before, there is reason to pessimism about the chances to strike an agreement with Beijing based on the mutual mistrust of the governments and nuclear asymmetry. Resultingly, the development process of this agenda is stuck in a deadlock. For this context, Vaddi and Panda argue that the assessment of “qualitative differences between U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces and accompanying doctrines is harder to do” (2021), this would explain why officials and members of Congress are so keen on the quantitative assessment which clearly indicates a growing Chinese nuclear arsenal. Ideas on how to approach China for arms control are existing, these include Acton et al. (2020), Zhao (2020a), and Cunningham (2021) among others.

To summarize the arguments above, there are clear obstacles in the policymaking progress as such a clear development process for the agenda at hand cannot be established. It is important to recognize the shift in approaching the issue of the Biden administration in comparison to the Trump administration. However, the strong anti-Chinese sentiment within the foreign policy apparatus and Washington in general constraints further development. Whilst a nuclear arms control agreement seems far-fetched and unrealistic for now, voices from within the system disregard the aforementioned political reality. At the same time, one part of the apparatus acknowledges the need for bilateral dialogues from which an arms agreement may eventually bloom. As such, one can conclude that there are positive signs in the perception of the issue, however there are clear obstacles to overcome that would allow an appropriate deeper and transparent development of the agenda.

Applying the Findings

The thesis thought of the following hypotheses in the context of the American agenda for a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement:

1. *American foreign policymaking is fully in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H1)*
2. *American foreign policymaking is partially in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H2)*
3. *American foreign policymaking is not at all in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking. (H3).*

To not reject H1, the data needs to suggest that all three pillars are evidently used in the foreign policymaking process for the case at hand. Vice versa, H3 is not rejected if none of the pillars occur in the policymaking process. The use of a pillar is verified when the evidence suggests that the requirements of an objective increased threat from China (pillar 1), of a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement among multiple scholars (pillar 2), and of a transparent development process for the agenda (pillar 4) are fulfilled, respectively.

Concerning pillar one, the analysis found that China is in fact posing an increasing threat to the United States. Based on the collected data, a growing instability between the Washington and Beijing was determined which comes as the result of a more assertive China on both the regional and global stage. Consequently, one can conclude that China poses an increased threat to the United States and pillar 1, *an emphasis on fact-finding*, can be verified. For pillar two, the analysis yielded the conclusion that there is no coherent scientific argument that justifies the American agenda for a Sino-American arms control agreement. The coding revealed that the arguments that aimed to provide evidence for the necessity of

the agenda are too general and are additionally disregarding the malfunctioning and asymmetry of the Sino-American relationship. At the same, arguments against an arms control agreement with China are considering the reality of the unsettled relationship and in the following provide a case for the need of trust building measures before an agreement can be discussed at the first place. As a result, the thesis concludes there is no coherent argument among scholars that would rationalize a bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and China. Therefore, pillar two, *citations of the available evidence for various options*, cannot be verified for the case at hand. Considering the third pillar, the analysis produced evidence that the policymaking process is not following a transparent development process. In fact, the policymaking process appears to be in a deadlock which hinders the development procedure. The main obstacle is the anti-Chinese sentiment in especially the Congress across both parties. At the same time, the Biden administration appears to recognize the necessity for bilateral dialogues with China as a starting point for the eventual goal of arms control. This can be regarded as a development as it signals a significant shift from the rationale and strategy the Trump administration pushed. However, due to the lack of further development, the thesis cannot validate a continuous development process of the policy. Subsequently, pillar four, *an emphasis on transparency of decision-making*, cannot be verified.

Based on these findings, the thesis determines only pillar one to be used within the US foreign policy apparatus. For the hypotheses this concludes:

1. H1 is rejected. Not all pillars are verified.
2. H2 is not rejected. Pillar one, the emphasis on fact-finding, does occur in the context of the agenda of the US foreign policy apparatus for a nuclear arms control agreement with China.
3. H3 is rejected. At least one pillar is verified.

CONCLUSION

One of President Biden's main administrative goals is to revive American politics by using evidence-based policymaking in all departments of the administration. Whilst today most US policy departments have adopted the use of evidence and proving good results, "the decision-making apparatus of the National Security Council and the Department of State stand out as particularly resistant to change" (Spokojny & Scherer, 2021). Foreign policy traditionally relies on the individual views of the decision-making officials. Due to the risk of subjective policymaking, evidence-based policymaking is strongly advocated for foreign policy. However, there is an apparent lack of research in the topic of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy. Interestingly, the shelf for research on the impact of evidence-based policymaking on foreign policy practice is non-existing. The thesis aimed to fill this gap by examining in how far Washington's agenda for a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement is in line with evidence-based policymaking. The thesis found that American foreign policymaking is partially in line with the pillars of evidence-based policymaking.

Answering the Research Question

To answer the central question of the research, the thesis developed a framework of how evidence-based policymaking can be integrated into foreign policymaking. For it, the research question was accompanied by two sub-questions:

1. *What are the demands of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy?*
2. *What evidence is available for and against a nuclear arms control agreement in the context of evidence-based policymaking?*

SQ1 aimed to establish a context in which evidence-based policymaking can act in foreign policy. This context was realized using Spokojny & Scherer (2021). The two authors contended that the use of EBP in foreign policy can be based on five pillars: (1) an emphasis on fact-finding; (2) citations of the available evidence for various options; (3) metrics of success in all policy memos; (4) an emphasis on transparency of decision-making; (5) an emphasis on learning from successes and failures. For the case at hand however, the pillars three and five were disregarded. The thesis broke the three remaining pillars down into measurable objectives that can be studied by qualitative content analysis. For pillar one to be verified, the data needed to suggest there is an objective increased threat from China. Pillar two would get confirmed if the evidence collected could provide a clear and coherent scientific argument for the necessity of a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement. At last, the verification of pillar 4 depended on a transparent development process for the agenda within the US foreign policy apparatus.

SQ2 aimed to gather evidence that would suggest the application of evidence-based policymaking in the US foreign policy apparatus within the case of the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China. Using the previously established pillars of evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy for the coding in 51 documents, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. China poses an increasing threat to the United States.
2. There is no coherent scientific argument that would suggest the need for a Sino-America nuclear arms control agreement.
3. There is no transparent development process for the agenda at hand within the US foreign policy apparatus because there appears to be a deadlock on the matter, as such no development takes place at all.

The thesis found conclusion one to be the only evidence that would suggest in favor of a nuclear arms control agreement in the context of evidence-based policymaking. Conclusions two and three act as evidence against the notion as they violate the principles that were established by pillar two and pillar four.

The answers to the sub-questions help to formulate an answer to the central research question:

In how far is the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China in line with evidence-based policymaking?

The thesis has found that only the pillar of fact-finding (pillar one) could be verified for the case at hand. There is clear evidence that suggest the need for the proposed action: China poses an increased threat for the United States. As a result, one can answer to the research question that the American agenda of pursuing a nuclear arms control agreement with China is somewhat in line with evidence-based policymaking. The answer suggests that the US foreign policy apparatus lacks the overall application of evidence-based policymaking in its agenda. Subsequently, future foreign policies may come short of their respective goals and policy disasters such as the Iraq invasion and Yemen War may occur again. However, in the time of an ascending China on the global stage, policy failures in this context may result in much bigger losses for the United States.

Implications of the Study

The thesis produced a novel study. So far, no ongoing agenda of foreign policy has been studied in the context of evidence-based policymaking. The studied example indicates that evidence-based policymaking is not a (fully) utilized principle within the US foreign policy apparatus. This however stands in conflict with the Biden administration's goal of reviving American politics (Biden, 2020a; Biden 2020b). The aim of this thesis is to initiate further academic investigations into foreign policy agendas within the evidence-based policymaking framework and to consequently improve the future output of the US foreign policy apparatus.

The novelty of the thesis' topic opens the door to a yet untouched area of research in public administration. As such, the thesis intends to take the role as a model study for future research. At the same time, the general rarity of research on evidence-based policymaking in foreign policy left little room for a more nuanced theory. Spokojny and Scherer's five pillars are the only criteria established on this issue. Therefore, it is likely the thesis misses out on important understandings that ought to be considered for the arena it acts in. It is also expected that the Nuclear Posture Review 2022 will allow for deeper insights into the foreign policy apparatus and how it plans to deal with China, however the report has not been published yet. This belief is based on the National Defense Strategy of the U.S. Department of Defense (2022) that precedes the Nuclear Posture Review 2022. The implied priorities for the Pentagon are mostly based on the perception of the Chinese threat. It is expected that this forthcoming report can offer advanced understandings into the application of evidence-based policymaking on the issue with China and a Sino-American nuclear arms control agreement. This opens a future research gap that is ought to be researched. Additionally, the thesis likes to pledge for more research on the concept of evidence-based policymaking within foreign policy.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Acton, J. M., MacDonald, T. & Vaddi, P. (2021). *Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/16/reimagining-nuclear-arms-control-comprehensive-approach-pub-85938>.
- Baldwin, D. A. (2000). Success and Failure in Foreign Policy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, 167-182. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.167>.
- Biden, J. R. (2021a). *Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-based-policymaking/>.
- Biden, J. R. (2021b). *Memorandum on Revitalizing America's Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/04/memorandum-revitalizing-americas-foreign-policy-and-national-security-workforce-institutions-and-partnerships/>.
- Biden, J. R. (2021c). *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.
- Blinken, A. J. (2021, March 3). *A Foreign Policy for the American People*. [Speech Transcript]. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/>.
- Brown, G. C. (2021). *Understanding the Risks and Realities of China's Nuclear Forces*. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/features/understanding-risks-realities-chinas-nuclear-forces>.
- Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (2021). *Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile*. <https://www.state.gov/transparency-in-the-u-s-nuclear-weapons-stockpile/>.
- Bureau of Public Affairs (2008). *Diplomacy: The U.S. Department of State at Work*. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm>.
- Carter, R. G. (2020). *Making US Foreign Policy: The Essentials*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2nd edition. ISBN: 978-1626378131.
- Cimbala, S. J. & Korb, L. J. (2022). *Nuclear arms control: Still necessary, but more difficult than ever*. <https://thebulletin.org/2022/04/nuclear-arms-control-still-necessary-but-more-difficult-than-ever/>.
- Coe, A. J. & Vaynman, J. (2020). Why Arms Control Is So Rare. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 342-355. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541900073X>.
- Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking (2017). *The Promise of Evidence-Based Policymaking*. <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Full-Report-The-Promise-of-Evidence-Based-Policymaking-Report-of-the-Comission-on-Evidence-based-Policymaking.pdf>.
- Cooley, A. & Nexon, D. H. (2020). *How Hegemony Ends: The Unraveling of American Power*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>.
- Cunningham, F. S. (2021). Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations. *The Washington Quarterly*, 44, 159-180. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253>.
- Cunningham, F. S. & Taylor Fravel, M. (2021). *China's nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?* <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/chinas-nuclear-arsenal-is-growing-what-does-that-mean-us-china-relations/>.
- Daly, R. (2022). *China and the United States: It's a Cold War, but don't panic*. <https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-03/china-and-the-united-states-its-a-cold-war-but-dont-panic/>.
- Davies, P. (2004). *Is Evidence-Based Government Possible?* <https://www.eldis.org/document/A18705>.
- Del Monte, M. & Lazarou, E. (2017). *How Congress and President shape US foreign policy*. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599381/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599381_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599381/EPRS_BRI(2017)599381_EN.pdf).
- Doshi, R. (2021). *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001>.

- Fowler L. L. (2015). *Watchdogs on the Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations*. Princeton. ISBN: 978-0691 151 618.
- fp21 (2020). *Less Art, More Science: Transforming U.S. Foreign Policy through Evidence, Integrity, and Innovation*. <https://www.fp21.org/less-art-more-science>.
- George, A. L. (1993). *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. United States Institute of Peace. ISBN: 978-1878379221.
- Gramer, R. & Detsch, J. (2020). *Trump fixates in China as Nuclear Arms Pact nears Expiration*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear-arms-pact-expiration/>.
- Haenle, P. & Bresnick, S. (2022). *Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478>.
- Hébert, M. (2021). *A government practitioner's guide to better success metrics*. <https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/insights/a-government-practitioner-s-guide-to-better-success-metrics>.
- Isaacs, J. (2021a). *Deterrence, Not Domination: How to Deal with a Rising China*. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/deterrence-not-domination-how-deal-rising-china-186014>.
- Isaacs, J. (2021b). *China is Not the New Soviet Union*. <https://armscontrolcenter.org/china-is-not-the-new-soviet-union/>
- Jenkins, B. (2021, September 6). *Nuclear Arms Control: A New Era?* [Speech Transcript]. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/under-secretary-bonnie-jenkins-remarks-nuclear-arms-control-a-new-era/>.
- Johnson, I. (2022). *Biden's Grand China Strategy: Eloquent but Inadequate*. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/biden-china-blinken-speech-policy-grand-strategy>.
- Julien, H. (2008). Content Analysis. In L. M. Given (ed.). *The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* (pp.120-122). Sage. ISBN: 978-1412941631.
- Kertzer, J. D., Holmes, M., LeVeck, B. L. & Wayne, C. (2022). Hawkish Biases and Group Decision Making. *International Organization*, 2022, 1-36. <https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0020818322000017>.
- Kimball, D. G. (2020). *No One Wins an Arms Race or a Nuclear War*. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-03/focus/no-one-wins-arms-race-nuclear-war>.
- Kimball, D. G. (2021). *Engage China on Arms Control? Yes, and Here's How*. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/focus/engage-china-arms-control-yes-heres-how>.
- Krebs, S. (2017a). The Legalization of Truth in International Fact-Finding. *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 18(1), 83-163. <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/3>.
- Krebs, S. (2017b). Designing International Fact-Finding: Facts, Alternative Facts, and National Identities. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 41(2), 337-382. <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol41/iss2/2>.
- Layne, C. (2020). Preventing the China-U.S. Cold War from Turning Hot. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 13(3), 343-385. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poaa012>.
- Lexington (2022). *Deploying reality against Putin*. <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/02/26/deploying-reality-against-putin>.
- Logan, D. C. (2021). *Trilateral Arms Control: A Realistic Assessment of Chinese Participation*. <https://www.stimson.org/2021/trilateral-arms-control-a-realistic-assessment-of-chinese-participation/>.
- McFaul, M. (2020). *Dressing for Dinner*. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599381/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599381_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599381/EPRS_BRI(2017)599381_EN.pdf).
- Nebehay, S. (2021). *U.S. says it hopes for arms control talks "soon" with China*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-says-it-hopes-arms-control-talks-soon-with-china-2021-12-16/>.
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2021). *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*. <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2022). *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*. <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.
- O'Hanlon, M. E. (2022). *But CAN the United States defend Taiwan?* <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/01/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/>.
- Oldemeinen, M. (2012). *How Dominant is the President in Foreign Policy Decision Making?* <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/11/how-dominant-is-the-president-in-foreign-policy-decision-making/>.
- Overhaus, M., Rudolf, P., & von Daniels, L. (2020). American Perceptions of China. In: B. Lippert & V. Perthes (eds.). *Strategic Rivalry between United States and China: Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe*. (pp.16-19). <https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP04>.
- Parkhurst, J. (2017). *The politics of evidence: from evidence-based policy to the good governance of evidence*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315675008>.
- Paul, M. & Overhaus, M. (2020). Security and Security Dilemmas in Sino-America Relations. In: B. Lippert & V. Perthes (eds.). *Strategic Rivalry between United States and China: Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe*. (pp.20-24). <https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP04>.
- Pew Research Center (2022). *China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S.* https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/04/PG_2022.04.28_U.S.-Views-China_FINAL.pdf
- Pew-MacArthur (2014). *Evidence-Based Policymaking: A guide for effective government*. <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/11/evidence-based-policymaking-a-guide-for-effective-government>.
- Rose, F. A. (2020). *Starting off on the right foot: Biden's near-term arms control and strategic policy challenge*. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/04/starting-off-on-the-right-foot-bidens-near-term-arms-control-and-strategic-policy-challenge/>.
- Rudd, K. (2021). *Preventing a US China Nuclear Arms Race*. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/us-china-nuclear-arms-control-by-kevin-rudd-2021-12>.
- Rudd, K. (2022). *The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China*. Public Affairs. ISBN: 978-1541701298.
- Rudolf, P. (2020). The Sino-American World Conflict. In: B. Lippert & V. Perthes (eds.). *Strategic Rivalry between United States and China: Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe*. (pp.9-11). <https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP04>.
- Saldana, J. (2016). *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. 3rd Edition. Sage. ISBN: 978-1847875495.
- Santoro, D. (2020). A U.S. Perspective on Trilateral Arms Control: A Long Shot – Within Reach. In U. Kühn (ed.). *Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing*. (pp.6-37). <https://ifsh.de/en/publications/research-report/research-report-002>.
- Scheinmann, A. (2022). *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Critical Tool in a Changing World*. <https://www.state.gov/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-a-critical-tool-in-a-changing-world/>.
- Schelling, T. C. & Halperin, M. H. (1961). *Strategy and Arms Control*. The Twentieth Century Fund.
- Shattuck, T. J. (2022). *Believe Biden When He Says America Will Defend Taiwan*. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/believe-biden-when-he-says-america-will-defend-taiwan/>.
- Siddiqi, M. U. A. (2013). United States Foreign Policymaking: Institutions and the Process. *The Journal of Political Science*, XXXI, 43-68.
- SIPRI (2021). *SIPRI Yearbook 2021*. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0192847577.
- Smith, D., Bauer, S. & Erästö, T. (2022). *The logic of avoiding nuclear war*. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2022/logic-avoiding-nuclear-war>.
- Spoehr, T. (2021). *Biden Must Boost 2022 Budget to Counter China*. <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/biden-must-boost-2022-budget-to-counter-china/>.
- Spokojny, D. & Scherer, T. (2021). *Foreign Policy should be Evidence-Based*. <https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/foreign-policy-should-be-evidence-based/>.

- Strauss, P. J. (n.d.) *Transparency in Decision Making*.
<https://forbesbooks.com/transparency-in-decision-making/>.
- Sutcliffe, S. & Court, J. (2005). *Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How does it work? What relevance for developing countries?* <https://odi.org/en/publications/evidence-based-policymaking-what-is-it-how-does-it-work-what-relevance-for-developing-countries/>.
- The Economist (2020). *Donald Trump wants China to join a nuclear-weapons pact*.
<https://www.economist.com/china/2020/05/23/donald-trump-wants-china-to-join-a-nuclear-weapons-pact>.
- U.S. Department of Defense (2018). *Nuclear Posture Review 2018*.
<https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.
- U.S. Department of Defense (2020). *Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2020*. <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>.
- U.S. Department of Defense (2021). *Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2021*. <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF>.
- U.S. Department of Defense (2022). *Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy*.
<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>.
- U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development (2018). *Joint Strategic Plan: FY 2018 – 2022*. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Joint-Strategic-Plan-FY-2018-2022.pdf>.
- Vaddi, P. & Panda, A. (2021). *When it comes to China's nuclear weapons, numbers aren't everything*.
<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/03/13/when-it-comes-to-chinas-nuclear-weapons-numbers-arent-everything/>.
- VCDNP (2022). *The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations*.
<https://vcdnp.org/future-us-china-nuclear-relations/>.
- Zhao, T. (2020a). *Practical Ways to Promote U.S.-China Arms Control Cooperation*.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/07/practical-ways-to-promote-u.s.-china-arms-control-cooperation-pub-82818>.
- Zhao, T. (2020b). *The Case for China's Participation in Trilateral Arms Control*. In U. Kühn (ed.), *Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing*. (pp.68-88).
<https://ifsh.de/en/publications/research-report/research-report-002>.
- Zhao, T. (2021). *What's Driving China's Nuclear Buildup?*
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/05/what-s-driving-china-s-nuclear-buildup-pub-85106>.
- Zhao, T. (2022). *Europe's Role in Promoting US-China Arms Control Cooperation*.
<https://hcss.nl/report/europes-role-in-promoting-us-china-arms-control-cooperation/>.