

University of Twente & WWU Münster

Public Governance across borders

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Can international cooperation between countries in the Horn of Africa and Germany be a solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling?

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## Summary

According to the United Nations, at least 2.5 million people were smuggled in 2016 (United Nations, 2018). By questioning the extent to which international cooperation can be a solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling between countries located in the Horn of Africa and Germany, this study addresses migrant smuggling as an important social issue for both the country of emigration as for the country of immigration. This thesis uses theorizing about the influences on migration, international cooperation, and projects on development cooperation to explore this question. As a first step of the data collection, theories on development cooperation are examined and a document analysis of various policy papers and action plans performed. These policy papers are provided by institutions on the European level as well as by German institutions. The findings generated based on the literature and the policy-papers are triangulated with two expert interviews. The first interviewee is a Research Fellow in the field of migration and the second interviewee works as a Senior Researcher in the field of development cooperation.

One of the main findings generated based on this method is the importance of “trust” between actors in the field of development cooperation. Plus, high transaction costs and the absence of information and reliable guarantees are considered as a potential threat which can lead to cheating behavior. This will be further described in the context of the Prisoner's dilemma.

Based on the interviews, the importance of questioning official documents and including different sources becomes visible.

## Section 1. Introduction

To a certain extent, migrant smuggling is a form of human trafficking, but it excludes force. Migrants pay the traffickers to gain illegal access to a country, whereas through human trafficking, victims are forced. Migrant smuggling is a global issue that can only be adequately addressed through international cooperation since it is a transnational challenge. Both sides, the country of emigration and the country of immigration, require better regulation and policies in order to prevent migrant smuggling or make it unnecessary due to a facilitation of legal entry. This is the reason why nonexistent routes and missing corridors for regular migration are also stated as a reason for the occurrence of migrant smuggling (Salt, 2000).

To analyze international cooperation on this issue, their successes and necessities, the focus of this study lies on projects of the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC). The GIZ is a Germany-based actor in the field of international development cooperation. It is a globally active enterprise with worldwide locations, representatives, and collaborators. The European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) was established in 2016 as a part of EUROPOL and focuses explicitly on preventing human smuggling activities (EMSC, 2019).

From 2014 to 2016, the number of migrants entering Europe peaked, which led to a crisis for the migrants as well as to a challenge for Europe. In 2015, the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling was adopted (applicable until 2020). The aim of this Action Plan was to reduce irregular migration and prevent the loss of lives through cooperation between the countries of emigration, countries of transit and countries of immigration (European Commission Action Plan, 2015). The EMSC was established to prevent migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea and illegal entry. In addition to that, the EMSC facilitates information exchange and cooperation between EU member states (EMSC, 2019).

Against this backdrop, the role of Germany and its migration policy is notable. In particular, Angela Merkel and her statement “Wir schaffen das!” was characterizing the German migration policy at this time. But a large part of the German population, especially in the Eastern part, did not agree with this attitude towards migrants. The rise of right-wing parties like the AFD and attacks on refugee homes were the consequences of the rising numbers of migrants and refugees coming to Europe. A key point of contention in these debates was migrant smuggling. However, studies on these debates largely focus on one side of the argument: European and German policy responses. Especially from 2015 onwards, there is much literature available on the topic of migration due to the increase of the number of migrants in this time. This is the reason why articles are often very Eurocentric and do not cover the whole process of migration. In this thesis, the focus lies on literature which covers both sides. This can be done by considering action plans and policy papers of projects which are directly interrelated with the situation

in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa was chosen for this study due to its importance concerning the issue of migrant smuggling. Plus, it is a crucial region for evaluating development cooperation “as a solution” due to various existing partnerships concerning the issue of migration which can be examined.

## **Section 1.1. Research Question**

The research question tackled in the thesis is: **“Can international cooperation between countries in the Horn of Africa and Germany be a solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling?”**

The research is scientifically relevant because it facilitates the understanding of how development cooperation and its policy-making functions in a broader theoretical context (Siitonen, 1990), as well as in this specific example. In 2020, the German government spent 12.4 billion Euro (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2020) on development cooperation, which is also a reason why the work and impact of these partnerships needs to be examined. Up until now, the success of development cooperation and its future is debated in the literature, which speaks to the scientific relevance of the thesis. International cooperation as a potential solution for migrant smuggling needs to be studied in order to identify what is necessary to cooperate successfully.

Research on the topic of migrant smuggling is highly relevant from a social as well as from a scientific point of view. The social relevance is emphasized by the threat smuggling poses on migrants which needs to be tackled. In the past decade, this threat became increasingly important for European countries, especially due to migrant smuggling through the Mediterranean Sea and the loss of lives. From 2014 onwards, approximately 23.500 migrants (Statista, 2022) and refugees have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea. It shows that the receiving countries have no/ not enough safe passageways for migrants to enter, which encourages the thriving business of migrant smuggling.

The contribution that I make is to look at both sending and receiving countries by explicitly considering development cooperation. Thus, I address the research question by answering the following sub-questions:

SQ1. How have measures on migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa evolved, especially after 2015? Were there any changes in policies or their implementation?

SQ2. What does cooperation look like between the GIZ, the EMSC and the countries located in the Horn of Africa?

SQ2.1. Which factors influence the cooperation between these actors? How can threats be faced?

SQ3.1 Did cooperation between GIZ, and the sending country contribute to the changes (if any) in policy?

SQ3.2 Did cooperation between EMSC, and the sending country contribute to the changes (if any) in policy?

### Case Background

To understand the relevance of the GIZ in the chosen case, a summary of the relations between Germany and the Horn of Africa is useful. Historically, development cooperation between Germany and the Horn of Africa arose a long time ago. Even during the Cold War, cooperation existed between the German Democratic Republic and Ethiopia, a country located in the Horn of Africa (Semela; Miethe, 2021). Today, cooperation between Germany and the region of the Horn of Africa focuses mainly on migration issues, such as the Better Migration Management programme (BMM) provided by the GIZ. The purpose of this project is to support migrants by making the migration process safer, which can be done by taking measures against migrant smuggling and human trafficking (GIZ Interview, 2018). In addition to that, this cooperation wants to ensure the development of policies in the countries located in the Horn of Africa as well as in the receiving countries, for the citizens and the migrants.

Cooperation on issues like migrant smuggling between Germany and countries located in the Horn of Africa has developed over the past decades. Although it has a long history, new concepts concerning migration management are discussed to improve the cooperation and guide it in the future. In terms of

migration management, the work of the GIZ is important in this study. It describes the approach to structure the process of migration in terms of safety (protection of migrants) as well as administrative issues (BMM GIZ, 2018).

Overall, the concept of migration management is controversial, its definitions and limitations are discussed quite recently, although this concept is highly relevant in the context of development cooperation. This new focus is subject to the gap this research tries to fill. Due to several new projects which emerged in the past five years, it needs to be analyzed to what extent cooperation can be a solution and how effective it is. Plus, “concern for trafficking and human smuggling [...] is running ahead of theoretical understanding” (Salt, 2000, p.1), which is why the topic of this study is relevant to address.



(Picture 1.: Back, 2019)

Together, the eight countries depicted in yellow (South Sudan in this picture located in Sudan) in Picture 1 make up the Horn of Africa. Table 1 reports characteristics and facts about each country located in the Horn of Africa. These include: the population, the GDP, the number of applicants to Germany in 2016 and the relevant push factors. Push factors relate to the country of emigration and the stimulus of leaving a country, whereas the pull factors attract people to a certain country or area due to various reasons like higher living standards including for example safety and security, but also better chances of employment (Urbanski, 2022). By examining the push factors of a specific country, potential reasons for emigration can be emphasized. I expect these characteristics to interrelate with each other. For example, if the population is relatively high and the GDP is relatively low, poverty and unemployment might be relevant push factors leading to a higher number of migrants.

Table 1.: Population, GDP, Applicants to Germany and relevant secondary areas of cooperation to reduce migrant smuggling

	Population	GDP	Applicants	Secondary areas of cooperation to reduce migrant smuggling
Sudan	43.8 million (Databank Population, 2020)	26.1 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	< 500 people in 2016 (BAMF, 2017)	conflicts (lack of safety and security), lack of economic opportunities (Migration in Sudan, 2011)
South Sudan	11.1 million (Worldometer, 2020)	1 billion USD (Trading Economics, 2019)	no data available	food insecurity, poverty, lack of safety and security (Migrants-Refugees)
Eritrea	3.5 million (World Population Review, 2020)	5.3 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	18.854 people in 2016 (BAMF, 2017)	political oppression, poverty (Elliott, 2015)
Djibouti	0.9 million (Databank Population, 2020)	3.3 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	no data available	No data available
Ethiopia	115 million (Databank Population, 2020)	107.6 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	3.000-5.000 people in 2016 (BAMF, 2017)	corruptions, unemployment, poverty (MPI)
Somalia	15.8 million (Databank Population, 2020)	4.9 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	5.000-10.985 people in 2016 (BAMF, 2017)	poverty, poor governance, lack of opportunities (Elmi)
Kenya	53.7 million (Databank Population, 2020)	98.8 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	no data available	political instability, medical treatment (GIZ site no longer available)
Uganda	45.7 million (Databank Population, 2020)	37.3 billion USD (Databank GDP, 2020)	no data available	limited livelihoods, especially for young Ugandan people (GIZ site no longer available)

As can be seen in Table 1, economic and political push factors like poverty, conflicts and poor governance are dominating in the eight countries of the Horn of Africa. A correlation becomes evident

in the case of Somalia. The GDP is relatively low in comparison to the population, which leads to push factors like poverty and poor governance. Eritrean migrants are by far the most represented group of migrants coming to Germany from the Horn of Africa. Even in an international comparison, Eritrean people are under the top ten nationalities (BAMF, 2017) coming to Germany in 2016. In addition to that, the number of illegal and undocumented migrants without papers need to be considered, as well as the dark figure.

## Section 2. Theory

*What is necessary for cooperation to occur?* The first and foremost necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for cooperation to occur is the desire to cooperate on both sides. While conflicts do exist between actors like power struggles and resulting struggles of dominance of one partner over the other, cooperation can happen if both partners see gain in it. Therefore, it is important to consider the relevance of mutual gains and selective gains in the decision of cooperating.

This answer can be nuanced by examining theories of transnational development cooperation (Siitonen, 1990/ Lipson, 1984/ Ansell; Gash, 2008). To begin with, cooperation is defined in the thesis as “any form of social interaction between actors allowing them to achieve voluntarily set common goals by sharing certain resources together” (Siitonen, 1990, p.7). Here, the Prisoner's Dilemma serves as an illuminating concept due to its ability to explain the “features of international conflict and cooperation” (Lipson, 1984, p.2). In the absence of full information and reliable guarantees, the Prisoner's Dilemma expects partners to cheat (or suspect that the other partner will cheat), and consequently, no cooperation will happen. However, cooperation can only arise when all partners gain, although they are suspicious of each other. The dilemma is described as the “ineluctable failure to coordinate despite the obvious possibility of joint gains” (Lipson, 1984, p.3).

Second, cooperation presupposes a common goal which serves as an orientation for the cooperating actors. This common goal emphasizes a sort of an outcome dependency between the actors involved in the cooperation. Arriving at a common goal has, in turn, some requirements. In their work, Ansell and Gash discuss how historical conflicts, trusting relationships, leadership, and institutional design all work together to drive collaborative governance (Ansell; Gash, 2008). In this research, the outcome dependency of the development cooperation between Non-State Actors (NSAs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and the Horn of Africa is the tackling of migrant smuggling.

Another important theoretical insight to include the policy papers and projects from the GIZ and the EMSC later on is the European perspective on trafficking and human smuggling (Salt, 2000). In this article, nonexistent routes for regular migration are stated as a reason for the occurrence of migrant smuggling. Additionally, the excessive demands on European entry management capacities due to the number of migrants from 2015 onwards might be a reason for smuggling to increase because control mechanisms were missing to overlook the whole entry process of all migrants (Salt, 2000).

This emphasizes the importance of considering **transaction costs** in the context of development cooperation. Transaction costs are costs that emerge out of a cooperation between actors, without adding a real value to the cooperation itself (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012). Consequently, actors are trying to keep these costs as low as possible to be more effective. This goal is set under the “new aid paradigm” (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012, p.2), which aims to achieve the best performance possible between cooperating partners. According to the OECD, transaction costs should be as low as possible and in some way helpful for the development in terms of “managing resources in partner countries” (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012, p.6). Transaction costs can emerge in various types of fields, for example for administrative issues. These include planning and monitoring tasks (like the control mechanisms stated above) as well as tasks related to bargaining, negotiating and decision-making, which can be referred to as *ex-ante* transaction costs. In comparison to this kind of transaction costs, *ex-post* costs ensure the compliance of the commitments. These might include governance-related issues as well as monitoring costs (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012).

Transaction costs vary a lot in their intensity as well as in the field in which they occur. To underline this variety and the statement that they “encompass a much broader reality” (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012, p.11), the topic of transaction costs will be applied to the development cooperation between Germany and countries located in the Horn of Africa. In order to do so, possible contributing factors will be analyzed like the Democracy Index and the Corruption Index, which is helpful to get an overview of potential threats that might be responsible for higher transaction costs.

The Democracy Index is scaled from 1 to 100, where 1 describes “not democratic” and 100 describes “democratic”. The Index especially includes factors related to governmental work and political freedom like “Electoral process and pluralism”, “Political participation” and “Civil liberties” (Kekic, 2007). In the Horn of Africa, Kenya is considered as the most democratic country with a score of 0.576, whereas Somalia has the lowest score in comparison with the other seven countries of 0.082. Therefore, the range of scores emphasizes a great discrepancy among the eight countries. Ethiopia for example got a score of 0.351, which means that the countries differ to a large extent in their level of democracy (Democracy Matrix, 2020).

The Corruption Index is scored from 0 to 100, where 0 is described as “corrupt” and 100 is described as “not corrupt”. This Index focuses on the behavior and the tasks of the government and of governmental institutions like “accountability”, “transparency”, “political stability” and “control of corruption” (GRP, 2021). By comparing the eight countries, it becomes evident that the scores of the Corruption Index resemble the ones of the Democracy Index. Uganda and Kenya are the least corrupt countries with scores of 27 and 30, whereas Somalia and Sudan are the most corrupt countries with scores of 13 and 20 (Trading Economics, 2021).

To be more precise, “[t]he Horn of Africa faces numerous challenges due to fragile statehood, internal and cross-border conflicts, and climate change” (GIZ, 2022, p.1). These are specific factors, determined by the GIZ, which could potentially threaten the cooperation. As can be seen in Table 1, there are country-specific push-factors which could also influence the cooperation and the development. These are for example “lack of safety and security” as well as “political instability”. In this case, the GIZ and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), located in the Horn of Africa, co-operate on issues related to policy-making, the implementation of policies and administrative support (e.g. harmonization of data). Due to a lower level of democracy, a higher level of corruption and area-specific challenges, it is probable that the transaction costs between the cooperating partners are high.

In sum, this thesis views cooperation between the GIZ, the EMSC and countries in the Horn of Africa as a potential solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling. Theoretical concepts will be used to identify how cooperation between these areas functions and what is necessary for the success of development cooperation.

### **Section 3. Methods**

Migrant smuggling is a global societal problem that could be tackled through international cooperation. Thus, the starting point of my methodological reflection is the question: **Can international cooperation between countries in the Horn of Africa and Germany be a solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling?**

To be more precise in my research, the following sub questions will be included:

SQ1. How have measures on migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa evolved, especially after 2015? Were there any changes in policies or their implementation?

SQ2. What does cooperation look like between the GIZ, the EMSC and the countries located in the Horn of Africa?

SQ2.1. Which factors influence the cooperation between these actors? How can threats be faced?

SQ3.1 Did cooperation between GIZ and the sending country contribute to the changes (if any) in policy?



SQ3.2 Did cooperation between EMSC and the sending country contribute to the changes (if any) in policy?

### Section 3.1. Operationalization

To formulate a theoretical basis for the overall research question, key concepts such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the influence of transaction costs will be operationalized in this thesis:

Prisoners' dilemma and how it influences the success of a cooperation Charles Lipson introduces the issue of the Prisoner's Dilemma from an economic and security point of view. In the introduction, he uses different definitions concerning the international political economy of various other authors. After that, he describes and explains the Prisoner's Dilemma, for example by using a table to underline how this game theory works in the context of international relations, "highlighting both the potential gains from cooperation and the temptations that prevent it" (Lipson, 1984, p.3).

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

		Player 2	
		<i>Cooperate</i>	<i>Defect</i>
Player 1	<i>Cooperate</i>	R = 3    R = 3	S = 1    P = 4
	<i>Defect</i>	T = 4    S = 1	P = 2    P = 2

Note: Payoffs are given as ordinal rankings, with 4 as most preferred; for each player  $T > R > P > S$ , where  
 T = temptation to defect  
 R = reward for mutual cooperation  
 P = punishment for mutual defection  
 S = sucker's payoff for unreciprocated cooperation

(Figure 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma Game Theory; Lipson, 1984)

Lipson also introduces the TIT FOR TAT strategy, which had been put forward by Robert Axelrod, and sets it into relation with the Prisoner's Dilemma theory. Therefore, Lipson uses existing literature to give a context, to introduce a new issue like a strategy or an example. After that, he explains theories on international relations and international cooperation by linking the issues mentioned before with his findings. He focuses especially on cheating behavior in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma by using examples like the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. This way of data collection and presentation of finding facilitates the understanding of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the functioning of international cooperation in general.

Influence of transaction costs on co-operating partners Frieda Vandeninden and Elisabeth Paul introduce the topic of transaction costs in two ways: by discussing different definitions which had been put forward in the past decades; and by addressing the issue of reducing transaction costs in terms of efficiency in an international cooperation framework. They make use of extensive literature review, analyzing documents and data from different sources. By doing this, they establish a "big picture", an overview of the various perspectives on transaction costs. Based on their findings, they try to estimate transaction costs by considering different variables in their equations such as "investment costs" and "harmonisation between donors" (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012). These influencing variables and equations serve as a starting point for the discussion on how to minimize transaction costs. Vandeninden and Paul illustrate their findings by using equations and models, which makes the data more comprehensible and makes it easier to overlook the relations between the variables.

### Section 3.2. Coding

A code should identify the key factors and should represent the most essence-capturing words or phrases of the texts included in a dataset. Coding, in the context of a document analysis in general, can be described as a translation and an interpretation of the dataset, of the texts included in the research process. A coding scheme is the step between theory and data and can be stated with the help of Atlas.ti. Therefore, this preliminary coding scheme includes phrases which I expect to find in my dataset. For that, I use an open coding technique.

Table 2 summarizes the coding scheme of the thesis. This coding scheme forms the basis for the codebook.

Table 2.: Coding scheme

Coding scheme Dimension	Theory	Category	Code
Transnational cooperation	Prisoner's Dilemma	Influencing values	Why and how does cooperation arise?
Co-operating actors	Influence of transaction costs	Influencing values	Cost-benefit ratio of development cooperation
Frame of Projects on development cooperation	Better Migration Management / EMSC (European perspective)	Development cooperation frame	Development cooperation highly influenced by power relations and resource disparities

The coding scheme consists of the three main perspectives based on which the policy documents and academic literature will be analyzed. The Prisoner's Dilemma theory serves as an explanation for cheating behavior in the absence of full information and emphasizes the relevance of mutual gains. The influence of transaction costs on international cooperation will be further examined by considering the importance of historical conflict, trust, leadership, and the institutional design. Finally, results from the cooperation between the GIZ, EMSC and countries located in the Horn of Africa are analyzed to underline credible commitment even in existing resource disparities.

### Codebook

The codebook is formed by applying this scheme to a subsample of materials.

Table 3.: Codebook

These codes form the basis for the literature analysis due to their influence on the success or failure of cooperation. Plus, they highly interrelate with each other and give an overview of important aspects that need to be considered.

Code	Definition of code	Sample
Information	The importance of full information and information exchange between partners in a cooperation	“Exchange of information may seem a very small step, but its significance should not be underestimated” (Furåker; Bengtsson, 2013, p.164). “collaborative governance builds on face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.558). “Uncertainty: as information is always incomplete, agents cannot predict other agents’ performance” (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012, p.9). “Accurate and reliable Migration Data are key to inform evidence-based migration policy” (GIZ, 2022, p.2).
Credible commitment	Making reliable guarantees so trust can evolve between cooperating partners	“the absence of reliable guarantees is an essential feature of international relations” (Lipson, 1984, p.4). “With the support of the BMM, the FSCE has been able to extend their efforts” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.2). “EMSC is well placed to collect more targeted intelligence and provide tailor-made operational support” (EMSC, 2019, p11).

Cheating behavior	Deflection before or during a cooperation by one or more partners or non-compliance with agreements	<p>“Each is assumed to be a self-interested, self-reliant maximizer of his own utility” (Lipson, 1984, p.2).</p> <p>“there is no external guarantee that promises will be kept” (Lipson, 1984, p.4).</p> <p>Over 3 000 migrants are estimated to have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea in 2014 (European Commission Action Plan, 2015).</p>
Ex-post and ex-ante transaction costs	Costs evolving out of a cooperation without adding a real value to it	<p>“ex-ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement” (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012, p.13).</p> <p>ex-post costs ensure the compliance of the commitments including governance-related issues as well as monitoring costs (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012).</p> <p>“lack of legal frameworks” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.2).</p> <p>“BMM implementation is currently taking place in eight partner countries” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.8).</p>
Mutual gains	Benefits evolving out of a cooperation for all partners	<p>“the goal of collaboration is typically to achieve some degree of consensus among stakeholders” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.547).</p> <p>“The purpose of collaboration is to generate desired outcomes together that could not be accomplished separately” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.14).</p> <p>“Citizens of EU countries are frequently confronted with the inhuman practices of human traffickers” (EMSC, 2019, p.11).</p>

Historical conflict, trust, leadership, institutional design	Influencing drivers in collaborative governance	<p>“overcome problems of distrust, disrespect, and outright antagonism (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.550).</p> <p>“A prehistory of conflict is likely to express itself in low levels of trust (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.553).</p> <p>“Leadership is crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust” Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.554).</p> <p>“Leadership is also important for empowering and representing weaker stakeholders” Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.555).</p> <p>“development of trust, which happens over time as parties work together” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.13).</p>
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### Section 3.3. Research Design

I chose this particular case study between countries located in the Horn of Africa and European countries with a focus on Germany because of its increasing relevance within the past decade. The dataset of this study not only consists of policy documents, but also includes textual data resulting from the interviews. To answer the sub-questions, a document analysis will be performed. To validate the findings, I will triangulate those results against two expert interviews to gain direct insights based on personal experiences.

#### *About the Document Analysis*

Documents have been taken from the European Commission, the GIZ, and the EMSC in order to have a broad picture of the process of development cooperation from many actors. Intending to lead the focus on migrant smuggling within the context of development cooperation, I focus on the action plans, projects and articles provided from the EMSC and the GIZ. Working with the documents of the GIZ, I focus on the Better Migration Management (BMM) which deals specifically with the situation in the Horn of Africa. Table 4 reports on the documents which are examined in the course of this thesis.

Table 4.: Policy Documents and Action Plans (Atlas.ti Project 2)

Title of the document	Year Published	Organization
Better Migration Management - Horn of Africa	2022	GIZ

Migration & displacement in the Horn of Africa. Support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in implementing regional migration policies	2022	GIZ
European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 5th Annual Activity Report - 2021	2021	EUROPOL - EMSC
Better Migration Management - Horn of Africa	2020	GIZ
European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 3rd Annual Activity Report - 2018	2019	EUROPOL - EMSC
Better Migration Management - Horn of Africa	2018	GIZ
Better Migration Management - Horn of Africa	2017	GIZ
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020)	2015	European Commission

#### About the Expert Interviews

The interviews include a second type of inquiry, explanatory research. The assumptions resulting from the document analysis are tested, claims are validated and individual motivations behind the cooperation are identified. In sum, it offers a more concrete view on the measures adopted in the past years. I will perform two expert interviews with a Research Fellow in the field of migration and a Senior Researcher in the field of development cooperation.

An expert interview is an appropriate technique because it is about “focusing on the knowledge of the expert, which is broadly characterized as specific knowledge in a certain field of action” (Döringer, 2020, p.1). By doing an expert interview, understanding can be gained about social reality. Plus, his or her individual, influential work, which contributes to the shaping of social reality, can be set in the broader picture of the chosen case. The interviews will be performed to validate findings, to close

knowledge gaps and to solve potential contradictory information about the cooperation in general, measures taken etc.

*Reflections on the Strengths and Limitations of the proposed research design*

Table 5.: Strengths and Limitations of proposed Research Design

	Document Analysis	Expert Interview
Strengths	<p>ability to identify knowledge gaps</p> <p>contradictory findings can be examined more easily</p>	<p>provides primary data</p> <p>can explain specific themes more in-depth</p> <p>can potential close knowledge gaps</p>
Limitations	<p>relies on secondary data which leads to a limitation of available data because not every article on a specific topic can be included</p>	<p>often only from single persons which might lead to bias</p> <p>Only relying on this method can cause knowledge gaps</p>

To overcome the weakness of undertaking a document analysis, it is juxtaposed by the performance of two expert interviews, which closes potential knowledge gaps and gives more practical insights in contrast to the theoretical findings.

#### Section 4. Systematic Literature Review

Based on the chosen literature about the Prisoner's Dilemma, Collaborative Governance issues, Transaction Costs and the associated codes, a two-step model can be identified:

**Step 1:** potential cooperating partners see reasons to cooperate from (mutual gains/ selective gains)

Step 1 describes a necessary condition for cooperation to take place but, although potential partners would benefit from a cooperation, it does not necessarily lead to a cooperation. There are still two possible outcomes that are strongly linked to the desire of cooperating.

**Step 2:** They ask, “should we cooperate?” (desire of cooperating)

Outcome 1: One or both partners cheat (they do not cooperate)

Potential reasons: Informational gaps, History of conflict, High transaction costs

Outcome 2: They do cooperate

Potential reasons: Credible commitment, Low transaction costs, Trust, Good leadership

To achieve the second outcome and to secure stable cooperation, it is important to overcome potential threats. In the context of this study, it is important to examine these threats in the cooperation between the GIZ, the EMSC and the Horn of Africa and to offer **solutions** on how to overcome them. In order to do that, the aforementioned codes will be linked to this specific case of cooperation against migrant smuggling.

### Ex-ante and Ex-post Transaction costs

High transaction costs can be a threat that leads to failure of a potential cooperation (ex-ante) or cheating behavior in an existing cooperation (ex-post). Plus, high transaction costs can lead to an underperformance of the development work (Vandeninden, 2012). *How can this threat be addressed in the case of this study?*

In the cooperation between the GIZ, the EMSC and countries located in the Horn of Africa, transaction costs need to be considered in terms of resource disparities (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011). Organizations located in Europe have much more capabilities compared to the governments of countries located in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, influences concerning issues like the infrastructure, the level of digitalization, education, and the legal frameworks (Vandeninden, 2012) need to be addressed in this equation. Here, the relative costs need to be taken into account rather than the absolute numbers. In addition to that, as can be seen in the documents from the GIZ concerning the Better Migration Management programme, the cooperation does not only take place between the three partners addressed, but between various other actors depending on the issue and aim. For example, “BMM implementation is currently taking place in eight partner countries” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.8), trying to protect, strengthen and support the migrants and their rights. Several organizations, with which the GIZ cooperates with, are located in each of those eight partner countries which leads to extensive exchanges and high transaction costs. Consequently, it is also important to consider geographical transaction costs. Although the transaction costs are in sum higher for European organizations and institutions, the countries located in the Horn of Africa are the ones that are facing numerous challenges.

Therefore, it is important to address **potential consequences emerging from different levels of transaction costs** experienced by partners. More specifically, imbalances or inequalities between cooperating partners need to be addressed and can be faced by a high level of trust by the “weaker” side (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011) and credible commitment by the “stronger” side in an existing cooperation. In case the cooperation does not exist yet, a high level of transparency and a high desire to cooperate is required by all potential partners. A high degree of motivation and willingness, especially by the leader, is essential (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011). Plus, mutual gains and benefits, which might emerge from a potential cooperation, have a positive impact on the chance of cooperating. Further transaction costs might occur according to the European Commission Action Plan due to the demand relating to the EU to “step up significantly its cooperation with third countries” (European Commission Action Plan, 2015, Section I.). This extension should focus on the use of tracking tools and information exchange concerning the issue of migrant smuggling. By extending the cooperation with third countries, new transaction costs will occur.

### Mutual gains

The outlook on gains by all partners highly influences the chances of cooperating. Additionally, mutual gains can stabilize an existing cooperation because all partners benefit from it. In the cooperation between the GIZ, the EMSC and countries located in the Horn of Africa, direct benefits are not distributed equally. In this cooperation, the Horn of Africa directly benefits from actions taken by the GIZ and EMSC concerning for example security, irregular migration, human trafficking, and poverty (BMM GIZ, 2020). On the other hand, the GIZ and EMSC do not necessarily directly benefit from this cooperation. *Why did the GIZ and EMSC cooperate with countries located in the Horn of Africa when they do not have the same number of direct benefits resulting from the cooperation?*

These institutions were established with the **aim of supporting** other countries as actors in international cooperation. By fulfilling their goals, founders like European governments or the European Union can benefit. Potential gains for these actors resulting from the work of the GIZ and EMSC are for example less illegal migration from countries located in the Horn of Africa to Europe; stable partnerships for future cooperation; and the progress in the collective fight against organized crime.

Plus, as stated above, power and resource imbalances influence the benefits and their distribution (Ansell; Gash, 2008). A relevant factor is that the goal of a participant in a cooperation cannot be achieved unilaterally. That means that there needs to be some sort of goal-dependency between the cooperating partners, whereas the goals do not have to be the same, but of similar importance (Ansell;



Gash, 2008). This is the reason why successful cooperation is not about a “winner-take-all” situation (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.547) but about generating “desired outcomes together” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.14).

### Cheating behavior

The cooperation between actors located in Europe (GIZ & EMSC) and actors located in the Horn of Africa is a stable partnership and free from relevant cheating behavior which negatively impacts the cooperation. *What remains is the question of how to effectively avoid a cheat.* Here, instead of focusing on a solution, it is important to **identify potential root causes which could trigger cheating behavior** before it occurs. “The absence of reliable guarantees is an essential feature of international relations [...] there is no external guarantee that promises will be kept” (Lipson, 1984, p.4). Having this low level of trust and reliability as a starting point in international cooperation, cheating behavior as a major obstacle needs to be considered.

Consequently, to secure cooperation, “distrust, disrespect and outright antagonism” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.550) needs to be addressed as potential root causes. Deciding over the trustworthiness of a potential partner can be treated as a rational choice decision. Still, it is important to consider the uncertainty about how the other will act. *Will he deflect or cooperate? What are his preferences?*

Consequently, it is necessary to include a social view to the rational-choice approach. Both partners need to feel an obligation to cooperate. Besides this feeling of obligation, it is important to overcome the high degree of mistrust originating from the uncertainty.

“Mistrust was rooted in ideological beliefs, cognitive biases, and historical narratives” (Ruzicka; Keating, 2015, p.13). These beliefs, narratives and images influence the interpretation of the other actions and therefore their trustworthiness, because “trust is about interpreting the actions of the other” (Ruzicka; Keating, 2015). Misinterpretation can lead to a “security spiral” (Ruzicka; Keating, 2015, p.4). This spiral describes the spending of resources on defense and security mechanisms of both partners without feeling more confident or secure in the cooperation because the other one does the same. This is the reason why cheating behavior can be triggered by this spiral of uncertainty in case the other partner does not seem trustworthy enough based on one's own beliefs and images.

### Historical conflict, Trust, Leadership, and Institutional design

These four factors are highly interrelated and drive collaborative governance (Ansell; Gash, 2008). As the findings validate, trust and trustworthiness are issues highly discussed in literature and influenced by the actions itself as well as by various expectations and conceptions of the other. These expectations can also be influenced by historical conflict as well as by the institutional design of the cooperation.

A history of conflict can consequently lead to low levels of trust, whereas a history of friendship and collaboration can express itself in high levels of trust (Ansell; Gash, 2008). The term “institutional design” refers to “ground rules for collaboration” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.555). In case these ground rules need to be discussed and expectations conflict, the level of trust declines and ex-ante transaction costs increase. This is the reason why “[t]rust has been found to be instrumental in reducing transaction costs” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.13). Therefore, the institutional design of a cooperation is relevant for successful collective work and to ensure public, mutual goods and benefits (Ansell; Gash, 2008). Plus, leadership is an essential driver of collaborative governance. It refers to the ability to bring “parties to the table” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.554), which is relevant in terms of negotiating, the emergence and deepening of trust between partners and the inclusion of weaker actors.

In this study, it is important to examine *to what extent these factors are represented and have an impact on the cooperation between European institutions and countries located in the Horn of Africa.*

In terms of leadership, it is difficult to have equal leadership capabilities of all partners due to resource imbalances between the EMSC, the GIZ and the eight partner countries in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, “bringing all parties to the table” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.554) might not be equally possible for all partners, although they have an equally high desire to cooperate, and their work has a high impact on the cooperation itself. What is also important to consider is that leadership comes with higher transaction costs due to an extension of tasks concerning negotiating, decision-making and

assurance of compliance (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012). Therefore, the leader must not only be willing to absorb (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011) transaction costs, but also financially capable.

Focusing on historical conflicts, it is important to mention the colonization of countries located in the Horn of Africa by different European countries at the end of the nineteenth century. This is the reason why it is even more important to pay attention to the **power-dynamics** and the institutional design of the cooperation. Additionally, conflicts between the countries located in the Horn of Africa could threaten the work and minimize results emerging from the cooperation.

Therefore, these four factors can have a high impact on the cooperation and its success. A more practical insight concerning these factors will be gained in the interview on development cooperation.

#### Absence of Information

Incomplete information or even its complete absence can lead to uncertainty and distrust. Due to the issue of uncertainty, it is not possible for an actor to correctly interpret the actions of the other according to one's beliefs (Vandeninden; Paul, 2012). This problem occurs because these beliefs and narratives are not based on full information. Consequently, one cannot develop a reasonable opinion. *How can this threat be addressed in a cooperation?*

The exchange of information is a key driver for a trustworthy relation as well as for successful cooperation (Furåker; Bengtsson, 2013). Agreements and mutual gains are only possible if all partners have a desire to cooperate and are confident (Lipson, 1984). This confidence can only be gained by having full information over the process. Therefore, it is essential to gain “process transparency” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.556) by focusing on dialogues and exchanges between all partners. This is the easiest way to develop a “shared understanding” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.543) on how the cooperation should look like.

#### Credible commitment

Generating and ensuring credible commitment in a cooperation is dependent on various variables like trust, respect, mutual benefits, and low transaction costs. By focusing on policy papers of the Better Migration Management programme of the GIZ and their results, the following question can be answered: *Are the partners committed to the cooperation itself and to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling?*

Credible commitment can be measured by comparing the guarantees made at the beginning of the cooperation and their extent of fulfillment afterwards. Therefore, credible commitment is strongly related to **reliable guarantees** (Lipson, 1984).

The discussion above is summarized in the following table:

Table 6.: Summary of the analysis

Factor	Impact on cooperation	How to evaluate the impact
High transaction costs	Strong, negative impact	High transaction costs can, especially in combination with other negative influences, lead to a higher chance of cheating behavior -> the decision of cooperating is influenced by a <b>cost</b> -benefit ratio

Mutual gains	Strong, positive impact	Mutual gains lead to a higher chance of cooperating and can outweigh negative influences like high transaction costs -> the decision of cooperating is influenced by a cost- <b>benefit</b> ratio
Cheating behavior	Strongest, negative impact	Cheating behavior is the result of too many negative influences leading to failure of cooperation -> the costs of cooperating outweigh its benefits
Historical conflict, Trust, Leadership and Institutional design	Negative impact; Strongest positive impact; Positive impact; Positive impact	A trusting relationship is the result of positive impacts outweighing the negative ones
Absence of information	Strong, negative impact	The absence of information has a strong negative impact because the actions of the partners cannot be predicted -> reasonable opinions and predictions are missing which leads to uncertainty
Credible commitment	Strong, positive impact	Credible commitment is an essential factor in cooperation -> actors involved in a cooperation need to be reliable and keep their promises

By linking the six codes to the cooperation in the Horn of Africa, it becomes evident that these influential factors highly interrelate with each other. As can be seen by focusing on these relations, the most influential requirement for cooperation and its success is trust. Only on the basis of trust, cooperation can thrive, and the potential threats mentioned above can be faced. As can be seen, the interplay of these six factors decides over the success or failure of the cooperation. By offering these solutions on how to overcome or outweigh negative impacts, the risk of failure and cheating can be minimized.

## Section 5. Expert Interviews

In the following section, specific results are mentioned from the GIZ and the EMSC to underline the importance of international cooperation in the context of migrant smuggling. This gives a background for the two expert interviews which are performed to triangulate the results and findings from the literature and the policy papers from the GIZ, the EMSC and the European Commission. After that, the transcripts of the two expert interviews are broken down and prepared for an extensive comparison in the next section.

## Section 5.1. Case background

### The BMM (GIZ)

The Better Migration Management programme is a project to address migrant smuggling, to secure human rights and to improve overall migration management in the Horn of Africa (BMM GIZ, 2017). The project started in April 2016 and will end in September 2022. At the beginning of the cooperation, the identification of all different needs of the eight partner countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda) and negotiations about the institutional design of the cooperation took place (BMM GIZ, 2017). This process is necessary to be able to adequately respond to these needs and to define individual goals of the programme (BMM GIZ, 2017).

In 2018, the first results became visible based on various cooperations. For example, due to the cooperation between the GIZ and the Forum on Sustainable Child Empowerment (FSCE), “accommodation centres in major migration corridors” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.2) were set up in order to address irregular migration and to prevent child-trafficking. Another aim was to address the “challenges of seasonal labour migration” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.3) between Sudan and Ethiopia. It becomes evident that the BMM is not only interested in the region but works very individually according to every country's needs. The first phase (2016-2019) of the BMM programme ended in September 2019. The results of the first three years are:

“174,600 migrants, potential migrants, and host community members involved in outreach activities” (BMM GIZ, 2020, p.1).

“16,600 government and civil society representatives engaged in workshops, trainings, roundtable discussions and other events. 60 government institutions and 40 civil society actors supported” (BMM GIZ, 2020, p.1).

“232 capacity building measures for 5,224 stakeholders implemented” (BMM GIZ, 2020, p.1).

“18,200 vulnerable migrants assisted. Thereof, 9,249 vulnerable migrants provided with accommodation, basic services, and counseling. 6,759 migrants supported by mobile health units” (BMM GIZ, 2020, p.1).

The aim of BMM II is also about ensuring human rights, whereas its focus lies on a more preventive approach to guarantee the sustainability of the measures beyond the duration of the project. Plus, this second phase is about ensuring that past results and cooperation can persist.

To fulfill this preventive approach, various training is provided by the BMM programme for example on healthcare issues, data protection and concerning the identification of victims (BMM GIZ, 2018). In addition to that, the BMM facilitates the cooperation between counties located in the Horn of Africa to tackle migrant smuggling. For example, the BMM supports cooperation between coastguards of Djibouti and Somaliland with the aim of information exchange and, consequently, better coordination and protection of migrants (BMM GIZ, 2018).

As the six years of the programme are coming to an end, the focus lies even stronger on supporting mechanisms to prevent migrant smuggling and ensuring sustainability through awareness-related work. This includes “distributing information” and “spreading awareness” within the population (BMM GIZ, 2022).

### The EMSC

The European Migrant Smuggling Center, as a part of Europol, is specialized on the threats posed by migrant smuggling and human trafficking. They address these threats by cooperating with different national police forces through various Operations. *Its aim is to address migrant smuggling through European Institutions. By focusing on the results, the degree of success and commitment becomes visible.* In 2018, Operation Muga and Operation Safar dealt with impeding smuggling activities from African countries to Europe. For example, through Operation Muga, a cooperation by the EMSC and the Spanish National Police, “an organized crime group suspected of facilitating large-scale migrant smuggling between French-speaking African countries and France” was dismantled (EMSC, 2019, p.12). Therefore, the EMSC does not directly address migrant smuggling as an independent actor but by cooperating with national governments and national police forces.

In 2021, Operation Hydra, another cooperation between Spanish police forces and the EMSC led to several arrests and house searches (EMSC, 2021). Although Operation Muga and Operation Hydra seem similar, the issue of “digital solutions” (EMSC, 2021, p.13) evolved strongly over the past years to one of the key focuses in addressing migrant smuggling.

## **Section 5.2. Interviews**

### *Interview on migration and migrant smuggling*

To emphasize the relevance and urgency of the issue of migrant smuggling, an expert interview was performed with a Research Fellow working in the field of migration and asylum policies.

These are the topics and questions this interview focuses on:

1. How has the relevance and attention on the topic of migrant smuggling evolved over the past years (in academia (your work) and according to your personal evaluation)?
2. To what extent is migrant smuggling a threat for European countries as well as for the migrants (asylum issues, unsafe migration etc.)?
3. How do you think the relevance of migrant smuggling will develop in the next few years (outlook: climate change, political stability etc.)?

By evaluating the importance of problematic issues concerning migration and migrant smuggling, the interviewee considers the last seven years are central (Min.: 00:02:12). These issues are political problems which need to be addressed accordingly (Min.: 00:02:28). As stated by the interviewee, the tackling of the “business model of smugglers” (Min.: 00:02:40) is essential for addressing and preventing this human security issue of migrant smuggling. For that, “working at the global level” (Min.: 00:13:07) is necessary. A problem in this context is the definition and Europe-wide tackling of migrant smuggling legally (Min.: 00:04:34).

Having this situation, other threats which for example relate to asylum issues can emerge. If papers were confiscated by smugglers, the process of identification is impeded. Plus, if no protection can be guaranteed due to the loss of papers, a migrant can also not be sent back to their home country because they have no papers. Consequently, it is a legal problem (no status and no papers) that needs to be addressed (Min.: 00:07:54-00:09:10).

Asking for an outlook on the issue of migration and migrant smuggling, the interviewee referred to the “alarmistic reports” (Min.: 00:10:32) concerning future migration waves. If this will pose a threat especially to European countries “is a big question mark” (Min: 00:10:42). Therefore, they “don't see it becoming more of a problem as it already is” (Min.: 00:10:10) for European countries.

### *Interview on development cooperation*

The findings stated in the last section are the result of reviewing various documents and academic literature. To have a stronger practical focus and more primary data on international cooperation in the Horn of Africa, another expert interview was performed with a Senior Researcher who works in the field of development cooperation. The main issues to be triangulated in this interview are:

1. The development and implementation of measures taken in the past years (Influencing factors on cooperation)
2. Specific results that underline the power and influence of international cooperation (Contribution to changes)
3. Threats that needed/ still need to be faced (Connection to the codes)

The interviewee also considers 2015 as a crucial year for migration issues and development cooperation issues due to the Syrian civil war (Min.: 00:01:42). Plus, they underline the emergence of “anti-immigrant and right-wing parties” (Min.: 00:02:34) in the context of migration based on which the attitude towards development cooperation changed. After 2015, development cooperation organizations are focusing more on issues “beyond just this question of: “why do people migrate?”” (Min.: 00:02:53). Talking about the BMM programme and their human-rights approach which I focused on in this thesis, the interviewee referred to problems that need to be addressed within the GIZ. Although this programme contributes to changes in the region, the approach of quick-wins is more often used than focusing on deep structural change (Min.: 00:05:57). “Words are one thing and then in practice, there was a lot of funding and resourcing, funding and resources directed to border externalization” (Min.: 00:07:14). The

BMM programme focuses to a large extent on “policing and prevention” (Min.: 00:14:23), on the symptoms, not the causes.

Plus, a more general threat that needs to be faced is the following blind spot: “no matter how much you improve conditions in East Africa, people are still going to migrate” (Min.: 00:07:42). This is a reminder that migration as a process cannot be finally “tackled”, whereas unsafe forms of migration like migrant smuggling can.

The interviewee considers a cooperation on migration issues as successful when two aspects are taken into account:

1. “There is a population of people who - if conditions improve, they won’t migrate” (Min.: 00:08:37)
2. “You cannot use development cooperation to prevent people from leaving” (Min.: 00:08:58)

As has been stated above, development cooperation on migration issues is not about impeding the process itself, but to “establish conditions for better livelihoods for people who otherwise stay” (Min.: 00:09:11) and to reliably inform potential migrants about the process of migration so that they are able to make an informed decision.

A threat that needs to be faced are the trafficking networks and the non-prosecution of human traffickers. People who are crossing the border illegally (the migrants) can be prosecuted for that, whereas the smugglers who bring the people to the border cannot be easily prosecuted. It is “a stop at the threshold of your jurisdiction” (Min.: 00:14:07).

One of the tasks of the interviewee is related to policy advisory work and especially to search for “gaps in the policy planning, the policy development” (Min.: 00:16:34). In their work, they identify trust as an important component for relationship building, which is “much more important on the German side” (Min.: 00:16:09).

## **Section 6. Discussion**

In this section, the literature, the interview, and the findings of this study are discussed. The first abstract focuses on the literature and documents which are included in the literature analysis. Conflicting ideas, potential biases, threats, and other influencing theories are addressed. In the second abstract, the findings from the interviews, the choice of interviewees and threats of the choice of data collection such as framing are discussed. The third abstract compares the overall findings from the literature analysis with the findings which are based on the interviews. Here, findings are triangulated, validated and conflicting ideas are examined.

### **Section 6.1. Discussion of Literature and Policy Documents**

In this section, conflicting theoretical understandings, the limitations of the chosen literature as well as the influence of other theories, which were not directly included in this study, will be discussed.

#### *Conflicting theoretical understandings*

In this study, two different documents were used to introduce the topic of collaborative governance (Ansell; Gash, 2008/ Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011). Although the authors share an overall understanding of collaborative governance and its importance, their theorizing differs.

For example, the definition from Emerson et al. is much broader than the one posed by Ansell and Gash. In the work of Ansell and Gash, collaboration is described in a more conventional way and includes the “public manager or the formal public sector” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.3). In contrast, the work of Emerson et al. includes wider forms of collaborative governance, such as “multipartner governance” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.2), which can also be initiated by IGOs and NSAs. Therefore, the understanding from Emerson et al. extends the conventional form of state-initiation and overcomes the state-centric paradigm of cooperation (O’Neill, Balsiger, VanDevee, 2003).

In addition to that, Emerson et al. define the context of cooperation and the drivers for cooperation separately. These drivers, which are essential for cooperation to occur, include: “Leadership, consequential incentives, independence, and uncertainty” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.5). Contrary to this approach, Ansell and Gash focus on the overall influences on cooperation between stakeholders and evaluate them as helpful or discouraging.

Plus, the relation between motivation and engagement is described differently. Ansell and Gash illustrate the relation between outcomes and engagement as a “virtuous cycle” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.558). Emerson et al. describe the relation between engagement and motivation for collaboration (and therefore for outcomes) as reinforcing (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011). That means that, according to Emerson et al., the cycle of engagement enhances the desire to cooperate which leads to an increased possibility for mutual gains through joint action, which, in turn, leads to higher motivation. Although interpretations differ, the description of this relation as a cycle is similar in both articles. This “self-reinforcing cycle” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.20) includes four essential drivers: “mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment” (Emerson; Nabatchi; Balogh, 2011, p.7). In this case, these drivers were similar in the article of Ansell and Gash, apart from legitimacy. As a fourth influencing variable, they include “commitment to the process” (Ansell; Gash, 2008, p.558). Another similarity is the relevance of leadership in cooperation agreements emphasized in both articles.

#### Limitations and Strengths based on the chosen Literature

One limitation or even bias which needs to be considered is the reinforcement of power issues. As mentioned before, power-dynamics have a crucial impact on cooperation and need to be considered. By using documents and academic literature which do not directly come from countries located in the Horn of Africa, but from European countries or the US, power-imbalances could be reinforced.

To overcome this potential bias which emerged on the basis of the chosen literature, umbrella organizations like the African Union could have been included. Additionally, an interview with someone working in a county located in the Horn of Africa, who can better evaluate the development on-site, could have been performed. Still, the BMM programme works together with small organizations located in the Horn of Africa like the “Forum on Sustainable Child Empowerment (FSCE)” (BMM GIZ, 2018, p.1), which gives direct insight in the cooperation and its results on-site.

A strength of this study is the juxtaposition of academic literature and theories on the one hand, and policy papers on the other hand. By conflating these different types of literature, theories were tested deductively by applying them to the specific case.

#### The Influence of other Theories

Theories on international development cooperation, collaborative governance and migration are very broad and are the topic of hundreds of papers. Therefore, only a limited number of theories were considered in this study.

At the beginning of this study, the importance of push and pull factors, stated by Urbanski in the context of migration, was mentioned (Urbanski, 2022). By tackling the issue of migrant smuggling, these factors could explain migration flows as well as potential reasons for migrating based on country-specific characteristics.

Push and pull factors occur in three main areas: economic, social, and political areas. Focusing on the first area, the economic area, push and pull factors include individual wealth such as wages and unemployment, but also common goods and circumstances relating to good welfare standards such as the level of education and healthcare. These factors relate to socio-economic standards, which is why they are also included in the second area, the social area. Plus, the social area also includes push factors like discrimination and pull factors such as family reunification. The latter one is also relevant concerning policy-making in Germany as well as on the European level. The third area of push and pull factors is the political area, which concentrates on the type of government as well as on law and justice (Urbanski, 2022). Therefore, push factors are for example the abuse of human rights and corruption, whereas pull factors are high levels of democracy and political freedom. Which area is the most relevant highly depends on the country and on individual circumstances.

In contrast to the human rights approach or “rights-based approaches” (RBA)” (Nelson, 2007, p.2041) that are emphasized by the BMM II programme (BMM GIZ, 2022), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been put forward as an alternative initiative to refocus on in the context of development cooperation (Nelson, 2007).

These goals address humans who earn less than one dollar a day and focus on tackling the “**symptoms of underdevelopment**” (Nelson, 2007, p.2042) like illness coming from poor water quality and nutrition. Overall, they focus on the “well-being” (Nelson, 2007, p.2041) of those people. To meet these

ambitious goals, support from donor countries must be mobilized through social movements and NGOs. These mobilizing-tasks, as well as monitoring-tasks, are the duties of the United Nations. Still, critics state that these goals are too ambitious and overall, not effective enough to tackle worldwide poverty and all symptoms of underdevelopment (Nelson, 2007). Plus, these goals do not address the structural factors, the root causes of those symptoms. A strength of the MDGs is the establishment of monitoring systems and benchmarks with which the development-aid donors are familiar and can achieve progress faster and more efficiently. Still, these “quick-win strategies [favor quick impact over addressing complex social systems]” (Nelson, 2007, p.2047). Therefore “most MDG strategies are neither societal nor systematic” (Nelson, 2007, p.2047).

Human rights, in contrast to the MDGs, are more normative and focus on human dignity. They connect systemic factors (like freedom of speech, political freedoms etc.) to economic and social factors. Therefore, the focus does not only lie on the individuals suffering from poverty, but on its root causes. Consequently, the establishment of “effective legal and institutional protection for groups that are subject to discriminatory treatment” (Nelson, 2007, p.2046) is essential.

The MDGs and the human rights approach differ a lot in their philosophy. Although the MDGs offer an important perspective of addressing relevant issues through development aid, the topic of this thesis, the tackling of migrant smuggling through development cooperation, allowed for a human rights approach like the one included from the Better Migration Management programme. Migrant smuggling violates the human dignity of migrants, and a legal and institutional protection is necessary.

## **Section 6.2. Discussion of the Interviews**

In this abstract, limitations and strengths that emerged by including the interviewees are discussed. Additionally, potential threats are considered.

### Limitations and Strengths

Focusing on the first interview, a potential limitation might be that the interviewee is relatively new in their position as a researcher and does not focus on the region of the Horn of Africa. Still, the given insights on the development of global migration emphasize the social relevance of this thesis. Plus, their expertise on asylum issues poses an important addition to the addressing of migrant smuggling.

Focusing on the second interview performed with a researcher on development cooperation, a potential limitation could be that they do not work for the GIZ and were not included in the BMM programme. Still, they had more exclusive and practical insights on this programme due to their long-standing experience in this field compared to the policy papers posed by the organization itself.

### Potential threats

As can be seen in Section 5.2., the questionnaire for the first interview included more specific questions, whereas the second questionnaire included more broader topics the interviewee should talk about. Although this might lead to a threat related to the limitation of the speaking times of the interviewees, it was necessary to confine these times a bit according to the relevance of this thesis. Migration and migrant smuggling are the aspects under which development cooperation is evaluated. Therefore, issues related to development cooperation are more important to validate or falsify findings from the literature in the next section.

## **Section 6.3. Comparison between findings from Literature and Interviews**

### Comparison with Interview on migration and migrant smuggling

Focusing on the first interview which deals with migration and migrant smuggling, the interviewee also identifies 2015 as a crucial year, as a starting point from which the importance of addressing migrant smuggling emerged. This statement validates the information from the literature. For example, the BMM programme started off in 2016 as a response to migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa. Plus, they describe migrant smuggling and its consequences (asylum issues etc.) as a potential “human rights issue” (Min.: 00:09:24). The BMM wants to address migrant smuggling by reinforcing human rights/ using a human-rights approach. Therefore, their evaluation fits the evaluation of the BMM programme.

A difference that emerged is that the interviewee does not necessarily see migration “becoming more of a problem as it already is” (Min.: 00:10:06) for the European Union considering climate change and political instability issues. Instead, they see displacement itself as the “major global problem” (Min.:



00:11:50). Although displacement is an issue which needs to be addressed, it is not something that can be prevented completely. Therefore, as it became evident by reviewing literature and various policy documents, it is necessary to tackle such global issues through cooperation between various partners, which are also located in the European Union. For sure, not everyone who migrates due to these reasons will arrive in Europe but that does not mean that it doesn't pose a problem for European countries which needs to be tackled. The statement can also be refuted by focusing on the situation in the Ukraine. Challenges do evolve but, due to rising political instability, of course there will be a higher number of migrants because it is one of the main push factors.

#### Comparison with Interview on development cooperation

A main finding that can be validated by the interview on development cooperation is that “trust” is a very important requirement for successful cooperation and central for relationship building (Min.: 00:15:50). Plus, they also see 2015, the high number of migrants and the emergence of “anti-immigrant and right-wing parties” (Min.: 00:02:34), as the starting point for re-considering the tasks of development cooperation and thinking beyond the “question of: “why do people migrate?”” (Min.: 00:02:53). Admitting that people undertake the process of migration, a journey which could be life-threatening, for various types of reasons is central. Like it is stated in the policy documents, development cooperation should be about establishing a better situation, to give the people a reason not to undertake this journey, and not about closing borders. This statement gets underlined by for example the awareness-work of the BMM.

By triangulating the findings, it becomes evident that the findings and impressions of the second interview cannot be completely validated by the policy papers.

As stated in these papers, the BMM focuses on a human-rights approach in the Horn of Africa, whereas the interviewee stated that, in practice, “quick wins” (Min.: 00:06:00) related to measures of prevention are more often represented than policies leading to actual change.

## **Section 7. Conclusion and Outlook**

In this research, different factors, and impressions from the literature, from experts, and from concrete organizations were taken to evaluate on the following questions:

### **Can international cooperation between countries in the Horn of Africa and Germany be a solution to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling?**

Concrete measures, such as through development cooperation, on the topic of migrant smuggling evolved after 2015. For example, the BMM programme and the EMSC were adopted in 2016 with the aim of tackling migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa (BMM) and in various other regions, including the Horn of Africa, from which the migrants are smuggled to European countries (EMSC). The EMSC operates within the European Union as an organization from Europol, whereas the BMM programme was only applied in the Horn of Africa as a part of the GIZ. The EMSC does not necessarily directly cooperate with actors located in the Horn of Africa or countries from which migrants were smuggled, but within the European Union. This organization addresses migrant smuggling by cooperating with different European national police forces through various Operations. A different approach is emphasized by the GIZ through the BMM programme. Here, development cooperation between the organization and various actors located in the Horn of Africa is considered as a solution to help solve migrant smuggling.

In this context, it is important to have a look at how successful cooperation can be achieved. As stated in the codebook and in the analysis, six factors are considered as “contributing factors on successful cooperation” in this thesis: ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs; mutual gains; cheating behavior; historical conflict, trust, leadership, institutional design; absence of information and credible commitment. As it became evident by applying these codes to the case of this study, “trust” is the most influencing factor for successful cooperation. Having a trusting relationship which can be built through reliable guarantees and full information, high transaction costs and even the possibility of cheating behavior (the Prisoner's Dilemma) can be addressed and avoided. The importance of “trust” was also underlined by the second interviewee.

One contribution of this study is the triangulation and verification of findings generated based on official policy documents. As the interview on development cooperation underlined, organizations in the field

of development cooperation must be critically scrutinized. Documents and policy papers provided by these institutions might not include problems and threats that occurred during the cooperation. As mentioned in the interview, the BMM programme might not be as effective as stated in the policy documents.

Therefore, development cooperation can potentially be a solution to help solve migrant smuggling when all actors consider the potential weaknesses and threats of cooperation like high transaction costs, mistrust or even cheating behavior. Additionally, the work of such organizations needs to be critically scrutinized in terms of “quick wins”.

Further research on development cooperation and migrant smuggling might focus even more on influencing global changes in the next few years concerning climate change and political instability issues. Here, it might be important to re-evaluate the necessity for development cooperation in the future if the global situation concerning migrant smuggling exacerbates.

## Section 8. Literature List

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