

Why do Negotiators use Deceptive behaviour?

A qualitative study

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ABSTRACT,

Purpose: *Analysis of the use and motives of deception in both personal and professional negotiations.*

Design/Methodology/Approach: *A series of negotiators of varying experience and backgrounds were interviewed about their experience and view-points on deception in a negotiation setting.*

Findings: *Deceptive strategies are viewed negatively by most negotiators and are typically employed as a retaliation to untrustworthy negotiation counterparts.*

Research limitations/implications: *More consideration for the culture and gender should have been given during the analysis of the interviews.*

Practical Implications: *A deeper insight into the deception during negotiations can be used as a warning for negotiators and may also provide insights on how to deal with deception.*

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	2
2. Literature Review of Negotiations, Deception and Trust.....	6
2.1 Defining Negotiations	6
2.2 Factors impacting negotiations: Behaviour, Culture and Styles.	9
2.3 Deceptive Negotiation Behaviours: Negotiation behaviour can range from competitive bargaining to falsification	13
2.4 Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANTs) are used in up to 60% of cases.....	15
2.5 Trust is fundamental for successful negotiations.....	17
2.6 The negotiation relationship can have immediate and delayed effects on the result of a negotiation.....	19
2.7 Synthesis of reviewed literature.....	20
3. Methods.....	22
4. Results.....	25
4.1 General negotiation: definitions, expected behaviour, process and outcome	25
4.2 Negotiation preparation: preparation time and steps taken to prepare.....	28
4.3 Familiarity in negotiations and the question of trust	32
4.4 Negotiation behaviour: the use of deceptive negotiation behaviours.....	35
4.5 The motivation and the expected gain from using deceptive behaviour.....	36
4.6 Thoughts on deception and the importance of the result and relationship	42
5. Discussion	44
5.1 Anchoring and hiding the bottom line are seen less as deceptive behaviour as opposed to misrepresenting factual information.....	44
5.2 Deceptive behaviour has a negative impact on the relationship between negotiators ...	49
5.3 Practical and theoretical implications of the thesis	50
5.4 Limitations and future perspectives	51
6. Conclusion	52

1. Introduction

A common trait amongst humans is that we deceive, deception is a frequent companion in our daily lives (Gaspar, Levine, & Schweitzer, 2015). This observation has been made over several centuries, even great philosophers and psychologists have studied truth and deception. For example, great philosophers such as Plato and Socrates postulated various theories and perspectives on truth and deception. Plato believed that the truth depends on 'being', thus relying on the context in which the truth is placed, thus also creating a grey area between truth and deception (Hestir, 2016). Little has changed in terms of truth and deception over time, even today deception is not solely observed in personal or juvenile settings but rather is of great significance even from a professional perspective (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).

Lying can be defined as a statement, believed by the liar to be false, made to another person with the intention that the other person is deceived by that statement (Bok, 1979). A further definition that shows overlap with the previous definition was provided by Williams (2010), he defines it as an assertion that the speaker knows to be false with the intention of deceiving the hearer with regard to that content.

Lying is often associated with deceit, but deceit is a more general term in both occurrence and scope. The term deceit implies an intention to mislead to the disadvantage of those who are misled. For example, a false insurance claim to return a profit at the loss of the insurance company may be regarded as deceit. Deceit can be achieved through lying and most lying causes deceit but that is not necessarily and in every instance the case (Rappaport, 2000). One instance in which a lie would not be considered deceit according to Bok (1979) definition would be the 'white lie' as the intention to mislead is not to the disadvantage of the misled. White lies form a part of everyday life, for example telling a friend that you will see them in 5min, when in fact you are running late and will require more time. It has even been argued that these lies are a foundation for proving social-communicative competence to navigate through society (Bryant, 2008).

Deception is common, it takes place in almost all settings of life, from children lying to their parents to financial advisors and lawyers lying to their clients and even physicians not being truthful to their patients (Angelova & Regner, 2013; Iezzoni, Rao, Roches, Vogeli, & Campbell, 2012; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007). A study by DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol,

Wyer, and Epstein (1996) shows that lying is a fact of daily life. On average the participants of the study lied once a day, while the participating university students lied twice a day on average. Of the interactions, the participants had one on one with others they lied in 30% of the cases while university students lied in 38% of their interactions.

As alluded to previously, many theories have been developed to explain why people lie, for the sake of brevity this section will introduce just a few theories.

The economic model of crime and dishonesty recognised that the decision-makers face a dilemma between the expected costs of punishment and the benefits related to committing a given crime. When the benefits outweigh the expected cost it is only rational to opt for the illegal act. This can also be applied to negotiations, if the expected gain outweighs the cost of being caught lying, it would be rational to opt for lying (Jacobsen, Fosgaard, & Pascual-Ezama, 2018).

Contrasting the economic model, the moral balance model argues that moral behaviour is the result of a moral balance score of former good and bad behaviour. People will have a personal standard that they will not surpass when they make the choice of lying or not. Instead of always following a strict moral standard they will deviate from what they know is morally correct as long as an overall balance is kept over time (Jacobsen *et al.*, 2018).

Closely related to the moral balance model the theory of self-concept maintenance was developed, this states that people will act dishonestly if they can do so without having to update their self-image of being a good and honest person (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).

Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, and Ayal (2015) identified that one factor that influences a decision on whether to lie, is the internal process of justification of a lie. A justification strategy may appear before or after a decision to behave unethically has been taken.

These are just a few theories that look at the reasons why people choose to use deceptive behaviour. Deception has even been shown to be a part of nature not only among humans but also within the animal kingdom (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), this topic of truth and deception has preoccupied society for centuries and warrants its own thesis, however, falls out of the scope of this thesis.

One of the most frequent areas where deception can be seen is in the setting of a negotiation (Ann E. Tenbrunsel, 1998). Prior to any negotiation, negotiators are faced with a variety of decisions that need to be made when formulating a plan or strategy for an upcoming negotiation, one such decision would be whether or not to use deceptive behaviour (Tasa,

2017). One factor for the decision of whether it is good to use deception could be explained by the economic model of crime. If the benefit outweighs the risk, the rational choice would be to apply deceptive behaviour.

Negotiations inevitably require the transfer of information between parties, leading to a challenge for the involved parties on whether to be truthful about the shared information or to be deceitful. While sharing information can lead to mutual trust and a beneficial relationship, it also exposes the parties to risk, if one side does not reciprocate (Fleck, Volkema, Pereira, Levy, & Vaccari, 2014).

According to Bernad Williams (2010), deception is wrongful due to its breach of Trust. Without a general understanding of trust, the implications of deception in negotiations cannot be truly elucidated. Trust refers to the belief that someone/something is safe and reliable, thus not causing any harm (Strudler, 2010). However, the concept and general understanding of trust does not end there, as the definitions and ideologies of trust have been shown to be greatly disputed. Many have argued that there are types of trust which are dynamic and evolve (Olekalns & Adair, 2013). From a negotiation perspective, mutual trust is the understanding of trust that is shared between negotiating parties. Since both parties are willing to take the risk in trusting the other, vulnerability is shared between members (Cheung, Wong & Yuan, 2016).

It is also important to consider that trust is not just a feeling one has towards another but also involves the willingness to take a risk, allowing oneself to be vulnerable enough to trust another party. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, trust will be defined as the willingness to risk being vulnerable in the belief that the opposing party will fulfil the expectations set by the trustor (Mayer *et al.*, 1995). Trust plays a pivotal role in negotiations as it forms the basis of a successful exchange. The importance of trust in negotiations will further be demonstrated later.

Deceptive negotiation tactics can have a large impact on negotiation results, it is, therefore, important to be able to detect and deal with such tactics (Shonk, 2020). Literature has identified the effects and risks that deceptive behaviour has in negotiations, the gap in the literature that has not been studied to the same extent, is to understand what motivates negotiators to use deceptive behaviour.

The aim of this thesis is twofold, firstly the aim is to get a deeper understanding of the reasoning behind why negotiators use deceptive behaviour. Secondly, this paper explores the emotional experience of deceived negotiators and the effect the deception has on the negotiator. The goal is to find motivations behind using deceptive behaviour and what it is that negotiators hope to gain from using these behaviours. Additionally, this paper aims to explore the effect that deceptive behaviour has on the relationship of the negotiators. As negotiations are a part of our daily lives, understanding what effects deceptive behaviour has, is useful in negotiating successfully and increasing the performance at a professional as well as personal level.

To understand why negotiators, apply deceptive behaviour in negotiations, the following research question will be answered; *What motivates negotiators to use deceptive behaviour?* Furthermore, the effect of deceptive behaviour on the relationship of the negotiation will be explored using the following research question; *How does deceptive behaviour affect negotiators who know they have been lied to?*

Using the above-mentioned research questions the thesis will try to understand the motivation behind using deceptive behaviours by linking to literature concepts such as behaviour, culture, ethically ambiguous tactics, and trust.

The paper will begin with a review of existing literature to gain an understanding of previous research on negotiation and deception. This section will begin with a look at some important definitions as well as an insight into the theory that will later be used to analyse the findings. Following the literature review, a short introduction to the used methodology will be provided describing the data collection and analysis method. Subsequently, the main findings from the conducted interviews will be provided followed by the analysis of these findings using the literature gathered in the literature review in section two. In the conclusion, this paper will try to explain the motivation behind using deceptive behaviour as well as how the use of deceptive behaviour makes deceived negotiators feel and its impact.

2. Literature Review of Negotiations, Deception and Trust

The following section will describe fundamental concepts of negotiations, defining and describing basic terminology used throughout the course of this thesis.

2.1 Defining Negotiations

This section will be introducing the definitions of negotiations as well as some other important concepts.

Negotiations are defined as a process of communicating back and forth for the purpose of reaching a joint decision (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). Greenhalgh and Lewicki (2015) defined negotiations as a process of arriving at a commitment through a course of actions in which the parties entered the conversation without consensus. According to Keough (2017), a negotiation is an interactive process between interdependent parties in the attempt to produce a joint decision. This simple definition by Keough (2017) is different from a lot of the other definitions in literature as there is usually a mention of conflict and conflict resolution (Mills, 2019). The definition by Keough (2017) is the one used in this paper, as some of the negotiation situations analysed do not necessarily contain conflict but rather share a common problem that requires a collaborative solution.

Negotiations generally take place when all parties have something to gain from each other, the range between the two parties' resistance points is known as the zone of possible agreements (ZOPA) (Raiffa, 1982; Yao, Zhang, & Liu, 2020). If the resistance point of the buyer minus the resistance point of the seller is positive, then a zone of possible agreements exists (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). For example, a seller of a house may want to sell their house optimally at 1million euros and is willing to go as low as 750 thousand euros, a prospective buyer aims to acquire the house for as little money as possible setting a maximal budget at 800 thousand euros and optimal price 600 thousand euros. Therefore, the ZOPA is between 750 thousand and 800 thousand euros.

A further important concept that needs to be introduced is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). A negotiator should always be aware of their fallback option if the

current negotiation is not leading to a fruitful result (Li, Vo, Kowalczyk, Ossowski, & Kersten, 2013). In the situation that one's BATNA is better than the agreement that can be reached in a negotiation, the logical choice is to go for the BATNA (Thompson *et al.*, 2010). Using the example above for ZOPA, if the prospective house buyer and seller cannot come to an agreement, then the buyer may fall back on a different house at a more affordable price point or they may continue living in the house they currently own.

Adding to the ZOPA and the BATNA, it is important to understand anchoring, this is a bias that is experienced in negotiations in which the first offer significantly affects the final price of a negotiation (Kristensen & Gärling, 2000; Wilson, 2012). This bias is a cognitive effect wherein the first offer is typically given a lot of significant weight, setting the scene for the rest of the negotiation (Shonk, 2022). Yet again using the example from above, if the house seller markets the price of his property at 950 thousand, the seller has set their offer well above the minimum value. Thus, the seller will set the scene for the negotiation, where the buyer will feel they are succeeding in a negotiation if the price is set below 950 thousand, while the seller is still turning a profit. Therefore, the seller has set an anchor price of around 950 thousand around which the buyer and seller will negotiate.

The concepts of BATNA and ZOPA are useful to understand when analysing the results from the conducted interviews in this paper.

Before moving into the concepts of deception it is important to understand the differences between a behaviour and a tactic. Behaviour is defined as an attempt on the part of an individual to bring about some change or to maintain the current state of affairs (Bergner, 2011). Examples of this could be driving to work or combing one's hair, or in the context of a negotiation raising an eyebrow or shaking one's head. Adler, Brahm, and Graham (1992) define negotiation behaviour as a set of visible communication tactics, these can be verbal or non-verbal actions that a negotiator displays to their opponent.

Lund, Tamnes, Moestue, Buss, and Vollrath (2007) define tactics as the means by which an individual tries to achieve their goals in a specific environment. In this case, it would mean that specific behaviour is exhibited by a negotiator to fulfil a tactic. For example, raising an eyebrow in response to an offer set too high.

Deception is the act of intentionally misleading one's counterpart. In this thesis, deception can be defined as advancing one's position to the detriment of the opposing side, lying would be one such technique (Rottenburger, 2020).

There is a conceptual difference between lying and deception. It is not considered deception unless there is a clear intent to deceive. A statement that contains false information made by mistake is not deceptive as there is no clear intent to deceive, although it may cause the opposing side to be misled. The difference between lying and deception boils down to the difference between asserting what one believes is false and leading the opposing side to believe something false by saying something that is neither true nor false (Green, 2001). For example, if a house seller intentionally avoids telling their prospective buyer about a mould issue in the basement that would require investment from the buyer to fix, then the seller is using deception. However, if the seller outright denies the existence of mould in the house upon being questioned, then they would be actively lying.

Leading on from deceptive behaviour, the legality of lying in negotiations is interesting, is the use of deceptive behaviour acceptable? A statement is defined as fraudulent when the negotiator makes a statement that is knowingly misrepresentative of a material fact on which the opposing side reasonably relies and causes damage (Shell, 1991). The legality of lying in negotiations is a topic that reaches beyond the scope of this paper. As a conclusion to the topic of the legality of lying it can be said that unethical bargaining practices are, as often as not, illegal or become so after they are brought to light (Shell, 1991).

One of the goals of this paper is the identification of the impact of deceptive behaviour on the relationship, there is also the applicability in business to business (B2B) negotiations. B2B negotiations occur when two or more businesses share an interest in trading utilities for resources (Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil, & Candi, 2018).

Having gone through the definitions and introductions to the relevant terminology such as understanding the relevance of a ZOPA and BATNA as well as deciding on a definition for negotiations, it is important to have a look at the factors that impact negotiations.

2.2 Factors impacting negotiations: Behaviour, Culture and Styles.

The following section will look at the literature on negotiation behaviour, broadly categorising the different behaviours into two distinct types: distributive- and integrative negotiations. In addition, this section will cover the impact of culture on negotiations, this is an important aspect to cover as the research was conducted with interviewees from a variety of cultural backgrounds which may affect their negotiation styles.

Behaviour:

The first type of behaviour is known as distributive negotiating, also known as a win-lose scenario (Fleming & Hawes, 2017). Negotiators from one or more parties view the negotiation over resources as a fixed pie and zero-sum game. The focus of the negotiators is to obtain as much of a resource as possible while still managing to convince the other side to agree to the deal (Brian, 2007).

The second approach is known as integrative negotiating or win-win scenario (Fleming & Hawes, 2017). Either or all sides acknowledge that the resources over which the negotiation is held can be expanded through collaboration. The expansion of resources can take place through creative approaches to decision-making and can potentially result in a larger pool of resources that can be distributed. In this type of negotiation, both sides often report higher satisfaction with an integrative approach rather than with a distributive approach (Fleming & Hawes, 2017). The choice of negotiation behaviour may have an impact on the use of deceptive behaviour.

Culture:

A further factor that may have an impact on the choice of behaviour is culture. Culture refers to a group's shared beliefs and attitudes, while individual people demonstrate personality, the sharing of behaviours by a group may be termed as culture. This culture can be within a limited area such as within a family or even be associated with a larger geographical area such as a country or continent (Lytle *et al.*, 1995). To better understand culture, G. Hofstede (1983) initially developed the four dimensions of national culture. Cultural patterns were identified for 50 countries from various regions. The analysis consists of four different aspects of national culture, which were called dimensions. The four initial dimensions were individualism versus collectivism, large versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity versus femininity.

Individualism versus collectivism deals with the fundamental issue involving the relationship between an individual and their colleagues' (G. Hofstede, 1983). On the one end of the spectrum are societies in which the ties between individuals are very loose, and people are expected to look after their own self-interests. This is made possible by the large amount of freedom given to the individuals in these societies (G. Hofstede, 1983). On the other end of the spectrum are societies in which the individuals shared close ties with each other. People are born into collectivities or in-groups. The individuals of these groups are expected to look out for the interests of the group and to have no other beliefs or opinions than those of the group (G. Hofstede, 1983).

The second dimension is power distance, this reflects how a society deals with inequality. People are unequal in both physical and intellectual capacities, some societies do not fight these inequalities and let them grow to where such inequalities turn into power and wealth (G. Hofstede, 1983). Other societies try to reduce these inequalities as far as possible. People in large power distance societies will accept a hierarchical order in which everyone has their place with no further need for justification. People from small power distance societies will expect a justification for the power inequalities. The power distance has a clear consequence on the way in which people build their institutions and organisations (Geert Hofstede, 1984).

Uncertainty avoidance is the third dimension covered by Hofstede. It is the degree to which an individual of society feels comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Societies with strong uncertainty avoidance have rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of deviant individuals and ideas (Geert Hofstede, 1984). Societies that have weak uncertainty avoidance tend to maintain a more relaxed atmosphere in which practice counts more than principles and where deviations are more easily tolerated (Geert Hofstede, 1984).

The final dimension introduced by Hofstede is masculinity versus femininity. Masculinity stands for a preference in society for achievement, assertiveness and material success, while femininity stands for a preference for relationships, modesty and caring for the weak (Geert Hofstede, 1984). Based on these dimensions of culture the behaviours exhibited during a negotiation may vary. For example, the interpretation of a situation is always placed into the context of the negotiators' own culture, therefore in dealing with moments that may be interpreted as conflict may be dealt with differently depending on the culture. It has been

shown that identical situations that could construe conflict may be viewed as mutual blame by Japanese negotiators, whereas North Americans tend to view such conflict from a more of a win-lose perspective (Gelfand and McCusker, 2002). Furthermore, a study by Drake (1995) showed that in a cross-cultural negotiations between negotiators from the USA and Taiwan had distinctively different strategies and behaviours. US negotiators tend to use a more analytical and reasoning based approach, while Taiwanese negotiators focus on normative approaches paying attention to social contexts and relationships. Culture may therefore have an impact on the type of negotiation behaviour exhibited by a negotiator.

Styles:

Five different negotiation styles of behaviour have been identified by research, competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating (Rahim, 1983; Robert & Jane, 1978). These five styles can roughly be placed in the above-mentioned distributive or integrative types.

The competing style is generally power-oriented with assertive and uncooperative behaviour. The collaborating approach, on the other hand, is a combination of cooperative and assertive behaviour, with negotiators using integrative approaches to generate a win-win situation. Compromising approaches incorporate elements from both the collaborative as well as the competitive styles, including both dominating and integrative behaviours. The avoiding style is both unassertive and uncooperative. Negotiators using this style usually avoid dealing with issues and generally avoid conflict. Finally, the accommodating style is usually expressed by unassertiveness and cooperativeness. Negotiators using this style often disregard their own needs for the needs of the opposing party (Sigurðardóttir, Hotait, & Eichstädt, 2019).

Before moving on to risk and risk propensity it is important to also have a look at non-verbal communication. Mehrabian (2009), a trailblazer in the research of body language noted that people convey 7% of information using words, 38% via their voice and 55% through their body language. A good negotiator must therefore be able to manage their own non-verbal behaviour while also being able to understand the behaviour of their counterpart (Peleckis, Peleckienė, & Polajeva, 2016). Body language can be a drastic factor that can change the course of a negotiation for the better or the worse, understanding when body language

contradicts the verbal language and when it supports it can be a great factor for gathering information (Peleckis *et al.*, 2016).

Non-verbal communication ranges through a wide variety of body language elements, it involves aspects such as posture, clothing style, gestures, facial expressions, voice intonations, laughter, eye contact and many more. It is important to understand that certain aspects of body language can be sent consciously, while others are sent instantaneously without much control of the person (Peleckis *et al.*, 2016).

A distinction can also be made between innate and genetically determined body language, such as the universal act of smiling to denote happiness or affirmative nodding, and body language that is determined by factors outside of genetics. Some of these factors include nationality, the same gestures in different countries have different meanings. Culture also has an impact, ethics, the educational level, and other cultural aspects all have an impact on the body language exhibited (Peleckis *et al.*, 2016).

Understanding body language and non-verbal behaviour allows negotiators to understand an opponent's physical and emotional state, it complements or weakens the spoken language and it allows a negotiator to tell whether an opponent is telling the truth or if they are being deceitful (Peleckis *et al.*, 2016). For instance, it has been shown that the use of deception is usually accompanied by a reduction of gesticulation by the deceiver in a bid, observing and processing such body language allows the opponent to respond accordingly and detect deceit before it is too late and harm may be caused (Cohen *et al.*, 2010).

The choice of negotiation styles may also be rooted in a person's propensity to take risks. Risk is seen as a function of two factors, the first factor is the uncertainty of outcome and the second is the significance of the consequences (Kapoutsis, Volkema, & Nikolopoulos, 2013). To counteract this risk an individual can either seek additional information to lower the uncertainty of the outcome, or lower their stakes in order to lessen the significance of the consequences (Taylor, 1974).

In negotiations, both an uncertainty towards gaining an achievable outcome exists as well as the counterparts' style and intentions, both of which can be researched by a negotiator. The

stakes of a negotiator can also be lowered by identifying and developing alternatives (Kapoutsis *et al.*, 2013).

Cho and Lee (2006) found that individuals with a low-risk propensity are likely to pursue risk-reducing strategies such as seeking additional information while also lowering their stakes or investments in the outcome. In terms of behaviour, low-risk propensity individuals will generally reject engagement and request making in favour of gathering more information and preferring to sub-optimize their requests. Individuals that have a high propensity for risk will exhibit the opposite behaviour, favouring engagement and entering into request making (Cho & Lee, 2006).

Past research has identified three individual characteristics as likely determinants of risk behaviour (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Risk preference is one of the identified characteristics of risk-taking behaviour. Decision-makers' who enjoy the challenges that come with risk will be more likely to undertake risky actions than those who do not (Brockhaus, 1980).

The second characteristic is risk perception, this is defined as a decision-makers' assessment of the risk inherent in a situation. Perceived risk is determined by the decision-makers' labelling of situations, their probabilistic estimate of the extent and the controllability of risks and the confidence in those estimates (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). The third and final individual characteristic is risk propensity. As already discussed, risk propensity is the willingness to take or avoid risks (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).

2.3 Deceptive Negotiation Behaviours: Negotiation behaviour can range from competitive bargaining to falsification

The previous section has introduced some general negotiation behaviours, this section will dive into the deceptive negotiation behaviours, these behaviours would be classified as unethical tactics.

Sigurðardóttir *et al.* (2019) identified eighteen categories of negotiation behaviour of which two have a focus on deception and a third uses deceptions as a part of a larger strategy. The behaviours are;

Traditional competitive bargaining, this type of behaviour involves the use of 5 items that are usually used in distributive negotiations. The employed techniques represent an

aggregate of hiding your bottom line, making inflated opening demands, securing information about your opponent, undermining an opponent's confidence, and stalling/delaying the negotiation process (Lewicki & Stark, 1996).

False promise-making, is a form of bluffing; the negotiator states their intention to do something even though they have no intention of following through with it. A false promise has the general form of "if you do X, I will reward you" (Lewicki & Stark, 1996).

Misrepresentation is another form of deceit; the negotiator intentionally misrepresents information to strengthen the negotiation arguments (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). Misrepresentation is sometimes deemed necessary to create a reason for the opponent to make a concession. A study has shown that negotiators who make extreme demands were more likely to have their opponents give in to those demands. Lewicki and Robinson (1998); (Lewicki & Stark, 1996) differentiated deceptive negotiation tactics into five forms.

Misrepresentation of position to an opponent is similar to the behaviour explained in the previous paragraph. Here the negotiator distorts their preferred settlement point (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998).

Bluffing, this too is the same as the behaviour of false promise making as seen above.

Falsification is another form of lying, it is the introduction of incorrect information as though it were correct. Examples of falsification would include the introduction of false documents such as warranties and guarantees or other false certifications. False information can either be introduced in verbal form or printed form (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998).

Deception attempts are made to manipulate the opposing side to arrive at a conclusion that is not entirely correct. Negotiators may only reveal certain information but not the entirety to lead the opposing side to make false inferences. When using deception the negotiator does not lie, rather they are not telling the full truth by intentionally omitting certain information (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998).

Selective disclosure or misrepresentation to constituencies, the final form introduced by Lewicki and Robinson (1998) is a form of lying that occurs in situations where parties other than the opponent are involved in the negotiation. Here the negotiator may misrepresent events that happened at the negotiation to their constituents or misrepresent the wishes of the constituents to the opposing negotiator.

2.4 Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics (EANTs) are used in up to 60% of cases.

There have been a variety of studies that have focused on the extent to which negotiators use ethically questionable tactics, this section will discuss the usage as well as a short introduction to countering deceptive behaviour.

Ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics go from exaggerating demands all the way to outright intentional misstating of facts (Fleck *et al.*, 2014; Rivers & Lytle, 2007). O'Connor and Carnevale (1997) found misrepresentations in 28% of negotiations while Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, and Pillutla (1999) have found that 34% of negotiators made false statements and were deceptive. A later study by Aquino and Becker (2005) found that an even higher percentage use deceptive behaviour when offered an incentive to deceive, 43% concealed information while 55% actively lied.

A study on technology acquisition ventures by Graebner (2009) found that negotiators exhibited deceptive behaviour in 60% of the cases. R. Volkema, Fleck, and Hofmeister (2010) examined email negotiations in a simulation between two parties with a focus on four different tactics: exaggerating offers, misrepresenting information, pretending not to be in a hurry and making false promises. Findings showed that at least one of these tactics is used in 66% of the negotiations, with misrepresentation of information being the most common tactic. These examples indicate that there is a rather widespread use of questionable tactics in negotiations.

Adair and Brett (2005) found that individuals often go into negotiations with a win-lose attitude (distributive behaviour), they assume a zero-sum game in which there is one winner and one loser and therefore employ tactics such as exaggeration of demands and misrepresentation of information to gain an advantage over their counterpart. A study by Steinel and De Dreu (2004) found that individuals are more likely to engage in deceptive behaviour when engaging in distributive (competitive) negotiations rather than cooperative (integrative) negotiations.

Incentives to engage in unethical negotiation behaviours are often rooted in the attempt to obtain a better set of outcomes than they could obtain from accepting what the opposing side will voluntarily give to them (Lewicki & Stark, 1996). Lewicki and Stark (1996) describe the motivation to use ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics as a problem of desperation and opportunism. Opportunism is motivated by the desire to gain while desperation is

motivated by the fear of loss. Ann E Tenbrunsel (1998) showed that incentives influence a negotiator to use deceptive behaviour. Performance rewards for doing well in a negotiation increase the likelihood that a negotiator uses deceptive behaviour, it also increases the expectation that the opposing side will use deceptive behaviour. When individuals approach a negotiation with the primary objective to win they are more likely to lie and to lie more egregiously than when they have a more cooperative mindset (Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005). Schweitzer *et al.* (2005) mention that negotiators who use deceptive behaviour often achieve a better outcome in negotiations.

The study by Fulmer, Barry, and Long (2009) found that the use of deceptive negotiation behaviour classed as misrepresentation of information yielded higher negotiation outcomes. The making of false promises on the other hand had the opposite effect and usually led to a lower result in the negotiation.

Knowing the importance of the transfer of information in negotiations and the likelihood of negotiators engaging in a win-lose mindset, what can be done to avoid deceptive behaviour and aid a mutually profitable negotiation?

According to Kahneman and Tversky (1981), humans are often motivated more by potential losses than they are by potential gains. Negotiators might therefore be more reluctant in using deceptive negotiation tactics if they know that they could negatively affect the negotiation outcome (Patton, 2010).

Fleck *et al.* (2014) classify the risks that negotiators face along two dimensions, the first dimension includes the substantive outcome and the relational outcome. A negotiator may therefore be reluctant to use deceptions as it could adversely affect the substantive outcome or damage the relationship or both (Fleck *et al.*, 2014). The second dimension mentioned by Fleck *et al.* (2014) covers the time frame, short term temporal orientation and long term temporal orientation. Fleck *et al.* (2014) further mention that individuals usually view near term risks as more concrete as opposed to long term risks which seem more abstract and central.

From the two dimensions, a matrix can be generated to form four categories each with its unique approach to neutralising deceptive behaviour (R. J. Volkema & Rivers, 2012). The risks discussed in the matrix are:

1. Immediate goal achievement (concerns about the failure to reach an agreement)
2. Immediate relationship (loss of respect, support)

3. Future goal achievement (loss of future business, potential legal problems)
4. Future relationship (loss of business/social networks)

Fleck et al. (2014) describe the consequences of deception using the above matrix and devise neutralising behaviour for the deceptive tactics.

This paper will not be focusing on neutralising behaviour, as the interest lies in finding why negotiators use deceptive behaviour and the effect on the relationship. An intriguing point that arises from the research by Fleck et al. (2014) is the expectations of consequences as an influencing factor for the use of deception. The concept of trust ties in with the use of deceptive behaviour. Using certain types of deceptive behaviour may come down to the level of trust that exists between the negotiating parties.

The following section will dive into trust and its effects on negotiations.

2.5 Trust is fundamental for successful negotiations.

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) defined trust as the willingness of a person to be vulnerable to the actions of another based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action that is important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party.

Understanding the importance of trust in negotiations is useful as some strategies leave negotiators more vulnerable to exploitation than others (Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011).

It has been identified that there are different types of trust. The most fundamental type of trust is referred to as *deterrence-based trust*, which is the most relevant to negotiations since it is the trust that backs the idea that the action of the negotiator matches their words. Therefore, following through with their agreements or being faced with negative backlash, is referred to the *deterrence* (Shapiro, 1994).

Another form of trust is known as *calculus-based trust*, this refers to a calculated trust that both parties aim to achieve positive outcomes, and this mutual mentality establishes a baseline trust (Shapiro, 1994). Over time, this trust which is more volatile strengthens and develops further with increased business, this form of trust that arises is known as *knowledge-based trust*. This resides in the ability to not only trust the outcomes of the negotiation but also goes further allowing a negotiator to predict the wants and demands of the other party. Lastly, the highest order of trust is *identification-based trust*, this occurs with

time and once a relationship between the negotiating parties is established and both negotiators have a deeper understanding of the other wants as well as their needs (Shapiro, 1994).

In negotiations, the vulnerability stems from the ability of the opposing side to take advantage of information that is shared (Butler, 1999). Trusting negotiators will be more willing to share information with their counterparts as they believe that their trust will not be exploited, and rather be used in a mutually beneficial way (Butler, 1999).

Negotiators who share information are generally considered more trustworthy as opposed to those who keep information to themselves. The sharing of information inspires reciprocal information sharing while the withholding of information will inspire reciprocal withholding (Butler Jr, 1995).

One such instance where mutual trust is necessary is the situation when a negotiator is asking questions and giving answers. The asking of questions invites vulnerability by revealing gaps in a negotiator's knowledge, while at the same time making it more likely that the questioner will need to answer questions (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Answering questions also creates vulnerability as they tend to reveal sensitive information about a negotiator's private preferences.

High trust between negotiators, grounded in the belief that shared information will be used to generate a mutually beneficial result will enable negotiators to surface their preferences through questions and answers (Gunia *et al.*, 2011). Low trust between negotiators based on the expectation that the opposing side exploits the vulnerability, makes asking and answering questions an unwise choice. If asking questions reveals incomplete information and the counterpart is expected to answer in a deceitful way, then what is the point in asking the questions at all? The same holds true for answering questions, if answering questions reveals sensitive information that the opposing side exploits then what is the purpose of answering questions? By withholding information, low-trust negotiators can avoid the risk of vulnerability (Butler Jr, 1995).

In the study conducted by Gunia *et al.* (2011), negotiators who assumed less trust used the question and answer strategy less often resulting in reduced sharing of information and therefore fewer insights into their counterpart's priorities, this caused them to achieve lower results than the trusting negotiators.

The level of trust between the negotiating parties has an impact on the use of deceptive behaviour according to the literature. Low trust between negotiators may lead individuals to use deceptive behaviour to not reveal sensitive information or to throw the opposing side of their game. The level of trust between negotiators ties in with the relationship that is built/ that exists between the parties, which may in turn influence the use of deceptive behaviour in future negotiations. The following section will dive into the relationship between negotiators and the effect it causes on the result of the negotiation.

2.6 The negotiation relationship can have immediate and delayed effects on the result of a negotiation

The choice of language and tone may have a significant impact on the outcome of a negotiation as well as the relationship, this section will look at the relationship aspect in negotiations. A firm or negotiator inappropriately presenting him/herself may lead to a perception of the counterpart that a long term relationship is not possible (Dion & Banting, 1988). The conclusion from a further study conducted by Rinehart and Closs (1991) shows that firms seeking long-term relationships can already determine the success of the relationship during the negotiations rather than at a later stage in the process. Understanding this can be significant for purchasing professionals or anyone involved in negotiations that have a long-term orientation allowing for a better understanding of the connection and therefore leading to more focused preparation for the negotiation (Sharland, 2001). Even before the first interaction or in subsequent interactions the relationship can be influenced by a negotiators reputation.

A negotiators reputation can either be favourable or unfavourable (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). Obtaining a negative reputation can occur through the use of ethically questionable tactics such as being untruthful and the effects may be long-lasting even if the short-term gain seems to be present (Fulmer *et al.*, 2009). Roger J. Volkema and Fleury (2002) mention in their paper that individuals are more likely to approve of and use ethically questionable tactics such as deception when negotiating with an opponent with an ethically questionable reputation.

Reputation itself can be a valuable determinant of what tactics are used during a negotiation impacting the use of deception. Negotiations frequently take place with unfamiliar counterparts; therefore, most negotiators go into negotiations with second-hand knowledge

about their opponent, therefore the reputation can be pivotal in not only strategies but also how the course of the negotiation takes place. A study containing over 206 participants noted that most negotiators hope to gain a reputation that is foremost honest and proficient followed by friendly which attenuates deceptive methods during a negotiation. Indeed, different studies have shown that beliefs *create reality* therefore, an honest reputation typically results in reduced deceptive tactics, a more valuable negotiation, a better relationship and better outcomes for both parties (SimanTov-Nachlieli *et al.*, 2020).

In negotiations in which the participants are unlikely to have a continuing relationship, the primary focus is on the individual for joint gain or profit. This changes when a negotiator can expect a repetitive negotiation context, here another outcome variable is important, reputation (Raiffa, 1982). A negotiator's reputation may bias others in a favourable or unfavourable way in future negotiations. A negotiator with a poor reputation that they have gotten from the use of ethically questionable tactics such as deceit could experience long-term negative results even if the immediate negotiation result is favourable (Fulmer *et al.*, 2009). A negotiator's reputation may also have an impact on the mood of the counterpart, knowing that the opposing side has a reputation for deceit will not result in a good mood during a negotiation.

There has been some research on the role of mood in negotiations, it was found that negotiators who are in a positive mood, who feel they are in a trustworthy negotiation are likely to be better at creative problem solving and are also more likely to increase their concessions (Gino & Shea, 2012). In contrast, negotiators that are in a negative mood are more associated with using competitive behaviour, they are more likely to make lower initial offers as well as joint gains. Negotiators in negative moods will increasingly use self-interested and competitive tactics (Gino & Shea, 2012).

2.7 Synthesis of reviewed literature

The covered literature includes the concepts of behaviour, culture, and styles.

Behaviour is split into the use of distributive and integrative approaches, the choice is based on what a negotiator hopes to achieve. Is the aim maximum reward or is the goal to achieve a mutually beneficial solution?

Culture has an impact on the exhibited negotiation behaviour based on the negotiators beliefs and attitudes which are based in the negotiators close surroundings such as family or even with the larger geographical area.

The five styles of negotiation behaviour identified in literature include competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating, these five styles can be roughly placed in the above-mentioned distributive and integrative approaches. The choice of style is dependent on the behaviour that is exhibited.


Moving along from the general negotiation behaviours the deceptive negotiation behaviours were looked at in more detail. Concepts such as hiding ones bottom line, false promise making and misrepresentation are just an extract of the deceptive negotiation behaviours that literature has identified. The use of these behaviours is once again may depend on the overall behaviour of distributive vs integrative as well as the cultural background of the negotiator. Studies on the use of deceptive negotiation behaviour found that negotiators use deceptive behaviour in up to 60% of the cases.

A further factor that was investigated in the review was the impact of trust. Literature broadly clusters trust into different types, deterrence-based trust, calculus-based trust knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust. High trust between negotiators fosters knowledge and information sharing while a lack in trust hinders such sharing and may lead to the use of deceptive behaviour.

The final topic that was reviewed was the importance a relationship can have on the effects of a negotiation result. Using deceptive negotiation behaviour has an unwanted effect of giving a negotiator a bad reputation which will effect the type of negotiation behaviour a counterpart may exhibit. Additionally the length of the relationship may have an impact on the use of deceptive negotiation behaviour, long term relationships will see a lower use whereas one-off negotiations the primary goal is the achieve the best possible result even if it involves being deceptive.

Using these theoretical insights and the information gathered through interviews with negotiators this thesis hopes to answer the research questions found in section one.

Figure 1. Overview of Covered Literature



3. Methods

To demonstrate and further evaluate the use of deception and how such deceptive tactics are received by negotiators interviews were conducted with a cohort of 13 variably experienced negotiators from varying backgrounds.

A qualitative approach to this research was chosen for the fact that it helps in understanding the nature, strengths, and interactions of variables. Similar to quantitative research it addresses causation and involves observation and interpretation of events. Unlike the quantitative approach, however, the qualitative approach answers the “what” rather than the “how often”, thus taking the holistic perspective which preserves the complexities of human behaviour (Black, 1994). Therefore, using this approach a series of questions were developed using a scale from 1 to 5 for each interviewee and then these scores were combined to gauge an overall opinion on each question asked. Furthermore, some questions were asked in the form of an open-ended question and specific keywords and phrases were looked for to compare with other participants to gain an impression of personal opinions.

The sample of interviewed negotiators was made up of 9 graduate students and 4 MBA students (n=13). The graduate students were part of an honours program at the University of Twente and have all received at least 400 hours of negotiation training. The students from

the negotiation project of the university had similar training. The participants included individuals from India, South Africa, Denmark, The Netherlands, The United States of America, and Denmark. Educational backgrounds vary from master’s in business administration with a specialisation in International Management, to MBA candidates, data science master students and geoinformation master students. The variety continues in the work experience, some of the interviewees have multiple years of work experience in banking, procurement, and manufacturing.

The reasoning behind the choice of interview partners was their experience in negotiations as well as their education in negotiations. Further, the sample was taken as there was a large variety of different cultural backgrounds and different countries of origin.

The following list depicts the Interviewees as well as their education and country of origin, the interview numbers will be used in the following parts to differentiate the answers.

Table 2. Interviewee nationality and education

	Interviewee Number												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Nationality	NLD	IND	IND	NLD	DEU	IND	IND	NLD	NLD	DNK	IND	ZAF	USA
Education	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MSc	MBA	MBA	MBA	MBA

NLD = Netherlands, IND = India, DEU = Germany, DNK = Denmark, ZAF = South Africa, USA = United States of America

The amount of negotiation experience and the training also differed between the interviewees, the training was generally done at the university in the honours program or the MBA program. The negotiation experience differed in time from 6 months to 6 years. The cohort was chosen with as much as possible diversity, not only in terms of experience and nationality but also in gender, cultural upbringing and age.

The interviews comprised 6 parts (see supplement Table 1), of which questions in part 5 were based on the questionnaire developed by Saorín-Iborra and Cubillo (2019). Section one started with a general and organisational part, followed by background questions. Following the introduction, general questions about negotiations were asked, this includes defining a successful negotiation and walking through the preparation phase. In the next phase, questions specific to behaviour were asked, this phase also included questions about deceptive behaviour and its use. The fifth phase included questions about the motivation for using deceptive behaviour and its impact on the relationship. The final part included

questions about the interviewees' thoughts on deception and lying in general and their preference towards the relationship or the result of a negotiation.

The interviews were conducted using a video conferencing tool and lasted between 45 min to 1 hour, the language of the interviews was English. Once the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed and analysed.

It is important to note that these interviews did not only focus on negotiations in a professional or competitive setting, but interviewees also applied viewpoints from day-to-day personal negotiations one might have with family and friends.

The interview data has been analysed using the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) which was first introduced by Charles Ragin in 1987. QCA as a method was founded based on the binary logic of Boolean algebra. The cases are represented as a combination of a cause and an effect (Cotte Poveda & Pardo Martínez, 2013). This method is of interest for this particular study as it involves small 'n' research and is focused on explaining rather than identifying cause and effect (Verweij & Trell, 2019).

As described above, the interviews were held using a video conferencing tool, the interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee and transcribed. Using the transcripts, the answers were then clustered and compared in order to derive similarities and differences in the negotiation behaviour exhibited by the interviewees.

Reliability of the results was ensured through an established recording procedure; all the interviews were recorded (with permission) and transcribed afterwards. In addition to the recording and transcribing of the interviews, the findings were cross-checked to confirm that the observations and interpretations are accurate. For this, raw unprocessed data from the interviews was provided to an independent unbiased person and interpretation of the results was discussed. Similarly, to the reliability, the validity of the results was ensured by using an additional third party to analyse the results to ensure that the potential personal bias is overcome as much as possible.

4. Results

The results from the interviews conducted are shown below in chronological order of which the interviews were conducted. Some answers have been shortened for clarity and brevity.

4.1 General negotiation: definitions, expected behaviour, process and outcome

The following few paragraphs will touch upon some definitions and the understanding of the interviewees on some general negotiation topics.

Definitions for negotiations followed a similar trend, where 2 or more parties come together to reach an agreement. The consensus in the interviews was that negotiations are about generating value for both involved sides, as well as leaving both sides feeling they got a satisfactory agreement. A few interviewees also mentioned the building of relationships as a core component of negotiations. Interviewee 11 stated a transition in the definition over time, describing negotiations as *“It was different when I started, then it was just to get the maximum of what I wanted. Now it’s more about creating a larger pie and ensuring all sides involved get a satisfactory agreement. So, creating long term value for all sides and building a relationship”*.

The most common answer received was that of generating win-win situations, put concisely by interviewee 8: *“It is a conversation between multiple parties where you try to reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties. In the end you try to get the best agreement for yourself”*.

The interviewees also have similar ideas when it comes to describing a good negotiator. Creating an environment where both sides are happy, empathy and openness are common ideas in all interviews. Interviewee 2 described a good negotiator as *“Someone who understands the needs of the deal. Someone who does their preparation in knowing the counterpart. Someone who shows empathy and actively listens”*. Another interviewee (8) described a good negotiator as someone who is *“building up a good relationship. Creating the feeling that you have a good deal and making sure you walk away happy with the deal”*. Good relationship-building skills, understanding the needs of oneself and the opposing side are considered essential for a good negotiator. A few interviewees also mentioned the ability to be claiming while making the opponent feel heard and involved in the process, as a skill that is important to have as a negotiator.

The question on the behaviour of a good negotiator was answered with a multitude of different answers. Recurring themes were: empathy, being curious and asking questions, being open-minded to solutions, remaining calm and collected, and helping each other rather than looking at the opposing side as the “enemy”. Interviewee 7 described good behaviour in negotiators as *“they should be calm, not letting emotions take the front seat. Controlling your emotions is important”*. Moreover, interviewee 1 described good negotiation behaviour as *“someone who separates the problem from the people, keeps their values in check and can keep their emotions to themselves”*. Interviewee 2 described good behaviour as *“someone with a good positive attitude, an open mindset and someone who is nonaggressive and a good listener. They should be a good team player”*.

One important concept that was also mentioned by one of the interviewees (no. 5) was that of separating the opposing side from the problem at hand. Other negotiators mentioned the fact that it is important to control ones emotions, and that remaining amicable is an important behaviour to have to be successful as a negotiator.

Essentials for a successful negotiation had the consensual answer that preparation was one of the most important elements. As well as the preparation, the creation of trust and building a relationship was important to generating a successful negotiation. Interviewee 6 described the essentials as *“A good preparation is key, understanding what you want. The creation of what-if scenarios to cover all situations, then creating questions to ask during the negotiation. Being able to formulate multiple packages to offer during a negotiation is also important, and finally, creating empathy and trust”*. Interviewee 8 described the essentials as *“having a good structure for the negotiation, having a good opening, middle and end. Not jumping all over the place results in a better negotiation.”* And *“getting to know the opposing party before actually entering the negotiation phase is beneficial for the relationship and therefore for the result”*. Thus also indicating the need for structure. A further interviewee (7) split the essentials into two parts, the first part *“the preparation phase in understanding the issue and the situation of the other party”* and the second part *“is building a good relationship, not going for war”*.

As seen from the answers provided by the interviewees, the importance was laid on the preparation before the negotiation. The need for a clear structure, understanding one’s position as well as that of the opposing side and creating tailored offers keeping the needs and wants of both parties in mind is considered essential.

The ideal outcome of a negotiation had consistent answers from all the respondents of the interview. Having a good result in terms of satisfaction should be balanced with a good relationship in a successful negotiation. A good result was described by interviewee 1 as *“where both parties feel they have won, they are both happy. You also want to have a relationship because you may have to deal with them again”*. Interviewee 11 described a good result in a negotiation as *“getting what you want while also making sure the relationship is not burnt”*, *“having a good balance between financial and non-financial goals”*.

A different response to the question by an individual in interview 8 about the ideal result was *“It is dangerous to say there is always an ideal outcome. It’s not good to have a fixed mindset that this one thing is a good outcome, I think it’s important to be flexible and always find a way to create new negotiation outcomes”*. Most of the interviewees mentioned that the ideal outcome involves the mutually beneficial creation of value while keeping the relationship in a good condition.

Table 3. General Negotiation Questions

Topic	Interviewee Response
Definition of a Negotiation	<p><i>“It is a conversation between multiple parties where you try to reach an agreement that is beneficial to both parties. In the end you try to get the best agreement for yourself”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“It’s more about creating a larger pie and ensuring all sides involved get to a satisfactory agreement”</i></p>
Description of a good negotiator	<p><i>“Someone who understands the needs of the deal. Someone who does their preparation in knowing the counterpart. Someone who shows empathy and actively listens”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“Building up a good relationship. Creating the feeling that you have a good deal and making sure you walk away happy with the deal”</i></p>

Behaviour of a good negotiator	<p><i>“They should be calm, not letting emotions take the front seat. Controlling your emotions is important”</i></p> <p><i>“Someone with a good positive attitude, an open mindset and someone who is nonaggressive and a good listener. They should be a good team player”</i></p>
Essentials for a successful negotiation	<p><i>“A good preparation is key, understanding what you want. The creation of what-if scenarios to cover all situations, then creating questions to ask during the negotiation. Being able to formulate multiple packages to offer during a negotiation is also important, and finally, creating empathy and trust”</i></p> <p><i>“Having a good structure for the negotiation, having a good opening, middle and end. Not jumping all over the place results in a better negotiation”</i></p>
The ideal outcome of a negotiation	<p><i>“Where both parties feel they have won, they are both happy. You also want to have a relationship because you may have to deal with them again”</i></p> <p><i>“It is dangerous to say there is always an ideal outcome. It’s not good to have a fixed mindset that this one thing is a good outcome, I think it’s important to be flexible and always find a way to create new negotiation outcomes”</i></p>

4.2 Negotiation preparation: preparation time and steps taken to prepare

The following results are focused on the process of preparing a negotiation and the work that goes into setting up for a successful negotiation.

The most common answer to the question about the length of the preparation was “it depends”. One clear distinction that was made amongst many interviewees is the preparation time for simulation/competition- and professional negotiations. Negotiation preparations can take anywhere from a few minutes to many weeks depending on the case that is negotiated.

Negotiator 10 replied to the question by distinguishing between preparation time for a competition and for professional negotiations, saying *“I think preparation [for]... competition... we will usually prepare, I would say almost twice or thrice of the actual negotiation time. For professional negotiations gathering the data about the suppliers can take weeks or months because of the volume of the data required”*. A different interviewee (8) replied by saying *“I think it depends if you are doing a negotiation simulation or real-life negotiation. Most likely the preparation time for a simulation is less than the negotiation because the information you have is quite limited. In a professional negotiation, it takes a lot of time. For example, contacting all the stakeholders in my project and all the preparation can take easily a day when the negotiation is only an hour”*. A yet different negotiator (1) broke the preparation time down into the number of factors that are negotiated, he said *“It differs how much you prepare. It’s about what you want. 5 mins for easy negotiations. Lots of preparation for important negotiations. Identifying trade-offs may take more time. The number of factors influence the time. 5 minutes per factor or up to 30 minutes per factor”*. As seen from the replies of the interview, the preparation time varies from one negotiation to the next. The influencing factors for the preparation time are the complexity of the issue that needs to be solved, the setting of the negotiation, is it a professional negotiation or is it a part of a competition and who the opposing side is. Preparation usually takes more time than the actual negotiation. The different approaches are shown below.

Individual negotiators have different approaches to the preparation of a negotiation, some negotiators have a set plan that they follow in the preparation phase while others adapt the preparation steps to the negotiation situation. One negotiator (12) who has a planned preparation process described it in the following way *“So I try to make a list of priorities for myself. Then I also find out what it is that the other party might want. And once you have all your priorities and the assumptions of the other party, then I think you can start building the strategy itself”*

Once the negotiator has the information that is necessary to build the strategy, the process of formulating opening statements, the creation of offers and the devising questions starts. The process here is very structured and applied for all negotiation preparations. It starts with the understanding of the case, followed by prioritising one’s interest and the potential interests of the opposing side. Once this is done, the strategy is formulated and, in the end, questions are framed, and an opening is written.

A different negotiator (11), who does not follow a step-by-step plan in negotiation preparations said the following *“No, not a step-by-step plan, I think it depends on what it is, but definitely starts with, of course, figuring out what I would like and figuring out what’s important for the opponent and then trying to see ways that it can be successful”*.

All the interviewed negotiators did however have the common approach to understanding their own needs and wants as well as understanding or assuming the priorities of the opposing side. Some negotiators even go to the extent that they build scenarios in their preparation phase, one such negotiator (12) said the following *“What goes into the preparation is kind of building the tools as well as a part which I don't really enjoy, the rebuttal. So we kind of do these multi scenario planning to say, you know if they say A and then we will say B, and then if they say, C, we would say D”*.

The process of preparation greatly differed when it comes to personal negotiations with family and friends. Negotiations with friends or family tend to be more “on the spot” and therefore don’t allow for proper preparation. One negotiator (8) explained it in the following way *“I think negotiations with friends and family are a bit more ad hoc, so they just happen. And in that case, you don ’t have much time to prepare”*. A different negotiator (7) put it into the following words *“Here the preparation is more of not trying to hurt the other person, trying not to break the relationship itself”*.

The interviewed negotiators here had the consensus that the preparation is very different, usually, there is no time to prepare and that even if one prepares it’s more on the emotional side as opposed to the logical side.

Table 3. Negotiation Preparation Questions

Topic	Interviewee Response
Preparation Time	<p><i>“I think preparation [for]... competition... we will usually prepare, I would say almost twice or thrice of the actual negotiation time. For professional negotiations gathering the data about the suppliers can take weeks or months because of the volume of the data required”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“It differs how much you prepare. It’s about what you want. 5 mins for easy negotiations. Lots of preparation for important negotiations. Identifying trade-offs may take more time. The number of factors influence the time. 5 minutes per factor or up to 30 minutes per factor”</i></p>
Preparation Steps	<p><i>“So I try to make a list of priorities for myself. Then I also find out what it is that the other party might want. And once you have all your priorities and the assumptions of the other party, then I think you can start building the strategy itself”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“I think it depends on what it is, but definitely starts with, of course, figuring out what I would like and figuring out what’s important for the opponent and then trying to see ways that it can be successful”</i></p>
Difference in preparation between professional and personal negotiations	<p><i>“I think negotiations with friends and family are a bit more ad hoc, so they just happen. And in that case, you don’t have much time to prepare”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“Here [personal negotiations] the preparation is more of not trying to hurt the other person, trying not to break the relationship itself”</i></p>

4.3 Familiarity in negotiations and the question of trust

The following section will look at the interview answers in relation to trust and familiarity in negotiations.

Trusting the opposing side was something that the interviewed negotiators saw differently. Some negotiators inherently trusted their counterparts whereas some negotiators went into negotiations with scepticism about the opposing sides trustworthiness. A trusting negotiator (8) answered the questions of whether he trusts his counterpart with the following answer *“Yeah, I would always tend to be trusting because I think [...] if you're always distrusting people, it makes your life really hard. I think just in general, it's better to trust people and sometimes they betray your trust and then you feel [despondent] for a day. But like if you're distrusting every single person that you're entering a negotiation with or in conversation with, then your life is going to be so difficult”*.

On the other hand, a negotiator (7) that is sceptical about trust said the following *“I think trust is something that comes with a bit of a cultural background as well. I personally am reluctant to openly or blindly trust my counterpart, unless that trust is shown a little bit from the other side as well, because I think it's just the way I have seen life. At least half the time I went into the negotiation not trusting the other person just because I don't know whether whatever they say is a bluff or is it the truth”*.

Negotiators from the interview were generally on one side or the other, either they inherently trusted their counterpart with the risk of being betrayed or they were on the sceptical side where they would not trust their counterpart. From the interviews, more individuals stated that they would inherently trust their counterparts than distrust them. Overall, out of all participants 6 out of 13 inherently trust their counterpart.

The importance of trust nonetheless seemed to be very important to all negotiators, from the interviews all the negotiators mentioned that they see the importance of trust in negotiations. One negotiator (12) said this to the question of the importance of trust *“So for me, trust is key [...] I think it's definitely one of the cornerstones of negotiation. Because with trust, you are able to be more open. And with openness, you are then able to collaborate and with collaboration, you're able to work together on what you both think is a good deal and a deal that kind of serves everyone's best interest and doesn't leave anyone worse off”*.

A negotiator (7) who mentioned his hesitation to inherently trusting the opposing side said the following to the importance of trust *“Trust is important mainly because it builds a relationship, and once the relationship is quite comfortable, it is easier to gain concessions or concede also. So, it goes both ways. But then to build that relationship, you need to have trust. And the elements of trust for me is, [...] that the other person is willing to understand your position and just not playing around his or her anchor”*. Trust is seen as crucial in negotiating successfully, it allows for greater collaboration, easier information sharing and finally for a better deal that both sides are happy to agree to.

Similarly, to the importance of trust, the interviewed negotiators had a similar opinion on sharing information with those that they trust as opposed to those that they don't trust. Negotiators who trust their opposing side can share information much more freely without having to fear that the opposing side would exploit that information. A negotiator (7) that is sceptical about inherently trusting the opposing side said that it's a natural process to share information differently. He said *“I believe that if you know the person and if you trust the person, you are more comfortable sharing the information and you're much more open about your situation during the negotiation and why you need the concession. So, it's [...] easier to influence the other person, whereas when it comes to someone whom you don't trust, I would contemplate at least twice whether the information I'm giving out can or cannot be used against me.”*

A negotiator (12) that inherently trusts the opposing side said *“Oh, yes. Yeah. It's much easier to share information with people that you know because you probably also know that they will share the information back. Yes, there's a big difference, and if I am with people that I don't know, I'm trying to figure out slowly how much information I can share because I do want to share information because that's always the way to get information back.”*

Table 3. Negotiation Preparation Questions

Topic	Interviewee Response
Trust between negotiators	<p data-bbox="903 398 1458 882"><i>“Yeah, I would always tend to be trusting because I think [...] if you're always distrusting people, it makes your life really hard. I think just in general, it's better to trust people and sometimes they betray your trust and then you feel [despondent] for a day. But like if you're distrusting every single person that you're entering a negotiation with or in conversation with, then your life is going to be so difficult”</i></p> <p data-bbox="903 904 1458 1137"><i>“I think trust is something that comes with a bit of a cultural background as well. I personally am reluctant to openly or blindly trust my counterpart, unless that trust is shown a little bit from the other side as well [...]”</i></p>
Importance of Trust	<p data-bbox="903 1160 1458 1599"><i>“So for me, trust is key [...] I think it's definitely one of the cornerstones of negotiation. Because with trust, you are able to be more open. And with openness, you are then able to collaborate and with collaboration, you're able to work together on what you both think is a good deal and a deal that kind of serves everyone's best interest and doesn't leave anyone worse off”</i></p> <p data-bbox="903 1621 1458 1800"><i>“Trust is important mainly because it builds a relationship, and once the relationship is quite comfortable, it is easier to gain concessions or concede also. So, it goes both ways. [...]”</i></p>
Sharing of information	<p data-bbox="903 1823 1458 2056"><i>“I believe that if you know the person and if you trust the person, you are more comfortable sharing the information and you're much more open about your situation during the negotiation and why you need the concession.”</i></p>

4.4 Negotiation behaviour: the use of deceptive negotiation behaviours

The interviewed negotiators were asked to rate the likelihood of using a certain behaviour on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being very unlikely and 5 being very likely, with the following outcome:

Table 4. Negotiation behaviour and the likelihood of usage

Item	Rating		
	Lowest	Average	Highest
Intentionally misrepresented factual information to your opponent when you know they have done the same	1	2.2	4
Intentionally misrepresented factual information to your opponent to support your argument/position	1	1.5	3
Make an opening demand that is far greater than what one actually hopes to settle for	3	4.4	5
Hide your absolute bottom line from your opponent	2	3.9	5
Convey a false impression that you are in no hurry to come to an agreement	2	3.5	5
Make an opening offer so high/low that it seriously undermines the opponents' confidence in their own ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement	1	2.2	4
Promise that good things will happen to your opponent if they give you what you want, even if you know you can't (won't) deliver those good things	1	1.3	2
Threaten or harm your opponent if they don't give you what you want, even if you know you won't follow through	1	1.2	2

Items such as making an opening offer that is far higher than what one hopes to achieve are used a lot more than conveying factually wrong information to make one's argument.

Threatening or harming the opposing side or making false promises is almost never used during negotiations.

4.5 The motivation and the expected gain from using deceptive behaviour

Misrepresenting information is a tactic that is not used very much in comparison to the other behaviours. The motivation behind using it was described by the few negotiators that would use it in the following way *“I think it's more of the tactic of using tit for tat, because unless the other person feels the pain of their actions, they would continue doing the same thing”* (Negotiator 7). Another negotiator (12) described their motivation by saying *“So I would say if I know that they have been dishonest in this, then I would maybe consider using underhand tactics as well, because I feel that that is what they are doing.”* The motivation is generally just to retaliate against the opposing side by using the same tactic. Misrepresenting information to support one's own argument is generally done by not telling the entire truth, rather than lying. One negotiator (11) said *“the motivation is definitely to try to bring them off their game, to set a high price or a low price, whatever way it's going, and simply trying to make them second guess if they're in the correct range. I wouldn't try to deceive factual information, I would maybe try to spin it in one direction but I would not lie about facts”*.

Making demands that are higher than what one hopes to achieve are used quite commonly in negotiations by the interviewees. The motivation was basically to use this behaviour to anchor in a negotiation. One negotiator (6) said the following as a motivation *“Because the basic assumption is that we always try to negotiate towards the price that you actually intend to sell for. So you start with the higher value so that you can always come down.”* A different interviewee (12) motivated their answer by saying *“So this one is anchoring, right? So I think in every negotiation, you have to anchor high or low in the interest of trying to get to what you hope to achieve. And for me, I think when negotiating with people that know how to negotiate, I go in with the knowledge that they do know that we are going to anchor and then negotiate based on the anchors or move away from the anchor. So it would just be an anchoring strategy, which I think is a negotiation, negotiating skill or strategy”*. This negotiation behaviour was described by most of the interviewees as “anchoring” and something they do in almost all of their negotiations.

Similarly to the previous behaviour, not revealing your bottom line to the opponent is a widely used behaviour by the respondents. The motivation behind using this behaviour is to not give the opponent information that they can use to strong arm the opposing side. One negotiator (7) put it into the following words *“I think if we expose our bottom line or the absolute final bottom line, I feel the other person might try to strong arm us using that and they might gain leverage and they might ask for extra benefits or extra concessions. So yes, I would probably give them a hint, but I would really not expose it completely, saying this is the bottom line and I really cannot go below this, or I really cannot go above that”*. A different negotiator (8) said *“Yeah, so the reason is that if you're giving your bottom line away, then your opponent will logically say that they want to close the deal for the bottom line. So I always find it very risky, but I also stated that before because sometimes the ZOPA is so small that in the end you do have to share your bottom line. But ideally, you don't want to do that, because if you're doing that, then of course, the other party will definitely trying to push the bottom line”*.

Not all negotiators hide their bottom line at all cost, some interviewees (12) also mentioned that *“So I think, hiding, my bottom line, sometimes I would not do this, this would depend on the level of trust and the kind of the feel of the room. So if it's a good negotiating and I feel like I trust the opponents, I would really tell them, OK, guys, this is my bottom line on this. We would then rather walk away with no agreement. So, I think we do actually see our bottom line with each other, with our opponents, depending on the relationship and the quality of the relationship”*. The negotiators in the interviews generally said they hide their bottom line but there are situations in which they would be willing to share their bottom line in the interest of reaching an agreement.

Giving the false impression that the negotiator is in no hurry to reach an agreement was similar to the previous point about the bottom line. It is important to note that the difference between deception and false impression is that false impression relies on the interpretation and perception on the person receiving the false impression, whereas deception is intentional from the deceiver and independent of the counterpart's interpretation. Negotiators would use this to not be backed into a corner during the negotiation. One interviewee (12) responded by saying *“So I think time is a big factor in negotiations, so people would expect you to compromise more in the interest of closing a deal if they know that you're pressed for time”*. A different negotiator (8) mentioned that he found it difficult to answer this question and

said *“Yeah. So I found it a bit of a difficult one because I don't like that much to give, like false representations of yourself, but with this, you're misrepresenting that you're not in a hurry, so it basically means that you're kind of in a hurry. So I would still be careful with using it. It helps you too. [It helps in] calming down the situation and saying that you're not in a hurry is sometimes really useful because it helps them to say, shit, we really have to reconsider our position. But it's also a bit related to the power of silence, which I would rather prefer, than literally saying we're not in a hurry”*.

Making extreme offers that undermine the confidence of the opposing side to reach an agreement was seen by the negotiators as a difficult balance between anchoring just right and over doing the anchor with significant consequences. A response of one interviewee (7) was *“Yeah. I mean, I think it's good to throw the ball far, but just not throw the ball too far that the dog just cant catch it. So it's more of, OK, you need to know your limitations, you need to know your boundaries. But at the same time, you need to also know who you're dealing with and what are their limitations and boundaries”*. Another negotiator (12) said *“So basically, if you anchored too high, then it kind of leaves very little room for negotiation. If you end extremely, some people can say, OK, you know what, maybe there is no zone of possible agreement and that jeopardizes a negotiation. And if you anchor too high or too low and then you shift drastically from that and that it's going to leave the other side feeling like, OK, so you just took 20 percent off. What is your logic or your reasoning behind that?”*. This behaviour was generally seen as risky as it could leave the negotiation open to a no deal as it may seem impossible to reach an agreement. In addition to the risk of the no deal it can have consequences on the reputation of the negotiator as someone who can't be trusted.

Making false promises was one of those behaviours that are rarely used in negotiations. One negotiator (1) motivated their answer by saying *“A possible motivation might be to get them to make a deal where even a no deal was possible and just by lying getting a deal from the opponent”*. A different interviewee (12) said that they might use it to generate a false hope and to make it look like they were conceding something even though they were not. Their answer was *“So with this one, I think sometimes in negotiations, the strategy that I like to use, or I can I try to leverage is sometimes to say, OK, you know what, we can't give you this deal now, but in the future, we could negotiate and try and come up with something. So, with that, you're not promising them anything concrete, but you are kind of delaying or creating enough false hope by false hope in the future”*.

Making threats was another behaviour that does not see much use in negotiations. The motivation behind using it was just to apply coercive pressure to reach an agreement. A response in the interview (12) was *“So I don't like conflict like I mentioned before, so I would hardly threaten because then I think you can reach an agreement that you've strong-armed someone into. I mean, we can sign on a deal, but then you're going to leave them feeling disenfranchised or disadvantaged or feeling worse off. And with that, they are unlikely to want to negotiate with you again”*.

Both the use of false promises and threats are rarely used and are generally seen by the negotiators as harming the negotiation rather than improving it.

Table 5. Motivation of using deceptive behaviour

Topic	Interviewee Response
Misrepresenting information	<p><i>“I think it's more of the tactic of using tit for tat, because unless the other person feels the pain of their actions, they would continue doing the same thing”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“the motivation is definitely to try to bring them off their game, to set a high price or a low price, whatever way it's going, and simply trying to make them second guess if they're in the correct range. I wouldn't try to deceive factual information, I would maybe try to spin it in one direction but I would not lie about facts”</i></p>
Making demands that are higher than what one hopes to achieve	<p><i>“Because the basic assumption is that we always try to negotiate towards the price that you actually intend to sell for. So you start with the higher value so that you can always come down”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“So this one is anchoring, right? So I think in every negotiation, you have to anchor high or low in the interest of trying to get to what you hope to achieve.</i></p>

Not revealing the bottom line to the opponent	<p><i>“I think if we expose our bottom line or the absolute final bottom line, I feel the other person might try to strong arm us using that and they might gain leverage and they might ask for extra benefits or extra concessions ...”</i></p>
	<p><i>“So I think, hiding, my bottom line, sometimes I would not do this, this would depend on the level of trust and the kind of the feel of the room. So if it's a good negotiating and I feel like I trust the opponents, I would really tell them, OK, guys, this is my bottom line on this. We would then rather walk away with no agreement. So, I think we do actually see our bottom line with each other, with our opponents, depending on the relationship and the quality of the relationship”</i></p>
Giving the false impression that the negotiator is in no hurry to reach an agreement	<p><i>“So I think time is a big factor in negotiations, so people would expect you to compromise more in the interest of closing a deal if they know that you're pressed for time”</i></p>
	<p><i>“Yeah. So I found it a bit of a difficult one because I don't like that much to give, like false representations of yourself, but with this, you're misrepresenting that you're not in a hurry, so it basically means that you're kind of in a hurry. So I would still be careful with using it.”</i></p>
Making extreme offers that undermine the confidence of the opposing side	<p><i>“Yeah. I mean, I think it's good to throw the ball far, but just not throw the ball too far that the dog just can't catch it”</i></p>
	<p><i>“So basically, if you anchored too high, then it kind of leaves very little room for negotiation. If you end extremely, some people can say, OK, you know what, maybe there is no ZOPA”</i></p>

Making false promises

“A possible motivation might be to get them to make a deal where even a no deal was possible and just by lying getting a deal from the opponent”

“So with this one, I think sometimes in negotiations, the strategy that I like to use, or I can I try to leverage is sometimes to say, OK, you know what, we can't give you this deal now, but in the future, we could negotiate and try and come up with something. So, with that, you're not promising them anything concrete, but you are kind of delaying or creating enough false hope by false hope in the future”

Making threats

“So I don't like conflict like I mentioned before, so I would hardly threaten because then I think you can reach an agreement that you've strong-armed someone into. I mean, we can sign on a deal, but then you're going to leave them feeling disenfranchised or disadvantaged or feeling worse off. And with that, they are unlikely to want to negotiate with you again”

“Just coercive pressure. It's a good strategy to rob a bank”

4.6 Thoughts on deception and the importance of the result and relationship

The overwhelming majority (11 out of 13 participants) of the interviewed negotiators have had the experience of being deceived in a negotiation. The feelings that were experienced due to the deception ranged from feeling foolish to feeling anger and disappointment. One negotiator (8) put it into the following words *“in a negotiation? I didn't notice. We were all not very good negotiators at that moment. And we had a case and they were lying into our faces about basically their bottom lines. I believed that. And I was like, OK, if that's your bottom line, then we should close the deal. But then in the end of the negotiation, I heard that that was not their bottom line. So I was really pissed off. The emotions were really high at the moment. I was like, I'm never going to negotiate with them again”*.

Using deceptive behaviour also has an impact on the relationship, the interviewed negotiators mentioned that being deceived had serious negative consequences for the relationship. One negotiator (1) said *“We would never do business with them ever again if it was a real-life negotiation”*, while others looked at it in a more conditional way. One response (7) was *“I think there would indeed be a dent, but it also would depend on who the person is and why did they do it. If the reason is really trivial, then I think the relationship would be dented for a long time, but if it is something that's really desperate for them, it is of very high value for them, and if it's a close person to me, someone who I love so much or something, then I think I would probably just forgive them”*.

This breakdown in the relationship was then also mentioned during the question about a change in behaviour when negotiating with someone who has a reputation of being deceptive. The behaviour exhibited by the negotiator against someone who is known for being deceptive is to generally be more careful and to make the negotiation less about the relationship. One answer (7) to the question about a change in behaviour was *“I would be more careful and I would double check all the facts and I wouldn't trust the person that easily, I would say I would be really careful and vigilant with what they say and how they react”*, while another said *“I don't make it personal anymore, I don't try to build a bond, its more cold”*.

A generally trusting negotiator (8) has two approaches to dealing with individuals who have a reputation as being deceptive, for him the level of power he has in a negotiation, more

specifically he said *“I would still then try to be professional. There might be two situations, like one of the situations that I just stay professional and keep it in my mind that they could deceive me and just try to ask a lot of questions to work around it, because I think that's still the best way to work around it. On the other hand, if you know that you're in a power position a bit more, then I would definitely take some time in the beginning of the negotiation to say that they have been using deceptive behaviour in a previous negotiation. And you really want to make sure that that doesn't happen the next time. And then you don't have to be angry at the negotiation because then you're also ruining the relationship. But I think if you're just saying it in an objective way and say I want to move forward, but we just need to know that you're not going to do that again. I think if you're in a power position, that would be a good strategy as well”*.

From the interviews the general tone was that the negotiators become a lot more careful in trusting their counterpart and in the way they might share their information.

Table 6. Thoughts on deception and the importance of a relationship

Topic	Interviewee Response
Experience of being deceived	<p><i>“In a negotiation? I didn't notice. We were all not very good negotiators at that moment. And we had a case and they were lying into our faces about basically their bottom lines. I believed that. I was like, OK, if that's your bottom line, then we should close the deal. But then in the end of the negotiation, I heard that that was not their bottom line. So I was really pissed off. The emotions were really high at the moment. I was like, I'm never going to negotiate with them again”</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>“So I think that, like, sometimes you do get deceived and. It does not leave you feeling good, right, but I think for me, yeah, it doesn't leave you feeling good, but we yeah, we do get to see it a few times”</i></p>

Effects of deception on the relationship	<p><i>“I would be more careful and I would double check all the facts and I wouldn't trust the person that easily, I would say I would be really careful and vigilant with what they say and how they react”</i></p>
	<p><i>“I don't make it personal anymore, I don't try to build a bond, its more cold”</i></p>
Approach to negotiations with deceitful counterparts	<p><i>“I would still then try to be professional. There might be two situations, like one of the situations that I just stay professional and keep it in my mind that they could deceive me and just try to ask a lot of questions to work around it, because I think that's still the best way to work around it. On the other hand, if you know that you're in a power position a bit more, then I would definitely take some time in the beginning of the negotiation to say that they have been using deceptive behaviour in a previous negotiation. And you really want to make sure that that doesn't happen the next time”</i></p>

5. Discussion

5.1 Anchoring and hiding the bottom line are seen less as deceptive behaviour as opposed to misrepresenting factual information

As stated in the first section of the thesis the aim is twofold, firstly the aim is to get a deeper understanding of the reasoning behind the application of deceptive behaviour in negotiations. Secondly, this thesis explores the impact of deceptive behaviour on the emotional experience of negotiators and the effect deception has on the negotiator. The goal is to find motivations behind using deceptive behaviour and what it is that negotiators hope to gain from using these behaviours. Additionally, this paper aims to explore the effect that deceptive behaviour has on the relationship of the negotiators.

To answer the first research question, *What motivates negotiators to use deceptive behaviour?* The eight previously mentioned deceptive behaviours from the interviews are analysed.

Intentionally misrepresenting information to the opposing side is not something negotiators like to use most of the time. The average likelihood of negotiators misrepresenting factual information when they know the opposing side has done the same is a 2.2, meaning that negotiators are **unlikely** to use this behaviour. Negotiators that did mention they would use this motivated their answers by saying it was mainly a retaliatory tactic. The negotiators admitted to saying it's not a wise choice and are aware of it but do it because they feel it's only fair to use it if the opposing side does.

Intentionally misrepresenting information to make one's argument is used even less, the average use is a 1.5, meaning it is **very unlikely** to be used. The few negotiators that did mention they would use it mentioned they mainly use it to bring the opposing side off their game and to test the understanding of the opposing side. Here an important point is that none of the negotiators would lie about factual information, the behaviour is mainly about not stating the entire truth or trying to spin something into a positive light.

The use of intentionally misrepresenting information seems to be used less than would be expected from the literature. The Literature describes misrepresentation as the most widely used tactic when it comes to questionable negotiation tactics (R. Volkema et al., 2010). From the interviews conducted for this paper, however, the use of intentionally misrepresenting information when the opposing side has done the same is slightly higher than using it to make one's argument, but the behaviour is still unlikely to be used. A possible explanation for the reduced use of misrepresenting information could be due to the fact that the negotiators used integrative negotiations as their norm in answering the interview questions. Negotiators are less likely to misrepresent information in integrative negotiations as compared to distributive negotiations (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).

The use of deceptive behaviour such as the use of intentionally misrepresenting information may also lie in the cultural background of an individual. A negotiator from India found it difficult to inherently trust the opposing side, they would enter negotiations with a sceptical outlook on whether there is trust between the negotiating sides. Indeed, studies have shown

that negotiators from Western countries tend to be more trusting than their Asian counterparts, this is also reflected here when the willingness to trust is compared between negotiators from the Netherlands with those from India. This effect is observed to be related to societal norms and hierarchy, countries that have strict social norms and expectations as seen in Asia tend to be less trusting than countries with looser social norms (Gelfand, 2006). Butler (1999) mentions that trusting negotiators are more willing to share information with their counterparts as they believe they will not be exploited. The lack of trust in this situation may lead a negotiator to use deceptive behaviours such as misrepresenting information or not fully presenting the relevant information due to a lack of trust. A negotiator from the Netherlands who tends to trust the opposing side was a lot less likely to misrepresent factual information to their counterpart. The Indian negotiator mentioned they were likely to misrepresent factual information while the Dutch negotiator said they were highly unlikely to use this deceptive behaviour. While this may be a cultural factor, the interviews conducted for this paper would not support this idea. The other Indian negotiators mentioned they are highly unlikely to use misrepresentation of factual information during negotiations. Something that does however align with the literature is the fact that trust and the willingness to share information seem to have a connection (Olekalns & Adair, 2013).

One of the most commonly used behaviours used by negotiators is to make opening demands that are greater than what one hopes to settle for. From the interviewed negotiators this behaviour received an average score of 4, meaning that negotiators are **likely** to use it. This behaviour can also be identified as anchoring, a common negotiation tactic. Negotiators mainly motivated using this behaviour by stating that allows the negotiation to focus around their initially stated number leading to an agreement around their target. However, negotiators also understand that an experienced negotiator knows how anchors work, nonetheless, using an anchor is seen as a basic negotiation behaviour. The interviewed negotiators also understand that anchoring too high/low can have serious consequences, this is something that will be discussed later.

The use of exaggerating opening demands is a negotiation behaviour that is expected to be used rather frequently as is described in literature. Graebner (2009) found that negotiators exhibited deceptive behaviour in 60% of the cases, and R. Volkema et al. (2010) identified that making exaggerated demands is a popular deceptive negotiation behaviour. In the interviews for this paper, the use of making exaggerated demands in a negotiation is one of

the most frequently and likely behaviours to be used. A plausible explanation for the frequent use of this behaviour could be the use of anchoring during a negotiation, this technique requires negotiators to make offers that are exaggerated.

A further behaviour that is used significantly by the interviewed negotiators is to hide their absolute bottom line. This received an average score of 4, meaning it is **likely** that negotiators would use it. The main motivation behind hiding one's own absolute bottom line is to not give away critical information that can be used by the opposing side. Giving away the bottom line may result in the opposing side wanting to close the deal on or around the bottom line, this is something that needs to be avoided. The negotiators however also mentioned areas in which they reveal their bottom line. There are situations such as having such a small zone of possible agreements that the only way to reach a feasible agreement is to share where one's limits lie. Relationships between the negotiating parties also influence the sharing of one's bottom line, having a strong relationship and trusting the opposing side leads to greater ease of sharing such critical information as the risk of being exploited are lower.

This behaviour is similar to the misrepresentation of information, here factual information may not be misrepresented, rather the entire truth is withheld from the opposing side. A possible explanation for the frequent use of this behaviour is that the interviewed negotiators underwent some training in negotiations, where the importance of a resistance point was explained. Knowing the opposing sides resistance point gives an advantage in the negotiation and is therefore kept a secret in most situations.

The last behaviour that sees heavy use in the negotiations conducted by the interviewees is to convey the false impression that they are in no hurry to reach an agreement. This too received an average score of 4, meaning that negotiators are **likely** to use this behaviour. Motivation behind this behaviour is similar to the above-mentioned hiding of the bottom line, the main reason is to hide vulnerability. The negotiators are afraid that if they share their time concerns that the opposing side will take advantage of this situation and force an agreement. An additional motivation is to get the opposing party to look at the problem in more detail to find a solution rather than just forcing the first best option. Time is a big factor in any negotiation, therefore revealing time pressure would lead to the opposing side expecting one to compromise in the interest of time. There are some negotiators who rather than deceive about the available time pressure use the power of silence, this leads the

opposing side to believe that time is of no concern while at the same time not straining the potential relationship by using deceptive behaviour.

Literature once again describes this behaviour as widely used, R. Volkema et al. (2010) found that deceptive behaviour is exhibited in 60% of the cases, and making a false impression that the negotiators are not in a hurry is one of the more widely used behaviours. This is also reflected in this paper, the negotiators interviewed for this paper mentioned they are likely to use this behaviour in a negotiation.

A behaviour that sees mixed-use, where some negotiators use it while others would not even consider it, is making opening offers or anchors that are so far out of the zone of possible agreements that it undermines the opposing side's confidence to reach an agreement. The average usage score was a 2, meaning that negotiators are **unlikely** to use this type of behaviour. The interviewed negotiators main motivation for not using this behaviour was that it leaves no room for a serious negotiation. Quoting a number that is way out of the zone of possible agreement, gives the opposing side the view that there is no room to negotiate a deal. If the negotiator then shifts by too much in their second offer it makes the opposing side question the logic of the negotiator, potentially making the opposing side feel like the negotiator is not a trustworthy person. The decision of how high/low to anchor needs to be made very carefully in order not to stretch too far resulting in a difficult position to negotiate from. Knowing the limitations and the expected result are important to make that decision properly, not having or gathering the information to make a well-founded decision about the anchor can be detrimental to a negotiation.

This negotiation behaviour is unlikely to be used by negotiators as it brings an inherent risk with it. Using this behaviour could lead to a complete breakdown in the negotiation. A possible explanation for the use could be, an accidental use due to a lack of understanding of the terms, if a negotiator is in unfamiliar territory and does not possess the required knowledge it can be all too easy to make an unreasonable offer. Studies have shown that anchors can have both incredibly positive and detrimental outcomes on a negotiation, it has been shown that the first realistic anchor set in a negotiation typically receives a better negotiation outcome (Galinsky, 2002). However, when unrealistic anchors are set to the knowledge of the counterpart the seriousness and trustworthiness of the negotiation is

undermined resulting in less successful negotiations, which may even lead to an increased use in deceptive tactics.

Making false promises and threatening or harming one's opponent received the lowest scores in the interviews, on average the likelihood of use was 1, meaning that negotiators are **very unlikely** to use this behaviour. The motivation behind creating false promises was to make the opposing side feel like they are receiving something even though the negotiator is not delivering. These promises are usually made to get a deal now, by promising that deals in the future may happen. Negotiators who did say they would use this behaviour also mentioned that they would not promise anything concrete to not strain the relationship by too much. Using false promises is therefore mainly a behaviour used in order to complete a deal and give the illusion of a concession by promising further deals in the future. Promising concrete things and not delivering on them is something that the interviewed negotiators would not do.

The use of threats or harming the opponent is the least used behaviour, only two people rated it as being unlikely with the rest stating it is very unlikely, they would use it. Negotiators in the interviews mentioned that it is possible to strong-arm someone into signing a deal when the power difference is high. Strong arming however will leave the opposing side like they are not better off as a result of the deal, likely leading to the opposing side not being open to negotiating in the future. While this behaviour may get a deal in the short run, it will surely lead to a poor relationship and therefore no future agreements.

5.2 Deceptive behaviour has a negative impact on the relationship between negotiators

From all the interviewed negotiators the consensus is that deceptive behaviour has a negative impact on the relationship between negotiators. While there is a difference depending on whether the negotiator is dependent on the opposing side or not, the overwhelming majority stated that they would not like to do business with the opposing side again if they were deceptive. Another factor that influences the relationship is the severity of the deception, if a negotiator were to lie about a trivial point it would have a greater negative impact on the relationship. On the other hand, if the negotiator is using deceptive behaviour to gain something critical to them, for example, if the deal decided the fate of a company, then the

relationship might not be harmed as much. In both cases the relationship would be hurt, the severity is however different.

Further, the longevity of the negotiations has an impact on the relationship and the use of deceptive behaviour. If the negotiations were to go on for a long time, such as a business relationship between a supplier and buyer, the use of deceptive behaviour has a greater impact on the relationship as it impacts the trust (Galinsky, 2002). In a one-time negotiation with a person whom the negotiator has little to no chance of seeing again, the use of deceptive behaviour does not have such a lasting effect on the relationship.

Reputation is a major factor in negotiations, and this is heavily impacted by the use of deceptive behaviour and a poor relationship. The interviewed negotiators entered negotiations with greater caution and with less trust. Facts that the opposing side state would always be taken and checked by asking lots of questions to try to figure out if they are telling the truth. Deceptive behaviour in one negotiation may therefore have an impact on future negotiations. Previous studies have also shown that a more trusting and honest reputation results in reduced deceptive tactics and greater integrity, this is also reflected in the increased longevity of the relationship. Expectancy violation theory states that upon breaching the honest expectation of a negotiation counterpart, thereby losing an honest reputation has an immediate impact on the use of deceptive tactics, once the honest expectation is lost, negotiators become more likely to deceive (Burgoon & Le Poire, 1993 ;SimanTov-Nachlieli, Har-Vardi & Moran, 2020).

5.3 Practical and theoretical implications of the thesis

This study aimed to uncover the use of deception during negotiations shedding light on how such tactics are used. The findings of this investigation highlight a complex understanding of deception in negotiations, in terms of what can be considered as deceptive behaviour and what effect this has on the negotiation counterpart. Another key element presented in this work is the intention and motive behind using deception.

This research gives rise to a plethora of theoretical implications, for example by generating a deeper understanding of psychological tendencies and motivators amongst negotiators. Another valuable implication of this paper is the information that is gained on the behaviour

of negotiators, their distinction between personal and professional negotiations and how this is reflected in their behaviour and negotiation strategies. Lastly, this study also has implications outside of the field of negotiations but in brief addresses the complex understanding of truth and untruth. A concept that has been discussed for centuries and has divided the philosophical community. *“It is at bottom not deception [people] hate but the dire, inimical consequences of certain kinds of deception”* (Wermuth, 2019) Nietzsche recognised this, and this is yet again mimicked in the analysis of the use of deception in negotiations, as the importance of trust is highlighted some negotiations still take place in its absence.

This research not only presents theoretical implications but also provides some practical implications. One overarching takeaway from this paper is its valuable insights into negotiation strategies and how they could be applied. General awareness of the types of deception was also established which may be used as a sign of caution or warning for future negotiations highlighting not only how one may be deceived but also the consequences of such practices. From a professional perspective, the need for the establishment of terms and conditions for a negotiation has evolved from this research, setting clear boundaries and guidelines for negotiations would minimise the use of deception and also allow in the instance of deceptive behaviour for the deceived to take previously agreed upon the action as a consequence to such behaviour.

5.4 Limitations and future perspectives

To limit the scope of this thesis many interesting ideas and avenues worth exploring were identified yet not delved into. However, there are many aspects that could be used to build upon this work and even improve this thesis.

An interesting idea that was not looked at in this thesis is the role of culture on deceptive behaviour. From conversations, after the official interview, some negotiators mentioned that it may be interesting to look at culture as in some nations it is customary to use deceptive behaviour as it is seen as a part of the “game” of negotiations. Other cultures believe in being as direct as possible and see deceptive behaviour in a different light. Overall, the impression of this cultural observation has also been observed by others in the field (Olekals & Adair, 2013; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).

Recent studies have also highlighted the impact of gender on the use of deception during negotiations, the cohort of negotiators used for this thesis were mixed and gender was not considered due to the small number of participants. However, with a larger cohort, potential sex-based differences may be identified with regard to willingness and applications of deception in negotiations (Jazaieri & Kray, 2020).

Another key aspect that would be worth exploring aside from culture and gender would also be generational differences in negotiations. Has the general view of deception stayed the same over time? Are the same deceptive tactics used by different generations of negotiators? (Slessor et al., 2011)

In hindsight, the interviewees should have also been asked to define their view on deception and where the line is drawn between a successful negotiation strategy and what tactic may be seen as deception. Since the impression was given that these views varied greatly among the interviewed candidates.

Furthermore, this study could be improved by observing negotiations to see the use of deceptive behaviour first-hand. While there are probably many more improvements, the last one I would like to touch upon is the selection of interviewees, here some inexperienced negotiators could be included to see how the use of deceptive behaviour changes between experienced and inexperienced negotiators.

6. Conclusion

As described in the above thesis, deceptive behaviour sees differing amounts of use depending on the type of behaviour and the situation that the negotiator is presented with. Behaviour such as misrepresenting factual information sees little use when compared with anchoring, hiding the bottom line and conveying a false impression of not being in a hurry. The most used behaviour is making an opening offer that is far greater than what one hopes to achieve (anchoring). Behaviour that saw the lowest use was the making of false promises and the use of threats or harming the opposing side.

The motivation behind misrepresenting facts is usually retaliatory, while anchoring, not revealing the bottom line and misrepresenting time constraints are done to achieve the best possible result for a negotiation. Motivation for false promises and threats is more difficult

to point out as it is heavily situation-specific, in one-time negotiations it may be used to close a deal while in negotiations that have a longer period it would rarely see any use.

Deceptive behaviour is also seen to harm the relationship between negotiators. In this thesis, negotiators mentioned that they would not want to negotiate with someone who is deceptive, and if forced to by some circumstances they would drastically change their behaviour in the negotiation, away from open information sharing and trust, towards scepticism and general caution.

To conclude, this thesis has demonstrated the use and implications of deception in the context of both professional and personal negotiations. Defining not only deception and truth in a negotiation context, but also demonstrating what these deceptive strategies are and how they may be utilised. This paper with the help of interviews was able to gather data on the behaviour and perspectives a general population of experienced negotiators have towards the use of deception and the value of trust. One key element that is highlighted throughout this work is the importance of the longevity of a relationship between negotiators even after initial negotiations are completed, and the importance of trust between negotiators to achieve goals and leaving the doors open for potential further negotiations in the future. Overall, this research has provided valuable insights into the behaviour of humankind regarding truth and deception and how this is applied to negotiations in both personal and professional settings.

7. Supplement

Table 1. Interview overview

	Phase	Question
1	Background	How old are you?
		What is your gender?
		What is your highest education qualification?
		How much work experience do you have with negotiating?
		Have you been specifically trained in negotiating?
		How long have you been negotiating for?
2	General Questions	How would you define a negotiation?
		What is a good negotiator?
		What are some behavioural characteristics of a good negotiator?
		What do you consider essential for a successful negotiation?
		What is the ideal outcome of a successful negotiation?
3	Negotiation Preparation	How long does it take you to prepare for a negotiation? Is this duration consistent?
		What factors influence your preparation duration?
		How do you prepare? What is your process?
		How does this process differ between personal and professional negotiations? Does the familiarity with your counterpart have an influence?
4	Familiarity in negotiations	Are the majority of your negotiations with the same people? How much do you trust them?
		How important is trust to you in negotiations?
		Does trust influence how you share your information?
5	Negotiation Tools and Strategies	What kind of communication tools do you use for your negotiations?
		What strategies do you consider pivotal in negotiating successfully?
		What behaviours and strategies do you dislike when used by your counterpart?

6	Situational questions: Deception in negotiations*	Have you ever intentionally misrepresented factual information to your opponent when you know they have done the same?
		Have you ever intentionally misrepresented factual information to your opponent to support your argument/position?
		Have you ever made an opening demand that is far greater than what one hopes to settle for?
		Have you ever tried to hide your absolute bottom line from your opponent?
		Have you ever conveyed a false impression that you are in no hurry to come to an agreement?
		Have you ever made an opening offer so high/low that it seriously undermines the opponents' confidence in their own ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement?
		Have you ever promised that good things will happen to your opponent if they give you what you want, even if you know you can't (won't) deliver those good things?
	Deception: general questions	Have you had the experience of being deceived?
		How did you feel when you were the one to be deceived (if it has occurred)?
		How did being deceived impact the relationship?
		How does the reputation of a negotiator influence your behaviour?
	Closing questions	What are your thoughts on deception and lying in general?
		What is more important to you? The result or the relationship.
		Do you have anything to add that I may have overlooked or that may be valuable?

*Candidates were also asked their likelihood to use such strategies from a scale of 1-5 (1 least to 5 most likely).

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