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MSc Business Administration – International Management & Consultancy

PRE-NEGOTIATION EXPECTATIONS IN INDIVIDUALISTIC AND COLLECTIVISTIC CULTURES.

A STUDY OF DUTCH AND CHINESE

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Abstract

People negotiate on a daily basis about all sorts of things and, with the world being more connected than ever because of the influence that globalisation has had in nearly all facets of life, Western people face the challenge of negotiating with the Chinese more and more often. This is unsurprising as China's market grows quickly and it has an increasing presence in the international arena. As such, this paper aims to take a step towards formulating what negotiators have had to figure out in practice: pre-negotiation expectations about the behaviour of the negotiating counterparty. Through a qualitative investigation, this study has identified 22 different expectations across a variety of topics using negotiation setting, i.e. power distribution, and the relationship between the negotiators as moderating variables. While this study was limited by time constraints and the number of participants, it nevertheless pointed to a highly contextual view of pre-negotiation expectations which are based on six semi-structured interviews with Dutch and Chinese participants who were able to share their perspectives and understandings on this matter. These perspectives further highlight the relevance of this study in that they demonstrate that the participants both agree and disagree on certain expectations. By representing these expectations with the context in which they were raised, this study aids by identifying in which circumstances expectations between Dutch and Chinese people may differ and why this is likely to be the case.

Keywords:

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1. INTRODUCTION

The world is more connected than ever, and globalisation has had its effect nearly everywhere one looks and continues to influence people's lives (Alli et al., 2011). China is a quickly growing market and it appears more and more often on the international scenario as one of the leading countries for new business especially for Western organisations (Pan & Mishra, 2018). When exploring the possibilities of establishing such business, negotiation comes to play a key role (Tabassum, 2020). It helps to regulate the differences between the parties, avoid conflicts, and get the best terms (Kurgat et al., 2015) ultimately, influencing profitability. According to Thompson (1990, p. 528), negotiation is defined as "a decision-making task in which people make mutual decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources" in its most general sense. However, that does not mean that negotiations only occur at the highest levels of business or government but also in daily interactions. For instance, money is a scarce resource, so salary negotiations qualify. So does a balance between how much time you can afford to give something and how much you expect in return. There are also different types of the negotiation setting: negotiations can be team or dyadic (or so-called one-on-one negotiations) (Brodt & Thompson, 2001). Furthermore, there are also different negotiation strategies, e.g., collaborative or competitive strategies, however, they can be all divided into "hard" and "soft" strategies (Chaudhry, 2011). To illustrate the difference, in "soft" negotiations the negotiators adapt a friendly approach and try to reach an agreement, while in "hard" negotiations the goal is the victory and participants are adversaries (Chaudhry, 2011). This grouping of negotiation strategies also refers to other two types of negotiations: "soft" refers to integrative negotiations (win-win) (Coleman & Fraser, 1979) while "hard" refers to distributive negotiations (win-lose) (Coleman & Fraser, 1979). As there are different possible negotiation strategies (Chaudhry, 2011), the final choice of the most appropriate one for the negotiation is left to the negotiator. Moreover, when setting up a strategy, one may think, among other things, about their expectations for negotiations (Wertheim, n.d.).

The current literature suggests that there exist huge differences between the Dutch and Chinese cultures (Miller et al., 2011; Broeder, 2020; Zhang et al., 2020; Rienties & Tempelaar, 2013; Louie, 2012; Trompenaars, 1996), more specifically in the individualistic-collectivistic perception (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Meyer, 2014). Therefore, there is a potentially significant difference in expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations that representatives of these two countries may have. Furthermore, according to Brett (2000), the individualism-collectivism duality can affect the process and the outcome of negotiations. For example, according to Liberman (2010), the creation of positive expectations can be used to manipulate the process of negotiation and its outcomes. The more a negotiator understands their counterparty, the more chances that the negotiations will be successful (Wertheim, n.d.). The literature also indicates that such expectations depend on a negotiator's individual need for closure (high versus low) (Pietrzak et al., 2014).

Moreover, understanding the expectations of the other party is indeed crucial given that, due to increasing globalisation (Alli et al., 2011), organisations find themselves more and more in cross-cultural negotiations involving people from different cultures (Costin, 2015). Indeed, there can be a significant number of differences between two cultures, and scholars have attempted to suggest a systematic approach for identifying and comparing them for several decades already, starting from Hall's framework in 1976 and up until the most recent Meyer's (2014) model. One of the differentiations that appears in all different models is the division of countries into collectivistic and individualistic (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2010; Meyer, 2014). Collectivistic cultures, and the countries

associated with them, are characterised by a focus on the group. That is, the interests of the group you belong to often supersedes the individual interests. Individualistic cultures are the opposite where the interests of the individual are paramount and those of any groups secondary. Though in different frameworks this notion is named differently, e.g., individualism, and communitarianism (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997), it narrows down to the same concept: representatives of individualistic cultures prefer to look after themselves while representatives of collectivistic cultures prefer to rely on a group (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2010). Yet, factors impacting cross-cultural negotiations in individualistic versus collectivistic contexts have been a limited research topic as is illustrated below.

Firstly, though there are some studies on inter-cultural negotiations (Cohen, 1987; Calatone et al., 1998; Brett, 2000; Kern et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2017), there is a lack of research on expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations between representatives of collectivistic and individualistic cultures, though they agree on the importance of said expectations on the outcome of negotiations (Wertheim, n.d.; Liberman, 2010). Additionally, there are studies on the composition of negotiations (Brodt & Thompson, 2001; Polzer, 1996) and there is some information on the effect of a power imbalance between the negotiating parties on the behaviour of said parties (Giebels et al., 2000; Beersma & De Dreu, 1999), but there seems to be a lack of knowledge when it comes to relating differing power positions in negotiations to pre-negotiation behavioural expectations of the negotiators. Much less how differing power positions mediate the pre-negotiation expectations of individualistic and collectivistic negotiators about the behaviour of their counterpart. Thus, the first research gap is formulated as follows.

Gap 1: There is a lack of knowledge on how differing power positions mediate the relationship between individualistic and collectivistic negotiators and their pre-negotiation behaviour expectations.

Secondly, as illustrated above, while there is quite some literature on the differences between the Dutch and Chinese cultures, scant research has been done concerning the diverse, and potentially differing, expectations of these cultures. Additionally, it is no secret that relationships, and friendship by extension, and the way they are perceived is a factor which has been considered culturally important and one which culture may influence itself (Hofstede et al., 2010; Meyer, 2014; Lu et al., 2021; Kito et al., 2017; Baumgarte, 2016; Adams & Plaut, 2003). Beyond that, research has found some information about beliefs about friendship between the negotiating parties and about the behaviour and feelings of individualistic and collectivistic negotiators belonging to the same 'group' (Zhang et al., 2021, Hofstede et al., 2010; Lituchy; 2009). However, there seems to be a distinct lack of research on the role that relationships play in the pre-negotiation behavioural expectations that individualistic and collectivistic negotiators might have. Hence, the second research gap is as follows.

Gap 2: There is a lack of knowledge on how different relations, friends and no friends, between the negotiating parties mediate the relationship between individualistic and collectivistic negotiators and the pre-negotiation behavioural expectations they hold.

Therefore, by addressing the above gaps, the aim of this study is to discover the country-specific and common expectations about the behaviour of the counterparty during dyadic negotiations between negotiators from China, as representatives of collectivistic culture, and The Netherlands, as representatives of individualistic culture. China is the best representative of a collectivistic culture as, firstly, it is the country with more than 1.4 billion people (Tan, 2022), and, secondly, China has a highly collectivistic

culture (Hofstede Insights, 2017). The Netherlands, on the other hand, is one of the best representatives of individualistic culture for this paper as The Netherlands has a highly individualistic culture (Hofstede Insights, 2021). Moreover, the Netherlands is one of the best countries for doing business (World Bank, 2020).

Thus, the following research question is formulated:

What expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during dyadic negotiations do individualistic (Dutch) and collectivistic (Chinese) negotiators have depending on the distribution of power in the negotiation setting and on the relationship between negotiators?

By addressing this research question, this thesis extends the current literature of cross-cultural negotiation by explaining the influence of the individualistic-collectivistic cultural dichotomy (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Meyer, 2014) on the process and outcomes of negotiations (Brett, 2000) by demonstrating the influence of this dichotomy on the concrete case of Dutch-Chinese negotiations. Additionally, this paper contributes to the current literature on pre-negotiation expectations regarding the behaviour of the negotiating counterparty of Dutch and Chinese negotiators by formulating (some of) those expectations (Wertheim, n.d.; Liberman, 2010) as such identifications are absent. Finally, this thesis extends the existing literature of friendship by outlining the differences in the negotiators pre-negotiation expectations with a friend and with a stranger, because the existing literature appears to be superficial in this regard (Lu et al., 2021; Kito et al., 2017; Adams & Plaut, 2003).

Furthermore, this research has practical contributions. By discovering the common and country-specific pre-negotiation expectations of negotiators from China and The Netherlands, this study will give first-time negotiators who seek to establish relations with one another an advantage (Thomas et al., 2021). Such knowledge may help in understanding the communication patterns such negotiators may encounter. Such a basis may also provide some aid to communications during Dutch-Chinese negotiations. This is because negotiation skills are considered specific communication skills (Mills, 2019).

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

With the continued onset of globalisation (Alli et al., 2011), it is perhaps no surprise that negotiation is a broad topic that has been researched in-depth in recent years. Especially as negotiation helps to regulate the differences between the parties, avoid conflicts, and get the best terms (Kurgat et al., 2015) ultimately, influencing profitability. Consequently, matters as negotiation strategy (Matos et al., 1998), e.g., "hard" and "soft" strategies (Chaudhry, 2011), negotiation performance (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002) and dyadic and team negotiations (Traavik, 2011) have had ample attention. Still, it appears that none of these studies have touched the topic of pre-negotiation expectations.

2.1 NEGOTIATIONS
One may find various definitions of negotiations in the literature. Mills (2019, pp. 399), for instance, puts forth two separate definitions. *"Negotiation is the process of arriving at commitment to a course of action in cases in which the parties entered the conversation without consensus —or, alternatively, in which neither party had the power to impose a decision",* and *"Negotiation is a very contingent, sometimes iterative, always dynamic, collaborative decision-making process involving at least two parties who believe the other party or parties can provide something they seek"* (Mills, 2019, pp. 403). Pillutla and Nicholson (2004) also share their definition. *"The process through which two or more parties who are in*

conflict over outcomes attempt to reach agreement. It is the constructive, positive alternative to haggling or arguing; it is aimed at building an agreement rather than winning a battle." These definitions seem to align on one point: negotiations are a form of communication that seeks to foster mutual agreement regarding something the other party needs or wants. Indeed, this point comes back in various papers (Urquhart, 2016; The World Bank, n.d.). Therefore, this paper will use the following working definition of negotiations.

A negotiation is a form of communication in which the parties involved, who number at least two, seek to reach a mutual agreement regarding either the allocation of scarce resources or the resolution of conflict.

2.1.1 Types of negotiation

Dyadic vs Team: When talking about negotiations, one aspect to touch upon is different negotiation compositions, specifically regarding the members involved in the negotiation. Brodt and Thompson (2001) outline two different compositions, namely dyadic and team (or group) negotiation compositions. Dyadic negotiations are negotiations where both parties consist of one person. So-called one-on-one negotiations. Team negotiations, however, are those where either one or both parties consist of two or more people who act as a single negotiation entity because of similarities in their underlying goals or motivations (Brodt & Thompson, 2001).

Zooming in on dyadic negotiations, as this is the focus of the current study, it can be shown that there is plenty of literature studying various aspects of this type of negotiation (Dabholkar et al., 1994; Brett et al., 1996; Elo et al., 2015). Indeed, it appears that dyadic negotiations are considered the traditional context, and have, therefore, been used as a starting point in research (Brodt & Thompson, 2001). Additionally, Polzer (1996) argues that in dyadic negotiations the negotiating parties experience higher amounts of trust and cooperation than team negotiations. The author refers to their experiment which pointed out that dyadic negotiations facilitate trust and cooperation more easily than do team negotiations (Polzer, 1996).

As for team negotiations, using the same experiment as above, Polzer (1996) discovered that the presence of teams increases competitiveness and decreases trust and cooperation among the negotiating parties. Moreover, when the team involves novices, these novices experience a more negative outcome than do trained negotiators. Additionally, team compositions allow for consistent idea generation, more strategic roles, and more presence (Polzer, 1996).

Integrative, distributive, and power: Beyond dyadic and team negotiations, the literature discusses integrative and distributive negotiations in-depth. Integrative negotiations are those negotiations where the negotiators can realise a significant joint value. Motives and utilities are often aligned fully or to a significant extent. These negotiations are also often characterised by having multiple resources which are to be divided (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Kersten, 2001). Distributive negotiations, on the other hand, are those where the negotiators engage in a zero-sum game. That is, what one gains, the other loses. For this type of negotiations, the literature often considers that there is but one resource under consideration and that attaining as much of it as possible is the best thing to be had (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Kersten, 2001). Though these two types of negotiations are very common factors in literature considering the division of resources, Kersten (2001) also considers pure conflict, pure coordination, and mixed-motive negotiations.

In essence, pure conflict corresponds to distributive negotiations and pure coordination to the most integrative negotiations. Mixed-motive negotiations, however, are those where there is an integrative

potential such that the best integrative result exceeds the value of the distributive result. There is, however, no guarantee that this outcome is reached as there may be multiple points where the integrative result values differ from one another (Kersten, 2001). This distributive versus integrative notion of negotiating can also be found in the attitudes of the participants. Giebels et al. (2000) suggest that so-called pro-social negotiators, those who seek better joint outcomes, are more inclined towards creating a collaborative environment than egoistic negotiators, who seem to have a tendency towards creating a competitive environment. Beersma and De Dreu (1999) found something similar in that pro-socially motivated negotiators experience higher levels of trust and less contending behaviour than egoistically motivated negotiators. In the terms used above, pro-social negotiators appear to be more inclined towards integrative negotiations while egoistic negotiators tend more towards distributive outcomes. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that more power seems to result in more egoistic behaviour in either case, though to a larger extent for egoistic negotiators than pro-social negotiators (Giebels et al., 2000).

Another important aspect to consider here is that of power distribution during the negotiation. Giebels et al. (2000) continue their findings by discovering that more power tends to correlate with more egoistic behaviour. This is more prevalent among those who negotiate egoistically to begin with than it is among more pro-social negotiators, but the effect seems universal (Giebels et al., 2000). Additionally, a different study found that more power and more individualistic tendencies both contribute to the likelihood that such a negotiator will initiate a negotiation (Volkema et a., 2016). Finally, Zhang et al. (2021) formulated several negotiation beliefs of American (individualistic) and Chinese (collectivistic) negotiators where power distribution in negotiations seemed to have had an influence. An example is the shared belief that, where one leaves opportunities for their opponent, said opponent will take advantage of them (Zhang et al., 2021). The fact that there are reasonably few studies on power distribution within (inter-cultural) negotiations is itself a testament to the first research gap that was formulated above. Moreover, it plays an important role in this study precisely because of this reason.

Business-to-business (B2B) vs Private: Furthermore, one may consider the differences between business-to-business (B2B) negotiations and private negotiations. In B2B negotiations, it is often a matter of managing different supply and demand solutions (Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil & Candi, 2018). Such matters can be exceedingly complicated and can involve a lot of stakeholders. As such, it may be beneficial for the parties involved to employ a representative on behalf of either negotiating party (Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil & Candi, 2018). There are various pros and cons to doing this and one may summarise them as follows. The main advantages of a representative are the presence of specialised knowledge and skills, and the opportunity to discuss offers made at the negotiating table without committing to them. The main disadvantage is that the representatives might get too caught up in their professional 'game' and lose sight of the real dividing issue of those whom they represent (Rubin & Sander, 1988). Additionally, the use of representatives implies a certain amount of accountability of the representative to the principal party. It has been found that such accountability results in a generally more competitive negotiation environment and pressure to reach a deal (Benton, 1972). Regarding private negotiations, it must be said that the extant body of literature does not seem to consider it as such. In fact, outside of dyadic negotiation literature, nothing could be found. The difference between B2B negotiations and private negotiations is considered to be that private negotiations are dyadic negotiations where the dyads are not (both) acting in the interests of a business entity.

One-time vs Ongoing: Finally, a large part of the extant literature on negotiation considers one-time negotiations as the norm (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010; Thomas, Murfield & Eastman, 2021). While some argue that room should be made for ongoing negotiating relationships within the negotiation literature (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010). As such, it is sensible to consider the differences in one-time negotiations and negotiations where there is the preconception of an ongoing relationship. First, for one-time negotiations, the parties at the negotiation table may be less concerned with the behaviour of the counterpart, whereas in negotiations where one wishes to extend the relationship into the future the behaviour of the counterparty may be considered of vital importance (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010). However, there can be a downside as well. It has been shown that negotiations held under the notion that future negotiations with this party will take place may suffer more from an "aspiration-collapse". That is to say, the parties involved may sooner yield to accommodate their counterpart than employ problem-solving strategies to maximise the potential joint benefit (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Hence, it may well be beneficial to demonstrate some significant level of resistance to yielding in such circumstances (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Additionally, there are differences in views concerning what constitutes an ongoing negotiation relationship. For instance, it may concern product installation, training, or something longer-lasting (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010). Lastly, given a pre-existing relationship with the preconception that it will or should continue, the parties involved may be more inclined to attribute negative experiences at the negotiating table to extra-relational factors if the relationship is highly valued (Thomas, Murfield & Eastman, 2021). That is, to factors that are outside the negotiators' control.

For the purpose of this research, it is also essential to introduce the term "negotiation setting". In the context of this paper "negotiation setting" refers to any combination of the types of negotiation discussed above. For example, negotiations can be dyadic, one-time and integrative at the same time. This could be considered one negotiation setting. An overview of related work on this topic can be found in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Types of negotiation

Aspect of negotiation	Term + definition	Concept	Paper
negotiation composition	**dyadic negotiations**: negotiations where both parties consist of one person (Brodt & Thompson, 2001)	considered the traditional context => used as a starting point in the research	Brodt & Thompson, 2001
		dyadic negotiations experience higher amounts of trust and cooperation among the negotiating parties than team negotiations	Polzer, 1996
		dyadic negotiation facilitates trust and cooperation more easily than do team negotiations	Polzer, 1996
	team negotiations: negotiations where either one or both parties consist of two or more people who act as a single negotiation entity because of similarities in their underlying goals or motivations (Brodt & Thompson, 2001)	presence of teams increases competitiveness	Polzer, 1996
		presence of teams decreases trust and cooperation among the negotiating parties	Polzer, 1996
		when the team involves novices, these novices experience a more negative outcome than do trained negotiators	Polzer, 1996
		team compositions allow for consistent idea generation, more strategic roles, and more presence	Polzer, 1996
behaviour, outcome and strategy	**integrative negotiations**: negotiations where the negotiators can realise a significant joint value. Motives and utilities are often aligned fully or to a significant extent. These negotiations are also often characterised as having multiple resources which are to be divided (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Kersten, 2001)	pure coordination corresponds to the most integrative negotiations	Kersten, 2001
		mixed-motive negotiations -- those where there is an integrative potential such that the best integrative result exceeds the value of the distributive result	Kersten, 2001
		during mixed-motive negotiations, there may be multiple integrative outcomes. Usually, only one is the best for all parties involved. There is no guarantee that this best outcome is reached in mixed-motive negotiations.	Kersten, 2001
		pro-social negotiators, those who seek better joint outcomes, are more inclined towards creating a collaborative environment	Giebels et al., 2000
		pro-socially motivated negotiators experience higher levels of trust and less contending behaviour than egoistically motivated negotiators	Beersma and De Dreu, 1999
	distributive negotiations: negotiations where the negotiators engage in a zero-sum game. That is, what one gains, the other loses (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Kersten, 2001)	pure conflict corresponds to distributive negotiations	Kersten, 2001
		distributive versus integrative notion of negotiating can also be found in the attitudes of the participants	Giebels et al., 2000
		egoistic negotiators, those who seek better individual outcomes, seem to have a tendency towards creating a competitive environment	Giebels et al., 2000
		more power seems to result in more egoistic behaviour in either case, though to a larger extent for egoistic negotiators than pro-social negotiators	Giebels et al., 2000
negotiation setting	business-to-business (B2B) negotiations	it is often a matter of managing different supply and demand solutions	Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil & Candi, 2018
		advantages: the presence of specialised knowledge and skills, and the opportunity to discuss offers made at the negotiating table without committing to them	Rubin & Sander, 1988
		the main disadvantage is that the representatives might get too caught up in their professional 'game' and lose sight of the real dividing issue of those whom they represent	Rubin & Sander, 1988
		the use of representatives implies a certain amount of accountability of the representative to the principal party which results in a generally more competitive negotiation environment and pressure to reach a deal	Benton, 1972
	private negotiations	*the extant body of literature does not seem to consider it as such. In fact, outside of dyadic negotiation literature, nothing could be found*	
frequency of negotiations	one-time negotiations	one-time negotiations considered to be the norm	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010; Thomas, Murfield & Eastman, 2021
		the parties at the negotiation table may be less concerned with the behaviour of the counterpart	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010
	recurring negotiations	room should be made for ongoing negotiating relationships	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010
		future the behaviour of the counterparty may be considered of vital importance	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010
		the parties involved may sooner yield to accommodate their counterpart than employ problem-solving strategies to maximise the potential joint benefit	Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984
		it may well be beneficial to demonstrate some significant level of resistance to yielding	Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984
		there are differences in views concerning what constitutes an ongoing negotiation relationship	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010
		the parties involved may be more inclined to attribute negative experiences at the negotiating table to extra-relational factors if the relationship is highly valued	Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010

2.2 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

The concept of culture is extremely hard to define so much that more than a hundred different definitions exist. Some examples include, culture is *"a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits"*; *"that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired... as a member of society"*; *"best seen not as complexes of concrete behaviour patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters', but 'as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions […] – for the governing of behaviour"* (Johnson, 2013, p. 1-4; *"the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another"* (Hofstede, 1980, p. 13); *"a way a group of people act to solve problems"* was a quote from Hall, author of Beyond Culture (Hall, 1959, p. 186). However, for the purposes of this paper Spencer-Oatey (2008, p. 3) sums it up nicely, gathering all the key aspects of the above definitions.

"Culture is a fuzzy set of values, attitudes and behaviours that are (partially) shared by a group of people, and that influences each member's interpretations of the meaning of other people's behaviour".

2.2.1 Cultural frameworks

From the scholars concerned with defining and quantifying culture, Hall, Hofstede and Trompenaars are some of the most influential (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007; Procter, 2004; Pagell, Katz & Sheu, 2005). To outline the differences in their thinking, the following describes their frameworks and thought processes.

Hall's framework: Hall (1976) organised culture into three aspects, namely, time, space, and context. To his mind, various cultural groups could be united or distinguished by the way they fill out these aspects. The aspect of time relates to how structured or unstructured people consider their time and the time of others. That is to say, a structured vision of time indicates that one plans ahead, is not extremely flexible, and works by appointment, for instance. Unstructured time is the opposite. Space refers to the physical distance people tend the keep between themselves and others and to the degree to which this differs based on the relationship between people. For example, when one considers something often referred to as one's personal space, this can mean different things to different people. If one considers that this space is very close to one's person, then some people may consider it perfectly acceptable for strangers to be in said "personal space" whereas others find this unacceptable. Context targets the way people communicate. Hall (1976) considers high- and low-context communication where high-context communication is highly dependent on contextual clues, expressions, and 'that which is not said'. Low context, then, is its opposite and means such communication as to put the entire meaning of the message into words. The overview of the Hall's framework can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Hall's framework (based on Hall (1976) and Carminati (2022))

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Explanation/definition	
space	physical space	objective space around us	
	personal space	subjective perception of space	intimate distance (0cm - 45cm)
			personal distance (45cm - 1,2m)
			social distance (1.2m - 3.7m)
			public distance (3.7m - 7.6m)
time	monochronic (single-focus, structured)	prefer to focus on one task at a time	
		stick to the schedule (schedules have always precedence)	
		emphasizes promptness	
		deadline as fixed	
		no interruption	
	polychronic (multi-focus, unstructured)	often deal with many tasks at once	
		adaptable to change	
		emphasize flexibility	
		deadlines are fluid	
		accept interruptions	
context	high-context	from general, contextual information to specific information	goal of the sentence usually does not equal to the meaning of the sentence
	low-context	from specific information to general, contextual information	goal of the sentence usually equals to the meaning of the sentence

Hofstede's framework: Hofstede's (1980) definition speaks to his way of reasoning. He considers culture to be the "collective programming of the mind", or, to translate, a set of beliefs, values, and norms which is unique to one cultural group. Hofstede's (1980) (in-)famous experiment centred on delineating these cultural groups into national cultural groups. The resulting quantification of national cultures has since been built on and now counts six dimensions or dichotomies (Hofstede et al., 2010). Power distance (high vs low) refers to the general acceptance that power is distributed unevenly. Individualism (vs collectivism) is the collective tendency to prioritise the individual over the group. That is to say, social connections are considered rather loose. Masculinity (vs femininity) has nothing to do with feminism but, rather, refers to the social desire for achievement, and material rewards. Femininity, however, is associated with the importance of quality of life, caring for the weaker members of society, and modesty. Uncertainty avoidance (low vs high) indicates the comfort members of society feel when dealing with uncertain situations or general ambiguity. Some might compare this to a rigid or laissez-faire management style. Long-term (vs short-term) orientation categorises society's disposition towards change and considers it a means to prepare for the future. Short-term orientation, however, indicates a preference for maintaining existing traditions. Finally, indulgence (vs restraint) refers to being able to (relatively) freely satisfy basic human needs as they relate to enjoying life. Restraint, then, maintains rather strict social rules which regulate indulgence as much as possible. The overview of the Hofstede's framework can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. Hofstede's framework (based on Hofstede et al. (2010) and Carminati (2022))

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Definition/explanation	
power distance	high power distance	power distance is the extent to which the less powerful memebers of institutions (the family, school, community) and organisations (at work) within a country expect and accept that power is distributed equally	accept power differences children are obedient teacher-centered education subordinates are told what to do
	low power distance		question power differences children have voice student-centered education subordinates are consulted
individualism	individualism	in individualistic societies the ties between individuals are loose; everyone is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family	responsible for self tasks prevail over relationships expressing personal opinions privacy is important
	collectivism	collectivistic societies are defined as those in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which are throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty	responsible for society relationship prevails over tasks maintaining harmony belonging is important
masculinity	masculinity	masculinity pertains to societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct (little overlap of roles)	assertive competitive admiration for the strong sex is a way of performing
	feminity	feminity pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap (big overlap of roles)	caring cooperative sympathy for the weak sex is a way of relating
uncertainty avoidance	high uncertainty avoidance	uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations	minimise risk control future need for structure and order emotional need for rules
	low uncertainty avoidance		accept risk go with the flow comfortable with chaos dislike of rules
orientation	long-term orientation	long-term orientation stands for "the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards - in particular, perseverance and thrift"	long-lasting process save money family guided by shared tasks good and evil are relative
	short-term orientation	short-term orientation stands for "the fostering of virtues related to the past and present - in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of "face" and fulfilling social obligations"	immediate gain spend money family life guided by rules good and bad are universal
indulgence	indulgence	indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun	release desires leisure show emotions higher percentage of declared happiness
	restraint	restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms	control desires work reserved lower percentage of declared happiness

Trompenaars Cultural Dimension Model: Trompenaars (1996) has a view on culture which is both similar to and distinct from Hofstede's (2010). Specifically, Trompenaars (1996) considers culture as a layered phenomenon and distinguishes between an explicit and an implicit culture. The explicit culture is that which people of a cultural group produce as a result from their norms and values. Meaning, physical artifacts or products. The implicit culture, on the other hand, are the basic assumptions which ground those norms and values. Based on this underlying principle, he identified seven cultural principles. Universalism (vs particularism) refers to the extent to which rules are applied homogenously to each member of society with universalism being on the end of complete homogeneity, whereas particularism might be inclined to

make exceptions for, say, friends. Individualism (vs collectivism) is much the same as what Hofstede et al. (2010) describe. Affective (vs neutral) is the degree to which one publicly displays emotion and indicates that it is perfectly fine to publicly show emotion. Neutral, however, indicates that there is a preference on restraining emotional displays. Specific (vs diffuse) refers to how many areas of each other's lives one tends to be involved in with specific being one or several specific area(s) while diffuse means being involved in various areas of another's life. Achievement (vs ascription) is a way of justifying hierarchies and claims authority based on achievement, whereas ascription claims authority based on power. Orientation towards time is the degree to which one is influenced by one's past, present and future. For instance, one might hold the past in extremely high regard but not consider the present of much importance while always looking towards the future or any other combination of the three. Finally, external (vs internal) control refers to whether one considers the environment to control humanity or the other way around (Trompenaars, 1996). The overview of Trompenaars Cultural Dimension Model can be found in Table 4.

Table 4. Trompenaars Cultural Dimension Model (based on Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997))

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Definition/explanation
universialism	universalism	the extent to which rules are applied homogenously to each member of society with universalism being on the end of complete homogeneity, whereas particularism might be inclined to make exceptions for, say, friends
	particularism	
individualism	individualism	people prefer to work on tasks on their own
	communitarianism	people prefer to work in teams or groups
affective	neutral	the degree to which one publicly displays emotion and affective indicates that it is perfectly fine to publicly show emotion. Neutral, however, indicates that there is a preference on restraining emotional displays
	affective	
specific	specific	how many areas of each other's lives one tends to be involved in with specific being one or several specific area(s)
	diffuse	being involved in various areas of another's life
achievement	achievement	a way of justifying hierarchies and claims authority based on achievement
	ascription	claims authority based on power
time	sequential time	projects are completed in stages and on time
	synchronous time	several things can be done at once, time is interchangeable
control	internal control	people believe they control their environment
	external control	people believe that to achieve their goals their environment must be worked with

Meyer's framework: While the frameworks described above are some of the more influential ones, one may also consider one of the newest frameworks. Meyer (2014) comes at culture from a business perspective. Additionally, Meyer approaches culture from a relative point-of-view which means that she

does not compare cultures on an absolute scale such as, for instance, Hofstede et al. (2010) but, rather, outlines only their relative differences on a set of continuums. The communication continuum compares similarly to Hall's (1976) context dimension in that it indicates the degree to which a culture uses high- or low-context communication. For evaluation, the degree to which people accept direct negative criticism is compared. Persuading indicates whether people are more likely to be persuaded through a concept-first or an application-first approach. Leading might be compared to Hofstede's (1980) power distance in that it indicates how egalitarian or hierarchical leadership structures are likely to be. The deciding continuum posits the degree to which decisions are made top-down or consensual. For trusting, the degree to which trust is based on tasks or relationships is compared. Disagreeing compares the degree to which one is likely to be confrontational. Finally, the scheduling continuum indicates whether one works in linear time (one thing after another) or flexible time (interruptions are acceptable). The overview of Meyer's framework can be found in Table 5.

Table 5. Meyer's framework (based on Meyer (2014))

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Definition/explanation
communication	high-context	cutures where people must be able to "read between the lines"
	low-context	cultures where people communicate and receive messages at face value
feedback (evaluation)	direct negative feedback	state negative feedback clearly and explicitly
	indirect negative feedback	deliver their messages in a subtler manner, often couching these messages in positive affirmations and using words to mitigate their feedback
thinking	holistic (dialectial)	focus on the overall situation, emphasize the relationships between individual elements
	specific (analytical)	focus on the individual element or action, de-emphasize the surrounding circumstances
leadership	egalitarian	everybody is equal, even in the workplace
	hierarchical	rank matters
decision-making	consensual	everyone's opinion is taken into account
	top-down	there is one decision-maker
disagreement	confrontational	disagreement is good for the group and is seen as an inevitable element in free exchange of ideas
	confrontation-avoidant	disagreement is bad for the goup and is seen as a personal attack
trust	task-based	trust develops based on the behaviour and task outcomes
	relationship-based	trust is personal based on the relationship (family, friends)
scheduling	linear-time (monochronic)	value a fixed, linear schedule
	flexible-time (polychronic)	work on several things at once

Naturally, the frameworks discussed above are no holy grail of culture and there are plenty of criticisms to consider when using each one of them. For Hall (1976), the most frequent criticism concerns his use of high- and low-context communication. Cardon (2008) published an elaborate critique of this part of Hall's model calling it "unsubstantiated" as the author argues that Hall should have elaborated better on his methodology. Cardon (2008) continues to cite the works of various quantitative studies which have found little support for Hall's contexting theory. One may infer, then, that caution may be warranted when using Hall's (1976) context dimension. When one considers Hofstede et al. (2010), or indeed any of his related publications, there is no trouble finding criticism either. McSweeney (2002), for instance, has published a substantial account where he casts doubt on much of Hofstede's work. Hofstede's analysis relies on surveys distributed among IBM subsidiaries. McSweeney (2002) argues that it is unlikely for this to be nationally representative. He further criticises the supposition that Hofstede's classification based on nationality means that the differences in individual survey responses must be caused by differences in nationality as, McSweeney (2002) points out, there may be various influences which prompt respondents to colour their answers. Interestingly enough, it proved difficult to find papers criticising Trompenaars (1996) or Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997) and none were found. As for Meyer's (2014) work, a similar difficulty was encountered though that might be explained by its relative newness. Some general criticisms with regards to these frameworks were found to be that they tend towards the average, without giving sufficient detail about any one culture (Lichy & Stokes, 2018; Venaik & Brewer, 2016; Chanchani & Theivananthampillai, 2009), so it is no surprise that it has been mentioned that these frameworks should only be used to obtain a first basic understanding of the culture(s) in question (Lichy & Stokes, 2018).

The above-mentioned criticisms notwithstanding, it does seem that there is one dimension most of these frameworks agree on: the individualistic-collectivistic dichotomy (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Hofstede et al., 2010; Meyer, 2014), though they may use different names to address it. For instance, Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997) speaks of individualism-communitarianism and Meyer (2014) of relationship-based trust as opposed to task-based trust, but the underlying description corresponds, in essence, to Hofstede et al.'s (2010) individualistic-collectivistic dichotomy. As such, this dichotomy warrants additional attention. Later in this paper this dichotomy is referred as individualistic versus collectivistic cultures based on the Hofstede's terminology. The reason is that, in spite of the criticism, this framework is popular and it was developed by the academic specializing in cultures without the business context (Hofstede Insights, n.d.), comparing to Meyer (Erin Meyer, n.d.) and to Trompenaars (Trompenaars Hampden-Turner, 2022). Additionally, due to Hofstede's popularity, it is reasonable to suppose that this terminology is widely understood.

2.2.2   Individualistic VS collectivistic cultures

An individualistic culture is defined as one where people prefer to look after themselves and close friends and relatives only, while in collectivistic cultures people belong to "groups" which in exchange for loyalty take care of them (Hofstede et al, 2010). Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997) acknowledge a very similar division of cultures into individualism and communitarianism. An individualism culture is defined as one where people prefer to work on tasks on their own, while communitarianism, on the contrary, is defined as a culture where people prefer to work in teams or groups (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997). However, while Trompenaars and Hofstede concern cultures in general, Meyer (2014) regards culture from a business perspective and divides culture, among others, into task-based and relationship-based cultures. In a task-based culture there is only one way to build trust between to people – through business-related activities and relationships usually end with the end of working together, while in

relationship-based, on the contrary, trust is built as people get to know each other better and better (Meyer, 2014). Therefore, based solely on the definitions of collectivistic and individualistic cultures, it can be concluded that there may be differences in the way the representatives of these cultures regard negotiations. Table 6 below summarizes the theoretical findings.

Table 6. Individualistic-collectivistic dichotomy overview

Dichotomy		Perspective on culture	Author
Individualistic VS Collectivistic		country-wide	Hofstede et al. (2010)
people prefer to look after themselves and close friends and relatives only	people belong to "groups" which in exchange for loyalty take care of them		
Individualism VS Communitarianism		country-wide	Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars (1997)
people prefer to work on tasks on their own	people prefer to work in teams or groups		
Task-based VS Relationship-based		Business	Meyer (2014)
trust between to people is built through business-related activities and relationships usually end with the end of working together	trust between people is built as people get to know each other better and better		

2.2.3 Friendship

While the cultural sections above are highly relevant to understand the participants of this study and to help explain their expectations, friendship is investigated for the effect it has on the expectations of the participants. First, it has been found that culture is one of the factors which influences the perception of friendship (Lu et al., 2021). Moreover, an entire study, based on Hofstede's framework (Hofstede et al, 2010), on how country-level factors may influence the role of friendship in people's lives has been conducted by Lu et al. (2021). Furthermore, according to Kito et al. (2017), the representatives of individualistic cultures are more involved in close relationships than the representatives of collectivistic cultures. The authors argue that this phenomenon may be due to higher relational mobility in individualistic cultures. This relational mobility refers to the ease with which someone may move on from an existing relationship. This, consequently, makes the relationships more fragile, and, to keep the existing relationship, more active engagement is needed comparing to collectivistic cultures where relational mobility is said to be lower (Kito et al., 2017). Finally, a similar observation was made by Adams & Plaut (2003). According to Adams & Plaut (2003), people from individualistic cultures are likely to have more friends than people from collectivistic cultures, however, the study of Adams & Plaut (2003) also outlines that people from individualistic cultures tend to show less caution toward their friends. Throughout the literature search, these authors were the only ones who directly related culture and friendship. Still, this leaves a background gap regarding how friendship relates to (inter-cultural) negotiations. There has been a study which has outlined several negotiation beliefs of American and Chinese negotiators. This study found that relationships, and friendship, only influenced the beliefs of Chinese negotiators (Zhang et al., 2021). A further study looked at the behaviours of American (individualistic) and Japanese (collectivistic)

negotiators towards so-called in- and out-group members. In- and out-group members are those people who belong to the same social group and those who do not, respectively. This can be likened to people with whom one has a relationship or with whom one is friends, and to people with whom one has/is neither. They found that the collectivist Japanese negotiators show more empathy, reach more integrative outcomes, and are more collaborating towards in-group members than individualist American negotiators (Lituchy, 2009). Besides power distribution which was described earlier, friendship is the second important moderator in this study.

2.3   EXPECTATIONS IN (PRE-)NEGOTIATIONS

Having defined and explored the relevant cultural dimensions for this study, this section goes on to discuss behavioural expectations and their relation to negotiations in general. As such, this section starts with defining behavioural expectations in negotiations before delving into different types of such expectations as they relate to negotiations in general.

2.3.1   Behavioural expectations in negotiations

Expectations have been defined as the "general beliefs held by individuals" (Bosch-Sijtsema, 2007, p. 359). For the purposes of this study, this definition will be placed in the context of negotiations. This results in the following definition.

Expectations in negotiations are the general beliefs held by individuals about the process, outcome and counterparts of negotiations.

Since this study focuses on behavioural expectations in particular, the above definition is transformed to account for that. This leads to the following operating definition of behavioural expectations for this paper.

Behavioural expectations in negotiations are the general beliefs held by individuals about the process of negotiations, outcome of the negotiations and about the behaviour of negotiating counterparts.

Having defined behavioural expectations in negotiations, it is crucial to understand the role of expectations in negotiations and the different types of expectations one might encounter. It has been shown, for instance, that starting a negotiation with positive expectations, in its general sense, is more likely to lead to an outcome where both parties agree. It should be noted, however, that these agreed to outcomes need not necessarily be positive (Liberman et al, 2010). Furthermore, among the types of expectations which have been discussed in the literature, a focus on the expectation of future interaction is discussed most, either its impact on the negotiation, the impact of its absence or in passing (Patton and Balakrishnan, 2009; Zohar, 2015). Nevertheless, the book of Mautner-Markhof (1988) discusses a number of other types of expectations as well. These are transient expectations (those that reach the negotiating table through backers or clients), expectations of operative principles (which deal with different aspects of the negotiation itself such as fairness, cooperation and outcome), expectations on realism (or how realistic we expect others to be), and expectations of the effects one's own behaviour has on their counterpart. Gelfand and Brett (2004) also mention expectations of conflict, meaning the expectation among one or more of the negotiators that a conflict is inevitable during the negotiation. Another type of expectation is that of a potential role reversal. This type of expectation was investigated by Bagchi et al. (2016). The overview of the related work can be found in Table 7.

Table 7. Types of expectations in (pre-)negotiations

Type of expectation	Concept	Author
positive expectations	starting a negotiation with positive expectations, in its general sense, is more likely to lead to an outcome where both parties agree	Liberman et al. (2010)
transient expectations	those that reach the negotiating table through backers or clients	Mautner-Markhof (1988)
expectations of operative principles	which deal with different aspects of the negotiation itself such as fairness, cooperation and outcome	
expectations on realism	how realistic we expect others to be	
expectations of the effects one's own behaviour has on their counterpart	the concious image one has regarding how one's own behaviour influences their partner	
expectations of conflict	the expectation among one or more of the negotiators that a conflict is inevitable during the negotiation	Gelfand & Brett (2004)
expectation on the potential role reversal	the conception that, in the future, one might be on the other end of the negotiation than the one from which one now operates	Bagchi et al. (2016)
expectations of future interactions	review what went well, what was surprising, what made things efficient after the negotiation has completed to improve for the next time	Zohar (2015)
	negotiators expecting future interaction have lower aspiration/ambition levels	Patton & Balakrishnan (2009)
	negotiators expecting future interaction expect the negotiations will be friendlier, and predominantly use a problem-solving bargaining style compared to negotiators who do not expect future interaction	
	the expectation of future interaction seems to have a strong moderating effect on satisfaction as the satisfaction of negotiators with this expectation is not based solely on the monetary outcomes of the negotiation	
	negotiations under the expectation of future interaction take longer than those not under this expectation	
	negotiations under the expectation of future interaction produce greater parity between buyers' and sellers' satisfaction	
	compared to one-time negotiations, negotiators with the expectation of future interaction are more likely to be disposed to bargain again, to enter into negotiations with a harmonious disposition and seek solutions that benefit both parties	

Additionally, according to Gelfand and Brett (2004), certain expectations may lead to distrust between the negotiators. Furthermore, if the negotiators expect that, in the future, they will be in a situation where their roles are reversed then they are more likely to make concessions in the current negotiation as they expect that their counterpart will reciprocate in the future (Bagchi et al, 2016).

2.4 THE ROLE OF INTER-CULTURAL AND (PRE-)NEGOTIATION EXPECTATIONS IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE

This section moves from behavioural expectations in negotiations and looks at the way inter-cultural negotiations in negotiations have been discussed in the existing literature. To this end, this section starts by discussing inter-cultural negotiations. Then, this section continues by addressing what has been said in existing literature regarding collectivism and individualism in inter-cultural negotiations, because this

study focuses on this cultural dimension. Lastly, this section discusses the ways the extant literature has discussed inter-cultural, negotiation expectations.

2.4.1 Inter-cultural negotiations

As the current research is dealing with negotiators from two different countries and cultures, it is relevant to take a closer look at already existing scientific work regarding inter-cultural negotiations. Extant literature mentions that cultural differences affect the inter-cultural negotiations and what differences can be overcome. However, some of the literature shows disagreement with the claims supported by several authors. An overview of related work on this topic can be found in Table 8.

However, the existing literature agrees that cultural differences affect negotiations (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000; Kern et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2017). Specifically, they agree that inter-cultural negotiations are influenced by potential inter-cultural dissonance (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000, Yang et al., 2017). This is further reinforced by the fact that culturally ingrained behaviour patterns may complicate matters surrounding inter-cultural negotiations (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000, Yang et al., 2017). This is explained as resulting from a correlation between cultural values and differences in behaviour (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000). As an example of a complicating matter, what one party sees as normal behaviour may be seen as arrogance, bad manners and bullying by the other (Cohen, 1987).

Furthermore, the extant literature seems to touch upon certain cultural dualities that affect inter-cultural negotiations. Examples of such dualities are individualism/collectivism or egalitarianism/hierarchy (Brett, 2000). Moreover, both social awareness and social distance may be a reason for "cultural and strategic misalignments between inter-cultural negotiators" (Kern et al., 2012). Additionally, there is also an aspect of the negotiation behaviour in inter-cultural negotiations. According to Yang et al. (2017), there is evidence that, depending on the country of origin, a negotiator is more likely to use ethically questionable tactics such as lying or bribing. Furthermore, the use of ethically questionable tactics may change depending on the nationality of the counterpart. Lastly, negotiation behaviour is likely to depend on the image of the country of the counterpart (Yang et al., 2017).

Factors to overcome Cultural Differences in Negotiations: Though cultural differences can affect the inter-cultural negotiations, there are several things that can help to overcome the inter-cultural dissonance (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000; Kern et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2017). For instance, the long history of contact between two cultures may be beneficial as it is argued by Cohen (1987) on the example of China and Japan, and as it is agreed with by Brett (2000) and by Yang et al. (2000). Moreover, though the cultural traits may be different, they may be complementary to each other and in this case, there is a possibility for success in negotiations (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000).

Furthermore, Brett (2000, p. 103) mentions that motivation to reach an agreement may "overcome individual, contextual and cultural differences in negotiation strategy". Besides, Kern et al. (2012) suggests that there are ways of closing the social distance. The paper suggests that the social distance in inter-cultural negotiations can be "bridged", and, to illustrate, they examined the use of the word "you" during the inter-cultural negotiations and examined the effect of bi-culturality. As a result, the more often usage of the word "you" and bi-culturality of one of the negotiators showed the positive correlation with overcoming the challenges of inter-cultural negotiations (Kern et al., 2012). Additionally, it is worth mentioning that there was also a study on online inter-cultural negotiations by Chen et al. (2013). This study analysed the role of haptic interaction in such a negotiation and concluded that the use of haptic

interaction improves the communication and understanding of each of the counterparts, easing the negotiation process.

Areas of inconsistent results: Nevertheless, scientific papers do not always agree with each other. In the quantitative study described by Calantone et al. (1998), one of the outcomes of the analysis they performed was that cultural context does not have an effect on a negotiator's satisfaction and perceived problem-solving approach. This finding contradicts the findings of Cohen (1987), Brett (2000), Kern et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2012) and Yang et al. (2017).

Also, it has been claimed that adaptation is not sufficient to generate joint gains in inter-cultural negotiations based on an analysis of USA and Japan (Brett, 2000). This finding partially disagrees with the statement that if there is a long history of contact between two cultures, the negotiation may be easier (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000; Yang et al., 2017). Both statements touch upon adaptation to each other, however, the long history of contact takes presumably much more time than adapting to something. Therefore, it can be assumed that simple adaptation that a person can have to another culture is not sufficient for easing the inter-cultural negotiations, but a long history of (multiple) negotiations between two cultures is.

Table 8. Inter-cultural negotiations

Category	Concept	Cohen (1987)	Calantone et al. (1998)	Brett (2000)	Kern et al. (2012)	Chen et al. (2013)	Yang et al. (2017)
Cultural differences affect the negotiations	Subject to the working of intercultural dissonance	X		X			X
	Culturally ingrained behaviour patterns complicate issues surrounding negotiations (Japan VS Soviet Union)	X		X			X
	Culturally ingrained behaviour patterns may be seen as arrogance, bad manners and bullying	X					
	Individualism VS Collectivism affects negotiations			X			
	Egalitarianism VS hierarchy affect negotiations			X			
	Direct VS inderect communications affect negotiations (high- VS low-context)			X			
	Differences in norms for negotiations correlated with cultural values			X			
	Differences in behaviour in negotiations correlated with cultural values	X		X			
	Social distance as a reason for cultural and strategic misalignments between inter-cultural negotiators				X		
	Social awareness as a reason for cultural and strategic misalignments between inter-cultural negotiators				X		
	Ethically questionable tactics usage may change depending on the nationality of the counterpart						X
	Negotiation behaviour depends on the image of the country of the counterpart						X
	Ethically questionable tactics may be likely to used more by one country than the other						X
Cultural differences can be overcome	A long history of contact between two cultures may get advantages in spite of the cultural differences (Japan VS China)	X		X			X
	Motivation to reach an agreement may overcome individual, contextual and cultural differences in negotiation strategy			X			
	Success by complementarity of cultural traits (Japan VS USA)	X		X			
	Bi-culturality may be the cause of closing the social distance				X		
	Social distance in inter-cultural negotiations can be bridged				X		
	Social awareness and the use of 'you' helps to close the social distance				X		
	Inter-cultural negotiators generate higher joint gains than intra-cultural negotiators				X		
	Haptic interaction plays a role in transmittion of emotion and expression of a sense of presence in online inter-cultural negotiation					X	
	Haptic interaction in online inter-cultural negotiation may make a negotiator adjust their thinking of a partner					X	
Areas of disagreement	Culture context does not have effect on negotiator's satisfaction and perceived problem-solving approach		X				
	Adaptation is not sufficient to generate joint gains in negotiations			X			

2.4.2 Collectivism and individualism in inter-cultural negotiations

There has been already quite some research done on the topic of inter-cultural negotiations where parties were representatives of collectivistic and individualistic cultures, though in some papers, there is no accent and no discussion of the cultural dichotomy collectivism-individualism and how it influences negotiations. One of these most recent studies is by Zhang et al. (2021) about discovering negotiation beliefs of the Chinese (example of collectivistic culture) and Americans (example of individualistic culture). This study started by formulating country-specific beliefs based on concepts that literature indicated were important for the country in question. They proceeded to test those formulated beliefs to produce a fine-tuned list of negotiation beliefs for Chinese and American people.

Furthermore, the study of Lituchy (2009) discusses the negotiations between the Japanese (collectivistic culture) and Americans (individualistic culture). According to this study, only Japanese-Japanese dyads have reached the win-win outcome, while Japanese-American and American-American dyads did not manage to reach the most integrative outcome. The reason for such an outcome, according to Lituchy (2009), lies in the fact that in collaborative cultures negotiators try not to be competitive, but rather cooperative, arguing that suppressing "I" in favour of "We" lies at the core of a collaborative culture, while maximizing one's own gains is a trait of an individualistic culture.

However, differences in culture can play a role not only in the process of negotiation, but also before. Volkema et al. (2016) analyse the influence of the collectivism-individualism dichotomy on initiating negotiations. Apart from rich findings which can also be inferred from the definitions of collectivistic and individualistic cultures, Volkema and colleagues (2016) place an emphasis on practical contributions because of the fact that, in order to achieve the desired results, the culture of the opponent should be taken into account. For example, the representatives of collectivistic cultures should be aware that individualistic opponents may appear more straight-forward and aggressive, while the representatives of individualistic cultures should be ready to recognise hints and indirect requests.

Table 9 below summarizes the discussed literature on the correlation between the individualistic/collectivistic dichotomy and negotiations.

In the works of Zhang et al. (2021), Lituchy (2009), and Volkema et al. (2016) one can find a few patterns. Firstly, they all conduct research based on the collectivism-individualism cultural dichotomy. For Zhang et al. (2021), however, that is where the patterns end. Lituchy (2009) and Volkema et al. (2016), on the other hand, have one more overlapping finding. They both identify matters that negotiators from different cultures should take into account when engaging in negotiations with a person from the other culture (individualistic/collectivistic). For instance, Lituchy (2009) indicates that collectivistic negotiators opt for a collaborative stance when negotiating, and Volkema et al. (2016) caution such collectivistic negotiators against the straight-forward and, arguably, aggressive stance of individualistic negotiators.

Table 9. Individualistic/collectivistic cultures and negotiations

			Outcome of the research	Author
			Collectivistic-individualistic dichotomy must be taken into account when negotiating	Zhang et al. (2021), Lituchy (2009), Volkema et al. (2016)
Different negotiation beliefs for Chinese (collectivistic culture) and Americans (individualistic culture)	Beliefs shared by Americans and Chinese	competition	Negotiation is a game of win or lose	Zhang et al. (2021)
			Threats and warnings are necessary tactics in negotiation	
			Negotiators can use power to overwhelm the other party to gain better outcomes	
			To gain better outcomes, negotiators need to be aggressive and competitive	
			For negotiators, it is more important to gain better outcomes than to care about the other party's feelings	
			The opening offer needs to be aggressive	
			As long as there are opportunities, negotiators can take advantage of others	
		cooperation	The negotiating parties can reach win-win outcomes	
			Even if there are differences in interests, negotiators should still be polite and respectful	
			Negotiators should try to be sincere	
			Negotiators should be prepared to compromise	
			The most important goal for negotiators is to maximise mutual interests	
			Negotiators can be expected to look out for others' interests	
			If negotiators provide information, the other side can be expected to provide information too	
			Most negotiators are trustworthy	
	American-specific beliefs	economic interest	Negotiators' outcomes depend on whether they reach their expected economic goals	
			If negotiators care about the relationship with the other party, then their interests can be hurt	
			If negotiators care about the relationship with the other party, the other party can take advantage of the situation	
			The most important goal for negotiators is to maximise their own interest	
			An important goal for negotiators is to maximise the difference between their own interests and the other side's interests	
		confrontation	Revealing one's true information in negotiation is risky	
			Negotiators should express directly if the opponent makes them uncomfortable	
			Negotiators should not make a concession first but try to let the other side make the first concession instead	
			Only when negotiators make the first concession is it possible for the other party to make a concession	
			Negotiators only use compromise as a last resort	
			It is normal for negotiators to express negative emotions, such as anger	
			Negotiators should directly point out flaws in the other party's statements once they find the flaws	
			Do not expect other negotiators to be frank	
			Negotiators make false claims	
	Chinese-specific beliefs	hierarchy	Negotiators' power comes from whether there is a good alternative	
			Negotiators' power comes from their social status	
			It is uncomfortable to negotiate with an acquaintance	
			Negotiations should be conducted on formal occasions	
			If there is a power distance between parties, the weaker side should let the more powerful side reach their goals	
			Making concessions is a way to show respect to the other party	
		relationship	If a negotiation endangers the relationship with the counterpart, then the negotiator should not negotiate at all	
			In negotiations, it is more important to maintain harmonious relationships than to earn profits	
			If negotiators care about the relationship with the other party, the other party can take advantage of the situation	
			Being aggressive in negotiations is not effective	
			If negotiations do not go smoothly, negotiators should change or adjust their goals and strategies to adapt to the other party	
			Negotiators should not haggle over small gains and losses, as there will be ample time for future interactions	
			A compromise is worthwhile if it gains goodwill from the other party even it hurts one's own interest	
The effects of collectivism on integrative outcomes btween Japanese (collectivistic culture) and Americans (individualistic culture)	Empathic concern		Collectivist Japanese negotiators with outgroup partners will have low empathy toward their partners	Lituchy (2009)
			Individualist American negotiators will have low empathy toward their partners, regardless of group membership	
	Collaborating behaviours		Collectivist Japanese negotiators with ingroup partners will use collaborating or cooperating behaviours	
			Collectivist Japanese negotiators with outgroup American partners will use competing behaviours	
			Individualist American negotiators will use competing behaviours, regardless of the negotiating partners	
	Integrative outcomes		Collectivist Japanese negotiators with ingroup partners will reach integrative outcomes	
			Collectivist Japanese negotiators with outgroup partners will reach distributive outcomes	
			Individualist American negotiators will reach distributive outcomes, regardless of their negotiating partners	
			Most integrative outcome of negotiation achieved by Japanese-Japanese dyads (collectivistic-collectivistic)	
The influence of power and Individualism-Collectivism on negotiation initiation			The more relative bargaining power a negotiator has in a situation, the greater his or her likelihood of initiating a negotiation (engaging, requesting, optimizing)	Volkema et al. (2016)
			The more individualist a negotiator, the greater his or her likelihood of initiating a negotiation (engaging, requesting, optimizing)	
			An individualist negotiator with high relative bargaining power will have a greater likelihood of initiating a negotiation (engaging, requesting, optimizing) than will a collectivist negotiator with high relative bargaining power	

2.4.3   The presence of inter-cultural and (pre-)negotiation expectations in existing literature

Section 2.4.1 discussed inter-cultural negotiations and section 2.4.2 continued by discussing the findings of the existing literature with regards to collectivism and individualism in inter-cultural negotiations. This section goes on to discuss the way inter-cultural expectations in negotiations have been described in existing literature. In their book, Gelfand and Brett (2004) highlight the relevance of inter-cultural negotiation expectations in that inter-cultural negotiators will encounter a mismatch of expectations from either party. Logically, the tendency of inter-cultural negotiators to encounter a mismatch of expectations (Gelfand and Brett, 2004) increases the chance that expectations may be violated. The authors stipulate that such violations can lead to higher numbers of negative emotions if the negotiators are not prepared for it. Moreover, they can hamper relation-building which, in certain cultures, is of paramount importance

(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2010). Furthermore, the kinds of expectations that are present at the negotiating table can have practical implications as well. So can expectations of conflict reduce problem-solving abilities and freeze "cognitive schemas" (Gelfand and Brett, 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that varying expectations are a cause for disagreement (Farber & Bazerman, 1989).

Moreover, none of the studies so far has touched the full scope of the current research. Some touched upon the negotiation of expectations for care in individualist and collectivist families between aging parents and adult children (Pyke, 1999), or described conflicts between young children from collectivistic and individualistic cultures in their leisure time (Martínez-Lozano et al., 2011). Others concerned instead with the support of Chinese-American negotiations via "computer mediated communication technologies" (Potter & Balthazard, 2000, p. 7) or the identification of the impact of national identity on individuals' responses to the specifications of their jobs (Croft & Fernando, 2018).

Lastly, Wade-Benzoni et al. (2002) provide examples for the differences in expectations between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. These examples are beneficial to be able to compare the outcomes of this study with established work. Through such a comparison, it is possible to see if the general examples of these authors are aligned with those generated from this study. Moreover, it will be possible to determine if and how the work can possibly be extended.

The overview of the related work can be found below in Table 10.

Table 10. Inter-cultural expectations in negotiations

Concept/finding	Author
intercultural negotiators will encounter a mismatch of expectations from either party	Gelfand and Brett (2004)
the tendency of intercultural negotiators to encounter a mismatch of expectations increases the chance that expectations may be violated	
violations of expectations can lead to higher numbers of negative emotions if the negotiators are not prepared for it	
expectations of conflict reduce problem-solving abilities and freeze "cognitive schemas"	
ciolations of negotiations can hamper relation-building	
varying expectations are a cause for disagreement	Farber & Bazerman (1989)
groups of decision makers from Japan will be more cooperative in an asymmetric social dilemma than will groups of decision makers from the United States	Wade-Benzoni et al. (2002)
groups of decision makers from Japan will share the burden by allocating resources more equally than will groups of decision makers from the United States	
groups of decision makers from the United States will expect others to be less cooperative than will groups of decision makers from Japan	

2.5 RESEARCH MODEL

As discussed above, this paper intends to determine what pre-negotiation expectations are held by individualistic and collectivistic people through the use of Dutch and Chinese participants. To this end, the following (qualitative) variables are defined. First, the dependent variable is the pre-negotiation expectations held by the participants. The independent variable is the following: *cultural background*, that is whether the participant is from a collectivistic culture or an individualistic culture. Finally, the following moderators are considered, *negotiation setting*, meaning a more integrative or distributive disposition, and *relationship*, or whether the parties engaged in negotiation have a positive relationship with one another.

To manipulate the influence of culture, the study comprises participants from both individualistic and collectivistic cultures (The Netherlands and China). Moreover, in the scenarios which will be put forward to the participants, there is a point which places the focus on how the participant would expect the

counterpart to behave if they were friends. This is also the manipulation for the relationship moderator. Lastly, negotiation setting will be manipulated by incorporating an incentive towards either more pro-social behavior or more egoistic behavior into the scenarios presented to the participant.

Finally, the outcome of the experiment is a list of pre-negotiation expectations which are either specific to a culture with collectivistic tendencies, individualistic tendencies or present in both. Through the supposed moderators incorporated in this study, it should also be possible to determine if said moderators indeed influence the pre-negotiation expectations of the participants. A full overview of this model can be found in Figure 1.


Figure 1. Research Model

3. METHODOLOGY

To outline the methodology of this study, this section is structured as follows. First, it discusses the research design from a high-level point of view. Next, the data collection method, selection, inclusion, and exclusion criteria are discussed. Beyond that, this section discusses the research instruments that were used to conduct this study. Finally, the data analysis approach is discussed.

3.1   RESEARCH DESIGN

A great number of different research designs exist: the research can be qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-method (Pawar, 2020). The aim of this study is to discover and formulate culture-specific and shared expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations of Dutch and Chinese negotiators. As shown in the Theoretical Background section, there is not enough research done on the topic, therefore, it is too early to consider either a quantitative research design or mixed-method design, as the latter comprises qualitative and quantitative aspects and therefore still relies on significant findings of prior research in terms of reliable means of measurement to test (causal) links. The idea is to describe the phenomena, to explain them; thus, the qualitative approach is to be used (Jackson, 2007; Pawar, 2020). Nevertheless, Nassaji (2015) argues that there is another type of research which is used interchangeably sometimes with qualitative, namely, descriptive research. According to Nassaji (2015), descriptive research concerns the "what" rather than "how" and "why", and, as long as the goal of this study is to describe the phenomenon, the descriptive research should be used. Therefore, this study use a qualitative design and have a descriptive nature.

Beyond the global study design, there are various ways to approach research. These are deductive, inductive, or abductive (Anderson, 2005). For deductive research, one aims to test existing theories by taking generalisations and reason towards specifics. Inductive research is the other way around in that it aims to develop a theory by using specific observations to reason towards generalisations. Lastly, abductive research combines both the deductive and inductive approaches in that it both generates theory and selects for further investigation, albeit with incomplete information (Kapitan, 1992). Furthermore, this approach is used for discovery, and to describe observable phenomena. As it generates plausible explanations, the abductive approach is a reasonable choice when considering a lack of theoretical background literature (Bamberger, 2018). This study, then, uses the abductive approach as the amount of theoretical information is sorely limited and this study seeks to extend the available knowledge in the area of pre-negotiation expectations and their relation to culture.

3.2   DATA COLLECTION

For data collection, participants were selected based on several factors. Firstly, three Dutch and three Chinese participants were selected. These participants were working adults who, in case they were Dutch, had worked in China or, if they were Chinese, had worked in The Netherlands. Additionally, negotiation was not the part of their primary job description. They were recruited through a participation request sent to various Facebook groups, relevant institutions, and to potential participants directly. Once all responses were in, they were purposively sampled. The reason for using such adults was that they were likely to be aware of their expectations while not having any experience in negotiating business deals, thus increasing the likelihood of them showing culture-specific expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations rather than expectations which had been adapted through practice as there is a direct correlation between age and negotiation performance (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Furthermore, participants were aged 18+, as they needed to give the informed consent for participation, and were proficient in the English language, as the interview was in English and no translator was present. To ensure said proficiency, participants were asked to rate their English prior to engaging in the interview.

3.3   RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

According to Gill et al. (2008), focus groups and interviews are the most common data collection methods in qualitative analysis. Barrett and Twycross (2018) add the observation method to this list as well. As the aim of this research is to discover and formulate the expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations, the observation method of data collection is not the best choice because observation helps a researcher to get a wide array of information and to get an idea of what is happening in a particular situation of interest (Barrett & Twycross, 2018). Moving on, the focus group refers to the group discussion of the topic guided by the researcher (Gill et al., 2008; Barrett & Twycross, 2018), therefore, this method is not applicable for the current study as the aim of the research is to get data from individuals and cluster it to further derive expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations. As such, the most efficient way of data collection for the current study is conducting interviews with the participants. This method allows the researcher to gather information from individuals and to cluster it in the further analysis.

To strengthen the case for using interviews, this study looked for other research which sought to identify the pre-negotiation expectations of some party involved in negotiations. While lots of research touches the influence of the presence or absence of certain expectations on negotiations, there do not seem to be many (if any) papers on the best way to identify the expectations of a party involved in negotiations. Moraes et

al. (2019), for instance, performed a study regarding the expectations of students within an educational system. Concretely, they used meta- and content-analysis. Another study, about the expectations of students, used a phenomenological design (Özer, 2018). Salyers et al. (2015) used surveys and interviews. From these examples, it appears that qualitative, target-driven methods of data collection are effective when identifying expectations of a certain target group, and suggests that conducting interviews with the participants is, indeed, one of the most efficient ways of collecting the data.

These interviews were one-on-one to avoid potential group bias and semi-structured as, on the one hand, they facilitated comparison of themes and, on the other hand they allowed to tailor further follow up questions depending on your participants' response (Saunders et al., 2009). The main limitation of semi-structured interviews is that participants must be guided through the structured part. Furthermore, given that we are still amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and that part of the sample of participants are based in China, the interviews were held online both for the safety and comfort of all involved and because it allowed for the fastest and easiest manner of conducting said interviews. In total there were six interviews, held in English and with no translator present as English fluency was a selection criterion.

The interviews concern dyadic, private, one-time negotiations. This type of negotiation has been considered as the traditional context in previous research (Brodt & Thompson, 2001). Additionally, the negotiation setting will concern one-on-one negotiations as they are a good basis to start from due to their wide-spread use (Dabholkar et al., 1994; Brett et al., 1996; Elo et al., 2015; Brodt & Thompson, 2001) and the relative ease of setting them up compared to team negotiations. Moreover, dyadic compositions are more likely to build trust among the parties involved and cooperate better (Polzer, 1996) which may avoid imagined deadlock scenarios and allow for more data collection.

Content-wise, the interviews were split in three scenarios for each interviewee to manipulate the negotiation setting in terms of dependence on the counterpart (power distribution, Giebels et al., 2000). One scenario sees the interviewee placed in a negotiation context where both parties have equal power and two more where the balance of power is tipped in favour of either the interviewee or their counterpart. In general, more power incentivises more egoistic behaviour (Giebels et al., 2000) which may lead to more distributive motives. The more equal scenario is to incentivise more pro-social motives (Giebels et al., 2000) which may lead to more integrative orientations. For each of these scenarios, participants were prompted to describe what they expected of the behaviour of their counterpart in such a scenario. Specifically, the following questions were put forward and tailored to either the Dutch or Chinese participant.

How do you expect your counterpart to behave in the negotiation if you are friends? The reasons for this question align with those of another. *How do you expect your counterpart to behave in the negotiation if you are not friends*? It has been shown that perceived relationships may well have an influence on expectations because its importance is one of the main differences between collectivistic and individualistic cultures (Hofstede et al., 2010). Moreover, differences in negotiation behaviour are correlated with cultural values (Cohen, 1987; Brett, 2000), and the individualism-collectivism dichotomy has been shown to affect negotiations (Brett, 2000).

The next question is, *how do you expect your counterpart to behave in general?* This question attempts to illicit the participant's views on the culture of their counterpart to provide a more thorough basis for whatever expectations they may have and is closely related to the question which follows it. *How do you*

expect another person of your culture to behave in this situation? Which tries to find the participant's own view of their culture to determine if expectations may match or not based on differing views of the counterpart's culture.

The last two questions pertain to comparing expectations to reality. The first of those is, *what would you do in this situation?* This question checks if the participant would act according to the expectations of their counterpart. Finally, the last question is, *what outcome do you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?* Which checks if there may be a cultural tendency towards integrative or distributive outcomes which is strong enough to overpower the incentives innate to the scenarios.

Given the semi-structured nature of the interview, there was also an opportunity for the interviewer to ask for clarification or further elaboration to maximise the quality of the collected data. For the full interview setup, see Appendix A.

The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and in English for analysis purposes. As such, consent forms were distributed to all participants before the start of the recording to account for any potential personal information which may be part of the recording. Recordings were kept for only as long as they were relevant for the validation of this study. Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Twente ethics Committee.

3.4   DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Before diving into the data analysis, this section outlines the demographic information of the participants.

Table 11. Detailed information about participants

Code of participant	Nationality	Age	Gender	Profession	Work experience in the Netherlands	Work experience in China	Self-rated negotiation experience
D1	Dutch	52	male	IT manager	*not applicable*	Management	very experienced
D2	Dutch	32	male	Business Development Manager	*not applicable*	Anti-counterfeiting online, Dutch Consultate, Chinese start-up e-commerce	very experienced
D3	Dutch	29	male	Product Owner	*not applicable*	Branch Manager	somewhat experienced
C1	Chinese	27	male	PhD student	PhdD student	*not applicable*	somewhat experienced
C2	Chinese	26	female	Entrepreneurship, technology and management	PhD candidate	*not applicable*	no experience at all
C3	Chinese	27	female	Junior Programme Coordinator	Chinese Marketing Specialist, Junior Programme Coordinator	*not applicable*	somewhat experienced

Table 11 above outlines all the information about participants that is available to the researcher. Several important observations can be made:

- *The number of Dutch participants equals the number of Chinese Participants;*

- *All Dutch participants are males;*

- *Age range is 26-52 with the mean 32.17 and the median 41.5;*

- *Work experience of the participants is diverse.*

Table 12. Participants' self-rated negotiation experience

No experience at all (1)	Somewhat experienced (2)	Experienced (3)	Very experienced (4)
1	3	-	2
Mean	2.5 (exactly between somewhat experienced and experienced)		
Median	2 (somewhat experienced)		

As illustrated in Table 12, the self-rated negotiation experience is concentrated towards the lower end of the spectrum though some participants seem to have had considerable negotiation experience.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

Jackson et al. (2007) discuss various analysis approaches used in the qualitative research. The most appropriate out of all is thematic analysis. This method is described in-depth by Braun and Clarke (2012) and Braun and Clarke (2006): these papers provide clear guidelines of conducting the thematic analysis in qualitative research, from coding the interviews to the clustering that is performed based on the concepts or topics that are mentioned most frequently in a particular question of interview. The outcome of coding should be a list of the most frequently occurring concepts that participants have touched upon during the interview. To follow these steps, this study used a combination of content analysis, which Bruan and Clarke (2006) argue is a manifestation of thematic analysis, for analysing the frequency of occurring concepts and the method proposed by Gioia et al. (2012) as their three-step approach corresponds to the most crucial steps of the thematic analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke (2012) and Braun and Clarke (2006).

To confirm that this study could use Gioia et al.'s (2012) method, it was important to confirm the base assumptions on which it operates. Firstly, the assumption that the "organizational world is socially constructed" (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 3). One may confirm that this is so through logical reasoning. Considering an organizational environment, one may observe that people in it behave according to social norms and values which may or may not be equal to those of other organizational environments. However, it is observed in each organizational environment. Therefore, it stands to reason that this assumption holds. Secondly, the assumption that "the people constructing their organizational realities are 'knowledgeable agents'" (Gioia et al., 2012, p. 3). This refers to people's ability to vocalise their thoughts, intentions and actions and explain them. Given that the participants of this study are not isolated from either Dutch or Chinese people and that they have working experience in The Netherlands and/or China, it stands to reason that these participants may be considered 'knowledgeable agents' in that they can vocalise their thoughts, intentions and actions. Their ability to explain them follows from the interview transcripts collected in the course of this study. As such, one may consider this assumption confirmed as well. Lastly, the last assumption is that researchers are knowledgeable agents as well. This follows from the demonstration of the data analysis presented later in this paper. Hence, all base assumptions can be confirmed.

The first step is a so-called first-order analysis in which the researcher keeps close to the words of the participants to generate a (potentially large) number of first-order concepts/codes (Gioia et al., 2012). This study will term these first-order concepts "codes".

For the second step, first-order concepts are transferred to second-order themes which will aggregate the first-order concepts and construct more abstract themes from them. This requires a mental picture which maintains the meaning of the participant but also transfers the wording into a more abstract space (Gioia et al., 2012). These second-order themes are termed "refined codes" in this study.

The third and last step is focused on aggregating the second-order themes into aggregate themes. These are workable theoretical concepts which may be used to explain the observed phenomena and are distilled from the second-order themes (Gioia et al., 2012). These second-order aggregate themes are termed "categories" in this study.

The pivotal next step in the method is to construct a data model which visualises how first-order concepts relate to second-order themes and, from there, to second-order aggregate themes. One may liken this to a flow chart where concepts are continually distilled until one arrives at the aggregate themes. From here it remains to turn the static into the dynamic to build a theory pertaining to the observed phenomena (Gioia et al., 2012). However, given the exploratory nature of this study, one may forgive it for focussing on clearly describing the observed phenomena instead of generating a comprehensive theory about them.

Additionally, quotes were used to illustrate the second-order concepts (themes and aggregates) more clearly and to illustrate potential clashes between what different participants have said. These quotes are marked D1-D3 and C1-C3 where D stands for Dutch Participant and C for Chinese Participant. The number is meant to clearly distinguish them from one another.

Earlier in this section, thematic (content) analysis was mentioned as the method by which this study looks at the frequency of concepts. This is applied to all first-order concepts distilled from the method suggested by Gioia et al. (2012) because these are the closest to the participant and, thus, could give an indication of the agreement between participants which helped forming conclusions about the situations in which participants agree or disagree. Additionally, these frequency tables are used to filter the results obtained from the method suggested by Gioia et al. (2012). For this, the inclusion criterion is that a first-order concept must be mentioned by at least two different participants from the same nationality.

The last steps of the analysis of these concepts involved formulating the expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during negotiations and comparing said expectations with the existing literature to figure out whether there is an alignment. Based on the analysis, the Results section goes more in-depth elaborating on the general findings of this study.

4. RESULTS

This chapter outlines the results which were obtained from the semi-structured interviews described in the previous chapter. These results aim to present the pre-negotiation expectations regarding the behaviour of the negotiating counterparty of Dutch and Chinese negotiators depending on the negotiating setting and the relationship between the negotiators. In our results, the findings that are relevant to the research question of this paper are separated from those which are interesting but came up coincidentally. Using Gioia's method (Gioia et al., 2012), first-order concepts, second-order themes and third-order themes were

extracted from the results (Table 13). The first-order concepts represent the topics and expectations that the participants were talking about during the interviews. The second-order themes abstract the first-order concepts to obtain a category of expectations which do not depend on contextual variables. Lastly, the third-order themes are aggregates of the second-order themes and form groups or types of expectations which may be used in future research as a reference to what has been investigated, a starting point for confirmatory studies, and a set to add to.

Furthermore, this chapter organises the expectations by starting from the third-order themes and moving down to second-order themes until the distilled expectations are clearly formulated. At the end of each section denoted by a second-order theme, a table is presented which shows a contextual overview of all the expectations discussed up to that point.

Table 13. Data model

Codes	Refined codes	Categories
Dutch accommodate slightly	Accommodate the negotiation counterpart	Sacrificing profit
Accommodate friends		
Chinese expect accommodation from friends		
Chinese needs above profit	Needs/desires above profit	
Dutch needs above profit		
Willing to pay more for desired item		
Focus on speed of sale		
Dutch are very direct	Counterpart is up-front/direct	Qualities in negotiations
Chinese are up-front		
Friends are very direct		
Awareness of negotiation position	Awareness of negotiation position	
Avoid aggressive communication		
Dutch sell for low price		
Use weak position of counterpart		
Chinese hold to limits	Party keeps clear limits	Negotiation strategies
Dutch hold to limits		
Chinese insist to test limits		
Win-win through mutual compromise	Integrative outcomes	
Confident win-win by fixing problems		

4.1 SACRIFICING PROFITS

The third-order theme of 'sacrificing profits' denotes two categories of expectations. First, it presents and formulates all the expectations that make up the 'accommodating the counterpart' second-order theme. These are expectations through which one or both parties are expected to sacrifice their profits to accommodate their partner. Beyond that, this section presents and formulates the expectations that make up the 'needs/desires above profit' second-order theme. This theme consists of expectations which indicate that one or both parties is willing to sacrifice their profit because they consider something else to be of greater importance. As it is the case with all expectations in this chapter, the expectations presented here are contextualised by the power position of the parties and by the relationship between the negotiating parties.

4.1.1 Accommodating the counterpart

The first theme which emerged from the data was that of 'accommodating the counterpart' in negotiations. When participants mentioned something which makes up the second-order theme of 'accommodating the counterpart', they did so by describing what kind of actions would be accommodating. The Chinese participants, in particular, unanimously agreed that Dutch people are likely to accommodate their

negotiation partner to some small extent, usually in a monetary way. Interestingly enough, all Chinese participants mentioned this only with regards to the first scenario, where both parties need one another, and never in the general sense. This is very well illustrated by the following quote from one of the Chinese participants:

"I think he [the Dutchman] would be quite calm and willing to sacrifice a bit, but just a bit" (C3)

Dutch participants, on the other hand, did not consider Dutch people, or indeed themselves, to be accommodating in negotiations. There was one Dutch participant who did feel inclined to accommodate their counterpart, but this was mentioned not in the context of scenario one, but scenario three. This is what they had to say about it:

"I would want to get enough for my ticket back home, so [...] 350 euros and perhaps a bit more. And then I would offer to ship the product myself" (D2)

Chinese participants seemed to feel much the same towards themselves and their fellow countrymen as the Dutch participants on this matter. Unfortunately, the point of Dutch and Chinese people considering themselves to accommodate their counterpart was not mentioned enough to contribute to the research question of this paper, but it may be an interesting point worth investigating for future research. The following quote illustrates the point of view of the Chinese participants:

"If it's way cheaper than what I have in mind, [...] then I would just blow off the deal. [...] If it's like 10 euros cheaper, then it's not gonna change anything" (C3)

From these results, one may derive the following expectation.

E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing.

However, matters seemed to change when the participant is a friend of their negotiation counterpart. Chinese participants, specifically, seemed to feel very strongly about friendship and appear to feel inclined to accommodate or assist their friends almost whenever they could. This was mentioned in the context of all scenarios and in the most general sense possible. Dutch participants seemed in agreement with their Chinese counterparts though to a lesser extent as, while all Chinese participants mentioned the importance of accommodating their friends, not all Dutch participants did the same, though they unanimously agree that accommodating friends is important to the Chinese. The following quotes summarise this rather well:

"I would stick with the price I wanted [...] but if it's my friend, [...] I would just ask how much money you want to pay [...] if it's doable then I would just accept it" (C3)

"The longer you are in China, the more you sort of think in that type of social system as well [...] I'd probably be fine with, if someone [a friend] would be paying [...] [just] the shipment costs, for example" (D2)

"We had bought many things from them [Chinese company] so there was already an established relationship, and they [Chinese people] value that relationship by giving certain discounts" (D3)

Hence, the following expectation can be formulated.

E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations.

Another thing most Dutch participants agreed on was that, while Chinese people feel strongly about accommodating their friends, they also seem to expect said friends to return the favour. They mentioned this in the context of scenarios one and three. Though only one Chinese participant mentioned this, it becomes interesting because they did so in the context of scenario two. Meaning that they expect some accommodation from their friends when they are in a position of need. To contrast, one Dutch participant likened his experiences to the use of what they called 'social credit'. Meaning that certain acts entitle you to concessions from your counterpart. They described it as follows:

"You have to establish sort of a relationship with anyone before you engage with them [...] Guanxi [Chinese concept focusing on building rapport with one another] can get a lot of things done for you [...] you sort of use [...] the social credit that you have to get these [discounted] type of deals from someone else" (D2)

Lastly, the following quotes further illustrate the thoughts of the Dutch and Chinese participants about expecting things from friends:

"I think [Chinese people would react] <u>a bit annoyed when you don't comply</u> to their price [when buying something from them] [...] but not grumpy, but like funny annoyed and trying to get you towards the price they want to sell it for" (D3)

"I expect the Dutch guy [who is a friend] can tell me his urgency and what the lowest price [is that] he can accept and tell me the reason why" (C1)

This leads to the following expectation.

E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position.

Table 14. Overview of second-order theme: accommodating the counterpart

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends		E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing	
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends			
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends			
Scenario-independent	**Friends**			E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends			

Note: regarding Table 14, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.1.2 Needs/desires above profit

The next second-order theme that presented itself suggests that profit may not be everything. One common trend among both the Dutch and the Chinese participants was that they appear to place their more immediate needs above making a profit. Both the Dutch and Chinese participants mentioned this in all three scenarios, though only the Dutch participants commented on it in the general sense. One particular example is that, if a deadline draws near, thoughts of making a profit make room for making the deadline. The following Dutch participant illustrates it well:

"So [...], in the beginning, [...] the right price would be 350 euros [...], but the closer I'm going to get to the point where I'm going home, I will definitely drop the price, because otherwise [...] I would just leave the wardrobe there and don't have anything at all" (D3)

This leads to the following expectation.

E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit.

An interesting point on this note is that, while most Dutch participants expected Chinese people to feel quite at ease with not being able to sell at all, most Chinese participants also indicated that they would

rather focus on making the sale before the deadline than consider leaving their goods behinds. What makes it more interesting is that all Chinese participants who mentioned this only did so in the context of the first scenario. The following quotes illustrate the thoughts of the Chinese and the Dutch participants and indicate a certain contrast.

"I do want to book the tickets as soon as possible, [...] [so] I wouldn't want to invest more time in it [selling the wardrobe]" (C3)

"But I do think they [Chinese people] make decisions really quick. They're far more flexible than Dutch people in that respect. And I think that they wouldn't sweat over losing some money on their way back home, they would probably just see this as some additional costs for leaving" (D2)

This gives rise to the following expectation.

E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all.

Lastly, both Dutch and Chinese participants indicated to be willing to pay more money for something that they really want. In this case, the agreement between participants seems almost absolute as both Dutch and Chinese participants mentioned this only in the context of scenarios one and three. The only difference being that the Dutch participants also claimed it in the general sense while the Chinese participants did not. One might consider explaining the interesting observation of this particular point only being raised in scenarios one and three by positing that Dutch and Chinese people may be more inclined to paying more when they are in an equal or better position than their counterpart. Unfortunately, no light can be shed on why this might be the case from the data that was collected. The following quotes illustrate the thoughts of the participants:

"I would, maybe, if I really wanted to have it [the wardrobe], I would not pay 300 euros [high-end price], but then a small negotiation could happen" (D3)

"If I really want it [...] then I would be willing to pay more money for it" (C3)

It should also be noted that these behaviours did not change if the participant was friends with their counterpart. The earlier finding that Chinese participants thought it important to accommodate friends, while it could be considered a need or desire, was significant enough to warrant its own category and, furthermore, did not relate to any tangible need or desire from the participants. This gives rise to the sixth expectation.

E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.

Table 15. Overview of second-order theme: needs/desires above profit

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends	*E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all*	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends			
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends			*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Scenario-independent	**Friends**			E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends			E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit

Note: regarding Table 15, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.2 QUALITIES IN NEGOTIATIONS

The next third-order theme to result from the interviews is the theme of 'qualities in negotiations'. This theme refers to individual qualities or traits that the participants identified in their counterparts. Two second-order themes resulted from the expectations of the participants. The first, 'counterpart is up-front/direct', presents the expectations that one or both negotiating parties are either up-front, honest, open, and forthcoming with information, or that one or both negotiating parties communicate in a direct manner. The second, "awareness of one's negotiation position", formulates the expectations that consider one or both parties to be aware of the (power) position they are in.

4.2.1 Counterpart is up-front/direct

As will be discussed later in this chapter, Dutch and Chinese participants identified two major qualities or traits in their counterparts: the quality of being up-front and awareness of negotiation position. The quality of being up-front or direct was the first to be indicated to such an extent that it became a second-order theme in and of itself. Firstly, there was a perception among all Chinese participants that Dutch people, in

general, are very direct. The Chinese participants were unanimous in mentioning this in the first scenario and in the general sense as illustrated by the following quote:

"I expect the Dutch person can [...] put forward his requirement [...] in a very strict forward way" (C1)

This gives rise to the following expectation.

E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing.

Regarding the Chinese, most Dutch and Chinese participants seem to agree that Chinese people tend to be rather up-front. This differs from being direct in that it was used to refer to honesty and the tendency to volunteer information while directness refers to bringing across information in a straight-forward, to-the-point manner. Both the Dutch and the Chinese participants touched upon this in all three scenarios, though only the Chinese participants mentioned it in general. The following quote illustrates this well:

"I think they'll [Chinese people] be pretty up-front about it [being in a weaker position]" (D2)

This suggests the following expectation.

E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position.

Lastly, while to the Dutch participants it did not appear to occur, most of the Chinese participants indicated that they feel that their Dutch friends in these scenarios would be rather more direct than Dutch people in general though it was only mentioned in the first scenario which could indicate that such friends do so mainly in a situation where both parties are on equal footing. One Chinese participant said this on the matter:

"If this person [the Dutch counterpart] is one of my friends, [...] he or she [may] behave very directly" (C1)

This finding reveals the following expectation.

E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart.

Table 16. Overview of second-order theme: counterpart is up-front/direct

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*	E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart	
	Not friends	E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends			
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends			*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Scenario-independent	**Friends**			E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends			E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position

Note: regarding Table 16, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.2.2   Awareness of one's negotiation position

This second-order theme arose because participants repeatedly mentioned that they believe one of the negotiating parties to be keenly aware of their negotiation position. This constitutes the second major quality that was identified in the interviews. In those literal words, however, it was applied mostly to Chinese people. Both by Chinese and Dutch participants. Chinese and Dutch participants also overlapped in mentioning this with regards to all three scenarios with the Dutch participants going as far as to consider it a general quality. The following quotes give a good impression of what these participants said:

"Chinese people in general are very aware of their position within a negotiation process" (D3)

"I think I am in a weaker situation and [...] I am afraid that if I insist on the condition I want, I may [...] lose everything" (C2)

This result leads to the expectation listed below.

E10: Both Chinese and Dutch people expect Chinese people to be aware of their own negotiation position.

Nevertheless, there were other indications which may suggest an awareness of one's negotiation position. Firstly, most participants indicated that, when their partner is in a weak negotiating position, they believe the partner will sell for a lower price. This implies that the partner would be aware that they are in a weak negotiating position. The interesting part of this observation, however, is that for both Dutch and Chinese participants 'the partner' was almost always considered to be the Dutch party. Furthermore, this point was raised exclusively in scenario two even though the Chinese participants would technically be at a disadvantage as they need their partner. However, perhaps this can be connected to an earlier finding where it was mentioned that Chinese people may expect certain things from their friends. The following quotes give a good illustration:

"If he [the Dutch person] just wanna get money and he doesn't care about how much he gets and he just wants to get money. I think he may sell this [the wardrobe] at [a] very low price" (C2)

"In this situation [where I'm in a weak position] I would be even quicker to give in [than if we were on equal footing], [...] there are just lower chances to sell the wardrobe" (D3)

The following expectations can be distilled from this.

E11: Dutch people expect to sell their item for less money when they are in a weak position.

E12: Chinese people expect Dutch people to sell their item for less money when they are in a strong position.

Lastly, both Dutch and Chinese participants mentioned that they would make use of the (weak) negotiating position if their counterpart was in such a position. This implies that both Dutch and Chinese people feel confident about being able to tell when their opponent is in a weak negotiating position. One interesting observation is that Dutch participants mentioned this in every scenario while the Chinese participants only mentioned it in scenario three. The following quotes also speak to this end:

"I would probably make use of that [advantageous] position as well" (D2)

"I expect him [the Dutch person] to sell the wardrobe for a very low price [...] because he's [in an] emergency and I'm not. I can say it to him" (C1)

This brings forth the following expectation.

E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation.

E14: Chinese people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart if the counterpart is in a weak position.

Table 17. Overview of second-order theme: awareness of one's negotiation position

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*	E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart	
	Not friends	E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*		
	Not friends	E11: Dutch people expect to sell their item for less money when they are in a weak position	E12: Chinese people expect Dutch people to sell their item for less money when they are in a strong position	
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends		E14: Chinese people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart if the counterpart is in a weak position	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Scenario-independent	**Friends**			E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends	E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation		E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position E10: Both Chinese and Dutch people expect Chinese people to be aware of their own negotiation position

Note: regarding Table 17, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.3 NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES

The last third-order theme, 'negotiation strategies', aggregates the expectations about the kind of strategies one or both of the parties employ during negotiations. This theme resulted from two second-order themes. First, the second-order theme of 'party keeps clear limits' was constructed based on expectations that one or both of the negotiating parties adheres to clear, or strict, limits when it comes to what a party is willing to lose in a negotiation. The last second-order theme that makes up this section is the one of 'integrative outcomes'. It resulted from expectations of wanting or aiming to reach integrative, win-win, outcomes.

4.3.1 Party keeps clear limits

Similar to the previous section, this second-order theme came into being because of multiple reiterations from multiple participants on the tendency of one of the negotiation parties to 'keep clear limits'. Meaning that a party enters a negotiation with a clear idea of how much they are willing to spend and that they will not exceed this limit.

Dutch participants unanimously agreed that Dutch people adhere to clear limits rather strictly. Furthermore, Dutch participants mentioned this tendency only in scenarios one and three which seems to imply that they may be less strict on this when they need their negotiating partner. Interestingly enough, not many Chinese participants seemed to share the thought that Dutch people keep rather strict limits and, when it was shared, it was done only in the context of the first scenario which may be an interesting finding for future research. Nevertheless, the following quote describes the thoughts of the Dutch participants fairly well:

"You have to be very grounded [...] to know really what is your bottom price [when negotiating with Chinese people]" (D1)

The following expectation can be distilled from this finding.

E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage.

On the other side of the negotiation table, most Chinese participants indicate that they adhere to clear limits too when engaging in negotiations. Moreover, on this count, the majority of the Dutch participants seemed to agree. This is illustrated by the following quotes:

"If the price he [the Dutchman] can accept is lower than what I want, then I will tell him that maybe I will find [another] person to sell [to]" (C2)

"of course, they [Chinese people] have set their boundary very very sharp" (D3)

Perhaps even more interestingly, both Dutch and Chinese participants consider Chinese people to hold to strict limits in scenarios one and two. Meaning that Chinese participants consider themselves to hold to such limits when they need their counterpart and not per se the other way around, but that Dutch participants feel that Chinese people hold to strict limits when said Chinese people have the upper hand besides the situation where both parties are on equal footing.

"If this wasn't the only wardrobe and it was too expensive for them [Chinese people], they would just turn to another" (D3)

The following expectations are the logical result of these findings.

E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart.

E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing.

Furthermore, it seems that both Dutch and Chinese participants consider relaxing the strictness of their limits when they are dealing with friends. For Chinese participants, this ranged from letting go of the limit completely to being significantly more relaxed about it, while Dutch participants mostly considered relaxing it if they did anything at all. The following was said by Dutch and Chinese participants on this subject:

"I think [my] friend is [more] important than anything [...] so whatever [...] price he can pay, I will sell" (C1)

"If it was my friend, I would be much easier with the price, depending on their situation" (D3)

The following expectations are the result of this finding.

E18: Dutch people expect themselves to loosen their limits when the negotiating counterpart is a friend.

E19: Chinese people expect themselves to loosen or completely let go of their limits when the negotiation counterpart is a friend.

Most of the Dutch participants were quite outspoken about one thing: 'Chinese insistence'. Meaning that they indicated that Chinese people would insist quite significantly on certain matters, price chief among them. The Dutch participants seemed to feel that this was particularly common in scenarios one and two. That is, when both parties are either on even footing or the Chinese party has an advantage. The most outspoken participants put it as follows:

"They're [Chinese people] all very eager to make money from you [...] doesn't matter in what way but they will do [everything they can to make the most money from you]" (D1)

"They [Chinese people] just keep nagging about it [buying from them]" (D3)

However, there seems to be another side to the story. One Chinese participant briefly elaborated on the reason behind such Chinese insistence. Moreover, contrary to the feelings of the Dutch participants, this Chinese participant did not think that Chinese people do this when in a stronger position per se. They, too, mentioned this only in scenarios one and two. The Chinese participant who mentioned this put it as follows:

"I still insist that 300 euros is what I want and to see whether he can give more or not" (C2)

When considering negotiating with friends, this behaviour did not seem to change very much which is quite interesting considering that earlier results indicated that friends are very important to Chinese people. Unfortunately, the Chinese participant who commented on this did not provide an explanation as to why this could be and it was not mentioned further, so this elaboration is not substantial enough for answering the research question of this paper but is an interesting finding which may be explained through future research nonetheless. The following quote will have to suffice to illustrate the matter:

"Yeah, [they would] also [nag with people they do not know] but not as much as with friends" (D3)

In short, this results in the following expectation.

E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party.

Table 18. Overview of second-order theme: party keeps clear limits

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*	E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
	Not friends	E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all *E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage* *E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart* *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing *E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing*	
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position* *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*		
	Not friends	E11: Dutch people expect to sell their item for less money when they are in a weak position *E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart* *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*	E12: Chinese people expect Dutch people to sell their item for less money when they are in a strong position *E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing*	
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
	Not friends	*E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage*	E14: Chinese people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart if the counterpart is in a weak position	
Scenario-independent	**Friends**	*E18: Dutch people expect themselves to loosen their limits when the negotiating counterpart is a friend*	*E19: Chinese people expect themselves to loosen or completely let go of their limits when the negotiation counterpart is a friend*	E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends	E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation		E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position E10: Both Chinese and Dutch people expect Chinese people to be aware of their own negotiation position

Note: regarding Table 18, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.3.2   Integrative outcomes

Another example of strategic behaviour is the outcome one is steering for. Specifically, all Chinese participants mentioned that they would be confident in reaching a win-win outcome through 'mutual compromise'. Here, the Chinese participants touched on this in all three scenarios which seems to imply that there is a universal drive for such outcomes. Dutch participants, however, only consider it in scenario one which could imply that there is less of a focus on the desirability of such an outcome among Dutch people than among Chinese people. The following participant illustrates the point:

"Because they [Dutch and Chinese people] both want something [...] they would definitely meet in the middle" (D3)

The following expectations are the logical result.

E21: Chinese people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations.

E22: Dutch people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations when they are on equal footing with their negotiating counterpart.

Table 19. Newly added expectations from second-order theme integrative outcomes

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by Dutch and Chinese
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*	E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart	
	Not friends	E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all *E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage* E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party* E22: Dutch people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations when they are on equal footing with their negotiating counterpart	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing *E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing*	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position* *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*		
	Not friends	E11: Dutch people expect to sell their item for less money when they are in a weak position E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*	E12: Chinese people expect Dutch people to sell their item for less money when they are in a strong position *E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing*	
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends	*E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage*	E14: Chinese people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart if the counterpart is in a weak position	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Scenario-independent	**Friends**	E18: Dutch people expect themselves to loosen their limits when the negotiating counterpart is a friend	E19: Chinese people expect themselves to loosen or completely let go of their limits when the negotiation counterpart is a friend	E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends	E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation	E21: Chinese people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations	E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position E10: Both Chinese and Dutch people expect Chinese people to be aware of their own negotiation position

Note: regarding Table 19, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations.

4.4 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section holds a small overview of all the 22 expectations that were identified in this chapter. Table 20 below depicts a list of the expectations and Table 21 further down gives a full contextual overview of them. Furthermore, in Table 21, expectations marked in the same color (other than black) and with *italic* are the same, but have occurred in different scenarios. The color here is a visual aid to identify such expectations.

Table 20. Overview of identified expectations

Expectation	The holder of the expectation	The expectation is towards	Power position	Friendship
Placement of more direct needs above making a profit	Dutch; Chinese	themselves	n/a	n/a
Significant accommodation during negotiations	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	friends
Willingness to pay more for an item which is greatly desired	Dutch; Chinese	themselves	n/a	n/a
Being up-front about negotiation position	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Being aware of own negotiation position	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Accommodation to some small extent during negotiations	Chinese	Dutch	equal	n/a
Communication in a direct manner	Chinese	Dutch	equal	n/a
Being direct	Chinese	Dutch	n/a	friends
Being insistent during negotiations	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in strong	n/a
Expectation of things during negotiations	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in weak	friends
Being at ease with not being able to make a sale at all	Dutch	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Selling an item for less money	Dutch	Dutch	Dutch in weak	n/a
	Chinese	Dutch	Dutch in strong	n/a
Making use of the position of the counterpart	Dutch	Dutch	n/a	n/a
	Chinese	Chinese	Chinese in strong	n/a
Adhering to strict limits	Dutch	Dutch	equal; Dutch in strong	n/a
	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in strong	n/a
	Chinese	Chinese	equal; Chinese in weak	n/a
Loosening of limits	Dutch	Dutch	n/a	friends
	Chinese	Chinese	n/a	friends
Reaching integrative outcomes during negotiations	Chinese	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Dutch	n/a	equal	n/a

Table 20 above provides a tabular overview of the results of this study. From each expectation, the general core is extracted, and the specifics are displayed in the following columns. "The holder of the expectation" is the nationality of the participants who voiced the expectation. "The expectation is towards" column shows whom the expectation refers to. In this case, "themselves" refers to the holder(s) of the expectation. The "power position" column indicates in which power positions the expectation was voiced. The "friendship" column is marked with "friends" if the expectation was voiced in the context where the negotiators are friends and with "n/a" if it was not. Note that the table should be read line-by-line. In the case where both Dutch and Chinese people hold the same expectation, but refer to different subjects, they are separated on different lines. Finally, the red separator indicates the point from which multiple expectations have the same core but differ in the second or third columns. A different type of overview is presented in Table 21 below. This was done to provide several perspectives on the results. The main difference is that Table 21 follows a matrix structure while Table 20 is row-based.

Table 21. Contextual overview of identified expectations

		Dutch-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Chinese-specific pre-negotiation expectations	Pre-negotiation expectations shared by
Equal power position (Scenario 1)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position*	E9: Chinese people expect Dutch people to be more direct when they are friends when they are on equal footing with their counterpart	
	Not friends	E5: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be at ease with not being able to make a sale at all *E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage* E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party* E22: Dutch people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations when they are on equal footing with their negotiating counterpart	E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing E7: Chinese people expect Dutch people to communicate in a direct manner when both parties are on equal footing E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Weak power position (Scenario 2)	**Friends**	*E3: Dutch people expect Chinese people to expect things from their friends during negotiations when both parties are either on equal footing or the Chinese party is in a weak position* *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*		
	Not friends	E11: Dutch people expect to sell their item for less money when they are in a weak position E16: Dutch people expect Chinese people to adhere to strict limits when the Chinese counterpart is in a position of strength or of equal footing when compared to the Dutch counterpart *E20: Dutch people expect Chinese people to be insistent during negotiations when the Chinese party is either on equal footing with the Dutch party or is in a stronger position than the Dutch party*	E12: Chinese people expect Dutch people to sell their item for less money when they are in a strong position *E17: Chinese people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in a weak position or in one of equal footing*	
Strong power position (Scenario 3)	**Friends**			
	Not friends	*E15: Dutch people expect themselves to adhere to strict limits when they are in situations of equal footing or at an advantage*	E14: Chinese people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart if the counterpart is in a weak position	*E6: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to be willing to pay more for an item which they greatly desire when on equal footing or in a strong position.*
Scenario-independent	**Friends**	E18: Dutch people expect themselves to loosen their limits when the negotiating counterpart is a friend	E19: Chinese people expect themselves to loosen or completely let go of their limits when the negotiation counterpart is a friend	E2: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are inclined to significantly accommodate their friends during negotiations
	Not friends	E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation	E21: Chinese people expect to reach integrative outcomes during negotiations	E4: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect themselves to place their more direct needs above making a profit E8: Both Dutch and Chinese people expect that Chinese people are up-front about their negotiation position E10: Both Chinese and Dutch people expect Chinese people to be aware of their own negotiation position

Note: regarding Table 21, newly added expectations are shown in red. If one expectation is valid for more than one context, it is repeated in each different context, e.g. if it is mentioned in scenarios one and two then it will be shown twice: once for scenario one and for scenario two. This is to indicate that the expectation is valid for each context, not only the first one in which it appears. Such duplicated expectations are given identical text colours, other than red, and are marked in italics to make them easily identifiable when they are not among the newly added expectations. Additionally, while Tables 19 and 21 look very similar, Table 21 represents the final overview of the results. Table 19 represents the last additions that were added to the overview. This is why Table 21 contains no red text while Table 19 does.

5. DISCUSSION

This chapter focuses on discussing the results of this study. To do so, it is separated in three main parts. First, the research model is briefly outlined to refresh what was discussed previously. Additionally, the way this research model contributed and guided the analysis, how the results supported or demanded alterations to the research model, and a conclusion as to the support found for the research model are discussed. Second, each theoretical research gap is addressed by focusing on the third-order themes that relate to it. Meaning that, for each research gap, the third-order themes are briefly elaborated, then through these themes the existing knowledge in the literature is discussed for the research gap. Afterwards, there is a clear identification of the exact novelties that were found through this study as they relate to the research gap in question. Finally, this chapter is concluded some practical contributions which stem from this work.

5.1 RESEARCH MODEL

This section starts by bringing the research model which was defined earlier in this paper back into focus. Figure 2 below is a copy of Figure 1 from earlier in this paper.


Figure 2. Research Model from Figure 1

As can be seen in the figure above, the model starts with the independent variable of cultural background. Then, through the moderators of negotiation setting and relationship (between negotiators) its influence on pre-negotiation expectations is analysed. The result is a list of pre-negotiation expectations which are either specific to the culture of the participant(s) who identified them, or are shared between the cultural backgrounds of the participants.

This research model guided the analysis through informing the contextual nature of the obtained results. This allowed the author to clearly separate and formulate expectations based on the exact context in which they

were made by the participants and resulted in the contextual overviews which characterise the end of each subsection of the previous chapter.

Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, this paper has identified both culture-specific pre-negotiation expectations and those shared between cultures. With that, the outcome of our research model was achieved. Furthermore, the contextual overview of all the identified pre-negotiation expectations shows that some expectations are specific to one or more negotiation setting and that participants expect the behaviour of their friends (and of themselves towards their friends) to differ from that when considering non-friends. It can, then, only be concluded that the research model was confirmed by the results in its entirety.

5.1.1 The research question

Before describing the specific contributions of this paper, this section seeks to discuss the extent to which the research question can be answered by the results of this study. Below, the research question is presented again, and Table 22 is used as an overview of the results presented earlier.

What expectations regarding the behaviour of the counterparty during dyadic negotiations do individualistic (Dutch) and collectivistic (Chinese) negotiators have depending on the distribution of power in the negotiation setting and on the relationship between negotiators?

Table 22: Overview of identified expectations redrawn from Table 20

Expectation	The holder of the expectation	The expectation is towards	Power position	Friendship
Placement of more direct needs above making a profit	Dutch; Chinese	themselves	n/a	n/a
Significant accommodation during negotiations	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	friends
Willingness to pay more for an item which is greatly desired	Dutch; Chinese	themselves	n/a	n/a
Being up-front about negotiation position	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Being aware of own negotiation position	Dutch; Chinese	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Accommodation to some small extent during negotiations	Chinese	Dutch	equal	n/a
Communication in a direct manner	Chinese	Dutch	equal	n/a
Being direct	Chinese	Dutch	n/a	friends
Being insistent during negotiations	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in strong	n/a
Expectation of things during negotiations	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in weak	friends
Being at ease with not being able to make a sale at all	Dutch	Chinese	n/a	n/a
Selling an item for less money	Dutch	Dutch	Dutch in weak	n/a
	Chinese	Dutch	Dutch in strong	n/a
Making use of the position of the counterpart	Dutch	Dutch	n/a	n/a
	Chinese	Chinese	Chinese in strong	n/a
Adhering to strict limits	Dutch	Dutch	equal; Dutch in strong	n/a
	Dutch	Chinese	equal; Chinese in strong	n/a
	Chinese	Chinese	equal; Chinese in weak	n/a
Loosening of limits	Dutch	Dutch	n/a	friends
	Chinese	Chinese	n/a	friends
Reaching integrative outcomes during negotiations	Chinese	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Dutch	n/a	equal	n/a

First, regarding the use of power distribution and friendship as moderators, Table 22, and the wider results, show that these moderators were well chosen. While the number of expectations which indicate the influence of these moderators do not outnumber the more general expectations, they do show that both power distribution and friendship have a meaningful impact on the pre-negotiation behavioural expectations of negotiators.

Furthermore, in broad terms, research question has been answered. Specifically, an overview of expectations held by Dutch and Chinese negotiators was constructed considering the moderators of power distribution and friendship. Nevertheless, it also shows that there are relatively few expectations which indicate the influence of friendship. Moreover, while there are more expectations demonstrating the effect of power positions, they are still a minority compared to the overall number of expectations. Thus, it is suggested that these results are a good start towards answering this research question. It seems likely that future research could find more pre-negotiation behavioural expectations which demonstrate the influence of both friendship and power distribution. This would provide a more thorough, nuanced, and generalisable answer to this research question.

Moreover, while Dutch and Chinese people are representatives of individualistic and collectivistic cultures, respectively, they are not the only such representatives. More depth and nuance may be gained from a larger scale study which includes several nationalities which are representative of these types of cultures. This may also confirm the generalisability of the results presented in this paper.

Lastly, Table 22 shows that it is possible for both Dutch and Chinese people to hold what is, in essence, the same expectation but to view this expectation differently. The expectations below the red separator are good examples of this. Indeed, they show that even different Dutch people may view the same expectation differently. Adding this nuance to the answer to this research question adds a perspective that just because the essence of an expectation is shared, it does not mean that both parties expect the same thing. This may be valuable input to future research should it choose to attempt to confirm or extend the current study.

5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Earlier in this paper, this study identified two separate research gaps which are listed again at the end of this introduction. This section considers each of these gaps in turn and identify the novelties in this study's findings and how said findings contribute to lessening the research gap in question. Finally, the section ends with a summary of the novelties that were discussed.

Contribution 1: The addition to the knowledge base of how differing power positions mediate the relationship between individualistic and collectivistic negotiators and their pre-negotiation behavioural expectations.

Contribution 2: The addition to the knowledge base of how different relations between the negotiating parties mediate the relationship between individualistic and collectivistic negotiators and the pre-negotiation behavioural expectations they hold.

5.2.1 Power positions as a moderator for individualistic/collectivistic pre-negotiation expectations

To address this first research gap, this study's results are categorised based on the power position a participant found themselves in during the interviews. This subsection goes scenario by scenario and outlines the noteworthy findings and expectations that were formulated in the context of the scenario in question. Then, reasons for which these expectations may belong to the scenario under discussions are sought from the wider literature and, finally, the novelties of these findings are illustrated.

Equal power position: From our results, a fair number of expectations were classified as being applicable in a situation where both negotiating parties are on equal footing, 11 in total.

These expectations cover all but one of the second-order themes identified in the results. The missing one is "awareness of one's negotiation position'. As such, a good place to begin is to try and explain why this result

is not represented at all in this scenario. Most of the expectations that gave rise to this second-order theme were formulated because participants expected behaviours which could be implications of positional awareness. As such, they often relate to a scenario in which one party has an advantage over another as, without such an advantage, one might surmise that any exhibited behaviour would be construed as neutral. Indeed, literature does provide a trail which leads to the conclusion that behaviour which indicates an advantage of one party over another would be absent from this scenario by discussing the absence of egoistic behaviour and the beliefs regarding cooperative behaviour held by individualistic and collectivistic people (Giebels et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2021). Nevertheless, no literature has formulated that expectations which may imply positional awareness are effectively absent from individualistic and collectivistic negotiators in a situation of equal power. The novelty of this finding, then, is that this study has formulated such expectations. It is only in knowing that something is or is not the case that one can ponder why it is so. As such, an important implication is that future research may be able to consider why this situation is conducive to the absence of expectations about positional awareness in negotiations while participants of this study did indicate that they expected positional awareness in other scenarios. This study tentatively suggests that this might be the case because the scenario itself enables a position where neither party has an opportunity to exploit nor has to fear for an opportunity being exploited. After all, it is both an individualistic and a collectivistic belief that opportunities will be exploited whenever they appear (Zhang et al., 2021). Taking this away, then, may reduce the need or usefulness of behaviours which indicate positional awareness.

The next logical step is to discuss the novelties that were found with the other second-order themes that were represented. One such novelty is that, for 'accommodating the counterpart', Chinese participants did not consider themselves to be accommodating. This is interesting because collectivistic people appear to believe that making concessions is a way of showing respect, that compromising is worth it if it gains goodwill, and that maintaining relationships is more important than profit (Zhang et al., 2021). As such, this finding is contradictory to existing literature (Zhang et al., 2021). One might consider that, during this scenario, none of these beliefs manifested because of the wider context of the negotiation under consideration. Thus, it is worthwhile confirming whether this conclusion is based on the scenario which the Chinese participants discussed or whether it is based on other contextual variables. Future studies might consider manipulating more contextual variables to determine this.

The next second-order theme, which outlines a tendency of both Dutch and Chinese people to place their 'own needs/desires above profit', also presents a novel point. The surprising point is that this holds for the Dutch participants, though to a lesser extent compared to the Chinese participants, as literature seems to indicate that the economic interests are of great importance and that individualistic people tend to employ more competing behaviours (Zhang et al., 2021; Lituchy, 2009; Giebels et al., 2000). However, it is possible that there are more emotional reasons behind the expectation of the Dutch to be willing to pay more for something desirable. For instance, it is possible that the beauty of the object or its perceived utility have an influence. After all, the difference in the extent to which they are willing to do so with the extent to which the Chinese appear willing to do so is in line with differences in individualism and collectivism (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997).

Among the second-order theme that a 'party keeps clear limits', there is quite some support for the Dutch and the Chinese doing so in a balanced scenario. After all, the literature does mention the individualistic belief that economic interests are very important and that individualistic people tend to exhibit less empathy towards their counterpart, and the collectivistic belief that people may take advantage if you value a relationship during negotiations and that only people in a weaker position should yield to those in a stronger one (Zhang et al.,

2021; Lituchy, 2009). Hence, without a difference in power to force the Dutch to reconsider their limits, it stands to reason that Dutch people would maintain their limits. The Chinese, in turn, may maintain their limits because either they do not consider it necessary to relax them, or to avoid potentially giving their counterpart an advantage. These discoveries are novel in that they provide a clear expectation behind something that may have been observed in a more general setting. It also opens an avenue of research for finding more detailed reasons behind these expectations.

There is one final novel point regarding this scenario, and it relates to Dutch people seemingly expecting win-win outcomes only in a balanced scenario whereas Chinese people expect it regardless of the power distribution. Both individualistic and collectivistic people seem to acknowledge that a negotiation is a win-lose game and that win-win situations are possible (Zhang et al., 2021). While the literature does not outright say why Dutch people expect a win-win outcome in this scenario only, one can synthesise quite a bit. First, Zhang et al. (2021) describes several beliefs for individualistic people but most of them come down to a great importance being placed on their own economic interests. Lituchy (2009) adds that individualistic people are generally less empathetic towards others in negotiations and Giebels et al. (2000) outline that a power imbalance incentivises egoistic behaviour in negotiations. Furthermore, individualism puts an emphasis on the importance of the individual (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Meyer, 2014). Given all this, the literature seems to support this finding as it stands to reason that Dutch people would use their perception to fill in their own expectations. What literature has not done, and what is the novel addition, is formulate the actual expectation. Finding out through searching the literature that this expectation is likely to be there is different from having empirical evidence that it certainly is. With this, future research can determine matters such as whether it is possible to alter this expectation or to explain it in more detail.

Weak power position: This part discusses the novelties in the expectations that participants hold when they were placed in weak power position. Meaning that the participant who formulated the expectation is the one in a weak power position. There are six expectations in total which were categorised into this situation.

There are remarkably less second-order themes represented in this part of the discussion than in the previous one with three out of six being present. One may formulate the first novelty in this situation by explaining the absence of the other three second-order themes, namely, 'needs/desires above profit', 'counterpart is up-front or direct', and 'integrative outcomes'. Given the power imbalance, one may infer that it is likely that one or both parties would consider the use of egoistic behaviour probable as the literature indicates as much (Giebels et al., 2000). As such, more competitive behaviours are likely to take the upper hand of which both individualistic and collectivistic negotiators seem to believe that negotiations are a matter of win-lose, that power can be used to overwhelm the counterpart, that outcomes take precedence over the feelings of the counterpart, and that opportunities will be taken advantage of if they show up (Zhang et al., 2021). Given this, it stands to reason that expectations regarding placing anything above profit, being up-front, or explicitly expecting integrative outcomes are placed by the side. While this conclusion follows fairly directly from the literature, there is no literature at all which states that these kinds of expectations are not present when negotiators are in a weak situation, much less that it is the case for individualistic and collectivistic negotiators. As such, this is a novel contribution to the existing literature on this subject. Future research may consider determining if there are more categories of expectations which fail to show up when negotiators are in a weak position or explain more definitively why they are absent.

Furthermore, at least two of the three second-order themes that are represented can be explained in a similar way. Following from the same literature as above, it can be confirmed that this situation is one of a power

imbalance which may give rise to more egoistic behaviour. This, in turn, may translate into more competitive beliefs taking the forefront and, therefore, a focus on personal gain (Giebels et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2021). This study suggests that this is a prime situation for displaying behaviours which can be associated with an "awareness of one's own negotiation position" and, therefore, it stands to reason that these expectations are present in this particular scenario. Moreover, as the party is always in a weak position in this situation, it is reasonable for expectations on limits to be present as well. An interesting novelty among these findings is that the Dutch participants expected the Chinese to hold to strict limits, but not necessarily themselves. This may be in line with current literature in that individualistic people seek to maximise their own economic interests (Zhang et al., 2021), and, because of the given situation, it may be that the Dutch participants did not see a way to do so. Hence, the focus may have shifted from sticking to what one wants to earn to earning anything at all. On the other hand, this finding may also be contradictory to existing literature as individualistic negotiators seem to have low empathy for their counterpart and, partly because of that, will employ competitive behaviours (Lituchy, 2009; Giebels et al., 2000). In this case, one would expect the Dutch to still fight for what they are after and maintain their limits. However, it may also be that these behaviours are still present but are channelled into just earning anything at all as one of the previous individualistic beliefs did say that they would seek to maximise their economic interests. This may not necessarily mean that those interests would be within the original limits nor that they represent what the Dutch are after in terms of profit. As such, this novelty contributes to the existing literature by introducing some nuance and context into existing theories.

The last second-order theme to be represented is the one of 'accommodating the counterpart'. One may consider this inherently contradictory to existing findings. Except that the only expectation from this theme that was used was the one where Dutch people expect the Chinese to expect things from their friends. Not accommodating anyone themselves seems in line with the literature discussed above (Zhang et al., 2021; Lituchy, 2009; Giebels et al., 2000). However, the introduction that some accommodation is expected adds to the existing literature as, from said literature, one would have to conclude that any accommodation would be absent. Therefore, this novelty provides some more depth to the existing literature.

Strong power position: Compared to the discussion above, the roles are now reversed. Participants in this position were place in a strong negotiating position and asked to formulate their thoughts on the expected behaviour of their counterparts.

Though the above expectations are the only ones that were formulated in this context, they still represent three of the second-order themes that resulted from the analysis. The first one is the shared expectation among both Dutch and Chinese participants that they are willing to pay more for a desirable item which gave rise to the theme of 'desires/needs above profits'. Interestingly enough, this is novel as the literature states that the power imbalance should incentivise more egoistic and competitive behaviours which are associated with beliefs that economic benefits are very important (Giebels et al., 2000; Lituchy, 2009; Zhang et al., 2021). Additionally, a focus on the individual is something known from cultural frameworks for individualistic people (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Meyer, 2014). While the literature also states that collectivistic negotiators do believe in putting things above profit, it also mentions that, in a competitive scene, collectivistic negotiators believe that better outcomes are important (Zhang et al., 2021). As such, while this appears conflicting, this study suggests that there are more factors at play in this situation than the ones discussed in existing literature. One plausible explanation is that there might be an emotional drive which influences the negotiators' decision on how much they are willing to spend. Another is that the negotiators may have a different primary goal in mind than making a profit. In this case, maximising that primary goal

does seem in line with the literature discussed above given this situation where the negotiators are in a strong power position.

A similar argument shows that the existing literature fully supports the other two second-order themes of "awareness of one's negotiation position" and 'party keeps clear limits'. The same sources as above show that there is little that could incentivise Dutch (individualistic) people to not adhere to strict limits when they are at an advantage. Perhaps more interesting is the absence of the same expectation for the Chinese participants. A possible explanation that is in line with current literature could be that collectivistic people are more pro-socially disposed as inferred from the relationship orientation of both their specific negotiation beliefs and their cultural classification in various cultural models (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Giebels et al., 2000; Hofstede et al., 2010; Meyer, 2014; Zhang et al., 2021). Being more pro-social implies a search for integrative outcomes which cooperative negotiation beliefs confirm leads to the belief of being ready and prepared to compromise (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; Giebels et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2021). From this, one may reason that the expectation of adhering to strict limits may indeed not be applicable when the power position is in your favour and, hence, there is little incentive to stick to such limits. This can be inferred from the general tendency in the results of this study where people in a weak position seem to be expecting to obtain less in terms of profit. As such, the main novelty here is that this study formulates a possible explanation for why collectivistic people may not adhere to such strict limits in a strong power position as they indicated they would in a weak power position. An explanation on this subject in and explicit form was hereto absent from the wider literature.

Lastly, while the Chinese may not hold to strict limits in a strong position of power, they do seem to be inclined to use a weak power position of their counterpart. This study suggests that this may be the case because collectivistic people could feel entitled to certain concessions when in a position of power. While the literature does not explicitly mention this as a trait of collectivistic cultures, it does mention that power distance, the perceived distance and level of formality between people in varying positions of power, is often a cultural aspect which stands out as being rather high (Hofstede et al., 2010). This is further supported by literature indicating that there are collectivistic beliefs which mention that people in a weak power position should yield to those in a strong position in negotiations, and that making concessions is a sign of respect to the other party (Zhang et al., 2021). Given the importance of relationships in collectivistic cultures (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Hofstede et al., 2010; Meyer, 2014), it may be inferred that respect is an important point as well, also in the way it combines with power distance. Combine this with the finding that the image one has about their negotiating counterpart influences one's behaviour (Yang et al., 2017) and it seems plausible that the Chinese may project their own values and expectations onto their counterpart. Hence, this may lead to them expecting certain concessions from their counterpart when they are in a strong power position. This particular view has not been explored in wider literature and is, therefore, novel in its suggestion. Future research could benefit from exploring this view further to see if holds under more varying conditions as well.

Scenario independent: In this part of the discussion, the novelties regarding the expectations that were formulated independently of any of the three above-mentioned scenarios are illustrated. In total, eight expectations were formulated in this way.

The first noteworthy thing is that all second-order themes are represented here. The next thing is that most expectations concern rather general expectations such as expected traits or imperatives. The existing literature does support these classes of expectations being scenario-independent through various combinations of cultural traits, negotiation intention, culture-specific or shared beliefs, and types of behaviour but does not

offer a clear explanation of why such expectations are independent of power distribution (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; Giebels et al., 2000; Lituchy, 2009; Zhang et al., 2021). A plausible explanation may be that such general expectations have to do with the image that the negotiator holds of their counterpart, as this has been shown to affect behaviour (Yang et al., 2017). Specifically, when negotiators do not know why or when they expect their counterpart to behave in a certain way, they may fall back on the knowledge that the image of the country or culture of their counterpart that they have and indicate that that is how they would expect their counterpart to behave in any situation. This is not a view that is taken in the existing literature on negotiations, negotiation expectations, or negotiation beliefs, and that is why this is a novel finding. If this explanation is true, then it could help to better understand when negotiators are speaking about pre-conceived expectations and when they are aware of subtle differences and nuances in situations. Future research could confirm this by exploring if this finding holds when more contextual variables are manipulated.

5.2.2 Friendship as a moderator for individualistic/collectivistic pre-negotiation behavioural expectations

For the second research gap, this study looked at how friendship mediated the pre-negotiation behavioural expectations held by individualistic (Dutch) and collectivistic (Chinese) people. The novelties discussed here are split into two parts. Either they relate to expectations where the negotiating parties were friends, or to expectations where the negotiating parties were not friends.

The negotiating parties are friends: In total there were six expectations where related specifically to the situation where the negotiating parties were friends.

Through the above-listed expectations, three second-order themes are represented in a situation where the negotiating parties are friends. The first relates to 'accommodating the counterpart' and the expectations show that the participants mostly expected the Chinese to accommodate their friends. The novelty here is that literature shows that friends are important to both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, even that individualistic cultures are more engaged in friendships, and yet the Dutch participants did not consider themselves as accommodating towards their friends (Hofstede et al., 2010; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Kito et al., 2017). The only support found in the literature outlines that individualistic people believe that caring about a relationship during negotiation leaves one open for exploitation and can hurt one's interests which are considered important (Zhang et al., 2021). Still, this support does not touch upon friendship and, therefore, misses some nuance. Instead, this study suggests that individualistic people care a lot about their close friends, not just any friends. This is in line with literature on cultural frameworks (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, it is possible that when the participants were asked about friends, they considered friends in the broadest possible sense which would result in the reaction that was found. Future research may consider asking a more nuanced question regarding close friends of individualistic people to confirm this explanation. Another interesting point about accommodation is that the Chinese are expected to accommodate friends even though literature indicates that collectivistic people consider negotiating with friends to be uncomfortable (Zhang et al., 2021). This is by no means a contradiction of the literature as there is other literature confirming the importance of friendship and the desire to maintain relationships (Hofstede et al., 2010; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Lituchy, 2009; Kito et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2021). One explanation this study suggests for this is that, if a negotiation reaches a distributive (win-lose) outcome, this might be viewed as a threat to the relationship with the friend from a collectivistic point of view.

Regarding the second-order theme that the 'counterpart is up-front/direct', the finding that (Dutch) friends are more direct than when they are not friends jumps out. There is literature to suggest that, while the Dutch are more engaged in friendships, they also exercise less caution when interacting with friends (Adams & Plaut, 2003; Kito et al., 2017). This suggests that the expectation that directness is exacerbated among friends for Dutch people is well-founded. Even more so because direct communication is a trait generally associated with individualistic cultures (Hofstede et al., 2010; Meyer, 2014). Hence, this finding is fully supported by existing literature but contributes to it by formulating a concrete behaviour of Dutch (individualistic) people when they interact with friends.

Lastly, regarding the second-order theme that a 'party keeps clear limits', there is the finding that both Dutch and Chinese people tend to let their limits slip when negotiating with friends, though Chinese people seem to do this to a greater extent than Dutch people. Given the importance of relationships for collectivistic people, this finding is fully supported by literature from the Chinese side (Hofstede et al., 2010; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Lituchy, 2009; Kito et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2021). When this discussion touched on the Dutch side, it was suggested that the Dutch might consider the questions about friends in a broad sense. At first this might seem contradictory, but this suggestion does not preclude Dutch people from accommodating more general friends as it only stipulates that it may be less likely. In fact, one can imagine that some relaxation of limits is reasonable considering that individualistic people also believe that, while their economic interests are very important, they should be prepared to compromise and look out for the other's interests (Zhang et al., 2021). Combine this with a more engaged treatment of friends in general, and it does seem reasonable that the Dutch would relax their limits slightly for friends, even more general ones (Adams & Plaut, 2003; Kito et al., 2017). Therefore, this novelty contributes to existing literature by providing some nuance to the Dutch (individualistic) treatment of friends in negotiations. Future research may consider finding out just how nuanced the difference between more general friends and more intimate friends are for the Dutch (individualistic) people.

The negotiating parties are not friends: Given that all but six of the expectations are mentioned in a situation where the parties are not friends, it should suffice to say that all second-order themes are represented here. The reasons why some are both here, and in the situation where the parties are friends may not be as interesting as how their representation differs between the situations where the negotiation parties are and are not friends. First, nearly all the expectations in the scenario where the negotiating parties are friends are of a positive type (Liberman et al., 2010) as they relate to what can be done for or by friends of the negotiator. For contrast, the expectations in the situation where the parties are not friends are more of the operative or realistic types (Mautner-Markhof, 1988) as they either concern the process of negotiation or how realistic the negotiator expects their counterpart to be. The literature does not provide an explanation as to why this is. As such, this paper suggests that the general feelings one has towards friends are positive and that that influences one's expectations. The reasoning is that one might consider the relationship important or wishes to help because of something the friend has done in the past. These seem more likely for collectivistic people than for individualistic people through the lens of cultural frameworks, though they do not preclude individualistic people from feeling this way (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars; 1997; Meyer, 2014). The fact that friendship is important, though differently perceived in different cultures, also supports this explanation (Lu et al., 2021; Kito et al., 2017; Adams & Plaut, 2003). This explanation is, in itself, a contribution to the literature on this topic but might be more important as fuel for future research attempting to unlock a more detailed view.

Another difference between these two scenarios is that, in the situation where the negotiators are not friends, the expectations take on a stricter and less accommodating nature. This finding is fully supported by existing literature on cultural models as both individualistic and collectivistic people value their friends and relationships. For individualistic people specifically, it is clear from various negotiation beliefs and cultural models that the absence of friendship would indeed make them stricter and less accommodating in their behaviour (Hofstede et al., 2010; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Lituchy, 2009; Kito et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2021). For collectivistic people, the absence of a relationship they care about may remove the incentive to be accommodating towards their counterparts as is also explained by the same literature. Nevertheless, it is still a novelty to find that friendship seems to be a catalyst in this regard as no current literature has mentioned it as such. Hence, the final theoretical contribution of this paper is the description of the role of friendship on the expectations of accommodating behaviour.

5.3 MAIN THEORETICAL TAKEAWAYS

This section serves as a highlight of what the reader should take away from the theoretical discussion, and illustrates the most important findings and their implications.

First, friendship was found to have a significant effect on the expectations Dutch and Chinese people hold regarding their negotiation counterpart. In fact, it appears to be a catalyst in determining whether an individualistic/collectivistic negotiator behaves in an accommodating fashion or not. This is profound, because, if one understands the role that friendship plays, it is possible to consider it more actively in determining which negotiators are best suited to dealing with, for instance, long-standing clients. Still, the wider literature does not seem to provide much information about friendship in negotiations. Given the apparent significance of this finding, one would imagine that researchers would respond by first validating it, and, then, by extending it.

Another important takeaway is that, when negotiators are in doubt regarding what to expect from their counterpart, they may fall back on the prior knowledge they have regarding their counterpart's background. Meaning that, effectively, they rely on either stereotypes or prior experience. The implication of the former is the most significant as it helps negotiators understand that certain behaviour, which may be based on stereotypes, is an indication that the counterpart is unsure what to expect. Existing literature does indicate the importance of one's background to (negotiating) behaviour, but does not quite extend to the point discussed in this paper.

Finally, it should be considered that the power distribution in a negotiation seems to have the potential to give rise to preconceived notions and expectations about both the process and the outcome of negotiations. An illustration is the Dutch expectation that win-win outcomes can only exist in situations of equal power. This implies that, perhaps, pre-negotiation clarification about the intentions, and goals of the negotiators could paint a more realistic picture which is based on the current situation rather than on pre-negotiation expectations.

5.4 PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

By discovering the common and country-specific pre-negotiation expectations of negotiators from China and The Netherlands, this study gives first-time negotiators as well as managers or consultants, who seek to establish relations with one another, an advantage (Thomas et al., 2021). Such knowledge may help in understanding the communication patterns these negotiators may encounter. Understanding such communication patterns may help in adjusting one's own communication and behavioural styles to the expectations of the counterpart. Such a basis may also provide some aid to communications during Dutch-

Chinese negotiations. This is because negotiation skills are considered specific communication skills (Mills, 2019).

This paper has provided a highly contextual overview of the expectations of Dutch people, Chinese people, and of those shared by both while also taking into account the scenarios in which they are applicable and the relationship one has with one's counterpart. The following is a small practical example of how these expectations can be used.

E1: Chinese people expect Dutch people to accommodate them to some small extent during negotiations where both parties are on equal footing.

To best use the above expectation to one's benefit, it is important to consider that, as a Dutch person, one should maintain a small concession that one is willing to make well in advance. Naturally, this is relevant only if one considers the relationship with the Chinese counterpart to be of importance, as violating expectations can hamper relationship building and give rise to negative emotions (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Moreover, as discussed previously, relationships seem to be important to the Chinese, which is why the violation of expectations may put one at a disadvantage in the future.

E13: Dutch people expect to make use of the position of their counterpart in any situation.

As a Chinese person, one may use the above expectation to understand that, if one faces a Dutch person in a negotiation, one should be careful with the amount of information one volunteers. Especially, the type of information which could put one at a disadvantage. Moreover, it is advisable to always maintain some information which the counterpart is unaware of, and which can be used to hold off any attempts at probing your position for weaknesses.

6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

As any research, this work has certain limitations that need to be considered. Firstly, only six interviews were conducted. Although the important findings with regards to the research question were discovered, the small number of and, consequently, reasonably big diversification among the participants may be a limitation to the generalisation of the results (Saunders et al., 2009). This limitation can be also attributed to the limitation of the research method – interviews, as, according to Boyce and Neale (2006), in-depth interviews use small samples and there is no room for using random sampling methods. In the future research this limitation can be overcome by conducting more interviews with Dutch and with Chinese participants to ensure the sufficient amount of data.

Secondly, although there were male and female people participating in the study, all Dutch participants were male, so no heterogeneity was present in this aspect which raises the question whether the expectations identified in this study could relate to a male way of thinking or whether they are generalisable. Future research should strive for a more representative sample. Similarly, though there was diversification in the professions of participants, most of them are related to the IT field, therefore, it may be a limitation to generalisation of the results (Saunders et al., 2009). This is the case because, as Saunders et al. (2009) outline, the selected sample should be representative of the whole population under investigation. Having a group with no gender diversification or more focused expertise could prevent these results from being generalisable to the point where expertise has no imaginable impact. Similar reasoning holds for the heterogeneity of gender as it may be that Dutch men experience these matters differently to Dutch women. In future research, greater care should

be taken to guarantee the heterogeneity of the participants (number of males and females; number of Dutch and Chinese participants; work experience in the country of interest) to extend the findings of this study.

Lastly, one of the selection criteria was proficiency in English. The English language was not native for either representatives of the Dutch culture, or for representatives of the Chinese culture, though every participant claimed that it was comfortable for them to be interviewed in English. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that participants were limited in their ability to fully express their thoughts and expectations. As the last suggestion to overcome the limitations of this study, the future researcher may consider conducting interviews in the native language of participants to ensure that participants can express themselves without any burdens.

7. CONCLUSION

Given China's growing influence on the world stage, it is likely that many people may find themselves in the situation where they need to negotiate with Chinese people. This study, therefore, has sought to supplement the current body of knowledge with regards to pre-negotiation expectations between Dutch and Chinese people. In the results of this study, 22 separate pre-negotiation expectations which were divided into Dutch-specific, Chinese-specific, and common expectations were identified. These expectations were derived from seven different categories which described accommodation, needs/desires, directness, awareness of one's position, limits, strategies, and outcomes of negotiations. Besides these varied topics, the expectations that were identified were placed in the context of three separate scenarios which described the power distribution between the negotiation parties. They were further divided based on whether the expectation was made towards friends or towards people who were not friends. Finally, this article proposes that these expectations may be used as a guide for future research to build on or to use for verification purposes. Additionally, this study identified several interesting side-discoveries which, when worked out, may well prove insightful. This study further proposes that there are likely many more pre-negotiation expectations to be found which may help the two cultures discussed in this paper understand one another better in negotiation situations. As such, in the interest of furthering and fostering mutual understanding, this study suggests that it is time to give pre-negotiation expectations between different cultures some more light in the current literature landscape. In short, this study has contributed to the existing body of knowledge by, first, formulating a varied, context-aware, number of pre-negotiation behavioural expectations for individualistic (Dutch) and collectivistic (Chinese) people, and by addressing the theoretical knowledge gaps which were associated with the use of negotiation setting (power distribution) and relationship (friendship) as moderators in establishing these expectations.

APPENDIX

Table A1, Table A2 and Table A3 below describe the interview set-up for a Chinese participant. Table A4, Table A5 and Table A6 below describe the interview set-up for a Dutch participant.

Table A1. Chinese - You both need each other.

Situation: **You both need each other**
You have been living in The Netherlands for a year. Currently you are renting an apartment in Amsterdam, but you are planning on going back home in 14 days. During your life in Amsterdam you bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. You want to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because you need the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.
You have posted the advertisement online on Facebook marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before you checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.
Today you received a message from one of the prospective Dutch home-seekers. The person offers 250 Euros for the wardrobe, but indicates that they are open to small negotiation about the price, *however, their budget is quite limited and they cannot afford the exact same new wardrobe.* You decide to negotiate. *You need the money, and you know that this person needs this wardrobe as soon as possible, and you know that currently your advertisement is the only one with such a wardrobe in Amsterdam.*

Questions:
1. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?
2. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?
3. How do you expect a Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?
4. What would you do in the described situation?
a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?
5. How do expect another Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?
6. What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

Table A2. Chinese - You need the partner.

Situation: **You need the partner**

You have been living in The Netherlands for a year. Currently you are renting an apartment in Amsterdam, but you are planning on going back home in 14 days. During your life in Amsterdam you bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. You want to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because you need the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.

You have posted the advertisement online on Facebook marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before you checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.

Today you received a message from one of the prospective Dutch home-seekers. The person offers 250 Euros for the wardrobe, but indicates that they are open to small negotiation about the price. *You know that your advertisement is not the only one available right now on the Facebook Marketplace in Amsterdam, furthermore, you know that there is a cheaper wardrobe of the same kind, and your potential Dutch client might opt for that one.*

Questions:
1. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?
2. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
    b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?
3. How do you expect a Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?
4. What would you do in the described situation?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?
5. How do expect another Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?
6. What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

Table A3. Chinese - Partner needs you.

Situation: **Partner needs you**

John, a Dutchman working in China, has just completed his work in Beijing. Currently he is renting an apartment in Beijing, but he is planning on going back home in 14 days. During his life in Beijing he bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. He wants to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because he needs the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of the departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.

He has posted the advertisement online on marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before he checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.

Today you, being a prospective Chinese home-seeker planning to go back home with no urgency, sent him a message, willing to buy the wardrobe for 250 Euros. You also indicate that you are open to small negotiation about the price. The d*utchman knows that his advertisement is not the only one available right now on the online Marketplace in Beijing, furthermore, he knows that there is a cheaper wardrobe of the same kind.*

Questions:
1. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?
2. How do you expect this Dutchman to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
    b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?
3. How do you expect a Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?
4. What would you do in the described situation?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?
5. How do expect another Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?
6. What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

Table A4. Dutch – You both need each other.

Situation: You both need each other
You have just completed your work in Beijing. Currently you are renting an apartment in Beijing, but you are planning on going back home in 14 days. During your life in Beijing you bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. You want to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because you need the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.
You have posted the advertisement online on marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before you checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.
Today you received a message from one of the prospective Chinese home-seekers. The person offers 250 Euros for the wardrobe, but indicates that they are open to small negotiation about the price, *however, their budget is quite limited and they cannot afford the same new wardrobe.* You decide to negotiate. *Furthermore, you are aware that this student needs this wardrobe as soon as possible, and you know that currently your advertisement is the only one with such a wardrobe in Beijing.*

Questions:

   7.   How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?

   8.   How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
   b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?

   9.   How do you expect a Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
   a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?

   10.   What would you do in the described situation?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?

   11.   How do expect another Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?

   12.   What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

Table A5. Dutch – You need the partner.

Situation: You need the partner

You have just completed your work in Beijing. Currently you are renting an apartment in Beijing, but you are planning on going back home in 14 days. During your life in Beijing you bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. You want to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because you need the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.

You have posted the advertisement online on marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before you checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.

Today you received a message from one of the prospective Chinese home-seekers. The student offers 250 Euros for the wardrobe, but indicates that they are open to small negotiation about the price. *You know that your advertisement is not the only one available right now on the Online Marketplace in Beijing, furthermore, you know that there is a cheaper wardrobe of the same kind.*

Questions:

1. How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?
2. How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
    b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?
3. How do you expect a Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?
4. What would you do in the described situation?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?
5. How do expect another Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?
6. What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
    a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

Table A6. Dutch – Partner needs you.

Situation: Partner needs you

A Chinese person John has just completed his work in Amsterdam. Currently he is renting an apartment in Amsterdam, but he is planning on going back home in 14 days. During his life in Amsterdam, he bought a new IKEA wardrobe for 500 Euros. He wants to sell it as soon as possible and for as much money as possible because he needs the money from selling the wardrobe for buying a ticket back home. Obviously, the closer the date of departure, the higher is the ticket price. Right now, the ticket costs 350 Euros.

He has posted the advertisement online on Facebook marketplace with the possibility of bidding, but before he checked that this exact piece of furniture (used) costs on average 300 Euros.

Today you, being a prospective Dutch home-seeker, sent him a message, willing to buy the wardrobe for 250 Euros. You also indicate that you are open to small negotiation about the price. The *Chinese person knows that his advertisement is not the only one available right now on the online Facebook Marketplace in Amsterdam, furthermore, he knows that there is a cheaper wardrobe of the same kind.*

Questions:

1. How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are not friends with you?
2. How do you expect this Chinese person to behave during negotiation, if they are one of your friends?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, where do the differences come from?
   b. **Potential follow-up**: In your opinion, why is there no difference?
3. How do you expect a Chinese person to behave during negotiations in general?
   a. **Potential follow-up:** Why do you think the behavior would be different in this particular scenario?
4. What would you do in the described situation?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would you behave like this?
5. How do expect another Dutch person to behave during negotiations in general?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why would your behavior differ in this particular situation?
6. What outcome would you expect in this scenario (win-win/win-lose)?
   a. **Potential follow-up**: Why do you expect such an outcome?

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