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Master Thesis

MSc Business Administration

Business Administration – Purchasing & Supply Management 2022

Topic:

**Strategic Adaptability in Negotiations, Linked to Negotiation Result, Gender,
Negotiation Environment, and Culture**

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26th of April 2022

Abstract

Purpose: This study explores what link can be established between strategic adaptability, (economic) negotiation outcome, gender, and culture in an online face-to-face setting. Little is known about strategic adaptability and commercial negotiations. Also, does being strategically adaptable lead to better (economic) outcomes such as higher individual results or reaching a Pareto Efficient deal. For centuries, men have dominated the distributive parts of negotiation and negotiation research. Though newer research shows that this is less likely in online negotiations and that women are more claiming than they are in person. Lastly, globalization has made it easier to connect with different cultures. This entails also being confronted with different negotiation behavior.

Methodology: – Left out due to confidentiality

Findings: – Left out due to confidentiality

Limitation: – Left out due to confidentiality

Contribution: – Left out due to confidentiality

Keywords: Strategic Adaptability, Turning Points, Negotiations, online (face-to-face), Gender, Culture, GLOBE, Negotiation Outcome, Pareto Optimum

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my first supervisor Dr. Aldis Sigurdardottir whose sincerity, encouragement, guidance, passion, and support I will never forget. In addition, I am especially grateful for the expertise, perspective, and insights that she has shared with me. Mostly I would like to thank her for introducing me to the field of negotiations and inspiring me to make it the center of my academic and professional career. Her passion for the subject of negotiations has inspired me beyond measure.

Furthermore, my gratitude extends to my second supervisor Drs. Henrike Fitschen for her constant assistance, feedback, and overall guidance throughout my master thesis. Her support and availability to discuss the research have been tremendous. She has introduced me to the field of strategic adaptability in negotiations. Her work around strategic adaptability will continue to inspire future students. Moreover, I would like to thank all the participants of this study, without whom this work would have not been possible.

Last, but not least, my warm and heartfelt thanks go to my friends, family, and employer for the tremendous support they have given me. Without this, this thesis would not have been possible. Thank you for all the support.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables	6
Abbreviations	7
1. Introduction	8
1.1 Negotiations and Their Relevance	8
1.2 Understanding how Strategic Adaptability, Gender, and Culture Affect Negotiation Economic Outcomes	9
1.3 Problem Statement.....	10
1.4 Research Aim; Strategic Adaptability in Negotiations, Linking to Negotiation Result, Gender, Negotiation Environment, and Culture.....	12
1.5 Structure of the paper:.....	12
2. Theoretical Framework.....	13
2.1 Negotiation Process/Phases.....	13
2.2 Pareto Efficiency and Pareto Optimum.....	16
2.3 Types of Negotiations: Distributive, Integrative, and Combined.....	17
2.3.1 Distributive (Win-Lose) Negotiations	18
2.3.2 Integrative (Win-Win) Negotiations.....	18
2.3.3 Combined Approach: Most Used in Negotiations.....	19
2.3.4 Strategic Adaptability.....	20
2.4 Turning Points	21
2.4.1 Process Dynamics: Process Maintenance and Process Shifts	23
2.5 Gender, influencing negotiation behavior	24
2.5.1 Stereotypes & Status.....	25
2.5.2 Gender; Virtual vs Face- to- Face	26
2.6 Culture in Negotiations	29
2.6.1 Framework	29
2.6.2 Limitations of the GLOBE Study	30
2.6.3 GLOBE cultural practice scores	30
3. Methodology – Left out due to confidentiality	32
4. Results – Left out due to confidentiality	32
5. Discussion – Left out due to confidentiality	32
6. Conclusion – Left out due to confidentiality	32
7. Limitations & Future Research– Left out due to confidentiality	32

References	33
Appendices	46
Appendix 1 - Strategic Adaptability Scale.....	46
Appendix 2 – Left out due to confidentiality	47
Appendix 3 – Left out due to confidentiality	47
Appendix 4 – Scatterplot Linear Regression SRH1- Before and after outlier removal	47
Appendix 5 – P-P Plot Linear Regression SRH1- Before and after outlier removal	48

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Negotiation Stages.....	14
Figure 2 Types of negotiation behavior by Saorín-Iborra	20
Figure 3 Initiating and concluding the turning point 3	22
Figure 4 Main communication medium in reviewed studies	27
Figure 5 Dependent variables in the reviewed studies over the last decades	28
Table 1 Overview of Culture Clusters scored according to GLOBE Study (practice scores).....	32
Table 2 Demographic Characteristics of Participants, collected via Pre-Questionnaire	32
Table 3 Variable Overview including Dependent and Independent variable, Measure and Analysis.....	32
Table 4 Code distribution summary of the 32 negotiations	32
Table 5 Distribution of SA over the quartiles	32
Table 6 Type of ADAP combined for all quartiles.....	32
Table 7 Summary of Regression Analysis for SA predicting Individual Scores showing Significant effect and Adaptability on Individual Economic Outcome	32
Table 8 Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for SA predicting Pareto Optimum showing that SA increased the likelihood of Pareto Optimum.....	32
Table 9 Result Independent Samples T-Test for SA between Men and Women.....	32
Figure 6 SA for Icelandic and non-Icelandic participants based on GLOBE.....	32
Table 10 Result Independent Samples T-Test for SA between Iceland and other Nationalities	32

Abbreviations

ADAP	Adaptability
B2B	Business to Business
COE	Coefficients
DIS	Distributive
F	Female
F2F	Face-to-face
FM	Financial Manager
GLOBE	GLOBE Study
IGC	In-group Collectivism
INT	Integrative
IO	Individual Outcome
M	Male
NEG	Negotiation
OO	Overall Outcome
PE	Pareto Efficiency
PM	Purchasing Manager
PO	Pareto Optimum
P-P Plot	Probability – Probability Plot
SA	Strategic Adaptability
SD	Standard Deviation
SP	Scatter Plot
TP	Turning Point

1. Introduction

1.1 Negotiations and Their Relevance

Negotiations are omnipresent and can be observed in a private environment as well as a business environment. While globalization and technological advancements have opened the world up and seemingly reduced distances between negotiation partners and cultures, COVID-19 has changed the focus of academic research.¹ Now more than ever, academic researchers have started to investigate different negotiation environments, as the global pandemic has shifted most negotiations towards an online environment. Next to specific negotiation settings, there are also different areas where negotiations are essential. Some common examples of the negotiation areas are relationships, salary negotiations, hostage negotiations, and business negotiations. With negotiations being represented in many fields, it is no surprise that there are multiple definitions for the term “negotiation”.

Negotiation is a process; a series of actions, sometimes based on a pattern. It is not a single occurrence but includes various options along the whole process.² Seeing the existing definitions and their variation of responsibility and areas of relevance it is important to note that “negotiating” is a skill and as such can be taught, improved, and tailored to the area of demand. Therefore, individuals seek instructions on how to improve their negotiation behavior and ultimately their negotiation outcome.³ When looking at the general negotiation behavior, negotiators should and usually will try to maximize their profits, keeping the counterpart satisfied. The earlier focus of research has been on economic outcomes,⁴ but an increasing number of studies have been analyzing the social-psychological outcomes, which can be referred to as “relational capital”.⁵ Negotiators will either unintentionally or intentionally deploy behaviors, tactics, or strategies during a negotiation that change the course and the outcome of the negotiation. In past research, academic researchers have already distinguished between “integrative” and “distributive” behavior, which has led to it being an industry standard to distinguish negotiation behavior and strategy.⁶ Negotiation outcomes include both, integrative and distributive features. With “integrative”, the focus is on creating value for both sides.⁷ However, distributive behavior aims at claiming value without the other party

¹ See Baltà- Salvador et al. (2021)

² See Fells & Sheer (2019)

³ See Thompson (1990); Oliver et al. (1994)

⁴ See Mestdagh & Buelens (2003)

⁵ See Curhan et al. (2006); Gelfand et al. (2006)

⁶ See Beersma & De Dreu (2002); Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)

⁷ See Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)

benefiting.⁸ While there is ample research available on integrative and distributive strategies, there are still parts under-researched. What is under-researched is the correct application of integrative and distributive behavior according to the negotiation context.⁹ Brett (2000) and Thompson (2009) already found that most negotiations have integrative and distributive parts. Especially Thompson (2009) supports that a sole distinction between either integrative or distributive behavior is not applicable in practice.¹⁰ In their research, Druckman and Olekalns (2011) have highlighted that the “How” and “Why” negotiation dynamics change is under-researched.¹¹ They were able to observe that changes in strategies (integrative to distributive behavior or reverse) take place during negotiations but were unable to conclude in which way and for what reasons negotiators adjust their strategy. Being flexible with the use of strategies according to the negotiation issues and the negotiation behavior of the counterpart can be defined as strategic adaptability.¹² This shows that academic research has identified strategic adaptability as an area of interest in negotiations, but that very little is known of its creation, impact, or occurrence. Therefore, this paper will focus on investigating strategic adaptability, its occurrence, and its possible link to gender and culture.

1.2 Understanding how Strategic Adaptability, Gender, and Culture Affect Negotiation Economic Outcomes

To be a good negotiator, one needs to understand instinct, strategy, and approaches. Otherwise, the strategic planning and adequate responses needed for an efficient negotiation are not given, and reaching the best agreement is unlikely.¹³ Understanding one's natural approach and style when confronted with a variety of situations gives one a considerable advantage in negotiations. Some negotiators are better at adapting to different conditions than others. Some people excel in situations where strong competitive instincts are required yet struggle in relationships.¹⁴ A negotiator's strategic adaptability is linked to a more advanced negotiation and, most likely, a better outcome.¹⁵ As a result, this is a critical negotiating aspect that will be examined further in this study. It is no secret that the roles of women and men in society are different, and with that their negotiation behaviors and styles. A good example of this imposed stereotype and expectation is “nice girls don't ask”.¹⁶ The type of negotiation and

⁸ See Weingart et al. (1990)

⁹ See Fleming et al. (2014)

¹⁰ See Brett (2000); See Thompson et al. (2010)

¹¹ See Druckman & Olekalns (2011)

¹² See Smolinski & Xiong (2020)

¹³ See Shell (2006)

¹⁴ See Shell (2000)

¹⁵ See Putnam (2017)

¹⁶ See Babcock et al. (2003)

used strategy (distributive or integrative) determines the success of men and women in negotiations. In addition, societal gender stereotypes about negotiations take ascendance and equally determine the level of success of a negotiation.¹⁷ In general, men are perceived as competitive and aggressive in negotiations, while women are viewed as cooperative. Women adopt integrative (win-win) types of negotiations while men assume distributive (win-lose) ones.¹⁸

However, Stuhlmacher et al. (2007) performed a meta-analysis in which they compared differences between men and women in virtual negotiations to face-to-face negotiations. Women were much more assertive and confrontational in virtual talks than in conventional face-to-face conversations, according to the findings. With that proven relevance, gender, as well as the negotiation setting (virtual, but face-to-face) will be further investigated.¹⁹

As the world becomes better connected and with that smaller, the culture surrounding the negotiation is one of the most important aspects of the negotiation setting.²⁰ Every culture's manifestation is defined by its values, rituals, symbols, and heroes, which can vary greatly across cultures.²¹ These components of culture impact the negotiation behavior and used strategies of individuals. Non-Western culture negotiators, for example, maybe more concerned with relational capital such as knowledge, mutual trust, and commitment.²² In contrast, negotiators in Western cultures tend to judge negotiation outcomes based on the joint profit.²³ Therefore, culture must be carefully considered when negotiating since it will impact the strategies and outcome. Considering that nowadays many negotiations take place in a virtual environment, a negotiator is more likely to face different cultural backgrounds each day.²⁴

1.3 Problem Statement

There is very limited research available on turning points and strategic adaptability in the business field and context. Most research has focused on psychological (e.g., hostage) or political (Nuclear Forces, GATT, WTO) negotiations and not B2B negotiations.²⁵ Within both areas, they are also referred to as “crisis events” such as terrorist attacks.²⁶ Those are referred

¹⁷ See Dobrijevic (2014)

¹⁸ See Shonk (2020)

¹⁹ See Stuhlmacher et al. (2007)

²⁰ See Arunachalam et al. (1998)

²¹ See Hofstede (2003); McSweeney (2002)

²² See Gelfand et al. (2006)

²³ See Neale & Bazerman (1992); Thompson et al. (2010)

²⁴ See Majchráková & Kremeňová (2020)

²⁵ See Druckman et al. (1986); Crump & Druckmann (2012); Druckman & Rosoux (2016); Druckman (2017)

²⁶ See Donohue (2017)

to as external events that the negotiating party has very little power over. Often turning points or departures are initiated by an external party, and the negotiators may or may not have knowledge of the pending event beforehand.²⁷ While this can happen in negotiation and even in a predominantly business negotiation (e.g., Merger and Acquisition, new patent/invention, Supply Chain issues due to a pandemic or data breaches), it is not an accurate representation of the “usual” business negotiations. The described difference in the events occurring in psychological or political research makes it difficult to take existing research and transfer its learnings to everyday business negotiations. According to Druckman and Olekalns (2011), the “How” and “Why” negotiation dynamics change is under-researched.²⁸ Looking at the available research, the timing, “When” of turning points is not well documented. The strategic shift is likely to happen at an “impasse” or towards the “end” of a negotiation, but no further research on the exact timing(s) is available.²⁹ Additionally, much research on the process maintenance and shift has been collected in face-to-face negotiations and not in virtual environments.³⁰ Previous research has shown the benefits of deploying integrative bargaining strategies in negotiations and leading to better communication.³¹ Recent analysis confirms the value of these negotiating strategies and extends it to the context of process frames and turning points.³² Since the turning points and strategic adaptability have not been researched enough it has also not yet been linked to other variables sufficiently. Especially in the context of commercial/B2B negotiations strategic adaptability is novel and has not been linked to either gender, negotiation environment, or culture.

All those three variables have been linked to affecting the negotiation outcome. Those variables are relevant in non-pandemic times, but even more interesting in COVID-19 times, as the negotiation environment has changed. The term “online/virtual” negotiations have been used differently in academic research so far. Most research on negotiations has not taken “video”/“online face-to-face” negotiations into consideration.³³ Lastly, with regards to culture, Iceland as a country and culture is under-researched. Neither the GLOBE Study nor the Hofstede study has added Iceland to their research since it has a small population and was so far not represented in cultural studies.³⁴

²⁷ See Druckman (1986, 2001)

²⁸ See Druckman & Olekalns (2011)

²⁹ See Druckman & Olekalns (2011)

³⁰ See Olekalns & Weingart (2008)

³¹ See Olekalns et al. (2003); Olekalns & Weingart (2003); Liu et al. (2010)

³² See Griessmair & Druckman (2017)

³³ See Geiger (2020)

³⁴ See Snaebjornsson et al. (2017)

1.4 Research Aim; Strategic Adaptability in Negotiations, Linking to Negotiation Result, Gender, Negotiation Environment, and Culture

This research aims to contribute to the academic knowledge of turning points in negotiations as well as the strategic adaptability of a negotiator. More specifically, can links be established between strategic adaptability, negotiation results, gender, negotiation environment, and culture? The negotiations took place within experienced negotiation groups of students and working professionals. Male and female negotiators with different cultural backgrounds negotiated a case that has distributive and integrative elements. Those negotiations were conducted virtually but in what we will refer to as a “Virtual video/virtual face-to-face” setting, which means that cameras were switched on. This research is going to show, if strategic adaptability yields a better economic *individual outcome* and a higher chance to reach the *Pareto Optimum*. Furthermore, the *gender & negotiation environment, as well as culture*, will be taken into account. These additional insights will contribute to the understanding of strategic adaptability and its connection to other variables. Furthermore, gender can be researched as this is one of the few studies with virtual negotiations that were purely conducted with an enabled camera. The aim is to see if the research conducted in face-to-face settings still holds true or if the same findings of Stuhlmacher et al. (2007) can be reproduced, where women were more hostile and claiming in negotiations.³⁵

Lastly, a closer linkage between negotiations and the GLOBE study will be formed, and Icelandic data on culture and negotiations will be evaluated, filling a research gap in Iceland. The goal of this research is to learn more about what happens during virtual negotiations as a result of COVID-19. Because there is currently little research available, and many researchers focus on external events alone. This also includes why strategy is adapted and what this means for an individual's strategic adaptability.³⁶ Therefore, the following research question was developed:

RQ: What link can be established between Strategic Adaptability, (Economic) Negotiation Outcome, Gender, and Culture in an online face-to-face setting?

1.5 Structure of the paper:

This paper will address the literature review in Section 2, where the main concepts and theories of this thesis are laid out. Existing research on the process of negotiations, type of

³⁵ See Stuhlmacher et al. (2007)

³⁶ See Druckman & Olekalns (2011)

negotiations, gender, culture, negotiation environment, strategic adaptability, and influence on negotiation outcome will be shown. In the same section will be two sub-research hypotheses and two sub-research questions addressed, which will help in answering the main research question. This will be followed by the methodology part in Section 3, where the information on data collection and participants will be given, including how the outcomes were grouped, assumptions tested, and analyzed. In section 4 the statistical results will be given. Following that, in section 5 the results will be discussed and compared to the literature in the discussion. Furthermore, the research questions and hypothesis will be answered. After that, the conclusions will be drawn. Lastly, the limitations of the study will be discussed, and areas for future research connected to strategic adaptability will be highlighted.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Negotiation Process/Phases

Negotiations are a form of communication that people frequently engage in without knowing it.³⁷ Anastakis (2003) defines it as “a strategy to resolve a divergence of interests, be they real or perceived, where common interests also exist” (p.74).³⁸ A more extensive definition of negotiations is, “a discussion in which the interested parties exchange information and come to an agreement” (p.71).³⁹ According to this definition, a negotiation has three fundamental components. First, the information is exchanged in two ways, second, both parties that negotiate evaluate the information from their perspective, and third, the final agreement is reached by mutual selection. The latest definition will be the definition used in this paper. As shown earlier, the research within the field has changed away from purely economic gain towards behavior and further areas. This means that negotiators are balancing their own goals, economic or other goals, and the opponent’s satisfaction, which can be measured in the relational capital.⁴⁰ Thus, negotiation processes involve the behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and motivations of negotiators. For example, substantial social psychological research has been conducted on the satisfaction of negotiators and the observed relationship between the participants.⁴¹

The model in Figure 1 has been designed by Braun et al. (2006), who researched negotiation systems and software agents.⁴² They adapted the usual lengthier but overly rigorous

³⁷ See Hodgson (1996)

³⁸ See Anastakis (2003)

³⁹ See Davis & Smith (1983)


⁴⁰ See Adler et al. (1992)

⁴¹ See Curhan et al. (2006)

⁴² See Braun et al. (2006)

behavioral negotiations processes in order to improve usability. Their model is based on Kersten's and Noronha's (1997) eight-phase model, which was developed from Gulliver's (1979).⁴³ Braun et al. (2006) modified and shortened the model to allow for greater flexibility in the negotiation process.⁴⁴ Braun et al. (2006), have pointed out that negotiations seldomly follow a straight line and that negotiators may revisit or quickly move forward to the next stage.⁴⁵

Figure 1 Negotiation Stages



Note. Adapted from “E-negotiation systems and software agents: Methods, models, and applications,” by P. Braun, J. Brzostowski, G. Kersten, J. B. Kim, R. Kowalczyk, S. Strecker, and R. Vahidoy, 2006, In *Intelligent decision-making support systems*, Springer, p. 274

Phase 1, the planning phase entails activities carried out by the negotiators both individually and collectively. Negotiators define their goals and preferences, as well as negotiation-specific terms like BATNA (the best alternative to a negotiated agreement) and reservation levels (walk away points), during this phase.⁴⁶ Negotiators choose strategies based on what they know or can learn about their opponents. The cooperative action in this phase

⁴³ See Kersten & Noronha (1997); Gulliver (1979)

⁴⁴ See Fisher & Ury (1981); Pinkley et al. (1994); See Braun et al. (2006)

⁴⁵ See Braun et al. (2006)

⁴⁶ See Fisher et al. (1991)

also includes deciding on the negotiating place and time, as well as the communication channels that will be used by the negotiators.

Phase 2 is where the negotiators exchange first information including agenda-setting and field exploration. The discussion may result in the addition of new concerns and alternatives, or the deletion of others. In some discussions, the negotiators may also discuss the protocol they will follow, the time of the exchanges, the deadline, and their objectives, priorities, and limits. The negotiators may need to change the problem, objectives, and preferences, as well as their plans and initial strategy, as a result of these discussions.

In the following *Phase 3*, the parties can learn about limitations and identify the most important issues by exchanging offers and arguments. During this phase, the parties recognize the possibility of a compromise and can consider options. Changing strategies, determining concessions, and revising aspiration levels, as well as limiting efficient solutions to those that are acceptable to both parties, is the focus.

Phase 4 is concerned with the parties reaching an agreement, they recognize that the negotiation has been successful. They may propose cooperative proposals or lessen their constraints after identifying the important challenges.

The model used in this paper is an adaption of the Braun et al. (2006) model since “Phase 5/Reaching an agreement” and the “post negotiation” have been removed. The negotiation stages were adopted since for the negotiations analyzed in this paper the transcripts were shortened. Thus, phase 5 and the post phase are not part of the negotiation and research design.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, turning points have been researched before, and so has strategic adaptability, but mostly in a political setting.⁴⁷ SA has been linked to “Stage transitions” and Druckman (2017) has pointed out that while researchers argue about the correct amount of stages, the number of stages is less important than the “occurrence of transitions”.⁴⁸ A case study by Druckman (2001) suggests that turning points occur usually during a crisis that threatens the continuation of the discussions, but Druckman (2001) has acknowledged that not every negotiation will have a crisis event.⁴⁹ Plus, the findings of his study point toward the end of negotiations, but leaving the “When” and “Why” only partly explained. The negotiation phases/stages have been adopted to better fit the research design since there are four phases in the model (see Figure 1). Already mentioned prior, negotiators

⁴⁷ See Druckman et al. (1986); Crump & Druckmann (2012, 2016)

⁴⁸ See Druckman (2017)

⁴⁹ See Druckman (2001)

may move back and forth between the phases which makes a correct categorization difficult.⁵⁰ To mitigate this the negotiations have been divided into quartiles (Q1; 0%-25%, Q2; 26%-50%, Q3; 51%-75%, Q4; 76%-100% of negotiation time). In order to answer this perspective on SA in business negotiations the following sub research question has been formulated:

SRQ1: In what “quartile” of negotiation is strategic adaptability most likely to be observed?

2.2 Pareto Efficiency and Pareto Optimum

Studies have found that negotiators who combine both negotiation behaviors and apply them in their negotiations achieve better individual outcomes.⁵¹ Whereas in the past, both types of behavior and negotiation styles were seen as mutually exclusive.⁵² The Pareto Efficiency or also called Pareto Optimum, has been a well-known concept within the field of negotiations and economics. The Pareto criterion is described as “any change which harms no one and which makes some people better off must be considered to be an improvement” (Baumol, 1977, p.527).⁵³ When no other solution yields a higher benefit without causing harm to the counterpart, an outcome or solution is called Pareto-optimal. In the social sciences, a Pareto Optimum is defined as a societal situation in which it is impossible to increase the gain of one individual by reallocating resources without simultaneously decreasing the welfare of another.⁵⁴ While much research effort has been directed towards measures of individual gain or effectiveness, current studies emphasize the importance of long-lasting business relationships and tend to analyze symmetric measures such as joint utility and Pareto Efficiency or Pareto Optimum.⁵⁵

Either optimization is the result or one of the negotiators will have to change its beliefs.⁵⁶ Often negotiation is seen as maximizing the quality of the result. Two types of optimizations are possible: the agents can try to achieve Pareto optimality, meaning that the outcome maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities, or, they try to reach a Nash equilibrium, meaning a stable state in the system. When negotiating about multi-issues, agents attempt to combine two or more issues in their discussion. An example is a typical seller-buyer relationship between two negotiators.⁵⁷ Aspects like price, quality, and lead-time are considered issues, which can be negotiated. The most used multi-issue method is the package

⁵⁰ See Braun et al. (2006)

⁵¹ See Brett et al. (1998); Carver (2003)

⁵² See Olekalns et al. (1996)

⁵³ See Baumol (1977)

⁵⁴ See Coleman & Fraser (1979)

⁵⁵ See Schoop et al. (2008)

⁵⁶ See Shen et al. (2003)

⁵⁷ See Schramm & Morais (2013)

deal method. In this method, complete packages with all the issues are provided. These can be discussed either sequentially or simultaneously.

Negotiators can deploy either an issue-by-issue (one-at-a-time) approach or a package approach (multiple issues at a time) in the negotiation.⁵⁸ One approach is to resolve each issue sequentially and independently of the others. This is referred to as issue-by-issue or sequential negotiation.⁵⁹ Abedin et al. (2014) think that a packaged approach is optimal since the negotiator lacks insight into the issues of the opponent.⁶⁰ When one issue is resolved, the negotiator proceeds to negotiate the other ones. This enables the negotiator to be both cautious and opportunistic. Since this is the definition of a win-win for both parties it may surprise one to find out that negotiators often fail to reach efficient settlements.⁶¹ When entering a negotiation and choosing a single or multi-issue strategy for the negotiation, the negotiator makes a distinctive decision that will inevitably influence the outcome. Similarly, Bac and Raff (1996) have stated that due to bounded rationality, negotiating a complete package may be too difficult for individual purchasers and that negotiators are likely to engage in an issue by issue negotiation if there is incomplete information about bargaining strength.⁶² However, since the value of an offer is not simply a sum of the values of the individual issues, some prefer to use package deals.⁶³ A lack of Pareto efficient deals can be traced back to the “fixed pie illusion”, where negotiators disregard the integrative potential.⁶⁴ In addition, the “illusion of conflict” can play a role, where the perception is that anything one gains are to the harm of the counterpart.⁶⁵

2.3 Types of Negotiations: Distributive, Integrative, and Combined

There are two main goals in negotiations, claiming value and creating value. Those are categorized as distributive and integrative negotiations.⁶⁶ In distributive negotiations, parties tend to compete against each other, and it is normally a win-lose situation.⁶⁷ One party is preoccupied with meeting its demands while ignoring the requirements of the other. Integrative or collaborative talks, on the other hand, result in a win-win situation in which both parties are

⁵⁸ See Fatima et al., 2004

⁵⁹ See Inderst (2000)

⁶⁰ See Abedin et al. (2014)

⁶¹ See Sebenius (1992)

⁶² See Bac & Raff (1996)

⁶³ See Zheng et al. (2016)

⁶⁴ See Bazerman & Neale (1992)

⁶⁵ See Thompson & Hastie (1990)

⁶⁶ See Sebenius (1992)

⁶⁷ See Ramsay (2004)

concerned about the requirements of the other.⁶⁸ There is a third type of negotiation in addition to the first two, the combined strategy. This negotiation type is distinguished by the presence of both integrative and distributive markers, making it a hybrid of the two.

2.3.1 *Distributive (Win-Lose) Negotiations*

Often titled distributive negotiations are positional negotiations or hard bargaining. It is an attempt to distribute a "fixed pie" of benefits. Thompson et al. (2010) argue that when negotiators are primarily concerned with their economic outcomes rather than the joint outcomes of all negotiating parties, a negotiation is defined as distributive.⁶⁹ These types of negotiations are also called "zero-sum", "competitive", or "claiming value." In these negotiations, one side wins, and the other one loses. Fixed resources are split between both parties in these discussions; the more resources one party receives, the fewer resources the other party receives.⁷⁰ Distributive negotiations involve one party that considers its needs and interests more important than the others. Notably, various techniques dominate in distributive negotiations, including compelling, withholding information, and manipulation.⁷¹ Positional bargaining is common in distributive negotiations, and it represents the parties' strategic posture. In general, parties disclose little precise information about their interests, benefits, or goals. The parties tend to provide competing stories in which they seem to adopt opposing stances and either retain or overemphasize the facts concerning their interests and needs. Everybody may try to confuse others with false, partial, or wrong information or even threaten the other party.⁷²

2.3.2 *Integrative (Win-Win) Negotiations*

Integrative negotiations are also called "collaborative" or known as having the attribute of "creating value." This type of bargaining involves variable resources divided amongst the parties in a negotiation. Here, both sides are bound to win, and the "pie" can be enlarged by collaborating.⁷³ When the interests of the group members are associated with each other and have several advantages, it is called integrative negotiation.⁷⁴ Bigoness (1984) argued that integrative negotiations are for long-term and better solutions because it promotes intergroup connections, authenticity, and trust and with that improve the relationship between parties.⁷⁵ In

⁶⁸ See Sharma et al. (2013)

⁶⁹ See Thompson et al. (2010)

⁷⁰ See Arnold (2003); Bartos (1995)

⁷¹ See Arnold (2003)

⁷² See Holbrook (2010)

⁷³ See Arnold (2003)

⁷⁴ See Beersma & De Dreu (2002)

⁷⁵ See Bigoness (1984)

the stage where it is important to derive what mutual profits are feasible within the negotiation context, distributive behavior will not be useful and integrative behavior should be applied.⁷⁶ The open flow of information should be available in an inclusive negotiation to expose the interests of the parties. Each side must be able to listen and comprehend the interests of the other while also disclosing his own. Positive and negative aims, desires, anxieties, fears, aversions, restrictions, and the like are examples of interests.⁷⁷ The major techniques used in these negotiations include sharing information, collaboration, and finding a solution mutually. This version is known as creating value as the objective is to ensure that both parties feel they have gained more value in the negotiation process than before.⁷⁸

2.3.3 Combined Approach: Most Used in Negotiations

While the sections above show the difference between integrative and distributive behavior and make it seem mutually exclusive, in reality, researchers have identified that most negotiations have both elements.⁷⁹ It is generally recognized that higher levels of satisfaction are achieved by using an integrative negotiation approach.⁸⁰ In practice, negotiations are neither purely distributive nor integrative but on a spectrum.⁸¹ Especially in recent years, more and more research shows that negotiations can be identified on a continuum.⁸² Saorín-Iborra (2008) has developed a framework to address this topic.⁸³ It distinguishes the competitive and integrative nature but then divides into three categories each, which results in a total of six types of negotiation behavior.⁸⁴ Competitive, or distributive, behavior can range from “Pure Competitive Behaviour” to “Competition” and “Soft Competition”, beyond that point the Integrative Orientation starts with “Compromise”, “Collaboration” and “Pure Integrative Behaviour”(see Figure 2).

⁷⁶ See Barry & Friedman, (1998) cited Lax & Sebenius, (1986)

⁷⁷ See Holbrook (2010)

⁷⁸ See Arnold (2003)

⁷⁹ See Brett (2000)

⁸⁰ See Fleming & Hawes (2017); Sigurdardottir et al. (2018)


⁸¹ See Saorin-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)

⁸² See Hawes & Fleming (2014)

⁸³ See Saorín-Iborra (2008)

⁸⁴ See Saorín-Iborra & Cubillo (2019)

Figure 2 Types of negotiation behavior by Saorín-Iborra



Note. From “Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum,” by M. C. Saorín-Iborra, 2008, *Business*, p. 135.

2.3.4 Strategic Adaptability

According to Smolinski and Xiong (2020), strategic adaptability is the skill to use, change or combine distributive and/or integrative strategies.⁸⁵ Adaptive negotiations involve being able to improve and change interaction patterns based on an ongoing evaluation of the evolving negotiation context, as opposed to sticking to a negotiation style regardless of the circumstances. Making this adjustment, or being an adaptive negotiator, is difficult, especially for experienced negotiators who are accustomed to their style. Their framework scores/ranks the strategic adaptability of an individual from --, -, 0 to + and ++ (see Appendix 1).

Turning points and strategic adaptability are important in the context of considering negotiation as a dynamic process. Since at least two parties are involved during negotiations, working together is essential to reach an outcome. Therefore, negotiation is always open and driven forth by social interaction, changes, and adapting to changes in alignment with the strategies of one.⁸⁶ On the other hand, De Dreu et al. (2000) illustrate that negotiators typically hold either a cooperative goal, targeting the creation of value for both parties, or an individualistic goal, aimed at claiming value for oneself.⁸⁷ Negotiation strategies reflect combinations of tactical behaviors. Negotiators' initial strategic approach may be integrative, supporting the cooperative objective of value creation, or distributive, backing the individualistic target of value claiming, depending on their initial result and relationship goals.⁸⁸

Negotiators need to mix the utilization of integrative procedures to create value with distributive procedures that claim value. They need to switch between strategies that are

⁸⁵ See Smolinski & Xiong (2020)

⁸⁶ See Ikle & Leites, (1962)

⁸⁷ See De Dreu et al. (2000)

⁸⁸ See Lewicki et al. (1999)

conflicting with their result objectives.⁸⁹ The change between integrative behavior and distributive behavior might be set off since negotiators realize that their current strategy is in the way of the objective attainment; or, because negotiators re-classify their view of what is attainable.⁹⁰ Regardless, seeing how these movements are set off builds our comprehension of how negotiators can stir negotiations towards a more successful path.⁹¹

2.4 Turning Points

Turning points equal a crucial point in time in that they mark a breakpoint or assign a change in development instead of routine advancement starting with one phase then onto the next.⁹² As per Druckman and Rosoux (2016), a turning point is a take-off that happens throughout a negotiation when the direction appears to change.⁹³ As illustrated in Figure 3, precipitants precede turning points and outcomes/consequences follow them. Turning points or departures may involve changing negotiation procedures, adopting new concepts, or foregoing a give-and-take approach.⁹⁴ During the negotiating process, they materialize as obvious, self-evident deviations from previous occurrences or patterns, which might arise suddenly or gradually.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ See Putnam (1990)

⁹⁰ See Weingart et al. (1999)

⁹¹ See Olekalns & Weingart (2008)


⁹² See Druckman et al. (1991)

⁹³ See Druckman & Rosoux (2016)

⁹⁴ See Griessmair & Druckman (2017)

⁹⁵ See Druckman, 2004; Olekalns & Weingart (2008)

Figure 3 Initiating and concluding the turning point 2



Note. From “To match or not to match? Reactions to turning points in negotiation,” by M. Griessmair and D. Druckman, 2017, *Group Decisions and Negotiation*, 27(1), p. 62 (<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-017-9550-x>).

Researchers have noticed these moments in different areas, such as interventions,⁹⁶ global negotiations,⁹⁷ and multilateral ecological negotiations.⁹⁸ Due to that, it is vital to differentiate between a departure/turning point and its consequence. Departure points to the action (turning point). The consequence refers to the direction assumed by the negotiation due to the action. The direction taken by the negotiation may progress away or towards the agreement, as shown in Figure 3.⁹⁹ To progress toward an agreement, the opponent needs to coincide with the turning point offer. The turning points are neither started nor concluded by one party as the parties depend on each other to accomplish their objectives. When one party initiates a turning point, the other side may decide to agree or disagree with the proposed changes. Turning points reveals the sophistication of a negotiation process.¹⁰⁰

Case studies have demonstrated that they arise usually during a crisis that threatens the continuation of the discussions.¹⁰¹ They frequently happen after times of emergency, delayed participation, or times of extreme heightening.¹⁰² In times of conflict, turning points develop through and within the concept of communication as it interacts with events both inside and outside of the discussions. A turning point investigation is made up of three sections: a precipitant, a flight, and an outcome.¹⁰³ In terms of turning points, the process of shifting from

⁹⁶ See Jameson et al., (2014); Höglund & Svensson (2011)

⁹⁷ See Druckman (1986, 2001)

⁹⁸ See Chasek (1997)

⁹⁹ See Griessmair & Druckman (2017)

¹⁰⁰ See Putnam (2017)

¹⁰¹ See Druckman (2001)

¹⁰² See Druckman, (2001); Druckman & Olekalns (2013); Olekalns & Weingart (2008)

¹⁰³ See Druckman & Olekalns (2013).

formulae to detail may be characterized. The procedure at several turning points indicates the progress towards a deal.¹⁰⁴ The ability to practice adaptive negotiations by realizing and employing an engagement style that maximizes the potential for success given the negotiating situation is the foundation for outstanding success as a negotiator.¹⁰⁵

2.4.1 Process Dynamics: Process Maintenance and Process Shifts

To actively influence the negotiation, it is important to know whether the dominant strategy is distributive or integrative. At the start, strategies are often static, however, become dynamic with time.¹⁰⁶ To maintain the process of the negotiating parties, there must be some match between the negotiators (e.g., a common goal). The interpretation of a common goal or benefit from each party in the negotiation is assured through reciprocity by providing immediate reinforcements.¹⁰⁷ However, Harinck and De Dreu (2004) expound that being in prolonged strategic stability in negotiations, the deal sometimes ends prematurely, meaning that only process maintenance can have negative impacts.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, strategic changes in the form of turning points in negotiations are considered important for competitive environments. As a result, strategic shifts in the form of turning points in negotiations are regarded as critical for competitive situations in which organizations may review their strengths and weaknesses, which is a future ahead. In turning points, a disruption of dominant phase orientation (i.e., strategies at the start) occurs owing to structural sequence, although in other cases, it occurs due to changes in approach from other parties, such as if one party shifts from integrative to distributive.¹⁰⁹

There is a narrow line between too much process maintenance and improper shifts. Little progress in talks, disagreement in shared goals, misinformation, and higher levels of abruptness frequently lead to departure from negotiations, whereas a cooperative-competitive approach leads to turning points that avoid departure.¹¹⁰ SA implies that an individual negotiates according to his/her needs and understands the issues under discussion while being able to change strategy.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the entire concept of integrative negotiations is enlarging the pie. This leads to the assumption that, if negotiators manage to not only negotiate distributive but also use integrative strategies (combined approach), the overall (commercial)

¹⁰⁴ See Zartman (1975)

¹⁰⁵ See Hawes & Fleming (2014)

¹⁰⁶ See Lytle et al. (1999)

¹⁰⁷ See Adair et al. (2001)

¹⁰⁸ See Harinck & De Dreu (2004)

¹⁰⁹ See Griessmair & Druckman (2017)

¹¹⁰ See Griessmair & Druckman (2017); Olekalns & Weingart (2008)

¹¹¹ See Smolinski & Xiong (2020)

sum of the deal is larger.¹¹² This founds the hypothesis that individuals with higher strategic adaptability not only have better individual results but are also more likely to reach the Pareto Optimum. As a result, the following sub-research topic and hypothesis emerged:

SRH1: Negotiators that display higher strategic adaptability score better individual economic results

SRH2: Negotiators that display higher strategic adaptability are more likely to reach the Pareto Optimum

2.5 Gender, influencing negotiation behavior

Looking at existing research, most scholars agree that women are less likely to negotiate.¹¹³ Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of studies on gender and negotiation outcomes.¹¹⁴ They found that, overall, women negotiated significantly lower outcomes than men. To illustrate this gap, salary negotiations are a good example, since both genders are focused on their gain. According to Small et al. (2007), For example, men were nine times more likely than women to request more pay.¹¹⁵ Women report greater anxiety about negotiations than males, and they are less likely to consider issues as negotiable.¹¹⁶ For instance, one study by Babcock and Laschever, (2003) found that in job negotiations among graduating students, only 7% of female students tried to negotiate their initial wage proposals, compared to 57% of men. They gained 7.4 percent on average over their first proposals after they were negotiated.¹¹⁷ Whereas on the stereotypical side, there are certain perceptions that men are better in negotiations as compared to women.¹¹⁸ Males are seen as intellectual and logical, and women as emotional and intuitive.¹¹⁹ Men are supposed to place a greater emphasis on objective facts, whilst women are expected to place a greater emphasis on maintaining connections.¹²⁰ Normally, men utilize a more powerful and straightforward language as they tend to express their opinions and justify their positions.¹²¹ In addition, they often consider female negotiators as less competent and often influence them; however, the self-perception of female negotiators is also important in this regard. For example, if a female perceives herself as less competent, leading to low self-confidence then this creates a disadvantage against any

¹¹² See Arnold (2003)

¹¹³ See Webber (2016), Leibbrandt & List (2012), Babcock & Laschever (2003); Babcock et al. (2006)

¹¹⁴ See Stuhlmacher & Walters (1999)

¹¹⁵ See Small et al. (2007); See Babcock et al. (2006)

¹¹⁶ See Babcock et al. (2006)

¹¹⁷ See Babcock & Laschever (2003)

¹¹⁸ See Kray et al. (2001)

¹¹⁹ See Alexandru (2015)

¹²⁰ See Gilligan (1993)

¹²¹ See Kugler et al. (2018)

male negotiators.¹²² Especially older research provides an ample amount of evidence that men seem to be better negotiators than women. However, newer research has also found areas where women prevail.

Further studies show that nonverbal signals are better comprehended by women because they are more sensitive to them. As a result, when it comes to bargaining, women have been proven to be more successful when subtle signs are important.¹²³ Women prefer asking questions that trigger the continuation of a discussion, which indicates an easier shift in negotiation strategy. Their communication often ensures the continuity of a negotiation.¹²⁴ Women may tend to use negotiations to build new connections.¹²⁵

2.5.1 Stereotypes & Status

It is common knowledge that within any society men and women are ought to have different “roles”. The female role is often associated with behaviors such as love, nurturing, self-sacrifice, friendliness, and emotional intelligence while the male role is associated with behaviors such as decision-making, assertiveness, instrumental behaviors, and being the breadwinner.¹²⁶ Society teaches men that they should avoid showing weakness, be independent and not be shy, while women should avoid showing dominance and be communal.¹²⁷ The gender-role play is both causes and contributes to stereotypes of women and men and shapes the norms and rules for the different genders in society and therefore also the job and business-related areas.¹²⁸ Looking at those norms some might say that the gender role difference only is relevant when individuals are judged as families and that only then do men and women fall into those characteristics. However, Pierce-Brown (1998) found that the gender difference exists regardless of women being single, married, or have children.”¹²⁹

In addition, societal gender stereotypes about negotiations take pre-eminence and equally determine the level of success.¹³⁰ In general, men are perceived as competitive and aggressive in negotiations, while women are viewed as cooperative. Women adopt integrative (win-win) types of negotiations while men assume distributive (win-lose) ones.¹³¹ Moreover,

¹²² See Eagly & Wood (1982)

¹²³ See Babcock & Laschever (2003)

¹²⁴ See Alexandru (2015)

¹²⁵ See Johnson (2016)

¹²⁶ See Lindsey (2015); Beere (1990)

¹²⁷ See Koenig (2018)

¹²⁸ See Lindsey (2015); Beere (1990)

¹²⁹ See Pierce-Brown (1998)

¹³⁰ See Dobrijevic (2014)

¹³¹ See Shonk (2020)

behaving in line with one's gender role is also rewarded on an interpersonal level¹³² in such a way that a violation of the gender stereotype can lead to backlash or other negative social reactions.¹³³ In sum, female negotiators may be more likely to adopt an integrative negotiation style to not deviate from the stereotypical gender norm expectation of women being more passive and understanding of others' needs. Prescriptive gender stereotypes originate from men's higher status in society compared to women.¹³⁴ Societies with higher gender equity are likely to follow fewer sexist beliefs.¹³⁵ The nature of origin is socio-cultural in nature such as socialization, education, and culture. Men often gain confidence from a familiar setup as well as are more exposed to a competitive setup; however, these things are less true for very developed societies with greater levels of egalitarianism.¹³⁶

2.5.2 Gender; Virtual vs Face-to-Face

Women negotiate differently in virtual environments (email, phone, face-to-face online negotiations) especially when the characteristics and gender of the opponent are not known.¹³⁷ Female negotiators were much less aggressive and distributive in face-to-face discussions than in virtual negotiations, according to Stuhlmacher and colleagues (2007). One reason could be that face-to-face encounters heighten gender-stereotypic expectations that women will be anxious about concluding the negotiation with a good relationship.¹³⁸ However, as previously said, this may be due to women's increased self-consciousness and awareness of stereotypes. Stereotypes have a greater impact on women in face-to-face situations than in more socially distant settings.¹³⁹ This assumption is further supported by previous studies that found that the absence of personal cues and the reduction of social context in computer-mediated communication, may reduce the impact of status effects such as social status or hierarchy.¹⁴⁰ With COVID-19 the negotiation environment has changed, many companies conduct their negotiations now virtually.¹⁴¹ There is little research conducted in virtual negotiation settings while having a camera turned on. This would allow for a virtual "face-to-face" negotiation with having additional input such as social clues, mimic, gestures, age, and gender of the opponent. When negotiating online (in a face-to-face setting), it is always preferred to make eye contact

¹³² See Clark & Kashima (2007)

¹³³ See Wood & Eagly (2012)

¹³⁴ See Conway et al. (1996); Hoffman & Hurst (1990); Jackman (1994); Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill (1977);

¹³⁵ See Glick et al. (2000)

¹³⁶ See Babcock et al. (2002); Babcock & Laschever (2003)

¹³⁷ See Walther (1996)

¹³⁸ See Gelfand et al. (2006)


¹³⁹ See Stuhlmacher et al. (2007)

¹⁴⁰ See Dubrovsky et al. (1991); Floyd & Parks (1995); Tan et al. (1998)

¹⁴¹ See Sarkis (2020)

with the camera, engaging in multi-tasking is associated with not paying attention.¹⁴² Geiger (2020) has reviewed in detail which medium was used in negotiations (see Figure 4). From this research, it is visible that the video has been under-researched.¹⁴³ In addition, Figure 5 clearly shows that “negotiation behavior” has received less focus in the research field.


Figure 43 Main communication medium in reviewed studies



Note. From “From letter to Twitter: A systematic review of communication media in negotiation” by I. Geiger, 2020, *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 29(2), p. 229 (<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09662-6>).

¹⁴² See Lorenzen & Krokowsk (2018)

¹⁴³ See Geiger (2020)

Figure 54 Dependent variables in the reviewed studies over the last decades

Note. From “From letter to Twitter: A systematic review of communication media in negotiation” by I. Geiger, 2020, *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 29(2), p. 229 (<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09662-6>).

Krishnan et al. (2014) have found that multitasking on a smartphone or answering emails while negotiating is being perceived as less professional, less trustworthy, and yields lower payoffs.¹⁴⁴ This can often be found under the terminology belonging to “communication”. As Geiger (2020) has concluded, Strategic communication theories concentrate on media and task features, while later social-psychological perspectives concentrate on communicator-medium interaction, which is related to negotiations and their surroundings. As a result, a medium can either promote or hinder certain social processes that are crucial to communicators. Already Purdy et al. (2000) found that online negotiations profit from the video being enabled, as participants can use gestures and approach the process more engaged.¹⁴⁵

Given that a) men and women behave differently in negotiation settings (regardless of the environment); b) business negotiations take place virtually due to COVID-19, and there is insufficient research on virtual face-to-face negotiation, and c) no research has been conducted

¹⁴⁴ See Krishnan et al. (2014)

¹⁴⁵ See Purdy et al. (2000)

to uncover differences in SA and gender, the following sub research question has been derived:¹⁴⁶

SRQ2: Is there a significant difference in strategic adaptability between men and women in online F2F negotiation settings?

2.6 Culture in Negotiations

2.6.1 Framework

Typically, cross-cultural researchers use Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions as well as his definition of culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (p.5).¹⁴⁷ Culture is embedded in individuals' lives, which means it can change over time. Hofstede (1980) created a cultural model and gave countries a corresponding scoring.¹⁴⁸

Comparing the first and the second research collection, there were changes in the answers, signifying that there has had been a global shift on some questions, which means that the scores are ever-evolving.¹⁴⁹ Due to the dynamic development of culture, this paper will not use the static Hofstede framework but instead, use the GLOBE Study. Culture is a large concept that has more than one definition. The meaning of culture in this paper is from House et al. (2004) “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations” (p.15).¹⁵⁰ Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) is a study investigating the societal, organizational, leadership, and cultural attributes of 62 countries. The project began in the 1990s, with the extensive process of collecting data in the Middle East and laid the foundations of the GLOBE Project. Since then, the project has spread to more than 160 countries with over 500 participating researchers. It is now one of the largest, most reputable, and most in-depth studies of its kind in social science.¹⁵¹ The GLOBE research program underwent three distinct but interrelated phases, also called waves since its start. The first one consisted of researchers identifying and developing measures of culture and society. “Culture”, according to social scientists, comprises all norms and social behavior found in human societies. This includes the beliefs, knowledge, laws, arts, customs, habits, and capabilities of individuals and groups. In the second phase pilot studies

¹⁴⁶ See Stuhlmacher et al. (2007); See Sarkis (2020)

¹⁴⁷ See Hofstede (2001)

¹⁴⁸ See Hofstede (1980)

¹⁴⁹ See Hofstede (2001)

¹⁵⁰ See Javidan & House (2001); See House et al. (2004)

¹⁵¹ See GLOBE Project (2014)

were conducted on various aspects of culture to establish the nine cultural dimensions: Humane Orientation, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Power Distance, Assertiveness, Institutional Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Gender Egalitarianism, and In-Group Collectivism. The dimensions were then formulated using psychometrics (e.g., item and generalizability analyses). More than 17000 managers from sixty-two different countries took part in the project to calculate the value and practice scores of each culture in these dimensions.¹⁵²

2.6.2 *Limitations of the GLOBE Study*

There have been several controversies and criticisms of the GLOBE Study. Some renowned authors have commented on the validity of the GLOBE Study, regarding the GLOBE scales as unfounded national stereotypes.¹⁵³ The authors argue that the researchers of the GLOBE Project have miserably failed to highlight the difference between personal values and collective cultural values. Minkov and Blagoev (2012) validate most of the cultural dimensions specified in the GLOBE Study except the Humane Orientation and Performance Orientation for which they have expressed skepticism. Additionally, not all countries are represented. Iceland, for example, is not in the GLOBE Study or the Hofstede study.

2.6.3 *GLOBE cultural practice scores*

According to the GLOBE Study, the score for each cultural dimension ranges between 1 and 7. A score of 1 is very low and a score of 7 is very high. Scores of 2 and 6 are termed as low and high, whereas 3 and 5 as relatively low and relatively high. A score of 4 is the medium score. These nine dimensions were scored in the form of societal values and societal practices. Societal values refer to the cultural beliefs and common thinking of present communities. And societal practices refer to what is being observed and carried on in society.¹⁵⁴ Research has concluded a negative correlation between practices and values. They held the economic principle of diminishing marginal utility as the chief reason for the abnormal correlations and argued that the principle relates to the cultural dimensions. Furthermore, the values from GLOBE Study did not take the total preference weights for the majority of the dimensions, and instead, the estimates were based on the countries' marginal preferences.¹⁵⁵ Iceland will be assigned to the Nordic Cluster for this study because it has previously been assigned to this

¹⁵² See House et al. (2004)

¹⁵³ See Minkov & Blagoev (2012)

¹⁵⁴ See Javidan & House (2001)

¹⁵⁵ See Venaik & Brewer (2010)

cluster and scores high on future orientation, gender egalitarianism, and low on assertiveness and group collectivism in GLOBE.¹⁵⁶

For this study, not all cultural dimensions are of interest. According to Shan et al. (2019) who researched how culture moderates the effect of gender on negotiation performance found that only a few cultural dimensions are of importance.¹⁵⁷ For their research, they reviewed 185 studies across 30 societies and found that *in-group collectivism* and *assertiveness* practice scores (GLOBE dimensions) moderate the gender effect on negotiation outcomes. In cultures with *higher in-group collectivism* and *low assertiveness*, women are more likely to outperform men in negotiations.¹⁵⁸ Thus, only the two variables below will be taken into account per cultural cluster (see Table 1). First, assertiveness assesses how assertive, confrontational, and antagonistic a person is in his or her interactions with others.¹⁵⁹ Countries with high scores display direct and unambiguous conversations and value competitive relationships. Low Assertiveness countries encourage cooperation and value warm relationships.

Second, in-group collectivism measures individual pride, cohesiveness, and loyalty in and to their organizations and/or family. Duties, obligations, and other such attributes are key reflectors of social behavior in higher-scoring In-Group Collectivism civilizations, and people desire relatedness with groupings. People in low-scoring In-Group Collectivism societies value rationality in their behavior. The Nordic Cluster does score low on assertiveness 3.66 compared to the overall average GLOBE score of 4.12. The same can be observed for in-group collectivism, here Nordic Europe scores a 3.75 compared to a 5.03 average score.

This paper focuses on gaining insights related to SA, the nationalities of the different participants provide a unique opportunity, since Iceland is usually not represented in any cultural mappings.¹⁶⁰ In addition, Shan et al. (2019) have already discovered that culture is a moderator for the effect that gender has on the negotiation outcome, high in-group collectivism and low assertiveness allow women to outperform men.¹⁶¹ There is currently no study available that has analyzed an association between SA and culture in this negotiation setting or context. Due to that the following sub research question has been formulated:

SRQ3: Is there a significant difference in mean strategic adaptability between Iceland and the other nationalities in this study?

¹⁵⁶ See House et al. (2004); Ronen & Shenkar (2013)

¹⁵⁷ See Shan et al. (2019)

¹⁵⁸ See Shan et al. (2019)

¹⁵⁹ See 2004, 2007 Studies - GLOBE Project (2014)

¹⁶⁰ See House et al. (2004); Ronen & Shenkar (2013)

¹⁶¹ See Shan et al. (2019)

Table 1 Overview of Culture Clusters scored according to GLOBE Study (practice scores)

Variable	Germanic Europe	Southern Asia	Confucian Asia	Nordic Europe	Average GLOBE Study
Assertiveness	4.55	3.86	4.09	3.66	4.12
In-Group Collectivism	3.7	5.87	5.42	3.75	5.03

- 3. Methodology – Left out due to confidentiality**
- 4. Results – Left out due to confidentiality**
- 5. Discussion – Left out due to confidentiality**
- 6. Conclusion – Left out due to confidentiality**
- 7. Limitations & Future Research– Left out due to confidentiality**

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Strategic Adaptability Scale



By Smolinski and Xiong (2020), (p. 18.-19)

Competency	Level	Behavioral traits
12. Strategic adaptability	--	Either too cooperative or too competitive regardless of the issue type; inability to differentiate between integrative and distributive issues and/or cooperative and competitive partners
	-	
	0	Firm on distributive issues, and competitive under unfavorable conditions or facing tough opponents; cooperative and flexible on integrative issues
	+	Ability to recognize and match the strategy and methods to negotiated issues and partners; quick behavioral adjustments based on new information or changes in the situation
	++	

Appendix 2 – Left out due to confidentiality

Appendix 3 – Left out due to confidentiality


Appendix 4 – Scatterplot Linear Regression SRH1- Before and after outlier removal



Appendix 5 – P-P Plot Linear Regression SRH1- Before and after outlier removal

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: How many points did you attain in total (based on the 5 negotiation issues and bonus)?



Scatterplot

Dependent Variable: How many points did you attain in total (based on the 5 negotiation issues and bonus)?

