Climate Change and Security Nexus: Analysing the European Discourse from 2007 to 2022

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Abstract

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, with a peak in 2007, climate change has been increasingly linked to security in politics and academia. As can be anticipated from this, there seems to be an agreement - at least in the western centred debate - that climate change is no longer only an environmental problem, economic concern, or an issue of justice, but has no shifted into the realm of security. The empirical literature provides mixed results on the nexus between climate change and security. Another strand of literature therefore approaches the issue through a more constructivist lens, using securitisation approaches. So far, however, this research mainly relies on a single concept of security or lacks theoretically based problematisation of how precisely various securitisation arise and produce various political outcomes. The aim of this thesis is to uncover the very distinct climate security discourses put forward to securitise the issue and to assess their different policy consequences. Drawing on Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation, based on Michel Foucault's governmentality approach and focusing on the European Union's security and defence policy (CSDP), this thesis shows how climate change is securitised drawing on three different power forms that are nonetheless connected to each other. It is argued that this helps to understand the underlying processes of securitisation and to identify even possible problematic implications.

Keywords

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
UN	United Nations

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1. Introduction

A recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute revealed that 10 out of 21 UN (United Nations) Peace Operations were activated in countries with the highest exposure to climate change (SIPRI, 2021). Since 2003, discussions in politics and academia have increasingly linked climate change to notions of security (Lucke, 2014, 2020; Oels, 2012a). Examples include a wide range of influential reports and articles published by governments and their advisory bodies, think tanks and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientists and UN bodies, as well as high-level debates in the UN Security Council (see J. Barnett & Adger, 2007; Campbell, 2008; Christian Aid, 2006, 2007; CNA Corporation, 2007; EEAS & European Commission, 2008; GTZ, 2008; *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations, A/RES/62/86*, 2008; Schwartz & Randall, 2003; UNGA (United Nations General Assembly), 2009a, 2009b; UNSC (United Nations Security Council), 2007, 2011, 2018, 2019; Vagg, 2012; WBGU, 2008). As can be anticipated from this, there seems to be an agreement – at least in the western centred debate – that climate change is no longer only an environmental problem, economic concern or an issue of justice, but has now shifted into the realm of high politics and security (Lucke, 2014).

The debate on the nexus between climate change and security emerged from the academic literature on environmental security and conflict that arose in the 1980s and 1990s (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012; Dalby, 2009, p. 14; Deudney, 1990; Deudney & Matthew, 1999; Pirages, 1991; Ullman, 1983, p. 134). At that time, climate change was only mentioned as one of several environmental issues that were increasingly associated with conflict and security concerns. However, because of its global extent and overall scope, it quickly emerged as one of the main threats (Lucke, 2020). According to Lucke, this contributed, among other things, to accomplish significant achievements in the global negotiations on climate change[1] (2020). While discussions on environmental and climate security subsided towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, they resumed in the mid-2000s as scientific evidence for the far-reaching conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001, 2007) accumulated (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012; Brzoska & Oels, 2011; Oels & von Lucke, 2015). In contrast to earlier debates, the focus shifted from other environmental issues to climate change. Since then, at the latest, environment ministries and, of particular interest for this work, defence ministries and the military sector itself have joined the chorus and framed climate change as a security issue (Oels, 2012a). Therefore,

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[1] A few examples include the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, the commencement of the Annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) in 1995, and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, all of which were, in some ways, justified by referencing the threat posed by climate change (Lucke, 2020).

2007 can be seen as a turning point (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012; Brzoska, 2012; Oels, 2011; Oels & von Lucke, 2015).

However, a closer look reveals that the debate on the link between climate change and security is multifaceted and relies on different security concepts, threats or referent objects they point to, and solutions they advocate. Some have primarily drawn attention to its 'national security' repercussions, such as direct threats to the territorial integrity of states, an increase in violent conflicts, the instability of entire regions, and ultimately, conflicts between states (international security). To prepare for a future characterised by violent conflicts because of climate change, they have urged traditional security institutions to incorporate climate change into their planning. According to a second viewpoint, climate change will affect people more directly than nations, endangering their 'human security', i.e., the overall deterioration of living conditions of poor populations, mainly due to resource scarcity and an increase in extreme weather events. Such an argumentation calls for long-term solutions and the increase of development aid, but also disaster response operations by the military. Lastly, many have avoided constructing actual threats in place of framing climate change as an all-encompassing 'risk' that will eventually affect innumerable variables and, in turn, pertain to a variety of risk groups and areas throughout the world. Accordingly, the appropriate response is to create sophisticated risk management plans to strengthen the resilience of risk groups and regions and reduce risk to a manageable level.

Academia has already looked at the connection between climate change and security from different angles. These can be roughly divided into an empirical and a constructivist approach. There are various works that attempt to assess whether climate change actually poses a threat to peace and security and which are the most threatened referent objects (J. Barnett & Adger, 2005, 2007; Gleditsch, 2012; Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al., 2012). However, these are not helpful because they do not show what kind of security issue climate change is and they do not examine the resulting policy debates. Of particular interest, however, is how these different perceptions of climate change as a security issue come about. Therefore, this thesis relies on a constructivist perspective and uses approaches of securitisation to understand the connection of climate change with different security concepts and the resulting policy consequences (e.g. Brauch, 2008; Brzoska, 2009; Corry, 2012; Dyer, 2018; Floyd, 2010; Lippert, 2019; Lucke et al., 2014; McDonald, 2005, 2008, 2013; Oels, 2012; Rothe, 2016; Trombetta, 2008, 2011). Constructivism, in essence, pushes the researcher to consider the ways in which social reality is an ongoing achievement of social actors rather than something that is external to them and entirely restricts them (Bryman, 2012). For now, the term 'securitisation' describes the process in which social actors construct something as a security issue.

Securitisation theory's core claim is that labelling something as a threat or 'security issue' is not only a change of words but has real political consequences.

There are various securitisation theories. However, while both the Copenhagen School and the Welsh/Aberystwyth School define the meaning of security by focusing on either a traditional security concept of national security (Oels, 2012b; Stripple, 2002, p. 109) or human security (Booth, 1991, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2005), the Paris School has gone to the other extreme, viewing securitisation largely as an ongoing, covert process in which (in)security experts gradually create a never-ending state of emergency (Bigo, 2002, p. 73; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008). There are studies that acknowledge that various security concepts can exist simultaneously, avoiding an overemphasis on one specific security notion (Detraz & Betsill, 2009; Lucke et al., 2014; McDonald, 2013). But when it comes to climate security, they essentially draw these different constructions of climate security from the existing literature. This lacks a more thorough theoretically based problematisation of how precisely various securitisation arise and produce various political outcomes (Lucke, 2020). Therefore, this thesis follows Lucke's argument that a central shortcoming of previous research is the insufficient problematisation of the role of power in securitisation processes (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Therefore, a securitisation theory based on Foucault's Governmentality approach is applied (Foucault, 2006b, 2006a). It regards securitisation as an instance of governing that makes use of three forms of power that are at the core of different discourses on securitisation and thus enable different securitisations and political effects (Lucke, 2014, 2020).

Today, most security threats are considered transnational, including terrorism, pandemics, and climate change, which has caused states to rely more and more on formal international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the European Union (EU) (Sperling & Webber, 2019). So far, Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation theory has only been applied to nation states. Therefore, it is of particular interest to analyse one of these international organisations. Numerous researchers point to the EU as one of the most significant institutions in the context of the climate security nexus (Bremberg et al., 2018; Odeyemi, 2020, 2021; Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021; Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016; Youngs, 2015). Moreover, the European Commission's (EC) current agenda focuses particularly on the EU's Green Deal, a strategy to make the Union a leading global promoter of change towards a more sustainable future, with the ambitious goal of a carbon-neutral Union by 2050. In this context, there also seems to be momentum on climate security, which reached a new peak with the publication of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap in 2020 (Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021). This intends to make the EU a leader in this area, which the organisation has already indicated on several other occasions. It was therefore decided to analyse the case

of the EU. The empirical analysis begins in 2007 as this is, as mentioned before, considered a turning point in the discussions of climate security (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012; Brzoska, 2012; Oels, 2011; Oels & von Lucke, 2015). It concludes with the European Security Strategy, which was recently published in March 2022. The research question therefore is:

> 'How has the securitisation of climate change impacted the European Union's security and defence policy between 2007 and 2022, and what possible implications can be drawn from this?'.

In this research, the EU's security and defence policy refers to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4.1. Thus, a single-case study is conducted using a combination of descriptive and interpretative policy analysis. Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation theory based on Foucault's governmentality approach helps to structure the empirical analysis, especially in providing explanations for the possible changes that have taken place over time. To achieve this, the research method mainly consists of a qualitative content analysis of the most influential EU security policy documents. Seven documents are examined, which were previously identified by means of purposive sampling.

The following second chapter will show how the understanding of climate securitisation can be improved by conceptualising it as discourses shaped by different forms of power, which also have different power effects. Therefore, first a literature review will outline why other approaches are not sufficient to answer the research question and thus to map the entire process of securitisation. Then, the applied theory will be explained in detail. The third chapter will introduce the methodology of the empirical analysis. After an introduction of what is to be understood under the EU's security and defence policy and a presentation of the EU's general approach to climate security, the theoretical approach is applied to the securitisation of climate change in the EU's security and defence policy. The main result is that a governmentality reading can generate new insights into how climate securitisation processes function and how one can make sense of different securitisations, the links between them, and particularly their policy implications.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Literature Review

The Changing Notion of Security

Security is defined as 'the state of being free from danger or threat; […] a state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear and anxiety'[2]. In general, security is associated with 'the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those which, if left unchecked threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future' (Williams, 2008). But, considering inter alia that threats and dangers can be of different natures, there are several dimensions in which security can be conceptualised. This would also be shown by any examination of the etymology of the word because security has very different meanings for people depending on the time and place in human history (Rothschild, 1995). For many decades, the prevailing response was that states were the most significant referents when considering security in international politics (Williams, 2008). From a traditional perspective, therefore, other states and their militaries were security threats. This position has faced growing opposition, especially since the end of the Cold War, as a result of the reorganisation of foreign and security policy that followed the end of the bipolar world (Williams, 2008).

Thus, the concept of security has changed over time. This involves not only the meaning of the term, but also the questions 'Whose security are we talking about?' (referent object), 'What counts as a security issue?' (threat construction) and 'How can security be achieved?' (proposed solution) (Williams, 2008). Therefore, in the theoretical debate, the 'broadening' (e.g. not only states are considered as security threats) and 'deepening' (e.g. new epistemological foundations of security thinking and the consideration of new referent objects such as individuals) of the above-mentioned traditional understanding of state or military security can be observed (Booth, 1991; Krause & Williams, 1996, 1997; Mathews, 1989; Ullman, 1983). Other challenges that are now perceived as threats are therefore referred to as 'non-traditional security threats' (Caballero-Anthony, 2016), and the perception of the referent object has also changed, as will become clearer in the following.

The Academic Debate on the Nexus between Climate Change and Security

This thesis seeks a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between climate change and security by using the concept of 'climate security', which is an attempt to capture the risks and threats to people and states posed by the adverse effects of climate change (Bremberg et al., 2018). It therefore does not take the position that a particular understanding of the link between climate change and security is to be preferred. In this context, the term climate change refers both to the 'natural variability' of the climate system, which has fluctuated between warm

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[2] Oxford English Dictionary.

and cold periods since the end of the ice ages 12,000 years ago in the Holocene, and to human-induced global warming in the 'Anthropocene', which has increasingly become the subject of scientific analysis since the 1970s (Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al., 2012). The terms climate change and security nexus, climate security, climate change security, etc. are used synonymously in the following.

Academia has already taken up the debate on the connection between climate change and security from different angles. These can be roughly divided into an empirical and a constructivist approach. Figure 1 summarises the different academic approaches to the nexus between climate change and security that are particularly relevant to this work, and which are explained in greater or lesser detail below.

FIGURE 1: Overview of the Identified Approaches. The approach used in the empirical analysis is shown in blue (Own illustration, according to literature review).

Empirical Perspective

Starting with the first, there are numerous works try to look at the issue from an empirical perspective. These are some works that assess whether and under what conditions climatic effects can lead to violent conflict (Barnett & Adger, 2005, 2007; Gleditsch, 2012; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). Several papers attempt to establish a direct empirical link between climate change and violent conflict by analysing the correlation between certain climatic or weather-related variables (such as temperature, precipitation, and extreme weather events) and certain aspects of violent conflict (in particular the outbreak or number of armed conflicts) (J. Barnett, 2003; J. Barnett & Adger, 2007; Gleditsch, 2012; Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al., 2012; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012b). The research's findings were inconsistent (J. Barnett & Adger, 2005, 2007; Gleditsch, 2012; Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al., 2012). Studies using quantitative data over long historical periods have found a

correlation between climate variability and armed conflict, while the empirical results for more recent periods are less conclusive (Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012b). Thus, the data is somewhat ambiguous, and it is challenging to establish a direct causal link because other trends (e.g. economics, society and politics) might have a greater impact (Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012b). Therefore, claims that climate change directly contributes to violent conflict are oversimplified. As a result, the empirical analysis was extended by further variables (Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012a, 2012b). Based on the arguments of Thomas Malthus (1970), various scholars studied the impact of a growing human population, degradation of the natural environment and scarcity of resources on the likelihood of violent conflict (J. Barnett & Adger, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Myers, 1989, 1995). Until now, the results are ambivalent and the effect seems to be at least not as clear-cut as originally assumed and to be influenced by various social and political variables (Hsiang et al., 2013; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012b). Thus, climate change does not seem to lead directly to violent conflict, but there appears to be a causal link between social and political instability due to the effects of climate change, which could lead to human insecurity and eventually to violent conflict (Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012a, 2012b). As will become clearer below, this development has been part of a broader process of reshaping and questioning the logic, meaning and practices of security, and has paved the way for the human security perspective, among others. The human security approach takes the individual lives of people as the referent object of security, not the political order of states like the traditional perspective (Oels, 2012a). Human security is defined as 'a variable condition where people and communities have the capacity to manage stresses to their needs, rights and values' (J. Barnett et al., 2010, p. 18). Those who advocate a human security perspective therefore do not contest that environmental stress can contribute to violent conflict under certain conditions (J. Barnett & Adger, 2007).

Constructivist Perspective

Despite this sometimes-weak empirical basis, the political debates on climate security mentioned above have not been without consequences. Although, they have not led to a clear consensus on what kind of security issue climate change represents, what countermeasures would be appropriate, and whether the climate change security nexus is to be welcomed from a normative perspective (Lucke, 2020). The empirical literature on the climate change and security nexus is not helpful for the research question anyway, as it does not examine the ensuing policy debates. Another strand of the debate therefore approaches the issue through a more constructivist lens, drawing on securitisation approaches to make sense of climate change being connected to different security concepts and the resulting policy consequences (e.g. Brauch, 2008; Brzoska, 2009; Corry, 2012; Dyer, 2018; Floyd, 2010; Lippert, 2019; Lucke

et al., 2014; McDonald, 2005, 2008, 2013; Oels, 2012; Rothe, 2016; Trombetta, 2008, 2011). Constructivism, in essence, asks the researcher to think about the ways that social reality is a continuing achievement of social actors rather than something external to them and that completely constrains them (Bryman, 2012). It implies that the categories people use to aid in their understanding of the natural and social world are actually creations of interaction. This notion suggests that, rather than being treated as a distinct inert entity, security for instance is produced as something whose meaning is built up during interaction. This meaning is highly likely to vary both in time and place. This is not to say that security threats are fictitious, rather it is about the decision by which a threat is chosen by social actors, how it is represented by them and how this may change over time and place through interaction. In what follows, it becomes clear that there are very different approaches to securitisation, which lead to different assessments of this process. It is therefore important to highlight this briefly. In total, there are four approaches to securitisation. These are the Copenhagen School, the Welsh or Aberystwyth School (or the idea of 'human security'), the Paris School and Foucault's governmentality approach (see also Figure 1).

The Four Approaches to Securitisation
The Copenhagen School, which is considered the original theory of securitisation, is based on the work of Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and others (Buzan, 1991, 2004; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Wæver, 1995, 1999, 2000). It locates the constructive quality of securitisation in Austin's speech act theory (Austin, 1962), which focuses the researcher's attention on elite speech acts and the interaction between speaker and audience. If the relevant audience accepts it, this speech act puts an issue above normal and democratic politics and justifies adopting exceptional top-down measures to counter the threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). Thus, a successful securitisation results in extraordinary measures (or at least their legitimisation) and elevates political issues above normal politics, democratic principles, and the law. Securitisation, in the Copenhagen School's opinion, should be avoided from a normative standpoint. To return to 'normal' politics and democratic processes, it therefore advises 'desecuritisation' tactics (Buzan, 1991, 2004; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Waever, 1995; Wæver, 1999, 2000).

Other approaches to security and securitisation, meanwhile, have demonstrated that this is not the only way security can be thought about. Some emphasise that security can also be interpreted as focused on people instead of states, coining the concept of the emancipation of the individual from security dangers (often associated with the Welsh or Aberystwyth School) (Booth, 1991, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2005). Similar in character, the idea of 'human security' has gained some popularity among practitioners in recent years (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Debiel &

Werthes, 2006; Werthes & Bosold, 2005). Once the notion of security is reclaimed as human security, it is hoped that the detrimental effects of securitisation as articulated by the Copenhagen School can be avoided (Oels, 2012a).

A further approach, referred to as the 'Paris School', attempts to develop a more procedural approach to securitisation. They argue that everyday activities of security professionals can securitise an issue over time, as opposed to being started by public elite speech acts (Bigo, 2002, 2008; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Huysmans, 2004, 2006). The Paris School argues that the production of issues through the transnational and transversal security field is neither good nor bad per se – it is the political implications that matter (Oels, 2012a). A final approach to securitisation that looks at the issue from a different angle draws on Foucault's Governmentality approach (Foucault, 2006b, 2006a). It considers securitisation as an instance of governing, drawing on different forms of power and thus allowing for different securitisation and political effects (Lucke, 2014, 2020).

The Missing Conceptualisation of Power

While the Copenhagen School helped in the first place establishing the thinking of security as something socially constructed, it is often criticised, especially when it comes to the securitisation of climate change (Oels, 2012a; Trombetta, 2011). A first shortcoming is the restriction of the analysis to speech acts, as this excludes visual representations and security practices (McDonald, 2008; Oels, 2011; Stritzel, 2007). Secondly, it adheres to a traditional, state- and military oriented security logic (Stripple, 2002, p. 109), which fixes the meaning of security to only one option (existential threat) and the policy response to only one choice (extra-ordinary measure) (Oels, 2012a). The Welsh or Aberystwyth School have helped to establish the human security perspective (Booth, 1991, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2005). The limitation to a single concept of security does not do justice to the much more nuanced processes of securitisation, as the extensive debates on different forms of climate security show. However, while these two approaches both fix the meaning of security by either focusing on a traditional security conceptions or human security, the Paris School has turned to the other extreme (Bigo, 2002, 2008; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Huysmans, 2004, 2006). Here, securitisation is largely seen as an ongoing, covert process in which (in-)security experts gradually create a never-ending state of exception (Bigo, 2002, p. 73; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008). In between these two more extreme poles, there are works that recognises that there can be different security constructions at the same time, thus avoiding an overemphasis on one particular security concept (Detraz & Betsill, 2009; Lucke et al., 2014; McDonald, 2013). But in the case of climate security, they essentially draw these different constructions of climate security from the existing literature. This lacks a deeper theoretically supported problematisation of how exactly different securitisations come

about and enable different political outcomes (Lucke, 2020). Therefore, this author agrees with Lucke's argument that a central shortcoming of previous research is the insufficient problematisation of the role of power in securitisation processes (2014, 2020). In the following, this will be explained in more detail.

As mentioned above, securitisation theory's core claim is that constructing something as a threat or security issue is not only change of words but has real political consequences. Lucke argues that linking securitisation to an analysis of power gives an even better understanding of these constitutive effects (Lucke, 2014, 2020). In doing so, he relies on Foucault's governmentality approach, which is a critique of the 1970s research on power and governance conducted by conventional political science and IR theory (Oels, 2010, p. 172). Power was directly linked to the ability of certain actors to control the actions of others and was therefore conceived as something coercive, dominating and essentially bad, exercised from the top-down over the dominated subjects without much possibility of resistance (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005).

Against this mainstream perspective, Foucault formulated his own, much more differentiated interpretation of power. For him, power can take on very different forms and is above all 'productive', that is, it enables political developments and constitutes subject positions through systems of meaning and significance (Lucke, 2020). It does so primarily by being anchored in what Foucault calls the 'discourse' (Foucault, 2003). On the basis of the productive quality of power, security discourses constitute problems in the first place, i.e., they make them governable from a certain perspective or create them as 'objects of governance' (Lucke, 2020) and thus delimit the political debate (Opitz, 2008). The term 'discourse' refers to 'a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities' (Hajer, 1997, p. 44). By focusing on the performative power of discourses, in the case of securitisation for example, the attention shifts from the analysis of seemingly objective threats to the analysis of political communities and the values and interests that need to be protected (Trombetta, 2012). Thus, a discourse is a power-knowledge nexus that constructs reality in a certain manner and determines what is right or wrong and who is authorised to tell the 'truth' (Lucke, 2020). According to Foucault, it is through discourse that individuals have access to reality and knowledge and therefore he claims that all reality and truth are exposed to and shaped by power dynamics (1980).Thus in this thesis a securitisation approach is applied, based on three different power forms derived from Foucault's Governmentality lectures at the College de France in the 1970s that shape the different climate security discourses (Foucault, 2006b, 2006a).

Combining a governmental perspective with securitisation has benefits because of its emphasis on the exercise of power. It can contribute to a better understanding of the actual functioning of securitisation and its potential policy implications. Moreover, a closer examination uncovers that power relations play a role in the initial facilitation of securitisation by providing the foundation or background from which specific actors can speak legitimately about security, acting as a catalyst for political attention, and setting agendas (Burgess, 2011, pp. 40–41; Hansen, 2000, p. 303). The concrete advantages of this approach are as follows. First, because of the framing concept of 'governmentalisation of security', this approach has a dynamic component that can explain the gradual evolution of security practices since the 1980s and the parallelism of (and links between) different power forms (Lucke, 2014, 2020). A governmentality perspective thus places the concept of securitisation in a larger historical and cultural context in which different security measures are constantly competing for political relevance (Elbe, 2009, p. 12; Foucault, 2006b, p. 76; Opitz, 2008, p. 206). This dynamic component is particularly beneficial for this thesis, as the aim is to examine how the EU has addressed the climate-security nexus in its security and defence policy over time. Second, because of its focus on power, the framework can provide deeper insights into the ways in which different securitisations are utilised to make issues governable from a particular perspective, and thus have different power effects and enable very different consequences (Balzacq, 2011; Elbe, 2009; Trombetta, 2011). Power relations limit security actors' choice of security arguments they can adopt (i.e. that have a chance of resonating in a given context) and therefore lead to very different forms of securitisation that entail a range of different conceptions of security (Balzacq, 2011, p. 26; Trombetta, 2011, p. 141). The third advantage of this approach is that it highlights the possibility that even securitisations that are beneficial at first glance, such as human security, can have indirect and often unnoticed power consequences that are undesirable from a normative perspective (Elbe, 2009, pp. 157–158; Floyd, 2007, 2011).

Based on Lucke's writings, this thesis aims to tackle the issue from a governmentality perspective (2014, 2020). Even though he starts from the works of Stefan Elbe, Angela Oels and others (Elbe, 2006, 2009; Methmann, 2013; Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2005, 2011, 2013; Rothe, 2011a, 2011b), his approach differs from their approaches in several aspects. Oels has been one of the first academics to approach climate issues from the perspective of governmentality (2005). Despite including the securitisation aspect in several works (Oels, 2011), her focus – and that of Methmann and Rothe as well (Methmann, 2013; Methmann & Rothe, 2012) – is not solely on the security aspect, but rather on broader changes in how climate change is governed within various political rationalisations or governmentalities over time. Lucke, in contrast, focuses more on the securitisation component and the notion that various securitisations can exist concurrently that are built upon various power forms (2014, 2020). In terms of theory,

Lucke's approach is most similar to Elbe's writings, but he concentrates on the worldwide securitisation of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/aids (Elbe, 2006, 2009, 2011). Moreover, while Oels' focus in on the global climate change debate and Luckes' focal point on the domestic level, this work concentrates on the EU as an international organisation and regional power. Lucke first applied this approach to the issue of climate change in 2014, analysing the discourse in the United States. In 2020, he published a book in which he conducted a comparative case analysis of the discourses in Germany, the United States and Mexico and used this to further develop the theory. In doing so, he analysed how securitisation is expressed through the three forms of power and what political effects they have on environmental and climate policy in particular, but also on defence and security policy, foreign, and development policy and disaster management. The empirical analysis that follows in Chapter 4 will be much narrower in scope, concentrating almost exclusively on the climate security discourse and changes in EU security and defence policy. Therefore, the following analytical framework will already put an emphasis on the consequences of the different discourses on the security and defence sector.

2.2. The Applied Theory: Securitisation based on a Governmentality Approach

This sub-chapter first introduces the concept of governmentality and its relevance for the theory of securitisation. It then introduces three distinct discourses on climate security by outlining the three different forms of power they rely on, and the different policy implication associated with them. Governmentality as a general analytical concept can be used to identify competing or complementary forms of governance through security, each based on a different form of power and with different political implications (Bigo, 2008; Dean, 2010). A governmentality analysis offers the possibility to capture the variety of ways in which a subject is made governable by identifying different discourses, their associated practices and their changes over time (Oels, 2011). Based on the differentiated understanding of power described above, Foucault proposes the concept of the 'governmentalisation of the state' as an alternative to concentrating primarily on the sovereign state and top-down governance processes using direct and often repressive power interventions (1983, p. 84). In this understanding, the term 'governing' has a broader meaning with the idea of different 'mentalities' underlying governance processes that are not limited to the state and thus include other actors in this process (Foucault, 2006b). This implies that the exercise of power in Western societies has been subject to continuous change since the 18th century, with the simultaneous application of a power triangle of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and governmental power[3], with the latter form of power proving to

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[3] Originally, this form of power is called governmental management or sometimes biopower (Foucault, 2006b, p. 161; Kelly, 2009, p. 60). However, for better comparability with the other forms of power and also to avoid confusion with the general governmentality approach, this author follows Lucke's suggestion and use the term 'governmental power' in the following (2014, 2020).

be the dominant one (Lucke, 2020). Throughout this process, governmental power has consistently modified the more traditional forms of power to serve a new goal – securing and enhancing the welfare of the population[4] rather than the state territory – by utilising the distinct characteristics of all three power forms (Foucault, 2006b, p. 161).

Governmentalisation of Security

Building on these original ideas and following Stefan Elbe (2009) and Oels (2011, 2012a), Lucke argues that security practices have changed similarly since the 1980s, and we can now see a 'governmentalisation of security' (2014, 2020). This means that security practices today also increasingly focus on the welfare of populations, rely on all three forms of power, are used by a wide range of actors besides the state, and cover a wide range of challenges, such as environmental or development issues (Elbe, 2009, pp. 9, 64,78). Similar to the governmentalisation of the state, the roots for transformation of security are to be found in changed social aspects – e.g. in the discussions of new and non-traditional security threats and referent objects such as the environment or human beings (Collier, 2009). This process is no longer primarily about securing a territory through traditional security measures such as police, intelligence, or army. Instead, there is a shift towards promoting the well-being of the population using new, less direct security systems built on a power triangle. Under this premise, security institutions and actors are gradually given the legitimacy to promote the well-being of the population, a development that is evident in the expansion of the concept of security beyond military and state issues (Elbe, 2009, p. 64). All these developments have shifted the narrow focus on violent conflict towards a more comprehensive approach to security.

Thus, securitisation in this light is understood as entities of governing, as processes that make things governable through the lens of security and the utilisation of different forms of power. The former distinction between 'normal' politics and ('extraordinary') security practices is becoming increasingly blurred in today's global politics (Oels, 2012). On the one hand, security turns into a technology of government, a way of 'rendering things governable' and thus transforming the mode of governing the population. On the other hand, security practices and theoretical concepts themselves are transforming and becoming less exceptional and more diversified (e.g. new security concepts such as human security, environmental security, gender security or risk (Hardt, 2017, p. 43)). As the term 'governance' already suggests, from this angle securitisation processes are not seen a priori as something that is extraordinary. But rather, they construct a specific mode of governance without inevitably producing extraordinary effects

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[4] The term 'population' refers to more than the simple number of citizens in the territory of a state. Rather, the term refers to all the statistical procedures made possible by the growth of sophisticated social scientific knowledge and the fact state bureaucracies record a wide range of demographic variables. The art of governance today is the precise use of all three forms of power to manipulate a wide range of factors at the population level (Foucault, 2007, pp. 74–75).

– yet they are anticipated to lead to pronounced effects that would not have been legitimate without securitisation (see Trombetta, 2012). For securitisation research and theory, this means that very different discourses of securitisation can be expected, using different combinations of the three forms of power with different political effects (Lucke, 2014).

Bidirectional Qualities of Securitisation

Especially with regard to the links to environmental and climate policy, it is clear to see how the logic of security itself is evolving (Corry, 2012; Floyd & Matthew, 2013; Trombetta, 2011). It shows the dual shift of a 'securitisation' of non-traditional issues like climate change (Corry, 2012; Floyd & Matthew, 2013; Hardt, 2017; Trombetta, 2011) and a 'climatisation' of traditional security concepts measures (Maertens & Baillat, 2017; Oels, 2012a), which Lucke calls the '"bidirectional qualities" of securitisation' (Lucke, 2020, p. 18). Thus, the term 'climatisation' of the security sector refers to the application of current security procedures to the issue of climate change as well as the adoption of new practices from the field of climate policy. Overall, it is possible to anticipate a restructuring of the security sector as a result of its 'climatisation' (Oels, 2012a). This means that both the concept of security is changing due to climate change as a perceived threat and the practices of security and defence policy is changing. This thesis places a particular emphasis on these 'bidirectional qualities' of security, as the focus is almost exclusively on how the perception of climate change as a security threat has changed EU security and defence policy, and does not ask how this has changed, for example environmental policy.

Accordingly, there are three different discourses on climate security based on the 'power triangle' of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power that is at the heart of Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation (2014, 2020). In the following, these three discourses are outlined by explaining the form of power they rely on, relating it to contemporary conceptions of security and illustrating how these manifests in the specific case of climate security. Whereby there is a focus on the implications for the security and defence sector.

2.2.1. The Sovereign Power Discourse on Climate Security

The first discourse is based on sovereign power (Lucke, 2014, 2020). In terms of its effects, such as the capacity to force one's will over others, this sort of power is comparable to traditional concepts of power and is founded on a Machiavellian or Hobbesian theory of power (Foucault, 2006b, p. 100; Machiavelli, 2005; Opitz, 2008, pp. 207–208). It has a binary and law-like character (Dean, 2010, p. 29; Foucault, 2006b, p. 149) and constitutes, in essence, a negative form of power that takes things away (Foucault, 2003, p. 240). Sovereign power is usually exercised by the sovereign – often the state and its organs such as the police or the

military – in a highly visible and direct way over a given territory, with its main objective being the maintenance of sovereignty itself (Foucault, 2003, p. 149). When applied to contemporary security debates and discourses, this form of power can be associated with a traditional state- and military-oriented concept of national security (Elbe, 2009, p. 86). To put it another way, national security - or corresponding concepts such as territorial security, state security, but also international security and order - are expressions of sovereign power (Lucke, 2020).

Threat Construction

Within the sovereign discourse, climate change is securitised in a directly and highly visible way by using 'national security' or similar concepts (Elbe, 2009; Lucke, 2014, 2020). It makes climate change governable as a traditional security issue, with a focus on state and military/defence actors' sovereign actions. The emphasis is not solely on military or state defence matters. But in the context of securitisation, Lucke argues, it is acceptable to understand it more narrowly (2014, 2020). The sovereign discourse focuses on security threats for states and their territory that may ultimately affect the international systems of states (Lucke, 2014, 2020). The focus of this discourse is mostly on second-order socio-economic effects of climate change. The threats expected in this discourse can be roughly divided into those for states of the Global South and the Global North. One of the core arguments is that climate change - in combination with population growth and dwindling resources - leads to instability and ultimately violent conflict, thus threatening the territorial integrity, stability and thus national security of states (Lucke, 2020). So far, this argument has been used in relation to countries of the Global South. The Global North sees itself threatened by spill-over effects of instability in countries of the Global South. The main pathways in this regard are political instability, the rise of terrorism, large-scale migration, and the spread of fragile as well as failed states, which could ultimately threaten industrialised countries or their vital interests in the affected regions. In addition, the Global North anticipates geopolitical tensions (e.g., concerning resources in the Arctic).

Political Effects

The sovereign discourse tends to point to solutions in the security and defence sectors, as its constructs climate change as a problem of traditional national security (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Sovereign power-based securitisation therefore limits the range of actors and focuses on the state and its agencies, especially the security, defence, and intelligence sectors (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Proposed policy measures could include preparing military bases and critical infrastructure for the impacts of climate change or expanding border security measures to keep out 'climate migrants'. It may also mean increasing military planning activities for geopolitical conflicts fuelled by climate change or simply for the altered mission scenarios around the world. The sovereign discourse often favours solutions that address the symptoms and thus point

mainly to adaptation for responding to the immediate security threat (Lucke, 2020). Although these solutions do not necessarily have to include a military component, military intervention in countries at risk of being destabilised or overwhelmed by climate change is a legitimate response within the framework of sovereign discourse. In its more extreme forms, effects like those of the Copenhagen School are conceivable. Examples include the suspension of laws, the acceleration or even circumvention of democratic procedures, or the involvement of the armed forces. This could ultimately result in military or political intervention to destroy greenhouse gas emitting industries or states that host them (Hartmann, 2010; Trombetta, 2008, p. 599). The following Table 1 summarises the main features of the sovereign discourse, focusing on the potential assignments for the security and defence sector.

TABLE 1: Sovereign Power Discourse on Climate Security

SECURITY CONCEPTIONS	THREAT CONSTRUCTION	POLITICAL EFFECTS
National security, regional security, territorial security, international security, international order, Military security, climate conflict, resource security, resource conflicts, water wars, energy security	Climate change is securitised in a direct, highly visible way, socio-economic effects of climate change leading to conflicts, violence and large-scale migration and therefore threatening the national security of the state.	**Transformation of the debate and of governance practices** Climate change as high politics, acceleration of procedures, decisive, effective, and radical measures (possibly bypassing democratic procedures). Focus on short-term and adaptation measures that tackle the immediate symptoms. Focus on direct interventions. Most important actors and referent objects are states and particularly the security, defence, and intelligence sector. **Exemplary policies** Direct political and military intervention to defend against secondary socio-economic dangers, military planning, prepare for geopolitical and regional tensions, secure military bases and critical infrastructure against adverse climate effects, increase border security against climate migrants.

Source: Own representation (mainly based on Lucke, 2020).

2.2.2. The Disciplinary Power Discourse on Climate Security

The basis of the second discourse is disciplinary power (Lucke, 2014, 2020). The goal is to discipline and control individual behaviour ('normation' (Foucault, 2006b, p. 90)), which is why this power form concerns individuals rather than a specific territory (Foucault, 1975). It is a precise form of power, as it operates at the micro level (Foucault, 2006b). Finally, disciplinary power expands the range of actors, and it is no longer only the state that is considered a legitimate actor, but also non-state actors such as NGOs and think tanks (Lucke et al., 2014). Looking at existing security concepts, disciplinary power is most evident in approaches to

human security (Elbe, 2009). All these conceptions of security place a focus on individuals and seek to empower and enable disadvantaged people towards a predefined ideal-type norm: the secure, free, and thus emancipated individual who is 'able to fulfil its human potential' (Booth, 1991, p. 319). The original concept of human security that evolved in the political sphere (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; UNDP, 1994), as well as related academic concepts such as individual security (Booth, 1991, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2005), have sought to create a new and positive concept of security. The aim was to empower individuals rather than states and to promote policies that would benefit their well-being.

Threat Construction

As a result, compared to the sovereign discourse, the securitisation of climate change appears to be quite different. The emphasis is on seemingly positive human security and similar conceptualisations (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Accordingly, the direct physical impacts of climate change on people's daily lives, such as extreme weather events, the spread of disease and resource scarcity, pose a greater threat than the second-order socio-economic impacts. The focus is on 'poor people in the Global South' who lack the necessary resources and government support to adapt to their changing environment (Lucke, 2020). Thus, securitisation moves along in a less alert, extra-ordinary and authoritative manner (Lucke, 2014, 2020).

Political Effects

Solution approaches are adaptation measures that directly serve the human security of individuals and prepare people for the threats of climate change (Lucke, 2014, 2020). This partially fulfils the emancipatory hopes of human security advocates. Plausible measures are direct interventions taken as part of development assistance programmes with the intention of changing the local population's behaviour to match to the ideal norm (Lucke, 2020). The objective is to increase public knowledge of both the risks posed by climate change and the global advantages of climate-friendly behaviour. Additionally, it aims to improve their coping capacities and lessen their 'outcome vulnerability' to the effects of climate change (O'Brien et al., 2007). The proposed solutions are thus mainly in the development field, and the range of actors is broader, as it also includes NGOs working on related issues (environment, development, and human rights). However, the framing of climate change as a danger to human security may also encourage deeper integration of military and civilian activities due to the changing concept of security, which comprises an increasingly close relationship between the development and traditional security sectors. Other possible measures include disaster response operations following disasters caused by climate change, supported by the military (Lucke, 2020). The following Table 2 summarises key characteristics of the disciplinary discourse, focusing on the potential assignments for the security and defence sector.

TABLE 2: Disciplinary Power Discourse on Climate Security

SECURITY CONCEPTIONS	THREAT CONSTRUCTION	POLITICAL EFFECTS
Human security, individual security, food security, environmental security, vulnerability, coping capacity	Climate change is securitised indirectly using human security conceptions and the like. A micro-perspective on individuals and small groups prevails. Focus on direct physical effects (everyday implications) of climate change for 'poor individuals'.	**Transformation of the debate and of governance practices** Focusing the climate security debate on the direct physical effects of climate change for human security, possibly leading to support and empowerment schemes for individuals. **Exemplary policies** Integrating development aid and military action, spread of 'networked security concepts', increasing deployment of disaster response operations.

Source: Own representation (mainly based on Lucke, 2020).

2.2.3. The Governmental Power Discourse on Climate Security

The third discourse is based on governmental power, which is directly linked to the governmentalisation of the state and the development of the population as the primary referent object (Lucke, 2014, 2020). It targets the macro-level rather than the micro-level by applying the concept of 'normalisation' to the whole population (Foucault, 2006b). A key instrument of normalisation is to statistically generate a normal distribution of certain values within the population (for example, the risk of being hit by adverse climatic effects) and then to bring statistical outliers ('risk groups', such as people living in high-risk areas or climate hotspots) down to this average (Foucault, 2006b, p. 97). Population in this sense is therefore not limited to the citizens of a single country but refers to the total population of the world. Social-scientific knowledge that allows for the measurement and covert manipulation of population dynamics is therefore one of the most crucial tools of governmental power (Lucke, 2020). Another attribute is a focus on the governance of the future by trying to (moderately) influence developments in their early phases and subsequently avoiding more far-reaching interventions at a later stage (Foucault, 2006b, p. 39). The objective is to contain problems that pose dangers from getting out of hand, to reduce them to a manageable level, but not fully eliminate them (Elbe, 2009, p. 62). These methods are more cost-efficient (Elbe, 2009, p. 67; Foucault, 2006b, pp. 498–499) and ensure that governmental power only interferes with natural population dynamics when necessary in the spirit of 'laissez-faire' or 'laissez-passer' strategies (Elbe, 2009, pp. 132–135; Foucault, 2006b, p. 69). Finally, the circle of legitimate actors is expanded to include non-state actors such as NGOs and Think Tanks. Concerning contemporary security conceptions, governmental power primarily resembles risk approaches (Corry, 2012; Elbe, 2009, p. 132). Risks are conceived as more diffuse and long-term than threats, yet they may still be calculated and managed (Lucke, 2020). In practice, risk approaches function similarly to governmental power, by identifying certain risk groups or high-risk activities through statistical methods and

forecasting, and them attempting to reduce these risks to tolerable levels rather than eliminating them completely (Corry, 2012, p. 245; Oels, 2011, p. 18). Additionally, it operates on an aggregate level, tends to encourage long-term solutions, and concentrates on root causes (see Elbe, 2009, pp. 131–135).

Threat Construction

A governmental power-based securitisation discourse constructs climate change as a long-term issue that may gradually increase several threats (Lucke, 2014, 2020). It is less direct and does not identify immediate threats or precisely specified referent objects. Instead, it uses complex statistical models to determine which high-risk populations and regions climate change may impact in the future (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Examples include geographical areas like coastal and drought regions, or small islands, or socio-economic groups. The emphasis is on reducing the danger of the outliers to a bearable level to ensure the welfare and functionality of the general population, drawing on the idea of 'normalisation'. Thus, the focus is on interfering subtly by attempting to lessen high-risk populations' 'contextual vulnerability' (O'Brien et al., 2007, p. 76).

Political Effects

In general, government discourse widens the circle of actors, and non-state actors such as NGOs and think tanks play a crucial role in implementing these forms of governance through various measures. However, the focus here will be on the security and defence sector. Within this discourse, security and defence actors increasingly rely on risk assessment and risk management systems (Lucke, 2014, 2020). These include vulnerability assessment (early warning and monitoring systems), the formation of climate risk groups and areas, and the development of prevention strategies to increase their resilience. Various fields are familiar with the concept of resilience, which refers to the ability of a system to anticipate, adapt, recover from and reorganise under adverse circumstances in order to sustain and strengthen the successful functioning of the system (Michel, 2021). In addition, it can be said that the security and defence sector is increasingly cooperating with the scientific sector. The main components of the governmental discourse are summarised in the following Table 3, again focusing on the possible assignments for the security and defence sector.

TABLE 3: Governmental Power Discourse on Climate Security

| SECURITY CONCEPTIONS	THREAT CONSTRUCTION	POLITICAL EFFECTS
Risk, risk-management, riskisation, scenario planning, resilience, risk-groups, risk-assessment, uncertainty, contingency-planning, precautionary principle, early warning systems	Climate change is securitised indirectly, using risk conceptions and focusing on the macro-level. Statistical construction of risk groups, areas and practices, focus not on direct effects/threats of climate change but on probabilities of these effects vis-à-vis the population, identified by risk assessment schemes and vulnerability assessments, acceptance of a general degree of uncertainty. Focus on future scenarios.	**Transformation of the debate and of governance practices** Increased surveillance of risk groups, areas and activities, 'normalisation' processes, acting on the future – long-term measures aimed at root causes, bringing down the risks to a tolerable level, focus on precautionary and resilience measures, reducing the vulnerability of certain groups, that is, critical vulnerabilities through adaptation measures, focus on contextual vulnerability, focus on cost-efficient measures that do not interfere too much, rather acting at the level of the population. **Exemplary policies** Risk management approaches (disaster risk atlases, early warning systems), vulnerability assessments, creation of climate risk groups and areas and development of appropriate policies to prepare these risk groups, resilience measures (reducing contextual vulnerability).

Source: Own representation (mainly based on Lucke, 2020).

Securitisation Process understood as an Act of Using Different Forms of Power

As can be seen from these descriptions of the different discourses, power plays a role in the process of securitisation of climate change. Not only are the discourses based on different forms of power, but the productive quality of power is also visible in the fact that the different discourses create different security truths. This means, as just described, that securitisation serves as a 'catalyst' for political debate while also limiting what the parties involved perceive as the most suitable understandings and countermeasures (Lucke, 2020). Moreover, it excludes others from the debate or frames them as victims or objects while establishing certain actors as legitimate and powerful. Finally, securitisation can directly legitimise and influence concrete policies. In this way, reality and truth are shaped by the power dynamics in the discourses, as Foucault suggested (1980). The three different discourses on climate security have different advantages and disadvantages, which will be discussed later in the discussion (Chapter 4.3.). Although Foucault clearly distinguishes between different forms of power and refers to 'older' and 'younger' ones, the latter have not simply superseded the former (Foucault, 2006b, p. 161). Instead, in accordance with the original governmentality approach, it can be anticipated that in the process of the governmentalisation of security, the balance of the power triangle shifts increasingly in favour of governmental power; it moves so to speak to the top of

the triangle (see Figure 2) (Dean, 2010; Elbe, 2009; Foucault, 2006b). Accordingly, the older forms of power, while retaining their core characteristics, are transformed in such a way that they also serve the goal of increasing the welfare of the population. To achieve this, they increasingly rely on a variety of governmental security mechanisms such as statistical analyses, risk assessments, cost-effectiveness, future orientation, according to the principle of 'laissez faire', less direct means of intervention (Dean, 2010; Elbe, 2009; Foucault, 2006b). It is therefore not a linear transformation. Moreover, securitisation proceeds differently in certain contexts and policy fields (Lucke, 2014, 2020). This depends not only on the social actor undertaking the securitisation, but also on the external circumstances in which it operates.

FIGURE 2: Climate Security Discourses based on Different Power Forms (Own illustration based on Lucke, 2014, 2020).

Securitisation process understood as act of governing using different power forms.

The manifestation of the discourses depends on the respective culture, institutional setup, actors.

GOVERNMENTAL POWER DISCOURSE

DISCIPLINARY POWER DISCOURSE

SOVEREIGN POWER DISCOURSE

Normalisation processes, surveillance of risk groups and areas, risk assessment, acting on the future, precautionary measures, resilience building, cost-efficient measures.

Normation processes, focusing the debate on the direct physical effects of climate change for human security, measures focused on outcome vulnerability.

Attention, focusing the debate on secondary socio-economic effects, direct state and military interventions, possibly extra-ordinary measures, focus on short-term measures.

2.3. Concluding Remarks

The previous chapter introduced the governmentality approach with its three forms of power and explained how they are at the core of the various security notions, e.g., national security, human security and risk or synonymous concepts. Linking the forms of power to these distinct concepts of security serves as a theoretical bridge between the governmentality approach and securitisation theory (see also Elbe, 2009, pp. 59, 86, 108, 131). This is useful for the following reasons. It expands the meaning and consequences of security, which leads to the second argument that it considers the ever-changing nature of security concepts and thus the political implications of securitisation processes. Therefore, Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation, which is based on Foucault's governmentality approach, is applied in this research. The three climate security discourses introduced in this chapter can be seen as ideal types to clearly distinguish between different security concepts and securitisation discourses (Lucke, 2014, 2020). The gradual transformation of the 'older' forms of power towards governmental

power is considered as a background premise and remains to be found in the empirical material in Chapter 4. This theory has, as far as this author knows, not yet been applied to the case of the EU in this way and in particular, not been applied with focus on the security and defence policy. However, this analytical grid is considered an extremely helpful way of identifying the changes that EU security policy has undergone because of climate change as a perceived security issue and, in particular, to better understand the reasons behind them.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design and Case Selection

Case Selection

The research aims to answer the research question: 'How has the securitisation of climate change impacted the European Union's security and defence policy between 2007 and 2022, and what possible implications can be drawn from this?'. A single case study (EU security and defence policy between 2007 to 2022) is conducted. The analysis begins in 2007, which, as already mentioned in the introduction, is considered a turning point in the discussions of climate security (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012; Brzoska, 2012; Oels, 2011; Oels & von Lucke, 2015). It concludes with the European Security Strategy, which was published in March 2022, which is a plan of action to strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. Thus, it points the way ahead for the next 8 years. The reason for this rather broad timeframe is that it allows the author to explore transformations of the discourses and thus within the political implications over time. The choice of the EU's security and defence policy as the unit of analysis was based on the fact that the majority of today's security threats are transnational, including terrorism, pandemics, and climate change, which has caused states to rely more and more on formal international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and indeed the EU (Sperling & Webber, 2019). Numerous researchers point to the EU as one of the most significant institutions in the context of the climate security nexus (Bremberg et al., 2018; Odeyemi, 2020, 2021; Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021; Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016; Youngs, 2015). Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, there seems to be momentum in climate and security defence policy since 2019, following the publication of the EU's Green Deal and several documents aimed at making the Union a leader in this field (Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021). It was therefore decided to analyse the case of the EU. The aim is to gain in-depth knowledge of the EU's approach to the link between climate change and security and how this may have changed over time.

Research Design

The analysis uses a combination of descriptive and interpretative approaches, as the aim is to examine how the perception of climate change as a security issue has changed over time, what policy actions are proposed and what are possible explanations for these developments. Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation theory based on Foucault's governmentality approach (Chapter 2.2.) helps to structure the empirical analysis, especially in providing explanations for the possible changes that have occurred over time. It is important to note that neither the empirical evidence on climate change and security in the EU is assessed nor the gap between the practical measures and the solutions adopted following these acts is examined. To achieve this, the research method mainly consists of a qualitative content analysis of the

most influential EU security policy documents. Seven documents are examined which were previously determined by means of purposive sampling (see Chapter 3.2.). Qualitative content analysis, often considered one of the best-known techniques for understanding social phenomena, is used (Krippendorff, 2018). This type of method emphasises the role of the researcher in analysing the 'reality' that social actors construct through the meaning of and in texts (Altheide, 1996), which fits well with the constructivist perspective of the theory used in this thesis. The focus of this approach is to allow categories to emerge from the data and to consider the importance of the context in which an object (and the categories derived from it) is analysed for understanding meaning (Bryman, 2012). A directed approach is used, which means that the analysis is conducted with a theory or relevant research findings as a guide (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Here Lucke's reconceptualisation of securitisation theory is applied, which helps to find the categories from the data, which are primarily the three discourses described above, as will become clear in the operationalisation (Chapter 3.3). The focus is on the characteristics of language as a medium of communication and concentrates on the content or contextual meaning of the text with the overall aim of providing knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Focus of the Analysis

This means, in the case at hand, that first of all it is described in a summarising way whether and how the three discourses on climate security explained above are reflected in the documents. The aim of this research design is to increase understanding of how and why the perception of climate change as a security issue has changed EU security and defence policy by mainly drawing on Lucke's securitisation theory. The objective therefore is to identify which securitisation discourse (or combination thereof) is dominant and to explore how these discourses are linked to specific policy implications. Attention is also paid to how the discourses are transported in the text, i.e., what language/words and rhetoric is used. Thus, the theory serves as a lens through which the content analysis is viewed and is used to identify factors that contribute to the changes of EU security and defence policy through climate change. The three climate security discourses explained in the previous chapter (Chapter 2.2.) can be seen as ideal types to clearly distinguish between different securitisations. The gradual transformation of the older power forms towards governmental power is considered as background premise and remains to be found in the empirical material. The aim is to gain new insights into the securitisation of climate change in the context of the EU's security and defence policy. To this end, the content analysis will in a first step uncover which securitisation discourses are dominant, which recommendations are associated with a specific securitisation discourse, whether there are connections between the discourses. As the theoretical framework has shown, this theory helps to explain the political effects and thus the reasons for possible

changes. Furthermore, the theory also offers the possibility to discuss future policy implications. These findings are discussed in a second step and supplemented by findings from the secondary literature, such as peer-reviewed articles, to enable a more critical evaluation. In addition, the results are embedded in the political and historical context to provide further possible explanations for the development of climate change securitisation. The research aims to provide evidence-based insights on how the approach to climate change in EU security policy developed and provide possible explanations for this.

Limitations

Compared to other qualitative research methods such as interviews or observation, the availability, accessibility, and universality of the policy documents contributed to the choice of qualitative content analysis. Furthermore, policy documents are perceived as an accurate representation of what is going on in EU climate security nexus. Other methods, such as interviewing and/or observing the people who contributed to or created the policy texts, would be difficult even if it were possible to reconstruct the policy procedures. Inherently, qualitative content analysis constitutes a suitable method to detect the presence of different discourses and changes over time. Another method that would have been appropriate to analyse the documents would have been critical discourse analysis. However, this would have exceeded the scope of this work. The qualitative content analysis is essentially based only on what could be extracted from the selected policy documents and draws on Lucke's securitisation theory, which, though carefully selected, may nevertheless lead to limited and one-dimensional insights into what is de facto going on. Although the results of the content analysis are supported by secondary literature and the overall context, it is important to note that the analysis does not guarantee that all factors involved in the development of climate security in the EU's security and defence policy are considered. Furthermore, the concept of the chosen framework could be misinterpreted and misapplied. Nevertheless, based on the theoretical framework and supported by additional findings, a single case study content analysis is considered the most appropriate method for this research.

3.2. Data Collection

The thesis mainly rests on an in-depth interpretative content analysis of the main EU security policy documents dealing with climate change. The websites of the EU institutions were searched for keywords such as 'climate change and security', 'climate security' and 'climate security nexus' to identify further politically influential articulations on climate security. As the EU institutions make many of their documents available online for all to access to fulfil their commitment to transparency, there were generally no difficulties in accessing the documents. The websites identified several thousand results, but often documents were displayed that had

nothing to do with the topic at hand. Simultaneously, secondary literature was consulted, which already had identified several documents as particularly relevant concerning the securitisation of climate change in the EU case (see for instance Bremberg et al., 2018; Herbeck & Flitner, 2010; Odeyemi, 2020, 2020; Oels, 2012; Remling & Barnhoorn, 2021; Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016; Sperling & Webber, 2019). These are about 40 documents. However, this involved not only documents relevant to the security and defence sector, but for example also development and diplomacy. In addition, the most recent documents could not yet be considered by the secondary literature. Therefore, it was finally decided to use the purposive sampling. This means that sampling is carried out with regard to the research objectives, so that documents are selected according to criteria that make it possible to answer the research question (Bryman, 2012).

Rules for Purposive Sampling

First, only documents published by the European External Action Service (EEAS), including the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) were considered. Within the EU, there is no actor clearly responsible for climate security or security and defence policy in general. Rather, it is as shared competence, and the member states are also active individually. However, the EEAS, with its unique position as a node in the EU's foreign and security policy system, is particularly relevant in this regard. It was created in 2010 and represents a single institutional setting which puts together the EC, the Council, and the Member States to carry out Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to push for greater coherence in the EU foreign and security policy. The HR heads the EEAS in their capacity as Vice-President of the EC and is permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. This position was already introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999). Following the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the post is supported by the EEAS. The EEAS, and in particular the post of HR, were created so that the Union could speak with 'one face and one voice' on foreign policy issues (European External Action Service, 2021). It was therefore decided to analyse only documents published by these institutions in the framework of this study. Secondly, the sample was limited to documents that established a connection between climate change and security (more precisely: security and defence), rather than just mentioning those terms separately. Third, only publications that are intended to function as strategy papers or roadmaps were included. That is, they are valuable for mapping practices because they are discursive artefacts that enable practitioners to do certain things and prevent them from doing others (Bremberg et al., 2018). Against this background, they are particularly well suited for this research, as they show the EU's internal understanding of the climate change and security nexus, as well as consequences the organisation draws from this. The main addresses are the primary stakeholders, i.e., especially other EU institutions, member states and security partners. Finally, documents

focusing only on security issues in a particular region were excluded as this could have biased the empirical analysis.

Based on these rules, seven documents were finally selected for the interpretative policy analysis. Two of them were published jointly by the EEAS and the EC. The other five were published by the EEAS. Two of them are European Security Strategies published during the observation period. As such, they provide direction for the EU's overall security policy and can thus be informative units of analysis on the extent to which the handling of the climate-security nexus has changed. The other documents deal exclusively with the connection between climate change and security. Figure 3 below shows the selected documents for the content analysis in chronological order of publication.

FIGURE 3: Timeline of Documents for Content Analysis (Own Illustration).

3.3. Operationalisation

To conduct the content analysis, the elements of the securitisation theory that are considered relevant are operationalised (translated into codes) and used as indicators of whether and how perceptions of climate change as a security issue have changed (c.f. Appendix B for the code book). The first step, in line with most empirical research within the governmentality framework, is therefore to assume that there are always multiple discourses at any given time and that it is possible to track changes in the distribution patterns of discursive elements over time (Foucault, 1983; Rothe, 2011b). Three different ways of securitising an issue, i.e., three ideal-typical climate security discourses based on the three forms of power, are assumed and translated into codes (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Thus, the three main codes represent the sovereign, disciplinary and governmental discourse (see Appendix A). One has to keep in mind that these discourses are ideal-typical simplifications and rarely occur completely independently from each other in political practice (Foucault, 2006b, p. 23). However, it is helpful to begin with this

simplified framework when organising the content analysis. To further facilitate the content analysis, each discourse on climate security and consequently each code is divided into two dimensions. The first dimension *threat construction* examines how the discourse in question frames the threat of climate change. That is, which security concept it applies and which objects it thus portrays as particularly threatened (Lucke, 2020). The second dimension focuses on the political consequences of each specific discourse, thus on the *political effects* (Lucke, 2020). In this particular case, it is about the legitimisation of policies and practices in the security and defence sector. Each main code has three sub-codes, which in turn have further sub-codes (see Figure 3).

As discourses and their political implications or political effects are co-constitutive (Diez, 2001, p. 13), separating these two dimensions is essentially another methodological simplification (Lucke, 2020). Discourses have a dual-quality in that they can justify policies and practices and at the same time these practices and policies reinforce or support certain discourses (Lucke, 2020; Salter, 2010). Despite this, individual policies or speech acts alone do not constitute a discourse. They are just one of many different layers that ultimately make up the discourse, and they only acquire meaning through their discursive representation (Lucke, 2020). Notwithstanding the fact that discourses change frequently, they are still rather stable structures of meaning that do not change easily (Diez, 1999). Finally, climate security discourses contribute to constituting climate change as a threat and to legitimising political practices and policies. Therefore, the separation between the two dimensions of threat construction and power effects is reasonable. The documents analysed did not focus exclusively on one of the three discourses, but often contained articulations of all three and tended to link the discourses together. Nevertheless, it was possible to identify discourses that were more relevant than others. To determine which discourse is predominant, the researcher relies on the frequency, internal coherence and intensity, and position of the argument within the document.

In addition to the three main codes, sovereign discourse, disciplinary discourse, and governmental discourse, one further code was created. The first, titled 'Document Specific Findings (DSF)' involves different sub-codes and is intended to support the analysis by assigning other significant passages to it. As can be seen from this, most of the codes stem from the theoretical framework. The initial coding scheme was thus developed before starting to analyse the documents (deductive approach). However, it was modified a few times and additional codes were produced as the study progressed (inductive approach). Thus, a combination of deductive and inductive methods is applied. The content analysis and its codebook constitute a deductive method that aids in measuring theoretical notions because it enables the researcher to determine the presence or absence of various aspects. Given the fact that policy documents cover

a variety of dimensions, multiple codes are given to a single excerpt (simultaneous coding). MAXQDA is used as software to analyse the selected policy documents using the coding scheme mentioned above.

Limitations

Given that the codes are designed, and documents are labelled by the researcher, this method is sensitive to human error. In addition, using a directed approach has certain disadvantages, as researchers look at the data with an informed but strong bias. As a result, researchers are more likely to find data that support a theory than to find evidence that contradicts it. In this case, however, the advantage of the targeted approach is that the theory provides a framework for the coding process, which is likely to lead to greater impartiality. This is particularly important in light of the fact that both the creation of the codebook and the coding itself were carried out by only one person. To maximise the validity of the research, the content analysis follows a consistent approach that follows specific coding rules (see Table 4). The research leaves, as mentioned before, potential for additional findings that emerge during the analysis (inductive) and secondary literature is used to supplement and validate the discussion of the findings. Finally, and most crucially, it is almost impossible to identify and explain all the changes in security and defence policy brought on by climate change based on the chosen research design. To put it another way, it is not anticipated that the findings of the chosen research design will provide a complete answer to the research question. However, it is expected that the policy documents, in combination with the chosen theoretical framework, additional insights from the secondary literature and contextual embeddedness will add to the overall understanding of how and why securitisation of climate change has changed the EU's security and defence policy. Consequently, this research design is considered the most practical and appropriate strategy for providing the most accurate and complete answers to the research question.

Table 4: Coding Rules for the Qualitative Content Analysis

CODING RULES	First, the unit of analysis (EU Security and Defence Policy between 2007 and 2022) and the documents are selected for the content analysis. These are EU security and defence policy documents that are considered particularly relevant for answering the research question. This was done with the help of a purposive sample.
	Secondly, the policy documents in general are reviewed to filter out the sections that are considered relevant for the study.
	Thirdly, a codebook is developed (Appendix B) based on the elements of the analytical framework (Chapter 2.2.).
	Fourthly, it is determined for each document whether and how the three ideal-typical climate security discourses are present. In addition, the presence of sections relevant to the code (document specific findings) is also observed.
	Fifth, the coding scheme and the code book were adapted (e.g., inductive codes added and explained).
	Finally, the relevant sections of the documents are analysed, whereas excerpts are labelled using the codes (Appendix A).

4. Securitisation of Climate Change in the EU's CSDP between 2007 and 2022

4.1. The EU's CSDP

Along with diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, climate action, human rights, economic support, and trade policy, CSDP is a tool in the EU's portfolio for promoting international security and peace. These various tools are put together in a certain way to match the unique circumstances of each crisis or emergency. This is the so-called Integrated Approach of the EU, which is a multifaceted strategy that is constantly modified to account for changing circumstances (European External Action Service, 2021). CSDP was first conceived by the EU in 1999 under the title European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The reason for EU-level cooperation on security issues is that the scale and complexity of the interlinked security threats and challenges facing the EU are beyond the capacity of any single member state (European External Action Service, 2021). What is now known as CSDP was adopted as an integral part of the CFSP in 2007 with the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Commission provides the following definition on CSDP:

> 'Policy offering a framework for cooperation between EU Member States within which the EU can conduct operational missions with the aim of peace-keeping and strengthening international security in third countries by relying on civil and military assets provided by EU Member States.' (European Commission, n.d.).

The policy is based on the overall belief that security threats generally do not originate from within the EU, but that what happens beyond the EU borders has a direct impact on the security of European citizens. The aim is to assist in the resolution of prevention of conflict and crisis, to strengthen partner capacities, and ultimately, to defend the EU and its citizens (European Court of Auditors (ECA), 2018). As a result, the ultimate purpose is to enhance EU security by encouraging international stability and security. The EU Treaties define a wide variety of responsibilities, including conflict prevention and peace-keeping, crisis management, joint disarmament activities, military advice and aid, and humanitarian and rescue missions, as well as post-war stabilisation. The tasks therefore cover the entire conflict cycle from prevention and intervention to peacebuilding (Meyer, 2020). Since its adoption, CSDP has remained essentially an intergovernmental affair. This means that any CSDP mission, whether military or civilian in nature, requires the unanimity of the Council to be launched, although a varying number of EU member states participate and actively contribute. Moreover, decisions on the deployment of a mission or operation by the EU are usually taken at the request of the partner country being offered assistance or in response to a UN Security Council resolution, and always in strict compliance with international law (European Court of Auditors (ECA), 2018). These decisions consider the EU's security objectives, strategic aspirations, and regional engagement policy. They are adapted to the local circumstances and the tasks to be performed.

4.2. The EU's Integrated Approach to Climate Security

Climate security is not one specific policy area but rather a collection of related policy areas linked together by the EU's declared intention to respond to and prevent climate-related security threats and risks. The focus of this thesis is on the perception and handling of climate change within the EU's CSDP. However, it is important to stress that the EU generally takes an integrated approach to promoting security, as described in the last sub-chapter, and this also applies to climate security. This also becomes clear again and again in the documents analysed (see EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020):

> 'Given the complexity of the links between climate change, environmental degradation and peace and security, and the impact of these links on different EU policy fields, including crisis response and conflict management, development and humanitarian action, it is paramount that the climate and security nexus is addressed through an integrated approach in EU external action' (EEAS, 2021, p. 1).

Moreover, the EEAS and European Commission in 2020 stressed that, in particular due to the nature of climate change as a multidimensional issue, an integrated approach also between the different EU actors is crucial to identify synergies and maximise impact (EEAS & European Commission, 2020). It is important to emphasise that the EU is taking an integrated approach to the climate change and security nexus, otherwise a distorted picture could be painted that would give the impression that the EU is addressing the issue only in the context of its security and defence policy. This is not the case and will be briefly touched on in the following. This author follows the proposal by, among others, Bremberg et al. to divide EU action on climate security into three policy areas: climate diplomacy, development, and security and defence (2018). This division is mainly for analytical purposes to distinguish between mandates and responsibilities, although it follows the definition of policy areas in the EU.

Climate Diplomacy

Climate diplomacy evolved in light of the slow progress in international climate negotiations following the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, the EEAS and the Commission called for a stronger EU external policy to prevent climate change and proposed three areas of action: promoting climate action, supporting the implementation of such action and pursuing work on climate change and international security (Bremberg et al., 2018). A new document with more precise operationalisations of how to cooperate with climate diplomacy was produced by the EEAS and the Commission in 2013 (European Union, 2013a). It was recommended that the EU strengthen its narrative on the relationship between the environment, natural resources, prosperity, and security. It also recommended that the EU encourage low-emissions and climate resilient development. This was adopted shortly after (European

Union, 2013c). In the meantime, climate diplomacy has become a policy area in its own right in terms of the strategic priorities of diplomatic dialogue and initiatives, and the security implications are increasingly recognised (Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016).

Within the analysed documents the emphasis of international cooperation and multilateralism is evident as well, which is to be reinforced. Multilateral forums shall be used to increase the attention on the nexus between climate change and security and especially the awareness of it. Exchanges and partnerships are proposed with third countries particularly exposed to the impacts of climate change, as well as with regional actors active there, such as the African Union (AU), the Alliance of Small Island States, the Arab League (EEAS, 2008, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). In addition, other key global partners, and international actors such as the UN, NATO and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are mentioned for existing cooperation and that this should be further developed (EEAS, 2008, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). Furthermore, investments in environmental protection and climate change mitigation should be considered as part of preventive security policy and promoted in multilateral forums (EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). In particular, the Paris Agreement, the international treaty on climate change negotiated in 2015, is mentioned in almost all documents from 2016 onwards and is also referred to as the 'first line of defence' (EEAS, 2019, p. 3) in the climate-security nexus (see also EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). From 2019, the documents analysed refer several times to the European Green Deal, which is more ambitious than the Paris Agreement (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). The importance of climate diplomacy for the EU, also in relation to the climate-security nexus, is illustrated by the fact that the Union sees itself in a leadership role and stresses on various occasions that it wants to strengthen its 'leadership' and advocate for a multilateral response (EEAS, 2008, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020).

Development
The link between climate change, security and development is seen as a priority in fragile situations and there are several instruments that strengthen it (Bremberg et al., 2018). The underlying assumption is that mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development cooperation will help vulnerable societies cope with the additional pressures that climate change brings. This means that development assistance and humanitarian aid will seek to increase the capacity of vulnerable people to cope with the impacts of climate change. Therefore, development policy and humanitarian action are mentioned in all the documents analysed. The humanitarian-development-peace nexus is also highlighted with regard to the EU's integrated approach, as it can provide entry points for cross-cutting approaches and thus develop

synergies (EEAS, 2021, p. 11). According to Sonnsjö and Bremberg, there is also significant potential for addressing climate security challenges given that the EU and its member states collectively provide more than €1 billion in annual development and humanitarian aid (2016). There are development initiatives that generally support countries and individuals to improve their climate resilience. But there are also financial instruments that specifically address the climate-security nexus. One of these various financial instruments is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP, formerly Instrument for Stability (Ifs)), which aims to increase third-country capacity to address certain global and trans-regional threats, including climate change (European Union, 2014).

Security and Defence

The third area which is the focus of this thesis is security and defence. Such a strategy might be thought of as civil-military collaboration in missions in a restricted sense. However, the comprehensive approach to security should be understood as using the many instruments at the EU's disposal 'in a strategically coherent and effective manner', with CSDP being only one of several instruments, as former HR Catherine Ashton stated in the run-up to the 2013 European Council on Security and Defence (European Union, 2013b, 2013c). Thus, as previously mentioned, the EU's integrated approach to the climate-security nexus comes into play again. This is also evident in the documents examined. Although the focus is on security and defence, the other two areas of climate diplomacy and development as well as humanitarian action are frequently mentioned, and all areas are interlinked. Nevertheless, the following analysis focuses on the area of security and defence, while it should only be considered as one of several instruments within the climate-security nexus.

4.3. Climate Security within the EU's CSDP

The following section answers the research question: 'How has the securitisation of climate change impacted the European Union's security and defence policy between 2007 and 2022, and what possible implications can be drawn from this?'. First, in the next three sub-chapters, the descriptive question 'how' is answered using the reconceptualisation of securitisation theory presented above. The threefold matrix of climate security discourses will be applied to observe whether and how they are reflected in the EU debate, what policy recommendations they have produced, which discourses have been dominant and whether there are links between the discourses. The subsequent discussion will answer the more interpretative part of the research question by discussing the results and what implications can be drawn from them. For this purpose, the results of the content analysis are used and supplemented by secondary literature. First, the main findings are summarised, then the policy implications of the three discourses and possible negative developments are discussed. All three discourses which

were introduced in Chapter 2.2. can be found in the documents analysed. This will be described in more detail below. There are not three different periods (sovereign discourse, disciplinary discourse, and governmentality discourse), but the discourses are completely interwoven, with the disciplinary discourse being the least visible. This fact did not change over time with minor changes still observable within the three discourses.

4.3.1. The Sovereign Power Discourse within the EU's CSDP

As mentioned above, the sovereign discourse focuses on security threats for states and their territory that may ultimately affect the international systems of states (Lucke, 2014, 2020). All documents make use of this discourse. In the EU, the sovereign discourse seldom revolves around direct threats posed by climate change to the security of this region. While in the first document the EU's security interests are even made a precondition for any action (EEAS & European Commission, 2008, p. 3), this is not the case in the other documents. The EU's security interests are thus no longer so strongly articulated in the following documents. Nevertheless, they are still visible. Instead, the impact of instability and violent conflicts on the security of countries in the Global South and their possible repercussions for international security are emphasised above all. International security or descriptions such as 'global stability', 'peace and security around the world' or 'international peace and security' were most frequently found in the documents analysed, regional security is also mentioned a few times. Whereby this term is never mentioned separately, but always in connection with other concepts, especially international security. Thus, it is not primarily about the defence of the EU and thus about internal and external demarcation. Rather, state security is interpreted as something common that cannot be established in one part of the world while other regions sink into chaos.

Threat Construction

As explained above, it is not the direct physical impacts of climate change (e.g., precipitation patterns, weather extremes and resource scarcity) that are identified as security threats, but rather the indirect socio-political and economic consequences that could be triggered by such events. One important argument in this discourse is that climate change could act as a 'threat multiplier', exacerbating existing trends, tensions, and instability (EEAS, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020) and destabilising states and eventually whole regions, contributing to more fragile and failed states in the world. Thus, the EU acknowledges that climate change can exacerbate tensions and existing civil conflicts, but it has not identified climate change as a direct cause of conflict outbreaks. This instability, in turn, is thought to trigger further security threats as the 'weak' and 'failing' states are overwhelmed with their already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges.

First, climate change and environmental degradation could exacerbate potential or existing conflicts. Conflicts are usually constructed in the context of scarce resources (e.g., water scarcity, reduction of arable land) and associated with the inadequacies or inability of governments to manage such situations (see EEAS, 2016, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). However, most of the resource conflicts are projected in concrete areas and mentioned with a statistical statement. Therefore, they are discussed in more detail in the governmentality discourse. Furthermore, it is assumed that 'climate change-related emergencies could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between ethnic and religious groups within countries and to political radicalisation' (EEAS & European Commission, 2008, p. 5). Although it is not clearly stated here, it could be mean that climate-induced migration of people within countries and to neighbouring countries could lead to tensions between different ethnic groups or citizens. This would at least correlate with the fact that climate-induced migration is another effect described as a security threat, leading to the second group of security threats (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). The third identified impact of increasing instability due to climate change is the growing potential for organised crime. In terms of organised crime, only an increase in environmental crime could be identified as a potential threat in the documents analysed (EEAS, 2016, 2021). Finally, it is believed that instability also prepares the ground for terrorism (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). On the one hand, 'large parts of inhospitable areas may no longer be under effective state control and may become safe havens for hostile forces' (EEAS & European Commission, 2020, p. 3) and on the other hand, the continuing challenges of unstable situations may be used tactically by such groups to 'encourage recruitment' (EEAS, 2021, p. 4). Even though a distinction is made here between these different security threats, it should be noted in principle that a differentiated view is difficult because the threats in this discourse are linked in different ways, which also illustrates why climate change is referred to as a threat multiplier.

Thus, another argument most often made in this discourse is that developing countries, considered less stable and lacking the necessary means to adapt to climate change, are believed to be hit first and hardest by these developments. They are relatively plainly referred to as 'least developed states', 'states particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change', but also as 'failed states' or 'weak states' as indicated above. However, through migration and conflicts that spill over national borders these developments could spread to other regions and eventually even to the EU. The result would eventually be a destabilisation of the entire global security architecture: 'The EU has long recognised that climate change acts as a threat multiplier with serious implications for peace and security across the globe' (EEAS, 2019, p. 3). This also explains why the EU repeatedly links regional and international security as already indicated above.

In addition to these spill-over effects, a third argument is that the EU considers itself and international security in general threatened by geopolitical tensions due to climate change. These could also lead to instability ultimately even conflict. It is possible to divide geopolitical tensions into two groups. The first is possible tensions stemming from climate change itself. Examples include disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights due to predicted changes in landmasses, especially caused by rising sea levels (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). In addition, global health crises, such as the recent Covid-19 pandemic, are expected to become more likely due to climate change, which could lead to international rivalries disruptions in key trade routes that can put pressure on critical supply chains and affect economic security (EEAS, 2022). The second group is tensions arising from the transition to increasingly climate-neutral economies in response to climate change, which could have social, economic, and political impacts that exacerbate conflict situations (EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). This is considered particularly relevant in relation to energy supply and energy transition, which is also why energy security is often mentioned in this discourse (EEAS, 2016, 2021, p. 2, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). Furthermore, and closely related to the first group, this could trigger tensions over previously inaccessible resources. The Arctic region is particularly highlighted here (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008), which is why this challenge is also merged into the governmentality discourse. The melting ice is expected to lead to possible conflicts over hydrocarbon reserves given their importance for the green energy transition. Therefore, it is concluded that the ecological transition, including the energy transition, must be done in a proper and fair manner in order not to trigger further disruptions in 'countries relying on fossil fuel industries' (EEAS, 2021, p. 4), because otherwise 'the multilateral system is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats' (EEAS, 2008, p. 5). However, the EU has so far only bundled climate diplomacy and development assistance tasks in the context of geopolitical tensions.

Political Effects

Although the security threat construction of this discourse is quite prominent in all publications examined, not many tasks for the security and defence sector are identified to counter these threats. A first finding that stands out is the absence of proposed extra-ordinary measures like what the Copenhagen School describes as the main effects of securitisation. The deployment of CSDP missions and operations in emerging conflicts outside the EU is not recommended as a priority in the documents, yet an increasing demand for it is considered possible (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). It is striking, though, that they are justified by threats to human security (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Besides this, no direct measures are mentioned in relation to the dangers mentioned in this discourse. As

will become clear in the following, these are more likely to be found in the other two discourses, especially the governmental discourse.

But what is suggested is getting ready for the shifting operational scenarios worldwide. This means that any planning of CSDP missions and operations must consider whether climate change could play a role in further increasing security challenges (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). Thus, the climate change factor must be increasingly considered in the implementation of a mission or operation. This includes also preparing the CSDP for the impacts of climate change. With the publication of the reflection paper 'Climate and Defence: Contributing to the Climate and Security Nexus including in the Context of CSDP' in 2019, the focus of the documents analysed increasingly shifted to proposals to adapt CSDP itself more strongly to climatic effects. A first field of action is the promotion of climate protection measures within the CSDP, as this would also 'contribute to the EU's climate-neutrality objective for 2050' under the Green Deal (EEAS, 2019, p. 10; see also 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). An illustrative example is that the security and defence sector is energy intensive and a large consumer of fossil fuels. Therefore, the EU is committed to increase energy and resource efficiency, as well as to promote renewable energy in CSDP (EEAS, 2019, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). However, while the aim is to reduce the CSDP's carbon and environmental footprint, this must not compromise operational efficiency in accordance with the 'mission-first principle' (EEAS, 2019, 2022). This is also in line with the second field, which concerns improving the resilience of the technology in the security and defence sector to the changing conditions of climate change, e.g., heat resistant materials (EEAS, 2019, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020) and cope with resource scarcity (energy-efficiency) (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Finally, in line with the 'do no harm-principle', CSDP missions and operations should not exacerbate the problems on the ground by contributing to environmental degradation or creating further resource-related tensions between communities (e.g., through depletion of water resources and unequal access to water, grazing land, etc.) (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). For this reason, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for climate and environment have been developed and an environmental advisor is deployed in all CSDP missions and operations as a standard position to contributes to the successful implementation of the SOPs (EEAS, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020).

4.3.2. The Disciplinary Power Discourse within the EU's CSDP

The disciplinary discourse is not as visible in the analysed documents as the sovereign one. This does not mean that it is not present in the documents analysed. On the contrary, the EU includes this perspective in its argumentation, and it can be found in almost all documents, but

it is not as prominent as the other two discourses. Its focus is less on violent conflicts and the security of states, but rather on everyday threats to individuals and groups, which are often grouped under terms such as 'human security', 'human vulnerability', 'water security' and 'food security'. However, as mentioned above, these terms are mostly linked to other security concepts that are common in sovereign discourse. The first document states that these security concepts are closely related: 'in line with the concept of human security, it is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked' (EEAS & European Commission, 2008, p. 2). Whereby human security often takes a back seat. Finally, the human security concept is often connected to human rights (EEAS, 2016, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). This brings particularly vulnerable groups into focus, which is why this will be discussed in more detail in the context of the governmental discourse.

Threat Construction

The main argument put forward in this discourse is that the direct physical effects of climate change threaten human security: 'Land degradation and desertification, water scarcity, biodiversity loss and the multiplication of extreme and unusual weather events are evidence of the changing climate and the deterioration of the environmental. These phenomena have detrimental impacts on livelihoods' (EEAS, 2021, p. 4). Thus, climate induced environmental degradation and extreme weather events, as well as natural disasters, are considered to increase vulnerability and exposure, threatening people in already fragile situations that lack coping capacities to these new circumstances (see EEAS, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). Secondly, and closely related to environmental degradation, is the increasing scarcity of goods, especially resources such as water or land for agricultural products (EEAS, 2016, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). For example, changing rainfall patterns and the disappearance of glaciers affect the availability of water for human consumption and agriculture, which in turn can have adverse consequences for food security. The third identified threat is related to the sovereign discourse. Conflicts triggered by climate change, e.g., over resources or tensions between different groups, create further humanitarian needs. Thus, increasing violence is considered to generate 'additional humanitarian needs' (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Finally, the increase in disease outbreaks due to climate change creates threats to human health and security (EEAS, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020).

Although it is mostly people in developing countries that are believed to be in direct danger of climate change, at some instance also EU citizens could be affected. This is especially true for disasters caused by climate change (EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Nevertheless,

the focus in the disciplinary discourse clearly is on poor people in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, that are thought to be hit first and hardest. Terms such as 'vulnerable societies', 'vulnerable communities' and 'people in particularly fragile and vulnerable situation' are used to describe these individuals. The second argument in this discourse is therefore that the EU sees as vulnerable mainly people outside the EU in developing countries who are unable to adapt or cope with the direct physical impacts of climate change, such as changing rainfall patterns, weather extremes and its consequences such as resource scarcity and diseases. As a result, they are considered to need the help of industrialised countries, in this case the EU.

Political Effects

Concerning the recommendations within the disciplinary discourse, the focus is on development measures to help local populations to cope with the effects of climate change which was already mentioned in Chapter 4.2. However, the focus of this analysis is on the security and defence sector, and the EU also proposes some tasks it as part of this discourse. In terms of the responsibility to protect, there is thus a real possibility for action by the security and defence sector even within this seemingly less dangerous securitisation, arguing that some states may not be able to protect the human security of their populations, or that a local human security situation could escalate into a threat to regional or global security – or also reach industrialised countries through migration. The EU therefore recognises a growing need for civil protection measures for humans in vulnerable situations such as climate-related disasters or violent conflicts. This includes the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments (civilian and military) (EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). This is considered relevant not only beyond the EU's external borders, but also within the Union. Whereas the latter is by far not as pronounced and is only mentioned once (EEAS & European Commission, 2020, p. 6). The military is thus increasingly involved in civil protection measures, as civilian forces may be overwhelmed by the diversity and scale of climate-related disasters. This leads, among other things, to an increasing integration of military and civilian operations (EEAS, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Thus, this discourse advances concepts such as 'networked security', which allow for a fusion of climate, development and disaster response measures with military and security centred approaches (Lucke, 2014).

4.3.3. The Governmental Power Discourse within the EU's CSDP

The governmental discourse with its less direct risk conceptions that depict climate change as a long-term risk, is at first sight least common in the EU discourse. However, a closer look reveals that some of its core concepts as the focus on statistically generated risk groups and areas and the thinking in future oriented risk and probability schemes can be found in nearly

all documents. In particular, the policy measure of early warning and monitoring is most prevalent. Therefore, the disciplinary discourse is next to the sovereign discourse the most common in the EU. When this discourse appears, it is most likely connected to one of the other two discourses to highlight the uncertainty of all climate predictions and the associated risk for socio-political consequences:

> 'It is important to recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests.' (EEAS & European Commission, 2008, p. 2) or 'Climate change together with environmental degradation are challenges that are widely recognized as risks to international peace and security. Their direct and indirect effects represent different types of challenges to human and state security undermining global peace.'(EEAS, 2021, p. 1).

Threat Construction

Thus, many reports use concepts such as 'risk management', 'risk assessment', 'scenario planning', 'resilience building', 'risk groups' and 'early warning systems' or describe them. The aim is to be able to cope with future climate effects and to govern these uncertain, yet dangerous future events in the present. Another finding is that from 2020 onwards, the term 'risk multiplier' was used more frequently than 'threat multiplier' when referring to climate change as a security challenge (EEAS, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). The first argument in this discourse, then, is that climate change acts as a 'risk multiplier' and its direct and indirect impacts pose various kinds of risks to human and state security that undermine global peace. A second argument is that the EU focuses its engagement to addressing these security threats on statistically identified 'high-risk areas' and 'high-risk groups' considered particularly vulnerable to first- and second-order climatic security threats, to keep the risk at a tolerable level in line with the principle of cost-effectiveness and laissez-faire. This draws on the governmental logic of 'normalisation'.

Starting with the first category, high risk areas, the EU identifies various geographical areas that are particularly vulnerable to the direct and indirect climate change induced security challenges, and repeatedly cite statistical data to support this (EEAS, 2008, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008). These risk areas are almost exclusively in developing countries, and the climate impacts to be expected in these regions and the associated risks are described. Roughly, the risks for these areas can be divided into two groups. First, water scarcity due to increasing droughts or the disappearance of glaciers, as well as rising sea levels and salinisation, both of which lead to productivity losses in agriculture and thus to food insecurity (in addition to water insecurity). Secondly, the threats to the habitat of millions of people from rising sea levels and increasing natural disasters. These challenges, especially water and

food insecurity and an unsustainable increase in food prices could result in instability that could lead to (violent) conflict and migration. As of 2019, the first category of identified high-risk areas has been increasingly complemented by a second category of high-risk groups, i.e., persons belonging to certain socio-economic groups considered particularly vulnerable to climate change-related security threats. The first group identified is women (EEAS, 2016, 2019, 2021, 2022) because climate change 'has a disproportionately greater effect on women, in particular in fragile and poor countries, where women are often less educated, poorer and excluded from decision-making processes, including as regards access, tenure and use rights on natural resources' (EEAS, 2019, p. 9), which has an impact in conflict and crisis situations. Therefore, the EU advises a gender-sensitive approach. The second group concerns children and youth, which is why the EU proposes an age-sensitive approach (EEAS, 2019, 2021, 2022)(Document, 4, 6, 7). An example for this is that they adapt more slowly than adults to changes in environmental heat and are more susceptible to heat-related health risks. Finally, already vulnerable groups such as migrants, including refugees and internally displaced people, are seen even more at risk (EEAS, 2021, 2022). Migrant livestock practices and potential threats to these groups as fertile land becomes less are cited here as a further example (EEAS, 2021, p. 14).

Political Effects

A further characteristic of the governmental discourse is that the aim is to bring risks down to a tolerable level, not eliminate them completely (as this is impossible, see Corry 2012). According to this logic, the goal is to keep the risk at a tolerable level by tackling some of its worst security implications. In contrast to the disciplinary discourse though, in the spirit of laissez-faire the governmental discourse seeks to interfere as little and as indirect as possible with the dynamics of the population. Therefore, there is less risk of direct intervention here, and the focus is more on improving the contextual vulnerability. Although, in line with this logic, the focus is on preventing the effects of climate change from occurring in the first place, the EU still identifies some tasks or changes in the security and defence sector to respond to climate-related security risks. The most visible policy measure are therefore risk assessment systems. This means that CSDP increasingly relies on early warning and monitoring systems to identify possibly problematic future climate events and climate-related security risks and to react to them. The use of early warning and monitoring systems in CSDP or its broadening and improvement is advised in all documents analysed. From 2019 onwards, all documents will even dedicate a separate chapter to this policy measure (EEAS, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Early warning and monitoring systems essentially have two tasks. On the one hand the system can be used for example 'for monitoring and providing lifesaving information about extreme weather event disasters, natural disasters or for long-

term preparations for ecosystem monitoring and climate impacts, which threaten the livelihoods and even existence of coastal communities placed in areas prone to floods' and on the other hand it can also detect 'situations at risk of violent conflict for non-EU countries with the objective of taking timely and coherent actions to reduce that risk' (EEAS, 2019, p. 9). The aim is thus to steer the future in terms of greater cost-effectiveness by trying to (moderately) influence developments in their early stages and avoid later, more far-reaching interventions. The examination of several variables covered by the early warning and monitoring systems thus covers the two functions of these risk assessment systems. This again shows that the governmental discourse recognises both direct and indirect security challenges. The reliance on these early warning and monitoring systems also shows that the security and defence sector is increasingly dependent on research. In addition, the EU advises strengthening research and analytical capacities to improve knowledge of possible security implications in each region (see EEAS, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020).

The second policy measure recommended by the EU is risk management programmes, which are closely linked to early warning and monitoring. This means that through early warning and monitoring, especially the latter, climate risk areas and groups are identified, and appropriate measures are developed accordingly to prepare them for the adverse impacts. In this way, the contextual vulnerability and resilience of climate risk areas and groups will be improved. This link between early warning and the development of appropriate measures has already been indicated above, but it becomes even clearer when the EU advises that climate and environmental aspects should continue to be mainstreamed in early warning systems 'for better situational awareness and conflict analysis to support the planning of CSDP missions and operations and strengthen the link between early warning and early action' (EEAS, 2019, p. 3). The connection between early warning and early action is particularly emphasised in the documents analysed since 2019 (EEAS, 2019, 2021, 2022; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Although early action is expressed mainly through tasks in the areas of climate diplomacy and development assistance to strengthen resilience, as indicated above, the EU also proposes some tasks for CSDP to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The EU proposes to conduct CSDP missions in support of security reform alongside development assistance (EEAS, 2016, 2021). The EU's intention is in line with 'good governance' and 'building resilience' that in countries with a stable security sector it is less likely that instability gets out of hand and results in further security issues (EEAS, 2021, p. 11). One possible area for security sector reform could be to support the host country's enforcement efforts to combat environmental crime and strengthen compliance with environmental laws and improve security-related aspects of environmental policy (EEAS, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). Furthermore, mediation support in CSDP missions is recommended, especially regarding resources

and environmental degradation (EEAS, 2021, p. 8). This is seen as building confidence and support peace and stability. Finally, future-oriented scenario planning of CSDP missions and operations is to take place based on lessons learned through early warning and monitoring (EEAS, 2008, 2019, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2008, 2020). This means the development of operational concepts for civilian and military CSDP missions. Closely related to lessons learned, the EU advises understanding the drivers of migration movements, including those triggered by climate change, through existing or completed operations and missions (EEAS, 2021, p. 1). This shows that the importance of analysis and research plays a major role in this discourse.

4.4. Discussion

In the following, the results of the content analysis are summarised, and the possible implications are discussed. This is done based on the findings and supplemented by secondary literature as well as a contextual embedding. These results as well as the main arguments and recommended policies are summarised in Table 5. A key statement of the theory applied is that a constant 'governmentalisation of security' can be identified, i.e., a far-reaching transformation of security practices. Thus, security no longer revolves exclusively on traditional top-down statist interventions but rather increasingly incorporates features of different forms of power. This can also be observed in the case of securitisation of climate change in the EU's CSDP between 2007 and 2022. Moreover, and in line with the theory, this transformation is not a constant and unilateral shift towards risk conceptions based on governmental power. Instead, closely linked to Foucault's observation that 'new' forms or power do not simply replace 'older' ones (Foucault, 2006b, p. 161), rather it was possible to establish through the content analysis that there is a persistent relationship between the different forms of power and the associated concepts of security. Thus, as the theory of governmentalisation of security suggests, the securitisation process today relies on all three power forms that also transform each other, which is visible in this case analysis as well and which will be discussed in the following.

Even though it was not possible to identify a dominant discourse, as both sovereign and governmental discourse were equally visible. It was nevertheless possible to draw a picture of what 'security truth' the EU is drawing in relation to climate security. Using the applied securitisation theory, it was possible to identify even minor policy implications resulting from the perception of climate change as a security issue in security and defence policy. Despite the strong presence of sovereign discourse, it has never introduced a state of emergency and proposed exceptional measures (such as the Copenhagen School), rather it has helped to establish a 'climatisation' of CSDP. Therefore, the general securitisation of climate change had the effect

of enabling developments that would probably not have taken place without it. Thus, securiti-sation served as a 'catalyst' by making climate change governable in a very specific way. It thus enabled some developments (e.g., the inclusion of climate change mitigation measures in CSDP) and prevented others from being seen as legitimate or even possible.

'Securitisation of Climate Change' and 'Climatisation of Security'

Thus, all three discourses are visible in the EU's security and defence policy. Another main finding therefore is that there are not three different periods (sovereign discourse, disciplinary discourse, and governmentality discourse), but that the discourses are completely interwoven. This fact has not changed over time, with minor changes still observed within the three dis-courses, as shown in the previous sub-chapters. Nevertheless, it is possible to divide the se-curitisation of climate change into two different time periods in the case of the EU. The first extends from 2007 to 2018 and can be titled 'securitisation of climate change' and the second period begins in 2019 to date and can be titled 'climatisation of security'. The momentum for an EU climate security discourse increased in 2007 after the IPCC released its Fourth Assess-ment Report on climate change and the United Nations Security Council held its first-ever de-bate on climate change. This debate in the UN Security Council is also taken up in the first document analysed in the introduction (EEAS & European Commission, 2008, p. 1). Thus, it can be assumed that the issue of climate security came on the agenda as the possible impli-cations of climate change grew more real and immediate in the wake of more robust scientific findings in the 2000s. This was followed by a discussion of the extent to which climate change has an impact on the international security architecture and what consequences must therefore be drawn for the EU's security and defence policy. While the first document still makes strong reference to the EU's security interests and also makes these a condition for political conse-quences, this is no longer the case in the following documents and the focus is on international security. This illustrates the thinking of the EU, which already became clear in the introduction of the CSDP (Chapter 4.1.), that state security is interpreted as something common that cannot be established in one part of the world while other regions sink into 'chaos'. After that, interest in the issue of climate change in the context of the EU's security and defence policy flattened out somewhat, and in 2019 there was momentum again, following a meeting of EU ministers of defence in Helsinki at the end of August 2019 and especially with the publication of the EU Green Deal in December 2019. Subsequently, documents were published in 2019, 2020 and 2021 that promised to fully integrate climate factors into CSDP. Although it should be promising in terms of pushing EU missions and operations planning and implementation towards a cli-mate change approach, the general approach did not change intensely. But a 'climatisation' of the CSDP took place. The main positive impact of this climatisation is that the security and

defence sector should contribute to climate mitigation and energy preservation measures, especially given that it is an energy-intensive sector.

Sovereign Power Discourse

In the sovereign power discourse, there are no recommendations for extra-ordinary measures, as already mentioned above. Rather, as expected in the securitisation theory, less direct forms of security are proposed. Direct sovereign intervention using military force are considered possible in the future (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020), but is not regarded as the preferred option and is instead increasingly combined with less direct approaches. This does not mean that governmental or disciplinary power is completely taken over, but rather that sovereign power is being gradually readjusted (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Focusing on the sovereign discourse, and hence largely on international security and similar conceptions, might significantly raise awareness of climate change and potential security threats (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Environmental and social issues have historically been securitised for this attention generating quality of security, which in and of itself can been positively (Floyd, 2013, p. 281). Moreover, the sovereign discourse enabled the climatisation of CSDP. Moreover, the sovereign discourse enabled the climatisation of CSDP, which contributes to more effective climate protection, as the security and defence sector is a major emitter of greenhouse gases. However, it also supports traditional forms of geopolitical thinking. This was also evident in the content analysis, especially regarding the EU's interest in energy security.

Disciplinary Power Discourse

The disciplinary elements of the securitisation focused attention to the issues of the most vulnerable in developing nations, who are the first and hardest afflicted by climate change. Thus, the securitisation of climate change has helped to put human security more firmly on the agenda of the security and defence sector. The fact that this discourse is least visible in the EU debate is probably due to the nature of the security and defence sector's historically evolved task of providing state security against external interference. It is therefore a welcome development that the concept of human security has found more entry into CSDP through the securitisation of climate change. Although this is a positive development, the 'normation' process nevertheless reproduces pre-existing constructions of identity and truth of powerful industrialised countries vis-à-vis 'helpless people' in developing countries and thus reinforces the prevailing dependence of developing countries on external aid (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Despite these objections, disciplinary discourse and its emphasis on human security have a considerably more positive reputation since, at first appearance, it seems to be less confrontational and military focused form of securitisation.

However, the in-depth analysis of the argumentation indicates that sovereign discourse and disciplinary argumentation are frequently connected. In most documents the argumentation does not end with a description of the issues with human security but rather the core argument continues to be a threatened international security. In this way, the CSDP's potential direct intervention in countries that are thought to be out of control as a result of climate change are legitimised (EEAS, 2019; EEAS & European Commission, 2020). This could be justified in the case of the EU by its belief that security is a universal good that cannot be produced in one region of the world while instability prevails in others and is thus closely linked to human security. However, this entails the danger that the paradigm of human security then no longer stands in opposition to the discourses it originally criticised; but can serve as a the framework for an interest-driven security policy (Herbeck & Flitner, 2010). So the risk is that industrialised countries, in this case the EU, are only concerned about human security in developing countries because the destabilisation of fragile states in an interdependent world can also backfire on industrialised countries (Oels, 2012a; Oels & von Lucke, 2015). Therefore, even a discourse that initially seems harmless or positive might have unforeseen effects. It also facilitated the merging of EU military and civilian initiatives in developing countries or disaster-affected areas, contributing to the coining of terms such as 'networked' security. This can certainly be advantageous, but also, as Wagner stated, carries the risk of militarising humanitarian assistance for disaster relief and development aid. However, various academics have ruled out the danger of militarisation in the case of the EU (see Lazard & Youngs, 2021; Sonnsjö & Bremberg, 2016; Youngs, 2015).

Governmental Power Discourse
The governmental power-based discourse in its ideal form turned out to be rather present and several developments revealed how the other power forms are beginning to transform towards this less direct exercise of power. Therefore, this can be seen as an illustration of the progressive transformation of sovereign power and the traditional security logic that Trombetta has already proposed (2011). The governmentality discourse can be an effective approach because it directs aid and attention to those who are most in need. The articulation of climate risk is also closely linked to the respective prevailing constructions of climate change as a threat to human security. This link has become even stronger after 2019, when the category of high-risk areas was increasingly complemented by the category of high-risk groups. However, this discourse risks neglecting other countries, groups and issues (Lucke, 2014, 2020). Furthermore, a risk-based securitisation can eventually also facilitate sovereign intervention to stop risks from becoming a danger for the overall population because, as has already been mentioned within the context of the disciplinary discourse, being at risk can quickly expand to be at odds with the welfare of the overall population: 'risk-based categories can generate further

stigma for individuals who are deemed to be members of those risk groups. To be 'at risk' is effectively to be at odds with, or even a danger to, the welfare of the population' (Elbe, 2009, p. 140). However, the governmental discourse aims to intervene with the dynamics of the population as little and indirectly as possible in the spirit of laissez-faire, in contrast to the disciplinary discourse. Therefore, there is less of a risk of direct intervention in this context, and the risk groups' contextual vulnerability and resilience are being improved instead (Lucke, 2014, 2020). In the EU, this idea has been reflected mainly in measures to monitor and possibly predict future risks for particularly vulnerable groups and areas, with the ultimate aim of preventing things from getting out of control (monitoring and early warning systems). The aim is to control climate risks through preventive peacekeeping approaches and the empowerment of local communities, e.g. through CSDP missions in support of security sector reform or mediation efforts (EEAS, 2016, 2021; EEAS & European Commission, 2020).

This discussion has shown that securitisation relying on any form of power needs to be carefully weighed, as it has both advantages and disadvantages that are not always obvious at first sight. In conclusion, it can be said that the governmentality approach and the focus on the three interacting power forms can help us to uncover these dynamics and to problematise both initially unfavourable developments and their effects. Moreover, the analysis revealed that the EU exclusively constructs the threats in all discourses outside its borders. This distracts from its own historical responsibility for climate change as an union of industrialised countries with large emissions (cf. Trombetta, 2008). But it is crucial to remember that the EU's external policies contribute to the problem of climatic instability, which is not just a danger from outside its borders. This means that even if adaptation to climate change impacts, such as addressing security threats, is deemed necessary, it should still be seen as the second-best alternative to mitigating climate change, which would address the security challenges at the root of the problem. This is not to say that the EU is not active in climate action, as briefly addressed in chapter 4.2. This analysis only paints a limited picture, as it only considers the EU's CSDP. However, it is striking that the EU's 'security truth' makes no reference to its historical responsibility for climate change as a comparatively large emitter of greenhouse gases.

TABLE 5: Main Findings of the Qualitative Content Analysis

DISCOURSE	SOVEREIGN DISCOURSE	DISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE	GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE
TIME FRAME	2007-today	2007-today	2007-today
MAIN ARGUMENTS	**1.** Climate change could act as a 'threat multiplier', exacerbating existing trends, tensions and instability and destabilising states and eventually whole regions, contributing to more fragile and failed states in the world that threaten international security. **2.** Developing countries, considered less stable and lacking the necessary means to adapt to climate change, are believed to be hit first and hardest by these developments. But through spill-over effects over national borders these developments could spread to other regions and eventually even to the EU. **3.** In addition to these spill-over effects, the EU considers itself threatened by geopolitical tensions due to climate change.	**1.** The focus is on direct physical threat to humans, such as extreme weather events and disasters, droughts, food and water insecurity and the spread of infectious diseases. **2.** Although in some cases EU citizens may also be affected by the physical impacts of climate change, people in developing countries are expected to be the first and most vulnerable to these threats, as they lack coping capacities.	**1.** Climate change acts as a 'risk multiplier' and its direct and indirect impacts pose various kinds of threats to human and state security that undermine global peace. **2.** The EU focuses engagement to addressing these security threats on statistically identified high risk areas and high-risk groups considered particularly vulnerable to first- and second-order climatic security threats, in order to keep the risk at a tolerable level in line with the principles of cost-effectiveness and laissez-faire.
RECOMMENDED POLICIES	Integrating climate change into planning of CSDP missions and operations; growing demand for CSDP considered possible. **'Climatisation':** Climate protection measures (reducing the carbon and environmental footprint of CSDP); improving resilience of the used technology (e.g., heat resistant materials); Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for environmental protection on the ground	CSDP missions and operations aimed at crisis and disaster management (civilian and military); military increasingly involved in civil protection measures; increasing civil-military coordination in CSDP ('networked security').	Use/broadening of risk assessment systems in CSDP (early warning and monitoring systems); strengthening research and analytical capacities; risk management programmes to improve contextual vulnerability and resilience (missions to support security sector reforms; mediation support; future-oriented scenario-planning of CSDP missions and operations).
LINKS TO OTHER DISCOURSES	Often links international and human security to justify policies, thus drawing on disciplinary discourse.	Often linked to the sovereign discourse, whereby human security frequently taking a back seat.	Nearly always connected to the other two discourses.
IMPLICATIONS	Could possibly raise awareness of climate change and potential security threats. It could contribute to climate mitigation and energy preservation measures. However, it supports traditional geopolitical ways of thinking.	It facilitated more focus on human security in the security and defence sector. However, the 'normation' process reproduces pre-existing constructions of identity and truth of powerful industrialised countries vis-à-vis 'helpless people' in developing countries. Moreover, the disciplinary argumentation is used for interest-driven national security policy.	The governmentality discourse can be an effective approach because it directs aid and attention to those who are most in need, but it can also result in the neglect of other countries, groups, and issues. Since it is almost always connected to the other two discourses, it can also enable direct interventions.

5. Conclusion

The overall aim of this paper was to present the changes within the EU's CSDP due to the perception of climate change as a security issue, possible reasons for this, as well as potential implications. The previous section has shown that securitisation can have both more far-reaching and less-noticed everyday consequences. However, this cannot be captured by most of the existing literature, which is based on only one concept of security and formulates its policy implications accordingly. For instance, the Copenhagen School with its emphasis on extraordinariness (Buzan et al., 1998), and the Paris School with its emphasis on long-term processes, practices and everyday consequences (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008). Therefore, the reconceptualisation of securitisation theory by Lucke was used, based on a governmentality approach, which provided new insights into the securitisation of climate change and its various policy implications (Lucke, 2014, 2020). The theory used, based on a governmentality approach, provided new insights into the securitisation of climate change and its policy implications. The main advantage of Lucke's framework is that, due to its focus on different forms of power and power effects, it can create a deeper understanding of how certain securitisations can lead to different political effects. Resting on a Foucauldian understanding of power and the concept of the governmentalisation of security, this allowed to better capture and theoretically make sense of the ambiguous and diverse variants of securitisation and the ever-changing concept of security itself. It has also helped to better understand the powerful political consequences of constructing non-traditional issues in terms of security.

To illustrate how this can work empirically, the climate security debate in the EU between 2007 and 2022 was analysed. The EU draws a 'security truth' that recognises both first and second order climatic security threats. In doing so, it focuses on international security and links it closely to human security. This is based on the EU's belief that security is a universal good that cannot be produced in one region of the world while instability prevails in others and is therefore closely linked to human security. As a result, it was shown that there is not one dominant discourse in the EU's CSDP. Rather, in line with the applied theory, it could be shown that all three discourses are apparent in the debate, with the sovereign and governmental discourse being equally visible. This resulted in a CSDP that uses less direct forms of security. This does not mean that direct sovereign interventions using military force are not considered possible in the future, but it is not regarded as the preferred option and instead mainly relies on monitoring and early warning systems, with the aim of preventing things from getting out of control through preventive peacekeeping approaches. Thus, the debate on climate change contributes to the development of a preventive security strategy in which environmental and security issues are increasingly recognised and inter alia addressed through 'networked' security concepts. Furthermore, it has been shown that climate change securitisation is not a

one-way street but has bidirectional effects that can be called 'climatisation'. Not only the securitised issue changes its meaning, but also the concept of security itself and governance practices in the security and defence sector change during the securitisation process. Therefore, two different time periods have been identified. The first from 2007 to 2018 'securitisation of climate change' and the second from 2019 to present 'climatisation of security'. From 2019 onwards, the focus shifted to measures to advance the planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations towards a climate change approach, leading mainly to increased climate and energy-saving measures in the security and defence sector. Finally, it was possible to show how the different discourses in the EU CSDP are interlinked. This provided insights into the transformation of climate security and helped to identify possible problematic implications.

Empirical analysis has thus shown the need for an analytical framework of security that is sensitive to the changing forms of power that are enabled in its name. It is not enough to distinguish between essentialised notions of security such as 'national security' and 'human security' and conclude that one is good and the other bad. Instead, security is best studied as a constellation of different technologies of power and their characteristic techniques. It is the interrelationship between these different technologies that needs to be examined, which varies according to time and place. Based on this approach, which has not been applied to this case before, it was thus possible to gain more insights into the securitisation of climate change in the EU CSDP between 2007 and 2022.

Limitations

However, despite this study's new insights, a few reservations apply. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with caution because several limitations should be considered. First, there could be a bias in the analysis. On the one hand because a purposive approach was used to select the documents analysed. On the other hand, the distinction between the three discourses is not always clear when it comes to the empirical material. Yet, this is a problem that all approaches working with different securitisation discourses have in common and which cannot entirely be solved on a theoretical basis but must be acknowledged in the empirical application. Second, the neglect of the disciplinary discourse and thus human security could be due to the focus on the security and defence sector that is traditionally in duty to defend national interests and in more recent history international peace and security. A completely different picture would probably have been drawn if the whole integrated approach to climate security (Chapter 4.2.) would have had been analysed. Which leads to a final limitation that security discourses do not originate out of the void, nor can they be brought into being by securitising actors at will but heavily depend on the broader enabling context. However, this

has been largely disregarded here, particularly due to the limited scope of this work. Thus, securitisation does not take place in a vacuum and other discourses such as 'climate justice' and 'climate economics' most likely play a role in the broader enabling context.

Suggestions for future research

The results and the limitations of this research lead to some suggestions for further research. While the results clearly indicate that securitisation of climate change in the EU's security and defence sector is mainly based on sovereign and governmental power, including the whole integrated approach to climate security (climate diplomacy and development) in the analysis could add depth to the results, include the overall picture of security as a way of governing and thus contributes to more representative results. This could also be done using different methods such as critical discourse analysis which could also focus more on the above mentioned broader enabling context. Likewise, this research design could increase the validity and representativeness of the findings. This was originally also one of the research ideas for this thesis, but it was too broad for its scope. At the same time, this research has already somewhat filled the research gap about how different types of climate securitisation are interlinked and how they are constantly changing by using a governmentality approach that draws on different forms of power. In this way, future research will further fill the research gap on climate securitisation in other contexts, but equally important, it will also inform the public about the essential role power has in securitisation.

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7. Appendix

Appendix A: Overview of the Code System for the Content Analysis (Retrieved from the Analysis in MAXQDA)

Appendix B: Codebook for the Qualitative Content Analysis

Sovereign Discourse (SD): Within the sovereign discourse, climate change is securitised in a directly and highly visible way using 'national security' or similar concepts.

Code	When to Use
1. SD_SecurityConcept	National security and related security concepts such as regional security, territorial security, international security, international order and military security are terms that are mentioned.
2. SD_ThreatConstruction	The sovereign discourse focuses on threats for states and their territory that may ultimately affect the international systems of states. The focus of this discourse is mostly on second-order socio-economic effects of climate change. The code is composed of various sub-codes that construct the threat.

2.1. SD_ThreatMultiplier	Climate change is referred to as a 'threat multiplier' that exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability.
2.2. SD_Conflicts	Socio-economic effects of climate change leading to conflicts. One of the core arguments is about climate change (e.g. in combination with population growth and degrading resources) leading to (violent) conflict, and therefore threatening national/international security. Another example is migration movements due to environmental degradation that led to violence between different ethnic groups.
2.3. SD_OrganisedCrime	Violations of environmental regulations that create new opportunities for organised crime and increase tensions.
2.4. SD_Migration	Migration triggered by climate change.
2.5. SD_PoliticalInstability	Political, social, and economic instability, as countries, for example, do not have the means to address the causes of tension. These tensions are in turn predicted to have an impact on industrialised countries.
2.6. SD_GeopolitcalTensions	Countries in the Global North are involved in geopolitical tensions due to climate change. Distinction possible between tensions due to the impacts of climate change and tensions due to the transition to climate-neutral economies, which can have social, economic and political impacts that can increase conflictual situations.
3. SD_politicaleffects	Proposed policy measures in the sovereign discourse.
3.1. SD_PlanningforalteredScenarios	Increase military planning activities for geopolitical conflicts fuelled by climate change or simply the altered missions scenarios around the world.
3.1.1. BQ_MitigationSecuritySector	Bidirectional Quality: Increasing the energy and resource efficiency of the security, i.e. mitigation targets.
3.1.2. BQ_MissionandOperationRules	Bidirectional Quality: To achieve the mitigation targets of the security sector, rules for reducing the environmental footprint are also formulated for missions.
3.1.3. BQ_AdjustmentofMaterials	Bidirectional Quality: Adaptation of equipment in the security sector to the changing conditions of climate change, e.g. heat-resistant materials.

Disciplinary Discourse (DD): In the context of sovereign discourse, securitisation takes place in a less attentive, exceptional and authoritarian manner using human security and similar concepts.

Code	When to Use
1. DD_SecurityConcept	Human security and related security concepts such as individual security, food security,

	environmental security and vulnerability are terms that are mentioned.
2. DD_ThreatConstruction	The focus is on direct physical effects (everyday implications) of climate change for people who lack adaptive capacity (often referred to as "poor people"). Examples are: water scarcity, food insecurity, displacement, forced migration, spread of diseases.
2.1. DD_FramingofThreatendHumans	Although people in countries of the Global North may also be directly threatened by climate change, the main focus is on 'poor people' in the Global South.
2.2. DD_HumanitarianNeeds	Increasing humanitarian needs due to (violent) conflict.
2.3. DD_EnvironmentalDegradation	Direct threat on humans due to environmental degradation, e.g., extreme weather events.
2.4. DD_AccesstoGoods	People do not have access to resources such as water or agricultural land due to the impacts of climate change.
2.5. DD_Diseases	Increased occurrence of diseases due to climate change that endanger people.
3. DD_Politicaleffects	Proposed policy measures in the disciplinary discourse divided into three sub-codes.
3.1. DD_IncreasingCivilProtectionMeasures	Strengthen planning and capabilities, including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response tools (civilian and military) to respond to the security threats posed by climate change.
3.2. DD_IncreasingInvolvementofMilitary	Military actors are increasingly involved in such disaster response missions.
3.3. DD_CloserRelationshipDevelopmentandTraditionalSecuritySector	Integration of military and civilian missions and operations (spread of so-called "networked security concepts").

Governmental Discourse (GD): In government discourse, climate change is seen as a long-term issue that can gradually amplify various threats, and a risk approach or similar security concepts are applied. It is less direct and does not name immediate threats or precisely specified reference objects.

Code	When to Use
1. GD_SecurityConcept	Risk and related security concepts such as risk-management, riskisation, scenario planning, resilience and uncertainty are terms that are mentioned.
2. GD_ThreatConstruction	The threat construction is less direct and does not refer to immediate threats or to clearly defined reference objects. Instead, it relies on sophisticated statistical models to calculate specific risk groups and areas that could be affected in the future. The threat design components are divided into two sub-codes.
2.1. GD_ClimateChangeasLongTermIssue	Climate change is framed as a long-term issue.

2.2. GD_HighRiskAreas	Threat to statistically identified areas (such as identified regions that are especially threatened vis-à-vis the effects of climate change, such as coastal and arid areas, or small islands).
2.3. GD_HighRiskGroups	Threat to statistically identified groups, e.g., women and children/youth.
3. GD_PoliticalEffects	Proposed policy measures in governmental discourse divided into two sub-codes.
3.1. GD_EarlyWarningandMonitoringSystems	Increased use and improvement of early warning and monitoring systems.
3.2. GD_IncreasingRelianceonScience	Increased trust in science and increased cooperation of the security sector with it.
3.3. GD_DevelopmentofPreventionStrategies	Development of prevention strategies based on vulnerability assessment of previously identified climate risk groups and areas.
3.4. GD_futureorientedscenarioplanning	Future-oriented scenario planning means developing operational concepts for climate change and the toolbox for crisis management (early warning and early action).