

Political disinformation: A closer look at the use of rhetoric and fallacies of a Dutch populist party regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war

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## **Abstract**

**Purpose:** In the light of political disinformation, this research aims to provide insights into the discourse of the Dutch political party Forum voor Democratie (FVD) regarding the war in Ukraine by researching rhetorical strategies and fallacies. Even though there is a varied focus on political disinformation in literature, as it poses a threat to democracy, there seems to be limited research available on populist rhetoric including fallacies in this context. By researching one specific populist party and taking into account an extensive list of fallacies in qualitative research, the implicit interpretation of deceiving information can be discovered more extensively. The up-to-date conflict contains relevance for the Dutch interest and its impact on public perceptions.

**Methodology:** A textual qualitative content analysis of tweets and YouTube videos was conducted through the use of ATLAS.ti. This included statements disseminated by members of FVD and on behalf of the party, for one year since the start of the war in Ukraine in November 2021. The search terms ‘Oekraïne’ or ‘Rusland’ were included in the title or description of the videos and in the tweets.

**Results:** The results revealed that the prevalent themes were about the interferences of the West, judgments of FVD on the war, and references regarding events in the past. This was conveyed by the pathos rhetoric most often, which showed sympathy for the citizens as well as an aggressive communication style towards the Dutch government. Logical arguments also occurred frequently– or the appearance of, as multiple fallacies were identified. The three most prevalent were the straw man, the ad populum/pathetical fallacy, and the fallacy of casting suspicion, in which arguments were distorted, conveyed by rhetoric instead of reason, and casted suspicion on others.

**Conclusion:** This study confirms the findings of populists’ frequent use of pathos rhetoric and fallacies, through which forms of disinformation were detected regarding conspiracy and propaganda-related content.

**Keywords:** populism, rhetoric, fallacies, argumentation, disinformation, Dutch politics, Forum voor Democratie, qualitative media content analysis, ethos, logos, pathos

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## 1. Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine ensured a great impact on the world, including increasing prices but also decisions about sanctions and emergency support to help the Ukrainian citizens. Forum voor Democratie (FVD), or ‘Forum for Democracy’ is one of the few parties in the Netherlands that expressed their support for the Russian government regarding the invasion. Its foreman, Thierry Baudet stated for example in an interview with an American website that Putin is “the hero we need” for exposing the globalists and that he should win the war (Geopolitics & Empire, 2022, 23:50). Various statements in favor of the Kremlin resulted in a majority of the Dutch parliament requiring research into Russian cash flows to Dutch politicians (NOS, 2022a). In the interview, Baudet also admitted to being a conspiracy theorist, believing that the world is governed by reptiles. The importance of the topic also shows in an example of a previous conspiracy theory narrative of FVD during the COVID-19 pandemic. The party showed much resistance against the restrictions, and it was shown that 50% of its following believed the virus was either developed in laboratories or developed to suppress citizens globally (Harambam, 2023). Additionally, 13% and 11% of the Dutch population were shown to believe either of these statements. The possibility that such a political party might influence public perceptions by alternative truths is worth paying attention to.

FVD was founded in 2014 and got into the Dutch House of Representatives successfully in 2017 after initiating a referendum regarding the 2016 association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (Chryssogelos, 2021; Forum voor Democratie, n.d.; NOS, 2022a). The referendum allowed citizens to vote in favor or against the agreement and contributed to the growth of the party. To show more of its positions, FVD campaigned ahead of the 2017 elections to ‘break the cartel of the establishment’, referring to their resistance against the established elite in the Netherlands (Van Raalte et al., 2021). This is one of the reasons the party is labeled as a populist right-wing party, next to the protection of the nation-state in their narrative and the frequent demonization of opponents. More successful years passed as the party even became the largest in 2019 during the provincial elections. Whereas its membership is the highest in the parliament (DNPP, 2022), its electoral base showed a decrease by 2023 and it seems that the party has become more of a social movement, being quite active on various social media (Hagen, 2022). The party thus maintains a connection with the audience.

Generally, there seems to be a connection between populist parties and the dissemination of disinformation. Often, populists make bold statements, thereby avoiding empirical evidence and placing common sense and ordinary people at the center stage of reality (Hameleers, 2020). In democratic systems, however, freedom of speech is a central value

regardless of whether the propagated information is false or with the aim to unfavorably influence an audience (Dawood, 2015). At the same time, citizens can be misled when electing political parties that are not entirely based on authentic news and factual debates (Tenove, 2020). The spreading of disinformation by political authorities is, therefore, a direct threat to democracy and might create distrust in the current institutions and resistance to voting (Douglas et al., 2019). By analyzing the use of rhetoric and fallacies in the discourse of FVD, this study seeks to shed light on the tactics employed by political actors to shape public opinion and contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges posed by political disinformation in contemporary democracies. It will be investigated in the context of the war in Ukraine as it has particular relevance to Dutch national interests and because of the potential impact of political communication on public perceptions of the conflict. Hence, the research question that will be answered is: “In what way does the Dutch political party Forum voor Democratie discuss the war in Ukraine?”

Even though previous studies have focused on FVD and its conspiracy narrative regarding the COVID-19 pandemic or its populist discourse, explaining its communication style and political perspectives (Harambam, 2023; Haverland et al., 2022; Tunderman, 2022; Van Raalte et al., 2021; Wondreys & Mudde, 2022), the current insights of FVD on the war in Ukraine is a novel topic. Additionally, while some studies have analyzed the connection between populist rhetoric and fallacies (Blassnig et al., 2019; Macagno, 2022), few have explored the potential use of these tactics for disinformation purposes, particularly in a qualitative manner. This study aims to fill this gap through a qualitative in-depth analysis of its complexity and contextual interpretations, taking into account an extensive amount of fallacies. Important implications derive from this study for policymakers, journalists, and the public at large, particularly in the Dutch context.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

The literature presented in this chapter forms the theoretical foundation for analyzing the party Forum voor Democratie (FVD) and its discourse regarding the war in Ukraine. As the aim of this study is to research the way the party discusses the war, it is important to look into the topics of political populist discourse, how this translates to the audience, and the different forms of disinformation. Next to this, rhetoric and fallacies are included for understanding strategies that can be implemented to persuade an audience as well as strategies spreading distorted or incorrect arguments.

### 2.1. Populism and the public debate

Populism's political power and interest in the topic have increased in recent years; it found its grounds in Europe and it appeared more frequently in documents, google searches, and academic articles (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020). Populism's core is countering ordinary people towards the corrupt elite, which is used as a style or tactic within politics (Hameleers, 2020). Additionally, populism is defined as a "thin-centered ideology concerning the structure of power in society" that restores popular sovereignty and refers to the ordinary people as a homogeneous group (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 408). Seemingly, populists generally distrust the traditional government because they believe it fails to represent the will of the people (Doyle, 2011; Hameleers et al., 2017). Times of uncertainty or chaos are therefore important for the popularity of populist parties, in which distrust is often emphasized. Distinguishing two types, populist parties can contain right or left-wing ideologies, such as nativism, anti-immigration, and the rejection of international commitments and values on the right and economic inclusion or anti-capitalism on the left (Chryssogelos, 2021; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020). Since FVD is a populist party with right-wing sympathies, the current study focuses on this side of the political spectrum. Besides the followers of populist parties, also much negativity exists towards it. To compare contrasting opinions, supporters of populist parties define populism as the rule of the people with an approach to popular sovereignty and thereby believe that they embody democratic principles (Abts & Rummens, 2007). Opponents, however, perceive populist parties to be a threat to democracy, which emerges from the rather extreme communication style.

The communication style of right-wing populists can be characterized as aggressive with emotional sentiments that attack 'mainstream discourse'. For instance, right-wing populists tend to talk down empirical evidence and expert analyses by using common sense or emotions as reality (Hameleers, 2020). The core of populism is to use this emotional style in

blaming an out-group, which is shown to be highly persuasive. Namely, political attitudes appear to be affected by messages of allegations that contain who should be accused of causing political problems (Hameleers et al., 2017). One of the scapegoats for populists seems to be the established press, whom they often accuse of lying, even though populists are often accused of spreading fake news themselves. This emerges through their anti-expert narrative, wherein populists generally seem to deny occurrences (like COVID-19 and global warming), because of their anti-elite and anti-science sentiments (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020). In their discourse, this can be detected using words like ‘hoax’ or ‘elite conspiracy’. It is additionally described that populist discourse includes arguments involving unreliable experts, making it plausible that there is a connection between populism and disinformation.

Considering the association between populist parties and the dissemination of disinformation, the increasing activity of populist parties on social media is important to focus on. Since populist parties ought to represent the voice of the people, it is not surprising that the internet has played an important role in the rise of many populist leaders (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020). Whereas using social media is a convenient way to attract followers and affect political discussion, it might also evoke political polarization and distrust. More specifically, it becomes easier to create distrust in established media or the government by helping to boost less credible sources, which is why social media play an important role in the visibility of disinformation (Lakshmanan et al., 2019). The agenda-setting theory has also shown that news media control what the public sees in a certain way and right-wing media have been shown to set the agenda for election reporting (Mccombs & Shaw, 1972; Vargo et al., 2018). Through the reinforcement of political polarization and disinformation by social media, democratic quality may be subverted (Tucker et al., 2018); it restrains the audience from receiving authentic information and might mislead public attitudes. More thorough interpretations can be made when understanding the communication tactics of populist parties on social media that are used to influence public perceptions, including the concept of disinformation.

## 2.2. Disinformation

To explain the concept of disinformation more extensively it is important to recognize its forms. In the context of this study, disinformation is used as an overarching term to describe types of information that are intentionally false (Scheufele & Krause, 2019). Disinformation exists in different forms to mislead the public, namely, by the implementation of falsification, distortion,

or omission (Fallis, 2014; McCornack, 1992). First, falsification refers to intentionally inaccurate information consisting of denying true information or providing information contradictory to true information. Second, the distortion of information includes accurate information being twisted or relevant aspects of the truth being left out to intentionally mislead the audience. This can be done through exaggeration, simplification, and equivocation which leads to misinterpretation of the information. Third, the omission of information means holding back all references to the relevant information. The latter two forms contain more implicit information and are more difficult to recognize since these are closely related to reality. These can be decoded by investigating the underlying messages of the given information (Van Raalte et al., 2021).

The implicit forms of disinformation that are harder to recognize could also be more manipulative. To provide a well-known example, propaganda is used often in political discourse for the distortion or omission of information. Even though propaganda has a longer history than disinformation (Freelon & Wells, 2020), propaganda is a form of disinformation used to win over the public by using “. . . attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons” (Sproule, 1994, as cited in Farkas & Neumayer, 2020, p. 709). It has originally been denoted as the selective use of information for political effect (National Endowment for Democracy, 2018) and contains factual information which is distorted. This form is one of the most widely used in political contexts to distort the truth and is therefore an indispensable subject of analysis within the scope of this research.

A different example includes conspiracy theories, a less implicit form of which it is quite hard to determine whether they are true or false. Conspiracy theories are a form of political propaganda that show alternative truths that are by definition contrary to the claims of authorities (Harris, 2022). Conspiracy theories often contain accusations of especially authorities who in secret try to achieve outcomes in order to further their own benefits, even though these events are not widely known by the public (Douglas & Sutton, 2023). These often emerge in newsworthy social or political circumstances, which is why the Russian invasion is interesting in this context. The criticism towards authorities shows the connection to populist’s anti-establishment narrative. The distinction between disinformation forms enables recognizing the way disinformation is spread and will help this research to more comprehensively understand disinformation within contexts.

A reason for populists to believe in conspiracy theories is because of their focus on power structures in society in which they often believe they are not in control. The absence of control namely ensures people feel the need for sources of structures – even threatening ones –



which is why they tend to see connections between stimuli (Dow et al., 2023). This is why the political elite is often accused of complying an agenda that fails to represent the will of the general people in times of chaos. Likewise, a feeling that one lacks control of the events in their environment can be increased by political events, like socio-economic uncertainty and decisions around COVID-19 (Dow et al., 2023). To sum up, strategies to make the audience believe that they have no control with respect to important political events, such as the Russian war, could occur when analyzing a populist party.

More cues can be used by a distributor of disinformation to intentionally and thus tactically exert influence on an audience, of which Tucker et al. (2018) named five aspects. Firstly, *partisan cues* tend to not only make partisans accept disinformation but also evoke propagation. Secondly, inaccurate information can lead to the acceptance of disinformation when messages contain stereotypes and *group cues* about the out-group. Thirdly, *emotional cues* are important for influence, for example, when in anger, inaccurate information is likely to be trusted as well as distributed if it supports their views. Additionally, emotional arousal tends to increase the spread of disinformation. Fourthly, frequent *exposure and virality* of disinformation lead to people being more affected. Lastly, *audiovisual content* is believed to be more persuasive, nonetheless, there is a lack of research on this topic as it often focuses on textual disinformation. An author who wants to persuade their audience by using disinformation could deploy these cues in their content since it makes people more inclined to believe or even spread inaccurate information. Recognizing what kind of content manipulating messages often contain, might lead to a more manageable detection of disinformation.

### 2.3. Rhetorical strategies

To discover in what way a political party tries to influence public perceptions, rhetorical elements are important to take into consideration as these are used to achieve consent to the given argument. Namely, an argument is often created for persuasion, or rather an attempt to (Karreman & van Enschot, 2018). Generally, a strong argument must contain premises that include relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (Van Eemeren, 1995). It must contain an adequate relation between the premises and conclusion, it must have enough evidence, and the premises must be true, probable, or reliable for a decent conclusion. However, this is no requirement for an argument to be persuasive. Persuasive strategies are called rhetoric, which is often implicitly used within content as the speaker wants to appear truthful, since rhetoricians do not often show concern about the soundness of arguments but rather care about their

persuasiveness. To investigate the intertextual potential of manipulated content, rhetorical strategies are therefore interesting to take into account. In order to do so, the well-known rhetoric of Aristotle shows three elements to make an audience trust, feel, or think: ethos, pathos, and logos (Stucki & Sager, 2018). These are used with the aim to persuade and to regularly appear a better cause by passing off falsehood for truth by using plausible arguments (Cope, 1867). Each rhetorical element will be discussed below to understand how an audience can be persuaded, which are important elements in this study for focusing on the way of speech.

Firstly, ethos is related to the speaker's appeal. The speaker's charisma, the way a person speaks, and the credibility of the speaker are the focus of an ethos text, in which image, reputation, and physical appearance are important (Demirdöğen, 2010). The speaker should give the impression that he or she is an authority worth listening to and to be taken seriously, which can be done by showing a moral character or piety. These align with Aristotle's three dimensions of ethos: expertise, reputation, and goodwill (Zompetti, 2019). Furthermore, acknowledgment and respect for studies of other authorities can also be used to boost own credibility. For example, ethos is recognized when the author uses lines such as 'the thoughtful research' or 'this work should be extended' to acknowledge other work and to show examples of other authorities that think alike (Varpio, 2018).

Next to the physical appeals of ethos, pathos describes the psychological appeals. It refers to empathy: relying on the receiver's emotions and capitalizing on these (Demirdöğen, 2010). For using empathy, it is important to indicate the emotional state of the audience in order to respond to these. Feelings such as sympathy and compassion, but also indignation and resentment can play important roles to persuade an audience, adverse to the opponent (Cope, 1867). It is rather important that the right emotions have the right virtue towards the actions described (Brinton, 1988). Yet, when these are not aligned, it might be translated as untruthful. Lastly, metaphors and certain God-terms are frequently used in pathos contexts, which expresses in non-literal language and the use of words such as freedom, justice, and duty (Higgins & Walker, 2012; Varpio, 2018). These terms refer to shared human values.

Logos refers to the arguments used to persuade the audience with intellect or reason (Demirdöğen, 2010). For instance, presumptive argumentation is a frequently used type of political argumentation (Komlósi & Tarrósy, 2009). Hereby, "Aristotle advised persuaders to use syllogistic arguments (enthymemes) in which the major premise was already believed by the audience." (Demirdöğen, 2010, p. 192). Common sense is therefore likely to be used within the reasoning of logos. Syllogistic arguments refer to those that contain deductive reasoning (i.e. premises), in which relevancy is important. There also must be an adequate relation

between the premises and the conclusion. The use of clarity, integrity, and (appearance of) rationality can be used to make an argument seem valid and signal words can be used to help the reader to process logos arguments, at least when they are capable of doing so (Higgins & Walker, 2012; Varpio, 2018). The signal words such as thus, furthermore, yet, for example, and finally refer to a certain relation. Nonetheless, errors within logos could lead to fallacies, which could subvert persuasion (Varpio, 2018).

#### 2.4. Fallacies

As mentioned, the implicit character of disinformation is more difficult to recognize than explicit ones, however, these variants might be more manipulative. Hereby, the quality of arguments plays an important role in the detection of such deceiving content. Whereas rhetorical models specify which role argumentation plays when convincing the audience, dialectical models specify which role argumentation plays when resolving a difference of opinion (Wagemans, 2009). Fallacies may be committed as soon as rhetorical elements are implemented at the expense of the dialectical obligation to follow a decent discussion according to the rules of argumentation (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006). When a politician uses persuasive arguments that seem correct, but logically are incorrect it is called a fallacy, which often relies on false patterns of reasoning (Jin et al., 2022; Rudanko, 2005). The usage of fallacies does not necessarily have to be severe as these may be unintentional or with the purpose of humor (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006). Yet, they must not hinder a discussion. Investigating fallacies allows to assess the quality of argumentation, in which pertinent incorrect or deceiving statements can be identified.

Many fallacies have been developed over time, yet a distinction can be made between two categories. On one hand, formal fallacies contain mistakes in their logical form (Blassnig et al., 2019). This means that there is an error within the structure of the argument as the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises (Holyoak & Morrison, 2013). These fallacies are also called deductive fallacies and are easier to detect than the informal form. Informal fallacies, on the other hand, are misapplied in a specific context that may contain a correct logical form, yet show other flaws, like irrelevancy or insufficiency, which makes the argument unreliable (Blassnig et al., 2019). To recognize fallacies within arguments, Van Eemeren et al. (2014) have formulated ten rules that result in fallacies when violating a certain rule. These rules include the freedom rule, obligation to defend rule, standpoint rule, relevance rule, unexpressed premise rule, starting point rule, validity rule, argument scheme rule,

concluding rule, and the language use rule. In this study, fallacies are categorized based on these ten rules, to ensure recognizing fallacies is more feasible. [Appendix A](#) shows the violations of the rules containing the accompanying fallacies (Van Eemeren et al., 2014, pp. 550–551). To illustrate an example, take the obligation to defend rule (rule 2). When a discussant does not defend a standpoint when asked to do so, it is possible that the discussant commits a fallacy of shifting or evading the burden of proof; either the discussant asks the opponent to defend the standpoint for him or her, or the discussant evades the burden of proof by stating the argument as self-evident.

In sum, this chapter showed an overview of the literature for a broader understanding of populists and their communication style, in which a connection is shown between populists, emotional discourse, and disinformation. The strategies to influence public perceptions and the concept of disinformation are the main focus of this study. To investigate this, an analysis will be conducted on the populist party FVD for its discourse regarding the Ukrainian war with the use of the rhetorical elements ethos, pathos, and logos to analyze its way of persuasion, together with the analysis of fallacies, to show faults in lines of reasoning and perhaps certain implicit forms of disinformation. The next chapter will present by what methods this will be executed.

### **3. Methods**

#### **3.1. Research design**

The aim of this study is to investigate the political and public debate of FVD about the Ukrainian war for its rhetorical character (ethos, pathos, logos) and potential fallacies. Because of the implicit character of rhetorical messages and fallacies, which can be interpreted in different ways, this study contained qualitative research. More specifically, a deductive content analysis was conducted; it was derived from literature on based Aristotle's rhetorical elements and fallacies (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

In order to outline the public and political discourse, social media posts on Twitter and YouTube videos on the subject of the Russian invasion were analyzed. First, Twitter shows statements primarily based on textual content, meant to translate political topics into public debate in a more understandable and brief way. YouTube, on the other hand, shows the political debate more comprehensively, because FVD shows parts of their parliamentary debates. Some videos are also meant to explain points of view, directed to the public. Next to this, the YouTube

channel contains content from talk shows where FVD party members were invited to speak and from the Ukraine symposium, in which FVD invites others to share opinions about the war (of which it is expected that they share FVD's opinions). This included a sample of rich textual and audiovisual content, representing discourse directed to the audience. The other channels used by FVD (i.e., Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, and Instagram) were excluded because they are less popular and are primarily based on short videos or photos, instead of text or long videos which allow for a decent analysis of interpretations.

### 3.2. Corpus

For the corpus selection of this research, content regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war was investigated. The search period started from the moment Dutch media showed that Russia might threaten to invade Ukraine on the 30<sup>th</sup> of November 2021 (Paauwe, 2021) until the recapture of the Ukrainian city Kherson on the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2022 (NOS, 2022b).

Within the time frame, the search terms on Twitter existed of “*(Oekraïne OR Rusland) (from:fydemocratie) until:2022-11-11 since:2021-11-30*”. Only the statements of FVD were included as this study insists on investigating its persuasive power. Thus, reactions from and to followers were excluded, since the statements to *all* followers matter; what FVD wants to propagate to the world. Moreover, solely text was investigated for a consistent analysis, which means that all links, images, and videos within tweets were excluded. This showed a sample of 74 tweets with either ‘Oekraïne’ or ‘Rusland’ in the text. After excluding three tweets that were forwarded by other authors than FVD, the total corpus existed of 71 tweets. The links, images, and videos within tweets were excluded to ensure consistency by solely analyzing text.

On the YouTube channel @ForumDemocratie, the search terms “Rusland Oekraïne” were inserted to find all videos that contained the subject within its titles and/or description to find a broad range of content. The first 40 results were manually sorted based on the time frame, resulting in a sample of 27 videos including the search terms either in their title or description. Four videos were excluded due to their lack of relevance (of which Ukraine or Russia were not the main topics). This resulted in a sample of 23 videos, including different themes like parliamentary debates, the FVD Ukraine symposium, and interviews at the tv shows ‘Café Weltschmerz’ and ‘Ongehoord Nederland’. The videos were transcribed and the statements of FVD members or speakers on behalf of FVD were coded based on a codebook. Hence, the different speakers during the Ukraine symposium were all included since they were invited to share their views about the war in Ukraine on behalf of FVD. However, the statements of

opponents in debates, other interviewees, or interviewers were excluded, because they do not represent the views of FVD.

[Appendices B](#) and [C](#) show specific information about the YouTube and Twitter corpus.

### 3.3. Codebook

For the codebook, the following main codes were compiled based on the theoretical framework literature: theme, rhetoric, and fallacies. These codes are searched for in the selected YouTube videos and tweets. Firstly, a categorization of the themes was made, as this study solely focused on content about the Ukrainian war. By doing this, it will become evident what topics are discussed most. The categorization is also done for getting an understanding of the context, in order to assess facts in the selected sources and to recognize the rhetorical elements and fallacies better. The included sub-codes are analyzed at paragraph level and consist of the themes: the invasion, historical references, international interferences, Dutch democracy, and Nord Stream.

The selected content is also analyzed for the persuasive elements it contains, which are analyzed at paragraph level. The first rhetorical element of Aristotle included an emphasis on the speaker's positive properties, such as charisma, reputation, image, physical appearance, or credibility. Hence, it was important to look at how speakers connect themselves or others to the topic, which could be done e.g. by presenting themselves as an expert and authority, by showing a moral character or piety, or by referring to sources that the speaker acknowledges or respects that share the same opinions. Secondly, pathos refers to the use of positive or negative emotions within a message to persuade the audience. Emotions from the audience or the portrayer themselves are often emphasized or emotions are used to reflect the opponent poorly. This is often done with the use of metaphors, like non-literal language, God-terms (freedom, justice, duty), sympathy, compassion, or resentment. The third rhetorical element is logos, which refers to logic, reason, and sound arguments. This is likely done with the use of facts presented with numbers or percentages, by presenting (un)reliable and empirical evidence, by using syllogisms (two premises that lead logically to the conclusion), or enthymemes (presumptions or common sense). Relevancy, clarity, integrity, and (the appearance of) rationality are important for logos arguments.

Lastly, the fallacies included in the codebook were categorized by van Eemeren et al. (2014) to recognize incorrect arguments within the corpus at sentence level. These were based on the ten rules for critical discussion (the rule of freedom, obligation to defend, standpoint, relevance, unexpressed premise, starting point, validity, argument scheme, and concluding

rules) which were first investigated at paragraph level to find violations of a rule, and the 37 fallacies were analyzed at sentence level.

Table 1 shows the short version of the codebook. In [Appendix D](#), the complete version of the codebook can be found, which includes the actual main codes and statements of FVD showing examples to explain the codes more vividly. The definitions and examples of the fallacy codes in the codebook are based on various studies (van Eemeren et al., 2000, 2003b, 2003a; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987, 1992).

**Table 1**

*Short version of the codebook*

<b>Code</b>	<b>Sub-code 1</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>1. Theme</b>	1.1. Invasion	Content regarding to the invasion in general, without a specific event	Consequences of the war (e.g., inflation, polarization), opinions about the war in general, the suffering of the war. Specific events during the war are excluded
	1.2. Historical References	Content in which the war is compared to historical events	References with other wars or events in the past (events before the war started in November 2021), historical references such as causes of the war
	1.3. International interferences	Content concerning interferences of other countries (other than Russia or Ukraine) regarding the war	The interferences of the Netherlands or the US, sanctions, emergency support (weapons, money), the role of “the West” (provocations by/EU or NATO membership). The role of foreign government. Events before the war (November 2021) are excluded and belong to 2.2.
	1.4. Dutch democracy	The role of the Dutch democracy in comparison to the Ukrainian war	The 2016 referendum and the association agreement. The example does not belong to 2.3., because in essence, it is about (the lack of) Dutch democracy
	1.5. Nord Stream		The existence of Nord Stream, sabotage of the attack on Nord Stream 2, the consequences of the attack (gas prices), accusations within this context
<b>2. Rhetoric</b>	2.1. Ethos	Convincing the audience by emphasizing own credibility and reliability of the speaker. The display of respect towards other experts can be used to emphasize ethos	The speaker makes use of properties such as appearances, image, reputation, character/charisma, and expertise. Showing respect and acknowledgement towards others can be used as well: * ‘the thoughtful research’; ‘this work should be extended’
	2.2. Pathos	Convincing the audience of the importance of an argument through the use of emotions. The emphasis of God-terms can be used for pathos	This includes the emphasis of positive or negative emotions of the audience or the speaker, emotions adverse to the opponent, the use of metaphors, such as non-literal language. * God-terms refer to shared human values (freedom, justice, and duty)
	2.3. Logos	Convincing the audience by argumentation and the use of clarity, logical integrity, reasoning, and rationality.	Logic, reasoning, grounded arguments, syllogisms, enthymemes (presumptions or common sense), relevancy, reliable and empirical evidence (numbers/percentages) or the appearance of. Signal

		<i>Errors in this form of persuasion lead to fallacies, which undermines the persuasiveness (cf. code 3).</i>	words are words such as thus, furthermore, yet, for example, and finally. * It is about the arguments leading logically towards the conclusions
		The usage of certain signal words can help the reader to process logical arguments. This rhetorical element is focused on the argument instead of the person	
<b>3.</b>	<b>3.1. The Freedom Rule</b>	1) Placing limits on standpoints or doubts 2) Restricting the other party's freedom of action; putting the other party under pressure	Fallacies: Declaring standpoints sacrosanct; declaring standpoints taboo; the stick; appeal to pity; attacking the other party's person; fallacy of depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, (etcetera); casting suspicion on the other party's motives; pointing out a contradiction in the other party's words and/or deeds
<b>Fallacies</b>	<b>3.2. The obligation to Defend Rule</b>	1) Shifting the burden of proof to the other party 2) Evading the burden of proof	Fallacies: Shifting the burden of proof; evading the burden of proof
	<b>3.3. The Standpoint Rule</b>	1) Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party 2) misrepresenting the other party's standpoint	Fallacy: The straw man
	<b>3.4. The Relevance Rule</b>	1) The argumentation has no relation to the standpoint under discussion 2) The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation	Fallacies: Irrelevant argumentation; playing on the sentiments of the audience; parading one's own qualities
	<b>3.5. The Unexpressed Premise Rule</b>	1) Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted 2) Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by one's defense	Fallacies: Distorting an unexpressed premise; denying an unexpressed premise
	<b>3.6. The Starting Point Rule</b>	1) Meddling with the starting points by falsely denying that something is an accepted starting point 2) Meddling with the starting points by falsely presenting something as an accepted starting point	Fallacies: Falsely denying an accepted starting point; making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions; making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions; using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint; circular reasoning/petition principia/begging the question
	<b>3.7. The Validity Rule</b>	1) Reasoning in which a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition	Fallacies: Denying the antecedent; affirming the consequent; division; composition



	2) Reasoning in which the properties of parts and wholes are confused	
3.8. The Argument Scheme Rule	1) Using an inappropriate argument scheme 2) Incorrectly applying an argument scheme	Fallacies: Populist; confusing facts with value judgments; authority; hasty generalization; false analogy; slippery slope
3.9. The Concluding Rule	1) Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist 2) Meddling with the conclusion by the antagonist	Fallacies: Refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully defended; concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully; refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended; concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended
3.10. The Language Use Rule	1) Misusing unclearness 2) Misusing ambiguity	Fallacies: Unclearness; ambiguity

### 3.4. Inter-coder reliability

To assure the inter-coder reliability of the codebook, about 10% of the corpus was coded by a second coder which consisted of randomly selected parts of 5 YouTube videos and 27 tweets. Since qualitative research can often be interpreted in different ways, a Cohen's Kappa with a minimum of 0.61 was applied. Beforehand, the second coder was informed about each paragraph needing at least and a maximum of one theme and one rhetorical element. Each paragraph preliminary included information about how many fallacies it contained, yet did not include information of where these were found exactly or which ones these were. The Cohen's Kappa of the fallacies was calculated twice, as it became evident that for this study, it is crucial to align interpretations of both coders on the codebook precisely (as the fallacies can be interpreted in various ways). The results of the inter-coder reliability are sufficient, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2**

*Cohen's Kappa per main code*

Main code	Cohen's Kappa
Theme	0.76
Rhetoric	0.64
Fallacies	0.74

### 3.5. Analysis

The inter-coder reliability and the corpus were investigated through the use of ATLAS.ti, which is a program that is used to code text and import social media data and transcripts. Firstly, the YouTube videos were transcribed in order to contain text only and were imported into ATLAS.ti. Tweets were directly imported with the aforementioned search string to select the specific content sample. The set-up codes were implemented to tag the qualitative content by hand and with the help of ATLAS.ti multiple tables were created to preview the results of the analysis, both frequencies and co-occurrences.

## 4. Results

In this section, the results of different topics, rhetoric, and fallacies are discussed which were represented in the 71 tweets and 23 YouTube videos. This is done by first presenting a general overview of the frequency of the themes to find out what topics were discussed most and which themes occurred in what source more often. Second, the rhetorical elements are sorted likewise to clarify the way of speech within the different sources. Lastly, the frequencies of the fallacies are presented to provide an overview of how these are implemented. Quotes are provided to explain the results and ID numbers of YouTube (YT) or Twitter (T) are added to refer back to the particular tweet or video from Appendices [B](#) and [C](#). Appendix [E](#) shows the Dutch translation of the quotes.

### 4.1. Themes

As presented in Table 3, the themes of international interference (n=148), invasion (n=79), and historical references (n=57) were mentioned most frequently in the Twitter and YouTube accounts. These sources showed that the discourse on the Ukrainian and Russian war was primarily focused on international interferences, which was more specifically about the interferences of the West; predominantly NATO, America, and the Netherlands. The West was accused of its desire for power by expanding its alliance to the border of Russia, which was regarded as an attempt to provoke and corner Russia. A recurring theme within this context emerged that the West was opting for ‘regime change’ in non-aligned countries in the world, including the Russian and the Ukrainian regime. This also aligns with how Ukraine’s candidate membership in the EU was regarded, namely as an expansion of the West, thereby threatening the sovereignty of Russia. It was often emphasized that Ukraine’s membership would drag the

Netherlands into a war because the EU would then formally be in a war state with Russia. Furthermore, the worldwide sanctions against Russia and the Dutch emergency support for Ukraine are often criticized, because it is harmful to the economy and thereby for the Dutch citizens (due to extreme gas prices, food shortages, and debts) whereas Russia remains unaffected. An example to illustrate how the theme of international interference occurred in a tweet ([T-ID: 1](#)), which shows their perceived cause of the war: *“NATO is literally and figuratively pushing the limits with Russia. In its ever-increasing eastward expansion, Ukraine is also an intended military alliance member – hence the tensions with Russia. Not in our interest.”* ([Translation](#)).

The theme ‘invasion’ included all content related to the invasion of Ukraine. On Twitter, the theme occurred most regularly when the members were announced at television shows, parts of debates were highlighted, the Ukraine symposium was promoted (in which guest speakers are highlighted and introductory texts or videos were posted), and possibilities to talk to FVD members about relevant topics, including the war. A tweet ([T-ID: 18](#)) shows, for example: *“Migration, housing shortage, energy and the approach in Ukraine – how can the municipality influence this? On Thursday night in Amsterdam, @thierrybaudet and our local grassroots representatives will discuss these issues with you. Book your tickets!”* ([Translation](#)). In YouTube videos, the party was often asked about its perception of the war and whether it condemned Russia. A response followed that ‘war is always terrible’, but the question pertaining to condemning Russia for its aggression was evaded by answering that ‘one cannot take morals into account when speaking about geopolitics’. At the same time, when acknowledging international law, Russia did not have a choice, it was self-defense, and thus Putin is not to be blamed. This topic is evident in the following quote ([YT-ID: 7](#)) from Thierry Baudet, the foreman of FVD: *“Yes so, any moralistic language has no place in international politics, so I cannot answer that question. I can say that I am deeply sorry that... I find it very, very tragic and terrible.”* ([Translation](#)). Moreover, the results showed that the Netherlands should accept Russia and make peace because Russia did not necessarily want to take Ukraine, yet wanted Ukraine to remain neutral and was forced to invade. The discourse regularly was about how the Russian side of the story is omitted in the Netherlands and that solely the views of the West and Ukraine are presented. Lastly, the hostility towards the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine was mentioned a couple of times.

Historical references were often made to mention preludes of the war. Wars and events in the previous century were referred to a couple of times (like World War 2, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Minsk-agreements, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan), as well as more recent

events like the 2014 Euromaidan and the association agreement in 2016. These events were often referred to for illustrating the Western regime in the past, explaining why Ukraine nowadays is a ‘fiction’ and a ‘puppet state’ of the US. These events were also highlighted to describe causes of the war; how it was provoked by the West. A reoccurring topic was the Maidan crisis to indicate the tensions that started between Ukraine, the West, and Russia and how the CIA started to control Ukraine ever since. It was cited as a reason that Ukraine is not a sovereign country, which therefore is allowed to be invaded. This argumentation emerges very clearly from the following quote of Baudet ([YT-ID: 7](#)): “. . . *precisely that international law has been utterly undermined by NATO countries over the past 30 years, and NATO itself has embraced an . . . aggressive regime change agenda. For example, in Kosovo, for example, in Libya, for example, in Afghanistan. So, the entire principle of sovereignty is already completely disrespected by NATO countries.*” ([Translation](#)). Additionally, the referendum initiated by FVD in 2016 (in the aftermath of the Euromaidan), was frequently praised in the sources as what could have prevented the war, hence FVD being right all along to not agree with the association agreement and that the government was warned for escalation.

The last two themes of Dutch democracy and Nord Stream were not mentioned often. When Dutch democracy was mentioned, it was within the context of the government not listening to the Dutch citizens who voted against the association agreement in the 2016 referendum. Besides, a connection was regularly made between the war in Ukraine and the so-called Great Reset. In this way, the perceived decrease of Dutch democracy was addressed. Nord Stream, on the other hand, was referred to when debating about who attacked the pipeline, as it was emphasized that Russia did not have any reasonable motive to destroy its own gas pipeline. It was sometimes referred to as the consequence of increasing gas prices when shutting down the pipeline.

The themes occurred in the different sources of YouTube and Twitter equally, except for the topic of historical references, as Table 3 shows. Historical references were mostly made to compare the current war with preceding events and to tell a story more comprehensively in YouTube videos. The difference might be explained by the limited amount of text available on Twitter to tell this story in a comprehensive way. The referendum was mentioned quite often on Twitter, however, mostly within the context of the current situation and how the government is not providing the Dutch interest (which refers more to international interferences and Dutch democracy). Lastly, it was noticed how the presenter of Café Weltschmerz showed in two YouTube videos. In the first, he interviewed Baudet during his show. In the second, he was

invited by FVD to the Ukraine Symposium to be the chairman, in which he was introduced as ‘one of the best interviewers of the Netherlands’.

**Table 3**

*Themes per source*

Theme	Source				Total	
	YouTube videos		Tweets		n	%
	n	%	n	%		
Invasion	55	22.4	24	33.8	79	24.9
International interferences	110	44.7	37	52.1	147	46.7
Dutch democracy	19	7.7	5	7.0	24	7.6
Historical references	55	22.4	3	4.2	58	18
Nord Stream	7	2.9	2	2.8	9	2.8
Total	246	100	71	100	317	100

#### 4.2. Rhetoric

Table 4 shows the rhetorical elements used in the party’s discourse. The results revealed that in the selected sources pathos was used in more than half of the statements to persuade the audience (n=181). Logos was also frequently used in their discourse (n=105), however, ethos seems to be rare (n=31). The pathos elements in the discourse of the sources were mainly aimed at gaining sympathy from the Dutch public, exaggeration, and extreme criticism. Hereby, words like ‘our own people’, ‘Dutch interests’, and ‘we’ were regularly used to clarify the care about Dutch citizens, which contains an emotional connotation and evokes a sense of cohesion. For this purpose, extremes often emerged in the content; for instance, Dutch children fainting at school due to malnutrition and people sleeping in their cars due to extreme gas prices as a consequence of the war. The empathy that showed for the Dutch citizens regularly skips to criticism towards the sanctions and emergency help of the Dutch government. Within this discourse, a strong negative connotation was apparent, mainly focused on attacking other politicians and criticizing the Dutch government, stating that the Netherlands is being forced into a war that is not ‘our war’, by the ‘incapable’ Dutch policy. The next tweet ([T-ID: 3](#)) clarifies this: *“The entire cartel agrees: Russia is the aggressor. Such hypocrisy. If your goal is to divide our continent, we are now on the right track. But if your goal is to stand up for Dutch interests and world stability, we are doing it all wrong.”* ([Translation](#)). In addition to this, figurative language was often used to tell a story, like ‘Pandora’s box’ or ‘adding fuel to the fire’, or to name people, like ‘Yankees’ referring to Americans or ‘the cartel’ in reference to the Dutch government, as shown in the quote. The results also showed that the Western world

was often accused of judging the war as too moralistic; in terms of 'good guys' and 'bad guys', which links back to the populist contrasting of the two groups. In doing so, nuances usually failed, so the discourse regularly showed either of the two extremes. Lastly, pathos also occurred regularly when statements were made without any substantiation or only contained speculation, which occurred mainly when the corpus showed statements about the West and its regime-change strategies, or how the Great Reset benefits the war. These were often unsupported statements, which mostly contained suspicion.

Another element that was repeatedly used for argumentation is logos. This appeared mostly when appropriate arguments were deployed to explain a certain point of view. For example, in both sources, the argument was used often that FVD was right ever since the referendum and that they warned the Dutch government of provocations. It showed an appropriate argument since they, in fact, had predicted further escalations. This was also used to refer to Ukraine getting (candidate) membership to the EU, contradictory to what was agreed to with the association agreement, which is what FVD had also predicted. Explaining this in a logical way, by describing causes, motives, and consequences show logos arguments. While describing these, different types of signal words were used many times, such as hence, furthermore, and due to. Syllogisms were also adopted to prove a point, which means the use of two statements to lead to a valid conclusion. An example is derived from the following statement of the FVD member Freek Jansen ([YT-ID: 11](#)): *“But one of the direct consequences for the Netherlands may be the further increase in gas prices. We have now heard today that Nord Stream 2 appears to be off the table seemingly for good, at least for now. That will have very big consequences. The gas price has already increased a lot.”* ([Translation](#)). Logos also became apparent when wanting to prove a certain point by making use of videos from the past. Rarely did the corpus show actual scientific sources to underpin arguments, whereas references to authorities showed more often. Thus, reasoning is one of the most important elements that were deployed in the logos arguments. This also becomes evident in the following quote of Baudet ([YT-ID: 13](#)), of which the regime-change strategies were actually based on an example used for substantiation instead of solely speculation (which is regularly evident with pathos arguments). *“So then there came a puppet regime from the US Foreign Ministry. There are also all these phone calls from Jeffrey Pyatt, with Victoria Nuland where they say “what are we going to do with Yatseniuk . . . Klychko is going to be mayor of Kyiv”, this and that.”* ([Translation](#)).

The third rhetorical element ethos was not used much in both sources. When it did occur, it was often used to show own capabilities and fame or to promote events. In tweets, this was

shown when a member being present at a television show was announced, to promote their Ukraine symposium and the opportunity to talk to FVD members during a tour across the country, or referring to debates that FVD appeared in. For example, it was often mentioned that an event would be worth to attend, which is formulated such as: ‘it will be a spectacular night’. In addition, studies of other people were promoted a few times, for instance, the theories of Brzeziński, Doegin, and Tocqueville, which represented different geopolitical views of the West and Russia. This belongs to ethos because acknowledging the work of others contributes to the credibility of both the author as well as own statements. Lastly, the dataset showed how the FVD took part in the 2016 referendum and that they predicted the war, predominantly for the purpose of boosting their own credibility. Baudet’s quote ([YT-ID: 14](#)) provides an example for this: “[F]or a long time, I have been one of the very few who says every time what is going to happen . . . who gets declared crazy, and then after a few years is proven right again. I am very sorry, at Corona I was proven right, at the euro I was proven right, on all those issues and the association suspicion with Ukraine, 2016, that we had that referendum...” ([Translation](#)).

Although ethos seems to be used rarely, it did seem to occur twice as often within tweets than YouTube videos, while, in fact, the different sources did not make much difference for pathos and logos elements, according to Table 4. In YouTube videos, many debates are shown, and ethos did not show regularly to pose an argument, except when it came to promoting well-known philosophers or emphasizing that FVD was right regarding the referendum. The FVD Twitter account was regularly used for announcements or to promote, which is why ethos occurred on this platform more often.

**Table 4**

*Rhetorical element per source*

Rhetoric	Source				Total	
	YouTube videos		Tweets		n	%
	n	%	n	%		
3.1. Ethos	19	7.7	12	16.9	31	9.8
3.2. Pathos	145	58.9	36	50.7	181	57.1
3.3. Logos	82	33.3	23	32.4	105	33.1
Total	246	100	71	100	317	100

#### 4.3. Fallacies

The bar graph in Figure 1 shows the frequency of the fallacies that occurred in the dataset. In total, 21 different fallacies from a total of 37 fallacies from the framework were identified. The

four most used fallacies were the straw man fallacy (rule 3; n=60), ad populum/pathetical fallacy (rule 4; n=45), indirect personal attack (rule 1; n=42), and making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions (rule 6; n=37). This means that rules 3, 4, 1, and 6 were violated most, which belong to the standpoint rule, relevance rule, freedom rule, and starting point rule. In short, FVD omitted fallacies by (3) attacking certain standpoints that were not advanced by the other party, (4) defending a standpoint that does not relate to the advanced standpoint, (1) preventing another from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints, and (6) by advancing arguments that do not belong to the common starting point. Table 5 provides an overview of the fallacies that occur in relation to certain rhetorical elements. It became clear that all fallacies occurred more frequently within pathos-based discourse and that solely the fallacies of declaring standpoints sacrosanct (1.1) and evading the burden of proof (2.2) occurred more regularly within a logos-based discourse. Pathos was likely to occur more often, since these sorts of arguments do not contain enough or correct evidence, meaning to persuade the public by means of emotions instead of valid argumentation. It might be explained that the 2.2. fallacy was located in a logos-based context because common sense is generally likely to be used within logos argumentation. It is also possible that both fallacies occurred more as logos in both sources, in which not necessarily the fallacy itself was logos, however, these were located in a logos-based text.

The straw man occurred when someone attributed a fictitious point of view to the other party or misrepresented/distorted the other party's standpoint, which often emerged in the dataset. To illustrate from the sources, members of the Dutch government's statements usually jumped to conclusions, even though these conclusions were not said directly by the person. For example, when it was mentioned that the Dutch government cares more about the war (and further escalations through the sanctions or emergency support) than they care for the Dutch citizens, of which the following tweet ([T-ID: 15](#)) shows an example: *"Against the Dutch interest, he is sending weapons, imposing sanctions (that affect the Netherlands), and seeking to quarrel with the world's largest nuclear power. This prime minister is anti-Dutch."* ([Translation](#)). This also occurred frequently in the context of the referendum, in which the government 'did not listen to the Dutch votes', although the votes during the referendum are not representative of the entire Dutch population. It was also called a 'colonization agreement', which likely distorted the intentions of others. Moreover, it was often indicated that various people were captivated by American war propaganda or anti-Russian war frames, even though there is no evidence for this. An example tweet ([T-ID: 44](#)) shows it is implied that the Dutch government is intentionally worsening the war by sending weapons, even though it aims to help




the Ukrainian army – hence twisting their intentions to appear poorly: “*The cabinet continues to send weapons, add fuel to the fire, and prolong the misery for Ukrainians.*” ([Translation](#))

The pathetic variation of the ad populum fallacy is deployed in the sources to play on the sentiments of the audience by using rhetorical elements instead of argumentation. Again, the consequences of the war for the Dutch citizens are used to get the public along with certain viewpoints. Often, it is said that the government must choose for the Dutch interests. Hereby, exaggerated examples were offered to prove the point of what crisis the Dutch citizens are in, in order to gain sympathy for certain standpoints instead of using decent and relevant argumentation. Furthermore, metaphors were integrated into arguments with exaggerated examples. The following tweet ([T-ID: 3](#)) provides an example of the ad populum/pathetical fallacy, which is posted in the context of ‘the cartel’ blaming Russia and perceiving Russia as the aggressor: “*If your goal is to divide our continent, we are now on the right track. But if you want to stand up for Dutch interests and world stability, we are doing it all wrong.*” ([Translation](#)). It shows that there is no argumentation used at all to explain this opinion, however, the audience is tempted to feel a certain way, by using words such as Dutch interest and world stability and by emphasizing the right and wrong way.

The indirect personal attack is a circumstantial variant of the ad hominem fallacy in which the data was often focused on the other party (instead of the other party’s person) and casted suspicion on them because they promoted their own interest. This is done repeatedly regarding the so-called hidden agenda of the West, helping Ukraine to further its own interest by changing its (and Russia’s) regime. This fallacy is committed when there is no adequate reasoning within the argumentation, which is for instance done when it is referred to the Great Reset, the American war propaganda, and when the ‘corona scam’ is compared to the ‘Russia scam’. It was mentioned that this agenda needs chaos for it to be accomplished; that is why the Western world uses the war for its own benefit to create a neo-communist world state. In a quote ([YT-ID: 12](#)), Baudet stated: “. . . a country that has seen that Ukraine was one of the strongholds of the deep state of the US, was one of the centers from which those Sustainable Development Goals and the Great Reset are being realized and has attacked it.” ([Translation](#)).

The fourth most commonly used fallacy was making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions; presenting a statement as if it is a common starting point when, in fact, it is not. Also, statements presented with few alternatives, which could have more alternatives in reality (false dilemma) were included. Of the two variants, the false dilemma occurred most in the sources and was often presented like Russia had no other option but to invade, showing statements such as ‘Russia was in a diabolical dilemma with only two options’ or ‘Russia was

cornered and could not do anything else’. Next to this, the ‘false’ common starting point was always presented as if it were correct by definition, usually evading the burden of proof, like stating that there was no motive whatsoever for Russia to destroy their own Nord Stream pipelines, and implying that Dutch citizens are by definition captivated by governmental consciousness constriction and therefore accept freedom restrictions. For example, Baudet stated (YT-ID: 9): “. . . thus continuing the narrowing of consciousness we have seen over the past two years and . . . what we have seen, of course, is that the moment people are in that fear and in that constriction of consciousness that they accept the most absurd restrictions on freedom.” (Translation). This quote is for example stated as if this is the truth and ‘naturally’ everyone agrees.



**Figure 1.** Frequency of the fallacies.

**Table 5***The frequency of the fallacies per rhetorical element*

Fallacies	Rhetoric			Total
	3.1. Ethos	3.2. Pathos	3.3. Logos	
	n	n	n	n
1.1. Sacrosanct	0	5	7	12
1.3. Stick (ad baculum)	0	2	0	2
1.4. Ad misericordiam	0	1	0	1
1.5. Ad hominem	0	20	5	25
1.6. Direct personal attack/“abusive” variant	1	17	3	21
1.7. Indirect personal attack/“circumstantial” variant	3	31	8	42
1.8. Tu quoque variant	0	7	4	11
2.1. Shifting the burden of proof	0	3	2	5
2.2. Evading the burden of proof	0	8	14	22
3.1. Straw man	3	44	13	60
4.1. Irrelevant argumentation (ignoratio elenchi)	0	6	4	10
4.2. Ad populum/pathetical fallacy	2	38	5	45
4.3. Ad verecundiam	9	5	0	14
6.2. Unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions	2	31	4	37
6.3. Many questions	2	10	3	15
7.2. Affirming the consequent	0	1	0	1
8.1. Ad populum: populist variant	1	1	0	2
8.3. Authority	3	3	0	6
8.4. Hasty generalization	0	8	4	11
8.5. False analogy	0	9	4	13
8.6. Slippery slope	0	15	4	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>373</b>

## 5. Discussion

This section will provide main findings into the discourse of FVD, with theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research. Lastly, the conclusion will sum up the research directives

### 5.1. Main findings

This study investigated three elements in order to discover the way FVD discussed the Russo-Ukrainian war, which consisted of the brought-up themes about the war, rhetorical elements used to persuade the audience, and committed fallacies within the argumentation of the selected corpus. To first provide insights into the overall topics of the war in the Tweets and YouTube videos, a clear main narrative was found linked to a larger issue: the war is frequently judged

based on the conspiracy narrative of The Great Reset<sup>1</sup>, which is discussed nine times within both sources. In this narrative, the common thread is the control of the Western world to influence human behavior with authoritarian control, which reoccurs roughly in all themes. The foundation of the corpus is thus grounded on an alternative reality. Furthermore, the sympathy for the Russian side becomes clear from the tweets and videos, by stimulating the acknowledgment of Russia as a legitimate global power, and wanting to strive for peace. Lastly, the 2016 referendum often showed for taking a strong position in debates.

It was found that this narrative was conveyed consistently by FVD in a particular communication style; via frequently attacking other politicians by blaming them for political crises, contrasting the Dutch citizens against the cartel (i.e. the Dutch government), and wanting to protect its nation over Ukraine's needs. It was done through the frequent use of pathos elements such as exaggeration, figurative language, and accusations, often lacking a degree of substantiation, which have been shown to lead to an increased susceptibility whenever distributing disinformation (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Tucker et al., 2018). Next to this, the context that was analyzed was based on explanations and logical arguments besides solely trying to transmit pathos. Many arguments rely on soundness and justifiable information, however, it showed that empirical evidence was not used often – which also regularly lacks in disinformation discourse (McCornack, 1992) – but frequently used common sense as reality, which showed to be evident in logos contexts (Demirdöğen, 2010).

Comparing the results with populist discourse, the usage of common sense is also frequently done in such parties (Hameleers, 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Besides the use of sound argumentation, FVD simultaneously appeared to do so to fit their predetermined narrative and ideology – for example when portraying various philosophers to show the visions of Russia and America – which is in line with literature concerning populist parties (Blassnig et al., 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Namely, populist parties may give the impression of presenting logical and factual based argumentation by often using selective and distorted evidence leading to false assumptions or misleading information, which also connects to the mentioned conspiracy narrative of FVD. Additionally, findings of The Great Reset conspiracy confirm those of earlier studies that have shown populist parties are likely to spread disinformation (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Hameleers, 2020) and to use uncertainty in times of chaos (Douglas & Sutton, 2023; Dow et al., 2023), of which the invasion is an example. Next

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<sup>1</sup> This common conspiracy theory narrative refers to a socialist-communist plot, using worldwide crises as opportunities to constrain freedom and create a totalitarian state, whilst it was developed to rebuild post-pandemic life by continuing to a more inclusive, equitable, and climate-focused world (Umbrello, 2022).

to this, the pathos rhetoric of FVD with elements of compassion for the Dutch citizens or accusations of the out-group (i.e. the authoritarian West and the cartel) matches populist discourse (Hameleers, 2020; Hameleers et al., 2017; Van Raalte et al., 2021). Lastly, elements of ethos were hardly used in the discourse of FVD, which is remarkable since studies have shown that populists often carefully prepare their appearance and performance, trying to achieve self-presentations such as ‘defender of the common people’ or to appear charismatic and as an idol (Wodak, 2013). Ethos therefore would have expected to occur more frequently.

To proceed on the selective and distorted evidence that populists often employ; fallacies are often used by populist (Blassnig et al., 2019; Macagno, 2022). The results of the current study confirm this, as many fallacies were used, of which the most frequent showed a pattern of conspiracy or propaganda narrative by distorting and exaggerating others’ statements (straw man)<sup>2</sup> and casting suspicion on the other party for containing a motive to advance their own stakes (indirect personal attack)<sup>3</sup>. These results of the specific fallacies are in line with what Wodak (as cited in Klerides & Carney, 2021, p. 122) describes as toolkits of populist discourse; by scapegoating, victim-perpetrator reversal, and construction of conspiracy theories. Namely, the people were contrasted against the cartel, by using false claims or anecdotes, distorted information, or suspicion and insinuations which include alternative truths. However, other fallacies are not excluded to be related to disinformation forms, these two are predominantly the most evident forms. Next to this, the argumentum ad populum fallacy (pathetical variant) showed statements that contained sentiments in advancing arguments to play on the emotions and prejudices of the audience instead of using solid argumentation. This illustrates the populist connection again by the use of the impression or absence of sound arguments that capitalize on the audience (Blassnig et al., 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Hameleers, 2020; Hameleers et al., 2017; Van Raalte et al., 2021) and confirms that pathos is evident in the discourse of FVD. Lastly, FVD used a lot of presuppositions presented as if they were common starting points, whereas, in fact, these are not common starting points, or used false dilemma’s. The latter has shown to be evident in populist discourse (Macagno, 2022), and the first could be explained by populists’ frequent use of common sense, which simultaneously connects to

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<sup>2</sup> As an example, it was frequently mentioned that the entire Dutch population voted against the 2016 referendum, initiated by FVD, to show that the Dutch interest is not fulfilled by the Dutch government. This is an example of exaggeration, since a small part of the Dutch population voted at all, namely 32.3% (Rijksoverheid, n.d.), which cannot be appointed to the Dutch interest entirely. This shows attractive conclusions, selective use of information, and distorted information, which relates to propaganda (Farkas & Neumayer, 2020; National Endowment for Democracy, 2018)

<sup>3</sup> Suspicion was cast on the US owning chemical weapons laboratories in Ukraine during the war, which is also believed to be a conspiracy theory, according to Douglas et al. (2023).

disinformation and logos texts (Demirdögen, 2010; Hameleers, 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This shows the connection between populist parties and disinformation again.

Finally, the cues that lead to a higher susceptibility to disinformation which include partisan, group, emotional, exposure and virality, and audiovisual cues, provided by Tucker et al. (2018), all occur in the sources of FVD to some extent. For instance, the presenter of the show *Café Weltschmerz*, that interviewed the foreman of FVD on his platform in one of the videos, was also the chairman of the Ukraine symposium, organized by FVD. This shows a partisan cue due to this bias in which the sympathies of FVD towards the presenter were evident. Group cues emerged in the corpus as the out-group is frequently attacked and presented as inherently opposed to the citizens, in which emotional cues are spread by pathos elements. Exposure and virality are achieved by the consistent discourse about the war and targeting a larger scope regarding the topic, as audiovisual cues are used on YouTube and tweets are subsequently used to promote these videos. These could all implicitly contribute to the deceiving influence on public perceptions.

## 5.2. Theoretical implications

With the results of this study, other scientists could gain more insights into the ways the Ukrainian war is discussed by a populist party that uses YouTube and Twitter to influence public debate. The themes of populist party rhetoric, fallacies, and disinformation come together to investigate the role of political disinformation more extensively. Whereas previous studies have focused on populist rhetoric and its frequent commission of fallacies (Blassnig et al., 2019; Macagno, 2022), this study affirms these findings and goes into greater detail that populism not only shows attacks on the established elite, but it also shows an attack on the distribution of mainstream information. This adds to the dimension of disinformation more specifically and provides an interesting basis for future research regarding the analysis of the role of (a more extensive list of) fallacies in populist disinformation research. With this information, fallacies can be used in specific contexts to compare parties or to identify themes. Next to this, the study provides new insights into disinformation that is spread about the Ukrainian war by the Dutch populist party FVD and again shows evidence for conspiracies in times of chaos and how conspiracies develop and are reused in different subjects.

### 5.3. Practical implications

Practically, this study contributes to showing the danger of certain forms of disinformation that may exist within the Dutch parliament, an institution that should actually exist for the benefit of the citizens. Since antigovernment conspiracy theories have been proven to result in people showing less intention to vote (Douglas et al., 2019), it is important to gain awareness and attack this problem. The role of decent argumentation within the parliament should help citizens of gaining authentic information and increase trust in the government in times of crisis. The Dutch government is already planning to deploy a national science communication center for a solid foundation to prevent pressuring knowledge in the public and political debate (Rijksoverheid, 2022). This is the first step to creating trust, gaining awareness, and tackling forms of disinformation, of which the present study could provide insights into the causes of a Dutch political party in terms of this. The present study could help recognize disinformation more accurately by the detection of certain fallacies. It also supports that there are connections between populism, cues of pathos, and disinformation, of which previous studies contain elements of (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Hamелеers, 2020; Hamелеers et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Van Raalte et al., 2021).

### 5.4. Limitations and future research

Whereas this study contributes to the research within the field of political disinformation and rhetoric, there are some limitations that contain suggestions for future research. Firstly, the scope of this research is limited to a certain extent by its very specific focus on disinformation through the use of fallacies. Future research could for example take into account the straw man fallacy and the fallacy of casting suspicion on the other party, as these showed clear connections to disinformation, next to additional aspects of disinformation.

Second, the themes were formulated on a rather abstract level, except for the theme of Nord Stream. For future studies, it might be interesting to look into more specific themes, to get a more systematic overview of the narrative used by FVD. Notwithstanding, the themes were only set up to categorize the topics FVD talks about regarding the war, which is why it does not affect the outcomes of the research.

Third, considering that the rhetorical elements were coded at paragraph level and the fallacies were coded at sentence level, no detailed conclusions can be made regarding the co-occurrence results of fallacies per rhetorical element. For example, it is possible that a certain fallacy could have been better ascribed as a logos element, whereas it was located in a pathos-

based text. This is why not much is said about this co-occurrence. The co-occurrence, however, is not perceived as a very important element within this research, hence, no recommendations are made for future research. Additionally, at the paragraph level of coding, the most prevalent themes or rhetoric were coded, which was a difficult decision sometimes that could be interpreted in different ways.

Fourth, the inter-coder reliability test took more time than it should have because the codebook was not explained sufficiently to the second coder in the first round. This research contains analysis that can be interpreted in many different ways and often acquires contextual knowledge, predominantly when coding fallacies. It is a reason why it is extremely important for the researcher to align the codebook with the second coder at the first attempt as it could have saved precious time. The potential various interpretations are also a reason why the quantity of the fallacies had to be assigned per paragraph beforehand, for the second coder to assign the fallacies better in the second round of testing. Fallacies are difficult to recognize in texts, especially when the researcher has a less thorough understanding of how these occur.

## 5.5. Conclusion

This study focused on the YouTube and Twitter discourse of the political party Forum voor Democratie regarding the war in Ukraine. By applying a coding scheme to detect rhetoric and fallacies in social media discourse, a specific focus on disinformation was included. As it turned out, the main narrative of FVD was based on the conspiracy theory of the Great Reset, blaming the West for its control over the world in which Russia was not expressively blamed for the invasion. The party showed a typical populist communication style by using pathos elements with frequent accusations of the Dutch government and the West as well as strong compassion for the Dutch citizens. Additionally, logical arguments were used based on reasoning or common sense, and FVD also frequently only appeared to do so, which emerged through the use of multiple fallacies. The commission of specific fallacies showed conspiracy and propaganda-related narratives by distortion, exaggeration, and simplification of arguments, and by casting suspicion on a higher power in the world. To conclude, this research affirmed previous literature on populist communication behavior and contributed to previous studies by including the detection of disinformation through an extensive amount of fallacies. It also took into account the current events of the Ukrainian-Russo war in researching the tactics employed by a political actor to shape public opinion.



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## Appendix A

### *Overview of violations of the rules and the resulting fallacies*

<b>Rule</b>	<b>Violation</b>	<b>Fallacy</b>
<b>1. Freedom:</b> Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints	1) Placing limits on standpoints or doubts	- Declaring standpoints sacrosanct - Declaring standpoints taboo
	2) Restricting the other party's freedom of action; putting the other party under pressure	- The stick (= argumentum ad baculum) - Appeal to pity (= argumentum ad misericordiam) - Attacking the other party's person (= argumentum ad hominem) - Depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, etcetera (= direct personal attack/"abusive" variant) - Casting suspicion on the other party's motives (= indirect personal attack/"circumstantial" variant) - Pointing out a contradiction in the other party's words and/or deeds (= tu quoque variant) - Shifting the burden of proof
<b>2. Obligation to Defend:</b> Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.	In a non-mixed difference of opinion, instead of defending his or her own standpoint, the protagonist forces the antagonist to show that the protagonist's standpoint is wrong	
	In a mixed difference of opinion the one party does not attempt to defend his or her standpoint but forces the other party to defend their standpoint Presenting the standpoint as self-evident Giving a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint Immunizing the standpoint against criticism	- Evading the burden of proof
<b>3. Standpoint:</b> An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really been advanced by the protagonist.	1) Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party Presenting one's own standpoint wrongly as the opposite standpoint Referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs Creating a fictitious opponent	- Straw man
	2) Misrepresenting the other party's standpoint Taking utterances out of context Oversimplifying or exaggerating	

**4. Relevance:** A standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.

1) The argumentation has no relation to the standpoint under discussion

- Irrelevant argumentation (= ignoratio elenchi)

2) The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation  
Non-argumentation

- Playing on the sentiments of the audience (= pathetic fallacy/ argumentum ad populum)  
- Parading one's own qualities (= ethical or ethotic fallacy/argumentum ad verecundiam)

**5. Unexpressed Premise:** A person can be held to the premises he leaves implicit.

1) Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted  
2) Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by one's defense

- Distorting an unexpressed premise  
- Denying an unexpressed premise

**6. Starting Point:** A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense takes place by means of arguments belonging to the common starting point (assumptions)

1) Meddling with the starting points by falsely denying that something is an accepted starting point

- Falsely denying an accepted starting point

2) Meddling with the starting points by falsely presenting something as an accepted starting point

- Making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions  
- Making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions (= fallacy of many questions)  
- Using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint (= - fallacy of circular etc.)

**7. Validity:** The arguments used in a discursive text must be valid or capable of being validated by the explicitization of one or more unexpressed premises

1) Reasoning in which a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition

- Circular reasoning/petitio principii/begging the question)  
- Denying the antecedent  
- Affirming the consequent

2) Reasoning in which the properties of parts and wholes are confused

- Division  
- Composition

**8. Argument Scheme:** A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied

1) Using an inappropriate argument scheme

- Populist (symptomatic argumentation) (= argumentum ad populum)  
- Confusing facts with value judgments (causal relation) (= argumentum ad consequentiam)

2) Incorrectly applying an argument scheme

- Authority (symptomatic argumentation) (= argumentum ad verecundiam)  
- Hasty generalization (symptomatic argumentation) (= secundum quid)  
- False analogy (comparison argumentation)  
- The slippery slope (causal argumentation)

**9. Concluding:** A failed defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint and a successful defence must result in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about the standpoint

1) Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist

- Refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully defended
- Concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully

2) Meddling with the conclusion by the antagonist

- Refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended
- Concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended (= argumentum ad ignorantiam)

**10. Language Use:** Formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambiguous and must be interpreted as accurately as possible

1) Misusing unclearness

- Unclearness (implicitness, indefiniteness, unfamiliarity, vagueness)

2) Misusing ambiguity

- Ambiguity

*Note.* From “Handbook of argumentation theory” by F. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, E. Krabbe, A. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, J. Wagemans, Springer Reference (2014) 1-988



## Appendix B

### *Corpus YouTube videos*

Title	Date	Duration	Speakers (on behalf of FVD)	Views (x1000)	Likes (x1000)	Category	Description
1. <a href="#">“Nederland in oorlog met Rusland – Wat is de toekomst van Oekraïne in de EU?”</a>	21-06-2022	2:50	Pepijn van Houwelingen (FVD), Thierry Baudet (FVD)	45.9	2.6	Parliamentary debate	FVD member talks about how the association agreement was a stepping-stone towards EU membership of Ukraine, even though it was said not to be and how FVD predicted this. This is proven by videos from the past
2. <a href="#">“Samenwerking tussen Europa en Rusland? – Joost Niemöller bij het Oekraïne Symposium”</a>	12-07-2022	20:02	Joost Niemöller (journalist, guest speaker)	31.5	1.2	Ukraine Symposium	The guest speaker is sharing his vision on the run-up to the war, comparing various philosophers and writers like Brzeziński and Doegin to show the American and Russian visions
3. <a href="#">“Sancties tegen Rusland, desastreuze gevolgen voor Nederland – De Graaff (FVD) over Oekraïne”</a>	15-07-2022	1:14	Marcel de Graaff (FVD-parlementarian)	53.3	2.5	European Parliament	De Graaff speaks at the European parliamentary about the consequences of sanctions for the Dutch citizens, stating that this is not a war for the Netherlands to fight
4. <a href="#">“Rusland of Oekraïne: wie is de agressor?”</a>	13-07-2022	3:02	Attendees symposium (including guests, guest speakers, Thierry Baudet, Freek Jansen)	45.9	2	Ukraine Symposium, aftermovie	Different guests are talking about the symposium. The emphasis is put on the successful symposium and the perspective from both Russia and Ukraine, instead of the one-sided news from mainstream media

5. <a href="#">“Russische ambassadeur bij paneldiscussie Oekraïne Symposium (volledige gesprek)”</a>	12-07-2022	45:04	Alexander Shulgin (Russian ambassador), Marcel de Graaff (FVD-Europe parliamentarian), John Laughland (academic, actor), Joost Niemöller (journalist), Marie-Thérèse ter Haar (East-Europe expert), Pieter Stuurman (host, Café Weltschmerz)	59.1	2.2	Ukraine Symposium, experts	The various guest speakers speak about their views on the (prelude to the) war, discussing the Russian view and show the visions of different philosophers which represent the Russian and American point of views
6. <a href="#">“Hier waarschuwd FVD in 2016 al voor: oorlog met Rusland” – Van Houwelingen (FVD)”</a>	10-03-2022	4:00	Pepijn van Houwelingen (FVD)	57.2	2.7	Parliamentary debate	Van Houwelingen speaks about the 2016 referendum, the way FVD predicted this crisis, the way the government did not listen to the Dutch citizens, and how they should lead on peace
7. <a href="#">“Het kartel rommelt ons opnieuw een oorlog in – Thierry Baudet over Oekraïne”</a>	28-02-2022	29:09	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	311.7	8.2	Parliamentary debate	Baudet speaks about the 2016 referendum and the way FVD predicted this crisis. Second, it is about the role of the governments wanting to control states and accusing the members in the parliament of using moralistic language which does not belong to geopolitics and for this reason not being able to judge the invasion by Russia. Lastly, the way out of the war is described as respecting the Minsk-agreements and to lead on peace

8. <a href="#">“Oorlog met Rusland? Rookgordijn voor revolutionaire agenda”</a>	03-02-2022	4:52	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	238.4	7.8	Parliamentary debate	Baudet speaks about the 2016 referendum and the way FVD predicted this crisis. Second, it is about the role of the governments wanting to control states. Lastly, the way out of the war is described as respecting the Minsk-agreements and to lead on peace
9. <a href="#">““Dit is de oplossing voor het conflict in Oekraïne!” – Thierry Baudet”</a>	08-03-2022	50:48	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	153.3	4.5	Guest at Café Weltschmerz	Baudet is interviewed at café Weltschmerz in which he speaks about his vision of the war, referring to the 2016 referendum, the control of the government, how the West provoked the war, and the sanctions
10. <a href="#">“Heeft het Westen een val gezet voor Rusland?”</a>	28-02-2022	3:49	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	146.5	4.3	Parliamentary debate	Baudet submits two motions regarding the referendum in 2016
11. <a href="#">“Freek Jansen (FVD) confronteert Rutte met zelfdestructieve sancties”</a>	22-02-2022	2:20	Freek Jansen (FVD)	90.8	1.9	Parliamentary debate	Jansen speaks about the Nord Stream pipelines and asks about the consequences when not using the pipelines anymore
12. <a href="#">“Genadeloos! Thierry Baudet VLOERT kartelpolitici in debat over Rusland en Europa   FVD”</a>	05-10-2022	23:27	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	156.4	6.4	Parliamentary debate	The debate is about the consequences of the sanctions, the influence of the West regarding the war, the investigation of explosions of Nord Stream pipelines, the role of the governments wanting to control states, and whether Baudet condemns Russia of the invasion
13. <a href="#">“Baudet vs kartel over Oekraïne (volledige inbreng debat)”</a>	07-07-2022	24:39	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	119.7	5	Parliamentary debate	Baudet speaks about the influence of the West in the world, sanctions, how the war could have been prevented referring to the 2016 referendum, whether he condemns Russia of the invasion, and the consequences of the emergency help

14. <a href="#">“Baudet voor vrede – dit is de uitweg uit crisis in Oekraïne”</a>	01-03-2022	32:21	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	220.2	6.3	Guest at Ongehoord Nederland	Baudet is questioned about the war at a TV-show, in which the 2016 referendum, the role of the governments wanting to control states, and solutions for the war are discussed
15. <a href="#">“Oorlog tussen fictie en realiteit – John Laughland bij het Oekraïne symposium”</a>	11-07-2022	25:54	John Laughland (academicus, actor)	95.2	3.9	Ukraine Symposium, expert	Laughland is a guest speaker at the symposium, in which he talks about the role of the West, implementing regime change strategies in various countries, and consequences of the sanctions
16. <a href="#">““U bent glashard aan het LIEGEN!” – Thierry Baudet confronteert Sjoerdsma (D66) over Rusland”</a>	22-06-2022	3:28	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	132.4	4.9	Parliamentary debate	Baudet is accusing the other party of misusing a quote and adopting anti-Russia war propaganda
17. <a href="#">“Het Oekraïne symposium – Wat is er aan de hand?”</a>	22-06-2022	1:30	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	26.3	1.5	Ukraine Symposium	Promoting video to come to the symposium, claiming that FVD represents both Ukrainian and Russian sides of the conflict
18. <a href="#">“Kartelleugens EXPOSED: Van Houwelingen houdt fenomenaal betoog over Oekraïne”</a>	17-09-2022	10:49	Pepijn van Houwelingen (FVD)	40.3	2.7	Introduction and plea during parliamentary debate	Van Houwelingen speaks about the consequences of the emergency help, mainly regarding the Dutch citizens and that it is not in the interest of the Netherlands
19. <a href="#">“Openingsspeech van Thierry Baudet bij het Oekraïne Symposium”</a>	11-07-2022	15:21	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	86.2	4.2	Ukraine Symposium	Introductory speech to the symposium, stating how the Netherlands lack of providing the Russian side of the war, the government trying to control the citizens, and about living in a quasi-totalitarian era
20. <a href="#">“10 juli: het Oekraïne-symposium van FVD! Met Thierry Baudet”</a>	05-07-2022	1:24	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	12.9	0.763	Ukraine Symposium	Promoting video to come to the symposium, highlighting the speakers, subjects, and claiming that FVD represents both Ukrainian and Russian sides of the conflict

21. <a href="#">“Alleen zo kunnen we een catastrofe afwenden” FVD-Europarlement ariër de Graaff over Oekraïne”</a>	04-03-2022	3:24	Marcel de Graaff (FVD)	37.1	2.5	Speech	Accusing the West of provoking the war, the lack of freedom due to the control of the West, and the solution to the war to make peace
22. <a href="#">“Jullie geest is vergiftigd door oorlogspropaganda – Thierry Baudet tegenover het hele kartel”</a>	26-06-2022	2:35	Thierry Baudet (FVD)	99.3	4.1	Parliamentary debate	Baudet speaks of three motions, of which one is about the prime minister calling the Ukrainian war “our war”, wishing to withdraw this statement
23. <a href="#">“Sjoerdsma is TOTAAL de weg kwijt in Nord Stream-debat met Van Houwelingen (FVD)”</a>	19-10-2022	3:44	Pepijn van Houwelingen (FVD)	58.2	2	Parliamentary debate	Van Houwelingen denies that Russia attacked the Nord Stream pipelines, confronting the other party to call for reasons to destroy their own pipelines and accusing them for not being able to do so

## Appendix C

### *Corpus tweets*

ID	Date	Re-tweets	Comments	Favorites	Description
1. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489289676603207688">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489289676603207688</a>	03-02-22	246	53	927	NATO's expansion towards Ukraine as a cause of the war
2. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489290631495176193">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489290631495176193</a>	03-02-22	29	2	150	Relations between Ukraine and NATO, referring to things said about membership in the past
3. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489307749376737284">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1489307749376737284</a>	03-02-22	617	211	2374	Getting involved in the war does not stand for Dutch interests and stability in the world
4. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1496219930089373706">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1496219930089373706</a>	22-02-22	504	185	1691	Relations between Ukraine and NATO as a cause of the war
5. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1496875633577795584">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1496875633577795584</a>	24-02-22	176	279	888	The Netherlands are dragged into a war they have nothing to do with
6. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1497207577444237325">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1497207577444237325</a>	25-02-22	77	72	333	Announcement of Thierry Baudet at a TV-show, talking about his book and Ukraine's situation
7. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498236345067741184">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498236345067741184</a>	28-02-22	173	145	596	Relations between Ukraine and NATO as a cause of the war, plea to make peace
8. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498273565136887816">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498273565136887816</a>	28-02-22	203	104	693	NATO's expansion towards Ukraine as a cause of the war, criticism towards the government
9. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498349322102059015">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498349322102059015</a>	28-02-22	481	193	1716	Reaction to the Dutch government's suspicion towards Russian financing of FVD
10. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498602304257339394">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498602304257339394</a>	01-03-22	811	457	2383	Criticism towards Dutch broadcasting, announcing declaration
11. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498738735810322438">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1498738735810322438</a>	01-03-22	360	167	1312	NATO's expansion towards Ukraine as a cause of the war, plea to make peace

12.	02-03-22	169	86	666	Announcement of Thierry Baudet at a TV-show, comparison between Corona and Ukraine's agenda
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499089368975392770">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499089368975392770</a>					
13.	03-03-22	441	269	1428	The consequences of sanctions towards Russia, criticism on the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499367182106607617">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499367182106607617</a>					
14.	03-03-22	222	87	834	The consequences of sanctions towards Russia, criticism on the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499515735579709442">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499515735579709442</a>					
15.	03-03-22	177	62	801	The consequences of sanctions towards Russia, criticism on the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499515737647501320">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1499515737647501320</a>					
16.	08-03-22	35	26	148	Announcing the possibility to talk to FVD members about the situation in Ukraine
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501182609145176065">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501182609145176065</a>					
17.	08-03-22	263	122	936	Consequences of the war, criticism on the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501275810677755905">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501275810677755905</a>					
18.	09-03-22	46	32	174	Announcing the possibility to talk to FVD members about the situation in Ukraine
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501472800950870017">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1501472800950870017</a>					
19.	10-03-22	385	104	1198	NATO's expansion towards Ukraine as a cause of the war, referring to the 2016 referendum
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/150196971665430466">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/150196971665430466</a>					
20.	11-03-22	88	45	297	Announcing that FVD will answer questions to citizens
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1502321491681189888">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1502321491681189888</a>					
21.	30-03-22	88	75	464	Referring to the 2016 referendum, emphasizing their point of view as prominent
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1509213817892450307">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1509213817892450307</a>					
22.	02-04-22	300	96	862	Consequences of the war and sanctions, insinuating that there is an agenda behind it from the government
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1510234502450270220">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1510234502450270220</a>					
23.	09-04-22	606	152	1745	Referring to the 2016 referendum and prime minister as liar for not keeping to the agreements
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1512804352343351298">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1512804352343351298</a>					
24.	11-04-22	957	278	2583	Stating that Zelensky forbid 11 political parties, indicating that the country has nothing to do with democratic values
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1513486407607767047">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1513486407607767047</a>					
25.	12-04-22	312	96	918	Responding to the acceptance of Ukraine being EU member, naming the consequences

<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1513861827339378693">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1513861827339378693</a> 26.	09-05-22	319	77	1114	Responding to the acceptance of Ukraine being EU member, naming the consequences
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1523703888724910081">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1523703888724910081</a> 27.	20-05-22	96	29	253	Attacking the Dutch press, responding to a journalist who criticized FVD's statement concerning the war
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1533792717523890176">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1533792717523890176</a> 28.	06-06-22	257	53	709	Referring to the 2016 referendum, emphasizing their predictions
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1534486418541658113">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1534486418541658113</a> 29.	08-06-22	138	33	446	Consequences of Dutch interference regarding the war
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1534498855802355712">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1534498855802355712</a> 30.	08-06-22	214	41	699	Referring to the 2016 referendum, Naming the possible EU membership and FVD's opinions
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1537074127911235584">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1537074127911235584</a> 31.	15-06-22	592	111	1805	Criticism on the Dutch political decisions and crises in the Netherlands, emphasizing that they hide behind the war
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538573401178136576">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538573401178136576</a> 32.	19-06-22	521	155	1316	The consequences if "corrupt Ukraine" enters the EU
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538852793959821317">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538852793959821317</a> 33.	20-06-22	642	168	1790	Criticism on the Dutch political decisions regarding the association agreement, not taking into account the votes of the Dutch citizens
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538881744178499584">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538881744178499584</a> 34.	20-06-22	317	114	830	Accusing Ukraine of being corrupt, indicating that it is foolish to include the country as EU member
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538957754664091651">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1538957754664091651</a> 35.	20-06-22	262	70	864	The consequences of the Dutch interferences, criticizing the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539162021421277188">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539162021421277188</a> 36.	21-06-22	612	109	1401	Criticizing the political decisions of the Dutch prime minister regarding the association agreement and the current EU membership
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539202830304694273">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539202830304694273</a> 37.	21-06-22	323	76	870	The consequences of Ukraine's possible EU membership and that FVD warned for these already
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539249080186064896">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1539249080186064896</a> 38.	21-06-22	279	29	791	Referring to a video in which Thierry Baudet warned for the chaos that would occur from the association agreement



39.	22-06-22	361	74	1147	Naming the consequences of EU membership, promoting NEXIT
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1539565933810827264">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1539565933810827264</a>					
40.	22-06-22	301	48	845	Announcing what will be discussed during the EU summit, accusing the parliament of being captivated by war propaganda
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1539623905811472390">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1539623905811472390</a>					
41.	05-07-22	36	13	97	Announcing the Ukraine symposium, indicating that both Ukrainian and Russian sides are never discussed
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544222533544808448">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544222533544808448</a>					
42.	05-07-22	35	1	81	Indicating that the prime minister did not keep to his promises when voting for Ukraine's candidate EU membership
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544398343027187712">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544398343027187712</a>					
43.	06-07-22	43	17	145	Announcing the Ukraine symposium, indicating that opinions about the war are unsubstantiated
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544716061576241152">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1544716061576241152</a>					
44.	07-07-22	280	103	1021	Indicating that the Dutch parliament is escalating the war by sending weapons to Ukraine
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545046155762905094">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545046155762905094</a>					
45.	07-07-22	201	57	592	Referring to a video in which Thierry Baudet is providing a "masterclass geopolitics" for the Dutch parliament members
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545065369588666368">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545065369588666368</a>					
46.	09-07-22	47	32	132	Announcing the Ukraine symposium and what will be discussed
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545721539055722496">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1545721539055722496</a>					
47.	10-07-22	349	101	1476	Announcing that the Ukraine symposium has begun with great attendance
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546124881158340609">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546124881158340609</a>					
48.	11-07-22	91	25	262	Referring to the opening ceremony by Thierry Baudet during the Ukraine symposium
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546463915294576641">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546463915294576641</a>					
49.	11-07-22	94	19	220	Referring to John Laughland's speech at the Ukraine symposium and criticizing the Western powers
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546525192255569923">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546525192255569923</a>					
50.	12-07-22	38	12	107	Referring to Joost Niemöller's speech at the Ukraine symposium who is talking about the different and similar geopolitical views of Russia and the US
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546783474262183936">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1546783474262183936</a>					
51.	12-07-22	42	5	114	Referring to the speakers at the Ukraine symposium
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1547225821563207680">https://www.twitter.com/fvdemocratie/status/1547225821563207680</a>					
52.	13-07-22	101	40	446	Announcing that the Ukraine symposium took place

<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1547225821563207680">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1547225821563207680</a>	15-07-22	238	51	727	Naming consequences of the sanctions, stating that this is not our war
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1547870229945978881">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1547870229945978881</a>	17-07-22	34	25	122	Referring to Joost Niemöller’s speech at the Ukraine symposium, showing that he discusses the views of Doegin and Brzeziński
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1548731645712293888">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1548731645712293888</a>	01-08-22	782	337	2862	FVD wanting the sanctions of the Netherlands and the West to stop, indicating that they are responsible for the deaths in Ukraine
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1554077776856096771">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1554077776856096771</a>	30-08-22	213	141	668	Criticizing the political decisions of the Dutch prime minister, indicating that he is to blame for the (economic) war with Russia
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1564522069693431809">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1564522069693431809</a>	31-08-22	322	95	926	Criticizing the political decisions of the Dutch prime minister, naming consequences for the Dutch citizens
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1564885521461088258">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1564885521461088258</a>	06-09-22	454	219	1398	Accusing a Dutch parliamentarian of “bullying” Putin, and how the sanctions affect the Netherlands instead of Russia
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1567043798559068161">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1567043798559068161</a>	06-09-22	202	122	791	How the sanctions affect the Netherlands instead of Russia, criticizing the Dutch prime minister
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1567209266620125184">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1567209266620125184</a>	13-09-22	663	422	2510	Naming suggestions for the Netherlands to do politically
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1569731620365631488">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1569731620365631488</a>	14-09-22	343	67	1221	Criticizing the Dutch parliament regarding sanctions and naming consequences for the Dutch citizens
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1570111184329646080">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1570111184329646080</a>	14-09-22	448	147	1152	Criticizing a Dutch parliamentarian regarding sanctions and naming the consequences for the Dutch citizens
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1570129097988112385">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1570129097988112385</a>	22-09-22	719	206	2605	Calling a Dutch parliamentarian of being hypocrite for insinuating that FVD operates on behalf of Russia
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1572842839037587457">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1572842839037587457</a>	28-09-22	31	87	127	Questioning whether it were Russia or the US who exploded the Nord Stream pipelines
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1575033714999848960">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1575033714999848960</a>	10-10-22	79	89	254	Announcing a must-read regarding the Russian views, for anyone who tries to understand the conflict
<a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1579371549823762432">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1579371549823762432</a>					

66. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1580829972604014592">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1580829972604014592</a>	14-10-22	110	59	334	The consequences for the Dutch citizens of the policy of the Dutch government, naming a solution
67. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1582692854303899649">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1582692854303899649</a>	19-10-22	254	187	887	Indicating that the Nord Stream pipelines cannot be exploded by Russia themselves, criticizing a Dutch parliamentarian
68. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1583380375027724288">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1583380375027724288</a>	21-10-22	98	88	289	Naming examples of the dependence of the state, warning for a controlling state
69. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1584811123123302400">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1584811123123302400</a>	25-10-22	353	128	850	Consequences for the Netherlands regarding the sanctions
70. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1590357927688568834">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1590357927688568834</a>	09-11-22	175	60	485	Promoting an analysis of an FVD member, indicating that other parliamentarians are left speechless
71. <a href="https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1590364883581022212">https://www.twitter.com/vdemocratie/status/1590364883581022212</a>	09-11-22	751	476	2689	Criticizing a Dutch parliamentarian, accusing him and others of being captivated by US war propaganda

## Appendix D

### *The complete codebook*

Code	Sub-code 1	Sub-code 1.1	Definition	Description	Example
<b>1. Theme</b>	1.1. Invasion		Content regarding to the invasion in general, without a specific event	Consequences of the war (e.g., inflation, polarization), opinions about the war in general, the suffering of the war. Specific events during the war are excluded	"Ik heb heel veel geleerd, heel veel over Oekraïne geleerd, heel veel over Rusland geleerd, heel veel over denkers uit die regio, de dingen die nooit doordringen in de westerse media, die je nooit in de in de krant leest, nooit op de TV ziet, waar ik ook niet heel veel van weet ik. Ik ben niet heel erg thuis in het onderwerp, dus ik heb vooral heel erg zitten luisteren en heel veel geleerd."
	1.2. Historical References		Content in which the war is compared to historical events	References with other wars or events in the past (events before the war started in November 2021), historical references such as causes of the war	"Ik denk dat het dat de vergelijking, op de grond is het natuurlijk anders, de situatie in Syrië is anders dan Oekraïne, maar de wijze waarop het westen reageert is volgens mij vergelijkbaar, namelijk vanuit wensdenken. De wens was: we gaan Assad ten val brengen. . ."
	1.3. International interferences		Content concerning interferences of other countries (other than Russia or Ukraine) regarding the war	The interferences of the Netherlands or the US, sanctions, emergency support (weapons, money), the role of "the West" (provocations by/EU or NATO membership). The role of foreign government. Events before the war (November 2021) are excluded and belong to 2.2.	"De Kamer aanschouwt de situatie in Oekraïne vol ongeloof. Maar hoe had het anders kunnen verlopen, na de agressieve uitbreidingsdrang van de NAVO? Het kartel begrijpt niks van geopolitiek en trekt ons zo opnieuw een oorlog in"
	1.4. Dutch democracy		The role of the Dutch democracy in comparison to the Ukrainian war	The 2016 referendum and the association agreement. The example does not belong to 2.3., because in	<b>"Een oorlog die bovendien volledig onnodig is en te vermijden was geweest als de Nederlandse</b>

essence, it is about (the lack of) Dutch democracy

**regering in 2016 slechts de wil van de Nederlandse bevolking had gerespecteerd, zoals die tot uitdrukking werd gebracht in het referendum op 6 april 2016.** Een referendum dat mede door de FVD is geïnitieerd.”

1.5. Nord Stream

The existence of Nord Stream, sabotage of the attack on Nord Stream 2, the consequences of the attack (gas prices), accusations within this context

“De Nord Stream-pijpleidingen zouden door Rusland zijn gesaboteerd. Maar waarom? Er is geen enkel motief voor de Russen om hun eigen gasleidingen te vernielen. Ook D66-oorlogshitser @swsjoerdsma kan er geen één bedenken. @pvanhouwelingen confronteert hem met de feiten. #FVD”

**2. Rhetoric**

2.1. Ethos

Convincing the audience by emphasizing own credibility and reliability of the speaker. The display of respect towards other experts can be used to emphasize ethos

The speaker makes use of properties such as appearances, image, reputation, character/charisma, and expertise. Showing respect and acknowledgement towards others can be used as well: \* ‘the thoughtful research’; ‘this work should be extended’

“Marie-Thérèse ter Haar, probably one of the most important. . . experts on Russia, founder of the Russia and Eastern Europe Academy. Lecturer, writer. Thank you for being here.”

2.2. Pathos

Convincing the audience of the importance of an argument through the use of emotions. The emphasis of God-terms can be used for pathos

This includes the emphasis of positive or negative emotions of the audience or the speaker, emotions adverse to the opponent, the use of metaphors, such as non-literal language. \* God-terms refer to shared human values (freedom, justice, and duty)

“Oekraïne krijgt ondertussen 9 miljard euro en volledige militaire steun, maar onze burgers moeten honger en kou lijden. En dat gebeurt om een oorlog die niet de onze is.”

2.3. Logos

Convincing the audience by argumentation and the use of clarity, logical integrity, reasoning, and rationality.

Logic, reasoning, grounded arguments, syllogisms, enthymemes (presumptions or common sense), relevancy, reliable and empirical evidence (numbers/percentages) or

“Oekraïne, een extreem corrupt land, staat op het punt om lid te worden van de EU. Gevolgen:- Directe oorlog met Rusland- Massale instroom Oekraïners- Enorme

			<p><i>Errors in this form of persuasion lead to fallacies, which undermines the persuasiveness (cf. code 3).</i></p> <p>The usage of certain signal words can help the reader to process logical arguments. This rhetorical element is focused on the argument instead of the person</p>	<p>the appearance of. Signal words are words such as thus, furthermore, yet, for example, and finally.</p> <p>* It is about the arguments leading logically towards the conclusions</p>	<p>kosten@ForumForDemos is een petitie gestart om dit absurde plan te blokkeren. Teken ook!"</p>
3. Fallacies	3.1. Freedom Rule: Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints	3.1.1. Fallacy of declaring standpoints sacrosanct	<p>1) Placing limits on standpoints or doubts; impose restrictions on the standpoints that may be advanced or called into question</p>	<p>* The opponent is prohibited from casting doubt on the argument; rendered immune to criticism.</p> <p>'Princess Diana? Nothing but good about her!' (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)</p> <p>* Common sense is excluded (cf. 4.2.2.)</p>	<p>"Brzeziński's boek the Grand Chessboard is een wonder van helderheid."</p> <p>"En daarna komen we dan heleboel praktische problemen met die noodhulp, want dat kan helemaal niet zoals we dat nu willen gaan doen, maar daar ga ik zo meteen nader op in, <b>maar het is überhaupt eigenlijk zinloos om daar nu mee bezig te zijn, zolang dat conflict doorgaat en er geen visie is op een eindpunt.</b>"</p>
		3.1.2. Fallacy of declaring standpoints taboo	1)	<p>* Standpoints are excluded or banned from discussion</p> <p>'Homosexuals in the army? I definitely do not want to talk about that (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)</p>	
		3.1.3. <i>argumentum ad baculum:</i> Fallacy of the stick	2) Restricting the other party's freedom of action; deny the other party the right to advance or to criticize a certain standpoint	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure</p> <p>* Threatening opponents with sanctions</p> <p>'You'll have to face the consequences for our personal relationship'</p>	<p>"Inmiddels staan we op de drempel van een atoom oorlog <b>en deze atoom oorlog komt er indien het Westen nu de veiligheid van Rusland nog verder bedreigt. Het is nagenoeg zeker dat Rusland de verantwoordelijke voor haar ondergang mee zal nemen in haar val.</b>"</p>

<p>3.1.4. 2)  <i>Argumentum ad misericordiam</i>  : Fallacy of appeal to pity</p>	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure  * An unjustified appeal to the audience's compassion to further one's own interests  'How could you let me fail my thesis? I have genuinely worked on it day and night!' (Van Eemeren et al., 2000)</p>	<p>“Oekraïne krijgt ondertussen 9 miljard euro en volledige militaire steun, <b>maar onze burgers moeten honger en kou lijden. En dat gebeurt om een oorlog die niet de onze is.</b>”</p>
<p>3.1.5. 2)  <i>Argumentum ad hominem</i>:  Fallacy of attacking the other party's person</p>	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure  * Discrediting their integrity, impartiality, expertise, or credibility</p>	<p>“Er is geen enkel motief voor de Russen oom hun eigen gasleidingen te vernielen. Ook D66-<b>oorlogshitser</b> @swsjoerdsma kan er geen één bedenken. @pvanhouwelingen confronteert hem met de feiten.”</p>
<p>3.1.6. Fallacy of depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, etcetera (=direct personal attack/“abusive” variant) 2)</p>	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure  'Don't listen to this moron, crook, liar, etc. (abusive)  An explicit attack, swearing</p>	<p>“De Kamer aanschouwt de situatie in Oekraïne vol ongeloof. Maar hoe had het anders kunnen verlopen, na de agressieve uitbreidingsdrang van de NAVO? <b>Het kartel begrijpt niks van geopolitiek en trekt ons zo opnieuw een oorlog in.</b>”</p>
<p>3.1.7. Fallacy of casting suspicion on the other party's motives (= indirect personal attack/“circumstantial” variant) 2)</p>	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure  'He just says so because he wants to be elected' (circumstantial)  * The speaker is accused of being an advocate (or opponent) solely to advance their own stakes  * The argument is considered invalid because there is a motive other than promoting dialogue</p>	<p>“Het leven wordt snel slechter. De middenklasse kan amper nog rondkomen door de inflatie. De torenhoge belastingen van Rutte, de ECB die ongebreideld geld bijdrukt (ook een vorm van belasting) en de zelfdestructieve sancties tegen Rusland; <b>wat is de agenda van deze mensen?</b>”</p>

<p>3.2. <b>Obligation to defend Rule:</b> Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.</p>	<p>3.1.8. <i>Tu quoque</i> variant: Fallacy of pointing out a contradiction in the other party's words and/or deeds</p>	<p>2)</p> <p>1) Shifting the burden of proof to the other party; trying to get the challenger to start proving why the standpoint that he has called into question is wrong (instead of defending it themselves)</p>	<p>* Putting the other party under pressure, hypocrisy 'Look who says so!' * Justifying own actions by pointing at the behavior of others instead of addressing the actual problem 'They did it as well, so it is permitted' * In a non-mixed difference of opinion, instead of defending his or her own standpoint, the protagonist forces the antagonist to show that the protagonist's standpoint is wrong, * In a mixed difference of opinion, the one party does not attempt to defend his or her standpoint but forces the other party to defend their standpoint 'If you don't believe me, just prove I'm wrong' * Presenting the standpoint as self-evident 'The facts speak for themselves...' * Giving a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint 'I can assure you that...' * Immunizing the standpoint against criticism; formulating a standpoint in a non-falsifiable way by leaving out quantifiers (such as numerals or some/many/each) and adding essential qualifications 'It is part of human nature that.. .' * Pretending as if the point does not need any defense (Van Eemeren &amp; Grootendorst, 1992): - There is no question that... - Needless to say, there is no doubt that...</p>	<p><b>“Kaag zegt dat “insinuaties” gevaarlijk zijn terwijl ze insinueert dat wij namens Rusland opereren. De hypocrisie is werkelijk ongekend.”</b></p> <p>“Het kartel suggereert dat #FVD gefinancierd wordt door Rusland. <b>Onzin natuurlijk. Maar laat dat onderzoek naar buitenlandse geldstromen maar komen, geen enkel probleem.</b> En kijk dan ook vooral naar Amerikaans, Chinees of Israëliisch geld bij andere partijen! #oekrainedeбат”</p> <p>“Oekraïne heeft namelijk enorm tekort op de begroting en Nederland gaat maar liefst 200 miljoen euro geven, want dat is wat het wordt, een gift, ook al is het officieel een lening. <b>Maar Oekraïne kan dat natuurlijk nooit terugbetalen aan Oekraïne om die begroting te steunen.</b>”</p> <p>“De NAVO probeert Rusland te omringen en in het nauw te drijven. <b>Geen wonder dat Poetin terugslaat;</b> geopolitieke experts waarschuwen hier al decennia voor. We moeten de Russische beer niet porren maar de vrede bewaren.”</p>
	<p>3.2.2. Fallacy of evading the burden of proof</p>	<p>2) Evading the burden of proof</p>		



<p>3.3. <b>Standpoint</b> <b>Rule:</b> An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really been advanced by the protagonist.</p>	<p>3.3.1. Fallacy of the straw man</p>	<p>1) Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party</p>	<p>- Every right-thinking person will agree that... - It is undeniable that... * a statement without argumentation is also included here * Presenting one's own standpoint wrongly as the opposite standpoint/ emphatically advancing a standpoint implying that the opponent takes the opposite view 'I don't know about my opponent but I personally regard it as extremely important that...' * Referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs 'That may be what he says now, but as a communist he naturally does not mean a word of it' * Creating a fictitious opponent 'Although almost everybody believes that...'</p>	<p><b>“Oud-baas van de MIVD fantaseert aan tafel bij de NPO over het ophangen (executeren) van een oppositiepoliticus.</b> Gert-Jan Segers, leider van de CU (een regeringspartij) kijkt knikkend toe. Dat dit mogelijk is op de publieke omroep is levensgevaarlijk.”</p>
<p>3.4. <b>Relevance</b> <b>Rule:</b> A standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.</p>	<p>3.4.1. <i>Ignoratio elenchi:</i> Fallacy of irrelevant argumentation</p>	<p>1) The argumentation has no <b>relation</b> to the standpoint under discussion</p>	<p>2) misrepresenting/ distorting the other party's standpoint</p> <p>* Taking utterances out of context * Oversimplifying or exaggerating (by omission of his nuances or qualifications by absolutizations or generalizations of his statements)</p> <p>A: Does he allow me to do that? B: He should allow you to do that because this and that...</p>	<p>“Het kartel suggereert dat #FVD gefinancierd wordt door Rusland. Onzin natuurlijk. Maar laat dat onderzoek naar buitenlandse geldstromen maar komen, geen enkel probleem. <b>En kijk dan ook vooral naar Amerikaans, Chinees of Israëlich geld bij andere partijen!</b>”</p>
	<p>3.4.2. Pathetical fallacy/<i>argumentum ad populum:</i></p>	<p>2) The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation (The standpoint is</p>	<p>* Non-argumentation * Pathos: playing on the emotions or prejudices of the audience</p>	<p>“Heel het kartel is het erover eens: Rusland is de agressor. Wat een hypocrisie. Als je doel is om ons continent te</p>

	Fallacy of playing on the sentiments of the audience	defended by rhetorical uses instead of argumentation)	'You do want your children to be safe in your own neighborhood, don't you?'	verdelen, zijn we nu op de goede weg. <b>Maar als je wil opkomen voor de Nederlandse belangen en de stabiliteit in de wereld, doen we het helemaal verkeerd.</b> #FVD”
	3.4.3. Ethical or ethotic fallacy/ <i>argumentum ad verecundiam</i> : Fallacy of parading one's own qualities	2)	* Non-argumentation. * Ethos: parading one's own qualities 'As an expert in the field I can say with some emphasis that...'	“Een oorlog die bovendien volledig onnodig is en te vermijden was geweest als de Nederlandse regering in 2016 slechts de wil van de Nederlandse bevolking had gerespecteerd, zoals die tot uitdrukking werd gebracht in het referendum op 6 april 2016. <b>Een referendum dat mede door de FVD is geïnitieerd.</b> ”
3.5. <b>Unexpressed Premise Rule:</b> A person can be held to the premises he leaves implicit.	3.5.1. Fallacy of distorting an unexpressed premise	1) Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted	* Blowing up an unexpressed premise is a special case of the straw man fallacy A: 'John is at home, because his car is in the drive' B: 'So you think people never go out without taking their cars'	
	3.5.2. Fallacy of denying an unexpressed premise	2) Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by one's defense	* Denying a correctly reconstructed unexpressed premise is a special case of evading the burden of proof A: 'John is at home, because his car's in the drive' B: 'So you think John does not go out without taking the car' A: 'Not at all. What makes you think so?'	
3.6. <b>Starting Point Rule:</b> A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense takes place by means of arguments	3.6.1. Fallacy of falsely denying an accepted starting point	1) Meddling with the starting points by falsely denying that something is an accepted starting point; a proposition is called into question even if it is clear that it belongs to the	* Casting doubt on a starting point 'What's wrong with adultery anyway?' Casting doubt or deny something everybody agrees about * Depriving the other party of the possibility of defending a standpoint	

belonging to the common starting point (assumptions)

common starting point.

3.6.2. Fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions. An attempt to avoid the burden of proof by presenting something as an accepted premise

2) Meddling with the starting points by falsely presenting something as an accepted starting point; a proposition is being presented as a common starting point when in fact it is not

\* Hiding away a proposition in an unexpressed premise  
'This applicant is unsuitable because she is married'  
Wrong conclusion.  
Difference 4.1.1. & 4.2.2.:  
4.6.2. do not necessarily exclude arguments from discussion.  
4.2.2. does not contain any substantiation (as it is self-evident), whereas 4.1.1. and 4.6.2. could.  
False dilemma is included: someone states that there are a limited number of alternatives, when in reality several may exist (Brisson et al., 2018)

Nederland gaat maar liefst 200 miljoen euro **geven, want dat is wat het wordt, een gift, ook al is het officieel een lening**”

“Wat is de rol van de Amerikanen, wat is de visie van de Russen eigenlijk? **Dat horen wij niet in Nederland**, maar die wil ik gewoon eens horen.”

3.6.3. Fallacy of many questions: Fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions

2)

\* Wrapping up a proposition in a presupposition  
'Where did you hide the murder weapon?'  
\* Enveloping a proposition slyly in a presupposition of a question  
\* The techniques used for this purpose include falsely presenting a premise as self-evident, enveloping a proposition slyly in a presupposition of a question

“Oekraïne is door en door corrupt. Als het gaat om bestuurlijke integriteit dan is Oekraïne van hetzelfde niveau als Afrika. Zo lag legt #Rutte de lat. **Behoort corruptie ook tot de ‘Europese waarden’ die de EU meent te beschermen?**”

“Poetin, Oekraïne, Groningen, energie. **Klopt het wat de media over #FVD schrijven?**FVD trekt heel het land door! Kom langs en stel zelf je vragen aan @thierrybaudet.”

3.6.4. Fallacy of using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint

2)

\* Concealing a premise in an **unexpressed** premise

	3.6.5. Fallacy of circular reasoning/ <i>petitio principii</i> /begging the question	2)	* Advancing an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint 'I am right, because what I say is true'	
3.7. <b>Validity Rule:</b> The arguments used in a discursive text must be valid or capable of being validated by the explicitization of one or more unexpressed premises	3.7.1. Fallacy of denying the antecedent	1) Reasoning in which a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition	* 'If the traffic in the area is really bad, the road should be widened' 'There aren't any problems with the traffic in the area, so there is no need for the road to be widened'	
	3.7.2. Fallacy of affirming the consequent	1)	'They are widening the road, so the traffic there must be really terrible'	“Maar het is één van de sterkste legers op aarde, Rusland, en dat wordt lang niet, met al die kracht, dus de bedoeling van Rusland lijkt te zijn geweest om snel naar de onderhandelingstafel te gaan.”
	3.7.3. Fallacy of division	2) Reasoning in which the properties of parts and wholes are confused	* A property of a <b>whole</b> is incorrectly ascribed to one or more <b>parts</b> 'This is a light boat, so the anchor of this boat is light' (fallacy of division)	
	3.7.4. Fallacy of composition	2)	* A property of one or more <b>parts</b> of a whole is incorrectly ascribed to the <b>whole</b> 'This boat is made of excellent materials, so it is an excellent boat'	
3.8. <b>Argument Scheme Rule:</b> A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in	3.8.1. <i>Argumentum ad populum</i> : Populist variant (symptomatic argumentation )	1) <b>Using</b> an inappropriate argument scheme	*Referring to some kind of authority * A scientist argues her standpoint to be right because everybody thinks it is right 'Everybody says so, so it must be true' A is held to be true or presented as true because everyone (or the vast majority) thinks that A is	“Maar, er is dus sprake geweest van heel duidelijke waarschuwing vanuit onze kant van Frits Bolkestein. Heel veel mensen, John Mearsheimer, bekende politicoloog, uit de Verenigd Staten. <b>Al die mensen zeggen doe dit niet is ontzettend</b>

which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied

true. This is irrelevant to whether the view is also true or not (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)

**onverstandig. En als je het toch doet.”**

3.8.2. *Argumentum ad consequentiam* :  
Fallacy of confusing facts with value judgments (causal relation)

1) Does the thing that is proposed as a cause/plan/policy indeed lead to the stated effect? (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)

\* Testing the truth or acceptability of a standpoint by pointing out desirable or undesirable consequences  
\* Plan X is (not) good, because plan X leads to Y and Y is (un)beneficial  
\* X must be true, because if X were not true, Y would be true and Y is not true

'The bell-curve research cannot be right, because if you stand behind those results you encourage discrimination against blacks in the US'

'The theory of evolution is not true, because that would mean that we are descended from the apes and of course that would be terrible' (Van Eemeren et al., 2003b)

'It is not true, because it may not be true' (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)

3.8.3. Variant of *Argumentum ad verecundiam*:  
Fallacy of authority (symptomatic argumentation )

2) Incorrectly **applying** an argument scheme

\*Referring to some kind of authority. This does not need to be a person, it can also be a written source such as the Bible or a particular tradition (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a). If a practical decision is defended by an appeal to expert authority and the standpoint is said to be right because an irrelevant or quasi-authority says so.

“Well, and let me remind you of what the **Pope Francis** said recently. He was 'asserted', is saying that maybe what is happening now may have been averted. And probably the cause is NATO barking at the gates of the Russian Federation.”

3.8.4. *Secundum quid*:  
Fallacy of hasty generalization

2)

\* Justifying a general conclusion on the basis of an insufficient number of (nonrepresentative) observations.

“Dinsdag 17 mei j.l. schreef @tomjanmeeus een artikel waarin hij het standpunt van #FVD over de oorlog in Oekraïne hekelt. @thierrybaudet

	(symptomatic argumentation )		"The American medical system doesn't care what happens to the patient. I know of a man who was turned away by a hospital and then died' A generalization drawn carelessly or too quickly without adequate inductive support (Woods, 2004). * Defending an opinion by comparing the matter in question with another, <b>essentially different</b> matter 'You can't have a compact disc, your father and I didn't have one when we are were young'	reageert er uitgebreid op. Om weer eens duidelijk te maken hoe bedroevend laag het niveau van de Nederlandse pers is."
	3.8.5. Fallacy of false analogy (comparison argumentation )	2)		"Wie herinnert zich niet van Baalen en Verhofstad die staan te schreeuwen op het Maidanplein in Oekraïne, ze oproepen in verzet te komen. En beloven dat elke week een Europese delegatie zal afreizen naar Kiev, tot de overwinning is behaald. Totaal onverantwoord. Totaal geschift. <b>Stelt u zich eens voor dat Poetin zou afreizen naar Parijs om daar de gele hesjes aan te moedigen. Of in Barcelona demonstranten zou oproepen in verzet te komen tegen Madrid.</b> " "#FVD wil dat Nederland en de rest van het Westen stoppen met het leveren van wapens aan Oekraïne. @thierrybaudet vs @ahammelburg (D66): "Het Westen prolongeert de oorlog onnodig en is daarmee de hoofdverantwoordelijke voor al dat leed en sterven in Oekraïne.""
	3.8.6. Fallacy of the Slippery Slope (causal argumentation )	2)	Does the thing that is proposed as a cause/plan/policy indeed lead to the stated effect? (Van Eemeren et al., 2003a)	* Rejecting a course of action because it is supposed to lead us from bad to worse, whereas it is not necessary for the alleged consequences to occur at all "Tolerating euthanasia leads to genocide. That's why I'm opposed to it' 'The cabinet's attitude is outrageous. By acting this way, a logical next step would be to lock writers up in the madhouse: which is also an effective means of getting them in line' (NRC Handelsblad, 1985, cited in van Eemeren et al., 2003)
3.9. <b>Concluding Rule:</b> A failed	3.9.1. Fallacy of refusing to retract a	1)	Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist	'I will not retract my standpoint. You can't even have any objections'

defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint and a successful defence must result in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about the standpoint

standpoint that has not been successfully defended

3.9.2. Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully

1)

\* 'You can't have any objections anymore, so what I said is true' (absolutizing the success of a defence)

3.9.3. Fallacy of refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended

2) Meddling with the conclusion by the antagonist

A: 'I'm giving up sex because it's bad for my health' B: 'That's never been proved, so it's very good for you' (false dilemma)

3.9.4. *Argumentum ad ignorantiam*: Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended

2)

\* A: 'I'm giving up smoking, because it gives you cancer' B: 'Nobody has proved that conclusively, so you can carry on smoking without any fear for getting cancer' (absolutizing the failure of a defence)

3.10. **Language Use Rule:** Formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambiguous and

3.10.1. Fallacy of unclearness

1) Gaining advantage over opponent by misusing unclearness

\* Implicitness, indefiniteness, unfamiliarity, vagueness  
\* Structural unclearness (textual level): obscure structure of paragraphs, "illogical" order of presentation, lack of coherence, etc.

must be interpreted as accurately as possible

3.10.2. Fallacy of ambiguity 2) Gaining advantage over opponent by misusing ambiguity

\* Implicit illocutionary force of a speech act (sentence level).  
A: 'Charles is a kleptomaniac'  
B: 'Is this just a statement, or a warning?'  
\* Indefinite reference of a speech act (sentence level)  
'Who do you mean by Charles, your neighbour or your brother-in-law?'  
\* Unfamiliar predication of speech act (sentence level)  
B: 'What's a kleptomaniac?'  
\* Vague predication of a speech act (sentence level)  
B: 'Does he steal every day, then?'  
\* Semantic ambiguity A: 'There was a leaf on the floor'  
B: 'What do you mean, a leaf from a plant or from a book?'  
\* Syntactic ambiguity  
A: 'I'm not going with you because of the rain'  
B: 'What do you mean, (a) are you not going and is the reason for it 'that it's raining, or (b) are you going and is the reason for it not that it's raining, but some other reason?'



## Appendix E

### Quote translations

([T-ID: 1](#), @fvdemocratie): *“De NAVO zoekt letterlijk en figuurlijk de grens op met Rusland. In de steeds verdere uitbreiding naar het oosten is ook Oekraïne een beoogd lid van het militaire bondgenootschap - vandaar de spanningen met Rusland. Niet in ons belang.”*

([T-ID: 18](#) @fvdemocratie): *“Migratie, woningnood, energie en de aanpak in Oekraïne - hoe kan de gemeente hier invloed op uitoefenen? Donderdagavond in Amsterdam gaan @thierrybaudet en onze lokale volksvertegenwoordigers met u in gesprek over deze thema's. Reserveer uw tickets!”*

([YT-ID: 7](#), Thierry Baudet): *“Ja dus, alles wat moralistisch taalgebruik is hoort niet thuis in de internationale politiek, dus ik kan die vraag niet beantwoorden. Ik kan wel zeggen dat ik het ten diepste betreur dat ik het zeer, zeer tragisch vind en vreselijk.”*

([YT-ID: 7](#), Thierry Baudet): *“Alleen dat, precies dat internationaal recht is de afgelopen 30 jaar door de NAVO-landen volstrekt ondermijnd en de NAVO zelf heeft een . . . agressieve regime-change agenda omarmd. Bijvoorbeeld in Kosovo, bijvoorbeeld in Libië, bijvoorbeeld in Afghanistan. Dus het hele principe van soevereiniteit wordt juist door de NAVO-landen al helemaal niet meer gerespecteerd.”*

([T-ID: 3](#), @fvdemocratie): *“Heel het kartel is het erover eens: Rusland is de agressor. Wat een hypocrisie. Als je doel is om ons continent te verdelen, zijn we nu op de goede weg. Maar als je wil opkomen voor de Nederlandse belangen en de stabiliteit in de wereld, doen we het helemaal verkeerd.”*

([YT-ID: 11](#), Freek Jansen): *“Maar één van de directe gevolgen voor Nederland kan de nog verdere stijging van de gasprijzen zijn. We hebben nu vandaag gehoord dat Nord Stream 2 ogenschijnlijk definitief van de baan blijkt te zijn, in elk geval voorlopig. Dat gaat hele grote gevolgen hebben. De gasprijs is alweer heel erg gestegen.”*

([YT-ID: 13](#), Thierry Baudet): *“Toen kwam er dus een puppet-regime van de Amerikaanse buitenlandse Ministerie. Daar zijn ook allemaal telefoongesprekken van Jeffrey Pyatt, met Victoria Nuland waar ze zeggen “wat gaan we doen met Yatseniuk . . . Klytsjko, die wordt burgemeester van Kiev, zus en zo.”*

([YT-ID: 14](#), Thierry Baudet): *“[I]k ben al heel lang één van de zeer weinigen die elke keer zegt wat er gaat gebeuren, die waarschuwt voor wat er gaat gebeuren, die voor gek wordt verklaard . . . Het spijt me heel erg, Corona heb ik gelijk gekregen, de euro heb ik gelijk gekregen, op al die onderwerpen en het associatieverdacht met Oekraïne, 2016, dat we dat Referendum...”*

([T-ID: 15](#), @fvdemocratie): *“Tegen het Nederlands belang in stuurt hij wapens, stelt hij sancties in (die Nederland raken), en zoekt hij ruzie met de grootste kernmacht ter wereld. Deze premier is anti-Nederlands.”*

([T-ID: 44](#), @fvdemocratie): *“Het kabinet blijft wapens sturen, olie op het vuur gooien, de ellende voor Oekraïners verlengen.”*

([T-ID: 3](#), @fvdemocratie): *“Als je doel is om ons continent te verdelen, zijn we nu op de goede weg. Maar als je wil opkomen voor de Nederlandse belangen en de stabiliteit in de wereld, doen we het helemaal verkeerd.”*

([YT-ID: 12](#), Thierry Baudet): *“. . . een land dat gezien heeft dat Oekraïne één van de strongholds was van de Amerikaanse deepstate, één van de centra was van waaruit die Sustainable Development Goals en de Great Reset gerealiseerd wordt en daar een aanval op heeft ondernomen.”*

([YT-ID: 9](#), Thierry Baudet): *“[W]aardoor dus de bewustzijnsvernaauwing die we de afgelopen twee jaar hebben gezien, zich voortzet en . . . wat we natuurlijk hebben gezien dat op het moment dat mensen in die angst zitten en in die bewustzijnsvernaauwing dat ze de meest absurde vrijheidsinperkingen accepteren.”*