

Five Shades of Brown: Social Identities of Nativist Populist Party Voters in Europe – a Latent Class Analysis

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Abstract

Previous research has consistently demonstrated that anti-immigrant sentiments are the most important predictor of Nativist Populist Party (NPP) voting. However, aiming to establish communalities between NPP voters, these studies overlooked important differences between subpopulations of voters. Additionally, the relationship between NPPs and their voters on the one hand and elites and immigrants on the other hand has been artificially reduced to a binary group division. This study employs a social-identity approach to NPP voting to demonstrate how social identities of NPP voters are heterogenous within and across countries. It argues that voters' readiness to adopting social identities proposed by NPP leaders depending on their perceived social reality, values, and past experience is key to understanding the origin of NPP voter subgroups. The study thus adds significantly to the understanding of voters' support for NPPs by emphasizing the importance of nonbinary group-relations and voters' agency in their interaction with NPP leaders.

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, Europe has seen an upswing in support for nativist populist parties (NPPs) starting in France with the Front National (Rydgren, 2004). This upswing was accompanied by a constantly growing interest in the political and social-science literature to explain the electoral success of these parties (Mudde, 2007). This interest continues, as NPPs have become stable and relevant electoral factors in many European democracies like France, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland (Hardleb, 2011). While Mudde held in 2007 that there would not be “a Europe-wide populist radical right wave of electoral success” (Mudde, 2007,

p. 207), in 2012 he conceded that NPPs do constitute the most successful party family in post-war Europe (Mudde, 2012). The scientific debate about the factors explaining this success continues into the present.

Scholars have often focused on the question what unites NPP voters (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). Their studies have consistently shown that a common feature of all successful NPPs in Western Europe is their mobilization of anti-immigrant feelings. At the same time, all these studies pointed towards the importance of other factors like economic grievances or political trust, at least to some degree or in some countries.

To explain the importance of predictors for NPP voting and the success of NPPs in Europe scholars have already pointed to the relevance of identity constructs more than a decade ago (Oesch, 2008). But only recently have scholars applied insights from social-identity literature to NPP voting (Bos et al., 2020; Mols & Jetten, 2016; Shayegh et al., 2022). These applications of social-identity approaches have greatly contributed to the understanding of identity dynamics leading to NPP voting. However, the traditional focus on bipolar group-dynamics in social-identity theory and its associated limitations constrains insights in underlying identity mechanism (Dixon et al, 2020). Previous studies have treated NPP voters as a homogenous group (Mols & Jetten, 2016; Shayegh et al., 2022). However, variances within the electorates' attitudes point to the possibility that social identities of NPP voters differ both between and within countries (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Rooduijn, 2018). This possibility has so far been neglected in the literature on NPPs.

To address this gap this study answers the following question: How do social identities of NPP voters differ *across*, as well as *within* countries?

This paper addresses these questions and adds to the existing literature by demonstrating various social identities of NPP voters in Europe. The study draws on the social-identity approach to leadership to explain results of past research and argues for the existence of

multiple, albeit overlapping, identity constructs held by different NPP voters both between and within countries (Haslam et al., 2020). Building on this discussion, the study proposes a taxonomy of NPP voters' social identities. It uses Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to analyse data from European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018) to explore patterns of social identities of NPP voters. Finally, the implications of the results for understanding NPP voting from a social identity perspective are discussed.

1.1 Nativist Populist Parties and Voting Predictors

Populism, and particularly radical right-wing populism, have been defined in various ways (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2007). In line with the growing consensus in the literature this paper uses the ideational definition of populism (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser 2019). Accordingly, populism is conceived as a thin-centred ideology, centred around an antagonist relationship between 'the people' as a homogenous mass and 'the elites' but is lacking substantive content. Populism advocates radical forms of public sovereignty at any cost. Radical right-wing populism in particular supplements the thin-centred ideology with nativism (Mudde, 2007). Nativism refers to ethno-pluralist nationalism. This is a special exclusionary form of nationalism characterised by a linkage of the ethnic heritage and culture to nationhood (Lenard & Miller, 2017). This paper uses the term nativist populism (NP), as the label contains the multiple dimensions of cleavage (Shayegh et al. 2022).

Scholars have consistently shown that the electorate of all successful NPPs in Europe hold anti-immigrant sentiments (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). Although the electorate of different NPPs varies in virtually all other characteristics, some other variables are important, too. Political distrust was an important predictor for NPP voting in seven out of ten countries tested by Rooduijn (2018). Likewise, Oesch's (2008) findings give support to the observation that political distrust remains important in most countries. Additionally, Oesch (2008) found

economic predictors to be important in all five countries tested, albeit to varying degrees. On the other hand, Rooduijn (2018) found economic determinants only to be relevant for the support of four out of ten parties. Strangely, two different predictors were important for two parties each and each predictor even had effects in opposite directions. The different findings of the two scholars might be explained by the difference among groups they examined. While Rooduijn considered all voters, Oesch considered only workers. Corroborating evidence comes from Ivarsflaten (2005) who found a division on economic issues between NPP voters from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Taken together, these findings hint at the varying importance of explanatory factors for specific groups in the voter population.

1.2 Social Identity and Leadership

The cleavages contained within nativist populism are understood from a social identity perspective in this study. Social identity is an individual's sense of their self understood as part of a social group (Haslam et al., 2020). According to social-identity theory, individuals distinguish between ingroup and outgroup through processes of (self-)categorization (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). When emotional value is attached to a group category, it becomes an individual's social identity. Individuals aim to maintain a positive social identity which is distinct from outgroups. Through the categorization process, differences between groups on the dimensions relevant to the distinction are accentuated, while differences within the group are attenuated. The effect of categorization is enhanced for those categories that are important to the individual's self-image and form part of their social identity. Consequently, those belonging to the ingroup are viewed in a positive light while those belonging to the outgroup are viewed in a negative light.

The social-identity approach to leadership builds on the insights of social identity theory (Haslam et al., 2020). According to this approach, leaders and their followers collectively

construct social realities. Leaders can act as identity entrepreneurs by defining boundaries of group categories, defining the content of the group categories, and portraying themselves as prototypical for the ingroup. Group boundaries are drawn through the definition of ingroup and outgroup. The content of a group category are its historical lineage, cherished values, and behavioural norms. Group content determines what it means to be a member of the ingroup or the outgroup. Leaders are prototypical for the ingroup to the extent that they minimize the difference between themselves and other ingroup members and maximize the difference to outgroup members. Simultaneously, followers are not passive recipients of proposed group categories but share agency in its creation. The readiness of followers to adopt a social category depends on their perceived social reality, values, and past experience. Thus, leaders construct social identities while followers can actively adopt them. In turn, who identifies themselves with the category determines who can be mobilized to advance the position of the social category in society (Reicher et al, 2005). For example, politicians might construct a social category while voters who adopt this social category can be mobilized to advance its position in society by voting.

1.3 Social Identities of Nativist Populist Party Voters

Leaders of NPPs try to mobilize voters by communicating the nativist and populist cleavages through social-identity frames (Bos et al, 2020; Rydgren, 2004). Social-identity frames contain social categories that are proposed as social identities to their recipients. NPP leaders present the society as split between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ and between the ethnic national population and foreigners. The people are depicted in a positive light as the hard working ordinary people, while elites are depicted as corrupt and self-serving (Mols & Jetten, 2016). The ethnic national population is depicted as a homogenous group whose good culture, norms, and values and economic security are threatened by foreigners (Rydgren, 2004). The outgroups

are rhetorically combined into an alleged alliance between elites with minority groups that forms a single outgroup to the people (Mols & Jetten, 2016). This split constructs a positive self-identity for those who choose to identify with the ingroup of the people (Bos et al, 2020).

1.3.1 Social Identity and Nativist-Populist Supply

The identity frames communicating an alleged alliance between elites and minority groups usually refer to the political elites but can also refer to economic elites (Mols & Jetten, 2016). In the case of political elites, the argument employed by right-wing populist actors is that corrupt political elites want to let immigrants into the country to undermine the country's culture. In return elites would hand out extensive benefits to them to ensure their own re-election. In the case of economic elites, the argument is that these profit from the arrival of foreigners, as they help to keep wages low (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). In both cases, an alleged alliance between the powerful elites and the weaker group of immigrants is portrayed as a single outgroup to the native people. This forms the connection to the anti-immigrant communication part of the NP social-identity frame (Bos et al., 2020). Anti-immigrant communication aims to blame migrants for a (materially) undesirable situation experienced by the ingroup of the people. The various anti-elite and anti-foreigner frames used can be combined in a single social identity frame (Rydgren, 2004).

The constructed group boundaries and group content vary between countries. All NPPs use foreigners outside and 'the corrupt elites' inside their country to define the outgroup. However, in different local contexts, populist leaders use different outgroups within their country to define the ingroup of people belonging to the nation (Mudde, 2007). For examples, in Italy, the Lega Nord excludes people from the South of Italy, while in many Eastern-European countries, like Czechia, Romanies are excluded from the ingroup. Additionally, socioeconomic contexts condition the effectiveness of these group categorizations. Padilla et

al. (2007) have shown from a social-identity standpoint that socioeconomic and political contexts matter for the interaction of leaders and followers. And Bos et al. (2020) demonstrated that economic conditions of individuals influence the credibility of boundaries between social groups proposed by nativist-populist rhetoric. Thus, the distinct outgroups and their associated values used for reference in the social-identity frames employed by populist leaders and a country's local socioeconomic contexts influence the ingroups boundaries and content.

Taken together these findings explain from a supply side perspective the varying importance of political, economic, and cultural variables observed in previous research. When comparing countries, Ivarsflaten (2008) found that all successful NPPs in Europe mobilized voters with cultural grievances due to a perceived threat from immigrants, while only some mobilized voters with economic grievances or grievances about the way the political system works. These results are in line with those of Oesch (2008), who found that the most important determinant for workers' support for NPPs is protectionism to shield off national identity and culture, while in some countries discontent with the national democracy was as important and economic factors also retained some weight. The different outgroups used by NPPs in different local contexts to construct the ingroup and the varying credibility of such frames in different contexts explain these results. While all NPPs use immigrants and other minorities, particularly refugees, to determine their outgroup, economic elites might not be used by all NPP leaders to define their group boundaries. As the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup constructed by populist leaders differ between parties in different countries, naturally their ingroup identities differ as well. Consequently, the extent to which the proposed ingroup identities predominantly resemble nativist identities likely varies per country. Thus, from a supply-side perspective, the observed differences *between countries* are explained by different outgroups effectively used by populist leaders to define their ingroup boundaries.

1.3.2 Social Identity and Demand for Nativist Populism

The agency of individual followers has been largely ignored in previous research on NPPs (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). Even studies within a social-identity framework do not make this idea explicit (Bos et al., 2020; Hameleers et al., 2018; Mols & Jetten, 2016). However, voters' readiness to adopt a proposed social identity is crucial to understanding their support for NPPs (Reicher et al., 2005).

Individuals' socioeconomic contexts and past social categories important to their self-image are likely to differ and influence their readiness to identify with proposed social categories (Haslam et al., 2020). This explains the different impact of the two parts of populist communication on people with distinct value systems observed by various scholars. Bos et al. (2020) found that anti-elitist frames have positive effects on issue agreement among individuals with high perceived relative deprivation, while anti-immigrant frames have negative effects on issue agreement, especially amongst those with low perceived relative deprivation. They suggest that the negative effect might depend on individual's tolerance, as the negative effect was not present for individuals who place themselves far on the political right. Furthermore, experimental evidence from Hameleers et al. (2018) demonstrates a positive effect of national attachment on issue agreement, when issues were communicated through a blame-shifting frame. This frame attributed the fault for the deterioration of the labour market to either the Dutch government or the EU. Additionally, National attachment tends to be higher amongst those with exclusionary national identities (Lenard & Miller, 2017). Taken together, these findings demonstrate how self-perception in relation to the socioeconomic context and past categories important to individuals' self-conception play a key role when trying to understand voters' support for NPPs.

The readiness of individual NPP voters to adopt various components of identity constructs proposed by NPP leaders likely differs within countries. This explains the variance

in the importance of explanatory factors for specific groups in the NPP-voter population discussed in section 1.1. Yet, previous studies of NPPs from a social-identity leadership perspective have treated NPP voters as a homogenous group (Mols & Jetten, 2016, Shayegh et al, 2022). This is not surprising, as the social identity paradigm has largely operated within terms of binary group-divisions (Dixon et al, 2020). However, this emphasis on group binaries obfuscated important complexities of group dynamics explaining NPP voting. Researchers accepted the portrayal of an alliance of elites and immigrants as a single outgroup opposed to the native people as a single ingroup for analytical purposes (Mols & Jetten, 2016). However, this simplistic conceptualization reduces to a binary group-division what is in reality a multi-group situation (Dixon et al, 2020). This reduction prevented scholars from adequately accounting for the variance of explanatory factors for specific groups in the NPP-voter population. The variance can be explained as depending on their perceived social reality, values, and past experience voters might partially adopt components of the complex identity construct (Haslam et al., 2020; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). For example, some voters might adopt only the nativist national-identity while others might adopt a nativist and anti-political-elite identity. It is at least plausible that different NPP voters *within* a country do not readily accept all aspects of the social identity proposed by NPP leaders.

1.3.3 Expected Taxonomy of Nativist Populist-Party Voters' Social Identities

Various types of social identities of NPP voters can be expected. Considering the findings of Ivarsflaten (2008) and Rooduijn (2018) that all successful NPPs mobilized grievances against immigrants it is expected that their voters hold nativist social identities. However, the variation of relevance of other variables such as political trust and economic grievance between countries found by these scholars and Oesch (2008) and within countries found by Ivarsflaten (2005) suggests a variance in the relevance of other categories to the respective social identities of NPP

voters. Such categories are anti-political-elite and anti-economic-elite conceptualization of ‘the people’ as the ingroup (Mols & Jetten, 2016). Furthermore, a nativist identity can be combined with anti-elite identity constructs of both types in social-identity frames employed by populist leaders (Rydgren, 2004). This results in a typology of four different social identities of NPP voters.

The types of social identities are nativist (N), nativist-anti-political-elite (NAP), nativist-anti-economic-elite (NAE) and nativist-anti-political-elite-anti-economic-elite (NAEP) or nativist-anti-elite in short. This taxonomy is shown in Figure 1.. All identity constructs employed by NPPs include a nativist identity. However, a combination of both types of anti-elitist identities without nativism could be found in left-wing populist parties (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Such parties are not considered in this study.




Figure 1. Taxonomy of types of social-identity constructs of RRWPPs at the national level. Nativist (N), anti-political-elite-nativist (NAP), anti-economic-elite-nativist (NAE), and anti-political-elite-anti-economic-elite-nativist (NAEP).

1.4 This Study

Previous studies have often focused on the question what it is that unites NPP voters. These studies have consistently shown that a common feature of all successful NPPs in Western Europe is their mobilization of anti-immigrant feelings (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Roodujin, 2018). At the same time, all these studies pointed towards the importance of other

factors like economic grievances or political trust, at least to some degree or in some countries. All these studies aim at explaining NPP voting at the micro level, in that they point to correlates between individuals' attitudes and their voting behaviour. They employ a variable centred reasoning that implicitly assumes that all individuals would be affected in the same way by the variables in question, that is they would be homogenous in their relation to relevant variables (Mudde, 2007). By employing such a reasoning, researchers might overlook important differences between individuals in their relationship to relevant variables (Weerts et al., 2014). For example, the findings of Rooduijn (2008) suggest that grievances over immigration are the most important predictor for NPP voting, while economic grievances are of less importance. This reasoning carries the implicit assumption that the higher importance of grievances over immigration would hold for all NPP voters. This reasoning overlooks the possibility that there might be a group of individuals for whom economic grievances might be as or even more important. This group of individuals, if large enough, could have caused the variance on the variable level.

This study overcomes the shortcoming of previous research by employing a person-centred research method (Weerts et al., 2014). Relatively recent advances in statistical methods made it possible to identify distinct profiles of individuals by employing model-based grouping techniques. By employing LCA this study aims at revealing previously hidden heterogenous groups of NPP voters. LCA is an empirical method which creates groups of individuals based on patterns observed in the data (Schwartz & Zamboanga, 2008). LCA has been used before by scholars to test assumptions about social-identity constructs in various contexts, such as prisoner's social identities or national social-identities (Boduszek et al., 2014; Huang, 2005).

In this study, LCA is employed to test the assumptions about distinct categories of NPP voters made through a social-identity approach. The results provide important insights about

different categories of NPP voters. The relevance of these findings for the understanding of NPP voting are discussed.

2. Method

2.1 Case Selection

Selection of NPPs followed the procedure outlined by Ivarsflaten (2008). To enhance comparability between studies, NPPs were chosen in accordance with those commonly referred to as NPPs or radical right-wing populist parties by other scholars. Additionally, only parties who secured more than 5% of the votes in the countries' last general election before data collection are included, as only those parties can reasonably be called successful at the national level.

Based on these selection criteria, the data set includes voters from Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria (Ivarsflaten, 2008), Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) in Switzerland (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2018), Front National (FN) in France (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2018), Fremskrittspartiet (FRP) in Norway (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2018), Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands (Rydgren, 2018), Perussuomalaiset (PS) in Finland (Rydgren, 2018), Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Sweden (Rydgren, 2018), and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany (Berning, 2017).

2.2 Data

The cross-sectional survey data for this study is drawn fully from the European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). This data source was chosen because it comprises a measurement for the election of most NPPs in Western Europe and is the most recent accessible data source of that nature. This enables examination of the NPPs voters in different countries in a strict

comparative sense (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Furthermore, the data comprises survey items referring to social groups which are suited to model the different components of social identities discussed above. Finally, the number of respondents in the data set is large enough to ensure identification of latent classes by LCA (Weerts et al,2014).

All respondents from countries without successful NPPs and those who did not vote for NPPs were excluded from the dataset. The final data set contained 1122 participants. 301 were from Austria, 147 from Switzerland, 111 from Germany, 135 from Finland, 103 from France, 82 from the Netherlands, 102 from Norway, and 141 from Sweden. 689 were males and 433 females. The mean age was 53 years ($SD= 16,7$). Drawing upon the eight-class scheme developed by Oesch (2006a; 2006b) voters are classified as follows: One self-employed professional, 14 small business owners, 87 technical (semi-)professionals, 280 production workers, 143 (associate) managers, 112 clerks, 65 socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, and 239 service workers. Additionally, 181 voters were unclassified due to missing data.

The sampling methods used in the different countries included in the survey differ greatly (Kaminska, 2020). The countries differ in terms of selection probabilities, clustering, and stratification. Weights to correct for the different sampling methods are included in the data set.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

LCA is a latent variable model, similar to factor analysis (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Latent variable models assume the existence of an error free latent variable. In LCA, as opposed to factor analysis, the assumed latent variable is categorical with a multinomial distribution. As the variable is latent, it cannot be measured directly. Rather, it is measured through two or more observed variables called indicators. It is assumed that the error-free latent variable causes the indicators. However, indicators are not error free, as they are measured using concrete items.

Therefore, most analytical statistical methods based on models aim to separate the latent variable and measurement error from indicators. Figure 2 shows the assumed causal relationship between the latent variable and indicators, as well as the influence of measurement error on indicators. The indicators are understood as a function of the latent variable and error. These indicators are modelled to be independent from each other, as any correlation is fully explained by their causal relationship with the latent variable.

In this study, the latent variable is assumed to be voters' social identity that causes their responses to survey items. Social identity is representing a latent construct that influences individuals' attitudes, as has been argued by Huang (2005). Such attitudes in turn can be used as indicators for a particular social identity. For example, negative attitudes towards immigrants or xenophobia are commonly used as an indicator of ethnic national identity (Lenard & Miller, 2017).




Figure 2. Latent variable with three observed variables as indicators. Adapted from Latent Class and Latent Transition Analysis by L. Collins and S. Lanza (2010). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

2.4 Latent Class Indicators

Nine items were selected as a maximum of ten non-binary indicators is appropriate for LCA (Weerts et al, 2014). For the model estimated with LCA to be identified, the number of estimated parameters per class must be smaller than the number of individuals within that class.

Furthermore, LCA requires the indicators to be treated as categorical (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Some of the measures were measured on eleven-point scale which would have made identification impossible because the number of parameters estimated per class depends on the number of categories of the ordinal indicators. Therefore, these variables were transformed into a scale with five ordered categories to ensure a higher number of individuals than estimated parameters per class. For example, the item “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” was coded on an eleven-point scale (European Social Survey, 2018, p.67). It was recoded into the five categories “worse place to live”, “rather worse place”, “indifferent”, “rather better place”, and “better place to live”. The category “indifferent” contains points 4-6 and all other categories each group together two points. Similarly, an item previously measured on an ordinal scale with nine responses was recoded into five categories by grouping two items each into a new category while the middle item stayed in a separate category.

Four theoretically related survey items were selected as indicators for a nativist identity. A full list of the selected indicators can be found in Appendix A. The items are chosen in line with Mudde’s (2007) discussion of nativism as an ethno-pluralist national identity. An example of such an item is: “[...] would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” (European Social Survey, 2018, p. 66)

Other three theoretically related survey items were selected as indicators of an anti-political-elite social identity. The chosen items tap into political trust. In terms of a distinction between concrete or abstract forms of political trust, these items refer to more concrete political entities (Hooghe, 2017; Lennard & Miller, 2017). This decision was made, as these items refer more to in-group and out-group than to a general satisfaction with the way a countries democracy works. An example of such an item is: “How much would you say the political

system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?”
(European Social Survey, 2018, p. 10)

Further three theoretically related survey items were selected as indicators for an anti-economic-elite social identity. Economic prosperity seems to be more a matter of perception, that is perceived relative-deprivation and not of actual relative-deprivation (Mols & Jetten, 2016). Therefore, the chosen indicators refer to the perceptions of the economic state of the respondent's country. Where possible, a reference to a wealthy group of society was made to include in-group and out-outgroup. An example of such an item is: *“Please think about the top 10% of employees working full-time in [country], earning more than [amount per month or per year]. In your opinion, are these incomes unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high? Please think generally about people earning this level of incomes.”* (European Social Survey, 2018, p.491)

The item *“In your opinion, are differences in wealth in [country] unfairly small, fair, or unfairly large?”* was excluded after initial analysis (European Social Survey, 2018, p.492). In the latent class model with ten indicators including this item, many individuals with answers at both extremes of the scale were included in the same class. This indicated that the variable was a poor indicator variable for the latent variable.

2.5 Analytical Method

LCA is a statistical method to identify subcategories of related cases from cross-sectional data categorized according to indicators (Weerts et al., 2014). LCA assumes categorical latent variables and categorical or ordinal indicators (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Furthermore, it is assumed that the latent classes explain all the variance in the data (Weerts et al., 2014). The requirements of a maximum of ten non-binary indicators and a sufficiently large sample need to be satisfied. Additionally, the pattern of missing data needs to be at random. LCA uses

goodness of fit indices and statistical tests to determine the number of latent classes that best fits the patterns observed in the data and controls for measurement error (Nylund et al, 2007).

Fitting a latent-class model is done by estimation of two sets of parameters (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Weerts et al., 2014). The first set of parameters are item parameter called item-response probabilities. They estimate the likelihood of an individual within a particular class endorsing a specific answer to an item. The second set of parameters are model parameters called latent-class prevalences and estimate the likelihood of an individual belonging to a particular class.

The parameters are estimated by the expectation-maximization algorithm (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Expectation maximization is an iterative search-algorithm that maximizes the likelihood function for the estimated parameters given the observed data. The likelihood function expresses the probability to observe the given data conditional on the estimated parameters. The likelihood function is maximized for each number of latent classes K for which a model is estimated.

Choosing the appropriate model, i.e., number of classes, follows repetitive steps. First, a one-class model is fitted, and fit indices are calculated (Weerts et al., 2014). Then, one class at a time is added to the model until the fit indices decline which indicates poorer fit than the previous model. The chosen model has to have good fit indices and better indices than the previous model. Additionally, each class should at least contain 1% of the sample and classes should be conceptually distinct to ensure a parsimonious selection and maximal efficiency of the model (Schwartz & Zamboanga, 2008).

Generally, two types of fit indices can be distinguished. These are absolute and relative fit indices. Absolute fit indices test how well a model with K classes fits the data (Morgan, 2015). Relative fit indices introduce a penalty for the number of estimated parameters and the sample size. As absolute fit indices tend to decrease as more classes are added to the model, relative fit

indices try to balance model fit against sparseness of the model in terms of the number of estimated parameters (Collins & Lanza, 2010). The model with the best relative fit index represents the optimal balance. The absolute fit criterion used in this study is the logarithm of the likelihood function (Log-Likelihood) (Morgan, 2015). Values closer to zero represent better fit of the model.

Out of the various relative-fit indices, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was relied upon for model selection. BIC adjusts the Log-likelihood with penalties for the number of estimated parameters as well as sample size to identify an optimal balance between model fit and parsimony. The BIC outperforms all the other options in simulation studies for sample sizes larger than one thousand (Nylund et al., 2007). Likewise, Yang (2006) concluded that the BIC has very good model selection accuracy for samples sizes larger than one thousand. Additionally, the originators of the used statistical software advised to rely on the BIC and only use other information criteria, if the BIC is not unambiguous (Muthén & Muthén, 2009).

Once a model has been selected the quality of the selected model was assessed. A common criterion that can be used to determine the degree of classification certainty is the entropy-based criterion called relative entropy (Ramaswamy et al., 1993). The entropy-based criterion is essentially a weighted average of the posterior probabilities were higher values mean less classification uncertainty (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Posterior probability refers to the highest classification probability among latent classes for each individual based on the final model estimates. Muthén and Muthén (2009) recommend using posterior probabilities for further analysis when entropy is higher than 0.8.

Conceptually, for a good model, all classes are homogenous in respect to the item response probabilities for the indicator that characterize them (Weerts et al., 2014). A latent class is considered homogenous with respect to an item-response probability when for that indicator there is one item-response probability or are multiple closely related item-response

probabilities particularly high, and all the others are low. Additionally, class separation needs to be high. This means that different answer patterns are clearly characteristic for each latent class. In other words, latent classes are conceptually different from each other.

Finally, a good latent class model needs to be meaningful in consideration of the relevant theory. To make sense of the latent classes, labels are assigned to them. The models were labelled in line with the indicators most characteristic for them and social-identity theory.

2.6 Comparative Method

Considerable differences between countries in terms of relevance of different factors in explaining NPP voting in these countries have been observed by different scholars (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). To compare the latent class prevalences across countries posterior probabilities were used. Posterior probabilities can be used for further analysis if entropy is larger than 0.8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2009). Once the different categories of social-identities of NPP voters' have been established on an aggregate level, the proportion of individuals from each of these categories belonging to the countries under consideration was calculated. The different constellations of social identities across countries have been compared.

2.7 Software

Filtering of cases, descriptive statistics and recoding of variables were carried out with SPSS. The LCA was carried out using Mplus, a latent variable modelling program well suited for this type of analysis. Mplus can carry out LCA with complex dataset taking into account weights for selection probabilities, stratification, and clustering. The commented code used for the input can be found in Appendix B. The .dat input file can be obtained from the author on request. The frequency table of posterior probabilities was calculated using the output of Mplus with

Microsoft Excel. Likewise, the graphs used to facilitate interpretation were made with Microsoft Excel.

3. Results

3.1 Latent-Class Model

3.1.1 Model Selection

Models with one to six latent classes were considered. Table 1 shows the number of latent classes and the number of parameters estimated in each model. The Log-Likelihood increased with each latent class that was added to the model. This indicates better absolute model fit for each additional class that has been added to the model. The increase in the Log-Likelihood from the four to the five latent class solution is markedly less pronounced than any previous increase in the Log-Likelihood. This indicates the flattening out in the increase in absolute model fit to be gained from the introduction of another latent class to the model at this point.

Of these models, the five latent-class solution had the minimum BIC value. The BIC decreased until it hit the minimum in the five latent-class solution and increased again afterwards. Thus, the optimal balance between absolute model fit and parsimony was reached. Therefore, for the further analysis, the five-class solution was considered.

Table 1

Number of Latent Classes, Number of Parameters Estimated, Logarithm of the Likelihood Function (Log-Likelihood), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Relative Entropy Values Per Model. All Values are Rounded to Two Decimals

Number of Latent Classes	Number of Parameters Estimated	Log-Likelihood	BIC	Entropy
1	35	-13305.64	26857.07	/
2	71	-12365.40	25229.42	.84
3	107	-12085.25	24921.95	.82
4	143	-11855.54	24715.35	.84
5	179	-11716.75	24690.59	.83
6	215	-11604.83	24719.58	.84

3.1.2 Model Evaluation

To evaluate the fit of the model the homogeneity within and the separation between latent classes, as well as the entropy measure were examined. Table 2 contains the latent-class prevalences. Tables 3-5 show the latent-class solution with five classes. These are the probability of an individual belonging to a particular latent class. Table 2-4 show the item-response probabilities. The left most column contains a short form for the latent-class indicators stretching over the whole width of the table as well as the different answer categories. Table 2 shows indicators of the anti-political-elite identity construct. Table 3 shows indicators of the nativist identity. Table 4 shows indicators of the anti-economic-elite identity construct. The second column in each of these tables contains the marginal probabilities for each answer category of each indicator. These are the answer probabilities of the whole sample. The last five columns contain the item-response probabilities of the individuals within each latent class. Item-response probabilities relevant for the classification of the latent classes are shown in bold numbers to facilitate interpretation.

The latent class prevalences are fairly equal between latent classes. This means that each latent class contains a large number of individuals. The criterion of at least one percent of individuals per latent class characterizing a good model is fulfilled.

Table 2

Latent Class (LC) Prevalences Rounded to Two Decimals

	LC 1	LC 2	LC 3	LC 4	LC 5
LC Prevalence	.22	.15	.19	.23	.21

Table 3

Marginal Probabilities and Item Response Probabilities for Anti-Economic Elite Indicators

Latent Class	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5	
Indicators	Marginals	Item Response Probabilities				
Does the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?						
Not at all	.30	.46	.07	.61	.14	.21
Very little	.42	.43	.36	.24	.53	.49
Some	.20	.10	.36	.07	.27	.24
A lot	.06	.00	.18	.08	.07	.03
A great deal	.01	.00	.03	.01	.00	.03
How much do you personally trust politicians?						
No or v. low trust	.38	.78	.11	.77	.12	.11
Low trust	.28	.21	.06	.22	.44	.41
Medium trust	.26	.01	.53	.00	.35	.46
High trust	.07	.00	.29	.01	.09	.02
V. H. or C. T.	.00	.00	.02	.00	.00	.00
Now thinking about the government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?						
E. Dissatisfied	.33	.70	.00	.83	.03	.06
R. Dissatisfied	.29	.27	.06	.15	.38	.49
Medium S.	.24	.03	.42	.01	.35	.44
Rather Satisfied	.11	.00	.46	.00	.19	.00
E. satisfied	.03	.00	.07	.01	.06	.00

Probabilities Rounded to Two Decimal; Item-Response Probabilities Relevant for Classification of Latent Classes Shown in Bold Numbers; V. = Very, E. = Extremely, R. = Rather, S. = Satisfied, V. H. = Very High, C. T. = Complete Trust

3.1.3 Latent-Class Homogeneity and Latent-Class Separation

All latent classes show fairly good homogeneity. This is especially true for Latent Class 3 and Latent Class 5. For Latent Class 3, for most indicators, one answer category is clearly the most likely one. For Latent Class 3 the answer pattern (Not at all/ No trust at all or very low trust/ Extremely dissatisfied/ Allow none/ Bad for economy/ Cultural life undermined/ Worse place to live/ Rather dissatisfied/ Fair) is by far the most likely one. Likewise, for Latent Class 4 and Latent Class 5, for most indicators of the nativist identity construct one answer category stands out to be by far the most likely one. This is the case to a slightly lesser extent for class four than for class five. For latent Class 1, two of the three indicators for the anti-political-elite identity construct show very good homogeneity. For most other indicators, two consecutive answer

categories per indicator stand out to be the most likely ones for all latent classes. This means that for these classes multiple answer patterns are characteristic. However, these answer patterns are very similar in their meaning. This is illustrated by bar graphs in Appendix C to facilitate comprehension of the item response probabilities.

Table 4

Marginal Probabilities and Item Response Probabilities for Anti-Immigrant Indicators

Latent Class		Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5
Indicators	Marginals	Item Response Probabilities				
Allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people to come and live here?						
Allow many to	.02	.04	.09	.00	.00	.00
Allow some	.29	.41	.46	.00	.11	.49
Allow a few	.43	.42	.44	.33	.53	.44
Allow none	.25	.13	.01	.67	.36	.07
Generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?						
Bad	.21	.05	.00	.75	.22	.02
Rather bad	.27	.37	.03	.25	.45	.16
Indifferent	.39	.46	.45	.00	.29	.71
Rather good	.13	.11	.50	.00	.03	.10
Good	.01	.01	.03	.00	.00	.01
[country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here?						
Undermined	.27	.19	.01	.78	.35	.00
R. undermined	.28	.37	.09	.17	.51	.15
Indifferent	.33	.33	.47	.04	.11	.73
Rather enriched	.11	.09	.40	.00	.02	.12
Enriched	.01	.02	.04	.01	.00	.00
Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?						
Worse place	.23	.14	.02	.74	.27	.00
R. worse place	.32	.48	.04	.19	.60	.16
Indifferent	.38	.32	.57	.07	.12	.84
R. better place	.07	.05	.36	.00	.01	.00
Better place	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00

Probabilities Rounded to Two Decimals; Item-Response Probabilities Relevant for Classification of Latent Classes Shown in Bold Numbers; R. = Rather

Table 5

Marginal Probabilities and Item Response Probabilities for Anti-Economic Elite Indicators

Latent Class		Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5
Indicators	Marginals	Item Response Probabilities				
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?						
E. Dissatisfied	.10	.18	.00	.33	.00	.00
R. dissatisfied	.23	.30	.00	.41	.22	.16
Indifferent	.31	.29	.21	.19	.24	.59
Rather satisfied	.29	.19	.60	.04	.47	.21
E. satisfied	.07	.05	.19	.04	.07	.04
The top 10% of employees working full-time in [country], are their incomes fair?						
Low: e. and v. unfair	.07	.11	.01	.10	.11	.00
Low: s. & slightly unfair	.08	.08	.07	.03	.05	.14
Fair	.41	.49	.39	.34	.33	.49
High: slightly & s. unfair	.25	.16	.39	.19	.29	.25
High: v. & e. unfair	.20	.17	.14	.35	.22	.12

Probabilities Rounded to Two Decimals; Item-Response Probabilities Relevant for Classification of Latent Classes Shown in Bold Numbers; E. = Extremely, R. = Rather, S. = Somewhat, V. = Very

The estimated model shows fairly good latent-class separation, as for each latent class there is a characteristic answer pattern that distinguishes it from the other latent classes. There is some overlap between the modelled latent classes. However, latent classes overlapping in terms of one theoretically related set of indicators show considerable differences in terms of another theoretically related set of indicators. Thus, the five classes are conceptually different from one another in terms of their theoretical meaning. Similarities and differences of the latent classes are discussed in the next section. A more extensive discussion of latent-class separation can be found in Appendix D.

3.2 Latent-Class Labels

In this section the results of the LCA are summarized by assigning labels to the latent classes based on their item-response probabilities. The labels are assigned in accordance with the theory used to select the indicators. Table 6 summarizes these results. A taxonomy of observed social identities is shown in Figure 3.

Table 6

Summary of the Labels Assigned to the Five Latent Classes and the Respective Latent Class Prevalences

Latent Class	Latent Class 1	Latent Class 2	Latent Class 3	Latent Class 4	Latent Class 5
Latent Class Prevalence	.22	.15	.19	.23	.21
Latent Class Labels	Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class	Moderate Class	Nativist-Anti-Elite Class	Nativist Class	Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites Class

3.2.1 Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class

Latent Class 1 is labelled Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class. The class is characterized by low trust in political elites. Immigrants are seen as rather bad for the country although to a smaller degree than for Nativist-Anti-Elite Class and slightly smaller degree than Nativist Class. The Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class is rather dissatisfied with the economy, but most individuals in the class consider the salaries of the best earning ten percent to be fair. Individuals in the Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class seem to be overall more likely to endorse more extreme positions than individuals in other classes except Nativist-Anti-Elite Class. However, the Nativist Class endorses more extreme positions on immigration related items.




Figure 3. Taxonomy of types of social-identities of NPP voters. Nativist (N), Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite (NAP), Nativist-Anti-Economic-Anti-Political-Elite (NAEP), Moderate-Anti-Political-Elite (AP), and Moderate (M).

3.2.2 Moderate Class

Latent Class 2 is labelled Moderate Class. It is characterized by a medium to high trust in political elites and medium to rather high satisfaction with the government. Individuals in this latent class have a relatively favourable view towards immigrants but would not want many foreigners to come into their countries. The satisfaction with the country's economy in this latent class is relatively high, while the salaries of the best earning ten percent are considered to be slightly or somewhat unfairly high by many individuals. Overall, individuals in this class are by far least likely to express extremely negative views towards the relevant outgroups.

3.2.3 Nativist-Anti-Elite Class

Latent Class 3 is labelled Nativist-Anti-Elite Class. It is characterized by very low trust in the political elites. Individuals in this class hold very negative attitudes towards immigrants. The economy is viewed as extremely dissatisfactory by this latent class and relatively many individuals in this latent class consider the salaries of the best earning ten percent very or extremely unfairly high. It is striking that individuals the Nativist-Anti-Elite Class are more likely to endorse extreme positions on all items expressing negative attitudes towards outgroups than individuals in any other latent class.

3.2.4 Nativist Class

Latent Class 4 is labelled Nativist Class. It is characterized by medium to low trust in the political elites, which is higher than for the Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class. Individuals in this class hold very negative views about immigrants, which sets them apart from other classes. They are rather satisfied with the economy but show a clear tendency to consider the salaries of the best earning ten percent to unfairly high.

3.2.5 Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites-Class

Latent Class 5 is labelled Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites Class. It is characterized by little trust in political elites. However, their trust is still higher than that of the Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class. Individuals in this class are rather indifferent towards immigrants. Likewise, individuals in this class are rather indifferent about the economy of their country and have the highest chance amongst all latent classes to consider the salaries of the best earning ten percent in their country to be fair. Individuals in the Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites Class are overall far less likely to endorse extreme positions than any class except the Moderate Class.

3.3 Comparative Results

In this section the frequencies of individuals in each latent class based on the posterior classification probabilities are reported per country. As Table 1 shows the entropy value for the five-class model is 0.826. As this value is greater than 0.8 classification certainty is considered high enough to justify the use of posterior probabilities for the further analysis (Muthén & Muthén, 2009).

Table 7 shows the proportion of the subsample in each latent class per country. Countries differ largely in the prevalence of latent classes. The Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class was the most frequent one for Germany. The Moderate Class was the most frequent one for Switzerland, Finland, and Norway. The Nativist-Anti-Elite Class was the most frequent class for France. The Nativist Class was the most frequent class for Austria. Finally, the Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites Class was the most common class for the Netherlands and for Sweden.

Several observations point to great variation between the latent class structures of each country. Each class is the most frequent class for at least one country. The Nativist-Anti-Elite Class seems not to exist in Switzerland. Furthermore, countries differ greatly in the degree to

which the sub-samples are distributed across latent classes. For example, in Austria and Switzerland one particular latent class stands out to be by far the most likely. On the other hand, in Finland, the distribution is much more flat.

Finally, four different types of latent-class structures can be observed between countries. The latent-class structures of Switzerland, Norway, and Finland appear very similar. The Pro-Political-Elite-Pro-Immigrant Class is most frequent in these countries. Likewise, the latent-class structure of the Netherlands and Sweden are similar to each other with the Anti-Political-Elite Class being the most frequent. The latent-class structure in Germany and France are relatively similar, despite a clear difference in the most frequent class in each of the two countries. Austria stands out to be a special case with the Nativist Class by far being the most frequent. The differences between these latent-class structures are not clear cut. Instead, the structure of some countries seems to be better described as a combination of two types. The latent-class structure of Finland is similar to that of Norway, but also similar to the structure of the Netherlands. Likewise, the latent-class structure of Sweden is similar to that of the Netherlands, but also alike to that of Germany. Figure 4 illustrates the latent-class structures of NPP voters' social identities in these countries.

Table 7
Proportion of the Subsample in Each Latent Class per Country

Country	Nativist-Anti-Political-Elite Class	Moderate Class	Nativist-Anti-Elite Class	Nativist Class	Moderate-Anti-Political-Elites Class
Austria	.04	.21	.07	.57	.11
Switzerland	.01	.59	.00	.20	.19
Germany	.33	.05	.17	.25	.20
Finland	.12	.33	.07	.21	.28
France	.19	.07	.30	.17	.27
Netherlands	.12	.24	.05	.26	.33
Norway	.04	.45	.04	.28	.20
Sweden	.20	.16	.11	.23	.31

Probabilities Rounded to Two Decimals; Highest Values per Country in Bold




Figure 4. Percentage of Individuals per Latent Class from Each Country, ordered in line with observed patterns.

4. Discussion

4.1. Discussion of Aggregate Results

As expected, one type of social identity is characterized by a nativist social identity. Likewise, a combination of nativist identity and anti-political-elite identity, and a combination of nativist, anti-political elite, and anti-economic-elite social identity were observed. These three social identities constitute the majority of NPP voters. This is in line with previous research that consistently demonstrated the importance of anti-immigrant sentiments in NPP voters (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018).

Contrary to expectations, there is no latent class centred around a nativist and anti-economic-elite identity. In the light of Oesch's (2008) findings that economic determinants are important predictors of workers' support for NPPs this is surprising. The absence of this class might be due to the limited number of items used to probe this social identity. However, there is also a plausible substantive explanation. Mudde (2007) points out that economic considerations are only of secondary nature to the electorate of NPPs and are only an application of the nativist ideology to the economy. The economic items used by Oesch (2008) refer to fears of wage dumping and welfare chauvinism, i.e. reserving social security for the ethnic majority. These items capture what is called perceived realistic threat in integrated-threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Perceived realistic threats are part of the basis for xenophobia. Thus, the items used by Oesch measured the perceived realistic threat element of xenophobia. Accordingly, from a social identity perspective, the relevance of economic factors resulted from a nativist identity and not from an anti-economic-elite identity.

Yet, the existence of a nativist-anti-political-elite-anti-economic-elite identity was demonstrated in this study. That anti-economic-elite sentiments are only observed in this combination might be explained by a traditional neo-Nazi group in the electorate of NPPs, as neo-Nazi ideology combines all three of these elements (Mudde, 2007). In neo-Nazi ideology the economic elites are Jews. Consequently, (previous) neo-Nazis might have a higher readiness to adopt an anti-economic-elite social identity (Haslam et al, 2020). Therefore, the observed anti-economic-elite identity might be antisemitic in nature and held only by neo-Nazi voters. At least in the German case, the support of traditional neo-Nazis for the AfD is plausible, as the AfD electoral gains are highly correlated to losses of the traditional neo-Nazi party (Berning, 2017), about a tenth of the employees of the AfD in the German Bundestag have connections to neo-Nazi organisations (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2018), and one of the most influential members of the AfD is a fascist (Rath, 2020).

Another finding contrary to expectations is that there is a social identity without nativism characterized by an anti-political-elite identity. This contradicts the results of past research which employed a variable centred reasoning (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). The existence of the anti-political-elite identity demonstrates that for some voters anti-immigrant sentiments are not the motivational factor to vote for NPPs. This is in line with the recent conclusion of Stockmer et al. (2021) that anti-immigrant attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far right. And it is consistent with the finding of Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) that voters can hold culturally liberal views and still support NPPs, if they hold populist attitudes. This can be explained from a social identity perspective, as NPP voters likely differ in their readiness to adopt a nativist identity (Haslam et al, 2020). Depending on individual's socioeconomic context (Bos et al, 2020), their past social identities such as constitutional national identities (Lenard & Miller, 2017), and their value structures, individuals might not be ready to adopt a nativist identity. However, they might still be ready to adopt social identities based on anti-elite communication contained in NP leader communication (Shayegh et al, 2022).

Surprisingly, the Moderate Class seems to be poorly captured by identity constructs centred around nativism or anti-elite identity. This class of voters is most strongly present in Switzerland. The presence of this latent class in the latent class model might thus be explained largely by dynamics in Switzerland. Bernhard (2017) argues that the SVP is most appropriately classified as a conservative-liberal party. Bernhard presents evidence based on party newspapers that the SVP has only little more anti-elite framing and no more antagonist framing than the Swiss Green party. Essentially, the SVP is a neoconservative party which uses anti-immigrant rhetoric to attract workers' votes (Afonso, 2013). Again, the readiness of voters to adopt proposed social identities plays a crucial role in explaining this result (Haslam et al, 2020). The neoliberal economic agenda of the SVP and its firm establishment in the Swiss

political landscape make anti-elite rhetoric hardly credible while mostly working-class voters are attracted by its anti-immigrant rhetoric and adopt a corresponding nativist identity. While the economic success of many small and large business owners depends on immigration, workers fear increased competition resulting from increased immigration. This explains why SVP voters' readiness to adopt a nativist identity differs. Consequently, the majority of the party's voters do not adopt a nativist identity while a large minority still do adopt such an identity.

4.2 Discussion of Comparative Results

The social-identity constellation of NPP voters across different countries are heterogenous. In all countries included in the data set different social identities are present with strongly varying proportions. The proportions of social identities in each country can be explained by examining its socio-political history and NPP leader's rhetoric.

In line with expectations, for the countries Austria, Germany, and France the most prevalent social identities are nativist social identities or combinations of a nativist social identity with anti-elite social identities. For the Austrian case, the large proportion of FPÖ voters with a nativist identity and the relatively small proportion of other social identities aligns with the results of Oesch (2008) and Rooduijn (2018) who found anti-immigrant sentiments to be the key predictor for FPÖ voting. FPÖ participation in government made anti-elite rhetoric largely implausible. However, the small proportion of FPÖ voters with a moderate-anti-political-elite identity paints a more nuanced picture of the Austrian electorate and captures voters' motivation to vote for the FPÖ not observed in correlational studies. This suggests that some of the initial protest voter clientele was not lost after entering government (Luther, 2003).

The high proportion of AfD voters with nativist identities is in line with expectations. The findings can be further elucidated by considering AfD rhetoric and German political

demographics. AfD rhetoric is centred around anti-immigrant issues (Berning, 2017; Hambauer & Mays, 2017). The anti-political elite frames are connected to the former government's handling of the alleged immigrant crisis. This explains why the majority of AfD voters with anti-political-elites identity also adopted nativist identities. However, the relatively high proportion of voters with a nativist-anti-elite-identity is surprising given the relative unimportance of economic issues to the AfD's success (Langfeld, 2017; Schwander & Manow, 2017). As discussed in section 4.1, the anti-economic-elite identity of AfD voters can be explained by the neo-Nazi support for the party. Evidence from Schwander and Manow (2017) that districts with radical right votes in the 1990s are also districts with AfD votes around 20 years later further corroborate this thesis. Thus, the German case provides evidence that voters' readiness to adopt social identities shaped by past social identities is an important factor in explaining electoral success of NPPs.

The high prevalence of the three types of nativist identities in the French case are in line with expectations based on previous research. Anti-immigrant and political elite-sentiments were found to significantly predict FN voting (Ivarsflaten; 2008; Rooduijn, 20018). These findings can be explained by social-identity dynamics. Because FN rhetoric contains frames portraying the values of the French republic as incompatible with those of particularly Moslem immigrants while accusing political elites of purportedly betraying these values (Hutchins & Halikiopoulou, 2020). And voters in neighbourhoods with a higher number of immigrants are less likely while those situated just outside of immigrant communities are more likely to vote for FN (Della Posta, 2013; Evans & Ivaldi 2021). This suggests that neighbourhood contact with immigrants makes nativist identity-frames less plausible. Likewise, Oesch (2008) found economic variables to significantly predict workers' FN support. This is explained by the highest prevalence among all countries of voters with a nativist-anti-elite identity in France. Since the financial crisis in 2008, FN rhetoric increasingly contains anti-economic-elite frames

and advocates redistributive policies combined with welfare chauvinism (Ivaldi, 2015). Additionally, FN is disproportionately supported by the working class and unemployed. Furthermore, FN has its roots in fascism and the post-war extreme right (Hutchins & Halikiopoulou, 2020). This lends further support to the thesis that voters with a nativist-anti-elite identity belong to a neo-Nazi subgroup of the electorate. Taken together, this suggests that results of past research are explained by FN voters' social identities and that voters differ in their readiness to adopt these identities depending on socioeconomic status and neighbourhood demographics.

Contrary to expectations, in the Netherlands and Sweden, the most prevalent social identity is not characterized by nativism but by an anti-political-elite social identity. In the Dutch case, the predominance of the anti-political-elite social identity can be explained by the centrality of dissatisfaction with the country's political elite to the rhetoric of the PVV (Van Kessel, 2015). Yet, taken together the prevalence of the nativist and nativist-anti-political-elite identities in the Netherlands is even higher. This can be explained, as PVV rhetoric contains anti-immigrant frames particularly against Muslims (Van Kessel, 2015). Thus, the different social identities observed in the Netherlands are in line with NP leader rhetoric and PVV voters seem to differ in their readiness to adopt the different social identities. The varying adoption of social identities suggests that the correlations of anti-immigrant sentiments and political distrust with PVV voting observed by Rooduijn's (2018) are caused by different subgroups of PVV voters.

Similarly, in the Swedish case, the large proportion of voters with an anti-political-elite identity can be explained by the centrality of anti-social-democrat frames in SD's rhetoric (Bergmann, 2015). The SD became successful by critiquing the Swedish social democrats for their purported betrayal of the Swedish people. The SD defines the Swedish people in essentially nativist terms and favours well-fare chauvinist policies. Therefore, the large

proportion of individuals with nativist identities is not surprising. Furthermore, SD voters have the third largest proportion of individuals with a nativist-anti-elite identity. This might be explained by the SD's roots in the Swedish neo-Nazi environment and its continued antisemitic rhetoric. This further corroborates the thesis that this social identity is held primarily by neo-Nazis. Additionally, it points to a varying readiness of SD voters to adopt the various social identities based on past social identities. Again, this discussion is largely in line with Rooduijn's (2018) findings that political distrust and anti-immigrant sentiments are important factors to explain SD's electoral success. Contrary to Rooduijn's findings that economic predictors would be irrelevant for the SD's electorate, this study demonstrates that for a considerable proportion of SD voters anti-economic-elite sentiments remain important.

Surprisingly, for Finland, Norway, and Switzerland the most frequent social identity is the Modest Class. Yet, individuals with nativist identities are still markedly represented in these countries albeit to decreasing degrees in the above order. The Swiss case is discussed in the section above. In the Finish case, the overall proportion of PS voters with nativist identities in its various combinations is still larger than the Modes Class and the prevalence of modest-anti-political-elite identity is considerable too. The PS's rhetoric contains identity frames constructing an antagonism between predominantly rural disenfranchised Finns and the country's elites (Bergmann, 2015). This frame is supplemented by strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and welfare chauvinist policy positions. Thus, the anti-elite and nativist social identities of PS voters are in line with NP leader rhetoric and voters differ in their readiness to adopt these social identities depending on their sociodemographic background. These social identities can elucidate the results of Roodijn (2018) who found that political distrust and anti-immigrant sentiments were important factors explaining PS's electoral success. Considering the Modest Class, the PS uses Gypsies inside Finland as a group allegedly not belonging to the Finish people and Christian religion as a defining ethno-cultural characteristic (Bergmann, 2015).

These anti-Gypsy and pro-Christian identities might explain the prevalence of the Moderate Class, as no indicator used to model social identities covered anti-Gypsy or pro-Christian sentiments.

In Norway, the Modest Class is most prevalent among FRP voters. Yet, nativist, anti-political-elite identity, and combinations thereof taken together still constitute a narrow majority. To explain the high prevalence of the Modest class, consider that the FRP might be considered as the mildest right-wing populist party in Europe (Bergmann, 2015). The party repeatedly expelled open extremists and racists (Bergmann, 2015; Mudde, 2007). Nationalism is only of secondary concern to the FRP and among the Nordic populist parties its economic policies are closest to a neoliberal agenda. For these reasons, Mudde (2007) argued that nativism is not central to the party's ideology and that it would be more appropriately classified as neoliberal populist party. Yet, Norwegian experts classify the FRP as radical right-wing populist party, as it still has the strongest anti-immigrant agenda in Norway (Bergmann, 2015). It portrays immigrants as economic burden to the country and advocates welfare chauvinism. FRP voters might differ in their readiness to adopt the nativist identity conveyed by such frames. This discussion yields a more nuanced picture than that presented in the research of Rooduijn (20018), as it portrays political distrust and anti-immigrant sentiments of FRP voters as equally pronounced than those of other NPPs. However, the correlation of these factors with FRP voting might have been caused by a subgroup of voters ready to adopt the corresponding social identities.

4.3 General Discussion

NP rhetoric involves two fundamental cleavages between groups (Mudde, 2007; Shayegh et al, 2022) and a reduction of both cleavages to a binary group-relation is a gross oversimplification of the complex identity processes involved (Dixon et al, 2020). NPP leaders construct an alleged

allegiance between corrupt elites and foreigners to build single outgroup to define the boundaries of the ingroup (Mols & Jetten, 2016). But even if one would assume this allegiance, multiple groups are involved in the dynamic and the relation between the ingroup to the different outgroups differs. Elites are in a position of higher socioeconomic status relative to the ingroup while immigrants and other alleged foreigners have a lower socioeconomic status. Accordingly, the nature of the intergroup processes between the ingroup and these outgroups differs (Dixon et al, 2020). The intergroup relation to the elites is marked by contestation of the legitimacy of their higher socioeconomic standing. Conversely, the intergroup relation to foreigners is marked by a desire to keep existing status relations in place. This study provides evidence that the different intergroup relations are reflected in diverging social identities of NPP voters. Some NPP voters define their social identity in relation to the higher status group of elites while others define their social identity in relation to the lower status group of foreigners. Yet another group of NPP voters define their social identity in relation to both.

The readiness of NPP voters to adopt the different social identities contained in NPP leaders' frames is the psychological mechanism determining their social identity (Haslam et al., 2020). Socioeconomic contexts, socio-political histories, and past social identities of NPP voters differ both across countries and within countries. These factors influence NPP voters' readiness to adopt social identities constructed by NPP leaders. Therefore, the ingroup of NPP voters is by no means homogenous but contains different sub-groups that adopt different social identities. Some NPP voters are ready to adopt an anti-political-elite identity while others adopt a nativist identity. And yet another sub-group of NPP voters adopts a nativist-anti-political-elite identity. Finally, the sub-group of NPP voters adopting a nativist-anti-elite identity that also stands in opposition to economic elites might consist of (former) neo-Nazis whose past identity makes them ready to adopt such a social identity. Therefore, especially in intergroup relations

involving multiple groups, considering the agency of NPP voters is the dynamic with NPP leaders is essential to understanding NPP voting.

The results of this study indicate that the different subgroups of voters differ in their likelihood to adopt extremely negative attitudes towards the outgroups used to construct their ingroup identity. Social-identity complexity is a possible psychological mechanism proposed by extant research explaining this observation (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Social-identity complexity is the degree to which individuals believe that their social identities overlap. Less complexity means an individual merges their social identities into one ingroup. This can be done by only considering the overlap between multiple social identities as the ingroup. For example, neo-Nazis might consider only members of their ethnicity that are neither members of established parties nor Jews as members of their ingroup. Alternatively, social identities can be merged by considering one as a subcategory of the other. For example, nativist voters might consider only members of their ethnicity as their ingroup while considering both the political establishment and NPP leaders as a subgroup.

Social identities become more complex when non-overlapping memberships are acknowledged (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Social identities can be seen as completely separated from each other and only be salient one at a time depending on context. For example, a moderate NPP voter might acknowledge that during work a Muslim co-worker is part of the ingroup while considering the same co-worker as part of the outgroup when national identity is salient. The highest degree of complexity is characterized by recognizing and embracing multiple group memberships simultaneously. Ingroup membership is extended to anyone who shares a relevant ingroup identity. For example, a Christian male might recognize both a Muslim male and a Christian female as ingroup members. It is implausible that this degree of social-identity complexity is common among NPP voters.

The pattern of voters' social identities and the degree to which they hold extreme views observed in this study points towards increasingly extreme views as the number of outgroups used to construct the ingroup identity increases. Lower levels of social-identity complexity are related to low inclusivity and intolerance (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Thus, the more extreme views of NPP voters with social identities characterized by multiple outgroups might be explained by intolerance influenced by their social-identity complexity.

4.4 Limitations and Future Research

The study used attitudinal measures as indicators for voters' social identities. This is in line with previous research using LCA (Huang, 2005). Therefore, it is highly plausible that the latent variable estimated by LCA represents voters' social identity, as the observed categories of the latent variable are largely in line with prior expectations based on social-identity theory. However, the author is not aware of any study testing the concurrent validity of the use of attitudinal measures as indicators for social identities against established social identity scales (Leach et al. 2008). Accordingly, doubt whether the estimated latent variable represents voters' social identity remains until concurrent validity is established. Therefore, future studies should test the concurrent validity of attitudinal indicators for social identities against established measures of social identities as indicators using LCA.

Posterior probabilities can be used for further analysis if entropy is larger than 0.8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2009). However, some caution needs to be exercised in the interpretation of the results based on posterior probabilities (Collins & Lanza, 2010). For some individuals there might be large classification uncertainty because entropy is essentially a weighted average of highest posterior probabilities of all individuals. Therefore, future research should try to replicate the latent class prevalences within each tested country, by applying LCA to a sample large enough for independent analysis.

This study presents only a snapshot in time, as the social identities of NPP voters were modelled based on cross-sectional data. The policy positions and rhetoric of NPPs change over time (Mudde, 2007) and therefore the social identities that NPP voters adopt might change, too. Additionally, voters of one party might consider each other as members of the same ingroup and therefore as credible sources of information and orientation (Shayegh et al., 2022). Accordingly, voters might influence each other's readiness to adopt a specific social identity and lead to conversion of their social identities over time. Therefore, future research should combine the methodology of this study with a longitudinal study-design to trace shifts of voters' social identities to get a better understanding of the processes and direction of social influence between subgroups of NPP voters.

This study argues that voters' readiness to adopt social identities proposed by NPP leaders explains the identity constellations within countries. However, the cross-sectional data used to model voters' social identities does not contain information about their past social identities. Therefore, future research should further corroborate this thesis by combining measures of voters' social identities with questionnaires about voters' values, past group membership, and perceived social reality. Such research could test the idea that NPP voters' (past) affiliation with neo-Nazi groups is causing their readiness to adopt a nativist-anti-elite identity.

This study proposes social-identity complexity as psychological mechanism explaining the degree to which NPP voters hold extreme views against outgroups. However, social-identity complexity was not measured. To test the suggested relation between the degree to which NPP voters hold extremely negative attitudes towards outgroup and their social-identity complexity future research should employ measures of voters' social identities and social-identity complexity.

Finally, past research has pointed to the importance of developing counter measures to populist rhetoric to promote positive intergroup relations in society (Shayegh et al., 2022). This study suggests that such counter measures might be most effective when tailored to subgroups of NPP voters by taking into account their specific social identities and the factors influencing the readiness to adopt alternative social identities. Therefore, future research should test if the insights of this study can usefully be employed to develop counter measures to NP leader's rhetoric.

4.5 Conclusion

This study demonstrates how social identities of NPP voters in Europe are heterogenous both within and across countries. Thus, this study adds to the existing literature on NPP voting by overcoming the implicit assumption of previous research that NPP voters within one country were homogenous with respect to the variables motivating their support for a NPP (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). Likewise, the study demonstrates that the implicit assumption made by past research that NPP voters within a country would have a homogenous social identity characterized by the exclusion of a single outgroup is wrong (Mols & Jetten, 2016). Instead, several different social identities of NPP voters within each of the countries included in this study were demonstrated. Therefore, this study adds significantly to the understanding of voters' support for NPPs by emphasizing the importance of nonbinary group-relations (Dixon et al, 2020) and demonstrating that voters' readiness is the key to understanding the complexity of the social identity constellation in each country (Haslam et al, 2020). Furthermore, the study suggests that the degree to which NPP voters hold extremely negative attitudes towards the outgroup is influenced by their social-identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) and suggests promising avenues for future research.

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Appendix

Appendix A

The items listed in this appendix are taken from the European Social Survey (2018): ESS9 2018 Documentation Report. Some of these items were dummy coded to satisfy the requirement for categorical variables for the application of LCA (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Some items were reverse coded to better fit the concept. The items are ordered by a general selection criterion for respondents and the social-identity constructs proposed in the theoretical framework, for which they can be considered indicators.

Respondents Selection Variable

- A) Country (p.2)
- B) Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? (p. 16)
- C) Which party did you vote for in that election? (Country) (p.16-36)

Indicators probing Nativist Identity

- A) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people {to what extent do you think [country] should allow them come and live here}? (p.65)

(Allow many to come and live here/ Allow some/ Allow a few/ Allow none)
Text in { } added by the author for clarity of the question.
- B) And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (p.66)

(0 Cultural life undermined/ 1/2/.../9/10 Cultural life enriched)
- C) Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? (p.67)

(0 Worse place to live/ 1/2/.../9/10 Better place to live)

- D) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (p.66)

(0 Bad for the economy/1/2/.../9/10 Good for the economy)

Indicators probing Anti-Political-Elite Identity

- A) How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does? (p.10)

(Not at all/ very little/ Some/ A lot/ A great deal)

- B) Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? (p.60)

(0 Extremely dissatisfied/1/2/.../9/10 Extremely satisfied)

- C) Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..politicians? (p.14)

(0 No trust at all/1/2/.../9/10 Complete trust)

Indicators probing Anti-Economic-Elite Identity

- A) On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? (p.59)

(0 Extremely dissatisfied/1/2/.../9/10 Extremely satisfied)

B) Please think about the top 10% of employees working full-time in [country], earning more than [amount per month or per year]. In your opinion, are these incomes unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high? Please think generally about people earning this level of incomes. (p.491)

(Low extremely unfair/ Low very unfair/ Low, somewhat unfair/ Low, slightly unfair/ Fair/ High, slightly unfair/ High, somewhat unfair/ High, very unfair/ High, extremely unfair)

Appendix B

Below is the full code of the analysis can be found. The TITEL command specifies the working Titel of the analysis, which will be printed to the output (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). The DATA command specifies the working directory of the input file. The specification NOBSERVATIONS provides information about the number of observations contained in the data set. The NAMES option of the VARIABLE command sets the names of the variables used in the data set. Participants id is coded as a. The country of participants is coded with b. Indicators probing the anti-political-elite identity construct are labelled with p-p6. The indicators probing the nativist identity construct are coded with r1-5. The items probing the anti-economical elite identity construct are coded with e1-4. The variables containing sampling weights, clustering, and strata are coded with c1-c3. The dataset contains more items than were used in the final analysis, as it was made at a stage where it was not yet entirely clear which variables will be used for the analysis. The variables included in the analysis are specified with USEVARIABLES. The option CATEGORICAL specifies which of these are ordered categorical variables. The options WEIGHT, STRATIFICATION and CLUSTER specify the analogous variables. The option MISSING specifies the symbol used for missing data in the dataset. The CLASSES option specifies the name of the latent class variable and the number of classes for the analysis. In the command ANALYSIS several parameters for the analysis are specified. The option TYPE specifies that complex data is used for the analysis using COMPLEX and MIXTURE specifies that a mixture model is to be estimated. Latent class modelling is a type of mixture modelling for which latent variable and indicator variables are categorical. The option ESTIMATOR is set to MLR as it enables robust parameter estimates with complex data. The STARTS option specifies the number of random sets used for the initial stage of optimizations and sets the number for best results used for the second stage of optimization to high numbers to ensure finding the maximum likelihood solution. There is no drawback for this kind of high numbers when computation power is high (Muthén & Muthén,

2009). The option `STITERATIONS` sets the number of iterations allowed for the procedure in the initial stage to a very high value to have a very thorough investigation. Likewise, `STCONVRGNCE` sets the convergence criterion used in the initial stage to a very small value. For similar reasons, `MITERATIONS` sets the number of iterations allowed for the EM algorithm to double the default. In the `OUTPUT` command the option `TECH1` is used to obtain parameter specifications. `TECH8` is used to print the optimization history in the output. `TECH10` is used to request model fit information. The `FILE` option of `SAVEDATA` command specifies the output directory. The `SAVE` option is set to `CPROBABILITIES` to save the posterior classification probabilities in the output file.

```
TITLE:      RRWPP identities using automatic starting values with random starts;
DATA:      FILE =
"C:\Users\benny\Documents\Uni\Master\Thesis\analysis\myfinaldata.dat";
      NOBSERVATIONS = 1122;
VARIABLE:  NAMES = a b p1-p4 e1 p5 r1-r5 p6 e2-e4 c1-c3;
      MISSING = .;
      USEVARIABLES = p1 p3 p5 r1-r4 e1 e3 c1-c3;
      CLASSES = identity (5);
      CATEGORICAL = p1 p3 p5 r1-r4 e1 e3;
      WEIGHT = c1;
      STRATIFICATION = c2;
      CLUSTER = c3;
ANALYSIS:  TYPE = COMPLEX MIXTURE;
      ESTIMATOR = MLR;
      STARTS = 1000 100;
      STITERATIONS = 1000;
      STCONVERGENCE = 0.1;
      MITERATIONS = 1000;
OUTPUT:    TECH1 TECH8 TECH10;
SAVEDATA:  FILE =
"C:\Users\benny\Documents\Uni\Master\Thesis\analysis\RRWPP9VC5.dat";
      SAVE = CPROBABILITIES;
```

Appendix C

For most indicators, two consecutive answer categories per indicator stand out to be the most likely ones for all latent classes. This means that for these classes multiple answer patterns are characteristic. However, these answer patterns are very similar in their meaning. This is illustrated by the bar graphs below.




Figure AC1. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have say in what the government does?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC2. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How much do you personally trust politicians?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC3. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Now think about [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC4. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC5. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC6. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “[country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC7. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Is [country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC8. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.




Figure AC9. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Please think about the 10% of employees working full-time in [country], are these incomes fair?” illustrating latent-class homogeneity.

Appendix D

In this Appendix latent-class separation is discussed more extensively than in the main text. While in the big picture the latent classes are clearly different, there is also considerable overlap between some latent classes for some indicators. For example, when only looking at the anti-political-elite identity indicators, three patterns are evident. Latent Class 1 and Latent Class 3 are very similar in their attitudes towards political elites. Likewise, Latent Class 4 and Latent Class 5 show very similar patterns on these indicators. Only Latent Class 2 distinct from all other classes on this set of indicators. Figure AD1 shows a Line Graph that illustrates these similarities and differences in the response patterns of the latent classes for the indicator “How much do you personally trust politicians?”.

The latent classes that show similarity on the indicators for the anti-political-elite identity-construct show different response patterns for the indicators of the nativist identity-construct. For example, Latent Class 1 and Latent Class 3 that showed considerable overlap before are now quite different from one another. On the other hand, Latent Class 1 and Latent Class 4 that were quite different before show now considerably similar patterns. Figure AD2 illustrates this using the indicator “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”.

The indicators for the anti-economic-elite identity-construct show different quality for latent class separation. While the indicator “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” discriminates well between latent classes, the item “Please think about the top 10% of employees working full-time in [country], are these incomes fair?” separates relatively poorly between latent classes. This is because many individuals in all latent classes consider the incomes of the ten percent earners in their countries to be fair. However, the separation between classes based on this item is still considerable when it comes to their respective probabilities to endorse other answer categories, especially the answer labeling the income of the top earners highly unfair. Figure AD3 illustrates this by showing a line graph

with the item response probabilities for this indicator. The rest of Appendix D contains such graphs for all other indicators to aid readers interested in examining latent-class separation themselves.




Figure AD1. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How much do you personally trust politicians?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD2. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD3. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Please think about the top 10% of employees working full-time in [country], are these incomes fair?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD4. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD5. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Now think about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD6. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD7. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “Generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD8. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “[country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” illustrating latent-class separation.




Figure AD9. Item response probabilities per latent class for the item “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” illustrating latent-class separation.